Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Erroneous gambling-related beliefs"

Rates of probable pathological gambling in colleges and universities across Scotland were investigated with a nationally distributed sample consisting of students (n = 1,483) and members of staff (n = 492). Gambling-related erroneous cognitions (Gambling Beliefs Questionnaire [GBQ]) and gambling severity (South Oaks Gambling Screen [SOGS]) were measured, with additional questions enquiring about awareness of treatments available for gambling problems. Rates of past-year problem and probable pathological gambling for students were 4.0% and 3.9%, respectively. An exploratory factor analysis of the GBQ resulted in a 24-item five-factor model, with gambling severity (as indicated by SOGS scores), indices of increasing gambling involvement (gambling frequency and number of gambling activities), and male gender being positively correlated with higher levels of erroneous cognitions, suggesting erroneous cognitions may not be prominent for females with gambling problems. Less than a fifth of students were aware of where to go to receive help for gambling-related problems.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether gambler’s cognitive errors affect gambling involvement and addiction. As the popularity of gambling has grown, questions are being raised about its excessive use and factors related to addictive behaviours. Design/methodology/approach – An online survey on 508 gamblers was conducted. Structural equation modelling was used to investigate the relationships among gambling beliefs, gambling involvement and problem gambling. Findings – Among the three sets of erroneous beliefs investigated, luck and superstition were significant predictors of both gambling involvement and the severity of gambling problems (according to the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI)), while the illusion of control showed a negative relationship with the PGSI. Moreover, gambling involvement positively affected the potential risk of disease and mediates the relationship between luck and superstition and PGSI. Research limitations/implications – Because not all cognitive dimensions apparently influence gambling behaviour, future research should extend the analysis to include other variables that may moderate or mediate the causal relationship. Practical implications – The results are useful to marketers in developing social marketing campaigns wishing to discourage gambling. Moreover, factors that influence gambling involvement and addiction may be used as diagnostic tools to correct gamblers behaviour. Originality/value – The paper proposes a deeper exploration of the relationships among beliefs, gambling involvement and dysfunctional gambling and an appropriate scale to capture the entire spectrum of gambler’s beliefs in relation to every form of gambling activity.

People who engage in gambling are known to hold erroneous views about the nature of gambling. One of the most commonly observed cognitive biases is the illusion of control, where people’s subjective appraisal of contingency between behavior and events is greater than the objective contingency. Such beliefs have been found to be strongest in problem gamblers and can lead to over-confidence in the ability to win money from gambling. A question, however, is whether such perceptions are (a) specific to gambling and whether gamblers display a tendency to over-estimate contingencies in everyday life and (b) if a tendency to endorse everyday illusion of control beliefs is related to specific gambling-related beliefs among those who gamble. Answers to these questions might provide insights into whether some people are potentially more vulnerable to beliefs that might have implications for gambling. An online sample of 788 adults completed a survey about simple everyday situations where people might attempt to exert control (e.g., pressing elevator buttons more often, throwing dice in games). The survey included a scale that captured everyday situations as well as established measures of illusion of control and superstition in gambling. The results showed that those who report greater control in everyday tasks scored higher on standardized measures of beliefs about chance and gambling-related cognitions relating to illusory control. Scores on both types of measures were higher in gamblers than non-gamblers. The findings suggest that gamblers may differ in how they generally perceive and respond to situations involving tasks largely dominated by chance or limited opportunities for genuine control.

Erroneous gambling-related beliefs are well researched in light of their association with problem gambling, with some research suggesting these beliefs also serve as justifications for gambling behaviour. The process of justification (i.e., rationalization) can provide insights into how those who gamble resolve dissonance resulting from persistent loss in the gambling context. Using in-depth interviews of 43 participants who identified electronic gambling machines as their preferred game type and were either experiencing gambling problems or were at risk of developing a problem, this study details how dissonance is managed through rationalizations in line with the Dawson (1999) framework. This framework is based on research of religious groups surviving prophetic disconfirmation and is employed here to highlight the contextual and socio-cultural underpinnings of rationalizations along with their supernatural and pseudo-religious qualities. Rationalizations reflect broader socio-cultural beliefs around morality, work, speculation, perseverance, and the supernatural. Implications for treatment are discussed.

Electronic gaming machines are popular among problem gamblers; in response, governments have introduced “responsible gaming” legislation incorporating the mandatory display of warning signs on or near electronic gaming machines. These signs are designed to correct irrational and erroneous beliefs through the provision of accurate information on probabilities of winning and the concept of randomness. There is minimal empirical data evaluating the effectiveness of such signs. In this study, 93 undergraduate students were randomly allocated to standard and informative messages displayed on an electronic gaming machine during play in a laboratory setting. Results revealed that a majority of participants incorrectly estimated gambling odds and reported irrational gambling-related cognitions prior to play. In addition, there were no significant between-group differences, and few participants recalled the content of messages or modified their gambling-related cognitions. Signs placed on electronic gaming machines may not modify irrational beliefs or alter gambling behaviour.

AbstractBackground and aimsHarmful gambling has been associated with the endorsement of fallacious cognitions that promote excessive consumption. These types of beliefs stem from intuitively derived assumptions about gambling that are fostered by fast-thinking and a lack of objective, critical thought. The current paper details an experiment designed to test whether a four-week online intervention to strengthen contextual analytical thinking in gamblers is effective in changing gamblers cognitions and encouraging safer gambling consumption.MethodsNinety-four regular gamblers who reported experiencing gambling-related harm were randomly allocated to either an experimental (n = 46) or control condition (n = 48), including 45 males, ranging from 19 to 65 years of age (M = 36.61; SD = 9.76). Following baseline measurement of gambling beliefs and prior week gambling consumption, participants in the experimental condition were required to complete an adaption of the Gamblers Fallacy Questionnaire designed to promote analytical thinking by educating participants on common judgement errors specific to gambling once a week for four weeks. Post-intervention measures of beliefs and gambling consumption were captured in week five.ResultsThe experimental condition reported significantly fewer erroneous cognitions, greater endorsement of protective cognitions, and reduced time spent gambling post-intervention compared to baseline. The control group also reported a reduction in cognitions relating to predicting and controlling gambling outcomes.ConclusionCognitive interventions that encourage gamblers to challenge gambling beliefs by reflecting on gambling involvement and promoting critical thinking may be an effective tool for reducing the time people invest in gambling activities.

BackgroundPathological gambling (PG) is a form of behavioural addiction that has been associated with elevated impulsivity and also cognitive distortions in the processing of chance, probability and skill. We sought to assess the relationship between the level of cognitive distortions and state and trait measures of impulsivity in treatment-seeking pathological gamblers.MethodThirty pathological gamblers attending the National Problem Gambling Clinic, the first National Health Service clinic for gambling problems in the UK, were compared with 30 healthy controls in a case-control design. Cognitive distortions were assessed using the Gambling-Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS). Trait impulsivity was assessed using the UPPS-P, which includes scales of urgency, the tendency to be impulsive in positive or negative mood states. Delay discounting rates were taken as a state measure of impulsive choice.ResultsPathological gamblers had elevated impulsivity on several UPPS-P subscales but effect sizes were largest (Cohen's d>1.4) for positive and negative urgency. The pathological gamblers also displayed higher levels of gambling distortions, and elevated preference for immediate rewards, compared to controls. Within the pathological gamblers, there was a strong relationship between the preference for immediate rewards and the level of cognitive distortions (R2=0.41).ConclusionsImpulsive choice in the gamblers was correlated with the level of gambling distortions, and we hypothesize that an impulsive decision-making style may increase the acceptance of erroneous beliefs during gambling play.

Abstract Objective Schizotypal personality (schizotypy) is a cluster of traits in the general population, including alterations in belief formation that may underpin delusional thinking. The psychological processes described by schizotypy could also fuel cognitive distortions in the context of gambling. This study sought to characterize the relationships between schizotypy, gambling-related cognitive distortions, and levels of problem gambling. Methods Analyses were conducted on three groups, a student sample (n = 104) with minimal self-reported gambling involvement, a crowdsourced sample of regular gamblers (via MTurk; n = 277), and an additional crowdsourced sample with a range of gambling involvement (via MTurk; n = 144). Primary measures included the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire – Brief (SPQ-B), the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI-21), the Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS), and the Problem Gambling Severity Index (PGSI). Luck was measured with either the Belief in Good Luck Scale (BIGLS) or the Beliefs Around Luck Scale (BALS). Results Small-to-moderate associations were detected between the components of schizotypy, including delusion proneness, and the gambling-related variables. Schizotypy was associated with the general belief in luck and bad luck, but not beliefs in good luck. A series of partial correlations demonstrated that when the GRCS was controlled for, the relationship between schizotypy and problem gambling was attenuated. Conclusions This study demonstrates that schizotypy is a small-to-moderate correlate of erroneous gambling beliefs and PG. These data help characterize clinical comorbidities between the schizotypal spectrum and problem gambling, and point to shared biases relating to belief formation and decision-making under chance.

The illusion of control refers to the overestimation of the probability of a win following a personal action in a gambling game. This thesis identifies gaps in the body of literature on factors influencing the illusion, uses a theoretically motivated methodology to address them, and tests the theory underlying the methodology. The thesis consists of a literature review and three papers. The review focuses on factors found to influence the illusion – factors such as the number of response options available in the gambling task, the degree of need for money, the average frequency of successes/wins in a sequence of rounds, and success-slope (i.e., whether wins are concentrated at the beginning or end of the sequence). The review draws attention to problems with the way the illusion of control has been measured in studies of success-frequency and success-slope. This observation, in turn, raises questions as to whether success-frequency and success-slope are, indeed, factors that influence the illusion. The review goes on to discuss the psychological processes underlying the effects of various influencing factors. Two relatively unexplored arguments are advanced. The first is that people in gambling tasks engage in problem-solving. Problem-solving involves searching for actions that bring about the desired outcome, which, in gambling settings, is a substantial monetary win. The greater the number of available response options and the need for money, the more likely the player is to still be searching for effective actions at the time that her perceived control is measured. Such a player is, in turn, less likely to report having 'no control' over the task. A second and related argument is that the actions people consider during problem-solving are influenced by their beliefs about the task at hand. In gambling, beliefs in the gambler's fallacy (Oskarsson et al., 2009) and beliefs about supernatural agents such as luck and God (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004) are particularly relevant. In line with terminology used by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder (1982), it is proposed that the illusion of control has two variants, primary and secondary, influenced by the gambler's fallacy and beliefs in supernatural agents respectively. The first two papers describe re-examinations of the effects of success-frequency (N = 97) and success-slope (N = 334) using a methodology consistent with the above explanation. Like most studies of these two factors, the experiments involved a gambling session under a particular success-frequency or success-slope condition, followed by a post-experimental questionnaire about the degree of perceived control over task outcomes. The novel aspects of the methodology included, for example, the separate measurement of the illusion's two variants. Success-frequency was found not to influence the illusion of control when it was measured in this way, while the influence of success-slope was confirmed, in that an 'ascending slope' (a concentration of wins at the end of the sequence) was found to be associated with higher illusory primary control. The finding regarding success-slopes suggests that people expected to learn the correct way of playing through trial-and-error, which is consistent with the above argument that people engage in problem-solving when gambling. The third paper describes a confirmatory factor analysis of a survey about erroneous gambling-related beliefs (N = 329). Items were based on interviews with people who gamble regularly, and, therefore, represented illusions of control – problem-solving solutions based on some playing experience. Consistently with the second argument presented above, the factor analysis showed that the items could be described in terms of two latent factors reflecting the gambler's fallacy and beliefs about supernatural agents, respectively.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, School of Psychology, 2013.