Книги з теми "Emissions intensity"

The 2°C target for global warming had been under severe scrutiny in the run-up to the climate negotiations in Paris in 2015 (COP21). Clearly, with a remaining carbon budget of 470–1,020 GtCO2eq from 2015 onwards for a 66% probability of stabilizing at concentration levels consistent with remaining below 2°C warming at the end of the 21st century and yearly emissions of about 40 GtCO2 per year, not much room is left for further postponing action. Many of the low stabilization pathways actually resort to the extraction of CO2 from the atmosphere (known as negative emissions or Carbon Dioxide Removal [CDR]), mostly by means of Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS): if the biomass feedstock is produced sustainably, the emissions would be low or even carbon-neutral, as the additional planting of biomass would sequester about as much CO2 as is generated during energy generation. If additionally carbon capture and storage is applied, then the emissions balance would be negative. Large BECCS deployment thus facilitates reaching the 2°C target, also allowing for some flexibility in other sectors that are difficult to decarbonize rapidly, such as the agricultural sector. However, the large reliance on BECCS has raised uneasiness among policymakers, the public, and even scientists, with risks to sustainability being voiced as the prime concern. For example, the large-scale deployment of BECCS would require vast areas of land to be set aside for the cultivation of biomass, which is feared to conflict with conservation of ecosystem services and with ensuring food security in the face of a still growing population.While the progress that has been made in Paris leading to an agreement on stabilizing “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels” and “pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C” was mainly motivated by the extent of the impacts, which are perceived to be unacceptably high for some regions already at lower temperature increases, it has to be taken with a grain of salt: moving to 1.5°C will further shrink the time frame to act and BECCS will play an even bigger role. In fact, aiming at 1.5°C will substantially reduce the remaining carbon budget previously indicated for reaching 2°C. Recent research on the biophysical limits to BECCS and also other negative emissions options such as Direct Air Capture indicates that they all run into their respective bottlenecks—BECCS with respect to land requirements, but on the upside producing bioenergy as a side product, while Direct Air Capture does not need much land, but is more energy-intensive. In order to provide for the negative emissions needed for achieving the 1.5°C target in a sustainable way, a portfolio of negative emissions options needs to minimize unwanted effects on non–climate policy goals.

The next decade will be decisive in the fight against climate change. It will be impossible to hold the planet to a 1.5 degrees Celsius temperature rise without controlling methane and carbon dioxide emissions from the oil and gas sector. Contrary to popular belief, the world will not run out of these resources anytime soon. Instead, oil and gas are becoming more climate-intensive to supply using technologies like fracking oil and liquefying gas—even as these abundant resources continue to be used to fuel cars, heat homes, and produce consumer goods like shampoo, pajamas, and paint. Policymakers, financial investors, environmental advocates, and citizens need to understand what oils and fossil fuels are doing to our climate to inform decision-making. In No Standard Oil, Deborah Gordon shows that no two oils or gases are environmentally alike. Each has a distinct, quantifiable climate impact. While all oils and gases pollute, some are much worse for the climate than others. In clear, accessible language, Gordon explains the results of the Oil Climate Index Plus Gas (OCI+), an innovative, open-source model that estimates global oil and gas greenhouse gas emissions. Gordon identifies the oils and gases from every region of the globe—along with the specific production, processing, and refining activities—that are the most damaging to the planet and proposes innovative solutions to reduce their climate footprints. Global climate stabilization cannot afford to wait for oil and gas to run out. No Standard Oil shows how people can take immediate, practical steps to cut greenhouse gas emissions in the crucial oil and gas sector while making sustainable progress in transitioning to a carbon-free energy future.

This chapter discusses the legal and policy issues associated with adopting an aggressive transition to renewable and lower carbon fuels in Alberta’s electricity market. The chapter describes the evolution of Alberta’s electricity sector and restructuring that will involve the addition of a capacity market to supplement the existing energy only market. The chapter examines Canada’s international commitments with respect to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, coal phase-out, and developments in climate change and energy efficiency policy at both the federal level and for Alberta, which currently has a carbon-intensive energy mix. The chapter then presents Alberta’s current climate change policy and the Climate Leadership Plan, focussing on the implications of this policy for the electricity sector and for market design within that sector.

Environmental consequences of climate change include increases in temperature as well as frequency, severity, and/or duration of heat waves; heavy precipitation events; intensity and/or duration of drought; intense tropical cyclone activity, and sea level. Adverse health consequences of climate change include heat-related disorders, respiratory disorders, allergic disorders, vector-borne diseases, waterborne and foodborne disease, and injuries related to extreme weather events. Adverse health consequences also include indirect effects of climate change on health related to decreased agriculture yields and food shortages, distress migration, and collective violence. In addition, all of the consequences of climate change can adversely affect the mental health of individuals, communities, and entire nations. The primary ways of addressing climate change are mitigation (policies and actions to stabilize or reduce the emission of greenhouse gases) and adaptation (policies and actions to reduce the impact of climate change). Building popular and political will to address climate change is essential.

Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change is a fundamental resource for primary industry professionals, land managers, policy makers, researchers and students involved in preparing Australia’s primary industries for the challenges and opportunities of climate change. More than 30 authors have contributed to this book, which moves beyond describing the causes and consequences of climate change to providing options for people to work towards adaptation action. Climate change implications and adaptation options are given for the key Australian primary industries of horticulture, forestry, grains, rice, sugarcane, cotton, viticulture, broadacre grazing, intensive livestock industries, marine fisheries, and aquaculture and water resources. Case studies demonstrate the options for each industry. Adapting Agriculture to Climate Change summarises updated climate change scenarios for Australia with the latest climate science. It includes chapters on socio-economic and institutional considerations for adapting to climate change, greenhouse gas emissions sources and sinks, as well as risks and priorities for the future.

Adaptive governance is defined by a focus on decentralized decision-making structures and procedurally rational policy, supported by intensive natural and social science. Decentralized decision-making structures allow a large, complex problem like global climate change to be factored into many smaller problems, each more tractable for policy and scientific purposes. Many smaller problems can be addressed separately and concurrently by smaller communities. Procedurally rational policy in each community is an adaptation to profound uncertainties, inherent in complex systems and cognitive constraints, that limit predictability. Hence planning to meet projected targets and timetables is secondary to continuing appraisal of incremental steps toward long-term goals: What has and hasn’t worked compared to a historical baseline, and why? Each step in such trial-and-error processes depends on politics to balance, if not integrate, the interests of multiple participants to advance their common interest—the point of governance in a free society. Intensive science recognizes that each community is unique because the interests, interactions, and environmental responses of its participants are multiple and coevolve. Hence, inquiry focuses on case studies of particular contexts considered comprehensively and in some detail.Varieties of adaptive governance emerged in response to the limitations of scientific management, the dominant pattern of governance in the 20th century. In scientific management, central authorities sought technically rational policies supported by predictive science to rise above politics and thereby realize policy goals more efficiently from the top down. This approach was manifest in the framing of climate change as an “irreducibly global” problem in the years around 1990. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established to assess science for the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The parties negotiated the Kyoto Protocol that attempted to prescribe legally binding targets and timetables for national reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. But progress under the protocol fell far short of realizing the ultimate objective in Article 1 of the UNFCCC, “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system.” As concentrations continued to increase, the COP recognized the limitations of this approach in Copenhagen in 2009 and authorized nationally determined contributions to greenhouse gas reductions in the Paris Agreement in 2015.Adaptive governance is a promising but underutilized approach to advancing common interests in response to climate impacts. The interests affected by climate, and their relative priorities, differ from one community to the next, but typically they include protecting life and limb, property and prosperity, other human artifacts, and ecosystem services, while minimizing costs. Adaptive governance is promising because some communities have made significant progress in reducing their losses and vulnerability to climate impacts in the course of advancing their common interests. In doing so, they provide field-tested models for similar communities to consider. Policies that have worked anywhere in a network tend to be diffused for possible adaptation elsewhere in that network. Policies that have worked consistently intensify and justify collective action from the bottom up to reallocate supporting resources from the top down. Researchers can help realize the potential of adaptive governance on larger scales by recognizing it as a complementary approach in climate policy—not a substitute for scientific management, the historical baseline.

Climate change adaptation is the ability of a society or a natural system to adjust to the (changing) conditions that support life in a certain climate region, including weather extremes in that region. The current discussion on climate change adaptation began in the 1990s, with the publication of the Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Since the beginning of the 21st century, most countries, and many regions and municipalities have started to develop and implement climate change adaptation strategies and plans. But since the implementation of adaptation measures must be planned and conducted at the local level, a major challenge is to actually implement adaptation to climate change in practice. One challenge is that scientific results are mainly published on international or national levels, and political guidelines are written at transnational (e.g., European Union), national, or regional levels—these scientific results must be downscaled, interpreted, and adapted to local municipal or community levels. Needless to say, the challenges for implementation are also rooted in a large number of uncertainties, from long time spans to matters of scale, as well as in economic, political, and social interests. From a human perspective, climate change impacts occur rather slowly, while local decision makers are engaged with daily business over much shorter time spans.Among the obstacles to implementing adaptation measures to climate change are three major groups of uncertainties: (a) the uncertainties surrounding the development of our future climate, which include the exact climate sensitivity of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, the reliability of emission scenarios and underlying storylines, and inherent uncertainties in climate models; (b) uncertainties about anthropogenically induced climate change impacts (e.g., long-term sea level changes, changing weather patterns, and extreme events); and (c) uncertainties about the future development of socioeconomic and political structures as well as legislative frameworks.Besides slow changes, such as changing sea levels and vegetation zones, extreme events (natural hazards) are a factor of major importance. Many societies and their socioeconomic systems are not properly adapted to their current climate zones (e.g., intensive agriculture in dry zones) or to extreme events (e.g., housing built in flood-prone areas). Adaptation measures can be successful only by gaining common societal agreement on their necessity and overall benefit. Ideally, climate change adaptation measures are combined with disaster risk reduction measures to enhance resilience on short, medium, and long time scales.The role of uncertainties and time horizons is addressed by developing climate change adaptation measures on community level and in close cooperation with local actors and stakeholders, focusing on strengthening resilience by addressing current and emerging vulnerability patterns. Successful adaptation measures are usually achieved by developing “no-regret” measures, in other words—measures that have at least one function of immediate social and/or economic benefit as well as long-term, future benefits. To identify socially acceptable and financially viable adaptation measures successfully, it is useful to employ participatory tools that give all involved parties and decision makers the possibility to engage in the process of identifying adaptation measures that best fit collective needs.

Any public debate about air pollution starts with the premise that air pollution cannot be good for you, so we should have less of it. However, it is much more difficult to determine how much is dangerous, and even more difficult to decide how much we are willing to pay for improvements in measured air pollution. Recent UK estimates suggest that fine particulate pollution causes about 6500 deaths per year, although it is not clear how many years of life are lost as a result. Some deaths may just be brought forward by a few days or weeks, while others may be truly premature. Globally, household pollution from cooking fuels may cause up to two million premature deaths per year in the developing world. The hazards of black smoke air pollution have been known since antiquity. The first descriptions of deaths caused by air pollution are those recorded after the eruption of Vesuvius in ad 79. In modern times, the infamous smogs of the early twentieth century in Belgium and London were clearly shown to trigger deaths in people with chronic bronchitis and heart disease. In mechanistic terms, black smoke and sulphur dioxide generated from industrial processes and domestic coal burning cause airway inflammation, exacerbation of chronic bronchitis, and consequent heart failure. Epidemiological analysis has confirmed that the deaths included both those who were likely to have died soon anyway and those who might well have survived for months or years if the pollution event had not occurred. Clean air legislation has dramatically reduced the levels of these traditional pollutants in the West, although these pollutants are still important in China, and smoke from solid cooking fuel continues to take a heavy toll amongst women in less developed parts of the world. New forms of air pollution have emerged, principally due to the increase in motor vehicle traffic since the 1950s. The combination of fine particulates and ground-level ozone causes ‘summer smogs’ which intensify over cities during summer periods of high barometric pressure. In Los Angeles and Mexico City, ozone concentrations commonly reach levels which are associated with adverse respiratory effects in normal and asthmatic subjects. Ozone directly affects the airways, causing reduced inspiratory capacity. This effect is more marked in patients with asthma and is clinically important, since epidemiological studies have found linear associations between ozone concentrations and admission rates for asthma and related respiratory diseases. Ozone induces an acute neutrophilic inflammatory response in both human and animal airways, together with release of chemokines (e.g. interleukin 8 and growth-related oncogene-alpha). Nitrogen oxides have less direct effect on human airways, but they increase the response to allergen challenge in patients with atopic asthma. Nitrogen oxide exposure also increases the risk of becoming ill after exposure to influenza. Alveolar macrophages are less able to inactivate influenza viruses and this leads to an increased probability of infection after experimental exposure to influenza. In the last two decades, major concerns have been raised about the effects of fine particulates. An association between fine particulate levels and cardiovascular and respiratory mortality and morbidity was first reported in 1993 and has since been confirmed in several other countries. Globally, about 90% of airborne particles are formed naturally, from sea spray, dust storms, volcanoes, and burning grass and forests. Human activity accounts for about 10% of aerosols (in terms of mass). This comes from transport, power stations, and various industrial processes. Diesel exhaust is the principal source of fine particulate pollution in Europe, while sea spray is the principal source in California, and agricultural activity is a major contributor in inland areas of the US. Dust storms are important sources in the Sahara, the Middle East, and parts of China. The mechanism of adverse health effects remains unclear but, unlike the case for ozone and nitrogen oxides, there is no safe threshold for the health effects of particulates. Since the 1990s, tax measures aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions have led to a rapid rise in the proportion of new cars with diesel engines. In the UK, this rose from 4% in 1990 to one-third of new cars in 2004 while, in France, over half of new vehicles have diesel engines. Diesel exhaust particles may increase the risk of sensitization to airborne allergens and cause airways inflammation both in vitro and in vivo. Extensive epidemiological work has confirmed that there is an association between increased exposure to environmental fine particulates and death from cardiovascular causes. Various mechanisms have been proposed: cardiac rhythm disturbance seems the most likely at present. It has also been proposed that high numbers of ultrafine particles may cause alveolar inflammation which then exacerbates preexisting cardiac and pulmonary disease. In support of this hypothesis, the metal content of ultrafine particles induces oxidative stress when alveolar macrophages are exposed to particles in vitro. While this is a plausible mechanism, in epidemiological studies it is difficult to separate the effects of ultrafine particles from those of other traffic-related pollutants.

Os contextos pandémico e pós-pandémico vêm impondo às cidades outras dinâmicas, outros sons, outros ecos, outros percursos, outros visitantes humanos e não humanos. Durante o confinamento, o encerramento de espaços teatrais e expositivos – bem como, durante o desconfinamento, as limitações para a sua utilização - têm tido consequências penosas nas programações artísticas e efeitos dramáticos nos quotidianos dos seus agentes (artistas, técnicos, programadores, curadores, etc.). Ao mesmo tempo, a desaceleração da vida da cidade (do trânsito, do ritmo nas ruas, do frenesim produtivo e de consumo, etc.) veio contribuir beneficamente para uma diminuição das emissões de CO2. Neste quadro, a cidade - mais concretamente as suas zonas públicas a céu aberto – surgem mais nitidamente como espaços de circulação e de interferência (ou de suspensão de interferência) entre pessoas. O que aprendemos com a experiência de confinamento e desconfinamento? Em primeiro lugar, que a cidade tem uma densidade flutuante, na medida em que as concentrações populacionais se esvaem quando nos encerramos em casa. Em segundo lugar, que o encontro com o outro (uma das prerrogativas da cidade) pode acontecer em outras escalas que não apenas a dimensão cultural. Em terceiro lugar, que o medo pode ser um sentimento público capaz de fazer implodir as próprias cidades, se não for transformado numa força para a vida. Como é que, neste processo, os artistas se organizam e se constituem como agentes na cidade? Como é que a cidade passou a ser representada? Que cidade é aquela que desejamos? Este congresso surge assim da necessidade de intensificar o diálogo entre a cidade e a arte, em particular as artes performativas. Este encontro efoi o culminar de dois anos de investigação consistente e consolidada no âmbito do projecto TEPe (Technologically Expanded Performance). Ao longo destes dois anos, desenvolvemos atividades com a comunidade com o intuito de promover um diálogo intercultural e transdisciplinar, e proporcionar o encontro com vivências urbanas variadas. Através das diferentes propostas de percursos pela cidade, mapeámos acontecimentos, hoje invisíveis, mas ainda assim presentes: desde “memórias soterradas” a “caminhadas sensoriais”, passando por registos íntimos de confinamento. O encontro visou partilhar as experiências realizadas com a contribuição de duas equipas: a portuguesa, em Lisboa, e a brasileira, em Fortaleza. Para além de apresentarmos as conclusões das pesquisas realizadas, lançamos esta chamada para apresentações, especialmente destinada a artistas e estudiosos de performance art, historiadores das cidades, antropólogos, urbanistas, geógrafos, estudiosos da escuta e do som e a todxs aquelxs a quem interessa pensar (e projectar) a vida na cidade. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The pandemic and post-pandemic contexts have imposed on cities other dynamics, other sounds, other echoes, other routes, other human and non-human visitors. During the lockdown, the closure of theatrical and exhibition spaces - as well as, during lockdown unlocking, the limitations for their use - have had painful consequences in artistic programming and dramatic effects in the daily lives of its agents (artists, technicians, programmers, curators, etc.). At the same time, the slowing down of city life (traffic, the pace of the streets, the frenzy of production and consumption, etc.) has made a beneficial contribution to a reduction in CO2 emissions. In this context, the city - and more specifically its open-air public areas - emerge more clearly as spaces for circulation and interference (or suspension of interference) between people. What have we learned from the experience of national lockdown and unlocking? Firstly, that the city has a fluctuating density, insofar as population concentrations fade when we shut ourselves indoors. Secondly, the encounter with the other (one of the prerogatives of the city) can take place on other scales than the cultural dimension alone. Thirdly, fear can be a public sentiment capable of imploding cities themselves if it is not transformed into a force for life. How, in this process, are artists organised and constituted as agents in the city? How did the city come to be represented? What kind of city do we want? This congress thus arises from the need to intensify the dialogue between the city and art, particularly the performing arts. This international meeting is the culmination of two years of consistent and consolidated research within the TEPe (Technologically Expanded Performance) project. Throughout these two years, we have developed activities with the community to promote intercultural and transdisciplinary dialogue and provide an encounter with varied urban experiences. Through the different proposals of walks through the city, we have mapped events, today invisible, but still present: from "buried memories" to "sensorial walks", passing through intimate records of confinement. The meeting aims to share the experiences carried out with the contribution of two teams: the Portuguese, in Lisbon, and the Brazilian, in Fortaleza. Besides presenting the conclusions of the researches carried out, we launch this call for presentations, especially addressed to artists and scholars of performance art, historians of cities, anthropologists, urban planners, geographers, scholars of listening and sound and to all those who are interested in thinking (and projecting) life in the city.