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Статті в журналах з теми "Electoral mathematics"

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Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 10 грудня 2022

Оновлено: 28 січня 2023

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1

Schofield, Norman, Christopher Claassen, Ugur Ozdemir, and Alexei Zakharov. "Application of a Theorem in Stochastic Models of Elections." International Journal of Mathematics and Mathematical Sciences 2010 (2010): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2010/562813.

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Previous empirical research has developed stochastic electoral models for Israel, Turkey, and other polities. The work suggests thatconvergence to an electoral center(often predicted by electoral models) is a nongeneric phenomenon. In an attempt to explain nonconvergence, a formal model based onintrinsic valenceis presented. This theory showed that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for convergence. The necessary condition is that a convergence coefficientcis bounded above by the dimensionwof the policy space, while a sufficient condition is that the coefficient is bounded above by 1. This coefficient is defined in terms of the difference in exogenous valences, the “spatial coefficient”, and the electoral variance. The theoretical model is then applied to empirical analyses of elections in the United States and Britain. These empirical models include sociodemographic valence and electoral perceptions of character trait. It is shown that the model implies convergence to positions close to the electoral origin. To explain party divergence, the model is then extended to incorporate activist valences. This extension gives a first-orderbalance conditionthat allows the party to calculate the optimal marginal condition to maximize vote share. We argue that the equilibrium positions of presidential candidates in US elections and by party leaders in British elections are principally due to the influence of activists, rather than the centripetal effect of the electorate.

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2

KAPUR, J. N., C. R. BECTOR, and UMA KUMAR. "Mathematical Modelling of Electoral Systems." Teaching Mathematics and its Applications 6, no. 4 (1987): 184–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/teamat/6.4.184.

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3

Stevens, Alexis, and John Stevens. "Using Mathematics to Elect the U.S. President." Mathematics Teacher 110, no. 3 (October 2016): 192–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/mathteacher.110.3.0192.

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4

McLean, Iain. "The Jenkins Commission and the Implications of Electoral Reform for the UK Constitution." Government and Opposition 34, no. 2 (April 1999): 143–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1999.tb00475.x.

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THERE ARE TWO MAIN CONCEPTIONS OF ‘REPRESENTATION’ IN democratic theory, and they are not wholly compatible. All democratic electoral systems implicitly appeal to one or the other conception of representation. Therefore, the nature of an ideal electoral system is an essentially contested question. Furthermore, the mathematics of social choice sets severe limits on what an electoral system — any electoral system — can achieve. Though the implications of social choice are not so nihilistic as some would have us believe, they are relevant and serious.

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5

Westbrooke, Ian, and Michael Ryan. "Applications: The Mathematics of Electoral District Allocation in New Zealand." Australian & New Zealand Journal of Statistics 44, no. 3 (September 2002): 267–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-842x.00229.

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6

Ocaña, Francisco A. "An approximation problem in computing electoral volatility." Applied Mathematics and Computation 192, no. 2 (September 2007): 299–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.03.032.

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7

Sokoh, Gbosien Chris. "Ethnic Politics and Electoral Violence in Nigeria: A Study of the South-South Geopolitical Zone." Humanities and Social Sciences: Latvia 29, no. 2 (December 2021): 106–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/hssl.29.2.07.

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The Nigerian state since political independence in 1960 has been basking in the euphoria of ethnic politics and electoral violence. Each ethnic nationality in Nigeria has its own culture, interest, aspiration, language and faith and these factors seems to affect the socio-economic and political fate of each group, make identification with the nation a problematic task and exacerbate the difficulty in attaining credible elections a true democracy in the society. Against this backdrop, this study examined the relationship and the effect of ethnic politics on electoral violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. A cross sectional research designed was adopted and data was collected via a survey of six hundred (600) respondents. Data collected were analysed using simple percentages, correlation, and linear regression analysis with the aid of statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) version 23. The results of the study revealed that there is a significant relationship between ethnic politics and electoral violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The study also showed that ethnic politics exerts a positive and statistically significant impact on electoral violence in the south-south geopolitical zone of Nigeria. Based on these findings, the study concludes that ethnic politics has significant influence on electoral violence in Nigeria. The study therefore recommends, among other things, that Nigerian political leaders should place Nigerian citizens at the centre of their political project without recourse to ethnic chauvinism and the acquisition of political power as a means for serving the collective interest of the citizens irrespective of their ethnic origin. This will go a long way to reduce electoral violence in Nigeria, especially in the south-south geopolitical zone.

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8

Stuart, Christopher. "Generating Functions and the Electoral College." College Mathematics Journal 32, no. 5 (November 2001): 380. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2687316.

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9

Balatif, O., L. Boujallal, A. Labzai, and M. Rachik. "Stability Analysis of a Fractional-Order Model for Abstinence Behavior of Registration on the Electoral Lists." International Journal of Differential Equations 2020 (June 22, 2020): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/4325640.

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In this work, we propose a fractional-order model that describes the dynamics of citizens who have the right to register on the electoral lists and the negative influence of abstainers on the potential electors. By using Routh–Hurwitz criteria and constructing Lyapunov functions, the local and the global stability of abstaining-free equilibrium and abstaining equilibrium are obtained. Finally, some numerical simulations are performed to verify the theoretical analysis, and they are given for different parameter setting of the order of derivative α.

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10

Arredondo, Verónica, Miguel Martínez-Panero, Antonio Palomares, Teresa Peña, and Victoriano Ramírez. "New indexes for measuring electoral disproportionality." Revista Electrónica de Comunicaciones y Trabajos de ASEPUMA 21, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 161–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.24309/recta.2020.21.2.05.

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The number of representatives obtained by each political party in an electoral process must be a whole number. So, the percentage of votes for each party usually differs from the corresponding percentage of seats, forcing a certain unavoidable disproportionality. On the other hand, different elements of the electoral system (constituencies, thresholds, etc.) may produce some avoidable disproportionality. Those indexes traditionally used to analyse disproportionality take into account an unreachable exact proportionality as a reference. Instead, our more realistic approach quantifies distortions from a specific allotment, namely the seat distribution obtained when applying a proportional method to the total votes (that is, as if it were a unique constituency, without electoral thresholds or incentives to the winning party). Hence, we measure the avoidable disproportionality associated with such method. Unlike traditional indexes, we propose indexes associated with proportional allotment methods that can be zero in real situations. They are simple to calculate and allow us to decipher the number of seats assigned beyond the inevitable disproportionality which arises from the constraint of whole numbers. We are particularly interested in the indexes associated with Jefferson and Webster methods, which are compared to Gallagher, Loosemore-Hanby and Sainte-Laguë indexes for the results of 55 elections held in several countries.

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11

Pitt, Daniel. "Future Conservative Electoral Prospects : Time for Tory Socialism ?" Observatoire de la société britannique, no. 27 (October 1, 2021): 267–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/osb.5513.

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12

Bizzotto, Jacopo, and Benjamin Solow. "Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure." Games 10, no. 3 (July 6, 2019): 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g10030029.

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Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.

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13

Duggan, John, and Mark Fey. "Repeated Downsian electoral competition." International Journal of Game Theory 35, no. 1 (November 22, 2006): 39–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0046-1.

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14

Campos-Valdés, Camilo, Eduardo Álvarez-Miranda, Mauricio Morales Quiroga, Jordi Pereira, and Félix Liberona Durán. "The Impact of Candidates’ Profile and Campaign Decisions in Electoral Results: A Data Analytics Approach." Mathematics 9, no. 8 (April 19, 2021): 902. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9080902.

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In recent years, a wide range of techniques has been developed to predict electoral results and to measure the influence of different factors in these results. In this paper, we analyze the influence of the political profile of candidates (characterized by personal and political features) and their campaign effort (characterized by electoral expenditure and by territorial deployment strategies retrieved from social networks activity) on the electoral results. This analysis is carried out by using three of the most frequent data analyitcs algorithms in the literature. For our analysis, we consider the 2017 Parliamentary elections in Chile, which are the first elections after a major reform of the electoral system, that encompassed a transition from a binomial to a proportional system, a modification of the districts’ structure, an increase in the number of seats, and the requirement of gender parity in the lists of the different coalitions. The obtained results reveal that, regardless of the political coalition, the electoral experience of candidates, in particular in the same seat they are running for (even when the corresponding district is modified), is by large the most influential factor to explain the electoral results. However, the attained results show that the influence of other features, such as campaign expenditures, depends on the political coalition. Additionally, by means of a simulation procedure, we show how different levels of territorial deployment efforts might impact on the results of candidates. This procedure could be used by parties and coalitions when planning their campaign strategies.

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15

Woodall, D. R. "An impossibility theorem for electoral systems." Discrete Mathematics 66, no. 1-2 (August 1987): 209–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0012-365x(87)90133-6.

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16

Trujillo Carmona, Manuel. "Exclusión social y abstención electoral en barrios de alta población gitana." Sociología Histórica, no. 10 (October 19, 2020): 174–205. http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/sh.451231.

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En algunos estudios se ha constatado que la población gitana tiene unas tasas extremadamente bajas de participación en elecciones, con resultados tomados de las encuestas FOESSA. Pero aparte de esta fuente no tenemos otras encuestas que analicen con más detalle los factores que intervienen en este hecho. En este artículo se analizan los resultados de participación electoral en las últimas elecciones generales. Se analiza si los barrios de más concentración de población gitana son los que mayor abstención electoral registran. La identificación de esos barrios, imposible de realizar a través de censos sin identificaciones étnicas, se realiza a través del “Mapa de Población y Vivienda Gitana”. Se constata que, efectivamente, los barrios con mayor presencia de población gitana son los que presentan mayor abstención electoral. Pero se da un paso más y se analiza la posible influencia de la renta de los hogares en esa relación. Se constata también que las secciones con mayor presencia de población gitana son las que reúnen más porcentaje de hogares en riesgo de pobreza, lo que lleva a plantear si la baja participación en elecciones en esos barrios podría explicarse en función de la renta. Mediante un análisis lineal se obtiene que el porcentaje de hogares en riesgo de pobreza explica la mayor parte de la diferencia de participación política electoral entre los hogares con población gitana y los demás hogares, si bien no toda. La conclusión por tanto es que en los barrios con mayor población gitana se vota menos que en el resto, pero debido a la altaproporción de hogares pobres. Some studies have confirmed that gypsy population have an extremely low participation rate in elections. The results have been taken from FOESSA surveys. But other than this source we do not have other surveys which analyse in morte detail the factors that cause this fact. This article is an analysis of the participation in the last general elections, to see whether in those neighbourhoods with a higher rate of gypsy population there is also more abstention. It is impossible to identify those neighbourhoods with the population census, for there is no ethnic identification, and therefore the Gypsy population and housing map is used.It is confirmed that those neighbourhoods with a higher presence of gypsy population also show a higher abstention. But we take a step further and analyse the potential influence of home income in this relation. It is also confirmed that those sections with a higher presence of gypsy population are the ones with a higher rate of homes in risk of poverty, and the approach is therefore whether the low participation in elections in those neighbourhoods could be income-related. A linear analysis shows that the rate of homes in risk of poverty explains most of the political participation difference between homes with gypsy population and the rest, but not all of it. Therefore the conclusion is that in neighbourhoods with more gypsy population people vote less. This is mostly due not to the fact of there being more gypsy population, but rather to the higher rate of poor households.

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17

Marošević, Tomislav, and Rudolf Scitovski. "An application of a few inequalities among sequences in electoral systems." Applied Mathematics and Computation 194, no. 2 (December 2007): 480–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2007.04.050.

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18

Dellis, Arnaud. "Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate? †." Games 13, no. 4 (July 31, 2022): 53. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13040053.

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Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? The paper investigates this question in the context of a laboratory experiment where a centrist candidate is added to the race between a left candidate and a right candidate. The experimental design varies the polarization of the left and right candidates. The paper focuses on the effect of party polarization on the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate through strategic voting behavior with experimental subjects acting as voters. The paper yields two main results: (1) party polarization initially improves the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate; and (2) the effect of party polarization on the electoral prospects of the centrist weakens and ultimately disappears as elections are repeated. This happens because party polarization slows down the speed at which voters desert their candidate and vote strategically for the centrist in an apparent attempt at preventing the election of the candidate on the opposite side.

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19

Coulombe, Raphaelle G. "The electoral origin of government spending shocks." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 129 (August 2021): 104167. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104167.

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20

Malley, Jim, Apostolis Philippopoulos, and Ulrich Woitek. "Electoral uncertainty, fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, no. 3 (March 2007): 1051–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2006.06.004.

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21

Phillips, Iain, and Maria Grazia Vigliotti. "Symmetric electoral systems for ambient calculi." Information and Computation 206, no. 1 (January 2008): 34–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2007.08.005.

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22

Jiménez-Ovando, Alejandra Gabriela, and Claudia Cadavid-Echeverri. "¿Politización de los influencers durante la crisis política post electoral en Bolivia?" Política, Globalidad y Ciudadanía 8, no. 16 (June 1, 2022): 01–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.29105/pgc8.16-1.

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Анотація:

El presente artículo es producto de una revisión documental digital cuyo objetivo consistió en describir el uso de las redes sociales de siete influencers en medio de la crisis política post electoral de Bolivia en octubre de 2019. Los pilares teóricos para el presente son redes sociales digitales, Democracia 2.0, campaña permanente y polarización política. En cuanto a la metodología se aplicó el análisis de contenido como método cuantitativo. Como uno de los principales hallazgos se encontró la adjetivación negativa a Evo Morales, al igual que las temáticas relacionadas con el mismo denotan lo violento mientras lo opuesto a este es lo pacífico. En este sentido, se concluyó que los influencers estudiados al tener acceso y amplio conocimiento respecto a las redes sociales digitales amplificaron sus discursos con contenidos políticos, como parte de una campaña permanente en contra de Morales, bajo una lógica de polarización ideológica a través del uso de adjetivos y diversos recursos narrativos.

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23

Bannikova, Marina, Artyom Jelnov, and Pavel Jelnov. "The Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures." Games 12, no. 4 (October 12, 2021): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12040076.

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This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

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24

Bannikova, Marina, Artyom Jelnov, and Pavel Jelnov. "The Number of Parties and Decision-Making in Legislatures." Games 12, no. 4 (October 12, 2021): 76. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12040076.

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Анотація:

This paper proposes a model of a legislature, formed by several parties, which has to vote for or against a certain bill in the presence of a lobbyist interested in a certain vote outcome. We show that the ease with which the lobbyist can manipulate a legislature decision increases with the number of elected parties, and, consequently, decreases with an electoral threshold. On the other hand, a lower electoral threshold increases the representativeness of a legislature. We combine these two effects in a notion of fairness. We show the existence of an electoral threshold that optimizes the fairness of a political system, which is close to 1–5%. Namely, the optimal threshold (in our sense) is close to thresholds that exist in most parliamentary democracies.

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25

Hernández Cortez, Noé, Iván Jesús Manuel Soto Benítez, and Ma Cristina Recéndez Guerrero. "La cuarta transformación en México como proyecto nacional-popular." Sapientiae 8, no. 1 (June 14, 2022): 108–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.37293/sapientiae81.09.

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En la elección presidencial del 2018 en México llegó al poder, por primera vez desde el inicio de la transición democrática, un partido de izquierda con el triunfo del candidato por la coalición electoral Juntos Haremos Historia Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). El presidente nombró su proyecto político de izquierda, el cual está actualmente en proceso, la Cuarta Transformación. En este contexto, el objetivo del presente artículo es describir los discursos coyunturales de la Cuarta Transformación bajo las categorías gramscianas de lo nacional-popular, el Príncipe moderno, guerras de posición y hegemonía. En esta línea argumentativa, se describe el itinerario político-partidario de AMLO, la relevancia política de su partido político MORENA, el discurso anti populista de los intelectuales de oposición, así como los discursos alineados a lo nacional-popular en materia de política exterior y de lo estatal. Para llevar a cabo esta visión de conjunto que dé cuenta de lo nacional-popular de la Cuarta Transformación, se empleó una metodología cualitativa que consiste en interpretar el significado de los discursos presidenciales, libros publicados por el presidente Andrés Manuel López Obrador, documentos de partido, plataformas electorales y notas periodísticas. Concluimos que la matriz discursiva de la Cuarta Transformación establece condiciones de posibilidad para la constitución de un proyecto político hegemónico nacional-popular en México.

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26

Honaker, James, Jonathan N. Katz, and Gary King. "A Fast, Easy, and Efficient Estimator for Multiparty Electoral Data." Political Analysis 10, no. 1 (2002): 84–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pan/10.1.84.

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Katz and King have previously developed a model for predicting or explaining aggregate electoral results in multiparty democracies. Their model is, in principle, analogous to what least-squares regression provides American political researchers in that two-party system. Katz and King applied their model to three-party elections in England and revealed a variety of new features of incumbency advantage and sources of party support. Although the mathematics of their statistical model covers any number of political parties, it is computationally demanding, and hence slow and numerically imprecise, with more than three parties. In this paper we produce an approximate method that works in practice with many parties without making too many theoretical compromises. Our approach is to treat the problem as one of missing data. This allows us to use a modification of the fast EMis algorithm of King, Honaker, Joseph, and Scheve and to provide easy-to-use software, while retaining the attractive features of the Katz and King model, such as thetdistribution and explicit models for uncontested seats.

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27

De La Cruz Díaz, Eduardo, Georgina Isabel De León Vargas, and Brajim Beetar Bechara. "La Lucha de los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas de Guerrero - México: por el Reconocimiento de sus Derechos a Elegir Autoridades Municipales Por usos y Costumbres una Mirada al Derecho comparado." Revista Jurídica Mario Alario D´Filippo 14, no. 28 (August 23, 2022): 238–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.32997/2256-2796-vol.14-num.28-2022-3973.

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Investigación descriptiva que tiene como objetivo dar a conocer los derechos que los pueblos y comunidades indígenas del Estado de Guerrero-México tienen a partir de los usos y costumbres como forma de vida interna, mismos que son reconocidos por tratados, convenios internacionales y la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. El problema que se expone radica esencialmente en las dificultades u obstáculos que no permiten el ejercicio pleno de este derecho; que van desde la falta de regulación en el marco jurídico, la resistencia al reconocimiento de estos derechos por las autoridades y la sociedad, generando discriminación, indiferencia, exclusión social y violación de derechos humanos. Así mismo, se pone énfasis en el proceso de lucha de los pueblos y comunidades indígenas en México, particularmente en el Estado de Guerrero, que han venido dando para que fueran reconocidos sus usos y costumbres como una forma distinta o no convencional al sistema jurídico preestablecido al momento de elegir a sus autoridades (presidente municipal). Por tal razón se analiza el comportamiento electoral de dos municipios indígenas del Estado de Guerrero, que iniciaron un proceso por el reconocimiento de sus usos y costumbres como un derecho a partir del año 2015, logrando un movimiento que obligó a las autoridades en materia electoral del Estado de Guerrero, a que reconocieran y generarán las condiciones y mecanismos jurídicos para que posteriormente se realizará la primera elección orientada por usos y costumbres en el municipio de Ayutla de los Libres Guerrero.

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28

Shapoval, Alexander, Shlomo Weber, and Alexei Zakharov. "Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives." International Journal of Game Theory 48, no. 3 (January 24, 2019): 713–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00659-3.

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29

Vanneschi, Leonardo, Roberto Henriques, and Mauro Castelli. "Multi-objective genetic algorithm with variable neighbourhood search for the electoral redistricting problem." Swarm and Evolutionary Computation 36 (October 2017): 37–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.swevo.2017.04.003.

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30

Neuwirth, Erich. "Probabilities, The US Electoral College, and Generating Functions Considered Harmful." International Journal of Computers for Mathematical Learning 9, no. 2 (2004): 237–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/b:ijco.0000040893.20374.ec.

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31

Lin, Pei-Chun, and Chiu Cheng. "Electorate redistricting for a single-member district plurality, two-ballot voting system: Taiwan’s electoral reform." Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research 24, no. 1 (2014): 71–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/yjor110210002l.

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In this study, we formulated a mathematical model for electorate demarcation in line with Taiwan?s electoral reforms, minimizing legislative seats for the main opposition party in Taipei City. The model is compared with historical election data to establish characteristics that are most contested and germane to the reform. Examination of the constituency demarcation for the Seventh Legislator Election ascertains that electorate demarcation can/can not be manipulated to create electoral advantage. Demonstrable evidence of a bias toward disproportionate representation in the single-member district plurality, two-ballot voting system ultimately attests the importance of scenario analysis before adopting new electorate systems.

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32

Belenky, A. S. "Calculating the minimal fraction of thepopular vote to win the U.S. Presidency in the electoral college." Computers & Mathematics with Applications 50, no. 5-6 (September 2005): 783–802. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.camwa.2005.03.014.

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33

GRADOWSKI, TOMASZ M., and ROBERT A. KOSIŃSKI. "THE EFFECT OF AN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FOR ELECTION RESULTS IN AN OPEN COMMUNITY." International Journal of Modern Physics C 17, no. 09 (September 2006): 1327–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0129183106009825.

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In the present paper, the Sznajd model of opinion formation with multi-valued opinions for the temperature T > 0 has been used for investigation of the election results in a population of N individuals represented by the nodes of a square lattice. Presence of temperature means that the population under consideration is open for the effect of external information. The distribution of opinions during the election campaign was found for different values of temperature and length of election campaign preceding the election. Comparison of the results of election to the Polish Parliament in the town with the population consisting 750000 voters, shows quite good agreement with the results of our calculations.

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34

ALAbaasi, Moatasem, and Ahmed Y. Alsabawy. "Testing a Model for Measuring Organizational Learning: a Survey Study of the Opinions of a Sample of Employees in the Electoral Commission in Nineveh Governorate." TANMIYAT AL-RAFIDAIN 41, no. 133 (March 1, 2022): 194–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.33899/tanra.2021.131120.1119.

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35

Balatif, Omar, Bouchaib Khajji, and Mostafa Rachik. "Mathematical Modeling, Analysis, and Optimal Control of Abstinence Behavior of Registration on the Electoral Lists." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2020 (January 3, 2020): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9738934.

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We propose a mathematical model that describes the dynamics of citizens who have the right to register on the electoral lists and participate in the political process and the negative influence of abstainers, who abstain from registration on the electoral lists, on the potential electors. By using Routh–Hurwitz criteria and constructing Lyapunov functions, the local stability and the global stability of abstaining-free equilibrium and abstaining equilibrium are obtained. We also study the sensitivity analysis of the model parameters to know the parameters that have a high impact on the reproduction number ℜ0. In addition, we propose an optimal strategy for an awareness program that helps politicians and officials to increase the rate of citizens registered on the electoral lists with an optimal effort. Pontryagin’s maximum principle is used to characterize the optimal controls, and the optimality system is solved by an iterative method. Finally, some numerical simulations are performed to verify the theoretical analysis using Matlab.

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36

Suciati, Dra Sri, and R. Ambarini. "A Rhetorical Analysis of Selected Speeches of Indonesian Woman Politicians: Pre-Electoral Strategies." Advanced Science Letters 24, no. 6 (June 1, 2018): 4541–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1166/asl.2018.11650.

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37

Tonkes, Elliot, and Dharma Lesmono. "A Longstaff and Schwartz Approach to the Early Election Problem." Advances in Decision Sciences 2012 (October 18, 2012): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2012/287579.

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In many democratic parliamentary systems, election timing is an important decision availed to governments according to sovereign political systems. Prudent governments can take advantage of this constitutional option in order to maximize their expected remaining life in power. The problem of establishing the optimal time to call an election based on observed poll data has been well studied with several solution methods and various degrees of modeling complexity. The derivation of the optimal exercise boundary holds strong similarities with the American option valuation problem from mathematical finance. A seminal technique refined by Longstaff and Schwartz in 2001 provided a method to estimate the exercise boundary of the American options using a Monte Carlo method and a least squares objective. In this paper, we modify the basic technique to establish the optimal exercise boundary for calling a political election. Several innovative adaptations are required to make the method work with the additional complexity in the electoral problem. The transfer of Monte Carlo methods from finance to determine the optimal exercise of real-options appears to be a new approach.

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38

Chiriță, Andrei, and Camelia Delcea. "A Laboratory Experiment for Analyzing Electors’ Strategic Behavior in a First-Past-the-Post System." Symmetry 12, no. 7 (July 1, 2020): 1081. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym12071081.

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As it is well acknowledged that the electoral system is one of the fundamental rocks of our modern society, the behavior of electors engaged in a voting system is of the utmost importance. In this context, the goal of the study is to model the behavior of voters in a first-past-the-post system and to analyze its consequences on a party system. Among the assumptions of this study is Duverger’s law, which states that first-past-the-post systems favor a two-party system as the voters engage in tactical voting, choosing to vote in favor of a less preferred candidate who has better odds of winning. In order to test this assumption and to better analyze the occurrence of the strategic behavior, a laboratory experiment was created. A total of 120 persons participated in the study. An asymmetrical payoff function was created to value the voters’ preference intensity. As a result, it was observed that as voters got used to the voting system, they engaged in more tactical voting behavior in order to either maximize the gain or minimize the loss of their choice. Moreover, the iterations where voters started displaying tactical behavior featured a clustering around two main choices. The obtained results are consistent with both the empirical results of real-life elections and Duverger’s law. A further discussion regarding the change in voters’ choice completes the analysis on the strategic behavior.

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39

Prascevic, Aleksandra. "The political economy of misusing income distribution in the electoral process: A biased pluralism approach." Ekonomski anali 62, no. 214 (2017): 7–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/eka1714007p.

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This paper examines the consequences of distribution of income on election results in conditions of biased pluralism and a small-scale electorate, when the results of the democratic electoral process are compromised due to electoral corruption. The paper discusses the most important concepts of political economy and political theory connected to achieving electoral victory through distribution and misuse of economic resources, focusing on identifying the conditions under which a democratic political system serves organized interest groups and not the majority; i.e., biased pluralism. Despite the formal equality of all voters, there are significant differences in their actual impact on election results. The democratic election process is put into question by the fact that the electorate is small and candidates have access to income that can be used to buy off ?privileged? voters through discretionary allocation of funds and the economic results generated by such distribution. Faced with the corrupt practice of the incumbent, the opposition candidate is driven to a similar position to gain the support of ?privileged? voters and win the election for the opposition. The economic and political result is that the free vote and political competition are compromised, resulting in a political hybrid, the semiauthoritarian regime. This paper provides a mathematical optimization model in which a hierarchically based organization is used as an approximation of society. In the model, differences in the position of members of the organization are similar to differences between voters in the electorate. The particle swarm optimization (PSO) method is used to calculate the amount of electoral bribes. The paper also uses game theory to provide an example of voting for the person who will manage the organization. The formal game between the incumbent and the opposition candidate is presented with a discussion of the various results of the game.

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40

Kumar, Ravinder, Gaurav Gupta, Muhammad Gulzar, Dragan Pamucar, Neeraj Gandotra, and Md Ashraful Alam. "Reliability Analysis of Poll Data with Novel Entropy Information Measure in Multicriteria Decision-Making Based upon Picture Fuzzy Environment." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2022 (February 27, 2022): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/2505397.

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The polling system has a considerable role in the democratic nation. The uncertainty of the people’s participation in polling generally affects the electoral-based system. Therefore, PFS (picture fuzzy set) is the furthermost efficient and useful extension of IFS (intuitionistic fuzzy set) in a fuzzy system capable of precisely handling human perception in the decision-making system. The PFS structure involves the different degrees, i.e., membership, nonmembership, neutral, and hesitancy which are comprehensively applied to such types of complex practical problems in the real-life scenario. This advantage of PFS motivates the author to propose PFSs centred novel entropy measure via this communication, which is comparatively more generalized, reliable, and simplified in place of the existing uncertain measures. The practicability of the proposed present research work is to deal with real-world problems pertaining to the relative importance of the attributes. Therefore, certainly, the proposed novel entropy developed a different approach to handle the uncertainty more precisely as a part of the existing approaches. The validation proof of the proposed entropy measure is proved in an organized manner and practically employed in the perspective of the polling data outcomes about the people’s opinions with the VIKOR-TOPSIS approach.

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41

Lara-Caballero, Alejandro, Sergio Gerardo de-los-Cobos-Silva, Roman Anselmo Mora-Gutiérrez, Eric Alfredo Rincón-García, Miguel Ángel Gutiérrez-Andrade, and Pedro Lara-Velázquez. "Multiobjective Genetic Algorithms for Reinforcing Equal Population in Congressional Districts." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2019 (October 1, 2019): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2019/2825854.

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Redistricting is the process of partitioning a set of basic units into a given number of larger groups for electoral purposes. These groups must follow federal and state requirements to enhance fairness and minimize the impact of manipulating boundaries for political gain. In redistricting tasks, one of the most important criteria is equal population. As a matter of fact, redistricting plans can be rejected when the population deviation exceeds predefined limits. In the literature, there are several methods to balance population among districts. However, further discussion is needed to assess the effectiveness of these strategies. In this paper, we considered two different strategies, mean deviation and overall range. Additionally, a compactness measure is included to design well-shaped districts. In order to provide a wide set of redistricting plans that achieve good trade-offs between mean deviation, overall range, and compactness, we propose four multiobjective metaheuristic algorithms based on NSGA-II and SPEA-II. The proposed strategies were applied in California, Texas, and New York. Numerical results show that the proposed multiobjective approach can be a very valuable tool in any real redistricting process.

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42

Markworth, Kimberly A., and Lara M. Willox. "Mathematical Explorations: The Electoral College." Mathematics Teaching in the Middle School 18, no. 2 (September 2012): 118–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/mathteacmiddscho.18.2.0118.

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43

Whitin, David J. "Exploring Estimation through Children's Literature." Arithmetic Teacher 41, no. 8 (April 1994): 436–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.5951/at.41.8.0436.

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Estimation is a crucial mathematical strategy that can be woven throughout the entire mathematics curriculum. The strategy can certainly foster the development of many of the goals advocated by the NCTM's curriculum and evaluation standards (1989). Since approximately 80 percent of real-world applications of mathematics involve estimation or mental computation, the goal of becoming an “informed electorate” requires us to use and analyze various estimation strategies.

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44

Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha, and Mandar Oak. "Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation." Games 13, no. 4 (June 21, 2022): 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g13040048.

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We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties’ seat shares, the size of the rents from holding office and their ideologies. We show that governments may be minimal winning, minority or surplus. Moreover, coalitions may be ‘disconnected’. We then look at how the coalition formation game affects the incentives for party formation. In particular, we show that when the rents from office are low, the median citizen stands unopposed, and when rents are high, there is more political entry. For intermediate rents, we show that strategic dropouts can happen to influence the final policy. We show that the incentives for strategic dropout can be higher under proportional representation than plurality voting, contrary to Duverger’s law. Our model explains the diverse electoral outcomes seen under proportional representation and integrates models of political entry with models of coalitional bargaining.

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45

Ganzfried, Sam. "Algorithm for Computing Approximate Nash Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Application to Continuous Blotto." Games 12, no. 2 (June 1, 2021): 47. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12020047.

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Successful algorithms have been developed for computing Nash equilibrium in a variety of finite game classes. However, solving continuous games—in which the pure strategy space is (potentially uncountably) infinite—is far more challenging. Nonetheless, many real-world domains have continuous action spaces, e.g., where actions refer to an amount of time, money, or other resource that is naturally modeled as being real-valued as opposed to integral. We present a new algorithm for approximating Nash equilibrium strategies in continuous games. In addition to two-player zero-sum games, our algorithm also applies to multiplayer games and games with imperfect information. We experiment with our algorithm on a continuous imperfect-information Blotto game, in which two players distribute resources over multiple battlefields. Blotto games have frequently been used to model national security scenarios and have also been applied to electoral competition and auction theory. Experiments show that our algorithm is able to quickly compute close approximations of Nash equilibrium strategies for this game.

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46

Patašius, Martynas. "Suitability of the Single Transferable Vote as a Replacement for Largest Remainder Proportional Representation." Symmetry 14, no. 8 (August 10, 2022): 1648. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/sym14081648.

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There are two main approaches to achieving proportional representation in elections: the single transferable vote and methods based on party lists. This paper discusses ways to use the single transferable vote while using some of the main features used with the largest remainder method, such as the electoral threshold. The investigation has shown that the Weighted Inclusive Gregory method is a suitable replacement for the largest remainder method when it is desirable to avoid wasted votes and to handle independent candidates in a straightforward way, but it is also desirable to keep the results as close to the ones achieved under the largest remainder method as possible. The investigation also led to the development of an algorithm for using the single transferable vote when preference lists are based on party lists, exploiting commonalities and symmetries between the patterns of preferences given in the votes. It has been shown that such an algorithm makes the calculations faster than the use of ordinary implementations of the single transferable vote when the numbers of seats and candidates are high, as commonly happens when methods based on party lists are used.

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47

Falter, Rolf. "Verkiezingen en kiesstelsels." Res Publica 27, no. 4 (December 31, 1985): 485–507. http://dx.doi.org/10.21825/rp.v27i4.19202.

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Nineteenth-century literature on electoral systems and elections in Belgium was generally made of political pamphlets. Politicians were the most interested in the subject, which seems quite logical for the elections, butis also true for the electoral legislation, because this bas almost continuously been a topic in the political fights in Belgium between 1830 and 1914. Therefore, a lot of research-work on electoral legislation and data was done in the discreet study-roms of local party-offices, as can be learned from the archives of nineteenth-century politicians.The valuable information resulting from this research was usually kept secret for the outside world, for which the politicians reserved their more propagandistic tracts. Nevertheless, out of the bulk of pamphlets on electoral systems and elections, a few books deserve some special attention. Like those aiming to gather the existing electoral data needed for further research : large compilations of vast amounts of jurisprudence on the rather loose electoral laws, or first and timid attempts to make electoral statistics available for the larger public. Analysing just held elections seems on the other hand to have been a sart of monopoly of the politicians themselves. Even if they tried in the first place to fit in the verdict of the electors into their propagandistic schemes, it should be stressed that they also gave timid evidence of trying to respect at least the statistical facts (cf. abstract 1, which is an analysis by the catholic leader Charles Woeste of the part the introduction of the secret ballot in 1877 played in the defeat of bis party one year later).It was only when, from 1890 to 1893, the Belgian constitution was revised, that the subject of electoral systems and elections became also a matter of interest for academic circles. University-professors then began to publish voluminous blue-prints for a new constitution, thereby usually replacing their scientific detachment by politica! engagement. An exception to this is the remarkably serene «mathematical tract» of Victor D'hondt, a law-professor at Ghent University, who in 1882 gave his name to what was to become the most applicated system of proportional representation in the world (cf. abstract 3).After 1900 the first more or less scientific works on the subject, based on critical research, were published: one written by the law-professor of Louvain, Leon Dupriez ( who, in abstract 4, fries to explain why in Liège the workers generally had fewer votes in the plural system than their colleagues of Hainaut), the other one by his French colleague of Montpellier, Joseph Barthélemy, who wrote a voluminous history of the Belgian electoral systems since 1830 (and, in abstract 5, examines the application of proportional representation in the politically motivated nominations at the Belgian courts). Bath in the first place seem to have wanted to improve the knowledge on the subject. Their research and analysis for the first time was not subordinated to their personal political engagement.

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48

Balatif, Omar, Abderrahim Labzai, and Mostafa Rachik. "A Discrete Mathematical Modeling and Optimal Control of the Electoral Behavior with regard to a Political Party." Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2018 (November 5, 2018): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2018/9649014.

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In this work, we propose a discrete mathematical model that describes the dynamics of citizens who have the right to vote and their electoral behavior with regard to a political party during an awareness program or an electoral campaign. Also, we propose an optimal strategy for an awareness program or an election campaign that helps politicians to distinguish between different categories of voters in order to increase the participation rate in the electoral process and obtain the greatest possible number of votes with a minimal effort. Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle, in discrete time, is used to characterize the optimal controls and the optimality system is solved by an iterative method. The numerical simulation is carried out using Matlab. Consequently, the obtained results confirm the performance of the optimization strategy.

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49

De la Poza, E., L. Jódar, and A. Pricop. "Mathematical Modeling of the Propagation of Democratic Support of Extreme Ideologies in Spain: Causes, Effects, and Recommendations for Its Stop." Abstract and Applied Analysis 2013 (2013): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/729814.

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This paper deals with the construction of a discrete population mathematical model for the short-term forecast until January 2016 of the electoral support of extreme ideology parties in Spain. Firstly, the nontrivial concept of extreme ideology is stated. Then, the electoral register is split in three subpopulations: supporters of extremist parties, abstentions/blank voters, and supporters of establishment parties. The model takes into account the following variables: economy measured throughout the Spanish unemployment rate; demography quantified in terms of birth and death rates and emigration; sociopolitical situation measured by the Spanish poverty indicator, trust on the Government labor indicator (GLI), and the indicator of political trust. By considering the dynamic subpopulations transits built throughout data obtained from public and private prestigious institutions and sociopolitical analysis, a system of difference equations models the electoral population behavior in Spain allowing us to compute the expected electoral support in the time horizon of January 2016. Sensitivity analysis versus uncertain parameters is performed in order to improve the reliability of the model results.

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50

Benoit, Kenneth. "Which Electoral Formula Is the Most Proportional? A New Look with New Evidence." Political Analysis 8, no. 4 (July 18, 2000): 381–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pan.a029822.

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A ranking exists in electoral systems research of different electoral formulas—the mathematical functions governing the conversion of votes into legislative seats—in terms of both proportionality of seats and votes and favorability to the largest party. I reexamine this issue with new methods and new evidence, attempting to cross-validate previous rankings using a larger and more controlled data set and more precise parametric methods than have been applied previously. The results by and large confirm previous knowledge but also illuminate several important new facets obscured in previous investigations. For example, at common ranges of district magnitude (from 5 to 15 seats), it is shown that electoral formula may matter at least as much as district magnitude in shaping proportionality.

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