Дисертації з теми "Dual Class Share"
Оформте джерело за APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard та іншими стилями
Ознайомтеся з топ-18 дисертацій для дослідження на тему "Dual Class Share".
Біля кожної праці в переліку літератури доступна кнопка «Додати до бібліографії». Скористайтеся нею – і ми автоматично оформимо бібліографічне посилання на обрану працю в потрібному вам стилі цитування: APA, MLA, «Гарвард», «Чикаго», «Ванкувер» тощо.
Також ви можете завантажити повний текст наукової публікації у форматі «.pdf» та прочитати онлайн анотацію до роботи, якщо відповідні параметри наявні в метаданих.
Переглядайте дисертації для різних дисциплін та оформлюйте правильно вашу бібліографію.
Fronterrè, Vittoria. "Voto plurimo e voto maggiorato. Dual class share statunitense ed europea a confronto." Doctoral thesis, Università di Siena, 2022. http://hdl.handle.net/11365/1185036.
Повний текст джерелаPajuste, Anete. "Corporate governance and controlling shareholders." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-537.
Повний текст джерелаDiss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004
Hoffmann-Burchardi, Ulrike. "Dual-class shares, initial public offerings and the market for corporate control." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2000. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1551/.
Повний текст джерелаCrucil, A. "ALLOCAZIONE NON PROPORZIONALE DEL DIRITTO DI VOTO E MASSIMIZZAZIONE DEL VALORE DELLA SOCIETÀ: TEORIA E PRASSI DELLE DUAL CLASS SHARES STATUNITENSI." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/349464.
Повний текст джерелаThe thesis analyses the determinants and effects on firm value of listed companies of a dual class share structure, made of two classes of shares with different voting power. Part I examines the theoretical and empirical studies concerning dual class companies in the United States; Part II focuses on a selected group of companies, the publishing companies, to verify whether in this sector dual class structures help safeguard the editorial integrity of newspapers, protecting them from the market pressure to maximize profits.
Bolin, Patrick, and Carl Widerberg. "Payout policy in family firms : A study on payout levels and dividend smoothing in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-387906.
Повний текст джерелаKim, Soohyung. "TWO ESSAYS ON CORPORATE FINANCE." UKnowledge, 2015. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/finance_etds/5.
Повний текст джерелаQvennerstedt, Eric, and William Svensson. "Pairs trading on the Swedish equity market; Cointegrate and Capitalize." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Statistiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353020.
Повний текст джерелаBäckström, Martin, and Fredrik Lundin. "Röstförstärkande Mekanismer : En studie om svenskt bolagsägande." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för samhällsvetenskaper, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-32899.
Повний текст джерелаReis, Diogo Anunciação. "Determinantes do diferencial de preço entre classes de ações: evidências do mercado brasileiro no período de 2002 a 2014." reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13430.
Повний текст джерелаApproved for entry into archive by Renata de Souza Nascimento (renata.souza@fgv.br) on 2015-02-24T16:06:57Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5)
Made available in DSpace on 2015-02-24T16:11:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 007293707_MPE_Dissertacao_V10.pdf: 747515 bytes, checksum: 91e13be0bac80e71972e87a4567cbc0b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-01-26
Este trabalho tem por objetivo contribuir para a discussão acerca do diferencial relativo de preços entre duas classes de ações - ordinárias nominativas (ON) e preferenciais nominativas (PN) - no Brasil e os seus determinantes no período compreendido entre 2002 e 2014. Considerando-se a disseminada utilização de duas classes de ações (com e sem direito de voto) por empresas listadas na BMFBovespa – permitindo a separação entre controle e propriedade - e a elevada concentração do controle, este trabalho contribui para o entendimento dos potenciais conflitos de interesse entre acionistas majoritários e minoritários. Utilizou-se o método de mínimos quadrados ordinários (MQO) e os procedimentos de efeitos fixos (EF) e aleatórios (EA) para um painel formado por 46 companhias listadas resultando em 1.653 observações. Foram encontradas evidências de que as ações ON (com direito a voto) são negociadas com prêmio em relação às PN (sem direito a voto) e de que o prêmio (pelo voto) apresenta leve tendência de alta durante o período. Por fim, em relação aos determinantes, foram encontradas evidências de que o maior grau de proteção aos acionistas minoritários, o tamanho da empresa e a maior proporção de ativos tangíveis (imobilizados) estão negativamente associados ao prêmio pelo voto.
This paper aims to contribute to the discussion about dual-class premium (voting and non-voting shares) and its determinants in Brazil from 2002 to 2014. Considering the disseminated issuance of voting and non-voting shares by Brazilian listed firms – allowing the separation of ownership and control – and concentrated ownership, this paper contributes to the understanding of potencial conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. This paper applies the ordinary least square (OLS) method and the procedures of fixed (FE) and random effects (RE) for a panel of 46 listed companies resulting in 1.653 observations. We found evidence that supports a premium of voting shares over non-voting shares (voting Premium). Furthermore, this premium presented a slight upward trend during the period. Finally, regarding the determinants, we found evidence that higher protection levels of minority shareholders rights, firm’s size and higher proportion of tangible assets are negatively associated to voting premium.
Chen, Yinghong. "Essays on voting power, corporate governance and capital structure." Göteborg : Dept. of Economics [Nationalekonomiska institutionen], Univ, 2004. http://www.handels.gu.se/epc/archive/00003821/01/ChendissNE.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаLu, Bei-Yu, and 盧貝諭. "Study on Preferred Stocks and Dual Class Share Structure." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4nhr4b.
Повний текст джерела國立臺灣大學
事業經營法務碩士在職學位學程
107
Since the Dual Class Share Structure formally violates the principle of the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders, some countries have a negative position on this. The Company Act of Taiwan has always adhered to the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders. In practice, the public issued companies in Taiwan are absolutely not allowed to issue shares with different voting rights. However, it can be observed from relevant foreign laws, that most countries have gradually relaxed restrictions on one-to-one rights so as to make the design of equity structure more flexible. I think it is worth thinking deeply about whether the Dual Class Share Structure is applicable to Taiwan. This thesis starts from the Dual Class Share Structure in the United States and Hong Kong. Then, it discusses the legislative evolution, related regulations of the Dual Class Share Structure in Taiwan and some noticeable points about enforcing the Dual Class Share Structure, especially the sunset provision. In the end, this thesis concludes by setting forth, suggestions and prospects of the Company Act of Taiwan based on practical observation.
Ko, I.-San, and 柯宜姍. "The Feasibility of Dual-Class Share Structures in TaiwanCapital Markets." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2hgge9.
Повний текст джерелаYu, Xue Jia, and 余雪佳. "A study on the feasibility analysis of Dual-class share structure in China’s stock market." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/m7t58e.
Повний текст джерела國立清華大學
科技法律研究所
105
To maintain the control of corporate is a governance dilemma, especially in the financing process. As a special ownership structure, dual-class share structure has a long history in western countries. Along with china’s internet corporate giants, like Alibaba and Jingdong, have rushed to list on US stock exchange, dual-class share structure started to get Chinese studies and the public’s attention Dual-class share structure originated in the United States. After more than 100 years of prohibitions and struggles, the dual-class share structure eventually formed a mature rule in the United States. It has been widely developed and used around the world. This essay will conduct a legal and history institutional analysis towards the dual-class share structure in United States and Taiwan. China’s company law maintains one vote per share as a mandatory rule nowadays, which means the dual-class share structure was so far not allowed. However, as capital markets developing, there will be more and more market participants whose needs are various, which means Chinese capital market has to make some changes to fit the newest circumstance. This essay analyzes the feasibility of dual-class share structure in China’s market, and explores the possibilities of the changes under the existing legal system. It may define the future direction of Chinese capital markets.
LAI, TSUNG-YEN, and 賴宗彥. "A study of no par value share and dual class share:The case of close companies in Taiwan." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/gk6j58.
Повний текст джерела國立臺北大學
會計學系
107
The world economy has been influenced by financial technology and information data a lot, and the map of industrial supply chain was dramatic changed ever before. Since Alpha Go, developed by Google with deep neural network learning and Big data, shocked the whole world. In the same time, some industries and start-ups have also emerged in Taiwan, benefit from those new technologies, AI(Artificial Intelligence) and Big data. As a financial industry worker, I would like to guide the star-ups to begin with a good start. From this point of view, how to help them framework out the whole picture is the most realistic consideration, and the type of organization is the first step. On July 1, 2015, the Ministry of Economy promulgated the special chapter “Close Company”, in the Section 13 of Chapter V of the Company Act, which aims to breed more and more innovative science and technology in Taiwan. On July 6, 2018, after the adoption of the Amendment to the Company Act on the third reading of the Legislative Yuan, the number of new ventures adopted the type of organization by “Close Company” began to grow rapidly. This study is based on the data “Close Company” published in the website of the Department of Commerce of the Ministry of Economy, and analyzes the feasibility of those “Close Companies” transferred to public offering.
HOU, CHENS-SI, and 侯承希. "A Study on the Dual-Class share structure-Focused on the Article 157 of the Corporation Law (As Amended)." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5374sm.
Повний текст джерела國立臺北大學
法律學系法律專業組
107
This thesis mainly observes and analyzes the dual-class shares under American law and New Listing Rules of Hong Kong and Singapore and China. After the Company Act revised Article 157, along with Company Act Article 356, allowing companies to issue preferred stock, which can carry multiple votes and use dual-class shares. However, it is still controversial issue in Public Company. In the first part, this thesis introduces the principles of stock structure, and analyzes how to release the agency cost with Control Enhancing Mechanisms. In the second part, this study introduces the legal foundation of the dual-class shares, and the pros and cons of the dual-class shares. The reason why many entrepreneurs and founders prefer the dual-class shares. In the third part, “One-share, one-vote” and “the equitable treatment of shareholders” as fundamental principles of corporate governance, we think it can make corresponding adjustments. In the fourth part, this thesis also analyzes “Xiaomi” Corp, which practice the dual-class structure and was listed in Hong Kong exchange. Under the sufficient protecting mechanism, including the cap of voting rights ratio of dual-class shares and fixed percentage of dual-class shares, forcing the company to establish “sunset clauses” and restrictions on the transfer of multiple voting rights and a clear delineation of multiple voting rights. For example, As the death of multiple voting rights holders, his shares will be converted into “One-share, one-vote”. On the other hand, protecting the rights of investors, strengthen disclosure requirements and corporate governance is necessary. To compliance with review of Taiwan Stock Exchange. Finally, We think the public company with dual-class shares can launch an IPO.
Liu, Yijia. "An analysis of corporate governance under the dual class structure: A case study of JD." Master's thesis, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10071/22562.
Повний текст джерелаO comércio eletrônico na China tem crescido rapidamente nos últimos 20 anos. Tanto as tecnologias de pagamento móvel como as de transporte logístico têm desempenhado um papel crucial. Com o rápido desenvolvimento da indústria de comércio eletrônico chinesa, um grupo de excelentes empresas de comércio eletrônico é criado. A JD é um dos líderes das empresas de comércio electrónico. Na fase de crescimento da empresa, a JD preparou-se para construir muitas construções básicas para desenvolver a logística, anexando clientes com uma estratégia de marketing de baixo preço. Isto levou a um grande montante de financiamento externo para a JD. A fim de garantir o poder de controle da JD, seu fundador Liu Qiangdong e sua equipe adotaram estrutura dual share quando se tornou público em 2014. Este documento foca as questões de governança corporativa da estrutura dual share adotadas pela JD, e apresenta sugestões razoáveis de melhorias. Este trabalho adota principalmente métodos de revisão de literatura e análise de casos, e principalmente coleta dados públicos até a data da JD, conduz análises de negócios, estrutura acionária, risco e finanças na JD. Além disso, este documento interpreta melhor as razões e influências da estrutura dual share adoptada pela JD, de acordo com a teoria do agente principal, teoria das partes interessadas e teoria da assimetria de informação.
Liu, Nai-Feng, and 劉乃鳳. "The Design of Mutiple-Class Shares in Theoretical and Practical:Focus on the Dual-Class Shares." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/sdht4f.
Повний текст джерела國立中央大學
產業經濟研究所
104
With the changing and booming development of the modern technology and the rapid economic, the way of business shall be adjusted to be more flexible and open in order to maintain the competitiveness of the business. However, the traditional shareholder right is placed too much emphasis on the formal principle of shareholder equality, which is far too rigid and outdated under the current legal system . This paper argues that, under the principle of contractual freedom and the investor responsible for the actions themselves, the competent authorities should not unduly interfere with the equity trading design of the shareholders and the company, unless there’s detrimental to the public interest or significant impact to the interests of shareholders. After the breakthrough of the rigid, traditional and formal principle of shareholder equality, the design of the equity can be different from the principle of “one share, one vote (OSOV)” , and such design is called “dual-class shares” structure. Dual-class shares structure is still a controversial system, so this paper introduces the origin, the development, the basic theory, the application, and the pros and cons of the system, to make the reader recognize the system and give the proper evaluation. In regards to the evaluation of the adoption of dual-class shares structure of the operators of corporation, in Williams v. Geier case, it was not recognized as that the operators of corporation breach the fiduciary duty for violating the principle of “one share, one vote (OSOV)”,but was reviewed on the different aspects respectively. As for the issue that whether dual-class shares structure is beneficial to shareholders, it should take the economic interests, the interests of voting right, the quality of shareholders consent and judicial review into account by case. And the case of Google Inc. issuing Class C Shares (GOOG stock) is worth considering. Also, this paper describes and analyzes Alibaba Partnership system as a reference for Taiwan to review the law. Finally, as a conclusion , there’s no sufficient legitimacy to prohibit the dual-class shares structures in theory, but it is still not suitable for Taiwan’s stock market in real to allow the adoption of dual-class shares structure. However, it may be a goal to open it in the future.
Wasserman, Olle, and Hylén Olle Andersson. "Insynsägandets relation till prestation, vad gäller i Sverige? : En kvantitativ uppsats om sambandet mellan insynsägande och finansiell prestation i Sverige." Thesis, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-96850.
Повний текст джерелаIntroduction: Whether Managerial Ownership affects financial performance is an area of research where previous studies have come to different conclusions. Based on Agency Theory, Managerial Ownership should have a positive impact on financial performance, and based on Entrenchment Theory, Managerial Ownership should have a negative impact on financial performance due to increased power. At the same time, based on Stewardship Theory, there should not be a relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance. Purpose: The purpose of the essay is to analyze the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance in Swedish companies, which are characterized by a high prevalence dual-class shares and a high ownership concentration. Furthermore, the purpose is to theoretically explain the results that appear in the essay to explain what existing theories in the field that can be applied in a Swedish context. Method: To analyze the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance in Swedish companies, the essay has taken a quantitative and deductive approach where theory has been tested through a panel regression containing 300 observations. Conclusion: The essays results show that the relationship between Managerial Ownership and financial performance, operationalized as Tobin's Q, takes its expression as an inverted U. In the range 0 to 37.75 percent Managerial Ownership we find support for an alignment effect while also finding support for an entrenchment effect at levels of Managerial Ownership above the inflection point of 37.75 percent. Furthermore, we find no support for Stewardship Theory. The inflection point noted in Swedish companies is lower than the inflection points detected in countries such as the US and the UK. The explanation for this may be the high prevalence of dual-class shares and the high ownership concentration that characterizes Swedish companies.