Статті в журналах з теми "Dispositive benevolence"

I begin with a note about moral goodness as a quality, disposition, or trait of a person or human being. This has at least two different senses, one wider and one narrower. Aristotle remarked that the Greek term we translate as justice sometimes meant simply virtue or goodness as applied to a person and sometimes meant only a certain virtue or kind of goodness. The same thing is true of our word “goodness.” Sometimes being a good person means having all the virtues, or at least all the moral ones; then goodness equals the whole of virtue. But sometimes, being a good person has a narrower meaning, namely, being kind, generous, and so forth. Thus, my OED sometimes equates goodness with moral excellence as a whole and sometimes with a particular moral excellence, viz., kindness, beneficence, or benevolence; and the Bible, when it speaks of God as being good sometimes means that God has all the virtues and sometimes only that he is kind, mereiful, or benevolent. When Jesus says, “Why callest thou me good: None is good, save one, that is God,” he seems to be speaking of goodness in the inclusive sense, but when the writer of Exodus has God himself say that he is “merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth,” God is using “goodness” in the narrower sense in which it means benevolence, for he goes on to make it clear that he is also just and severe. Similarly, “good will” may mean either “morally good will” in general, as it does in Kant, or it may mean only “benevolent will,” as it usually does; in “men of good will” it is perhaps ambiguous.

Abstract This study analyzed the influence of trust and trustworthiness on the intention to adopt and use e-government services. A structural model was proposed, considering the relationship among Ability, Benevolence, Integrity, Perceived Risk, Trust of the Government, Trust of the Internet and Disposition to Trust. The model was tested through structural equation modeling (partial least square method). An online questionnaire was applied, including 36 items for all the constructs presented in the model, and measured with 11-point Likert scales. After the first round of analysis, an alternative model was proposed with a better fit. Results indicated that: 1) Ability, Benevolence, and Integrity, together, positively influence Trust of the Government; 2) Trust of the Government and Trust of the Internet positively influence Trust in e-Government; 3) Trust in e-Government negatively influences Perceived Risk and positively influences Intention to Use and; 5) Perceived Risk negatively influences Intention to Use. Considering the results of this research, as government agencies increase their expenditure to implement and maintain e-gov initiatives, they must recognize and deal with trust-related issues.

Resumen: Sócrates, en el Gorgias (521d) , afirma ser el único ateniense que practica en su tiempo el verdadero arte político. En este artículo se interpreta esta aserción desde el análisis del verbo θεραπεύω , que en el contexto del diálogo puede traducirse como “servir”, “cuidar” o “atender” (513e, 521a), y que alude primariamente al carácter terapéutico de la política en analogía con la medicina, aunque eventualmente también se usa para referir, por ejemplo, al entrenamiento de los caballos (516e). La tesis central es que Sócrates entiende el ejercicio de la política como cuidado de las pasiones, y de su relación con la benevolencia, que se define como una disposición afectiva básica y esencialmente política. A manera de conclusión, se plantea que el ejercicio socrático de la política depende de las posibilidades performativas del lenguaje, y está determinado por una tensión irreductible entre lo político y lo apolítico.Palabras clave: Platón, Gorgias, política, pasiones, benevolencia.Abstract: In the Gorgias (521d), Socrates claims to be the only Athenian who practices the real art of politics in his time. The present paper interprets this assertion based on an analysis of the Greek verb θεραπεύω, which in the context of the dialogue means “serving”, “caring”, or “tending” (513e, 521a). It alludes primarily to the therapeutic character of politics by analogy with medicine, but it also can refer to the training of horses (516e). Socrates understands the practice of politics as a way of taking care of the passions, and of their relation to goodwill, which is considered to be a necessary affective disposition that is inherently political. Socratic political n practice depends on the performative possibilities of language. An irreducible tension between the political and the apolitical determines it. Keywords: Plato, Gorgias, politics, passions, benevolence.

The article is devoted to the study of the factors of the axio-psychological design of the life achievements of the individual and to the identification of gender differences in this phenomenon. According to the results of the factor analysis, the determining features of the axio-psychological design of the life achievements of the individual in the period of early adulthood of the female gender were determined, represented by the following integral psychological characteristics - 10 factors: disposition of self-efficacy, disposition of perfectionism, attribution of responsibility, overcoming obstacles, use of unproductive coping, "futile efforts", combination of androgyny with femininity, benevolence, desire for success, lack of adequate mental age assessment. Instead, representatives of the male gender of early adulthood are distinguished by the following integral psychological characteristics - 10 factors: traits of the male gender in achieving success, overcoming obstacles, helplessness, lack of externally regulated perfectionism, failure, lack of independence as a lack of result, understanding of the situation, reward for what has been achieved, duality of externally regulated perfectionism , affective-conative complex. Gender-based differences between the factors of axio-psychological projection in early adulthood have been revealed: in women, this process is motivated by the disposition of self-efficacy and perfectionist guidelines, and in men by masculinity traits and the desire to overcome obstacles.

This paper is regarded in the framework of anthropological linguistics and is devoted to the study of the notion of friendliness. Friendliness is defined as friendly disposition or friendly attitude of a person in relation to other people. The paper emphasizes valuable dominants of a friendly attitude – kindness, benevolence, disposition and sympathy. The results of free association experiment allowed the author to generalize ideas about the notion of friendliness among native speakers and describe the image of a friendly person in the Russian linguistic worldview. Friendliness can be manifested by verbal and nonverbal means of communication that reflect positive and good-minded communication style. The paper discusses vocal expressions, lexical means of language, facial expressions, gestures, actions that are regarded as manifestations of friendliness. It is worth noting that the addressee experiences a wide range of positive emotions dealing with manifestations of friendly attitude. The research emphasizes that friendliness is highly valued in the Russian-speaking culture. The results of this paper contribute to the study of the linguistic image of a friendly person as a fragment of the Russian linguistic worldview.

This study presents a multiyear empirical examination of gender bias in the handling of juvenile court cases in Hawaii. Based on prior qualitative and quantitative data, it is hypothesized that once female juvenile offenders are found delinquent, they will be sanctioned more severely than male offenders by the juvenile court, holding other factors constant. Results from a series of analyses indicate significant differences between male and female juvenile justice outcomes, particularly for youth of color. Female offenders are more likely than male offenders to be handled informally at the early stages of the system, but the court's benevolence declines as girls move into the disposition stage. The implications of these findings for resolving inconsistencies in prior research are discussed. Also considered are policy implications with regard to congressional initiatives to de-emphasize the deinstitutionalization of status offenses and reduce concerns about minority overrepresentation in the juvenile justice system.

Abstract Humans should be able to trust that they can safely interact with their home companion robot. However, robots can exhibit occasional mechanical, programming or functional errors. We hypothesise that the severity of the consequences and the timing of a robot’s different types of erroneous behaviours during an interaction may have different impacts on users’ attitudes towards a domestic robot. First, we investigated human users’ perceptions of the severity of various categories of potential errors that are likely to be exhibited by a domestic robot. Second, we used an interactive storyboard to evaluate participants’ degree of trust in the robot after it performed tasks either correctly, or with ‘small’ or ‘big’ errors. Finally, we analysed the correlation between participants’ responses regarding their personality, predisposition to trust other humans, their perceptions of robots, and their interaction with the robot. We conclude that there is correlation between the magnitude of an error performed by a robot and the corresponding loss of trust by the human towards the robot. Moreover we observed that some traits of participants’ personalities (conscientiousness and agreeableness) and their disposition of trusting other humans (benevolence) significantly increased their tendency to trust a robot more during an emergency scenario.

The knowledge of the promoting variables of dating violence has been a topic much studied in the last decade. However, the definition of the profile of this type of victim still presents numerous unknowns that hinder the effectiveness of prevention programs against violence. This study analyzes the interaction of cognitive, emotional and behavioral variables that converge in the victim profile. The sample comprised 2577 adolescents (55.2% girls) of 14 to 18 years in age (M = 15.9, SD = 1.2). The instruments used were the dating violence questionnaire (CUVINO), the scale of detection of sexism in adolescents (DSA), Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale and Child and Adolescent Disposition Scale (CADS). To study the relationship between the different variables considered in this article, a SEM analysis was used. The results show that victims of gender violence and emotional abuse have high scores in benevolent sexism, moral disengagement and emotionally negative behavioral patterns. Likewise, the existence of an interdependent relationship between these three sets of variables was found.

The study investigated the relationship between perceived organizational support and organizational outcomes among nurses of selected mission hospitals in Ghana. Compared with Public Sector hospitals, Mission hospitals in Ghana operate with very limited resources. Thus, they have very little to incentivize their staff. Nonetheless, there is the general assumption that employers who demonstrate generous disposition towards their employees will reap reciprocal benefits. Such employees work beyond the job demands even in periods of serious financial difficulties. Phenomenology research design under the qualitative research method was used to find answers to the research questions. A sample size of 40 was drawn through purposive sampling technique from five selected Mission Hospitals in Bono and Bono East Regions of Ghana. Data collection tools used in the study were interview and observation. The data analysis went through compiling, disassembling, reassembling, interpreting and concluding, phases. The text was sorted based on predefined themes. Illustrative words from the original field notes were selected and placed in a table. Initial (level 1) codes mimicked the original information in the case of semantic coding process and, in the case of latent coding, meanings imbedded in the text were generated; this was presented in a form of discourse analysis. When the perceptible index of employees is made up of benevolence, care and celebration; when employees perceive employers who are concerned about their goals and values, and are willing to help them when they need special favour, they become a part of the organization and are ready to work beyond the job demands. Hence, organizations are advised to resource their human resource departments adequately to be able to respond to the needs and aspirations of their employees.

The importance of addressing the continuance of gender bias in children's literature cannot be overstated. Considering that children, as the intended audience of children's literature, should be agents of change in society, particularly with relation to gender roles equality. The issue addressed in this study is how women are portrayed in Arleen A. Kingdom Tale Collections, a collection of children's books authored by a woman. The purpose of this paper is to describe and explain the gender bias towards female and male characters in Kingdom Tale Collections. This literary work is created by a woman and will discuss the description of the status and role of women; therefore, feminist literary criticism will be employed as the guiding theory and methodology. This descriptive qualitative research approach obtains its data with a focus on feminism literary critique in the study of literature. The results of this study pertain to the portrayal of gender bias faced by the main female character, including the notion that a woman must be beautiful despite her mental and physical weakness, whereas a guy with a strong body is autonomous and intellectual. Second, the woman must be able to cook and sew for her family, but she cannot pursue a job that is substantially distinct from the male characters. Third, a virtuous woman is shown as possessing a weak and timid disposition. They are portrayed in the novel as lacking the bravery to express their heart's desires; women will always be expected to submit to the desires of men, whilst men are free to express their hearts. This study concludes that there is still a gender bias in the form of women's domestication as a manifestation of traditional gender norms. As if their life depend on the benevolence of males, women are portrayed in the domestic sphere as mere accessories. This, of course, further demonstrates that gender bias persists in children's literature from the "Kingdom Tale Collection," despite the fact that the story's author is a woman, and that it appears to be a problem that will persist in our culture.

Despite being obviously contradictory to each other, a common question is spelled by both ecumenism and ethnophilysm. How the unity is to be achieved by Christian people? How one could come to lifetime friendship with all those having diff erent beliefs or with those not having any belief at all? That very unity means togetherness in God, and not an agreement based on minimum concordance. Thus, such unity is to be realized in respective church’s community where all nations and all people are called up. In that sense, ecumenism merits its full sense within church’s authenticity of dialogue between diff erent ones, as well as within creative communication of all those who would like to achieve and edify themselves through church. However, there are certain obstrictions and drawbacks which could be superseded only when we all become part of togetherness in beatifi c love of God, which is fully come out as Blessed Empire of Father and Son and Holly Spirit, with “no Greeks, neither Jews, but Christ is all in everything”. In this way, we are all winning and nobody is defeated or dismissed – we are all materialized as “one man in Christ”. An undeniable rule here is that “higher” should serve “lower”, and that implies disposition and order. Therefore, Orthodox Christians are the most responsible side in ecumenical dialogue in which all participants should be welcomed witnessing salutary joyfulness. Thus, all nations and all people are jointly realized in Christ’s love. The diff erences are clear and they are not inessential – but, such diff erences should not be the reason unnegotiable confl icts. Here, the tolerance is just the beginning of realization, while all is replenished in vivid and living love. In addition to this theological standpoint, there are social and political reasons for putting the faith into function of substantiation of peace, justice and truth in life. The responsibility of all those who believe should be factor of integration in all human relations, and not reason for upsets, intolerance and confl icts between various and diff erent creeds. By its particular quality, the religion excludes intolerance, tyranny, slavery, servitude, fear and selfi shness. The religion means that one is ready to understand everybody, since it is not and it should not be grouping of those having same ideas. The religion is constant readiness in benefi cence – in diff erent case, there is no religion despite nominal conformity of individuals to certain community. Only when believer has introspected whole heaviness, he is to understand the strength of faith. And, that is to be confi rmed by his benevolence to everybody. The ecumenism is confi rmation of our common benevolence, while ethnophilysm shows that we stand just at the beginning – but, one should set out forward. Only in that way all of us would reach the end despite the fact that we are on diff erent paths, pathways and winding footpaths... This responsibility is on all Christians, and particularly on those who emphassize their orthodox denomination. Nobody should be afraid of this, nobody should traduce this, and nobody should leave this to negligence. We are all supposed to do our best, while God always replenish by mulitplying to no-end and infi nity. And, in such way, everything really becomes new, unlimitedly new – we all become good forever without giving up, we all become persevering in love.

This study examines the relationship between the level of trust that adolescents place in a specific commercial website and their behavioural intentions to disclose four categories of personal information (identity information, geographical information, profile information and contact information) to the website. Following the integrative model of organisational trust, we hypothesise that respondents’ level of trust in a specific commercial website is determined by three dimensions of trustworthiness: ability, integrity and benevolence. In order to test the proposed model, we conducted a survey among 1042 Flemish adolescents. Analyses indicate that perceived ability and integrity predicted adolescents’ level of trust in the focal website. The respondents’ trust in the website subsequently predicted their willingness to disclose. The influence of the discerned trustworthiness beliefs was fully mediated by the level of trust adolescents had in the specific commercial website. Adolescents’ risk perception about disclosing information to this website also affected their willingness to disclose information. Finally, our analysis identified an individual’s disposition to trust (i.e. trust propensity) as significantly predicting (1) the three trustworthiness beliefs and (2) the willingness to disclose the four discerned categories of personal information. Surprisingly no significant association was found between trust propensity and adolescents’ trust in the specific commercial website.

AbstractUnderstanding the phenomenology and content of the inhaled N, N, dimethyltryptamine (N, N-DMT) experience is critical to facilitate and support ongoing research and therapeutic models targeting mental health conditions and central nervous system pathology. A qualitative analysis was conducted of all N, N-DMT experiences posted to the r/DMT Reddit community over a 10-year period from 2009 to 2018. A total of 3778 experiences from 3305 posts were included in this study. A median dose of N, N-DMT of 40.0 mg [interquartile range (IQR), 27.5 to 50.0] and a median experience duration of 10 min (IQR, 5.0 to 15.0) were identified. The most common somatic effects were somaesthesias (n = 1415, 37.5%) and an auditory ringing (n = 583, 15.4%). Visualizations predominantly consisted of fractals, shapes, patterns (n = 1231, 32.6%) and vivid colours (n = 953, 25.2%). Entity encounters were reported in 45.5% (n = 1719) of the experiences and involved predominantly a feminine phenotype (n = 416, 24.2%); deities (n = 293, 17.0%); aliens (n = 281, 16.3%); creature-based entities (n = 158, 9.2%, including reptilian and insectoid beings); mythological beings (n = 144, 8.4%, including machine elves); and jesters (n = 112, 6.5%). Entity interactions were predominantly positive (n = 600, 34.9% of encounters) involving benevolent, comforting, protecting, or outwardly caring interactions. A companion-type, pedagogical, or guide-type interaction was identified 32.4% of encounters (n = 557). Common typology, architecture, and structural features of the “DMT world” included descriptions of alternate or higher dimensions (n = 952, 25.2%); rooms [n = 582, 15.4%, including the “waiting room” (n = 105, 2.8%)], and a tunnel (n = 390, 10.3%). Features of mystical and ego-dissolution experiences were common. Additional rewarding aspects were identified, including a sense of familiarity and the acceptance/removal of the fear of death. Challenging and difficult responses were less frequent but also documented. Statements of profundity were identified in 232 experiences (6.1%), including pronouncing the experience or an aspect of the experience as the most “beautiful” or feeling the most “beautiful” of their life (n = 47, 1.2%). This study identified common phenomenological themes and content of naturalistic inhaled N, N-DMT experiences. Major thematic domains included (1) physical and somatic experiences; (2) visualizations and imagery; (3) entity encounters including entity phenotype, descriptors, attributes, disposition, and characteristics of the interaction; (4) typology, architectural features, structural characteristics, and scenery of the “DMT world”; (5) alerations in consciousness (including mystical experiences, out-of-body experiences, and ego-dissolution); (6) emotional responses (including positive, rewarding, difficult, and challenging); and (7) statements of profundity.

‘We are faced today with an entire system of communication technology which is the perfect medium to host and transfer the very programs designed to destroy the functionality of the system.’ (IBM Researcher: Sarah Gordon, 1995) Despite renewed interest in open source code, the openness of the information space is nothing new in terms of the free flow of information. The transitive and nonlinear configuration of data flow has ceaselessly facilitated the sharing of code. The openness of the info-space encourages a free distribution model, which has become central to numerous developments through the abundant supply of freeware, shareware and source code. Key moments in open source history include the release in 1998 of Netscape’s Communicator source code, a clear attempt to stimulate browser development. More recently in February 2004 the ‘partial leaking’ of Microsoft Windows 2000 and NT 4.0 source code demonstrated the often-hostile disposition of open culture and the potential threat it poses to existing corporate business models. However, the leading exponents of the open source ethic predate these events by more than a decade. As an extension of the hacker, the virus writer has managed, since the 1980s, to bend the shape of info-space beyond recognition. By freely spreading viruses, worms and hacker programs across the globe, virus writers have provided researchers with a remarkable set of digital footprints to follow. The virus has, as IBM researcher Sarah Gordon points out, exposed the info-space as a ‘perfect medium’ rife for malicious viral infection. This paper argues that viral technologies can hold info-space hostage to the uncertain undercurrents of information itself. As such, despite mercantile efforts to capture the spirit of openness, the info-space finds itself frequently in a state far-from-equilibrium. It is open to often-unmanageable viral fluctuations, which produce levels of spontaneity, uncertainty and emergent order. So while corporations look to capture the perpetual, flexible and friction-free income streams from centralised information flows, viral code acts as an anarchic, acentred Deleuzian rhizome. It thrives on the openness of info-space, producing a paradoxical counterpoint to a corporatised information society and its attempt to steer the info-machine. The Virus in the Open System Fred Cohen’s 1984 doctoral thesis on the computer virus locates three key features of openness that makes viral propagation possible (see Louw and Duffy, 1992 pp. 13-14) and predicts a condition common to everyday user experience of info-space. Firstly, the virus flourishes because of the computer’s capacity for information sharing_; transitive flows of code between nodes via discs, connected media, network links, user input and software use. In the process of information transfer the ‘witting and unwitting’ cooperation of users and computers is a necessary determinant of viral infection. Secondly, information flow must be _interpreted._ Before execution computers interpret incoming information as a series of instructions (strings of bits). However, before execution, there is no fundamental distinction between information received, and as such, information has no _meaning until it has been executed. Thus, the interpretation of information does not differentiate between a program and a virus. Thirdly, the alterability or manipulability of the information process allows the virus to modify information. For example, advanced polymorphic viruses avoid detection by using non-significant, or redundant code, to randomly encrypt and decrypt themselves. Cohen concludes that the only defence available to combat viral spread is the ‘limited transitivity of information flow’. However, a reduction in flow is contrary to the needs of the system and leads ultimately to the unacceptable limitation of sharing (Cohen, 1991). As Cohen states ‘To be perfectly secure against viral attacks, a system must protect against incoming information flow, while to be secure against leakage of information a system must protect against outgoing information flow. In order for systems to allow sharing, there must be some information flow. It is therefore the major conclusion of this paper that the goals of sharing in a general purpose multilevel security system may be in such direct opposition to the goals of viral security as to make their reconciliation and coexistence impossible.’ Cohen’s research does not simply end with the eradication of the virus via the limitation of openness, but instead leads to a contentious idea concerning the benevolent properties of viral computing and the potential legitimacy of ‘friendly contagion’. Cohen looks beyond the malevolent enemy of the open network to a benevolent solution. The viral ecosystem is an alternative to Turing-von Neumann capability. Key to this system is a benevolent virus,_ which epitomise the ethic of open culture. Drawing upon a biological analogy, benevolent viral computing _reproduces in order to accomplish its goals; the computing environment evolving_ rather than being ‘designed every step of the way’ (see Zetter, 2000). The _viral ecosystem_ demonstrates how the spread of viruses can purposely _evolve through the computational space using the shared processing power of all host machines. Information enters the host machine via infection and a translator program alerts the user. The benevolent virus_ passes through the host machine with any additional modifications made by the _infected_ _user. The End of Empirical Virus Research? Cohen claims that his research into ‘friendly contagion’ has been thwarted by network administrators and policy makers (See Levy, 1992 in Spiller, 2002) whose ‘apparent fear reaction’ to early experiments resulted in trying to solve technical problems with policy solutions. However, following a significant increase in malicious viral attacks, with estimated costs to the IT industry of $13 billion in 2001 (Pipkin, 2003 p. 41), research into legitimate viruses has not surprisingly shifted from the centre to the fringes of the computer science community (see Dibbell, 1995)._ _Current reputable and subsequently funded research tends to focus on efforts by the anti-virus community to develop computer hygiene. Nevertheless, malevolent or benevolent viral technology provides researchers with a valuable recourse. The virus draws analysis towards specific questions concerning the nature of information and the culture of openness. What follows is a delineation of a range of approaches, which endeavour to provide some answers. Virus as a Cultural Metaphor Sean Cubitt (in Dovey, 1996 pp. 31-58) positions the virus as a contradictory cultural element, lodged between the effective management of info-space and the potential for spontaneous transformation. However, distinct from Cohen’s aspectual analogy, Cubitt’s often-frivolous viral metaphor overflows with political meaning. He replaces the concept of information with a space of representation, which elevates the virus from empirical experience to a linguistic construct of reality. The invasive and contagious properties of the biological parasite are metaphorically transferred to viral technology; the computer virus is thus imbued with an alien otherness. Cubitt’s cultural discourse typically reflects humanist fears of being subjected to increasing levels of technological autonomy. The openness of info-space is determined by a managed society aiming to ‘provide the grounds for mutation’ (p. 46) necessary for profitable production. Yet the virus, as a possible consequence of that desire, becomes a potential opposition to ‘ideological formations’. Like Cohen, Cubitt concludes that the virus will always exist if the paths of sharing remain open to information flow. ‘Somehow’, Cubitt argues, ‘the net must be managed in such a way as to be both open and closed. Therefore, openness is obligatory and although, from the point of view of the administrator, it is a recipe for ‘anarchy, for chaos, for breakdown, for abjection’, the ‘closure’ of the network, despite eradicating the virus, ‘means that no benefits can accrue’ (p.55). Virus as a Bodily Extension From a virus writing perspective it is, arguably, the potential for free movement in the openness of info-space that that motivates the spread of viruses. As one writer infamously stated it is ‘the idea of making a program that would travel on its own, and go to places its creator could never go’ that inspires the spreading of viruses (see Gordon, 1993). In a defiant stand against the physical limitations of bodily movement from Eastern Europe to the US, the Bulgarian virus writer, the Dark Avenger, contended that ‘the American government can stop me from going to the US, but they can’t stop my virus’. This McLuhanesque conception of the virus, as a bodily extension (see McLuhan, 1964), is picked up on by Baudrillard in Cool Memories_ _(1990). He considers the computer virus as an ‘ultra-modern form of communication which does not distinguish, according to McLuhan, between the information itself and its carrier.’ To Baudrillard the prosperous proliferation of the virus is the result of its ability to be both the medium and the message. As such the virus is a pure form of information. The Virus as Information Like Cohen, Claude Shannon looks to the biological analogy, but argues that we have the potential to learn more about information transmission in artificial and natural systems by looking at difference rather than resemblance (see Campbell, 1982). One of the key aspects of this approach is the concept of redundancy. The theory of information argues that the patterns produced by the transmission of information are likely to travel in an entropic mode, from the unmixed to the mixed – from information to noise. Shannon’s concept of redundancy ensures that noise is diminished in a system of communication. Redundancy encodes information so that the receiver can successfully decode the message, holding back the entropic tide. Shannon considers the transmission of messages in the brain as highly redundant since it manages to obtain ‘overall reliability using unreliable components’ (in Campbell, 1982 p. 191). While computing uses redundancy to encode messages, compared to transmissions of biological information, it is fairly primitive. Unlike the brain, Turing-von-Neumann computation is inflexible and literal minded. In the brain information transmission relies not only on deterministic external input, but also self-directed spontaneity and uncertain electro-chemical pulses. Nevertheless, while Shannon’s binary code is constrained to a finite set of syntactic rules, it can produce an infinite number of possibilities. Indeed, the virus makes good use of redundancy to ensure its successful propagation. The polymorphic virus is not simply a chaotic, delinquent noise, but a decidedly redundant form of communication, which uses non-significant code to randomly flip itself over to avoid detection. Viral code thrives on the infinite potential of algorithmic computing; the open, flexible and undecidable grammar of the algorithm allows the virus to spread, infect and evolve. The polymorphic virus can encrypt and decrypt itself so as to avoid anti-viral scanners checking for known viral signatures from the phylum of code known to anti-virus researchers. As such, it is a raw form of Artificial Intelligence, relying on redundant inflexible_ _code programmed to act randomly, ignore or even forget information. Towards a Concept of Rhizomatic Viral Computation Using the concept of the rhizome Deleuze and Guattari (1987 p. 79) challenge the relation between noise and pattern established in information theory. They suggest that redundancy is not merely a ‘limitative condition’, but is key to the transmission of the message itself. Measuring up the efficiency of a highly redundant viral transmission against the ‘splendour’ of the short-term memory of a rhizomatic message, it is possible to draw some conclusions from their intervention. On the surface, the entropic tendency appears to be towards the mixed and the running down of the system’s energy. However, entropy is not the answer since information is not energy; it cannot be conserved, it can be created and destroyed. By definition information is something new, something that adds to existing information (see Campbell, 1982 p. 231), yet efficient information transmission creates invariance in a variant environment. In this sense, the pseudo-randomness of viral code, which pre-programs elements of uncertainty and free action into its propagation, challenges the efforts to make information centralised, structured and ordered. It does this by placing redundant noise within its message pattern. The virus readily ruptures the patterned symmetry of info-space and in terms of information produces something new. Viral transmission is pure information as its objective is to replicate itself throughout info-space; it mutates the space as well as itself. In a rhizomatic mode the anarchic virus is without a central agency; it is a profound rejection of all Generals and power centres. Viral infection, like the rhizomatic network, is made up of ‘finite networks of automata in which communication runs from any neighbour to any other’. Viral spread flows along non-pre-existent ‘channels of communication’ (1987 p. 17). Furthermore, while efforts are made to striate the virus using anti-viral techniques, there is growing evidence that viral information not only wants to be free, but is free to do as it likes. About the Author Tony Sampson is a Senior Lecturer and Course Tutor in Multimedia & Digital Culture, School of Cultural and Innovation Studies at the University of East London, UK Email: t.d.sampson@uel.ac.uk Citation reference for this article MLA Style Sampson, Tony. "A Virus in Info-Space" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture <http://www.media-culture.org.au/0406/07_Sampson.php>. APA Style Sampson, T. (2004, Jul1). A Virus in Info-Space. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 7, <http://www.media-culture.org.au/0406/07_Sampson.php>

In the summer of 1944, American Sergeant Paul Dorsey was hired by the Naval Aviation Photography Unit (NAPU) to capture “the Marines’ bitter struggle against their determined foe” in the Pacific islands (Philips 43). Dorsey had been a photographer and photojournalist before enlisting in the Marines, and was thus well placed to fulfil the NAPU’s remit of creating positive images of American forces in the Pacific. Under the editorial and professional guidance of Edward Steichen, NAPU photographers like Dorsey provided epic images of battle (especially from the air and sea), and also showed American forces at ease – sunbathing, swimming, drinking and relaxing together (Bachner At Ease; Bachner Men of WWII). Steichen – by now a lieutenant commander – oversaw the entire NAPU project by developing, choosing and editing the images, and also providing captions for their reproduction in popular newspapers and magazines such as LIFE. Under his guidance, selected NAPU images were displayed at the famous Power in the Pacific exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New York at the end of the war, and distributed in the popular U.S. Navy War Photographs memorial book which sold over 6 million copies in 1945.While the original NAPU photographers (Steichen himself, Charles Kerlee, Horace Bristol, Wayne Miller, Charles Fenno Jacobs, Victor Jorgensen and Dwight Long) had been at work in the Pacific since the summer of 1942, Dorsey was hired specifically to document the advance of American Marines through the Marianas and Volcano Islands. In line with the NAPU’s remit, Dorsey provided a number of famous rear view shots of combat action on Guam, Saipan and Iwo Jima. However, there are a number of his photographs that do not fit easily within that vision of war – images of wounded Marines and dead Japanese soldiers, as well as shots of abject Japanese POWs with their heads bowed and faces averted. It is this last group of enemy images that proves the most interesting, for not only do they trouble NAPU’s explicit propaganda framework, they also challenge our traditional assumption that photography is an inert form of representation.It is not hard to imagine that photographs of abject Japanese POWs reinforced feelings of triumph, conquest and justice that circulated in America’s post-war victory culture. Indeed, images of emaciated and incarcerated Japanese soldiers provided the perfect contrast to the hyper-masculine, hard-bodied, beefcake figures that populated the NAPU photographs and symbolized American power in the Pacific. However, once Japan was rehabilitated into a powerful American ally, and the decision to drop the atomic bomb was questioned once again in America’s Culture Wars of the 1980s and 90s, it was no longer acceptable to feel triumphant in the face of Japanese abjection and suffering. Instead, these images helped foster a new kind of belated patriotism – and a new global disposition – in which Americans generated their own magnanimity by expressing pity, compassion and sympathy for victims of their previous foreign policy decisions (Lisle).While that patriotic interpretive framework tells us much about how dominant formations of American identity are secured by the production – especially the visual production – of enemy others, it cannot account for images or viewer interpretations that exceed, unwork, or disrupt war’s foundational logics of friend/enemy and perpetrator/victim. I focus on Dorsey because he offers one such ‘deviant’ image: This photograph was taken by Dorsey on Guam in July 1944, and its caption tells us that the Japanese prisoner “waits to be questioned by intelligence officers” (Philips 189). As the POW looks into Dorsey’s camera lens (and therefore at us, the viewers), he is subject to the collective gaze of the American marines situated behind him, and presumably others that lay out of the frame, behind Dorsey. What is fascinating about this particular image is the prisoner’s refusal to obey the trope of abjection so readily assumed by other Japanese POWs documented in the NAPU archive and in other popular war-time imagery. Indeed, when I first encountered this image I immediately framed the POW’s return gaze as defiant – a challenging, bold, and forceful reply to American aggression in the Pacific. The problem, of course, was that this resistant gaze soon became reductive; that is, by replicating war’s foundational logics of difference it effaced a number of other dispositions at work in the photograph. What I find compelling about the POW’s return gaze is its refusal to be contained within the available subject positions of either ‘abject POW’ or ‘defiant resistor’. Indeed, this unruliness is what keeps me coming back to Dorsey’s image, for it teaches us that photography itself always exceeds the conventional assumption that it is a static form of visual representation.Photography, Animation, MovementThe connections between movement, stillness and photography have two important starting points. The first, and more general, is Walter Benjamin’s concept of the dialectic image in which the past and the present come together “in a flash” and constitute what he calls “dialectics at a standstill” (N3.1; 463). Unlike Theodore Adorno, who lamented Benjamin’s Medusa-like tendency to turn the world to stone, I read Benjamin’s concept of standstill – of stillness in general – as something fizzing and pulsating with “political electricity” (Adorno 227-42; Buck-Morss 219). This is to deny our most basic assumption about photography: that it is an inert visual form that freezes and captures discrete moments in time and space. My central argument is that photography’s assumed stillness is always constituted by a number of potential and actual mobilities that continually suture and re-suture viewing subjects and images into one another.Developing Benjamin’s idea of a the past and present coming together “in a flash”, Roland Barthes provides the second starting point with his notion of the punctum of photography: “this element which rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me” (25). Conventional understandings of the punctum frame it as a static moment – so powerful that it freezes the viewer, stops them in their tracks, and captures their attention. My point is that the affective punch of the photograph is not a frozen moment at all; rather, the punctum – like the dialectic image – is fizzing with political electricity. Therefore, to suggest that a viewing subject is arrested in the moment of perception – that they are somehow captured by a photograph’s meaning – is to mistakenly understand the act of looking as a static behaviour.I want to use Dorsey’s image of the POW to push these theoretical starting points and explore the mobile dispositions that are generated when a viewing subject encounters a photograph. What most interests me about Dorsey’s photograph is the level of animation it produces. The POW’s return gaze is actually rather blank: it is unclear whether he is angry, weary, bored, insane or none of the above. But it is the viewing subject’s anxiety at such ambivalence – such unknowability – that provokes a powerful desire to name it. The visceral sensations and emotional responses provoked in viewers (are we taken aback? Do we sympathize with the POW? Are we equally blank?) very quickly become settled interpretations, for example, “his defiant gaze resists American power.” What I want to do is explore the pre-interpretive moment when images like Dorsey’s reach out and grab us – for it is in that moment that photography’s “political electricity” reveals itself most clearly.Production, Signification, InterpretationThe mobility inherent in the photograph has an important antecedent at the level of production. Since the Brownie camera was introduced in WWI, photographers have carried their mode of representation with them – in Dorsey’s case, his portable camera was carried with him as he travelled with the Marines through the Pacific (Philips 29). It is the photographer’s itinerary – his or her movement prior to clicking the camera’s shutter – that shapes and determines a photograph’s content. More to the point, the action of clicking the camera’s shutter is never an isolated moment; rather, it is punctured by all of the previous clicks and moments leading up to it – especially on a long photographic assignment like Dorsey’s – and contains within it all of the subsequent clicks and moments that potentially come after it. In this sense, the photographer’s click recalls Benjamin: it is a “charged force field of past and present” (Buck-Morss 219). That complicated temporality is also manifested in the photographer’s contact sheet (or, more recently, computer file) which operates as a visual travelogue of discrete moments that bleed into one another.The mobility inherent in photography extends itself into the level of signification; that is, the arrangements of signs depicted within the frame of each discrete image. Critic Gilberto Perez gives us a clue to this mobility in his comments about Eugène Atget’s famous ‘painterly’ photographs of Paris:A photograph begins with the mobility, or at least potential mobility, of the world’s materials, of the things reproduced from reality, and turns that into a still image. More readily than in a painting, we see things in a photograph, even statues, as being on the point of movement, for these things belong to the world of flux from which the image has been extracted (328).I agree that the origin point of a photograph is potential mobility, but that mobility is never completely vanquished when it is turned into a still image. For me, photographs – no matter what they depict – are always saturated with the “potential mobility of the world’s materials”, and in this sense they are never still. Indeed, the world of flux out of which the image is extracted includes the image itself, and in that sense, an image can never be isolated from the world it is derived from. If we follow Perez and characterize the world as one of flux, but then insist that the photograph can never be extracted from that world, it follows that the photograph, too, is characterized by fluctuation and change – in short, by mobility. The point, here, is to read a photograph counter intuitively – not as an arrest of movement or a freezing of time, but as a collection of signs that is always potentially mobile. This is what Roland Barthes was hinting at when he suggested that a photograph is “a mad image, chafed by reality”: any photograph is haunted by absence because the depicted object is no longer present, but it is also full of certainty that the depicted object did exist at a previous time and place (113-15). This is precisely Benjamin’s point as well, that “what has been comes together with the now” (N3.1; 463). Following on from Barthes and Benjamin, I want to argue that photographs don’t freeze a moment in time, but instead set in motion a continual journey between feelings of absence in the present (i.e. “it is not there”) and present imaginings of the past (i.e. “but it has indeed been”).As Barthes’ notion of the punctum reveals, the most powerful register at which photography’s inherent mobility operates is in the sensations, responses and feelings provoked in viewers. This is why we say that a photograph has the capacity to move us: the best images take us from one emotional state (e.g. passive, curious, bored) and carry us into another (e.g. shocked, sad, amused). It is this emotional terrain of our responses to photography that both Roland Barthes and Susan Sontag have explored in depth. Why are we moved by some images and not others? Are documentary or artistic photographs more likely to reach out and prick us? What is the most appropriate or ethical response to pictures of another’s suffering?Sontag suggests a different connection between photography and mobility in that it enables a particular touristification of the world; that is, cameras help “convert the world into a department store or museum-without-walls in which every subject is depreciated into an article of consumption, promoted to an item for aesthetic appreciation” (On Photography 110). While Sontag’s political economy of photography (with its Frankfurt School echo) continues to be explored by anthropologists and scholars in Tourism Studies, I want to argue that it offers a particularly reductive account of photography’s potential mobilities. While Sontag does address photography’s constitutive and rather complex relationship with reality, she still conceives of photographs themselves as static and inert representations. Indeed, what she wrestled with in On Photography was the “insolent, poignant stasis of each photograph”, and the photograph’s capacity to make reality “stand still” (111-12; 163). The problem with such a view is that it limits our account of interpretation; in short, it suggests that viewers either accept a photograph’s static message (and are thus moved), or reject it (and remain unmoved). But the moving, here, is the sole prerogative of the viewer: there is no sense in which the photograph and its contents are themselves mobile. I want to argue that the relationships established in the act of looking between viewing subjects and the objects contained within an image are much more complex and varied than Sontag’s framework suggests. Photography’s Affective MobilityTo reveal the mobilities underscoring photography’s affective punch, we must redistribute its more familiar power relations through W.J.T. Mitchell’s important question: what do pictures want? Such a question subverts our usual approach to photographs (i.e. what do we want from photographs?) by redeploying the privileged agency of the viewer into the image itself. In other words, it is the image that demands something of the viewer rather than the other way around. What it demands, of course, is a response. Certainly this is an emotional response, for even being bored by a photograph is a response of sorts. But an emotional response is also an affective response, which means that the punch carried by a photograph is as physical as it is metaphorical or visual. Indeed, it is precisely in the act of perception, where the emotional and the affective fuse, that photography’s assumed stillness is powerfully subverted.If Mitchell animates the picture by affording it some of the viewer’s agency, then Gilles Deleuze goes one step further by exploring what happens to agency in the act of perception. For Deleuze, a work of art – for our purposes, a photograph – is not an inert or still document, but rather a “block of sensations” (Deleuze; Deleuze & Guattari; Bogue). It is not a finished object produced by an autonomous artist or beheld in its entirety by an autonomous viewer; rather, it is a combination of precepts (initial perceptions) and affects (physical intensities) that passes through all subjects at the point of visual perception. This kind of relational encounter with an image not only deconstructs Modernity’s foundational distinction between the subject and the object, it also opens up an affective connection between all subjects engaged in the act of looking; in this case, the photographer, the subjects and objects within the photograph and the viewer.From Deleuze, we know that perception is characterized by common physical responses in all subjects: the movement of the optic nerve, the dilation of the pupil, the squint of the eyelid, the craning of the neck to see up close. However small, however imperceptible, these physical sensations are all still movements; indeed, they are movements repeated by all seeing subjects. My point is that these imperceptible modes of attention are consistently engaged in the act of viewing photographs. What this suggests is that taking account of the affective level of perception changes our traditional understandings of interpretation; indeed, even if a photograph fails to move us emotionally, it certainly moves us physically, though we may not be conscious of it.Drawing from Mitchell and Deleuze, then, we can say that a photograph’s “insolent, poignant stasis” makes no sense. A photograph is constantly animated not just by the potentials inherent in its enframed subjects and objects, but more importantly, in the acts of perception undertaken by viewers. Certainly some photographs move us emotionally – to tears, to laughter, to rage – and indeed, this emotional terrain is where Barthes and Sontag offer important insights. My point is that all photographs, no matter what they depict, move us physically through the act of perception. If we take Mitchell’s question seriously and extend agency to the photograph, then it is in the affective register that we can discern a more relational encounter between subjects and objects because both are in a constant state of mobility.Ambivalence and ParalysisHow might Mitchell’s question apply to Dorsey’s photograph? What does this image want from us? What does it demand from our acts of looking? The dispersed account of agency put forward by Mitchell suggests that the act of looking can never be contained within the subject; indeed, what is produced in each act of looking is some kind of subject-object-world assemblage in which each component is characterised by its potential and actual mobilities. With respect to Dorsey’s image, then, the multiple lines of sight at work in the photograph indicate multiple – and mobile – relationalities. Primarily, there is the relationship between the viewer – any potential viewer – and the photograph. If we follow Mitchell’s line of questioning, however, we need to ask how the photograph itself shapes the emotive and affective experience of visual interpretation – how the photograph’s demand is transmitted to the viewer.Firstly, this demand is channelled through Dorsey’s line of sight that extends through his camera’s viewfinder and into the formal elements of the photograph: the focused POW in the foreground, the blurred figures in the background, the light and shade on the subjects’ clothing and skin, the battle scarred terrain, and the position of these elements within the viewfinder’s frame. As viewers we cannot see Dorsey, but his presence fills – and indeed constitutes – the photograph. Secondly, the photograph’s demand is channelled through the POW’s line of sight that extends to Dorsey (who is both photographer and marine Sergeant), and potentially through his camera to imagined viewers. It is precisely the return gaze of the POW that packs such an affective punch – not because of what it means, but rather because of how it makes us feel emotionally and physically. While a conventional account would understand this affective punch as shocking, stopping or capturing the viewer, I want to argue it does the opposite – it suddenly reveals the fizzing, vibrant mobilities that transmit the picture to us, and us to the picture.There are, I think, important lessons for us in Dorsey’s photograph. It is a powerful antecedent to Judith Butler’s exploration of the Abu Graib images, and her repetition of Sontag’s question of “whether the tortured can and do look back, and what do they see when they look at us” (966). The POW’s gaze provides an answer to the first part of this question – they certainly do look back. But as to what they see when they look back at us, that question can only be answered if we redistribute both agency and mobility into the photograph to empower and mobilize the tortured, the abject, and the objectified.That leaves us with Sontag’s much more vexing question of what we do after we look at photographs. As Butler explains, Sontag has denounced the photograph “precisely because it enrages without directing the rage, and so excites our moral sentiments at the same time that it confirms our political paralysis” (966). This sets up an important challenge for us: in refusing conventional understandings of photography as a still visual art, how can we use more dispersed accounts of agency and mobility to work through the political paralysis that Sontag identifies. AcknowledgementsPaul Dorsey’s photograph of the Japanese POW is # 80-G-475166 in the NAPU archive, and is reproduced here courtesy of the United States National Archives.ReferencesAdorno, Theodore. Prisms. 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