Статті в журналах з теми "Democratization AND Democratisation"

This study employs four-dimensional and one composite indices of democratization constructed to capture the democratization processes in Nigeria’s transition polity, to investigate the empirical relationships between the levels of democratization in Nigeria and two economic growth variables – domestic savings and domestic investment. As would be expected, the findings do not settle the debate in any direction. However, they could shed some light on the differences between the dimensional and the overall effects of democratization on economic variables. The results of the analyses show that the short-run responses of growth variables to changes in democratization may differ from their long-run responses.

This paper aims to explore the role of democratisation in the socio-economic and political empowerment of women from various walks of life. Women were and are still one of the marginalised groups in the globe. Prior to democratisation, women’s authentic voices and identities were abridged to subservience and their societal roles were, predominately, pinned to domesticity whereas their male counterparts relished in administrative dominance. It is the advent of the democratic jurisdiction that occasioned and championed equality amongst men and women in socio-economic and political spaces. This democratisation authorised and empowered women to assert and reassert their identities, which are, sometimes, questioned, berated and shunned despite the autonomous dispensation. This is evinced by the appalling patriarchal, sexist and misogynistic attitudes that menace the women’s rise and impact in society in the present day. The paper employs a qualitative method guided by textual analysis to probe into democratisation as a catalyst for women empowerment from a literary perspective. It selects and utilises Nadine Gordimer’s None to Accompany Me as a case in point to crystalise the focal theme of the study. Furthermore, the study scrutinises Gordimer’s literary work above, which is a reflection of democratisation as an impulse for women empowerment with a feminist lens. This paper, among other things, finds that whilst democratisation has aided and granted women rights to create a platform to authenticate their voices and reconstruct their identities, it has not utterly liberated the women from socio-economic and political maladies.

The scholarly literature on democratic transitions has largely ignored developments at the local level and the relationship between federalism and democracy. In this work I examine the development of federalism in Russia and I assess the impact of Russia’s highly asymmetrical form of federalism on democratisation. The study shows that federalism far from promoting democracy has allowed authoritarianism to flourish in many of Russia’s eighty nine regions and republics. Federalism and democratization in Russia exist in contradiction rather than harmony. In a vicious circle, authoritarianism at the centre has been nourished by authoritarianism in the region and vice versa. “Elective dictatorships” and “delegative democracies” are now well entrenched in many republics, and mini-presidential systems are firmly established in a majority of the regions.

This paper focuses on the gender dimension of the transition processes of Western and Eastern Europe, which is viewed from the perspective of democratization processes, i. e. waves of democratization. Adding gender perspective to the analysis, results in the reconceptualization of the democratic approach to the transitional processes. As proposed by Charles Tilly, it requires an alternative approach such as de-democratisation. Some examples of countries with a chosen Western and Eastern European transitions system include: Spain, Portugal, Poland, and Romania. During the last fifty years, they showed how politics concerning reproductive rights, especially on the issue of abortion, differentiate between the real shape and the direction of transition processes which leads either to democratization or its complete opposite.

This paper analyses the significant role the civil society groups (CSGs) played in the democratisation process in Nigeria between 1960 and 2007. The paper discovers that the CSGs made use of the conceptual mechanism in the democratisation process of Nigeria. The conceptual mechanism allowed the CSGs to inject such important concepts as accountability, rule of law, democracy, transparency, human rights and due process into the democratisation process between 1960 and 2007. These concepts were used to tackle some of the major democratization challenges, such as corruption, religious crisis and governance that confronted Nigeria between 1960 and 2007. By using the historical methodology, the paper analyses the crucial role the CSGs played in both the civilian and military administrations thatgoverned Nigeria between 1960 and 2007. The central thrust of the paper is to show how the CSGs contributed to the enthronement of democracy and democratic practices in Nigeria.

This paper focus on examining the transformation of Islamic activism in North Sumatra especially their movement, which was echoed by the Aksi Bela Islam in Jakarta 2016, in this region in post- punishment of Basuki Tjahaja Purnama between 2017 and 2018. The study analyses their movement in keeping the narration of politics, discourse of intimidated Islam, and then all these have been capitalised for political interest in regional election such as governor election in North Sumatra 2018. The study is approached by social movement theory, Islamic social movement, and then being related to the project of democratization and the contemporary narration of Indonesia nationalism. This study argues that firstly, this movement is still going on move longer than many scholar predicted because their ability to keep discourse and analize political structure opportunity. Secondly, fragmentation in the body of movement can not be avoided because working disorientation and their relation with political elit and electoral politics. Third, the shadow of this movement existence remains a big challenge for democratization project in North Sumatra and generally Indonesia.

This review article brings together six recent books on democratisation. They cover Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, East Central Europe and the Balkans, Eurasia, and East and South East Asia. The review asks what we can learn from reading about democratisation in different parts of the world. The aim is twofold: to identify regionally specific processes of democratisation and to explore cross-regional commonalities. When viewed in combination, these regional studies of democratisation reveal the limitations of area studies and the need for comparative area studies. Cheeseman N (2015) Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hale H (2015) Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hsin-Huang MH (ed.) (2014) Democracy or Alternative Political Systems in Asia: After the Strongmen. London: Routledge. Mainwaring S and Pérez-Liñán A (2013) Democracies and Dictatorship in Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Petrovic M (2013) The Democratic Transition of Post-Communist Europe: In the Shadow of Communist Differences and Uneven Europeanisation. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Sadiki L (ed.) (2015) Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization. London: Routledge.

ABSTRACT Democracy and development are key concepts in the developmental discourse, and they are considered crucial to a sustainable developmental strategy. This study thus appraised the nexus between democracy and development in Nigeria. The study utilized content analysis and descriptive method to actualize the objectives of the research. This study revealed that absence of democratic paraphernalia like free and fair election, rule of law, constitutionalism among others, have constituted series of misunderstandings in the tenets and principles of liberal democracy, especially in Nigeria. The study further ascertained that factors such as: poor state of economy, high level of unemployment, illiteracy, ignorance, ethnicity, tribalism, ethno-religious crises, and poverty have coalesced to constitute impediments to the smooth and effective operation of democracy in Nigeria, with serious implications for democratization and sustainable development. Among others, the study recommends political, structural and institutional reforms of the Nigerian state in a manner that promote and deepen democracy and national development.

The earthquake off the west coast of Sumatra on 26 December 2004 unleashed a tsunami in the Indian Ocean that affected more than a dozen countries throughout South and Southeast Asia and stretched as far as the northeastern coast of Africa. The two worst affected areas - North-East Sri Lanka and the Aceh region in Indonesia - have both been marked by protracted intra-state armed conflicts. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, international journalists and humanitarian actors argued that the disaster could actually constitute and opportunity for conflict resolution, as the scale and urgency of humanitarian needs should bring the protagonists together in joint efforts for relief, reconstruction and conflict resolution. In contrast, research on the impacts of natural disasters often concludes that disasters tend to deepen rather than resolve conflicts. Four years after the tsunami it can be observed that Aceh and North-East Sri Lanka have followed highly divergent trajectories. In Aceh, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Indonesia and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) was signed shortly after the tsunami and has been followed by peace and a process od political integration into Indonesian democracy. In Sri Lanka, the tsunami created a humanitarian pause from the gradual escalation of hostilities and an attempt to create a joint mechanism between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for handling humanitarian aid, but Sri Lanka has since the returned to full-scale warfare between the GOSL and LTTE. This brief article, which is based on work in progress, will highlight some key lessons and preliminary conclusions for each of these research quetions: (1) How and to what extent has reconstruction/development been linked to processes of conflict resolution and rights based democratization?; (2) How and to what extent has a process of rights based democratization been related to the parallel processes of revonstruction/development and conflict resolution?; (3) How and to what extent have the parallel processes of reconstruction/development, conflict resolution and democratization generated political transformations of the armed insurgency movements?

The marjaʿiyya is the dominant religious authority structure among Twelver Shiʿis. This study explores the attitudes of ‘lay Shiʿis’ (non-marjaʿs) towards the institution of the marjaʿiyya outside of the Iranian political system. Rather than assuming that the relationship between authority and follower is one-way, it considers that both the marjaʿ and the follower might negotiate the relationship. It examines ‘lay Shiʿis’ commitment towards following a marjaʿ, regional variation, their understanding of religious leadership, and contemporary concerns regarding the marjaʿiyya. Insofar as the marjaʿiyya has undergone roughly three phases of development, a key point of enquiry in this paper is whether or not the marjaʿiyya is undergoing a fourth phase of development as a result of advances in digital technology, the democratisation of knowledge, and the global Shiʿi diaspora. Data for this paper was collected through surveying Shiʿis worldwide as well as interviewing five prominent marājiʿ in Iraq.

The subject of the study is the power policy of the United States and its allies in the fight against international terrorist organisations in Afghanistan, aimed at building a new Afghan society based on the principles of Western democracy. The research focuses on the processes of democratisation, which were implemented in three stages in 2001-2014. The article also describes important events related to democratization – the creation of a political system in Afghanistan loyal to the United States and its allies; the holding of the first presidential and parliamentary elections; the formation of political opposition from different strata of Afghan society; the holding of the second presidential and parliamentary elections in the said country; the development of the political process against the background of the withdrawal of the main foreign contingent in 2014. The author analyses the miscalculations and serious failures of the administration of the United States and NATO related to the formation of a new government of Afghanistan, the organisation of presidential and parliamentary elections, economic recovery, training for Afghan law enforcement agencies and security. The assessment of the actions of the United States related to the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan during the period most dramatic for the population of the country is given. This article is an analysis of the processes of democratisation of Afghan society, revealing individual aspects of each stage carried out within the framework of the military operation of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. The main conclusion of the study is that the United States and its partners have failed to achieve their goals of building an Afghan society based on Western democratic values.

This article aims to analyse how the press has depicted Francisco Sá Carneiro, founder of the Social Democratic Party, regarding his role in the construction of Portuguese democracy. Debates on the Portuguese transition to democracy focus almost invariably on its revolutionary phase and on the relative importance of its actors and agents of change. Nonetheless, little attention has been paid to the role of civilian leaders during or after the 74-75 Revolution. In addition, the impact of the media on the historical memory of the Portuguese transition remains an underexplored research topic. Considering the importance of the media in shaping public opinion and in the process of building the historical memory, we will undertake a qualitative analysis of piece of news published on Sá Carneiro and his role in Portuguese democratization. Our research will focus on Portuguese and Spanish largest newspapers in order to perceive if Sá Carneiro’s memory also changed abroad. This article argues that the press hasn’t paid much attention to Sá Carneiro’s role in the democratisation process, echoing mythologized visions of the centrist leader.

Hungarian public administration culture has traditionally been considered as overtly legalistic and proceduralist, which appears to be in contrast with claims of weakening the rule of law or facing sanctions under Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union. This article offers an overview on the criticisms put forth by academic writers and EU institutions regarding the Hungarian development path and puts them into the wider context of democratization through transaction (transitology, democracy export) theory. The article compares findings of contemporary interventionist authors with the propositions of such iconic writers as Dankwart Rustow (1970) and Samuel P. Huntington (1984) and attempts to connect the dots between these realms of thought. These authors all share the view that democracy shall be exported the more and quicker the better. Transitology, though, has had its critics, while contemporary interventionist theory appears to be rather monolithic without considerable criticism. The article uses the approach of Payne (2006), and of other authors, to question various statements of contemporary interventionists. Not least, recent developments in Afghanistan provide historical evidence that the ambitions of transactional democratisation are predetermined to fall short on non-democratic institutions imposing democracy using non-democratic measures on recipients of various sorts.

Discussions about democratisation have often revolved around the strengthening or weakening phenomenon/notion of democracy. This research is a continuation of previous studies on democratic regression in Indonesia. Charles Tilly (2007) examined democratic regression from democracy and de-democratization theory through the concept of low-capacity democracy. Tilly's perspective argues a low-capacity democratic process occurred during the Joko Widodo administration in Indonesia from 2014 to 2020 when the state implemented the Police as a political instrument to maintain power. As a result, the character of the Police deviated from democratic principles, leading to a problem for police professionalism. The study employs qualitative methods, in which the primary data is obtained from in-depth interviews with several key informants. The secondary data is gathered from scientific works of literature and news in online media. This study indicates how low-capacity democracy developed through: first, the Indonesian regime's intervention and exercise of control by involving and appointing police officers to civilian positions; second, police repression against civil liberties; and third, the Police's justification for their authority and power. Thus, this study confirms Tilly's argument that a low-capacity democratic process occurs when democratic countries pursue undemocratic methods by manipulating the Police as an instrument to strengthen the power of the regime. The recommendation of this study is to strengthen democracy in terms of law enforcement by the supervision of parliament and supervisory institutions to retain the Police’s role as an independent law enforcement institution.

The article is devoted to the role of Shiite clergy in the Islamic revolution and in the political life of Islamic Republic of Iran. The author attempts to analize the possibilities of the Islamic regime’s survival in the context of modernizing society. IRI is a special model of the state system that embodies the idea of the Islamic rule of Imam Khomeini. Its political, socioeconomic, legal spheres are based on Islamic principles. The clergy managed to establish almost absolute control over secular institutions. At the same time, the Iranian regime can not be regarded as the only theocratic. It combines Islamic ideas with republican principles and admits democracy as a form of political participation. Iran’s political system combines elements of the modern Islamic theocracy with republican principles. Over nearly 40-years of its existence (since 1979), the political system underwent certain transformations which were caused by the economic and sociocultural development of the society and external factors. The liberalization of the economic sphere and the development of political parties put on the agenda political changes. Liberal-minded clergy relying on the ideas of religious modernism support the strengthening of democratic elements within the Islamic Republic. Some of them are ready to abandon the principle of “velayat-e faqih” or to reduce the authority of the leader in political sphere. They initiated reforms in political and public sphere.However, the clergy standing on the positions of fundamentalism, is not ready to reduce the Islamic component. They condemn the modernization trends intensified in Iranian society in recent years and are trying to bring the country back to the first post-revolutionary decade. However, the society is not ready to share such approaches. During the recent election campaigns Iranians have supported the liberal forces. The events of early 2018 demonstrated the protest potential of the society.This shows the desire of the citizens for further democratization of the political system and secularization of the public life. Although, there are calls for overthrowing the dictatorship of the clergy among the opposition groups in the West and inside the country. Hopes for the democratisation of the regime have not been lost. If external factors do not have a destructive effect, then the implementation of the Iranian model of modernization can become a reality.

This paper analyzes the Islam Nusantara program of the Islamic Studies Institute of Nahdlatul Ulama (STAINU) and then of the Nahdlatul Ulama University of Indonesia (UNUSIA) that started in 2013. The largest Islamic social organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has emphasized the moderateness and tolerance of Islam in Indonesia and conceptualized its Islam as Islam Nusantara and started to disseminate this concept to stem the deepening conservative turn of Islam especially after the democratization in 1998. In order to disseminate Islam Nusantara more effectively, the NU-affiliated college (STAINU), later its university (UNUSIA) started the graduate program for Islam Nusantara. After elucidating the Islamic conservative turn and the propagation of Islam Nusantara both by NU and the state, this paper analyzes the theses and their abstracts and the biodata of authors of theses and sees how Islam Nusantara has been producing the proponents of Islam Nusantara. The paper finds that the authors of the theses are young and many of the theses analyze the harmonious Islamic adaptation to local cultures. The authors are male dominant and Java-born-dominant with the focus on their own birthplace. The paper concludes with the importance of more comparativeand critical analysis on local variations of Islam Nusantara in the future theses and dissertations so that the program can critically and objectively analyze the Islam Nusantara concept itself. Keyword: Islam Nusantara, Nahdlatul Ulama, UNUSIA Jakarta REFERENCE: Abdul Mun’im DZ. Mengukuhkan Jangkar Islam Nusantara, Tashwirul Afkar no.26, 2008. Abdurrahman Wahid. “Pribumisasi Islam.” Dalam Muntaha Azhari and Abdul Mun’im Saleh, eds. Islam Indonesia Menatap Masa Depan. Jakarta: P3M, 1989. Abdurrahman Wahid. “Melindungi dan Menyantuni Semua Paham.” Dalam Yenny Zannuba Wahid, Ahmad Suaedy et al., eds. Ragam Ekspresi Islam Nusantara. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2008: h. xi-xii. Ahmad Najib Burhani. Islam Nusantara as a Promising Response to Religious Intolerance and Radicalism, Trends in Southeast Asia, 2018. No.21. Ahmad Suaedy. Islam, Minorities and Identity in Southeast Asia. Yogyakarta and Jakarta: inklusif and ISAIs UIN Yogya, 2018. Akhmad Sahal. “Prolog: Kenapa Islam Nusantara?” Dalam Akhmad Sahal dan Munawir Aziz eds. Islam Nusantara dari Ushul Fiqh hingga Paham Kebangsaan. Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2015. Akhmad Sahal dan Munawir Aziz eds. Islam Nusantara dari Ushul Fiqh hingga Paham Kebangsaan. Bandung: Mizan Pustaka, 2015. Anderson, Benedict. A Life Beyond Boundaries. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2016. Azymardi Azra. Islam Nusantara: Jaringan Global dan Lokal. Bandung: Mizan, 2002. Dawam Multazam. “Islam Nusantara, Dari NU untuk Dunia” (artikel diakses pada 10 January 2015 dari http://www.nu.or.id/post/read/60706/islam-nusantara-dari-nu-untuk-dunia). Fealy, Greg. “Nahdlatul Ulama and the Politics Trap.” New Mandala. (diakses pada 12 November 2019 pada https://www.newmandala.org/nahdlatul-ulama-politics-trap/), 2018. Fogg, Kavin W. “The Fate of Muslim Nationalism in Independent Indonesia.” PhD dissertation (Yale University), 2012. Formichi, Chiara. Islam and the Making of the Nation: Kartosuwiryo and Political Islam in 20th Century Indonesia. Leiden and Manoa: KITLV and Hawai’i University Press, 2011. Hefner, Robert W. “Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia.” Dalam Robert W. Hefner ed. Making Modern Muslim: the Politics of Islamic Education in Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009: h. 55-105. Hefner, Robert. W. What Happened to Civil Islam? Islam and Democratisation in Indonesia, 20 Years On. Asian Studies Review. Vol.43. No.3, 2019: h. 375-396. Hoesterey, James Bourk. Public Diplomacy and the Global Dissemination of “Moderate Islam” Dalam Robert W. Hefner ed. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia. London: Routledge, 2018: h. 406-416. IPAC (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict). After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in Indonesia. IPCA Report No.44, 2018. Jadul Maula. Orientasi “Islam Nusantara”: Melahirkan “Insan (Kamil) Nusantara”. Tashwirul Afkar No. 13, 2006. Laffan, Michael, The Makings of Indonesian Islam: Orientalism and the Narration of a Sufi Past. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011. Menchik, Jeremy. Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Nor Huda. Islam Nusantara: Sejarah Sosial Intelektual Islam di Indonesia. Yogyakarta: Ar-Ruzz Media, 2008. Pepinsky, Thomas B., Liddle, William R. and Saiful Mujani. Piety and Public Opinion: Understanding Indonesian Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Power, Thomas P. Jokowi’s Authoritarian Turn and Indonesia’s Democratic Decline. Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 53(3), 2018: h. 307-338. Robison, Richard and Hadiz, Vedi R. Reorganizing Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in An Age of Markets．London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004. Yenny Zannuba Wahid, Ahmad Suaedy et al. eds. Ragam Ekspresi Islam Nusantara. Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2015. Syafiq Hasyim. Islam Nusantara dalam Konteks: Dari Multikultralisma hingga Radkikalisme. Yogyakarta: Gading, 2018. van Bruinessen, Martin ed. Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn". Singapore: ISEAS, 2013. van Bruinessen, Martin. Introduction: Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam and the “Conservative Turn” of the Early Twenty-First Century. Dalam van Bruinessen, Martin ed. Contemporary Developments in Indonesian Islam: Explaining the "Conservative Turn". Singapore: ISEAS, 2013: h.1-20. van Bruinessen, Martin. Indonesian Muslim in a Globalising World: Westernization, Arabisation, and Indigenising Responses. RSIS Working Paper No. 311. Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2018. William Putra Utomo and others. Indonesia Millennial Report 2019. Jakarta: IDN Research Institute, 2019. News: 2013/2/25: STAINU Jakarta Kumpulkan Tim Pakar PPM Islam Nusantara. (diakses pada 10 November 2019 pada https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/43199/stainu-jakarta-kumpulkan-tim-pakar-ppm-islam-nusantara) 2013/7/3: STAINU Jakarta Luncurkan Pascasarjana Islam Nusantara. (diakses pada 10 November 2019 pada https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/45577/stainu-jakarta-luncurkan-pascasarjana-islam-nusantara) 2013/7/4: Islam Nusantara Diharapkan Jadi Solusi Kasus Intoleransi. (diakses pada 13 Desember 2019 pada https://www.merdeka.com/peristiwa/islam-nusantara-diharapkan-jadi-solusi-kasus-intoleransi.html) 2013/7/4: Mahasiswa Thailand Minati Studi Islam Nusantara Indonesia. (diakses pada 11 November 2019 pada https://news.okezone.com/read/2013/07/04/373/831915/mahasiswa-thailand-minati-studi-islam-nusantara-indonesia) 2015/4/14: Imam Aziz: Dunia Butuh NU (diakses pada 11 November 2019 pada https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/58831/imam-aziz-dunia-butuh-nu) 2015/10/9: Pascasarjana Islam Nusantara STAINU Jakarta Mulai Kuliah Perdana Hari Ini. (diakses pada 11 November 2019 pada https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/62673/pascasarjana-islam-nusantara-stainu-jakarta-mulai-kuliah-perdana-hari-ini) 2016/9/3: Siapakah Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah. (diakses pada 11 November 2019 pada https://www.nu.or.id/post/read/70944/siapakah-ahlussunnah-wal-jamaah)

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi is widely known as Mahatma Gandhi due to his noble personality, true sacrifice & great contribution to Indian freedom movement. Gandhi encouraged simplicity in life, abhorred violence and had enough charisma to inspire the masses. This paper tries to examine the nature of Gandhian political ideas about Gandhian democratisation in nationalism and what were these meant for Gandhi and His future vision for India. The paper is divided into 4 parts: 1. Gandhi’s democratization; 2. Gandhi’s civilisational democratization; 3. Individual and community in Gandhi’s point of view and 4. State and swaraj. Received 9th December 2020; Revised 2nd March 2021; Accepted 18th March 2021

In this paper, the role of higher education in post-uprising Libya is analysed in terms of its relationship with transitional processes of democratization and civic development. It begins by contextualising the Libyan uprising within the optimism of the ‘Arab Spring’ transitions in the Middle East. Following this, the relationship between higher education and politics under the Qadhafi regime and in the immediate aftermath of its overthrow is discussed. A case-study of a programme designed to support Tripoli University in contributing towards democratisation will then be presented. The findings of the case-study will be reflected upon to offer a set of recommendations for international actors engaging in political and civic education in conflict-affected settings, in particular in the Middle East.

Este artigo explicita as condições sob quais uma “sociedade civil” pode contribuir para o aprofundamento do regime democrático de um país. Iniciando com um esforço de conceituação de noções que dizem respeito à sociedade civil, democratização e racialidade, a partir das teorias de Antonio Gramsci, Paulo Freire e Jürgen Habermas, demonstro que a capacidade de instituir espaços democráticos includentes é uma das principais vias do aprofundamento democrático. Argumento que o vínculo que une potencialmente sociedade civil e democracia é condicional e precisa ser avaliado empíricamente. Não há, portanto, nenhuma relação necessariamente positiva entre os dois. Demonstro que a avaliação da relação entre qualidade da representação e da participação democrática de grupos historicamente excluídos e marginalizados, como os negros, em organizações da sociedade civil é um elemento que permite avaliar o seu potencial democrático. Analisando a participação dos negros nos processos decisórios e nas posições de mando das ONGs baianas, de forma a captar o grau de representação de negros e sua participação efetiva em tomadas de decisões coletivas, concluo que a maioria das ONGs baianas não aproveita seu potencial democratizante, no sentido de superar a segmentação de raça internamente. Ao contrário, estes grupos reproduzem as formas de exclusão racial que marcam a formação da sociedade brasileira. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: racismo, exclusão social, qualidade do regime democrático, sociedade civil. CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRATIZATION AND RACIAL EXCLUSION IN BRAZIL This paper proposes the conditions under which “civil society” can to contribute to deepen the democratic status of the country. It begins with an attempt to conceptualize the ideas related to civil society, democratization and race, based on Antonio Gramsci, Paulo Freire and Jürgen Habermas’ theories. The paper shows that the capacity of creating inclusive democratic spaces is one of the major paths to democratic deepening. It argues that the potential tie that links civil society and democracy needs to be evaluated on an empirical basis, since there are no positive relationships between them. The paper shows that the evaluation of the relationship between the quality of representation and the democratic participation of historically excluded and marginalized groups, such as the blacks, enables the evaluation of their democratic potential in civil society organizations. It analyzes the participation of the Blacks in the decision-making processes and in leading roles in Bahian NGOs. Thus it was possible to perceive the degree of the Blacks representation and their effective participation in the collective decision making processes. The conclusion reached was that most of the Bahian NGOs do not take profit of their democratizing role to overcome their in-house racial segmentation issue. On the contrary, these groups reproduce the racial exclusion forms that have shaped Brazilian society. KEY WORDS: racism, social exclusion, democratic regime, quality, civil society. SOCIETE CIVILE, DEMOCRATISATION ET EXCLUSION RACIALE AU BRESIL Cet article explicite à partir de quelles conditions une “société civile” peut contribuer à approfondir le régime démocratique d’un pays. A partir d’un effort de conceptualisation des notions relatives à la société civile, démocratisation et racialité, selon les théories d’Antonio Gramsci, de Paulo Freire et de Jürgen Habermas, il est démontré que la capacité d’instituer des espaces démocratiques d’inclusion est une des principales voies de l’approfondissement démocratique. L’argument est que le lien qui unit potentiellement la société civile et la démocratie est conditionnel et doit être évalué empiriquement. Cependant, il n’existe aucune relation obligatoirement positive entre les deux. Je démontre que l’évaluation de la relation entre qualité de la représentation et participation démocratique des groupes, comme les Noirs par exemple, historiquement exclus et marginalisés dans des organisations de la société civile, est un élément qui permet d’en évaluer le potentiel démocratique. L’analyse de la participation des Noirs dans les processus de décision et lorsqu’ils assument des postes de commande dans les ONG bahianaises, permettant de saisir le niveau de représentation des Noirs et de leur participation effective dans les prises de décisions collectives, permet de conclure que la majorité des ONG bahianaises ne profitent pas de leur potentiel de démocratisation, c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne sont pas capables d’aller internement au-delà de la segmentation des races. Au contraire, ces groupes reproduisent les formes d’exclusion raciale qui caractérisent la formation de la société brésilienne. MOTS-CLÉS: racisme, exclusion sociales, qualité du régime démocratique, société civile. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.br

Introduction The highly contagious COVID-19 virus has presented particularly difficult public policy challenges. The relatively late emergence of an effective treatments and vaccines, the structural stresses on health care systems, the lockdowns and the economic dislocations, the evident structural inequalities in effected societies, as well as the difficulty of prevention have tested social and political cohesion. Moreover, the intrusive nature of many prophylactic measures have led to individual liberty and human rights concerns. As noted by the Victorian (Australia) Ombudsman Report on the COVID-19 lockdown in Melbourne, we may be tempted, during a crisis, to view human rights as expendable in the pursuit of saving human lives. This thinking can lead to dangerous territory. It is not unlawful to curtail fundamental rights and freedoms when there are compelling reasons for doing so; human rights are inherently and inseparably a consideration of human lives. (5) These difficulties have raised issues about the importance of social or community capital in fighting the pandemic. This article discusses the impacts of social and community capital and other factors on the governmental efforts to combat the spread of infectious disease through the maintenance of social distancing and household ‘bubbles’. It argues that the beneficial effects of social and community capital towards fighting the pandemic, such as mutual respect and empathy, which underpins such public health measures as social distancing, the use of personal protective equipment, and lockdowns in the USA, have been undermined as preventive measures because they have been transmogrified to become a salient aspect of the “culture wars” (Peters). In contrast, states that have relatively lower social capital such a China have been able to more effectively arrest transmission of the disease because the government was been able to generate and personify a nationalist response to the virus and thus generate a more robust social consensus regarding the efforts to combat the disease. Social Capital and Culture Wars The response to COVID-19 required individuals, families, communities, and other types of groups to refrain from extensive interaction – to stay in their bubble. In these situations, especially given the asymptomatic nature of many COVID-19 infections and the serious imposition lockdowns and social distancing and isolation, the temptation for individuals to breach public health rules in high. From the perspective of policymakers, the response to fighting COVID-19 is a collective action problem. In studying collective action problems, scholars have paid much attention on the role of social and community capital (Ostrom and Ahn 17-35). Ostrom and Ahn comment that social capital “provides a synthesizing approach to how cultural, social, and institutional aspects of communities of various sizes jointly affect their capacity of dealing with collective-action problems” (24). Social capital is regarded as an evolving social type of cultural trait (Fukuyama; Guiso et al.). Adger argues that social capital “captures the nature of social relations” and “provides an explanation for how individuals use their relationships to other actors in societies for their own and for the collective good” (387). The most frequently used definition of social capital is the one proffered by Putnam who regards it as “features of social organization, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam, “Bowling Alone” 65). All these studies suggest that social and community capital has at least two elements: “objective associations” and subjective ties among individuals. Objective associations, or social networks, refer to both formal and informal associations that are formed and engaged in on a voluntary basis by individuals and social groups. Subjective ties or norms, on the other hand, primarily stand for trust and reciprocity (Paxton). High levels of social capital have generally been associated with democratic politics and civil societies whose institutional performance benefits from the coordinated actions and civic culture that has been facilitated by high levels of social capital (Putnam, Democracy 167-9). Alternatively, a “good and fair” state and impartial institutions are important factors in generating and preserving high levels of social capital (Offe 42-87). Yet social capital is not limited to democratic civil societies and research is mixed on whether rising social capital manifests itself in a more vigorous civil society that in turn leads to democratising impulses. Castillo argues that various trust levels for institutions that reinforce submission, hierarchy, and cultural conservatism can be high in authoritarian governments, indicating that high levels of social capital do not necessarily lead to democratic civic societies (Castillo et al.). Roßteutscher concludes after a survey of social capita indicators in authoritarian states that social capital has little effect of democratisation and may in fact reinforce authoritarian rule: in nondemocratic contexts, however, it appears to throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by generating popular support, by suppressing regime threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing undemocratic ideals concerning governance (752). In China, there has been ongoing debate concerning the presence of civil society and the level of social capital found across Chinese society. If one defines civil society as an intermediate associational realm between the state and the family, populated by autonomous organisations which are separate from the state that are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values, it is arguable that the PRC had a significant civil society or social capital in the first few decades after its establishment (White). However, most scholars agree that nascent civil society as well as a more salient social and community capital has emerged in China’s reform era. This was evident after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, where the government welcomed community organising and community-driven donation campaigns for a limited period of time, giving the NGO sector and bottom-up social activism a boost, as evidenced in various policy areas such as disaster relief and rural community development (F. Wu 126; Xu 9). Nevertheless, the CCP and the Chinese state have been effective in maintaining significant control over civil society and autonomous groups without attempting to completely eliminate their autonomy or existence. The dramatic economic and social changes that have occurred since the 1978 Opening have unsurprisingly engendered numerous conflicts across the society. In response, the CCP and State have adjusted political economic policies to meet the changing demands of workers, migrants, the unemployed, minorities, farmers, local artisans, entrepreneurs, and the growing middle class. Often the demands arising from these groups have resulted in policy changes, including compensation. In other circumstances, where these groups remain dissatisfied, the government will tolerate them (ignore them but allow them to continue in the advocacy), or, when the need arises, supress the disaffected groups (F. Wu 2). At the same time, social organisations and other groups in civil society have often “refrained from open and broad contestation against the regime”, thereby gaining the space and autonomy to achieve the objectives (F. Wu 2). Studies of Chinese social or community capital suggest that a form of modern social capital has gradually emerged as Chinese society has become increasingly modernised and liberalised (despite being non-democratic), and that this social capital has begun to play an important role in shaping social and economic lives at the local level. However, this more modern form of social capital, arising from developmental and social changes, competes with traditional social values and social capital, which stresses parochial and particularistic feelings among known individuals while modern social capital emphasises general trust and reciprocal feelings among both known and unknown individuals. The objective element of these traditional values are those government-sanctioned, formal mass organisations such as Communist Youth and the All-China Federation of Women's Associations, where members are obliged to obey the organisation leadership. The predominant subjective values are parochial and particularistic feelings among individuals who know one another, such as guanxi and zongzu (Chen and Lu, 426). The concept of social capital emphasises that the underlying cooperative values found in individuals and groups within a culture are an important factor in solving collective problems. In contrast, the notion of “culture war” focusses on those values and differences that divide social and cultural groups. Barry defines culture wars as increases in volatility, expansion of polarisation, and conflict between those who are passionate about religiously motivated politics, traditional morality, and anti-intellectualism, and…those who embrace progressive politics, cultural openness, and scientific and modernist orientations. (90) The contemporary culture wars across the world manifest opposition by various groups in society who hold divergent worldviews and ideological positions. Proponents of culture war understand various issues as part of a broader set of religious, political, and moral/normative positions invoked in opposition to “elite”, “liberal”, or “left” ideologies. Within this Manichean universe opposition to such issues as climate change, Black Lives Matter, same sex rights, prison reform, gun control, and immigration becomes framed in binary terms, and infused with a moral sensibility (Chapman 8-10). In many disputes, the culture war often devolves into an epistemological dispute about the efficacy of scientific knowledge and authority, or a dispute between “practical” and theoretical knowledge. In this environment, even facts can become partisan narratives. For these “cultural” disputes are often how electoral prospects (generally right-wing) are advanced; “not through policies or promises of a better life, but by fostering a sense of threat, a fantasy that something profoundly pure … is constantly at risk of extinction” (Malik). This “zero-sum” social and policy environment that makes it difficult to compromise and has serious consequences for social stability or government policy, especially in a liberal democratic society. Of course, from the perspective of cultural materialism such a reductionist approach to culture and political and social values is not unexpected. “Culture” is one of the many arenas in which dominant social groups seek to express and reproduce their interests and preferences. “Culture” from this sense is “material” and is ultimately connected to the distribution of power, wealth, and resources in society. As such, the various policy areas that are understood as part of the “culture wars” are another domain where various dominant and subordinate groups and interests engaged in conflict express their values and goals. Yet it is unexpected that despite the pervasiveness of information available to individuals the pool of information consumed by individuals who view the “culture wars” as a touchstone for political behaviour and a narrative to categorise events and facts is relatively closed. This lack of balance has been magnified by social media algorithms, conspiracy-laced talk radio, and a media ecosystem that frames and discusses issues in a manner that elides into an easily understood “culture war” narrative. From this perspective, the groups (generally right-wing or traditionalist) exist within an information bubble that reinforces political, social, and cultural predilections. American and Chinese Reponses to COVID-19 The COVID-19 pandemic first broke out in Wuhan in December 2019. Initially unprepared and unwilling to accept the seriousness of the infection, the Chinese government regrouped from early mistakes and essentially controlled transmission in about three months. This positive outcome has been messaged as an exposition of the superiority of the Chinese governmental system and society both domestically and internationally; a positive, even heroic performance that evidences the populist credentials of the Chinese political leadership and demonstrates national excellence. The recently published White Paper entitled “Fighting COVID-19: China in Action” also summarises China’s “strategic achievement” in the simple language of numbers: in a month, the rising spread was contained; in two months, the daily case increase fell to single digits; and in three months, a “decisive victory” was secured in Wuhan City and Hubei Province (Xinhua). This clear articulation of the positive results has rallied political support. Indeed, a recent survey shows that 89 percent of citizens are satisfied with the government’s information dissemination during the pandemic (C Wu). As part of the effort, the government extensively promoted the provision of “political goods”, such as law and order, national unity and pride, and shared values. For example, severe publishments were introduced for violence against medical professionals and police, producing and selling counterfeit medications, raising commodity prices, spreading ‘rumours’, and being uncooperative with quarantine measures (Xu). Additionally, as an extension the popular anti-corruption campaign, many local political leaders were disciplined or received criminal charges for inappropriate behaviour, abuse of power, and corruption during the pandemic (People.cn, 2 Feb. 2020). Chinese state media also described fighting the virus as a global “competition”. In this competition a nation’s “material power” as well as “mental strength”, that calls for the highest level of nation unity and patriotism, is put to the test. This discourse recalled the global competition in light of the national mythology related to the formation of Chinese nation, the historical “hardship”, and the “heroic Chinese people” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). Moreover, as the threat of infection receded, it was emphasised that China “won this competition” and the Chinese people have demonstrated the “great spirit of China” to the world: a result built upon the “heroism of the whole Party, Army, and Chinese people from all ethnic groups” (People.cn, 7 Apr. 2020). In contrast to the Chinese approach of emphasising national public goods as a justification for fighting the virus, the U.S. Trump Administration used nationalism, deflection, and “culture war” discourse to undermine health responses — an unprecedented response in American public health policy. The seriousness of the disease as well as the statistical evidence of its course through the American population was disputed. The President and various supporters raged against the COVID-19 “hoax”, social distancing, and lockdowns, disparaged public health institutions and advice, and encouraged protesters to “liberate” locked-down states (Russonello). “Our federal overlords say ‘no singing’ and ‘no shouting’ on Thanksgiving”, Representative Paul Gosar, a Republican of Arizona, wrote as he retweeted a Centers for Disease Control list of Thanksgiving safety tips (Weiner). People were encouraged, by way of the White House and Republican leadership, to ignore health regulations and not to comply with social distancing measures and the wearing of masks (Tracy). This encouragement led to threats against proponents of face masks such as Dr Anthony Fauci, one of the nation’s foremost experts on infectious diseases, who required bodyguards because of the many threats on his life. Fauci’s critics — including President Trump — countered Fauci’s promotion of mask wearing by stating accusingly that he once said mask-wearing was not necessary for ordinary people (Kelly). Conspiracy theories as to the safety of vaccinations also grew across the course of the year. As the 2020 election approached, the Administration ramped up efforts to downplay the serious of the virus by identifying it with “the media” and illegitimate “partisan” efforts to undermine the Trump presidency. It also ramped up its criticism of China as the source of the infection. This political self-centeredness undermined state and federal efforts to slow transmission (Shear et al.). At the same time, Trump chided health officials for moving too slowly on vaccine approvals, repeated charges that high infection rates were due to increased testing, and argued that COVID-19 deaths were exaggerated by medical providers for political and financial reasons. These claims were amplified by various conservative media personalities such as Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity and Laura Ingraham of Fox News. The result of this “COVID-19 Denialism” and the alternative narrative of COVID-19 policy told through the lens of culture war has resulted in the United States having the highest number of COVID-19 cases, and the highest number of COVID-19 deaths. At the same time, the underlying social consensus and social capital that have historically assisted in generating positive public health outcomes has been significantly eroded. According to the Pew Research Center, the share of U.S. adults who say public health officials such as those at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention are doing an excellent or good job responding to the outbreak decreased from 79% in March to 63% in August, with an especially sharp decrease among Republicans (Pew Research Center 2020). Social Capital and COVID-19 From the perspective of social or community capital, it could be expected that the American response to the Pandemic would be more effective than the Chinese response. Historically, the United States has had high levels of social capital, a highly developed public health system, and strong governmental capacity. In contrast, China has a relatively high level of governmental and public health capacity, but the level of social capital has been lower and there is a significant presence of traditional values which emphasise parochial and particularistic values. Moreover, the antecedent institutions of social capital, such as weak and inefficient formal institutions (Batjargal et al.), environmental turbulence and resource scarcity along with the transactional nature of guanxi (gift-giving and information exchange and relationship dependence) militate against finding a more effective social and community response to the public health emergency. Yet China’s response has been significantly more successful than the Unites States’. Paradoxically, the American response under the Trump Administration and the Chinese response both relied on an externalisation of the both the threat and the justifications for their particular response. In the American case, President Trump, while downplaying the seriousness of the virus, consistently called it the “China virus” in an effort to deflect responsibly as well as a means to avert attention away from the public health impacts. As recently as 3 January 2021, Trump tweeted that the number of “China Virus” cases and deaths in the U.S. were “far exaggerated”, while critically citing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's methodology: “When in doubt, call it COVID-19. Fake News!” (Bacon). The Chinese Government, meanwhile, has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy across the South China Sea, on the frontier in the Indian sub-continent, and against states such as Australia who have criticised the initial Chinese response to COVID-19. To this international criticism, the government reiterated its sovereign rights and emphasised its “victimhood” in the face of “anti-China” foreign forces. Chinese state media also highlighted China as “victim” of the coronavirus, but also as a target of Western “political manoeuvres” when investigating the beginning stages of the pandemic. The major difference, however, is that public health policy in the United States was superimposed on other more fundamental political and cultural cleavages, and part of this externalisation process included the assignation of “otherness” and demonisation of internal political opponents or characterising political opponents as bent on destroying the United States. This assignation of “otherness” to various internal groups is a crucial element in the culture wars. While this may have been inevitable given the increasingly frayed nature of American society post-2008, such a characterisation has been activity pushed by local, state, and national leadership in the Republican Party and the Trump Administration (Vogel et al.). In such circumstances, minimising health risks and highlighting civil rights concerns due to public health measures, along with assigning blame to the democratic opposition and foreign states such as China, can have a major impact of public health responses. The result has been that social trust beyond the bubble of one’s immediate circle or those who share similar beliefs is seriously compromised — and the collective action problem presented by COVID-19 remains unsolved. Daniel Aldrich’s study of disasters in Japan, India, and US demonstrates that pre-existing high levels of social capital would lead to stronger resilience and better recovery (Aldrich). Social capital helps coordinate resources and facilitate the reconstruction collectively and therefore would lead to better recovery (Alesch et al.). Yet there has not been much research on how the pool of social capital first came about and how a disaster may affect the creation and store of social capital. Rebecca Solnit has examined five major disasters and describes that after these events, survivors would reach out and work together to confront the challenges they face, therefore increasing the social capital in the community (Solnit). However, there are studies that have concluded that major disasters can damage the social fabric in local communities (Peacock et al.). The COVID-19 epidemic does not have the intensity and suddenness of other disasters but has had significant knock-on effects in increasing or decreasing social capital, depending on the institutional and social responses to the pandemic. In China, it appears that the positive social capital effects have been partially subsumed into a more generalised patriotic or nationalist affirmation of the government’s policy response. Unlike civil society responses to earlier crises, such as the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, there is less evidence of widespread community organisation and response to combat the epidemic at its initial stages. This suggests better institutional responses to the crisis by the government, but also a high degree of porosity between civil society and a national “imagined community” represented by the national state. The result has been an increased legitimacy for the Chinese government. Alternatively, in the United States the transformation of COVID-19 public health policy into a culture war issue has seriously impeded efforts to combat the epidemic in the short term by undermining the social consensus and social capital necessary to fight such a pandemic. Trust in American institutions is historically low, and President Trump’s untrue contention that President Biden’s election was due to “fraud” has further undermined the legitimacy of the American government, as evidenced by the attacks directed at Congress in the U.S. capital on 6 January 2021. As such, the lingering effects the pandemic will have on social, economic, and political institutions will likely reinforce the deep cultural and political cleavages and weaken interpersonal networks in American society. Conclusion The COVID-19 pandemic has devastated global public health and impacted deeply on the world economy. Unsurprisingly, given the serious economic, social, and political consequences, different government responses have been highly politicised. Various quarantine and infection case tracking methods have caused concern over state power intruding into private spheres. The usage of face masks, social distancing rules, and intra-state travel restrictions have aroused passionate debate over public health restrictions, individual liberty, and human rights. Yet underlying public health responses grounded in higher levels of social capital enhance the effectiveness of public health measures. In China, a country that has generally been associated with lower social capital, it is likely that the relatively strong policy response to COVID-19 will both enhance feelings of nationalism and Chinese exceptionalism and help create and increase the store of social capital. 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