Дисертації з теми "Corporate incentives"
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Novaes, Walter. "Managerial incentives and corporate control." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12595.
Повний текст джерелаAmiot, André, and Johansson Fredrik Hallin. "Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Governance and CEO compenastion incentives." Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Företagsekonomi, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-28334.
Повний текст джерелаLi, Xinping. "Managerial incentives, capital structure and corporate governance /." May be available electronically:, 2008. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU1MTUmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=12498.
Повний текст джерелаCovas, Francisco. "Managerial incentives, corporate investment, and economic preference /." Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 2004. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p3130203.
Повний текст джерелаAmadeus, Musa. "Essays on the Corporate Implications of Compensation Incentives." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104367.
Повний текст джерелаThis dissertation is comprised of three essays which examine the ramifications of executive compensation incentive structures on corporate outcomes. In the first essay, I present evidence which suggests that executive compensation convexity, measured as the sensitivity of managerial equity compensation portfolios to stock volatility, predicts firm-specific crashes. I find that a bottom-to-top decile change in compensation convexity results in a 21% increase in a firm's unconditional ex-post idiosyncratic crash risk. In contrast, I do not find robust evidence of a symmetric relation between compensation convexity and a firm's idiosyncratic positive jump risk. Finally, I exploit exogenous variation in compensation convexity, arising from a change in the expensing treatment of executive stock options, in buttressing my interpretations within a natural experiment setting. My results suggest that managerial equity compensation portfolios do not augment a firm's future idiosyncratic crash risk because they link managerial wealth to equity prices, but rather because they tie managerial wealth to the volatility of a firm's equity. In the second essay, I exploit an exogenous negative shock to CEO compensation convexity in examining the differential ramifications of option pay and risk-taking incentives on the systematic and idiosyncratic volatility of the firm. I find new evidence that is largely consistent with the notion that compensation convexity, stemming from option convexity, predominantly incentivizes under-diversified risk-averse CEOs to increase the value of their option portfolios by increasing the systematic volatility of the firms they manage. I hypothesize that this effect manifests as systematic volatility is readily more hedgeable than idiosyncratic volatility from the perspective of risk-averse executives who are overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms. If managers use options as a conduit through which they can gamble with shareholder wealth by overexposing them to suboptimal systematic volatility, options are not serving their intended contracting function. Instead of decreasing agency costs of risk, by encouraging CEOs to adopt innovative positive NPV projects that may be primarily characterized by idiosyncratic risk, option pay may have contributed to the same frictions it was intended to reduce. In the third essay, I present evidence that is consistent with the notion that certain managerial debt-like remuneration structures decrease the likelihood of firm-specific positive stock-price jumps. Namely, I find that a bottom-to-top decile increase in the present value of CEO pension pay leads to a roughly 25\% decrease in a firm's unconditional ex-post jump probability. However, I do not find that CEO deferred compensation decreases firm jump risk. Finally, I find that information in option-implied volatility smirks does not appear to reflect these dynamics. Together, these results suggest that not all debt-like compensation mechanisms decrease managerial risk-taking equally
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
Fairburn, James Anthony. "Promotions, incentives and the market for corporate control." Thesis, University of Southampton, 1994. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.241164.
Повний текст джерелаTsekeris, Athanasios. "Managerial incentives and corporate acquisitions : evidence from the US." Thesis, University of Strathclyde, 2015. http://oleg.lib.strath.ac.uk:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=26116.
Повний текст джерелаGaertner, Fabio B. "CEO After-tax Compensation Incentives and Corporate Tax Avoidance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/145277.
Повний текст джерелаImes, Matthew Douglas. "Essays In Executive Incentives." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2019. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/596467.
Повний текст джерелаPh.D.
My dissertation consists of three chapters which explores various aspects of executive incentives. In the first chapter, I examine the relation between executive equity pay and stock returns. By compensating CEOs and CFOs differently, shareholders can create incentive conflicts between the firms’ top two managers that potentially affects shareholder wealth. On the one hand, incentive conflict potentially benefits shareholders by improving information exchange and establishing checks and balances in decisions made jointly by the CEO and CFO but alternatively, can harm shareholders by increasing risk through impeding the decision-making processes. I examine the relation between CEO-CFO incentive conflict and stock returns. The analysis indicates that an investor who routinely buy firms with the least incentive conflict and shorts firms with the greatest incentive conflict between CEO and CFOs will outperform the market by 475 basis points per year. I investigate whether risk, firm performance, or market inefficiency explain the excess returns and provide evidence that shareholders demand higher returns for bearing risk associated with CEO-CFO incentive similarities. Next, I explore the impact of executive incentives on bondholder wealth through looking at bond yields. Firms compensate managers to maximize shareholder value, yet these same incentives affect bondholder risk. I investigate the relation between executive equity pay and the cost of debt. My findings indicate a “u-shaped” relation between bond yields and equity pay. These results are consistent with the notion that bondholders prefer a moderate amount of executive equity pay and above or below that level, bondholders increase yields to protect their interests. Instrumenting equity pay using CEO heritage, I find support for a curvilinear relation. These findings suggest that moderate levels of equity pay mitigate the agency costs between firm shareholders and bondholders. Finally, I study the affect of board gender diversity on CEO and director compensation. Females occupy only about 12% of director positions on corporate boards. I find that boards with more female’s onboard tend to give CEOs larger fractions of equity in their compensation packages while incentivizing directors with lower fractions of equity pay. This evidence is consistent with the notion that female board members are superior monitors yet also possess greater risk-aversion than male board members.
Temple University--Theses
Gordon, Bruce L. (Bruce Lee). "Corporate Sale-and-Leaseback Transactions: An Examination of Corporate Incentives, Wealth Effects and Dealer Spreads." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1993. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc279191/.
Повний текст джерелаMeneghetti, Costanza. "Managerial incentives and the choice between public and bank debt." unrestricted, 2008. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-08132008-140059/.
Повний текст джерелаTitle from file title page. Jayant Kale, committee chair; Omesh Kini, Harley E. Ryan, Anastasia V. Kartasheva, committee members. Electronic text (77 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Oct. 8, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 47-49).
Van, Alfen Tyson D. "ESSAYS ON FINANCIAL INCENTIVES." UKnowledge, 2019. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/finance_etds/9.
Повний текст джерелаShabeeb, Ali Mohamed A. "Equity compensation incentives, earnings management, and corporate governance : the UK evidence." Thesis, University of Surrey, 2013. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.599994.
Повний текст джерелаArena, Matteo P. "Three essays on the corporate debt choice." Diss., Columbia, Mo. : University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/10355/5902.
Повний текст джерелаThe entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file viewed on (May 2, 2007) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.
Hirsch, Gregory S. (Gregory Seymour). "The Motivational Impact of Incentive Programs on Young Adult Employees in Corporate Casual Restaurants." Thesis, University of North Texas, 1996. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc278724/.
Повний текст джерелаGose, Michael A. "Corporate Inversions: Realigning Tax Incentives to Keep Corporations in the United States." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2015. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1033.
Повний текст джерелаProtopapa, Marco. "An essay in corporate finance : managerial incentives, financial constraints and ownership concentration." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2009. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2196/.
Повний текст джерелаYin, Chao. "Institutional investors : their incentives for monitoring companies and the effect on corporate governance." Thesis, University of Reading, 2018. http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/78974/.
Повний текст джерелаMalmlund, Alexander. "The Financial Incentives to Adopting Corporate Social Responsibility and Socially Responsible Investing Practices." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2019. https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/2103.
Повний текст джерелаHill, Lesley Ellen. "Executive Incentives, Corporate Governance and Tax Haven Utilisation: Evidence from Australian Financial Institutions." Thesis, Curtin University, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/79399.
Повний текст джерелаForeman, Denise Ann Wren. "The anticipation and interpretation of UK company announcements : the incentives to acquire information." Thesis, Brunel University, 1996. http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/handle/2438/6269.
Повний текст джерелаHeed, Emilia, and Hanna Törnbom. "Corporate Social Responsibility : Varför ska banker ta ett ansvar?" Thesis, Högskolan i Halmstad, Sektionen för ekonomi och teknik (SET), 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-19123.
Повний текст джерелаPersson, Stefan. "Long-term CSR incentives at fashion chains in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Business Studies, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-8814.
Повний текст джерелаIn recent time the pressure on companies from groups like governments, regular citizens and media on taking its social responsibility has increased in rapid pace. This has led to increased interest from companies all over the world about social issues and the companies’ responsibility for these issues.
In the more competitive environment were companies act today the use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) to differentiate itself against other company’s increases in importance. Together with increasing interest from stakeholders about social issues has made it central for companies not only to be social responsible but also to be good at finding future social trends that will give them competitive advantage against other actors.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how the three largest fashion chains in Sweden, Hennes & Mauritz, Lindex and KappAhl, are managing its CSR work now and how good their organisation is prepared to manage the CSR work in the future. The examination will focus on the factors that make the management of CSR successful or not, and to get an overview of if the conditions for current and future successful CSR is present at the companies. By doing a qualitative document analysis of the selected companies the conclusion is made that there is much work to be done at the three largest Swedish fashion chains to more effectively use CSR and the positive effects that a well developed CSR plan can bring to the companies. The conclusion is based on the lack of long-term remuneration incentives for the management that rewards a short-term decisions and the extensive use of collective commitments instead of exclusive CSR work.
Spagnolo, Giancarlo. "Essays on managerial incentives and product-market competition." Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics [Ekonomiska forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögsk.] (EFI), 1999. http://www.hhs.se/efi/summary/500.htm.
Повний текст джерелаLilhauge, Hjortshøj Toke. "Essays on empirical corporate finance : managerial incentives, information disclosure and bond covenants /by Toke Lilhauge Hjortshøj." Aarhus : School of Economics and Management, 2008. http://www.gbv.de/dms/zbw/560680929.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаWang, Jeffrey J. "Asset Managers and Financial Instability: Evidence of Run Behavior and Run Incentives in Corporate Bond Funds." Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17417581.
Повний текст джерелаApplied Mathematics
Wan, Hong. "Two Essays on Corporate Governance⎯Are Local Directors Better Monitors, and Directors Incentives and Earnings Management." [Tampa, Fla] : University of South Florida, 2008. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0002494.
Повний текст джерелаSemadeni, Matthew Briggs. "Leaving the corporate fold examining spin-off actions and performance /." Texas A&M University, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1969/289.
Повний текст джерелаJuks, Reimo. "Corporate governance and the firm's behaviour towards stakeholders." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-938.
Повний текст джерелаDiss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2010; Sammanfattning jämte 3 uppsatser.
Petkova, Kunka, and Alfons J. Weichenrieder. "The Relevance of Depreciation Allowances as a Fiscal Policy Instrument: A Hybrid Approach to CCCTB?" WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, Universität Wien, 2018. http://epub.wu.ac.at/6536/1/SSRN%2Did3249512.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаSeries: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series
Fodor, Daniel. "Theoretical incentives vs. perceived motives for using interest rate derivatives in Swedish corporations." Thesis, KTH, Industriell ekonomi och organisation (Inst.), 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-161227.
Повний текст джерелаDenna uppsats undersöker om verkliga motiv och praxis för användning av räntederivat i svenska storföretag är förenliga med teoretiska incitament för räntederivatanvändning som ofta förekommer i akademisk litteratur. De flesta teoretiska förklaringsmodeller för företags användning av räntederivat utvecklades och beskrevs innan den globala finanskrisen 2007-08. Efter krisen har värderingen av räntederivat samt det administrativa arbetet kring instrumenten förändrats till följd av implementering av nya finansiella regler, bokföringsregler och prissättningsmetoder. Akademisk litteratur beskriver generellt åtta teoretiska incitament om varför företag använder räntederivat (vilka finns sammanfattade i detta arbete). För att verifiera teoretiska grunder och medvetenhet kring dessa teorier genomfördes en enkätundersökning samt djupintervjuer med totalt 13 beslutsfattare inom räntederivat i svenska storföretag. Studiens resultat ger starkt stöd till att tre av de teoretiska incitamenten i hög grad överensstämmer med verkliga motiv för användning av räntederivat, samt att fyra incitament delvis kunde förklara verkliga motiv, medan stöd saknades för ett teoretiskt incitament. Utöver de åtta testade incitamenten visar studiens resultat att det finns ett ytterligare motiv för användning av räntederivat: räntevalutaswappar används av flera svenska storföretag som emitterar obligationer i utländsk valuta för att konvertera pengar till företagets funktionella valuta. Förfarandet är känt inom industrin men understuderat i akademisk litteratur. Studien visar att kunskap inom bokföring och administration relaterat till finansiella derivat har blivit allt viktigare för svenska storföretags internbanker, medan vikten av att ha en aktiv marknadssyn minskat, jämfört mot 10-15 år sedan. Över denna tidsperiod har antalet handlare i storföretagens internbanker minskat kraftigt, då flera av funktionerna i praktiken har outsourcats till banker.
Chen, Yuhui. "Issues in executive compensation." Doctoral thesis, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.18452/16776.
Повний текст джерелаThis dissertation provides empirical evidence on the issues of executive compensation. Analyzing data of U.S. listing firms, I find an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm performance, but this relation vanishes when firm performance from last period is controlled. I also find that executive option awards is positively related to firm performance, while executive stock awards has no statistically significant impact on firm performance. Evidence also indicates that the structure of executive compensation contracts is related with observable and unobservable firm attributes and executive personal characteristics.
Trezevant, Robert Heath. "The effect of tax law changes on corporate investment and financing behavior: Empirical evidence from changes brought about by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184897.
Повний текст джерелаKinney, Michael Richard. "Changes in corporate capital structures and investment in response to tax incentives in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/184996.
Повний текст джерелаCleaveland, Mary Catherine. "The relationship between r&d investment and dividend payment tax incentives and their role in the dividend tax puzzle." unrestricted, 2006. http://etd.gsu.edu/theses/available/etd-12122006-125647/.
Повний текст джерелаErnest R. Larkins, committee chair; Fred A. Jacobs, Detmar W. Straub , Sally Wallace, committee members. Electronic text (100 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed Aug. 9, 2007. Includes bibliographical references (p. 78-85).
Braun, Lucas. "Incentivos aos administradores: a opção de compra de ações." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-10012014-155751/.
Повний текст джерелаGranting of stock options to a companys manager is generally seen as a positive corporate governance practice as it helps to overcome the agency problem between shareholders and executives. This thesis however aims to offer an alternative approach to this subject. Its purpose is to demonstrate that, to the extent that this incentive is not properly designed and monitored, it may lead to destruction of companys value. Therefore, the first two chapters explore the legal and economical foundations of the stock options grants. The next chapter discusses four fundamental aspects of this matter, which, surprisingly enough, are ignored by the Brazilian legal literature. They are the following: the cost of granting stock options, the shortcomings of its benefits, its main problems and the plausible explanations for such grants. The flaws of the legal strategies available to control the distortions caused by stock options are discussed in the fourth chapter. In the final part of the thesis, the conclusions of this study are presented and an amendment to the corporate governance listing rules of BM&FBOVESPA is suggested, in order to address specific rules regarding stock options grants. Additionally, the schedules to this thesis summarize the main findings of an extensive research on the characteristics of executive compensation and stock-based incentives adopted by Brazilian listed companies.
Liu, Xuejiao, and 刘雪娇. "The effects of CEO equity-based compensation on firm promptness in remedying material weaknesses in internal control." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10722/200360.
Повний текст джерелаpublished_or_final_version
Business
Doctoral
Doctor of Philosophy
Oliveira, Edimundo Dias de. "A relação entre o nível de gastos socioambientais voluntários e a obtenção de benefícios fiscais." Universidade Presbiteriana Mackenzie, 2013. http://tede.mackenzie.br/jspui/handle/tede/927.
Повний текст джерелаVolunteer expenses with the Environment is becoming, every time more, regular action in various companies. Involvement and propagation practices, also policies aimed for corporate sustainability, can be considered common today, counting even with standard reports that provide some descriptive elements about these practices. There is, however, a gap in the scientific literature about the relevance of such participation spending on business structure. Many companies indicate in their reports the existence of social and environmental costs, but the real impact of these actions are unclear, beyond the supposed improvement of the institutional image. This exploratory, qualitative approach, aimed to verify if the level of corporate environmental spending is associated significantly with the tax benefits that they may have. The sample consisted of 35 companies of the Índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial (ISE) of BM&F Bovespa . The techniques that were applied are the content analysis. The results showed that the average level of environmental expenses are higher than the tax benefits obtained, indicating that these companies used a combination of donations, sponsorships and investments, suggesting the existence of other factors beyond the tax benefits limits involved.
Gastos socioambientais voluntários se tornam, cada vez mais, ações regulares em várias empresas. Envolvimento e divulgação de práticas e políticas voltadas à sustentabilidade corporativa podem ser considerados comuns nos dias de hoje, contando com relatórios que oferecem alguns elementos descritivos sobre essas práticas. Existe, entretanto, uma lacuna na literatura científica sobre a relevância da participação de gastos dessa natureza na estrutura empresarial. Muitas empresas apontam em seus relatórios a existência de gastos socioambientais, porém o real impacto dessas ações ainda não são claras, além da suposta melhoria da imagem institucional. Este estudo exploratório, de abordagem qualitativa, objetivou verificar se o nível de gastos socioambientais das empresas está associado, significativamente, com os benefícios fiscais que as mesmas possam obter. A amostra foi formada por 35 empresas integrantes do índice de Sustentabilidade Empresarial (ISE) da BM&F Bovespa. Aplicaram-se técnicas de análise de conteúdo. Os resultados obtidos apontaram que o nível médio de gastos socioambientais é superior aos benefícios fiscais obtidos, indicando que estas empresas utilizaram uma combinação entre doação, patrocínio e investimento, sugerindo a existência de outros fatores envolvidos além dos limites de benefícios fiscais.
Dyballa, Katharina [Verfasser], Kornelius [Akademischer Betreuer] Kraft, and Philip [Gutachter] Jung. "Corporate governance in the private and public sector : Empirical studies on the determination of managerial incentives in the private sector and efficiency and quality in the public sector / Katharina Dyballa ; Gutachter: Philip Jung ; Betreuer: Kornelius Kraft." Dortmund : Universitätsbibliothek Dortmund, 2017. http://d-nb.info/1149920440/34.
Повний текст джерелаGershkowitz, Todd M. "Creating an incentive for investor intermediaries to improve corporate governance." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/37115.
Повний текст джерелаIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 95-98).
At the end of the 1980s, there was some speculation that leveraged buyouts (LBOs) would lead to the demise of the public company in favor of privately owned companies after a decade of the market for corporate control serving as a check against agency costs and management inefficiency. Of course, this didn't happen, and throughout the 1990s, in addition to the market for corporate control, the use of stock-based managerial incentives served a similar purpose. But the failure of these measures to prevent the next cycle of corporate governance crises that occurred in the last five years (e.g., WorldCom, Enron) ushered in an era of hard governance whereby market mechanisms and incentives have given way to Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and stock exchange rules designed to ensure proper stewardship of companies by their boards of directors. A central theme of this thesis is that, although this new era of hard governance might have decreased the degree of information asymmetry between investors and their agents, and thus improved the state of corporate governance, it may be that this has simply lulled us into a false sense of security until the next cycle of corporate governance crises. Companies might adopt symbolic mechanisms that are decoupled from actual practice to evidence compliance with increasing rules and regulations.
(cont.) Some research suggests that a different course-soft governance-is necessary to foster a constructive relationship between companies and their investors, through investor intermediaries such as hedge funds. Soft governance refers to the exercise of voice by investor intermediaries instead of exit (i.e., trading out of a company's stock). It is believed that not only is soft governance necessary to supplement hard governance, but that the lack of it might also be a significant lost opportunity that could contribute to an erosion of U.S. business competitiveness. This thesis is devoted to an assessment of a specific mechanism for instituting soft governance, referred to as Ownership Shares, a concept introduced by the founder of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Robert A. G. Monks, in 2004.
by Todd M. Gershkowitz.
S.M.
Mohlin, Ingela, and Malin Norrman. "Kontrollerande aktieägare och företagsvärde : En empirisk studie av hur den kontrollerande aktieägarens kapitalandel respektive röstandel påverkar ett företags värde." Thesis, Uppsala University, Department of Economics, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-5958.
Повний текст джерелаGao, Jie, and 高洁. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 2009. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B43278656.
Повний текст джерелаGao, Jie. "Essays on incentive contracts, earnings management, expectation management and related issues." Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 2009. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B43278656.
Повний текст джерелаDostálová, Iveta. "Využití nástrojů interního marketingu pro zvýšení spokojenosti zaměstnanců." Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta podnikatelská, 2020. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-416853.
Повний текст джерелаHjorth, Amanda, and Rundström Julia Pantzar. "Transparens i skatteredovisning : Vad anser koncernskattechefer?" Thesis, Högskolan i Skövde, Institutionen för handel och företagande, 2016. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:his:diva-13070.
Повний текст джерелаBackground: A decision made by OECD, together with G20-countries says that Corporate Groups shall report report tax according to new guideline, called Country-By-Country-reporting. This means that corporate groups for example will report tax paid per jurisdiction and therefore will the tax transparency be increased. According to authorities, the new implementation is positive but the question is whether the corporate groups and their corporate group tax managers will be positive or not. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to identify and explain attitudes of tax managers when a new legislation changes today´s tax reporting in the form of a CbC-report which will increase transparency in the tax reporting, and what elements are behind these identified attitudes.This study will contribute by giving an empirical material thats opens to further research about corporate group tax managers attitudes with increased tax transparency. The study also gives better knowledge for public authorities, particularly the tax authority and to concerned corporate groups. Method: Through a qualitative method with interviews with corporate group tax managers with 8 large corporate groups and tax authorities, empirical material has been gathered, which leads to further analysis and a conclusion. Conclusion: The most prominent results in this essay has been the fact that some corporate group tax managers sees the connection between tax and social responsibility and therefor are positive to the implementation because it will strengthen the social contract.Other corporate group tax managers sees the hazards with CbCr and appurtenant costs and therefor decreased incentive compensation. These corporate group tax managers have a negative attitudes towards an increased tax transparency.
Wu, Kaishu. "The Interaction of Incentive and Opportunity in Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Financially Constrained Firms." Thesis, University of Oregon, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/23753.
Повний текст джерелаMoore, Elwood D. "The Relationship between Fitness-Based Incentive Programs and Exercise Adherence in a Corporate Fitness Facility." Fogler Library, University of Maine, 2003. http://www.library.umaine.edu/theses/pdf/MooreED2003.pdf.
Повний текст джерелаSchaffner, Carmen Paternostro. "A dança expressionista alemã: contribuições e incentivos para a dança na Bahia." reponame:Repositório Institucional da UFBA, 2013. http://www.repositorio.ufba.br/ri/handle/ri/8157.
Повний текст джерелаMade available in DSpace on 2013-01-25T12:57:03Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação Corrigida.pdf: 14184767 bytes, checksum: 2cc40030e7b591d6053bf9b3235f9fe4 (MD5) Carmen Pré-textuais novas.pdf: 36205 bytes, checksum: 8545b3edbfca63586926ec744fea8aca (MD5)
FAPESB
Trata essa dissertação de desenvolver estudos e pesquisas sobre A Dança Expressionista Alemã: Contribuições e Incentivos para a Dança na Bahia, que poderão trazer novos entendimentos da dança contemporânea, assim como agregar informações e análises acadêmicas com relação à importância da criação da Escola de Dança da UFBA e sua permanência como centro de excelência nesta arte. Apoiada em conhecimentos extraídos de publicações teóricas e históricas, aprendizagens adquiridas, processos de experimentação, encenações chaves, coreografias marcantes, percursos artísticos representativos e materiais documentais, a pesquisa abrange outras áreas como estética, filosofia e história para discutir dança em sua especificidade. Serão avaliados os conceitos do movimento expressionista alemão e sua influência sobre a Ausdruckstanz (dançaexpressão), sua estrutura e alicerces teóricos influenciados por métodos pioneiros, desenvolvidos principalmente por François Delsart, Rudolf Laban e Oskar Schlemmer da Bauhaus.
Programa de Pós Graduação em Dança- Escola de Dança
Gomes, João Pedro Leal. "O tratamento fiscal dos encargos com juros enquanto incentivo ao endividamento." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/4650.
Повний текст джерелаEste trabalho, baseado na revisão de literatura e na análise do sistema fiscal português e de outros países da União Europeia (UE), tem por objectivo indagar de que modo o endividamento pode ser incentivado pelas normas fiscais e quais as soluções que têm sido acolhidas para minimizar essa influência na estrutura financeira das empresas. Assim, o facto de os encargos com juros relativos ao capital alheio poderem ser dedutíveis para efeitos de determinação do lucro tributável das sociedades torna esta forma de financiamento mais vantajosa do que poderia acontecer com o mesmo montante a ser investido através da forma de capital próprio. Este tratamento preferencial dado aos juros não existe somente em Portugal. Apesar da existência de diversas regras adoptadas quer por Portugal, quer pelos diversos Estados Membros (EM) da UE para reduzir esta distorção, o tratamento fiscal dos encargos com juros, continua a ser extremamente vantajoso face à fonte de financiamento via capital próprio. Com base na análise empreendida apresentam-se algumas sugestões de alteração do sistema fiscal português e indicam-se pistas para investigação futura.
This work based on literature review and analysis of the Portuguese tax system and other European Union (EU) countries, which objective is to ask how the debt can be encouraged by tax rules and the solutions that have been taken to minimize this influence in the financial structure of companies. Thus, the fact that interest expenses relating to borrowed capital may be deductible for purposes of determining the taxable profits of the companies make this the most advantageous form of financing of what could happen with the same amount to be invested by the form of equity. This preferential treatment given to interest does not only exist in Portugal. Despite the existence of various rules adopted either by Portugal and the various EU Member States (MS) to reduce this distortion, the tax treatment of interest payments, continues to be extremely advantageous in view of the source of financing through equity. Based on the analysis taken we present some suggestions for amending the Portuguese tax system and indicates clues for future research.
"Corporate Social Responsibility and Compensational Incentives." Thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10388/ETD-2015-08-2209.
Повний текст джерела