Щоб переглянути інші типи публікацій з цієї теми, перейдіть за посиланням: Corporate and IT Governance.
Дисертації з теми "Corporate and IT Governance"
Оформте джерело за APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard та іншими стилями
Ознайомтеся з топ-50 дисертацій для дослідження на тему "Corporate and IT Governance".
Біля кожної праці в переліку літератури доступна кнопка «Додати до бібліографії». Скористайтеся нею – і ми автоматично оформимо бібліографічне посилання на обрану працю в потрібному вам стилі цитування: APA, MLA, «Гарвард», «Чикаго», «Ванкувер» тощо.
Також ви можете завантажити повний текст наукової публікації у форматі «.pdf» та прочитати онлайн анотацію до роботи, якщо відповідні параметри наявні в метаданих.
Переглядайте дисертації для різних дисциплін та оформлюйте правильно вашу бібліографію.
1
Žilková, Alena. "Corporate Governance." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2009. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-11230.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Definition and basic theoretic information about Corporate Governance of big industry company Description and Analyse of corporate Management, the functions of Top Management Members, their role in relationship to owners / shareholders (describtion of used tools for internal control of government, investment and tools for financial analyses)
2
Li, Hao Yost Keven E. "Corporate risk and corporate governance." Auburn, Ala, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10415/1686.
Повний текст джерела
3
Schäfer, Lars. "Corporate Governance bei Kapitalanlagegesellschaften - Fund Governance." Berlin Duncker & Humblot, 2008. http://d-nb.info/992895383/04.
Повний текст джерела
4
Staub, Peter. "Corporate governance reporting /." Zürich : Schulthess Juristiche Medien, 2005. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00135029.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
5
Huang, Cong. "Liquidity, corporate policy, and corporate governance." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2018. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/8419/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Liquidity has a potential impact on the investment strategies and financing strategies which can affect or be affected by the risk perspective. The thesis aims to establish linkage between liquidity and three risk-related issues in the finance literature. First, we inspect the impact of market liquidity on feedback trading. Our results suggest that the market liquidity should be included in the feedback traders’ demand function for shares in East Asian stock markets. We then analyse the listed US firms to test the impact financial flexibility on firm’s corporate social responsibility. We find a negative relationship between financial flexibility and CSR, which indicates that the two are substitutes to each other in hedging financing risk. Furthermore, we find the negative relationship between financial flexibility and CSR is affected by both CEO conservatism and the lifecycle stage of a firm. Finally, we investigate the impact of CEO inside debt compensation on the adjustment speed of cash holding of the listed US firms. We find that the CEOs with high inside debt compensation accelerate the adjustment of cash holding when the actual cash ratio is below target while decelerating the adjustment speed of cash holding when there is excess cash.
6
Guidoux, Aymeric. "Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018SACLX122/document.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Selon la théorie des parties prenantes, la Responsabilité Sociétal de l’Entreprise (RSE) est la réponse donnée par les entreprises à la pression croissantes des employées, actionnaires, communautés locales, ONG environnementales ou régulateurs afin de prendre en compte les impacts environnementaux et sociaux de leurs activités. L’enjeu n’est pas une simple compensation des externalités négatives mais une transformation des entreprises pour permettre une croissance durable. Ainsi, la RSE pousse les entreprises à être proactive et à dépasser les attentes règlementaires. Cependant, comment réussir à concilier des objectifs si différents voire opposés ? Alors que de plus en plus d’entreprises intègrent la RSE au cœur de leurs stratégies, les processus de gouvernance semblent être le chainon manquant pour réunir performance économique, sociale et environnementale. Cette thèse présente des arguments empiriques et théoriques de l’impact de la gouvernance à son plus haut niveau, du conseil d’administration au Directeur Général (DG). Après un chapitre d’introduction, le chapitre 2 analyse le lien entre la composition des conseils d’administrations et l’intégration de la RSE dans la stratégie des entreprises. Il s’appuie sur une loi sur la représentation des femmes dans les conseils d’administrations. Adopté en France en 2011, cette loi a entrainé la nomination de nouveaux administrateurs, majoritairement des femmes plus jeunes que leurs prédécesseurs. Pour autant, ce chapitre montre que l’augmentation de la diversité au sein des conseils n’est pas corrélée à variation de la performance financière et extra-financière. Ce chapitre repose sur l’étude des entreprises du SBF 120 de 2009 à 2015. Cependant, si les caractéristiques des administrateurs sont impliquées dans les processus de décisions, la mise en place des stratégies et le management de l’entreprise est confié au soin du DG. Grâce à un système de rémunération avec part variable, le conseil d’administrations s’applique à aligner les intérêts du DG avec les siens. Le chapitre 3 étudie l’efficacité des rémunérations variables basées sur des critères environnementaux ou sociétaux. Il montre que l’impact de ces « Bonus RSE » dépend du modèle de gouvernance de l’entreprise. Chez les entreprises possédant une gouvernance de type actionnarial, les « Bonus RSE » semble n’avoir qu’un impact négatif sur la performance financière. En revanche, pour les entreprises du type partenarial, ces bonus permettent efficacement l’amélioration des performances extra-financières sans diminuer la performance financière. Cette étude empirique se base sur un panel mondial de 3500 entreprises sur la période 2006-2015. Le chapitre 4 propose un modèle théorique permettant d’analyser l’impact de la nature intrinsèque ou extrinsèque des motivations. Basé sur le modèle principal-agent développé par Che et Yoo (2001), ce chapitre analyse différentes incitations pour une entreprise composée de deux agents travaillant sur une tâche « RSE ». Trois scénarios sont étudiés : les deux agents reçoivent une compensation financière, les deux agents sont motivés intrinsèquement, un agent est motivé intrinsèquement et l’autre financièrement. Le modèle montre que le scénario optimal pour le principal dépend du niveau de motivation intrinsèque mais également de l’interdépendance entre les décisions des deux agents. Dans le cas particulier de la rémunération des directeurs d’entreprises, les données empiriques montrent qu’inclure des critères RSE dans la rémunération est plus adapté aux entreprises avec une forte interdépendance décisionnelle. La conclusion retrace le lien qui unit gouvernance et RSE à plusieurs niveaux, et discute de l’implication des réseaux et effets de mimétisme entre entrepriseAccording to the stakeholders’ theory, Corporate Social Responsibly is the firm’s response to increasing pressure from employees, shareholders, communities, environmental NGOs or regulators to consider the social and environmental consequences of their business activity. What is at stake, is not only a compensation of negative externalities but the adaptation and the participation of firms to a sustainable growth. In that sense, CSR is not just about being efficient but being the best and push firms to be proactive and go beyond legal requirements. But how manage objectives so various and even opposite? While firms start to integrate CSR into their global business strategy, at the top of the decision-making process, corporate governance appears to be the missing link to join economic, environmental and social objectives. This dissertation provides empirical and theoretical evidences of the determining factors involved at the high level of firms’ governance, from the board of directors to the CEO. After an introduction chapter, chapter 2 investigates the link between board composition and integrated CSR strategies. Adopted in 2011, the law targets listed firms and brought about the entrance of new directors, more likely to be women and younger than prior directors. However, we do not find evidence that this diversity is correlated to financial or extra-financial performance. For this chapter, we use a panel composed of French listed companies (SBF120 index) over the 2009-2015 period. If director’s characteristics are involved at the top of the decision making-process, the execution of the strategy and management of the firm is delegated to the CEO. Using variable pay, compensation part determined by performance objectives, the board aligns the CEO’s interests with his own interests. Chapter 3 shows evidence of the effectiveness of CSR based compensation part, labelled under the term “CSR contracting”. We show that the impact of such compensation depends on the governance structure. For firms who focus on shareholder, CSR contracting is more likely to have a negative impact on financial performance and no impact on extra-financial performance. On the contrary, for firms with a stakeholder model of governance, we show that CSR contracting is effective and have a positive impact on the environmental and social performance without impacting the economic results. This empirical work is conducted on a worldwide dataset with 3500 firms over the 2006-2015 period. Chapter 4 provides a theoretical framework to understand the role of governance factor on the efficiency of incentives. We develop a model based on Che et Yoo (2001) model to study the influence of compensation among a team of two managers who have to work on a CSR task. We determine the optimal compensation between three compensation mixes: both agents receive monetary compensations, both agents receive external rewards from their environment, one agent receives monetary compensation and the other receives an external reward. We show that the choice of the optimal compensation scheme depends on the environment outside the firm, i.e. the level of the exogenous reward, and the environment inside the firm through the level of the interdependence between the managers' decisions which corresponds to the capacity of the firm to create cooperation between the agents. Then, using evidence from executive compensation, we apply this model to the relationship between the CEO and the board of directors and find that the adoption of monetary incentives for CSR tasks is more suitable for firms with a high decisional interdependence than for firms with a lower interdependence. In conclusion, from directors’ characteristics to the overall governance organisation, we retrace the link between corporate governance and CSR integrated strategies; a link who could go beyond firm frontiers and include industry ties and peer effects
7
Tumuheki, Justine. "Towards good corporate governance: an analysis of corporate governance reforms in Uganda." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/4570.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The recent onslaught of corporate scandals has compelled the world to acknowledge the profound impact of corporate governance practices on the global economy. Corporate governance has become important for the survival of companies and indeed of national economies in the increasingly global economy. Corporate governance is of particular concern in developing economies, where the infusion of international investor capital and foreign aid is essential to economic stability and growth. For transition economies, such as Uganda's, which are faced with the challenge of restructuring for greater efficiency and creating a foreign investment-friendly environment, good corporate governance is crucial for success. This research highlights corporate governance initiatives in Uganda, focusing on the proposed corporate governance reforms. An analysis of the major corporate governance reforms is done including; statutory reforms, development of codes of conduct and best practice and institutional reforms. The evolution of Uganda's corporate structure and the forces driving corporate governance reform is examined. It is noted that corporations in Uganda cannot shield themselves from the global movement that is shaping standard principles governing corporations. Therefore the global principles of corporate governance are examined concerning how they can serve as models for enhancing corporate governance standards in Uganda. The analysis is based on the need to bring Uganda's corporate governance reforms in line with internationally accepted standards but considering the best interests of Uganda and its citizens.
8
Li, Yiwei. "Essays on corporate governance and corporate finance." Thesis, University of Reading, 2018. http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/80634/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis is a comprehensive study on how corporate governance structure and quality affect the corporate policies. First of all, I examine the effects of female directors on corporate debt maturity structures, using a dataset of S&P 1500 firms with 10,285 firm–year observations during 1997–2016. I find that firms with a higher ratio of female directors tend to have a larger proportion of short-maturity debt. This effect is more pronounced with female independent directors but insignificant with female inside directors. Then, I study the association between both the age of compensation committee members and the age dissimilarity between the CEO and compensation committee members and CEO compensation, using a dataset of FTSE 350 firms with 3,420 firm–year observations during 2002–2013. I find that both the age of committee members and the age dissimilarity from the CEO have negative impacts on the level of CEO total compensation and cash compensation. On the issue of how CEO’s human capital influences corporate policies, I find that CEOs with general managerial skills can account for corporate investment inefficiency. CEOs who possess general managerial skills over broad work experience (generalist CEOs) have different risk-taking incentives compared with their counterpart CEOs, whose skills are only valuable within a specific organization (specialist CEOs). They may thus overinvest when there is a lack of efficient monitoring. Finally, I study the effect of firm-level tournament incentives on the level and value of firm cash holding, using a sample of 20,993 US firm–year observations over the 1992–2014 period. This paper investigates the impact of tournament incentives of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) on the level and valuation of firm cash holdings. I document the higher propensities to keep larger cash holdings for firms with strong tournament incentives.
9
Mietzner, Mark. "Changes in corporate governance and corporate valuation /." München : GoingPublicMedia, 2009. http://d-nb.info/992892937/04.
Повний текст джерела
10
Stagliano, Raffaele. "Corporate governance, corporate diversification and ownership structure." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2011. http://www.theses.fr/2011TOU10056.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Cette thèse a pour objectif d'étudier le rôle que la diversification des entreprises et la structure de propriété jouent dans le processus de création de valeur. Le deuxième chapitre est consacré à une revue de littérature portant sur les travaux théoriques et empiriques qui analysent l’impact de la structure d’actionnariat et de la diversification des entreprises sur leur valeur de marché. Le troisième chapitre approfondit l'analyse de la diversification des entreprises en étudiant l'effet d'interaction entre diversification des produits et diversification internationale. Ce chapitre considère la relation entre diversification et structure du capital sur un échantillon d’entreprises manufacturières italiennes. Nos conclusions nous permettent de soutenir que cet effet d’interaction a un impact négatif sur la capacité d'endettement. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre étudie l'impact d’une structure d’actionnaires multiples sur la prise de risque des entreprises. L’analyse est menée sur les firmes cotées sur le marché financier américain. La plupart des études antérieures sur la structure de propriété se concentre sur les différences entre les entreprises avec au moins un actionnaire de référence par rapport aux entreprises à l’actionnariat éparpillé, sans tenir compte de l'effet potentiel de l'existence de multiples détenteurs de blocs d’actions sur la volatilité et la performance des titres boursiers. Nous montrons que les détenteurs de blocs jouent un rôle important dans l'atténuation des conflits d'intérêts entre actionnaire majoritaire et actionnaires minoritairesThe purpose of this thesis is to examine how corporate diversification and ownership structure affect value creation for firms. In Chapter 2, we review the relevant theoretical models in the field of corporate finance. The chapter also summarizes the empirical results found regarding the relationship between corporate diversification, ownership concentration and the firm’s value. In Chapter 3, we extend the analysis of corporate diversification and consider the effects of the interaction of both product and international diversification on a firm. Empirically, this chapter considers the impact of diversification decisions on the capital structure for a sample of Italian manufacturing firms. We find that the interaction of both international and product diversification has a negative impact on debt capacity. Finally, in Chapter 4, we empirically examine the impact of complex ownership structures on the risk choices of U.S. firms. Most previous studies on ownership structure focus on the differences between firms with at least one blockholder and widely held firms, without considering the potential effect that the existence of other blockholders might have on the financial variables. We find that the blockholders with intermediate holdings play a mitigating role in the conflicts of interest between the largest blockholder and the minority shareholders
11
Tan, Michael N. T. School of Modern Language Studies UNSW. "Corporate governance in China." Awarded by:University of New South Wales. School of Modern Language Studies, 2006. http://handle.unsw.edu.au/1959.4/24269.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Since the late nineteen nineties, corporate governance has been recognised by the Chinese leadership as being an integral and vital part of economic reform. At the macro level the reform is to transition to a market economy and at the micro level, business enterprises are adopting sound standards of corporate governance. This thesis analyses the various models: the shareholder value, the stakeholder, the stewardship and the convergence models of corporate governance. It looks at the Chinese scenario - what model of governance has China adopted and is it appropriate? What problems of corporate governance are special to China and how are these problems being resolved? Many of the problems are due to the fact that China has adopted the shareholder value model ??? a model based on the UK / USA. However, unlike them, China does not posses the requisite institutions necessary to underpin the efficient functioning of the model. The Chinese capital markets are nascent and not well regulated, the rule of law is tentative and the regulatory bodies are lacking in enforcement powers. In an effort to encourage good corporate governance, the China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the QFII (Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor) scheme in December 2002 in the hope that by opening the domestic securities market to foreign financial institutions, this would result in the implementation of sound corporate governance in Chinese listed companies as they vied to attract foreign shareholders. A survey was carried out and the results have only been mildly encouraging. The QFII has not had the dramatic impact that was expected of it initially and the reason is that the quotas allocated have been small and the QFII have had many restrictions placed. Until these are loosened the impact of the QFII will continue to be modest.
12
Rebers, Eugène Henri. "Essays on corporate governance." [Maastricht : Maastricht : Universiteit Maastricht] ; University Library, Maastricht University [Host], 1998. http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=8538.
Повний текст джерела
13
El, Ghoul Sadok. "Essays on Corporate Governance." Thesis, Université Laval, 2008. http://www.theses.ulaval.ca/2008/25765/25765.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
14
Yang, Minhua. "Essays on Corporate Governance." Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2009. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2999.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore the changes in corporate governance around the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 2002. In the first essay, I examine the relation between board structure and compensation as a bargaining game between the board and the CEO. Bargaining game theories describe an endogenous process of determining the structure of director and CEO compensation. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered the equilibrium of power between the board and CEO by changing the monitoring role of the board. SOX essentially provides a natural experiment to test how a shock to the bargaining game alters the balance of power between directors and the CEO. Using the ratio of director compensation to CEO compensation to proxy for bargaining power, I find a significant increase following the passage of SOX, consistent with directors gaining bargaining advantage. Moreover, firms with strong shareholder rights exhibit even greater evidence of power shifting to the directors. Overall, the results suggest that directors gain more power relative to the CEO in determining compensation plans and strong shareholder rights help firms to align directors' incentives with those of shareholders. In the second essay, I examine the relation between CEO compensation structure and acquirer returns. In the literature, researchers find that executive compensation structures influence corporate acquisition decisions. Equity-based executive compensation should reduce the non-value-maximizing behavior of acquiring managers. A series of corporate reforms such as SOX and the FASB expensing rule affected the structure of CEO equity-based compensation. I find a significant increase in CEO restricted stock compensation and a significant decrease in CEO option-based compensation following these reforms. I also find that CEOs with strong managerial power are more likely to receive more restricted stock in their compensation package after the 2002 reforms. Finally, I find a significant positive relation between the restricted stock compensation of acquiring firm CEOs and abnormal stock returns after 2002. This provides empirical support on the effectiveness of the shift away from options towards restricted stock in executive compensation packages. Restricted stock is associated with better merger decisions.Ph.D.
Department of Finance
Business Administration
Business Administration PhD
15
Tan, Tih Koon. "ESSAYS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE." Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2010. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/3006.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This dissertation is composed by two essays that explore corporate governance issues in S&P firms. The first essay examines changes in corporate governance after a firm gets added to the S&P 500 index? Using firms added from 1994 to 2007, this paper examines how governance mechanisms change for these firms. Specifically, I look at both the overall governance and details on how each mechanism changes. I find that governance improves after being added to the index. Controlling for firm size, leverage, prior firm performance, and growth opportunities, the market reacts positively to governance improvements as a whole. In addition, changes in governance are positively associated with changes in operating performance. In the second essay, the departure of a CEO often raises questions about who will replace him/her. This study examines the homogeneity/heterogeneity nature of the internal labor market using a novel measure, a heterogeneity index, which captures the concentration of executive compensation levels. I find that a more homogeneous internal labor market is associated with (1) a greater likelihood of an internal replacement, (2) a higher probability of a CEO turnover, and (3) a bigger tournament prize. In addition, the negative performance-turnover relationship is strengthened by a more homogeneous internal labor market. The heterogeneity index seems to proxy for internal labor market competition.Ph.D.
Department of Finance
Business Administration
Business Administration PhD
16
Wang, Su. "Blockholders and corporate governance." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2018. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/422198/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Blockholding has long been perceived as a harmful force to corporate governance due to its alleged exacerbation of minority expropriation, which is the core theoretical justification of recent worldwide ‘anti-blockholding’ regulatory movements. However, two facts should not be neglected that, first, although blockholding imposes risks of deepening Type II agency conflicts in public companies, it serves a crucial corporate governance role to minimise the Type I agency problem. Therefore, whether tightening rules that might disincentive blockholding is warranted can only be determined if the expected benefits outweigh associated costs. Second, while theories suggest that concentration empowers blockholders to expropriate minority shareholders’ interests, it is largely based on an over-simplified assumption that blockholders are homogeneous, sharing the same incentives and behaviours. To this end, viewing corporate governance as the reflection of a firm’s agency conflicts, this thesis aims to facilitate a more balanced view with a focus on disentangling the interactions between corporate governance and the nature of blockholders; particularly effects from the most passive blockholder type – state, and the most active type – hedge fund activists. Seeing audit fee as an indicator of firm’s extent corporate governance effectiveness, the thesis first examines the individual and joint impacts of the controlling shareholder’s (CS’s) three attributes – types, the level of control and control-ownership wedge – on audit pricing of Chinese public companies. Contrary to extant research suggesting that control concentration monotonically enlarges the agency problem and, eventually, audit fees, findings suggest such a relationship depends on the nature of control. It is interesting to find that the voting rights level of state CS is significantly negatively related to audit fee; whereas that of non-state counterparts is significantly opposite. This supports the view that auditors are likely to recognise incentive alignment as the dominant effect introduced by state control and entrenchment effect as the threat brought by non-state control. Furthermore, evidence suggests that auditors tend to perceive two-right divergence for non-state CSs as intentional and a risk indicator; but see that for state CSs as the expanding of control chain, which wears away the risk mitigation effects. To some extent, this thesis illustrates that control concentration, per se, does not necessarily impair corporategovernance; rather this impairment is caused by CSs’ unethical incentive and excessively large control without bonded ownership. Moreover, using a proprietary dataset of hedge fund activists together with 2002-2014 SEC 13D(/A) filings in US markets, this study next examines the impact of hedge fund activism (HFA) on risk perception of auditors, proxied by audit fee. It proposes that there should be a ‘learning curve’ for stakeholders to recognise long-term corporate governance benefits brought by this new wave of shareholder activism. Consistent with expectations, results show that, relative to those of matched controls, audit fee for HFA-targeted companies exhibits no differences pre-intervention; however, these differences emerge and increase significantly in the first three post-intervention audit engagements, followed by a fall back to the fifth post-event year. Furthermore, findings suggest that the post-intervention fee drop is negatively associated with the auditor-HFA experiences/encounters. Findings also suggest that these audit fee dynamics do not result from indirect effects caused by changes of firm’s fundamentals. Taken together, the results suggest that policymakers should not be urged to tighten regulations on HFA but instead should allow more time for this new breed of activist blockholder to be understood. Once the intangible perception gap between third party and presence of blockholders was addressed, in the final empirical analysis, this research further investigates tangible impacts of HFA on portfolio companies’ choice between real activity (REM) and accrual-based earning management (AEM) techniques as a result of their influences on the strategic aspect of corporate governance. Specifically, results suggest that target firms’ REMs via reducing/postponing R&D and SG&A expenses declined significantly during HFAs’ holding period; as well as after shares being withdrawn. This not only indicates that HFAs suppressed managers’ intention to deliver earnings at the cost of long-term performance; but also that such beneficial influences persisted in the short- and long-term periods after HFA’s disposal of shares. On the AEM side, the study reveals a significant increase in AEM after HFA intervention. This supports the expectation that targeted companies reallocate reduced earnings to AEM as a result of HFAs’ demand for balancing stakes among stakeholders and earnings-smoothing. Overall, these findings support the previous view that HFA serves as a remedy for extant corporate governance.
17
McGaughey, Ewan. "Participation in corporate governance." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2014. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3079/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Over the last thirty years there has been a remarkable functional convergence in the way companies are run. Behind directors, asset managers and banks usually participate the most in setting the ultimate direction of corporations, as they have assumed the role of stewardship over shareholder voting rights. At the same time, an increasing number of people’s livelihoods and old age now depend on the stock market, but these ultimate contributors to equity have barely any voice. Why has there been such a separation of contribution and participation? Two positive theses explain this convergence in corporate governance, one political, one economic. The first positive thesis is that laws which guarantee participation rights in investment chains (either for shareholders against directors, or for the ultimate contributors against institutional shareholders) were driven by a progressive democratic movement, but very incompletely compared to its social ideals. The second positive thesis is that when there have been no specific rights in law, the relative bargaining power of different groups determined the patterns of participation, whether the outcomes were reasonable or entirely arbitrary. In practice, the separation has grown between those who contribute to equity capital and those who participate in governance. These theses are preferable to existing narratives in political literature, and law and economics, which entail predictions of different forms of rational interest-driven institutional evolution. On the contrary, participation in corporate governance is largely unprincipled. The evidence is found in the historical development of participation rights in the UK, Germany and the US. Does the separation of contribution and participation matter? One normative thesis is derived from the historical evidence. It proposes that the separation of contribution and participation is a pressing concern, precisely because participation in corporate governance, as it stands, manifests no coherent principles. Asset managers and banks have gathered shareholder voting rights through no better reason than their peculiar market position as investment intermediaries. They have significant conflicts of interest when they exercise voting rights with other people’s money. They are able to use votes like any other selfperpetuating interest group would, because they are not effectively accountable to their natural beneficiaries: the ultimate investors. To ensure that the successes of modern corporate law are not unravelled, corporate governance should protect the principle of a symmetry between contribution and participation. This will mean that in the future, corporate governance becomes more economically efficient, sustainable, and just.
18
Eyzaguirre, Court Cristián. "Introducción al corporate governance." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2001. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/107229.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)No autorizada por el autor para ser publicada a texto completo
En la actualidad y desde hace más de 10 años, el tema del Corporate Governance, que no es otra cosa que la expresión anglosajona de la forma de administrar, dirigir y controlar una sociedad, en especial las sociedades anónimas, ha tomado especial importancia constituyéndose en un tema en sí mismo. En esta introducción al Corporate Governance, intentaremos caracterizar lo que la doctrina y el derecho comparado entiende por tal, cuales son los principios y objetivos de esta nueva tendencia de estudio del derecho de sociedades y cuáles han sido las metodologías adoptadas para lograr dichos objetivos. Dentro de esto último abordaremos los llamados Códigos de Conducta, los cuales para algunos se pueden contraponer o complementar con las reformas de las respectivas legislación de valores y de sociedades anónimas, dejando para el final algunos breves comentarios respecto de las modificaciones que introduce a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico la Ley Nº 19.705 sobre Oferta Pública de Adquisición de Acciones y Gobierno Corporativo.
19
Nordberg, Donald. "Corporate governance and institutionalization." Thesis, University of Liverpool, 2012. http://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/6493/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This thesis concerns corporate governance, a field that has attracted attention from a wide range of academic disciplines and evoking the often competing interests of corporations and investors. Interest in the field grew over the past three decades in response to recurrent corporate and market failures, through which it became a focal point of public policy debate as well. The complexity makes analysis both difficult and deeply rewarding. Scholars approach it from a wide variety of often conflicting theoretical perspectives, which ironically results in a field that can seem under-theorized. Studies of the field take a number of directions, presenting a challenge to all those who study it. This thesis addresses that challenge by adopting three different stances and then bringing them together under a framework based in institutional theory. An introductory chapter outlines the work, while the concluding chapter then articulates the links further and points towards an agenda for further research.
20
Bindasová, Daniela. "Corporate governance v bankách." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2007. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-1608.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Diplomová práce pojednává o problematice corporate governance, a to v rovině obecné, aplikované na obchodní společnosti v České republice, v dalších částech v rovině konkrétní, aplikované na bankovní subjekty. Jádro práce je tvořeno 2 částmi - statí právní rámec corporate governance a statí společensko - etický rámec corporate governance. Cílem práce je shrnout všechny součásti problematiky a poskytnout ucelený náhled na jejich realizace v praxi.
21
Sayrak, Akin. "Corporate diversification and governance /." Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
Повний текст джерела
22
Nelson, James Michael. "Essays on corporate governance." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288976.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Despite a great deal of interest by institutional investors and others in the issue of corporate governance, there is surprisingly little empirical evidence linking governance practices with firm performance. This dissertation examines the link between corporate governance practices and firm performance, acknowledging the endogenous nature of the relationship. I begin by defining corporate governance as a set of constraints and incentives on managers and shareholders bargaining to determine how the value of the firm will be allocated. In chapter one, I examine an unbalanced panel of 1,721 firms from 1980 to 1995, which includes each firm's charter and bylaw provisions, existence of a poison pill, applicable state anti-takeover laws, and board composition data, combined with financial data from CRSP and Compustat. This chapter provides the stylized facts about corporate governance today and details how governance practices have evolved over time. It also provides an explanation as to why shareholders would be willing to adopt governance provisions that have the potential to constrain their future allocations of firm value. I document that firms adopting governance provisions requiring shareholder approval tend to out perform benchmark portfolios prior to adoption and firms adopting poison pills under perform benchmark portfolios prior to adoption. I find that firms tend to under-perform benchmark portfolios following the adoption of governance provisions that are potentially harmful to shareholders. I find no relationship between CEO age, tenure, or compensation surrounding governance changes. In chapter two, I investigate the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm performance by examining firms where the constraints imposed by the governance system are most likely to be binding, i.e., firms that have experienced significant declines in quarterly operating performance. My results suggest that firms covered by fair price charter amendments and/or state control share acquisition statutes take longer to recover from declines in operating performance. I also examine firms with significant negative shocks in quarterly earnings, and find the persistence of these shocks is greater in firms covered by a freeze out statute and the persistence is lower in firms covered by cash out statutes, findings consistent with some governance features constraining shareholder value.
23
Wang, Shuai. "Essays on Corporate Governance." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2017. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/447982.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
Recent literature provide widespread and robust evidence on the impact of corporate governance. Ownership structure and management characteristics are among the center of the debate. Empirical studies report conflicting evidence regarding the information environment of public family-controlled firms. We use staggered exogenous shocks to the information environment to test whether family control influences corporate disclosure. After an exogenous decrease in the information environment, we find that family firms provide greater, more informative, and more rapidly produced disclosures than their nonfamily peer firms. Family control increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure by 190% relative to nonfamily firms after a negative information shock. These disclosure increases occur across founder-, descendant-, and externally- led family firms, suggesting families possess strong incentives to protect the firm’s information environment. Beyond ownership structure, I examine the relation of CEO overconfidence on compensation incentive. My findings suggest that the cost-reduction hypothesis applies when firms offer higher incentive to overconfident CEOs to exploit their positively biased views of firm performance; risk-reduction hypothesis dominates when CEOs are extremely overconfident, where firms offer reduced compensation convexity to lower CEO’s excessive risk-taking incentive. Extremely overconfident CEOs receive less convex compensation than moderately overconfident CEOs and this relation amplifies with history of value-destroying acquisition and better corporate governance.
Temple University--Theses
24
Neuber, Andreas. "Corporate governance & culture." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2019. https://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_oa/627.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Based on the institutional logic that enterprises will conform with the immediate cultural values and settings in a nation, the important influence of culture on corporate governance has been acknowledged in recent research. It has been shown that the quality of corporate governance varies strongly within regions and globally. Therefore, tests of cultural influences on single components of corporate governance or surrogates thereof have been conducted and their outcomes discussed. This research investigates the influence of culture on corporate governance using all 6 Hofstede cultural dimensions and a uniquely broad set of corporate governance factors that are present in reality. Using 565,787 year observations relating to 18,344 companies in 41 countries for the years 2010-2015, the results of cross-sectional regression analysis with appropriate control variables is presented. The ensuing results further enhance our understanding of culture's influence on the composition of the board of directors and will help regulators and lawmakers in their endeavors to improve relevant legislation as well as allow multinational companies to design effective and reliable corporate governance structures in their enterprises. In my analysis, I find a substantial influence of cultural dimensions on the structural elements of the composition of the board of directors around the globe. In particular board independence, time on the board, gender diversity, and absolute size of the board are impacted by the surrounding cultural environment of the enterprise. These results also hold true in a robustness test with alternative cultural dimensions. A final moderating test gives some evidence of the moderating influence the cultural environment has on the relationship between board structural elements and the quality of corporate governance.
25
Brühl, Kai. "Corporate governance, Strategie und Unternehmenserfolg ein Beitrag zum Wettbewerb alternativer Corporate-governance-Systeme." Wiesbaden Gabler, 2009. http://d-nb.info/995466793/04.
Повний текст джерела
26
Schäfer, Lars [Verfasser]. "Corporate Governance bei Kapitalanlagegesellschaften - Fund Governance. / Lars Schäfer." Berlin : Duncker & Humblot, 2009. http://d-nb.info/1238362265/34.
Повний текст джерела
27
Li, Xiao. "Corporate governance in the context of corporate restructuring." Thesis, Connect to e-thesis, 2008. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/60/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Glasgow, 2008.Ph.D. thesis submitted to the Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences, School of Law, University of Glasgow, 2008. Includes bibliographical references. Print version also available.
28
Perera, Shalini. "Corporate Ownership and Corporate Governance in Sri Lanka." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.517315.
Повний текст джерела
29
Johl, Satirenjit Kaur. "Corporate entrepreneurship and corporate governance : an empirical analysis." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2006. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.430642.
Повний текст джерела
30
Gibbs, Philip Archel. "The role of corporate governance in corporate restructuring." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/12544.
Повний текст джерела
31
Mohseni, Mahdi. "Three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance." Thesis, Boston College, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2345/bc-ir:104372.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Thesis advisor: Philip StrahanIn my first essay, I find that CEOs with more control over the firm have smaller compensation packages and are less likely to have severance contracts. Despite lower pay, these CEOs have longer tenure and their boards' replacement decisions are less sensitive to their performance, which is consistent with the view that there is a trade-off between pay and dismissal risk. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I use divorce as an exogenous shock to CEO equity ownership, and find that following a divorce, turnover risk goes up and pay increases significantly. My findings highlight the importance of turnover risk in studying executive compensation. The second essay shows that staggered boards are associated with higher private benefits of control. We find that companies de-staggering their boards experience a decrease in control premiums. Using two court rulings in 2010 with opposite decisions on the effectiveness of staggered boards, we show that our findings are not driven by the endogeneity of the corporate control. Finally, we find evidence that the stock market reactions to the court rulings are negatively associated with the changes in control premium. Overall, our results suggest that staggered boards decrease shareholder value via entrenchment. In my third essay, I study the impact of accounting practices on debt renegotiations and covenant violations. Firms that recognize losses in a timelier manner (i.e., have more conservative accounting practices) have less slack at any given time and are more likely to violate loan covenants. But the consequences of a covenant violation by such firms differ from those of firms with aggressive accounting practices. I also find that firms with more conservative accounting practices are more likely to renegotiate their loans with creditors
Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015
Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management
Discipline: Finance
32
He, Ting. "Three essays in corporate finance and corporate governance." HKBU Institutional Repository, 2011. http://repository.hkbu.edu.hk/etd_ra/1230.
Повний текст джерела
33
Cha, Taemin. "Two Essays on Corporate Policy and Corporate Governance." Thesis, The George Washington University, 2014. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3608897.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Employee Ownership and Corporate Governance: I find that firms that actively promote employee ownership through profit sharing and equity ownership plans pay their executives less and adopt more provisions favorable to shareholders. Furthermore, my empirical evidence shows that the shareholders in firms with higher employee ownership tend to be more active in corporate governance through the execution of proxy voting. The corporate boards in firms with higher employee ownership are younger, more diverse, and more representative of employees. My findings suggest that in the shareholder-manager conflict, employee ownership tends to shift power in the direction of shareholders and could significantly mitigate existing agency problems in the firm.
Leadership and Corporate Culture: Evidence from Executive Migrations across Firms This paper examines the importance of leadership for corporate culture by studying changes in firm environmental policy around executive successions. I find that firms improve significantly their environmental performance following the arrival of executives from firms with strong pro-environmental culture and firms tend to decrease their environmental standards following the arrival of executives with poor environmental record. However, the economic impact is much weaker for an executive with poor environmental record. The findings provide insight into the formation of organizational culture and the diffusion of cultural norms in the economy.
34
Popov, M. (Mikhail). "Corporate governance in Russia:effects of ownership concentration on corporate governance in the Russian firms." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201402131110.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This Master Thesis examines corporate governance in Russia and effects of ownership concentration on dividend policies in the Russian companies. We find that the classical agency approach is not applicable in the case of the Russian firms, but the stakeholder theory should be applied instead. We discuss effects of different stakeholders on the corporate governance. According to the existing evidence insiders (large shareholders, managers and employees) and outsiders (minority shareholders and creditors) can impose constraints on the companies in Russia. Also the State and product markets can affect corporate governance practices in the Russian companies. At the same time the role of boards of directors is very important in countries like Russia, where low legal enforcement and weak investor protection prevail. Boards should mitigate the agency problem in absence of proper investor protection and law enforcement.
The previous research suggests that a classical conflict of owners and managers is not the case in the Russian corporations. Instead the conflict of large and small shareholders should be considered. Thus, our research focuses on the analysis of ownership concentration effects on corporate governance. We use dividend payout ratios as a proxy for corporate governance practices in the Russian companies. We find extremely low dividend payouts in the Russian companies. The finding implies that the agency problem does exist in the Russian companies. However, our results suggest that it is not caused by ownership concentration. Instead ownership concentration has a significant positive effect on dividend payouts. Our findings support the prior research suggesting that a large shareholder has enough incentive and power to monitor management. The results are also in line with the substitute dividend model, according to which we can conclude that large shareholders would compensate minority shareholders for weak investor protection and also would try to establish good reputation on the capital markets.
35
Jeppesen, Birgitte. "Corporate governance i børsnoterede selskaber i Danmark = Corporate governance in listed companies in Denmark /." Aarhus : Institut for Økonomi, Aarhus Universitet, 2008. http://mit.econ.au.dk/Library/Specialer/2008/20032569.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
36
Birkner, Hartmut Alexander. "Corporate Governance und Private Equity." St. Gallen, 2007. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/02603280002/$FILE/02603280002.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
37
Müller, Stephan Andreas. "Corporate Governance für Family Offices." St. Gallen, 2008. http://www.biblio.unisg.ch/org/biblio/edoc.nsf/wwwDisplayIdentifier/01652734002/$FILE/01652734002.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
38
Weishaupt, Till. "Corporate Governance von humankapitalintensiven Unternehmen." Doctoral thesis, [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2007. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=985245301.
Повний текст джерела
39
Kharitonenko, Dmitri. "Corporate governance ratings in Russia /." Schaan, 2009. http://aleph.unisg.ch/hsgscan/hm00264404.pdf.
Повний текст джерела
40
Schwarz, Sebastian Henner. "Regulierung durch Corporate Governance Kodizes." Doctoral thesis, [S.l. : s.n.], 2005. http://deposit.ddb.de/cgi-bin/dokserv?idn=976510898.
Повний текст джерела
41
Jiang, Yi. "Corporate governance across institutional contexts." Columbus, Ohio : Ohio State University, 2006. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1150918766.
Повний текст джерела
42
Bengtsson, Björn. "Corporate Governance Kod i Sverige." Thesis, Kristianstad University College, Department of Business Administration, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-3412.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Jag valde att i min uppsats behandla den svenska Koden för bolagsstyrning
(Corporate Governance) och mitt syfte var att göra en jämförelse mellan Kodens
och Aktiebolagslagens regler för bolagsstyrning För att lyckas med detta har jag
använt mig av den traditionella juridiska metoden och utgått från den
rättsdogmatiska ansatsen.
Bolagen ska, enligt Koden, offentliggöra tid och plats för stämman i samband
med att tredje kvartalsrapporten lämnas. I god tid ska bolaget på sin hemsida
informera om aktieägarnas rätt att få ärende behandlat av stämman och Koden
har även noterat ett ökat internationellt ägande i svenskt näringsliv och därför
ska bolaget överväga om stämman ska simultantolkas. Även regeln om att man
ska kunna delta i bolagsstämma från annan ort underlättar för utländska ägare.
En av de stora nyheterna i Koden är att bolagen ska ha en valberedning med
uppgift att nominera kandidater till styrelsen, ge förslag till arvodering av
styrelsen, nominera revisor och föreslå arvode till revisorn. Bolagen ska även ha
ett revisionsutskott, med ansvar för kvalitetssäkra den finansiella
rapporteringen, och ett ersättningsutskott med ansvar för att bereda förslag till
principer för ersättningar och andra anställningsvillkor för bolagsledningen.
Utöver att stärka ägarnas position är informationsgivning Kodens nyckelord. På
bolagets hemsida ska en speciell plats skapas där all information som krävs
enligt Koden ska vara lätt tillgänglig.
Koden fokuserar starkt på den interna kontrollen och transparens i ekonomin som jag anser är förutsättningar för ett väl fungerande näringsliv. Min slutsats blir därför att Koden har en stor funktion att fylla.
43
Pajuste, Anete. "Corporate governance and controlling shareholders." Doctoral thesis, Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, Finansiell Ekonomi (FI), 2004. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hhs:diva-537.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries.Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004
44
Shih, Ching-Ping, and 石青平. "Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2002. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84682029454494308852.
Повний текст джерела
45
Domingues, Bruno Miguel Ribeiro. "Corporate governance." Master's thesis, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10451/18186.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
A dissertação de mestrado que se segue, realizada na área das ciências jurídico-empresariais, incide no estudo do papel dos sócios na governação societária. Nesse sentido analisaremos a evolução da intervenção dos sócios nas sociedades, os seus direitos e poderes de controlo e fiscalização, pretendendo-se também dessa forma compreender o seu alcance prático.
Depois passaremos a uma análise da repartição de competências entre os acionistas e a administração, tentando delimitar o âmbito de atuação de cada um deles e qual o lugar que ocupam na governação das sociedades nomeadamente no âmbito das matérias de gestão.The master's degree paper that follows, done in the corporate law area, consists in the study of shareholders role in corporate governance matters. For that we will take in account the evolution of shareholders intervention in the life of corporations, their rights and powers of control and supervision, understanding it practical appliance. Then we will proceed to analyse the divisions of competences between shareholders and the administration trying to confine their attributions specially in terms of management matters.
46
Pan, Chin-Shu, and 潘金樹. "Corporate governance." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70072411064197566794.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士國立成功大學
高階管理碩士在職專班
93
After the financial meltdown in Southeast Asia and after fraudulence of enterprises, such as Enron, Xerox, and WorldCom, happening in the United States, corporate governance has become the focus subject for discussion again. Many international organizations invest in considerable resources and much time to study the solution when facing similar crises afterwards. Since February 2002, our securities authority has also required that a listed company for the first time set two independent directors and one independent supervisor and expected to give an impetus to establish the system of corporate governance in Taiwan by using a gradual way. Prior scholars’ studies in Taiwan typically probed the effects of setting independent directors and supervisors voluntarily on managerial achievements. However, the corporate properties make it essential to set independent directors and supervisors voluntarily and also have relation to managerial achievements. This study is discussed that those corporations under the requirement of setting independent directors and supervisors according to law whether the result conforms to the anticipation of the authority, and whether there are positive effects on managerial achievements. This study takes 152 listed companies for the first time during 2002 as samples and compares the variations of managerial achievements between earlier and later stages in listed companies which set the system of independent directors and supervisors with those in listed companies which do not set it. Considering the effect of fluctuant economics prosperity, this study randomly chooses a contrastive company from the companies in samples, compares the rising or the falling extent of managerial achievements in earlier and later stages between a sample company and a contrastive one, and tackles the effect of setting independent directors and supervisors according to law. This study finds that listed companies for the first time setting independent directors and supervisors according to law have positive effects on their managerial achievements when comparing the variations of managerial achievements in earlier stages with those in later stages. It also obtains the same conclusion in the some trade. Hence, this study concludes that companies which set the system of independent directors and supervisors according to law have better managerial achievements than those which do not set the system and that setting the system has positive effects on advancing the function of corporate governance in Taiwan.
47
Wang, Chung-Mei, and 王鍾湄. "Corporate Information Governance." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/82935028303995285517.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士國立臺灣大學
法律學研究所
103
Since the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the surge of corporate scandals in the U.S. between 2001 and 2002, such as the collapse of Enron, have led to a renewed interest in corporate governance internationally, namely how does company law deals with mismanagement and balances the interests of stakeholders in a company by adopting a range of mechanisms that can be described as a system of checks and balances. Improving transparency and disclosure are key steps to corporate governance as they can provide stakeholders with timely and accurate disclosure on all material matters of a company. According to Article 210 of Taiwan Company Act, any shareholder and any creditor of a company may request at any time, by submitting evidentiary document(s) to show his/her interests involved and indicating the scope of interested matters, an access to inspect and to make copies of the Articles of Incorporation, the minutes of every meeting of the shareholders, the financial statements, the shareholders roster and the counterfoil of corporate bonds issued by the company. However, the scope of a company’s books and records that can be inspected and copied does not include the original date of the accounting books and records or financial and business conditions of an affiliated enterprise, which indicate the results of operations and the financial position of a company. Refer to the U.S. legislative experience, Companies Act 2006 and Hong Kong Companies Ordinance, we can find out that the shareholders roster and other corporate books and records should be transparent at a minimum level. Greater transparency in corporate books and records can give stakeholders the necessary knowledge to exercise their rights and protect their interests. What’s more, it can defer the directors or mangers of a company from wrongdoings. In addition, company registration is a key part of information disclosure regime. Whereas, the competent authority in Taiwan have no right to update or rectify the company registration records or documents, and there are still other ways to access corporate information, we need to rethink the function of company registration and to clarify the role that the competent authority should play in corporate information governance. Finally, this thesis will review the current legal mechanism of the corporate information right under Taiwan Company Act, and propose amendments base on the cases and theories discussing in previous chapters.
48
Liu, Hsiang-Sheng, and 劉向晟. "The Corporate Risk and Corporate Governance." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4ar4b9.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士逢甲大學
財務金融學所
100
Prior studies mostly focus on the corporate performance and pay little attention to the relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk. This study aims to examine the effect of corporate governance on the corporate risk from different perspectives. We divided corporate governance into board composition and ownership structure. The risk examined in the study includes the total risk and idiosyncratic risk. We use the standard deviations of return on assets, stock return and Tobin''s Q as proxies for total risk. We also follow the direct decomposition method provided by Xu and Malkiel (2003) to estimate the corporate idiosyncratic risk. Finally, we employed the panel data regression to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate risk. The result shows that board size, board independent, and CEO holding have a negative relationship with total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Board duality has positive relationship with corporate risk. However, not all corporate governance variables have a significant relationship with both risk measures variable. The institutional holding not only has impact on corporate risk behaviors, but will also affect the risk measures differently.
49
Chen, Yuan-Yi, and 陳原毅. "Corporate governance factors and corporate performance." Thesis, 2009. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17802103311159986366.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士中國文化大學
會計研究所
97
This study empirically examines the relationship between corporate governance factors and corporate performance. Prior research of corporate governance and corpo-rate performance usually use single indicator or single dimension as the measurement of corporate governance. Using a limit indicators or dimensions of corporate governance will create correlated omitted variable problem. According to the OECD principles of corporate governance, we use the OECD’s principle as the standard to classify the corporate governance into four dimensions. Ex-tract 8 corporate governance factors by exploratory factor analysis from 17 corporate governance indicators. Use 8 corporate governance factors into research to examine the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. Finally, the re-search will expect that adjusted R-square will be effectively promoted. The results indicate that director size factor, institutional shareholding factor and director payoff factor have significantly positive with corporate performance. Related transaction factor and employees’ work experience and qualifications factor have significantly reverse with corporate performance. Finally, the result show that adjusted R-square have effectively promoted than before.
50
Chen, Shiang-Ju, and 陳湘茹. "The Corporate Governance of Corporate Reorganization." Thesis, 2007. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25039029429385119143.
Повний текст джерела