Книги з теми "Construction contracts – Mathematical models"

William, Schwartzkopf, ed. Calculating lost labor productivity in construction claims. New York: Wiley Law Publications, 1995.

Marcet, Albert. Recursive contracts. Florence: European University Institute, 1998.

Kalashnikov, Vladimir Vi͡acheslavovich. Mathematical methods for construction of queueing models. Pacific Grove, Calif: Wadsworth & Brooks/Cole, 1990.

Kalashnikov, V. V., and S. T. Rachev. Mathematical Methods for Construction of Queueing Models. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4684-1475-2.

Englmaier, Florian. Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.

Barten, A. P. Methodological aspects of macroeconomic model construction. Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia, 1987.

Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1989.

Lacker, Jeffrey Malcolm. Optimal contracts under costly state falsification. West Lafayette, Ind: Institute for Research in the Behavioral, Economic, and Management Sciences, Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University, 1988.

Fredley, John. Contracts with the trades: Scope of work models for home builders. Washington, D.C: Home Builder Press, 1997.

P, Baker George. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

Bajari, Patrick L. Bidding for incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

Mathewson, G. Frank. Incentives and exclusive dealing in franchise contracts. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1985.

Lang, William W. An examination of wage behavior in macroeconomic models with long term contracts. [Philadelphia, Pa.]: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 1989.

Kolotilov, I︠U︡ V. Simulation of construction operations in analytical systems. New York: Izvestiya Publishers of the Administration of the President of Russian Federation, 2013.

Bright, Judy Kathryn, ed. Mathematics for carpentry and the construction trades. 2nd ed. Upper Saddle River, N.J: Prentice Hall, 2002.

Hori, Kazumi. Hōrudo appu mondai ni kansuru keiyaku no riron oyobi sono keiyakuhō no bunseki e no ōyō. Tōkyō: Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo, 2008.

Edlin, Aaron S. Contract renegotiation in agency problems. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997.

Hosios, Arthur. Self-selection with renegotiation. Toronto: Dept. of Economics and Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1991.

Hosios, Arthur. Self-selection with renegotiation. Toronto: Dept. of Economics, Institute for Policy Analysis, University of Toronto, 1988.

Nakaizumi, Takuya. Fukanbi keiyaku riron no ōyō kenkyū: Application of incomplete contract theory. Yokohama-shi: Kantō Gakuin Daigaku Shuppankai, 2004.

Hori, Kazumi. Hōrudo appu mondai ni kansuru keiyaku no riron oyobi sono keiyakuhō no bunseki e no ōyō. Tōkyō: Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo, 2008.

Arvan, Lanny David. Optimal long term labor contracts when workers have heterogenous opportunities. [Urbana]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1985.

Fuhrer, Jeffrey C. Optimal monetary policy in a model of overlapping price contracts. [Boston]: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, 1994.

A, Hart Robert. Wage and profit sharing compensation under efficient contracts. Stirling: Department of Economics, University of Stirling, 1989.

Gibson, Rajna. Option valuation: Analyzing and pricing standardized option contracts. Genève: Georg, 1988.

Option valuation: Analyzing and pricing standardized option contracts. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.

Concrete and concrete structures: Numerical modelling and applications. London: Elsevier Applied Science, 1989.

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol. Testing out contractual incompleteness: Evidence from soccer. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol. Testing out contractual incompleteness: Evidence from soccer. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2005.

Rosen, Sherwin. Contracts and the market for executives. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990.

Rosén, Åsa. Contributions to the theory of labour contracts. [Gothenberg: Göteborgs universitet, 1991.

Jovanovic, Boyan. Contracts and money. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

L, Gruneberg Stephen, ed. The economics of the modern construction sector. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

Bentolila, Samuel. The macroeconomic impact of flexible labour contracts: An application to Spain. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1991.

Gorton, Gary. The design of bank loan contracts, collateral, and renegotiation. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

Levin, Jonathan. Contracting for government services: Theory and evidence from U.S. cities. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

Rey, Patrick. The role of exclusive territories in producers' competition. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.

Levin, Jonathan. Contracting for government services: Theory and evidence from u.s. cities. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007.

Bernheim, B. Douglas. Exclusive dealing. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1996.

Theodoridis, Ariane. Currency basket construction and currency basket policy: Theoretical and empirical aspects of currency basket construction and currency basket policy in Austria and the Nordic countries. Genéve: Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1997.

Ivakhnenko, Alekseĭ Grigorʹevich. Modeli i metody upravlenii͡a︡ ėnergeticheskim stroitelʹstvom. Kiev: "Budivelʹnyk", 1985.

Khibukhin, V. P. Matematicheskie metody planirovanii͡a︡ i upravlenii͡a︡ stroitelʹstvom. 2-ге вид. Leningrad: Stroĭizdat, Leningradskoe otd-nie, 1990.

Linguistic geometry: From search to construction. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 2000.

Fabel, Oliver. Insurance and incentives in labor contracts: A study in the theory of implicit contracts. Frankfurt am Main: A. Hain, 1990.

Kaplow, Louis. Optimal insurance contracts when establishing the amount of losses is costly. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

Edlin, Aaron S. Cadillac contracts and up-front payments: Efficient investment under expectation damages. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1994.

Schmitz, Patrick. Investment incentives under asymmetric information and incomplete contracts. Aachen: Shaker, 1999.

Antràs, Pol. Incomplete contracts and the product cycle. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2003.

Pfeffer, Karin. Integrating spatio-temporal environmental models for planning ski runs. Utrecht: Koninklijk Nederlands Aardrijkskundig Genootschap, 2003.

Sercu, Piet. The optimal number of contracts in cross- or delta-hedges. Kowloon, Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong, Department of Economics and Finance, 1997.