Статті в журналах з теми "Commandery of Cologne"
Щоб переглянути інші типи публікацій з цієї теми, перейдіть за посиланням: Commandery of Cologne.
Оформте джерело за APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard та іншими стилями
Ознайомтеся з топ-50 статей у журналах для дослідження на тему "Commandery of Cologne".
Біля кожної праці в переліку літератури доступна кнопка «Додати до бібліографії». Скористайтеся нею – і ми автоматично оформимо бібліографічне посилання на обрану працю в потрібному вам стилі цитування: APA, MLA, «Гарвард», «Чикаго», «Ванкувер» тощо.
Також ви можете завантажити повний текст наукової публікації у форматі «.pdf» та прочитати онлайн анотацію до роботи, якщо відповідні параметри наявні в метаданих.
Переглядайте статті в журналах для різних дисциплін та оформлюйте правильно вашу бібліографію.
1
JASKULSKI, Waldemar. "LIEUTENANT COLONEL JÓZEF OLSZYNA-WILCZYŃSKI IN LATVIAN CAMPAIGN (DECEMBER 1919 – FEBRUARY 1920)." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 163, no. 1 (January 2, 2012): 216–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3254.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article introduces Lieutenant Colonel Józef Olszyna-Wilczyński in the Polish and Latvian campaign conducted in winter 1920. Then, this officer commanded 3 Infantry Brigade Legions and at the same time as was Acting Commander of 1 Infantry Brigade Legions and Infantry Division, which belonged to Edward Rydz-Śmigły.During this campaign Lt. Col. Olszyna-Wilczyński commanded Grupa Przełomowa (the Breakthrough Group), which mainly carried out attacks. On 3 January he conquered Daugavpils. In the first ten days of January Gen. Rydz-Śmigły gave J. Puriņša`s Latvian Group under Lt. Col. Olszyna-Wilczyński’s command.For the Polish and Latvian campaign, conducted under very harsh conditions, he was held in high regard by the division commander Gen. Rydz-Smigly and the commander of the Lithuanian and Belarusian Front Gen. Stanislaw Sheptytsky. For conquering Daugavpils, at Stefan Dąb-Biernacki’s request, he was decorated second time with the Cross of Valour. At the beginning of February 1926, the President of the Republic of Poland permitted him to accept and wear the Latvian Cross Lacplesis (Bear Slayer) Class III.
2
Pięciak, Krzysztof. "2nd Lieutenant Jan Siewiera “Wicher”: A Soldier of the National Armed Forces and the Underground Polish Army." Sowiniec 26, no. 46 (June 30, 2015): 31–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/sowiniec26.2015.46.03.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article describes the history of second lieutenant Jan Siewiera “Wicher” (1922-1947), especially his underground activities. During World War II he served in the National Armed Forces where he graduated from an officer-cadet school and where he was a soldier of colonel “Czech’s” division (NN). In April 1945 he was arrested and sentenced to one year of imprisonment for his activities in the NSZ. After he left prison, he entered a division of the Underground Polish Army in the autumn of 1946, commanded by second lieutenant Alfons Olejnik “Babinicz”, in which he became deputy commander. After receiving severe wounds he died during interrogation by the officers of the UB (Department of Security). He was probably interred in Wieluń.
3
Gliniecki, Tomasz. "Capturing cities with the force of 5th Guards Tank Army during the Red Army’s Mława–Elbląg offensive operations in January 1945." Masuro-Warmian Bulletin 305, no. 3 (November 25, 2019): 543–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.51974/kmw-134821.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The paper presents battles for cities during the Mława–Elbląg offensive operation, conducted by units of the 5th Armoured Guard on January 17–26, according to the orders of Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski, who commanded the 2nd Belarusian Front, and Colonel General Vasily Wolski. The findings, based on the documentation of the Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation and related literature on the subject, present the daily battles for cities led by armoured units and their assigned support. The border territories they occupied, marching routes and combat operations are noted, alongside the problem raised by commanders of insufficient support for tanks with infantry forces. The article describes the occupation or capture of: Mława, Działdowo, Nidzica, Stębark, Ostróda, Iława, Morąg, Zalewo, Małdyty, Pasłęk, Młynary and Tolkmicko as well as the initial battles for Elbląg.
4
Radziwiłłowicz, Dariusz. "Generał brygady Kazimierz Rumsza – z armii carskiej do polskiej." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 11, no. 1 (June 30, 2020): 105–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.5974.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Since its inception, the 5th Siberian Rifle Division was led by Colonel [płk.] Rumsza who operated under the orders of Colonel [płk.] Czuma, the commander of Polish forces in Siberia. In the light of the examined documents, Colonel Kazimierz Rumsza appears to be a man with two faces. On the one hand, he was an excellent commander, proving his worth in the extreme war conditions. On the other, a violent officer who humiliated his personnel and got involved in shady financial ventures. He was never proven guilty of embezzlement. However, his very presence in the group of suspects stigmatised him among the officers. He won back some favour after the lost September Campaign. During World War II, Rumsza did not play any significant role in the Polish Armed Forces. After demobilisation, he settled down in London. On 1 January 1964, he was promoted to the rank of brigadier general [gen. brygady]. Kazimierz Rumsza died on 28 January 1970.
5
Kiyanskaya, Oksana I. "“THEY MADE AN ELEPHANT OUT OF A FLY”. S.I. MURAV’EV-APOSTOL AND THE UNREST IN THE SEMYONOVSKY REGIMENT IN 1820." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. "Literary Theory. Linguistics. Cultural Studies" Series, no. 9 (2021): 160–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2686-7249-2021-9-160-175.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article deals with the soldiers’ unrest in the Semyonovsky Regiment in 1820, which, according to many researchers, was a kind of “prelude” to the Decembrist uprising. After the soldiers’ unrest in October 1820, the Semyonovsky Guards Regiment was disbanded and its officers were transferred to the army regiments. The article explores the causes of soldiers’ and officers’ dissatisfaction with the regiment’s commander, Colonel F.E. Schwartz, the course of the riots in the regiment, and the behavior of the officers. In addition, the article investigates the case of Semyonovsky Regiment officers, D. Yermolaev and I. Scherbatov, accused of sympathizing with the soldiers and attempting to meet with the punished instigators of riots. The Semyonov history is considered in connection with the biography of one of its participants, the future Decembrist S.I. Murav’ev-Apostol. The article describes the events in the company commanded by Muravyov-Apostol, as well as the consequences that this “story” had for his life and career. It is concluded that by offending an innocent officer, the authorities thereby contributed to his transformation into a radical revolutionary and leader of an antigovernment conspiracy
6
Stopczyński, Waldemar. "Raport „Alego” z akcji na Kutscherę, czyli czego nie powiedział dowódca batalionu „Parasol”." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 20, no. 2 (2019): 55–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2019.2(268).0003.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The elimination of Franz Kutschera by the soldiers of the 1st platoon of the „Pegasus” company (later the „Parasol” battalion) is one of the most famous military actions of the Polish underground. Until the 1990s, the post-war narrative about the events of February 1, 1944 was based on the accounts of those participants of the operation who survived the war and on a brief report sent by the commander of „Pegasus” to Colonel „Nil”, and it was consolidated by P. Stachiewicz’s book „Parasol”. The documents published in 1993 and 2016 – the report of the deputy commander of the „Kutschera” operation and the cover letter of the commander of „Pegasus” attached to it – questioned this narrative. The article traced the development of the story about the operation against the „executioner of Warsaw”, indicating that the commander accepted this version which contained the most discrep
7
Kehrberg, Richard F., and Hans von Luck. "Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck." Journal of Military History 55, no. 1 (January 1991): 124. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1986152.
Повний текст джерела
8
Komarov, Dmitry E. "The Military Reality of the Early Days of the Great Patriotic War against the Background of the Fate of an Encircled Officer: The Case of Colonel M.G. Kirillov (1942)." Herald of an archivist, no. 2 (2022): 522–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2022-2-522-533.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the midst of severe defeats of the initial period of the war, many units and formations of the Red Army were surrounded. Both private and command corps who broke out of the encirclement, as well as those who were captured and escaped, were thoroughly checked. This measure seems reasonable and legitimate. The absolute majority, after passing this “filter,” were sent to the front, against others charges were brought under the laws of wartime. Among the latter was the commander of the 38th Rifle Division, Colonel Maxim Gavrilovich Kirillov, who was shot by court verdict in 1942. Commanding his division, M. G. Kirillov was surrounded in the Vyazma defensive operation (October 2-13, 1941) to the west of Vyazma. Several times, the colonel placed disparate groups under his under command, making unsuccessful attempts to break out. Later, he was captured by the enemy, escaped, commanded a partisan detachment. In March 1942 Kirillov was summoned to the “mainland,” accused of treason and shot; only in 1991, he was rehabilitated. The personality of Colonel Kirillov is much discussed in press and in the Internet. His personal tragedy is considered an example of illegal repressions against the servicemen who were surrounded and held captive. The facts provided in the article detail and clarify Kirillov's actions in the occupied territory. It is shown that charges against him were mostly proven and fell under current statutory provisions. Information on Kirillov is given against the background of mass repressions against senior Red Army officers at the beginning of the war. Investigative documents record some changes in the work of the punitive apparatus in contrast with the period of 1937–38. However, physical coercion and attempts to bring his action under the article 58 of the criminal code remained. The conclusions on Colonel Kirillov’s sentence are another evidence of tragical and inconsistent fate of the Soviet encircled servicemen and prisoners of war. The facts indicate a need for a thorough study of the fate of each serviceman who was surrounded or captured from the standpoint of military realities of the initial period of the Great Patriotic War.
9
Wątor, Agnieszka. "Major Bolesław Michał Nieczuja-Ostrowski’s Service in the “Maria” Inspectorate of the Home Army in the Years 1943–1945." Sowiniec 26, no. 46 (June 30, 2015): 7–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.12797/sowiniec26.2015.46.02.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The aim of the article is to present the service of Major Bolesław Michał Nieczuja-Ostrowski (1907-2008) in the Regional Inspectorate of the Home Army in Miechów, codename “Maria”, in the years 1943–1945. The author of the article used the documents which were drawn up by the communist authorities of Poland during the investigation that was conducted against Nieczuja-Ostrowski who was lieutenant colonel at that time and against the soldiers of the 106 DP AK formed in the area of the “Maria” Inspectorate of the Home Army. This information was confronted with and extended by the information contained in the publications that are available, and especially in the recollection-related works of General Nieczuja-Ostrowski.In August 1943, the commander of the Kraków Region of the Home Army, colonel Józef Spychalski, nominated him the Commander of the Miechów Regional Inspectorate of the Home Army which was a part of this district. Major Ostrowski assumed this function on 15 September 1943 and on 31 July he was nominated the commander of the 106th Infantry Division of the Home Army, a great military unit which was organised as a part of the effort to restore the Armed Forces, a process associated with Operation “Burza”/“Tempest”. From July 1943 until December 1944 about 20 thousand people were incorporated into the Home Army in the area of the Miechów Inspectorate.
10
Kazakevych, G. "UKRAINIAN O'CONNORS: THE FAMILY OF IRISH ANCESTRY IN THE CULTURAL LIFE OF THE 19TH CENTURY UKRAINE." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 132 (2017): 15–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2017.132.1.03.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article is devoted to the O'Connor family, which played a noticeable role in the Ukrainian history of the 19 – early 20th centuries. A founder of the family Alexander O'Connor leaved Ireland in the late 18th century. The author assumes that he was a military man who had to emigrate from Ireland shortly after the Irish rebellion of 1798. After some years in France, where he had changed his surname to de Connor, he and his elder son Victor arrived in Russia where Alexander Ivanovich De-Konnor joined the army. As a cavalry regiment commander, colonel De-Konnor took part in the Napoleonic wars. He married a noble Ukrainian woman Anastasia Storozhenko and settled down in her estate in the Poltava region of Ukraine. His three sons (Victor, Alexander and Valerian) had served as army commanders and then settled in Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv regions respectively. Among their descendants the most notable were two daughters of Alexander De-Konnor jr – Olga and Valeria as well as Valerian De-Konnor jr. Olga De-Konnor married a famous Ukrainian composer and public figure Mykola Lysenko. As a professional opera singer, she stood at the origins of the Ukrainian national opera. Her younger sister Valeria was a Ukrainian writer, publicist and political activist who joined the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic in 1917. Valerian De-Konnor jr. is well known for his research works and translations in the field of cynology.
11
JASKULSKI, Waldemar. "COLONEL EDWARD CZOPÓR (1887- ?). OFFICER OF 2ND REPUBLIC OF POLAND. CONTRIBUTION TO BIOGRAPHY." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 165, no. 3 (July 1, 2012): 209–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0002.3487.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The author presents the figure of Colonel Edward Czopór. This officer originally served in the Russian Army and as its soldier took part in World War I. In November 1918 he joined the Polish Army. In the years 1924-1928 he served in educational establishments, where he was promoted to colonel. Then he commanded an artillery regiment. From 1932 until the outbreak of war he served in leadership positions in the ordnance branch.
12
Донченко, С. П. "Soviet-Finnish War." Grani 22, no. 6 (August 28, 2019): 86–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.15421/171966.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The whole period of the Soviet Union’s existence and the first years of independence of Ukraine didnot write and talked about the military conflict in the winter of 1939–1940. The reason for the strategicdefeat of the huge Soviet Union in the war with a small Finland. In the Soviet Union, they tried to createsuch a notion as the «Soviet people,» the relocation and mixing of a large number of people throughout thespace of the USSR. Therefore, no one has ever defined participants in events by nationality or territoriallocation. Ukrainians also did not stand out. It was only when Ukraine became independent that therewas a need to determine the participation of Ukrainians in the Soviet-Finnish war and their role. Duringthe Soviet-Finnish war, the North-West front was commanded by the future Marshal and Hero of theSoviet Union, Ukrainian Timoshenko Semyon Konstantinovich. Future Marshal and Hero of the SovietUnion, Ukrainian Kulik Grigory Ivanovich, as Deputy People’s Commissar for Defense of the USSR,participated in the preparation of Army and Artillery Parts for the Soviet-Finnish War. The commanderof the 70th division was Ukrainian Kirponos Mikhail Petrovich. Participated in the combat operations ofthe pilot-as and Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Kravchenko Grigory Panteleevich. Future Marshaland Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian, Moskalenko Kirill Semenovich, during the Soviet-FinnishWar, was the head of the artillery 51st Perekopskaya Rifle Division of the Odessa Military District. Thefuture Colonel-General of the Tank Army and Hero of the Soviet Union, Ukrainian Kravchenko AndriyGrigorievich, during the war, was Chief of Staff of the 173th Motorized Infantry Division. In the threemonth conflict, nearly 40,000 Ukrainians died. Among those who fought in this war and received thehighest award – the Order of Lenin – Vasyl Petrenko from Poltava region. On the side of the USSR twodivisions participated in the war, which were completed in Ukraine. These are the 44th and 70th InfantryDivisions. The first of them fell into the environment and almost all died, trying to break away from theFinnish ring. Those who escaped were subjected to a martial law court. Division commander, chief ofstaff, chief of the police department and commissar were shot. In general, several thousand participantsin this war suffered repressions. Instructive that the Finnish side arranged the graves of the dead Sovietsoldiers. The city of Suomussalmi has a monument to the soldiers of the 44th Division, at the time whenthe names of the heroes were for gotten in the homeland.
13
Horton, Murray. "REVIEW: Sandline crisis thriller that fails to deliver." Pacific Journalism Review : Te Koakoa 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 185–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/pjr.v6i1.693.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Review of Enemies Within: Papua New Guinea, Australia, and the Sandline crisis: The Inside Story, by Mary-Louise O'Callaghan. Sydney: Doubleday.
This book gives an extremly detailed account of those unprecented events. Accroding to this book, the worst things about the dentention of Sandline commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tim Spicer, by the PNG military, was that he missed the Hong Kong Rugby Sevens. Bad Show! This book reads like a thriller.
14
Stanković, Slavoljub Tale. "ĐENERAL ĐORĐE (JOVANA) MIHAILOVIĆ KOMANDANT ŠUMADIJSKE DIVIZIJE I POZIVA U PRVOM BALKANSKOM RATU." Šumadijski anali 17, no. 11 (2021): 61–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/sanali17.11.061s.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
General ĐorĎe J. Mihailović was an elite Serbian army officer in the time of Serbian Principality / Kingdom. Unitil nowadays, just an enciclopedic biographic entry was published. His father-in law Aćim P. Prokić was a high positioned clerk and peoples’ representative on King’s electotal list. His brother-in-law also were: Belgrade administrator, state counselor, colonel Bogdan M. Damjanović colonel Antonije Milošević, medical corps officer Dr Blagoje Nikolić, colonel Petar A. Prokić, railroad clerk Nikola A. Prokić and proffesor Sofronije Simić. Their relationship significantly influenced the ouctome of the May Coup in 1903. General ĐorĎe j. Mihailović, during The First Balkans War commander with almost 30.000 soldies in Šumadija. He is almost unheard of in his homeland (the vicinity Požega). In Čačak, the town of his upbringing and early education, there is no mark, as in Kragujevac, where he spent most of his life, died, and was buried. His grand-daughter, a modestly paid, retired secondary school history professor, regulary bears maintenance costs of the family cript.
15
Varakin, Andrei V. "Нерешенные проблемы изучения похода А. Лисовского в 1615 году: историография". Canadian-American Slavic Studies 48, № 1-2 (2014): 98–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22102396-04801010.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Based on a preliminary analysis of Polish and Russian Historiography concerning Colonel A. Lisovsky’s campaign in Russia in 1614, the author concludes that further progress in studying this subject is possible by means of a complex examination of “Lisovchiks” and their commander’s activities during the last stage of Russia’s Time of Troubles, 1607–1615.
16
Storkmann, Klaus. "“Moral Execution of a General”." International Journal of Military History and Historiography 37, no. 2 (October 14, 2017): 173–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24683302-03702003.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Four-Star-General Günter Kießling (1925–2009) was the highest-ranking West German general in nato and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. His dismissal due to false accusations that he was homosexual came in late summer 1983, at the height of the conflict over the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Eventually, the Military Counterintelligence Service was ordered to conduct investigations in the Cologne gay scene. The Minister of Defence ordered to suspend the general from active duty without military honours in December 1983. Kießling decided not to retire quietly but to fight for his honour. Since nothing that “incriminated” Kießling was found, the minister altered course completely. The major issue raised by the Kießling scandal later centred around the question of who was to “blame” for it. And finally, an East German agent at the top of the West German Military Counterintelligence Service, who had been compromised in 1990, was another person to blame, as he had an almost ideal role of the evil.
17
Yacubian, Elza Márcia Targas. "When epilepsy may have changed history: Antônio Moreira César as the commander of the third expedition in the war of Canudos." Arquivos de Neuro-Psiquiatria 61, no. 2B (June 2003): 503–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0004-282x2003000300035.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Colonel Antônio Moreira César, the Commander of the third Expedition against Canudos (1896-1897), nicknamed "head-chopper", was considered an implacable military man, a synonym of ferocity and extreme brutality against his adversaries. Therefore, he was nominated the Commander of an expedition considered almost invincible. Since his 30's he presented epileptic seizures, which increased in frequency and severity on his way to Canudos. After several well-documented episodes and probably considering himself the winner in anticipation, he ordered a premature and almost ingenuous attack against Canudos. His misjudging is attributed to the effect of successive seizures. He was shot and killed on the very first day of that battle and his expedition had a horrible and unexpected end. Based on the descriptions of his biographer we discuss the nature of his disease probably characterized by focal seizures with elementary and complex visual hallucinations followed by language deficits and episodes of complex partial seizures and secondary generalization and its role in this episode of Brazilian history.
18
Руккас, Андрій, та Ігор Срібняк. "Генеральний інспекторат Армії УНР: створення, інституалізація, специфіка функціонування (1920–1921 рр.)". Studia z Dziejów Historiografii Wojskowej 23, № 1 (2023): 49–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/sdhw.2023.03.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article reconstructs the process of creation and specifics of the activities of the Inspectorate (General Inspectorate) of the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1920–1921, which became one of the important steps on the way to creating the institutional foundations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the modern era and increasing the level of combat readiness of its units. In September 1921, the commander of the 3rd Iron Rifle Division, colonel-general Oleksandr Udovychenko, was appointed to the position of inspector general of the UNR Troops, who was well acquainted with all the difficulties that the Ukrainian military had to face. Based on the results of his inspections of the camps, O. Udovychenko prepared reports in which he highlighted the actual condition of the internees (combat conditions of the units, living conditions, provision of clothing and food, moral and psychological condition and mood of the soldiers, the intensity of cultural and educational work in their environment, etc.). These reports were addressed to the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the Minister of War, allowing them to understand the real situation in the internment camps, and accordingly take the necessary measures to normalize it. During the entire period of internment, the
19
FRENCH, D. "Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War against Germany, 1939-1945." English Historical Review CXI, no. 444 (November 1, 1996): 1182–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cxi.444.1182.
Повний текст джерела
20
Kirszak, Jerzy. "Cóż będzie dalej? Nieznany list gen. broni Kazimierza Sosnkowskiego z roku 1945 o sytuacji międzynarodowej i perspektywach sprawy polskiej." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 21, no. 1 (2020): 188–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2020.1(271).0006.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
After his dismissal from the post of Commander-in-Chief, General Kazimierz Sosnkowski was given a leave of absence and via New York he went to Canada to visit his juvenile sons, who were evacuated there. Unintentionally, Canada became a place of his half-internment. From across the ocean he followed the development of the international situation, the assessment of which he presented, among others, in a letter to a former trusted subordinate, Colonel Franciszek Demel. Sosnkowski aptly predicted a number of events and socio-political processes of the near and far future. For example, he forecast the imminent disbanding of the Polish Armed Forces in the West, the end of Stanisław Mikołajczyk’s activity in Stalin-controlled Poland, or the constant expansion of Russian imperialism. He also showed the backstage and effects of his removal from the post of Commander-in-Chief, which made the process of dismantling the army in exile much quicker, and due to which the opportunities for securing a better existence of soldiers in exile and funds for organized independence activity in the free world were lost. The General’s statement presents a clear-headed assessment of the political activity of the highest Polish state and military authorities in the last months of the World War II, and carefully analyzes the behind-the-scenes personal games which led, for example, to the dismissal of General Władysław Anders from the post of Acting Commander-in-Chief in favor of General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski. This document is an interesting material for researchers of the beginnings of post-war emigration, the process of dismantling the Polish Armed Forces, and finally makes a valuable contribution to the biographers of Kazimierz Sosnkowski.
21
Wagstaff, J. M. "Colonel Leake and the Classical Topography of Asia Minor." Anatolian Studies 37 (December 1987): 23–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3642888.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Almost everyone interested in the classical topography of Asia Minor is acquainted with the name of Leake. To Ramsay (1890, 51) he was “the greatest of modern topographers”. But few will know more than that he was a scholar to be reckoned with when attempting to locate classical sites or reconstruct ancient topographies. This paper outlines his career and his work on Asia Minor.Colonel Leake (Plate II a), as he was generally known during the last 47 years of his life, was born in Bolton Row, off Bolton Street, Piccadilly, on 14 January, 1777. The family name was actually Martin-Leake. It was adopted by William's great-grandfather, Captain Stephen Martin, in 1721 after he had inherited much of the property of his life-long friend, brother-in-law and commander, Sir John Leake (1656–1720), Rear-Admiral of Great Britain (Markham 1895). William's grandfather, after a spell in the Navy Office, became a herald (1727) and finally (1754) Garter King of Arms. Stephen Martin Leake, in fact, was one of the great holders of that office. Not only did he save the College of Arms from foundering, but he also launched it on a major phase of revival. He was a considerable heraldic scholar, as well (Noble 1805, 408–14; Wagner 1967, 380–406). Garter's second son, and William's father, was John Martin Leake (1739–1836).
22
Kułagowska Silva, Katarzyna. "Żeniu! Dziecino droga! Historia znajomości łączniczki AK i jej dowódcy Franciszka Studzińskiego." Przegląd Archiwalno-Historyczny 4 (2017): 71–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/2391-890xpah.17.004.14907.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Tekst opowiada historię komendanta Okręgu AK terenu tarnopolskiego pułkownika Armii Krajowej Franciszka Studzińskiego i jego łączniczki oraz osobistej sekretarki Eugenii Starościn, działaczki AK oraz – w okresie późniejszym – organizacji Wolność i Niezawisłość. W artykule omówiono aktywność konspiracyjną obu postaci w okresie II wojny światowej oraz ich powojenne losy naznaczone przesłuchaniami, więzieniem, licznymi przeprowadzkami i problemami ze znalezieniem pracy. Zhenya! My love! The story of the relationship between a Home Army military courier and her commander, Franciszek Studziński The article presents the story of the Home Army colonel in the district of Tarnopol, Franciszek Studziński, and his courier and personal assistant Eugenia (Zhenya) Starościn, an activist of the Home Army and in subsequent years of the Freedom and Independence organization. The article presents their conspiracy activity during the Second World War and their post-war experiences: interrogations, imprisonment, numerous relocations, and problems with finding employment.
23
Carniel, Lucas Sidnei, Gilmei Francisco Fleck, and Hugo Eliecer Dorado Mendez. "BERNABÉ RIVERA E A DESCONSTRUÇÃO DO "HERÓI": RESSIGNIFICAÇÕES DO PASSADO NO ROMANCE ¡BERNABÉ!, ¡BERNABÉ!, DE TOMÁS DE MATTOS." EntreLetras 13, no. 3 (2022): 50–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.20873/uft2179-3948.2022v13n3p50-65.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Based on the analytical theories of the historical novel listed byFLECK (2017), AÍNSA (1991) and BASILE (2002), in this paper we propose a reading of the novel ¡Bernabé!, ¡Bernabé!, by Tomás de Mattos. This starts from the problematization done about the historical event officially known as “The Massacre of Salsipuedes”. We seek to offer analytical tools for the interpretation of the novel based on the deconstruction of the character Colonel Bernabé Rivera, the commander who was the responsible for the mission that resulted in the murder of the natives Charruas during the independence process of Uruguay in the 19th century. From the reading we make of the novel, we aim to relate the interpretation of this work by Mattos (1994) to possible criticism concerning the civic-military dictatorship that ruled the country between 1973 and 1985.
24
Iacob, Dan Dumitru. "Orașul Botoșani în surse cartografice austriece din secolul al XVIII-lea." Historia Urbana 31 (March 15, 2024): 241–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.59277/hu.31.12.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article aims to analyse several military plans and engravings found in the archives and libraries of Vienna, which illustrate and describe the phases of the battle that took place on 22 March 1788 near Botoșani town. The battle was fought between the Austrian troops, commanded by Colonel Michael von Fabri, and the Ottoman troops, commanded by Ibrahim Nazir Pasha. While the battle was not a significant event, its outcome had strategic consequences as it opened up new supply opportunities and hastened the defeat of the Turks at Hotin. The conflict has a particular resonance for the history of Moldavia and Botosani town, as it represents the first clash in the military campaign of 1788, which resulted in the occupation of the capital of Moldavia, the city of Iași, and a large part of this principality by Austrian and Russian troops. Apart from establishing the military context that led to the creation of the plans and engravings, this article also highlights other aspects obtained from the research of these sources. These include updating bibliographical references, completing technical details, identifying the authors, and analysing the topography of the area and the urban structure of Botoșani town.
25
Radziwiłłowicz, Dariusz. "Żołnierze 5 Dywizji Strzelców Polskich w bolszewickiej niewoli i ich repatriacja." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 8, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 23–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3601.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The formation of Polish armed troops began in summer 1918, during the battles between troops of the Czechoslovak Corps (Radziwiłłowicz 2010, 107–126), “white” Russians and Bolsheviks in the Volga region and in Siberia. Earlier that year, small Polish troops began to form spontaneously, taking their names from the towns of formation; therefore, those were, among others, Omsk, Irkuck, Semipalatynsk “legions”. In October 1918, due to a Bolshevik offensive, Polish forces were stationed in Novonikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk) on the Ob river. A division with three rifle regiments, a light artillery regiment and a lancer regiment was formed in 1918 and 1919. The newly-formed troops made up a tactical unit which drew on the tradition of the 5th Polish Rifle Division of the 2nd Polish Corps, with the same number and name (Radziwiłłowicz 2009). More ambitious organisational plans were developed for a supra-division command structure: the Polish Army Command in Eastern Russia and Siberia. From the end of November 1919 to early January 1920, over a distance of nearly a thousand kilometres, troops of the 5th Polish Rifle Division divided into 57 echelons and evacuated by the decrepit Trans-Siberian Railway as the rearguard of the allied forces, through the area of a civil war, among the hostile population of Siberia. The capitulation of the 5th Polish Rifle Division at the Klukviennaya station came as a surprise, not only to its command. The behaviour of the Czechoslovak commanders blocking the railroad, when troops of the Soviet 5th Army and Bolshevik guerrillas attacked the stretched Polish echelons, was regarded as deliberate and aimed at the liquidation of the Polish division. The commander of the Polish division, Colonel Kazimierz Rumsza with a group of his followers, as well as over a thousand officers and privates, who had no illusions that Bolsheviks would observe certain wartime and moral standards adopted by both parties of the conflict, avoided Bolshevik captivity and its cruelty. This group made their way to Harbin in Manchuria, from where a small number of Polish troops were evacuated by sea to Poland (Radziwiłłowicz 2015). The remainder of the division, after surviving the hell of Soviet POW and labour camps, returned to Poland in 1921 and 1922 by repatriation transports. About 4 thousand soldiers of the 5th Polish Rifle Division did not survive the hardships of the camps and the cruelty of the Cheka.
26
Каримов, О. В., and О. В. Пумпянская. "Eleven Acknowledgements Issued by Stalin to Colonel M. N. Yakushin (Hero of the Spanish War Participating in the Great Patriotic War)." Вестник Рязанского государственного университета имени С.А. Есенина, no. 2(75) (August 4, 2022): 68–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.37724/rsu.2022.75.2.007.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Рязанская губерния (в ее административно-территориальных границах до 1917 года) является малой родиной многих полководцев, военачальников и командиров, которые были военными советниками или военными специалистами, участвовавшими на стороне республиканцев в гражданской войне в Испании (1936–1939). Актуальность настоящего исследования обусловлена важностью воспитания подрастающего поколения регионов России на примерах подвигов их земляков. Целью настоящей статьи является описание боевого пути уроженца Рязанской губернии генерал-майора авиации Михаила Нестеровича Якушина — участника четырех войн: гражданской войны в Испании, военного конфликта на Халхин-Голе, Советско-финляндской войны, Великой Отечественной войны. Якушин, выбрав для себя изначально гражданскую специальность рабочего ткацкого производства, по партийному набору был направлен на службу в военную авиационную школу, после двух мирных лет службы оказался на первой для него войне — в Испании. Проявив себя исключительно с положительной стороны, был признан испанским правительством одним из лучших советских пилотов. Награждение двумя орденами Красного Знамени и высокий уровень мастерства послужили своего рода «трамплином», позволившим в дальнейшем продолжить службу в Главной авиационной инспекции ВВС Наркомата обороны. В годы Великой Отечественной войны Якушин был назначен командиром 215-й истребительной авиационной дивизии, с которой воевал на Калининском, Западном, 1-м и 2-м Белорусских фронтах. За годы войны был неоднократно награжден и одиннадцать раз упомянут в приказах Верховного главнокомандующего И. В. Сталина. Одиннадцать раз в честь воинов его дивизии в Москве раздавался салют. Данная статья должна способствовать патриотическому воспитанию граждан Российской Федерации в уважении к Отечеству и его защитникам в целом, привитию гордости к своей малой Родине — Рязанской земле. The Ryazan Province (as it used to be before 1917) is a motherland to many military officers, commanders, military counsellors, and military specialists who participated in the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) and supported the republicans.The relevance of the research is accounted for by the importance of educating modern teenagers at the example of their valiant compatriots. The aim of the article is to describe the military exploits of a native of the Ryazan Province, Mayor General of Aviation Mikhail Nesterovich Yakushin, a participant of four wars: the Spanish Civil War, the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol, the Winter War, and the Great Patriotic War. Being a skillful weaver, Yakushin was sent to a military aviation school and after two peaceful years of military service found himself engaged in the Spanish Civil War. Being a highly qualified pilot, he was recognized as one of the best Soviet pilots and was awarded two orders of the Red Banner for his outstanding flying skills, which enabled him to continue serving in the Aviation Inspection of the Soviet Air Forces. During the Great Patriotic War, Yakushin became Commander of 215th Aviation Division and fought at Kaliningrad, Western, the 1st and the 2nd Belorussian fronts. He was awarded eleven times by Joseph Stalin and eleven fireworks were displayed in honor of his division. The aim of the article is to promote patriotic upbringing of citizens of the Russian Federation and to encourage Ryazan citizens to feel proud of their valiant compatriots.
27
DAVIES, HUW J. "Wellington's First Command: The Political and Military Campaign Against Dhoondiah Vagh, February–September 1800." Modern Asian Studies 44, no. 5 (February 4, 2010): 1081–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x09990345.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractWellington's first independent command has been seen as a short, but intense, ‘baptism of fire’ in which the young Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Wellesley commanded a small force against the insurgent, or ‘freebooter’, Dhoondiah Vagh. New evidence presented here, however, demonstrates that the three-month military campaign was preceded by several months of political negotiation and intelligence gathering designed to isolate Dhoondiah and starve him of sanctuary, support and sustenance. As a result, the campaign was much more complex than previously thought, and demonstrates important lessons about British imperial expansion in the region at the beginning of the nineteenth century, on the nature of British authority in India, and on the opening stages of the military career of the future Duke of Wellington.
28
Rable, George C. "Unhonored Service: The Life of Lee’s Senior Cavalry Commander, Colonel Thomas Taylor Munford, CSA by Sheridan R. Barringer." Journal of Southern History 89, no. 2 (May 2023): 365–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/soh.2023.0081.
Повний текст джерела
29
Wanko, A., R. Mose, and A. Liénard. "Capacités de traitement d'un effluent de synthèse en infiltration percolation." Revue des sciences de l'eau 18, no. 2 (April 12, 2005): 165–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/705554ar.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Dans cet article, nous présentons des travaux mettant en évidence les capacités de traitement biologique des eaux résiduaires urbaines au sein des milieux poreux de textures différentes. Une étude comparative du développement de la biomasse couplé aux mécanismes généraux de transferts gazeux à travers deux réacteurs biologiques est menée. Des lits d’infiltration percolation sont simulés par des colonnes garnies de sables d’origine et de structures différentes. Ils sont alimentés périodiquement via un automate de commande avec un influent d’une charge de 525 mgDCO/l et de 54 mgNK/l. Les résultats obtenus établissent le fait qu’un développement équilibré de la biomasse incluant les phases de croissance et de régression est intrinsèquement lié à la nature physique du matériau support. A l’aide des carottes prélevées sur les massifs filtrants et des sondes d’oxymétrie introduites à différentes hauteurs des lits d’infiltration, nous montrons que la répartition verticale du biofilm dans les colonnes ainsi que l’oxygénation des milieux poreux lors des périodes de repos sont également corrélées à la structure des supports pourtant de diamètres moyens similaires. L’efficacité de traitement biologique du carbone est supérieure pour un sable d’origine alluvionnaire comparativement à un sable concassé ; la tendance s’inversant significativement lorsqu’il s’agit de la diminution de l’azote.
30
Ermolaev, A. N., and E. D. Dubrovskaya. "Oliferov's Raid on the Territory of Kuzbass in the Winter of 1920–1921: Why the Red Failed." Bulletin of Kemerovo State University 22, no. 1 (March 31, 2020): 13–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.21603/2078-8975-2020-22-1-13-19.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The present article features the raid of the White Guard rebels attempted by Lieutenant-Colonel Oliferov on the territory of Kuzbass (Mariinsky and Shcheglovsky districts) in the winter of 1920–1921. The research objective was to identify the reasons why the Red Army forces failed to promptly crush the rebellion. The methodology was based on the classical principles of historicism and objectivity represented by the typological, comparative-historical, and chronological methods. The authors managed to restore the course of events related to the raid and its progress. The article focuses on the measures taken by the Soviet government to eliminate the White rebels. The analysis of rare archival materials proved that the Soviet military units, represented by special forces, internal service units, and regular military units, failed to coordinate their actions. The irregular Soviet military units were known for their weak discipline, poor training, and frequent cases of desertion. Each of the Red commanders tried to lead the entire operation, thus letting the well-organized and disciplined White detachment to repeatedly avoid the chase and win the battles.
31
Dandolo, Ignazio. "A Modern Anabasis : The official diary of Colonel Garioni, the commander of the Italian contingent in China (1900-1901)." Bulletin de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient 78, no. 1 (1991): 317–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.3406/befeo.1991.1782.
Повний текст джерела
32
Nagielski, Mirosław. "Anton Żdanowicz płk kozacki w świetle diariusza i korespondencji hetmana litewskiego Janusza Radziwiłła." Studia Polsko-Ukraińskie 9 (July 18, 2022): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.31338/2451-2958spu.9.1.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the article, the author would like to show the achievements by the Cossack colonel Anton Zhdanovych. He belonged to the Cossack Starshyna (military and administrative governing authority) of the period of Bohdan Khmelnytky’s rise to power and was his trusted commander as well as a diplomat, sent in envoys, among others to Turkey and Moscow. Before that, Zhdanovych had served in the Chyhyryn regiment, so he was well known to Khmelnytsky, who trusted him a lot. The source of the research is the diary and correspondence of the Lithuanian Hetman Janusz Radziwiłł. After Bohdan Khmelnytky’s death, Zhdanovych supported the new hetman Ivan Vyhovski in his anti-Moscow activities, participating in the Battle of Konotop against the forces of Aleksey Trubetskoy. With the fall of the founder of the Treaty of Hadiach, Anton Zhdanovych and other supporters of Ivan Vyhovski were removed from power, forbidden to sit on the council and deprived of the right to receive the office. Hence, he disappears from the group of the Cossack Starshyna in a period of the Ruin.
33
Lizogub, Anna S. "Memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel K.N. Ignat’ev about his service in the 12th Siberian Barnaul Infantry Regiment. 1910." Herald of an archivist, no. 2 (2024): 522–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2024-2-522-535.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This work is devoted to the analysis of regimental histories as one of the tools for the formation of historical memory in the military environment. Active work on creating histories of military formations was carried out at the turn of the 19th–20th centuries, which was associated with reforms in the army in the last quarter of the 19th century, as well as a series of regimental anniversaries. This genre of military historical literature contains rich information not only about wars, but also about the peculiarities of regimental life. For the first time, the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel K.N. Ignat’ev about his service in the 12th Siberian Barnaul Infantry Regiment are published, deposited in Fund 339 - Russian Military Historical Society of the Russian State Military Historical Archive (RGVIA). The analytical part of the article analyzes the heuristic potential of the source, characterizes its structure, style and content. In the memoirs of K.N. Ignat’ev contains information about some regimental traditions, personal characteristics of commanders and colleagues. The source contains references to the names of officers, information about which is being introduced into scientific circulation for the first time. To identify the information about the mentioned military personnel of the regiment, lists of officers by seniority of the imperial army of the second half of the 19th - early 20th centuries were used. Based on contextual-historical analysis, it was determined that the time of creation of the memories of K.N. Ignat’ev coincides with active work on creating an essay about the 12th Siberian Barnaul Infantry Regiment, compiled by military historiographer, member of the Imperial Russian Military Historical Society (IRVIO) M.K. Sokolovskii. Historical and comparative analysis made it possible to establish that the lieutenant colonel’s memories were not used by M.K. Sokolovskii while working on regimental history. The compiler's attention is focused on recreating the life of the regiment during the Russo-Japanese War. The author comes to the conclusion that in order to form the identity of a military corporation, regimental histories focused on military events and heroic deeds of the military formation. However, analysis of the memories of K.N. Ignat’ev made it possible to establish that in local commands and battalions with less combat experience, they sought to preserve the memory of commanders and regimental traditions. The published document allows us to significantly supplement our knowledge about the history of the Barnaul regiment, as well as about the peculiarities of relationships within the military corporation. At the same time, analysis of the content of the source and the context of its appearance reveals some features of the process of compiling regimental histories.
34
Shafer, Michaela R. "Shattered, Suffering, and Silenced: Sharon's Story." Annual Review of Nursing Research 34, no. 1 (January 2016): 15–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0739-6686.34.15.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This chapter presents a case study of a 30-year-old female news reporter in Albuquerque, New Mexico, named Sharon Fullilove. The case is presented as a personal narrative by her mother, who is a critical care nurse, former chief nurse, Level I trauma unit commander, and colonel in the U.S. Air Force. The narrative is followed by excerpts from Sharon's chart that confirm a series of decisions made by both the hospital and the providers. The subsequent narrative is meant to give the reader an opportunity to reflect on the variety of clinical ethics questions that emerge when a patient enters into a contract with a physician and hospital for care. The goal is not to perform a thorough ethical analysis of the case but to let the reader experience what it is like when best practice standards, attention to patient care, and compassionate concern for family members are set aside. The case concludes with a set of broad questions that can be used for further discussion. Hopefully, this case will bring to the forefront the centrality of ethics in professional decision-making within the context of medical care.
35
Pogorelskaia, Elena I. "War correspondent and translator K. Lyutov (I. Babel). A new commentary on the writer’s army diary." Philological Sciences. Scientific Essays of Higher Education 1, no. 2 (March 2024): 131–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.20339/phs.2.1-24.131.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
For the first time, the documents of the 6th Cavalry Division of the First Cavalry Army, recently identified in the Russian State Military Archive, which are associated with the participants of the American military air squadron named after T. T. Kościuszko,, who fought in 1920, during the Soviet-Polish war, on the side of the Polish army, are published and introduced into scientific circulation. It is about Babel’s conversation with captured pilot M.C. Cooper, who introduced himself as Frank Mosher, and about the questionnaire compiled by the writer, as well as about Babel’s translation into Russian of a letter to New York, Colonel B.F. Castle, from squadron commander C.E. Fauntleroy. Both documents are Babel’s texts and are certified by his handwritten signature as K. Lyutov (his military pseudonym). These documents not only serve as a commentary on Babel’s diary note of July 14, 1920, they largely clarify the content of this note and, in addition, add significant details to the biography of Cooper during the Polish campaign. Cooper became later a famous film director, producer and screenwriter who shot the cult film “King Kong” in 1933.
36
Benhalima, Yacine. "La « neutralité partiale ». Félix Broche et le ralliement des établissements français d’océanie à la France Libre (septembre 1940)." Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains N° 291, no. 3 (June 30, 2023): 69–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/gmcc.291.0069.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Le 2 septembre 1940, les Établissements Français d’Océanie (EFO) figurent parmi les toutes premières colonies de l’empire français à rallier la France Libre. Ils sont la deuxième colonie du Pacifique à sauter le pas, après les Nouvelles-Hébrides le 22 juillet 1940 et avant la Nouvelle-Calédonie le 19 septembre 1940. Durant les événements ayant mené au ralliement des EFO, le capitaine Félix Broche, qui commande l’armée de terre à Tahiti, observe une phase d’apparente neutralité, n’acceptant de se joindre au mouvement et d’entraîner sa compagnie à le suivre qu’une fois le ralliement acté. Présenté par l’historiographie et par les témoins des événements ayant publié leurs mémoires comme un indécis, cet article vise à proposer une piste de réflexion différente, voyant en Félix Broche non pas un hésitant mais un soutien de la France Libre refusant de se mêler de politique et aspirant aux mêmes fins que les gaullistes ayant réalisé le ralliement : refuser l’armistice conclu par Vichy et rester dans la guerre.
37
Fóris, Ákos. "“The Sacrificed Army” – the Hungarian 2nd Army Between Memory and History." Mìžnarodnì zv’âzki Ukraïni: naukovì pošuki ì znahìdki, no. 30 (November 1, 2021): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/mzu2021.30.304.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The fate of the Hungarian 2nd Army has a significant role in the Hungarian memory. The army was sent to the Eastern Front in 1942 suffered one of the great defeats of the Hungarian military history during the Soviet counter-offensive in January 1943. During the past almost 80 years, different narratives have emerged about it were evolved in the Hungarian public. In the paper the author shall analyse the most significant elements of these narratives. Firstly, there will be examined the genesis and underlying causes of the decision to send the 2nd Army to the Eastern front. The author counter a popular post-war myth that the Hungarian leadership sent out the Hungarian soldiers and labour servicemen with the intention of sacrifice that it could limit Hungary's involvement in the German war effort. Although the Hungarian military leadership discriminated against various social groups (primarily of individuals of Jewish descent, non-Hungarian nationalities) in military service, they did not aim to destroy them. Similarly, the higher proportion of reserve officers and lower social classes (peasantry, workpeople) in the army was misinterpreted. In the second part of the paper the author will examine the interpretations of the defeat in January 1943. As a part of this topic there will be shown how the public opinion and survivors overstated the loss data and the temperature conditions of “the Russian winter.” In addition, the author scrutinize the fighting and withdrawal in January 1943 from the viewpoint of the military discipline. Finally, he analyse the interpretations of two orders. The army commander, Colonel General Jány wrote in his order on 24 January that “the 2nd Army has lost its honour.” Although later he withdrew this order, it became the symbol of the barbarity and betrayal of the Hungarian military elite against the Hungarian soldiers. It received a different opinion on the order of the commander of the III Corps of 1 February 1943, in which Major General Stomm disbanded his formation - which was unprecedented in Hungarian history
38
Kashirin, Vasily B. "Lieutenant-Colonel Nazar Karazin in the Danubian Principalities on the Eve and at the Beginning of the Russian-Turkish War of 1768–74." Slavic World in the Third Millennium 16, no. 1-2 (2021): 109–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2412-6446.2021.16.1-2.06.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this article, which is based on unpublished materials from the Russian archives and Romanian sources which are practically unknown in Russia, the activities of Russian Lieutenant-Colonel Nazar Aleksandrovich Karazin are described. Karazin was a secret emissary of Empress Catherine II in the Principality of Wallachia at the beginning of the Russian-Turkish War of 1768–74, and later the commander of an independent partisan detachment with a special assignment in the Danube theatre of war, acting separately from the main forces of the Russian army. Based on the new material, this article clarifies the geography and chronology of Karazin’s walking trip (in the guise of a pilgrim monk) to Bucharest in the spring of 1769. Moving through Galich on the Dniester and via the Great Skete Monastery (Manyavsky Holy Cross Monastery) in the region of Pokutie, Karazin arrived in the town of Suceava on 4 April, from where he travelled to Wallachia through Austrian Transylvania, crossing the Carpathian Mountains twice. On 7 May, 1769, he arrived in Bucharest, and then, having established contact with the leadership of the pro-Russian party of Wallachia, on 19 May moved back and arrived at the camp of the main forces of the Russian 1st Army near Derazhnya on 2 June, 1769. After that, Karazin, in accordance with his instructions, remained at the headquarters of the 1st Army commander, Prince A. M. Golitsyn, during the summer campaign. On 10 September, 1769, after the capture of the Khotin fortress by the Russian army and the retreat of the Turks from Moldova, Karazin, on behalf of Golitsyn, again set off at the head of a detachment of Arnauts (mercenaries of Balkan origin who had switched to the Russian side) to the town of Fokshany on the border between Moldavia and Wallachia, with a mission to raise an anti-Turkish uprising. His detachment played an important role in organizing the insurrectionary movement in the northeastern part of Wallachia and the expulsion of the Turks from Bucharest in early November 1769, and then in the defense of the capital of Wallachia during the counter-offensives of the Ottoman forces in December 1769 and January 1770. The content of the article refutes the family narratives about N.A. Karazin and his adventures during the war years, which contain factuallyinaccurate information.
39
Nykıel, Piotr. "The 15th Corps of the Imperial Ottoman Army on the Eastern Galician Front (1916-1917)." Belleten 79, no. 284 (April 1, 2015): 335–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.37879/belleten.2015.335.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The article starts with some essential information related to the circumstances of the decision to send the Ottoman 15th Corps to the Eastern Galician front as well as to the preparations before the redeployment and the journey up to the frontline. Then a relatively detailed account of fights is given. The author draws attention to the heavy losses suffered by the Ottoman troops within the first few weeks of their fights in Galicia and stresses that the first commander of the 15th Corps Colonel Yakup Şevki beard the full responsibility for this situation. While summing up the one-year long period of the Ottoman presence on this European front the author points out that it was, and still can be perceived by the Polish nation as a symbolic fulfillment of the words said by the 18th century Ukrainian prophet Wernyhora (Poland would be reborn when Turkish horse drink in the Vistula River). The author gives some information on the establishment of the Turkish Studies Department at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland in 1919 too, which was a direct result of contacts of the Polish orientalist prof. Tadeusz Kowalski with the wounded Ottoman soldiers. The article ends with some facts on the burials of the 15th Corps soldiers in Krakow.
40
Astika Pidada, Ida Bagus. "PERALATAN PERANG NICA DALAM MENGHADAPI PEJUANG PADA MASA REVOLUSI FISIK DI BALI TAHUN 1945 - 1950." KULTURISTIK: Jurnal Bahasa dan Budaya 3, no. 1 (January 18, 2019): 42. http://dx.doi.org/10.22225/kulturistik.3.1.939.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
[Title: The Nica War Equipment in Facing Patriots in Physical Revolution in Bali In 1945 – 1950] Giving up without the conditions of Lieutenant General H. Ter Poorten (Commander of the Dutch East Indies) on behalf of the United States Army in Indonesia to Liuetenant General Hiroshi Imamura (Japanese Army Leader). Since the Dutch East Indies government ended in Indonesia. At that time Dutch soldiers who were Japanese prisoners of war because they did not have time to flee to Australia were sent to the interior of Siam and Birma to clear forests and make bridges and railways. On August 15th 1945, Japan finally surrendered to allies. This defeat of Japan caused the captives of the Dutch to quickly hold preparatory exercises back to Indonesia. The arrival of the Dutch in Bali received resistance from the fighters under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel I Gusti Ngurah Rai. Although the weapons possessed by fighters in Bali is limited but the struggle is long enough to survive. NICA in the face of fighters in Bali during the physical revolution has used modern war equipment such as: pipercub airplanes, lucked airplanes, motorbikes, jeeps, telephones, bren, mitraliur, stengun, mortar, lichthalon and others but not easy can beat him. This is because the fighters with the people in Bali are united.
41
Koreś, Daniel. "Ku modernizacji kawalerii. Prace teoretyczne i studia Kawaleryjskiej Sekcji Naukowej Towarzystwa Wiedzy Wojskowej." Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 20, no. 4 (2019): 44–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2019.4(270).0002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The role and significance of the Military Knowledge Society (TWW), and more specifically its Cavalry Research Section, have not been discussed yet by anyone but the author of this article. Historians and hobbyists dealing with the history of the Polish cavalry are still unaware of the impact that the cavalry subdivision of the TWW had on the development of this service arm. Its position was raised so high primarily thanks to Certified Colonel Jan Karcz, who made sure that the troubles of the Polish cavalry became the subject of discussions among prominent – due to their degrees, positions, functions, but also experience and theoretical research achievements – officers coming from this service arm. In this respect, Karcz was a visionary who believed that the intellectual achievements of cavalry officers, which were presented in military periodicals, could be used much more efficiently within the quasi-advisory body of the Cavalry Department. I shall even put forward the hypothesis that that no other service arm commander or chief of service in the Polish Army has used the possibilities offered by the research sections of TWW to such an extent as Karcz did as head of the Cavalry Department of the Ministry of Military Affairs
42
Marek Kielasiński. "Judicial Murders: a Report." Archives of Criminology, no. XX (August 1, 1994): 97–135. http://dx.doi.org/10.7420/ak1994e.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The Lublin castle has historical connections with the old town area. The castle hill was the seat of a stronghold and residence of the starost who ruled in the king’s name. Excavations led to discovery of traces of a 9th century settlement. The construction of a stone castle began in the 14th century. It was used as a prison in the 19th century and until 1954. In 1939‒1944, the Lublin Castle housed a prison of the Nazi secret police and security service, the Sicherheitsdienstpolizei and Sicherheitsdienst Lublin. The role of the Lublin Castle prison was particularly dreadful; dring the period of martyrdom and extermination of the Polish nation under the Nazi occupation of Poland. Even today, the castle is treated as a national symbol of the heroism and suffering of the Polish nation. Before they took flight, the Nazis organized a last execution on Jury 22, 1944: 286 prisoners were murdesed in the Castle. On that same day and on July 20, 1944, a further 800 prisoners were taken from the castle and executed at the concentration camp in Majdanek, a suburb of Lublin. On July 22, 1944, of the Polish Committee for National Liberation (PKWN) was created under Soviet pressure. It assumed power over the territory of Poland which had been taken by the Red Army after the flight of the Nazis. Organized armed forces known as the Home Army, ‒ operated in Poland troughout the war. They were subordinate to the Polish Government in Exile, residing in England. The Government in Exile was recognized by all counties except the USSR. Home Army troops refused to submit to the Red Army and PKWN. For this reason, the Soviet and Polish army, together with security services, started to disarm the Home Army troop. Mass arrests and deportations into the USSR began. A number of Home Army units were disarmed, among them the famous 27th Infantry Division. Troughoot the Lublin District, mass arrests of Home Army soldiers took place. The detainees were sent to the former concentration camp in Majdanek and the Lublin Castle prison. Arrested were also state oflicials ‒ delegates of the Polish Government in London. The Commander of the Home Army Lublin District, General Kazimierz Tumidajski, was detained during negotiations with Soviet authorities and deported to the USSR. Home Army soldiers who had been arrested and confined to Polish prisons, were subjected to investigations by the Soviet and Polish security service which involved the use of threats and a variety of tortures. Describing his ordeal, one of the prisoners stated he could not relate “all the atrocities” he had suffered from Soviet officers. The detained soldiers received no medical assistance; those who managed to survive the Castle prison nightmare described the appearance of battered Home Army soldiers and related their complaints. During the initial period discussed in this report, most Home Army soldiers were arrested by Soviet authorities without due judicial decision. They were interrogated in Russian, a language they did not speak. It was only 2 or 3 months later that the detainees were handed over to Polish authorities. Only then, Polish prosecutors issued formal decisions to remand them in custody, and the records of selected hearings were translated into Polish. The evidence gathered by Soviet security officers provided the grounds for indictments directed to military courts that operated in Lublin. III. In 1944, the indictments signed by Polish military prosecutors were lodged with the Military Court of the Lublin Garrison, commanded by a Soviet officer, Colonel Konstantin Krukovsky. Preceding the first-instance hearing was a closed sitting where the court, composed of three judges, confirmed the indictment; the trial followed on that same day. The copy the indictment was delivered to the detainee only after the hearing had started. The main charges contained in indictments were: membership in the Home Army, unlicensed possession of firearms, or evasion of military service ‒ acts threatened with capital punishment. There is evidence to show that the actual penalties were decided upon by the Mi1itary Courts Department of the Polish Army, headed by a Soviet ofIicer, Brigadier General Alexander Tarnovsky. The execution of the orders was the responsibility of the head of the court, Colonel Krukovsky, and the judges presiding over the case. In none of the cases did the Lublin Garrison Military Court took any evidence whatsover, whether on motion of the defendant or on its own initiative. The only hearing of evidence consisted of hearing the defendant’s statement; the defendants admitted their membership of the Home Army but refused to acknowledge any guilt. The various formulations they used were then quoted out of context to prove they had in fact been guilty of trying to subvert democratic system of Poland ‒ an assumption made well in advance. The trials were held at the Lublin Castle prison. They were closed sittings in which neither the counsel for the defence nor the prosecutor participated. The defendant’s family were not informed about the date of the trial as they knew nothing about his fate anyway, and the defendant himself did not learn about the trial until it started. Unqualified persons participated in deciding on conviction and sentence, or the court was formed inadequately. For example, the principle that the lay judges’ rank should not be lower than the defendant’s was commonly infringed upon. A glaring example of such infringement was the case of Colonel Edward Jasiński who was convicted by N.C.O. lay judges. Delivering the judgment, the court informed the defendant that the decision was final and not subject to appeal. Most defendants were sentenced to death. Many meritorious Home Army soldiers who had fought for independence throughout the Nazi occupation met death this way. The sentences were carried out upon confirmation by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army (at that time, General Michał Rola-Żymierski) or his second in command (Generals Świerczewski and Berling), and sometimes by lower rank commanders. They were obliged to examine the justification of the sentences ex officio; they also had the right to grant pardon. Confirmation of the sentence and pardon were two separate institutions of the law of criminal procedure; thus pardon could be granted even if the sentence had been confirmed. In practice, no rules whatsoever were observed: confirmed sentences were carried out without pardon proceedings, or following such proceedings but without the proceedings aimed at review of the grounds. It should be added that under the law in force, pardon could only be refused by the President of the National People’s Council, Bolesław Bierut, while the army commanders had merely the right to grant pardon. In fact, they also refused pardon on numerous occasions. In practice, sentences were carried out basied on the order of Brigadier General Alexander Tarnovsky who informed the head of military court about the decision of Commander-in-Chief and ordered the need for immediate execution. Capital punishment was executed at the Castle prison, in the basement of the administration building, at various hours of day and night. The Report quotes the account of an execution provided by a surviving Lublin physician, and a numer of facts which, together with the now available reports from executions, tell about the identity of their participants. The grim record holders are two sergeants: within 50 minutes, one of them participated in the execution of 11, and the other one – of 12 Home Army soldiers. Until January 5, 1945, the bodies of the executed were secretly buried at a Lublin cemetery upon written of the prison warden Second Lieutenant Alojzy Stolarz; the orders have been preserved in the cemetery archives. There is no mention at all about subsequent burials although – as follows from the attached documents – Home Army soldiers were still executed at the Castle after that date. The soldiers kept on their dignity till the end; scant accounts of their demeanour were provided by prison chaplains, the only persons the convict’s family about hos death. Throughout both the preparatory and the judicial proceedings, valid legal provisions were violated. The system of military penal law contained provisions dating from the 1930’s and not yet quashed at the time of examination of the discussed cases. Such provisions were simply treated as non-existent. The Code of Criminal Procedure and the Military Code of the Polish Armed Forces in USSR, developed by the Political and Educational Board of the Polish Army in the USSR established in 1943 was adopted as the legal grounds for proceedings. As shown by the facts quoted in this report, the summary procedure was applied to defendants. It was provided for by the code of criminal procedure of the Polish Armed Forces in the USSR, but military courts competed with each other in breaking the law to the extent of not even observing the law that had been established in the USSR. Under the law then in force, none of the sentences discussed in the report ever became final and valid. Judicial proceedings glaringly infringed on all the principles of procedure: direct examination of evidence, impartiality, presumption of innocence, openness, adversary trial, right to defence, to appeal, and the right to apply for pardon. The Home Army soldiers mentioned in the report were convicted in defiance with the ban on retroactive force of law as the decree on protection of state under which they were tried had entered into force on November 4, 1944 with the binding force since August 15, 1944; most had been imprisoned for many weeks before the decree was actually introduced. VII. The extermination of Home Army soldiers at the Lublin Castle was kept secret for decades. Many attempts at revealing the tragic events failed, and the demands for posthumous acquittal, made by families of the executed, were rejected. It was only after June 4, 1989, as a result of extraordinary appeals or re-institution of proceedings, that the Supreme Court passed many decisions on acquittal, manifesting not only the groundlessness of convictions but also their function as a political disposal of opponents of the new authority – of the Home Army formed by the legitimate Polish Government to fight the Nazi invaders. The enormity of lawlessness of the discussed practices made the Parliament of Republic of Poland pass, on February 23, 1991, an act on the invalidity of the judgments in cases of persons victimized for their activities on behalf of a sovereign Polish state.
43
Ryan, Kathy L., Jack A. Loeppky, and Donald E. Kilgore. "A forgotten moment in physiology: the Lovelace Woman in Space Program (1960–1962)." Advances in Physiology Education 33, no. 3 (September 2009): 157–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1152/advan.00034.2009.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In 1959, Brigadier General Donald Flickinger and Dr. W. Randolph Lovelace II suggested that it would be more practical from an engineering standpoint to send women rather than men into space due to their lower body weights and oxygen requirements. When the Air Force decided not to pursue this project, Dr. Lovelace assumed leadership of the Woman in Space Program and began medical and physiological testing of a series of accomplished women aviators at the Lovelace Medical Clinic in Albuquerque, NM, in 1960. The tests that these women underwent were identical to those used to test the original Mercury astronauts, with the addition of gynecological examinations. Thirteen of the nineteen women tested passed these strenuous physiological exams (for comparison, 18 of 32 men tested passed); a subset of these pilots was further tested on a series of psychological exams that were similar to or, in some instances, more demanding than those given to male Mercury candidates. Despite these promising results, further testing was halted, and the Woman in Space Program was disbanded in 1962. Although the Woman in Space Program received a great deal of publicity at the time, the story of these women was somewhat lost until they were reunited at the 1999 launch of the shuttle Columbia, commanded by Colonel Eileen Collins.
44
Grakhotskiy, A. P. "The V. Schoeneman Case: Einsatzkommando 8, the Wehrmacht and the Holocaust." Lex Russica 74, no. 10 (November 12, 2021): 113–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.17803/1729-5920.2021.179.10.113-124.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In 1964, the trial of Werner Schoenemann, the commander of one of the 6 punitive units of the Einsatzkommando 8, took place in Cologne. The criminal was charged with mass executions of Jews on the territory of Belarus in late June — September 1941. The paper shows how the former Nazi tried to avoid criminal responsibility and what legal assessment by the German justice his atrocities received. V. Schoeneman denied his guilt and sought to shift responsibility for what he had done to the Wehrmacht troops. The defendant argued that the actions of extermination of Jews were carried out on the initiative of the German armed forces and were in the nature of reprisals; they were designed to force the local population to abandon the conduct of guerrilla warfare. Based on the testimony of the accused, law enforcement officers detained three officers of the 354th Infantry Regiment involved in the liquidation of the Jewish community of the town of Krupki (September 18, 1941). During the investigation, it was established that the service members provided support to members of the Einsatzkommando 8 during the execution, but were not the initiators of this atrocity. For complicity in the grave murders of 2,170 Jews in the settlements of Slonim, Borisov, Smolevichi, Krupki and others, V. Schoeneman was sentenced to 6 years in prison. When assigning such a lenient punishment, representatives of the German Themis relied on the dominant approach to assessing the criminal activities of former Nazis in the 1960s. According to the jury, the defendant was only a submissive executor of orders, an impersonal, devoid of his own motives “cog” in the mechanism of the Nazi state. V. Schoeneman did not repent of what he had done. For the former punisher, Jewish victims were still just dry figures in the reports, thanks to which he sought to make a career. Schoeneman’s case proves that Wehrmacht service members took an active part in the Holocaust along with members of the Einsatzkommandos. The genocide, unprecedented in the history of humankind, became possible only because of the broad participation of German citizens representing various social strata and professional groups.
45
Frolova, E. V. "August 6 — International Physicians for Peace Day." Spravočnik vrača obŝej praktiki (Journal of Family Medicine), no. 7 (July 8, 2023): 59–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/med-10-2307-08.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
73 years ago, on the morning of August 6, 1945, at 8:15 a.m., an atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. The American bomber had the sonorous name "Enola Gay" - it was named after the mother of the crew commander, and the deadly bomb with the affectionate name "Little Boy" contained 20 thousand tons of TNT equivalent. In a few seconds, the "Little Boy" claimed about 130 thousand human lives, most of which turned into radioactive dust, and tens of thousands of people were dishoused. Three days later, on August 9, the city of Nagasaki was subjected to a similar strike using a bomb with no less peaceful name "Fat Man", with equally terrible consequences [3]. According to some reports, the Americans, in order to achieve complete surrender of Japan, planned to carry out a total of three nuclear strikes, but as of early August 1945, the US military had only two deadly bombs at their disposal. At that time, few could have imagined how terrible and irreversible the consequences of a nuclear strike could be. The incidence of leukemia increased 18 times. The victims of this terrible bombardment continue to die from radiation sickness to this day, annually replenishing the list of victims by 5,000 names [1]. To date, the number of victims of the tragedy has approached 450 thousand. The US Air Force colonel, who gave the order to drop the bomb from an escort aircraft, soon went mad, and spent the rest of his days in a psychiatric hospital.
46
Dermer, Philip J. "Trip Notes on a Return to Israel and The West Bank: Reflections on U.S. Peacemaking, the Security Mission, and What Should be Done." Journal of Palestine Studies 39, no. 3 (2010): 66–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2010.xxxix.3.66.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The following document, previously unpublished, was written in March 2010 by a recently retired ( June 2009) U.S. Army colonel with thirty years experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty and advisory roles (in both military/security and civilian domains) from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. The subject of the informal report is the author's first two trips as a "civilian" to Israel and the West Bank, where he had served two tours of duty, most recently as U.S. military attachéé in Tel Aviv during Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza and the formation of the U.S. Security Coordinator's (USSC) mission to reform Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. Written as an internal document for military colleagues and government circles, the report has been circulating widely——as did the author's earlier briefings on travel or missions in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and especially Iraq——among White House senior staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), EUCOM (U.S. European Command), and the USSC team. The document's focus is the state of the "peace process" and the current situation in the West Bank, with particular attention to the PA security forces and the changes on the ground since the author's last tour there ended in mid-2007. But the real interest of the paper lies in the message directed at its intended audience of military and government policy officials——that is, its frank assessment of the deficiencies of the U.S. peace effort and the wider U.S. policy-making system in the Israel-Palestine arena, with particular emphasis on the disconnect between the situation on the ground and the process led by Washington. The critique has special resonance in light of the emerging new thinking in the administration fueled by the military high command's unhappiness (expressed by CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Michael Mullen) with the State Department's handling of Middle East diplomacy, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the grounds that diplomatic failures are having a negative impact on U.S. operations elsewhere in the region. For most JPS readers, the report has additional interest as an insider's view of the U.S. security presence in the Israel-Palestine arena. It also reflects a military approach that is often referenced but largely absent in public discourse and academic writings. The author, in addition to his tours of duty and peacekeeping missions in various Middle Eastern countries, has served as advisor to two U.S. special Middle East envoys, the U.S. negotiating team with Syria, General Petraeus, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, Vice President Dick Cheney, and, more generally, to CENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others. In retirement, he has worked with CENTCOM as a key primary subject matter expert in the development of analyses and solutions for its area of responsibility, leads predeployment briefings for army units heading to Iraq, and travels frequently to Iraq and elsewhere in the region as an independent consultant. He is currently in Afghanistan with the CENTCOM commander's Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. The report, made available to JPS, is being published with the author's permission.
47
Kubiak, Krzysztof. "Mozambickie zmagania Portugalczyków w czasie I wojny światowej." Klio - Czasopismo Poświęcone Dziejom Polski i Powszechnym 51, no. 4 (December 30, 2019): 109–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/klio.2019.039.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The historical literature devoted the Great War in Africa is dominated by the struggle between the German forces, superbly commanded by the initially lieutenant colonel, and finally general Major Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck and units of the British Empire. The main reason of such situation is that in the east of Africa, the Germans continued fighting until the ceasefire in Western Europe in November 1918. In this narrative, there is relatively little room for a broader description of the struggles between the Germans and the Portuguese in Mozambique. The Luzytan military effort was described mainly, and at the same time disapprovingly, by the British. The impression appears that Albion deprecating the Iberian ally tried to dump a significant portion of the responsibility for the South-East Africa failures. The intention of the author of this text is to show Portuguese actions in an objective manner, not burdened with the British imperial narrative. It serves, above all, the use of Portuguese materials. This is - according to the author's knowledge - the first such attempt in the area of Polish historical-military literature. The author discussed the course of armed operations between the Portuguese and German forces and their impact on the findings of international conferences building a new balance of power after the end of the Great War.
48
Kędzierski, Adam, Dariusz Wyczółkowski, and Leszek Ziąbka. "Badania archeologiczne domniemanej mogiły powstańca styczniowego z 1863 r. w miejscowości Lipe, gm. Blizanów, pow. kaliski, woj. Wielkopolskie." Zeszyty Kaliskiego Towarzystwa Przyjaciół Nauk 23 (2024): 41–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/26578646zknt.23.003.18885.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Archaeological Research of the Alleged Grave of a January Insurgent from 1863 in the village of Lipe, Blizanow Commune, Kalisz County, Greater Poland Voivodeship In July 2023, verification archaeological research was conducted at the site of the alleged grave of a January insurgent in the village of Lipe, Blizanow Commune, Kalisz County, Greater Poland Voivodeship. On May 30, 1863, there was a skirmish between the tsarist army and insurgent units commanded by Colonel Edmund Callier. The violent clash, which broke out in the village of Borowiec, resulted in 14 deaths and left seven insurgents wounded. The fallen were buried at the local cemetery in Grodziec and the wounded found help and shelter among local people. According to oral history, one of the wounded allegedly reached the village of Jarantow Kolonia, where he was taken care of by the Mikolajczak family, but died of his wounds. His body was supposedly transferred near Pisko- Lipe and laid to rest in a nameless grave. A GPR survey undertaken before excavation works revealed soil disturbances in the vicinity of the wooden cross. The archaeological research did not confirm the existence of a grave in this area. There were modern destructions in the area where GPR detected soil disturbances, which indicates attempts to dig up the alleged grave. The insurgent may have been buried near the symbolic gravesite.
49
Şahhüseyn qızı Ağayeva, Nilufər, and Leyla Etibar qızı Musazadə. "Nakhchivan special forces in the second Krabakh war." SCIENTIFIC WORK 77, no. 4 (April 17, 2022): 63–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/2663-4619/77/63-67.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Məqalədə ikinci Qarabağ müharibəsi haqqında məlumat verilir. Müəllif tərəfindən 2016-cı ilin 2-5 aprelində baş verən “dördgünlük müharibə”, 2018-cı il mayın 20-dən 27-nə qədər Naxçıvan Muxtar Respublikasında “Günnüt əməliyyatı” və 2020-ci il iyulun 12-də başlayan Tovuz rayonu istiqamətindəki döyüşlərin “İkinci Qarabağ” müharibəsinə gedən yol olduğu qeyd olunur. Həmçinin 10 oktyabr 2021-ci ildə verilən əmrə əsasən Naxçıvan Xüsusi təyinatlılarının Qarabağa göndərilməsi və onların “Hadrut-Füzuli-Xocavənd”, “Hadrut-Şuşa”, “Hadrut-Xankəndi” istiqamətlərində düşmənə qarşı döyüşlərdə iştirak etməsi qeyd olunur. Həmin döyüşlərdə polkovnik-leytenant, Naxçıvan Əlahiddə Ümumqoşun Ordusunun Xüsusi Təyinatlı Bölməsinin Komandiri Anar Əliyev qəhrəmancasına şəhid olması məqalədə öz əksini tapıb. Açar sözlər: ikinci Qarabağ müharibəsi, dördgünlük müharibə (aprel döyüşləri), Günnüt əməliyyatı, Naxçıvan, xüsusi təyinatlılar Nilufar Shahhuseyn Aghayeva Leyla Etibar Musazade Nakhchivan special forces in the second Krabakh war Abstract The article provides information about the second Karabakh war. The author discusses the “four-day war” that took place on April 2-5, 2016, the “Operation Day” in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic from May 20 to 27, 2018, and the battles in the direction of Tovuz region that began on July 12, 2020. It is noted that this is the way to the "Second Karabakh" war. It is also noted that according to the order issued on October 10, 2021, Nakhchivan Special Forces were sent to Karabakh and they took part in the battles against the enemy in the directions "Hadrut-Fuzuli-Khojavend", "Hadrut-Shusha", "Hadrut-Khankendi". The article reflects the heroic martyrdom of Lieutenant-Colonel, Commander of the Special Forces of the Nakhchivan Special Forces Anar Aliyev in those battles. Key words: second Karabakh war, four-day war (april battles), Gunnut operation, Nakhchivan, special forces
50
Muntean, Ovidiu. "Two years on the Galician front (1914–1915). Pages in the diary of the Transylvanian Officer Marian Popu." Acta Musei Napocensis. Historica, no. 56 (January 15, 2021): 109–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54145/actamn.56.07.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
"Marian Popu was born in 1889 in the village of Diviciorii Mici in Solnoc-Dăbâca County and came from a Romanian family of intellectuals, his father being a teacher. He attended primary school in his native village and then attended secondary and high school in Gherla. After graduating from high school, in 1909 he enrolled in the ‘Ludovika’ Honvéd Military Academy in Budapest. Here he attended classes for three years and graduated in 1912, obtaining the rank of second lieutenant. Among his teachers there was also Lieutenant-Colonel Aurél Stromfeld, who would later be his regimental commander on the Galician front. In 1914, at the outbreak of the First World War, Marian Popu was promoted to the rank of lieutenant major and was sent to the Galician front at the head of a subunit of the Honvéd Infantry Regiment no. 32 of Dej. In 1914–1915, the Romanian officer reached this front four times. Each time he fought on the front line. His memory recalls the grim reality of the war, the entry into the front line of battle, the marches, the cold, the terrible death of his comrades but also the periods of convalescence spent in the military hospitals of Vienna and Dej. Here he was treated three times due to illness, exhaustion and the fact that he was shot in the arm during the offensive of May 1915. After the stabilization of the front, in the fall of 1915, Lieutenant Marian Popu reached the front line on defensive fighting positions in a forest in the area of Bedrykivti, on the banks of the Tupa River. Here he remained until June 1916, when he was forced to retreat after the start of the offensive led by Russian General Alexei Brusilov."