Дисертації з теми "Collective mental time travel"

Après avoir longtemps négligé l’ancrage temporel des groupes sociaux, un nombre croissant de travaux en psychologie sociale appréhende désormais les groupes comme des entités qui se meuvent à travers le temps et suggère que les représentations du passé et du futur collectifs des individus, en plus d'être continuellement (re)construites en fonction du présent, sont pertinentes pour la compréhension des comportements collectifs actuels. Cette nouvelle ligne de recherche a récemment conduit à l'idée d'un voyage mental temporel collectif (VMTC) –i.e., l'équivalent collectif du voyage mental temporel individuel, qui rassemblerait les influences croisées entre les représentations du présent, du passé et du futur du groupe des individus. Cette thèse visait à examiner les dynamiques et conséquences de ces VMTC, à la lumière de l'anomie sociétale perçue –i.e., la perception que la société actuelle est désintégrée et dérégulée. A travers neuf études corrélationnelles et expérimentales, nous avons montré que la perception d’anomie dans la société actuelle (a) façonnait les représentations du passé national des individus (e.g., une représentation plus positive de Charles de Gaulle) (b) favorisait la projection de futurs nationaux négatifs et anxiogènes et (c) influençait les relations entre les représentations du passé et du futur collectifs (e.g., une représentation de déclin national d’autant plus abrupte lorsque la société actuelle était perçue comme anomique). Par ailleurs, ces VMTC étaient à leur tour associés au soutien et à l’intention présente de s'engager dans différents types d'actions visant à défendre la France (dont des actions anti-immigration)
After neglecting the temporal aspect of social groups for a long time, a growing body of research in social psychology now apprehends groups as entities that move through time and suggests that people’s representations of the collective past and future, in addition to being continuously (re)constructed according to the present, are relevant for understanding current collective behaviours. This new line of research has recently led to the idea of a collective mental time travel (CMTT) -i.e., the collective equivalent of individual mental time travel, that would gather the cross-influences between people’s representations of the group’s present, past, and future. This thesis aimed to examine the dynamics and consequences of these CMTT in light of perceived societal anomie -i.e., perceiving that current society is disintegrated and disregulated. Through nine correlational and experimental studies, we found that perceiving anomie within current society (a) lead individuals to reinterpret the national past (e.g., even more positive representations of the former French president Charles de Gaulle) (b) fostered the projection of negative, anxiety-inducing national futures and (c) influenced the relationships between people’s representations of the national past and future (e.g., declinist representations of the nation across time that were steeper when current society was perceived as highly anomic). Moreover, these CMTT were in turn associated with people’s current support for and intention to engage in various types of actions aimed at defending France (including anti-immigration actions)

Episodic memory and episodic future thinking appear to be fundamentally linked, sharing many commonalities that have led numerous theorists to claim that they rely on the same neural system and develop simultaneously. On the other hand a number of striking temporal asymmetries have also been observed in the way that we think about the past and the future: events in the future appear to be valued more than those in the past, feel closer in subjective time and elicit stronger emotions. The aim of this thesis was two-fold in that it considered both of these areas of the mental time travel literature. Developmental research into the link between past and future mental time travel is limited therefore, Studies 1a and 1 b examined 3-to 10-year-olds' past and future narratives. The findings suggest that the proposed link between episodic past and future thinking may be more complex among children than adults and raise doubts over the manner in which previous studies have interpreted the relations between narratives for past and future events. Studies 2a-3c explored the developmental profile of temporal asymmetries in mental time travel. Until now a developmental account of temporal asymmetries in value, emotion and subjective temporal distance was absent; therefore Studies 2a-3c make original contributions to knowledge. Over the course of these studies, appropriate tasks and methodologies were identified for examining such asymmetries in children and adolescents. The evidence emerging from these studies suggests that the type of task used (hypothetical versus real event tasks) in developmental studies is crucial, whilst these different asymmetries did not appear to emerge at the same stage in development. These studies offer a comprehensive and wide-ranging developmental consideration of mental time travel, not only examining the similarities in the same way as previous developmental studies, but also considering the temporal asymmetries in mental time travel.

The current research study explores the use of counterfactual thinking by children in school settings. Counterfactual thinking is entertaining imaginative thoughts about what might have been -­‐ the 'what if' or 'if only' thoughts. Research has shown regularities in the way that people think counterfactually and has suggested that the focus of these thoughts is influenced by the order of events prior to an event (temporal and causal order) and there are strong links with self-­‐ evaluative emotions (e.g., regret and blame) and social judgements (e.g., blame). The first section will entail a comprehensive and in-­‐depth review of the existing literature with regards to this area and its links to educational practice. The empirical study, found in the second section, is primarily aimed at addressing the order effects within counterfactual thinking using quantitative and qualitative methods. Consequently, 121 children were asked to answer questions about two scenarios. In addition, this research adopted a mixed-­‐design approach and a series of interviews were carried out with 13 pupils, randomly selected from the children who took part in the quantitative stage of the study. These pupils were asked specific questions about their responses to the scenarios. Two focus groups comprising of teachers of some of the pupils who took part in the study were also set up to elicit views, more generally, on children's thinking about school-­‐based events. The temporal order effect was observed in the sentence completion task and for blame questions but not for questions about regret and blame. The causal order effect was observed in the choice of first event to focus on but not for the question of blame. Thematic analysis of the qualitative data indicated that children thought of order to explain their choices but also created stories to explain their ideas. A few children described their choices in terms of automatic thoughts; locus of control was also a theme from the interviews. Analysis of teachers' views suggested that they felt negatively about children's thinking in terms of events in school and made links between pupils' thought patterns and their emotional experiences. In addition, the teachers believed that children should take more responsibility for their actions. Interpretations of the findings are discussed with regard to children’s thinking, emotions and behaviour. Implications for educators and educational psychologists are considered.

The main objective of this master thesis is to clarify the nested structure in time consciousness, depending on mental time travel and episodic memory. Time consciousness, mental time travel and episodic memory are connected, and function depending on each other. Mental time travel ability enables us to imagine personal future events. Episodic memory allows us to travel mentally into both past and future. Similarity between remembering the past and imagining the future indicates that episodic memory system contribute to future-directed personal mental time travel competence, and justifies the relation between episodic memory and mental time travel into both past and future. Episodic memory requires autonoetic consciousness, which can be applied to mental time travel competence, and mental time travel is a function of episodic memory. Distinguishing humans and non-humans is a method to understand the role of episodic memory and mental time travel in time consciousness. Episodic memory and mental time travel indicate to a higher-level time consciousness in humans, because mental time travel, episodic memory, autonoetic consciousness and recursive language are unique to humans, while non-humans show future-directed acts, possess episodic-like memory, and communicate with limited ways. Time consciousness is derived from the notion of autonoetic consciousness and it is a sort of temporal consciousness which enables us to be conscious of ourselves who travels in time and aware of ourselves along the temporal line. Non-humans have a rudimentary form of time consciousness, even they are deprived of autonoetic consciousness.

Mental time travel (MTT) refers to an individual’s ability to mentally travel through subjective time, autonoetically re-experiencing past events under the form of autobiographical memories (past MTT), and pre-experiencing events as future autobiographical representations (future MTT). MTT can occur voluntarily, whereby a past/future autobiographical event is subjectively experienced as an intended occurrence, or involuntarily, wherein such an event is subjectively experienced as an unintended outcome of which the individual is aware. Studies investigating MTT’s characteristics in dysphoria and depression show that dysphoric and depressed individuals produce more overgeneral and negative MTT events when compared to control groups. However, existing research has been limited to past and voluntary MTT events, with few studies investigating involuntary MTT and future MTT in dysphoria and depression. The overarching aim of the present research was to compare the phenomenological characteristics of MTT in dysphoric individuals vs. normal mood individuals (Study 1), and in clinically depressed individuals vs. never-depressed individuals (Study 2), with the purpose of furthering existing knowledge on MTT and its relation with dysphoria and Major Depressive Disorder. This aim was addressed by conducting two studies, using a 2 x (2 x 2) mixed-factorial design, with temporality (past vs. future events) and type of retrieval (voluntary vs. involuntary events) as within-subjects independent variables, and participant group as a between-subjects variable. In Study 1, Portuguese university students were categorised into a dysphoric (n=17) or a normal mood group (n=39) depending on their score on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-IA) – cutoff point (≥ 10). In Study 2, clinically diagnosed depressed patients (n=32) were recruited from a Portuguese hospital and matched for age and gender with never-depressed control participants (n=32) recruited from the community. The dependent variables tested were: level of spatiotemporal specificity, self-relevance, mood and physical impact, valence, and visual perspective of the MTT events produced. A diary methodology was used in both studies, with an open-ended time period that lasted for a minimum of two weeks, for participants to record their MTT events and grade them on the above mentioned variables using Likert-type ratings. Between seven and fourteen MTT events were produced for each of the four MTT conditions (past voluntary, past involuntary, future voluntary, future involuntary). Results showed that when compared to their respective control groups, depressed, but not dysphoric participants, exhibited a clear influence of mood on several of the phenomenological characteristics of MTT. In Study 1 there were no statistically significant differences in the specificity, negative valence, and mood/physical impact of the MTT events produced by dysphoric and normal mood participants. On the contrary, in Study 2, results partially supported a lower specificity and fully supported a greater negativity and mood/physical impact of MTT events in depressed individuals compared with never-depressed participants. Both studies supported the greater self-relevance of voluntary MTT events and partially supported the hypothesised effect of type of retrieval in specificity. These were the first studies to directly compare past and future, voluntary and involuntary MTT events in dysphoric and depressed individuals, addressing existing gaps in the literature. The key limitation is the relatively small sample size of both studies, however each participant was comprehensively assessed for at least two weeks, providing a rich set of reliable data. Despite limitations, this thesis provides novel pilot findings that help understand the similarities and differences between involuntary and voluntary, past and future MTT, as well as providing new information regarding the possible role of MTT in dysphoria and depression.

Recent research showed that a network of brain regions known as the Default Mode Network (DMN), including the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), is active when individuals remember the past, imagine the future, take the perspective of others, as well as during spontaneous cognition (mind wandering). The goal of this dissertation is to investigate whether the vmPFC plays a crucial role during DMN-related cognitive processes, such as MTT and mind wandering. Experiment 1 revealed that a damage to the vmPFC provokes the disruption of past and future MTT and a decreased ability to imagine future other-related episodes. vmPFC role extends to imagining events that are not self-relevant indicating that vmPFC is crucial for the imagination of complex experiences alternative to the current reality. In experiment 2, findings showed that a lesion to vmPFC disrupts the ability to construct complex atemporal scenarios. However, unlike the control groups, vmPFC patients had more difficulties in imagining future compared to fictitious experiences, suggesting that vmPFC is more critical for the simulation of future episodes. Experiment 3 revealed that these results are not explained by the disruption of non-episodic capabilities, such as narrative and working memory abilities. Furthermore, experiment 4 explored the effect of a lesion to vmPFC on the occurrence of mind wandering. A damage to the vmPFC provokes a decreased propensity to mind-wander, showing that vmPFC supports spontaneous cognition. Experiment 5 confirmed the involvement of the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in supporting mind wandering. Using the transcranial direct current stimulation to inhibit the mPFC we could decrease the intensity of mind wandering in males. Together, these results point out the fundamental role of vmPFC in allowing human beings to escape the here and now, whether it occurs deliberately or spontaneously.

Vi ställs dagligen inför väldigt många val och beroende på vilka val vi väljer att göra kommer dessa till stor del att påverka hur vi lever vårt liv och även hur tillfreds vi kommer att vara med livet. Vi baserar många av våra val på känslomässiga förutsägelser som är våra antaganden om hur framtida händelser kommer att påverka oss känslomässigt. Våra känslomässiga förutsägelser är dessvärre ofta påverkade av olika bias som gör att vi missbedömer hur starkt och under hur lång tid vi kommer att reagera känslomässigt på kommande händelser, vilket i sin tur påverkar vilka val vi kommer att göra. Den här uppsatsen kommer att undersöka hur våra känslomässiga förutsägelser påverkar vårt subjektiva välbefinnande och även hur förståelse för detta skulle kunna användas i psykologisk coachning i form av interventioner för att hjälpa människor att göra fler val som leder till ett ökat subjektivt välbefinnande.

Intertemporal choice is certainly a matter of study dear to economists, for many decisions which are economic in nature reflect its commonsensical feature, that of an action whose associated consequences are deferred in time and, therefore, temporally separated from the decision itself. Given the great deal of occurrences in which our immediate choices have inevitably delayed outcomes, it only seems sensible to focus our attention on the mental processes behind the attribution of value in intertemporal setting and on the manners in which such mechanisms challenge the traditional economic models of intertemporal choice: the first chapter of this work is entrusted with this goal. The ability to simulate and access future states, emotions and contingencies, both involving us as protagonists and mere participants, in particular, seems to be crucial for a reliable, useful and, perhaps, successful evaluation of future situations and associated outcomes. Mental time travel refers to our faculty to mentally project ourselves backwards in time to re-live given events, or, forwards to pre-live them. Evolutionary considerations well allow for the possibility that a vivid memory and an imaginative foresight may be pivotal cognitive mechanisms for human decision-making processes, constituting a system with notable flexibility features in its design to grant ourselves outstanding adaptability in a complex, dynamic environment. The second chapter unravels by discussing the necessary conditions and the neural substrates identifiable in mental time travel engagement, as well as its implications, reviewing the evolutionary grounds speculated to have allowed for its emergence in the first place and their relevance in economic terms, and dedicating much needed attention to studies investigating mental time travel aptitude in nonhuman animals. The work then proceeds to disclose its experimental core in Chapters III and IV.

This dissertation addresses three novel aspects of children’s future thinking: First is a study of 3- to 5-year-olds’ capacity to think about the future across two different conceptual domains. Specifically, children had to think ahead to meet either a future physiological need (desire for food) or psychological need (avoiding boredom). Most future thinking tasks only require children to plan in one domain, this despite that future thinking is presumably domain general in humans. Children were better at addressing a future need for food than a future need for toys, with even 3-year-olds succeeding above chance. This study also served as an opportunity to replicate the results of a previous similar task (Atance et al., 2015) and improve the task by removing unnecessary components (social, pretense). Second is a study of 3- to 5-year-olds’ spontaneous talk (as a proxy for spontaneous thought) about the future and past within the context of a behavioural future thinking task. Spontaneous or involuntary thought about the past and future are ubiquitous in adult cognition. Few developmental studies have investigated past spontaneous thought, and none have investigated future spontaneous thought. Children of all ages spontaneously spoke about the future and past and some children even spontaneously solved the future thinking task. Further, children who spontaneously spoke more about the past and future were more likely to correctly answer an explicit test question. Third is an attempt at addressing a limitation in all existing behavioural future thinking tasks: That is, tasks used to assess the development of future thinking do not require children to think ahead about a future state of the world that differs from the present. Children could potentially be solving behavioural future thinking tasks without having to represent the future. However, representing a future that differs from the present is argued to be core to adaptive future thinking in humans. To overcome this limitation, we modified an existing task so that children could not succeed based on their representation of how the world currently is but, rather, how it will be at a future point in time. Four- to 7-year-olds all remembered the information required to solve the modified task; however, only 7-year-olds made a future-oriented decision more often than chance. With the task modification removed (so the correct answer for the present and future matched), even 4-year-olds succeeded above chance. These findings challenge the current accounts that suggest by age 4, children can reliably succeed in future thinking tasks. Taken together, this research program contributes new insights to the development of future thinking in early childhood and suggests directions for novel research.

Pendant longtemps, le voyage mental dans le temps a été considéré comme unique à l’humain. Selon des auteurs, les animaux ne pourraient pas se projeter dans le passé ou le futur parce qu’ils sont ancrés dans le présent. Néanmoins, pendant les 30 dernières années les chercheurs ont apporté des connaissances considérables sur les capacités des animaux à se souvenir de leur passé et à anticiper leur futur. Même si les opinions ont évolué, le débat sur l’unicité du voyage mental dans le temps est toujours d’actualité. Le but de ma thèse est d’apporter de nouvelles données sur les capacités des animaux à se souvenir du passé et à anticiper le futur. Plus particulièrement, je me suis intéressée à la mémoire de la source, qui est la capacité de retrouver l’origine d’un souvenir, chez deux espèces animales très éloignées, la seiche commune Sepia officinalis, et le geai des chênes, Garrulus glandarius. Les résultats ont montré que les seiches étaient capables de résoudre une tâche de discrimination perceptive, montrant qu’elles pouvaient discriminer et retenir leurs propres perceptions après un délai de 3 heures. Les geais, eux, ont révélé des différences mâles/femelles inattendues concernant leur capacité d’encoder et de retrouver une information contextuelle non-intentionnelle (source contextuelle). Une étude sur le comportement orienté vers le futur a montré que les seiches étaient capables de prendre une décision dans le présent en fonction de ce qu’elles avaient appris dans le passé, et en fonction des conditions expérimentales futures. Une étude préliminaire sur la planification a également apporté des résultats prometteurs sur la capacité des seiches à anticiper leurs besoins futurs. Enfin, nous avons pu explorer et mettre en lumière pour la première fois les substrats neuroanatomiques de la mémoire de type épisodique chez la seiche. Ces résultats permettent d’enrichir nos connaissances sur le voyage mental dans le temps chez la seiche et chez le geai, suggérant que cette capacité cognitive complexe peut avoir évolué sous différentes contraintes environnementales
Some authors support that mental time travel is unique to humans. To their point of view, animals are not able to project themselves into the past of the future because they are bound into the present. Nevertheless, during the last 30 years, researchers have brought considerable knowledge on animals’ capacities to travel mentally through time. Even though opinions have evolved, the debate concerning the unicity of mental time travel is still on. My PhD thesis aimed at bringing further knowledge on this matter by focusing on an innovative aspect of episodic cognition in common cuttlefish, Sepia officinalis and Eurasian jay, Garrulus glandarius, namely, source-memory. Source-memory is the capacity to retrieve the origin of an episodic memory. Results showed that cuttlefish were able to perform a source-discrimination study, revealing that they were able to discriminate and retrieve their own perceptions after 3-hours delay. A study on jays’ capacity to encode incidentally a contextual information (contextual source) revealed unexpected differences between males and females. Investigation of future-oriented behaviour in cuttlefish showed that they were able to take a decision in the present according to previous encoded knowledge and according to future experimental conditions. A preliminary study also revealed promising results on cuttlefish capacity to anticipate their future needs. To finish, we explored and revealed for the first time the neuronal substrates of episodic-like memory in cuttlefish. Alltogether, these results provide new knowledge on mental time travel in cuttlefish and in jays, suggesting that this capacity would have evolved under different environmental contraints

Background Acculturation has effects on mental health outcomes among young newly arrived migrants and refugees. Innovative methods, such as the Time Travel Method, can help understand cultural heritage, contribute to improved acculturation and subsequently lead to positive individual as well as societal outcomes.    Aim The aim was to explore the experiences, acceptability and use of the Time Travel Method, an educational method using applied cultural heritage education, among Finnish students and young migrants and refugees introduced to the method.  Methods Data was collected during 7 weeks of internship at the Ostrobothnian Children’s Cultural Network in Finland. Participant observations and letters written by participants during Time Travel events were coded and analysed using observational method and secondary analysis of qualitative data. Result The Time Travel Method was found to be appreciated by the participants by creating a safe space which allowed for cultural expressions, learning and social cohesion. A variance in narrative and perspective between Finnish and newly arrived students was observed. The Time Travel Method allowed for improved communication, reflection and expressions of feelings. The recognition of similarities between cultures was valuable to the participants. Conclusion The Time Travel Method functions as a bridge between cultures allowing for successful acculturation. Interprofessional joint actions on all societal levels are required. Further development and initiatives focusing on culture may increase awareness of the impact of cultural heritage.

Dans cette thèse, je propose de repenser la mémoire afin de repenser l'identité personnelle. Je pars de la question suivante : Comment est-il possible que les personnes, malgré les changements qui les affectent, se reconnaissent comme mêmes à différents moments du temps ? Une réponse classique à la question diachronique de l'identité personnelle est qu’elle repose sur la mémoire : les souvenirs fondent notre continuité psychologique. Cependant, les récentes recherches empiriques sur la mémoire épisodique montrent qu'elle a une dimension constructive et qu'elle n'est pas seulement une capacité de stockage fidèle du passé. Qu'est-ce que cela change à la question de l'identité personnelle ? J’explore d’abord la théorie mémorielle de l'identité personnelle de John Locke, et je soutiens qu'être une personne, selon Locke, c'est se reconnaître comme telle à différents moments du temps et donc, dans cet acte d'auto-reconnaissance, constituer son identité personnelle. Je soutiens cependant que la vision conservatrice de la mémoire de Locke doit être révisée et je propose de repenser le concept de mémoire en m’appuyant sur les sciences contemporaines de la mémoire. Je soutiens qu’elle a une dimension constructive et propose une théorie de la mémoire constructive de l'identité personnelle. La mémoire épisodique est à la fois une capacité qui me permet de me reconnaître et, parce que cette reconnaissance n'est pas une simple reconnaissance mais la construction d'une représentation de moi-même à travers la collecte d'informations provenant de diverses sources, elle peut produire et constituer mon identité personnelle
In this thesis, I propose to rethink memory in order to rethink personal identity. I start from an interrogation about personal identity. How is it possible that people, despite the changes that affect them, recognize themselves as themselves? A common answer to the diachronic question of personal identity is that memory is what makes the self: memories allow us to connect with ourselves and to have an idea of our diachronic personal identity. But interestingly, the recent empirical research on episodic memory shows that it has a constructive dimension and is not only a storage capacity that allows one to preserve and retrieve accurate representations of the past. What does it change for the question of personal identity? I start with an exploration of John Locke’s memory theory of personal identity, and argue that to be a person, in Locke's view, is to recognize oneself as same at different moments of time and thus, in this act of self-recognition, to constitute oneself as a person with a temporal dimension. I argue that Locke’s preservative view of memory has to be revised, and I propose an empirically informed discussion on the concept of memory. I contend that episodic memory has a constructive dimension and has both epistemic functions and functions related to the constitution of diachronic personal identity. I propose a constructive memory theory of personal identity. Episodic memory is at the same time a capacity which allows me to recognize myself and, because this recognition is not a simple recognition but a construction of a representation of myself through the gathering of information from various sources, it can produce and constitute my personal identity

Yes
Objectives To examine the impact of memory accessibility on episodic future thinking. Design Single-case study of neurological patient HCM and an age-matched comparison group of neurologically Healthy Controls. Methods We administered a full battery of tests assessing general intelligence, memory, and executive functioning. To assess autobiographical memory, the Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman, Wilson, & Baddeley, 1990. The Autobiographical Memory Interview. Bury St. Edmunds, UK: Thames Valley Test Company) was administered. The Past Episodic and Future Episodic sections of Dalla Barba's Confabulation Battery (Dalla Barba, 1993, Cogn. Neuropsychol., 1, 1) and a specifically tailored Mental Time Travel Questionnaire were administered to assess future thinking in HCM and age-matched controls. Results HCM presented with a deficit in forming new memories (anterograde amnesia) and recalling events from before the onset of neurological impairment (retrograde amnesia). HCM's autobiographical memory impairments are characterized by a paucity of memories from Recent Life. In comparison with controls, two features of his future thoughts are apparent: Reduced episodic future thinking and outdated content of his episodic future thoughts. Conclusions This article suggests neuropsychologists should look beyond popular conceptualizations of the past–future relation in amnesia via focussing on reduced future thinking. Investigating both the quantity and quality of future thoughts produced by amnesic patients may lead to developments in understanding the complex nature of future thinking disorders resulting from memory impairments.
Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds

Dissertação de Mestrado em Evolução e Biologia Humanas apresentada à Faculdade de Ciências e Tecnologia
Time. The notion of time is something inherent to human behavior; the pervasive understanding of temporal relations present in nature was and is crucial for our adaptation and survival as a species. Nevertheless, it is still not well defined in the literature how time is conceptualized and mapped by the brain. What we know is that phenotypic plasticity presented by our species cannot be justified only by our genetic nor corporal/linguistic experiences. Therefore, culture comes as a potential source for this variability. Considering the culture as one of the bases that shape our conception of time and evaluating this variability across the human populations: the objective of this work is to explore one of the dimensions of temporal cognition: the capacity to travel mentally in time. We aim to assess which are the influences of remembering the past and projecting de future on decision-making, in particular in economic intertemporal choices and risky behaviors.We carried out three experiments with the same experimental procedures. Each participant was respectively induced to focus on one day of his/her past or future, always with a distance of fifteen years. These effects were measured through standard questionnaires used in this field: monetary choice questionnaire (Kirby, 1999) and DOSPERT questionnaire of risk-taking (Weber, 2002). This research was carried out in the Center of Mind, Brain and Behavior of the University of Granada, and the sample is composed by 120 students of the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Granada.The observed results between the inducted groups were significant in the first and second experiment. These results showed a reduction of discounting rate when the temporal focus and the decisions were considered in the same time period. In the third experiment, the differences between groups were not significant, possibly because that this questionnaire is not adequate for this experiment, since because not all decisions are classified as intertemporal choice.The contrast among inducted groups indicates that manipulation of temporal focus can be an important tool to reduce the discounting rate. High discount rates have been associated with a number of risk behaviors. Thus, the temporal focus appears as a possible solution for the treatment and prevention of these behaviors. This project constitutes an advance in the understanding of psychological time, evidencing influences of temporal focus on our behavior.
Tempo. A noção de tempo é algo inerente ao comportamento humano; a constante compreensão das relações temporais presentes na natureza foi e é fundamental para a nossa adaptação e sobrevivência enquanto espécie. No entanto, como este conceito é conceptualizado e mapeado pelo cérebro ainda não está bem definido na literatura. O que se sabe é que a plasticidade fenotípica exibida pela nossa espécie não pode apenas ser justificada pela genética, nem apenas pelas experiências corporais e linguísticas, surgindo a cultura como fonte provável desta variabilidade.Considerada a cultura um dos pilares da nossa conceptualização do tempo e avaliando as influências desta variabilidade no comportamento de cada população: o objetivo deste trabalho é explorar a nossa capacidade de viajar no tempo mentalmente. Visamos verificar quais as influências de reviver o passado ou imaginar o futuro sobre a tomada de decisões intertemporais económicas e condutas de risco.Foram realizadas três experiências com o mesmo procedimento experimental. Cada participante foi induzido a focar-se respetivamente num dia do seu passado ou futuro, sempre com uma distância de quinze anos. Os efeitos deste foco temporal foram medidos através de questionários standard na área: questionário de escolhas intertemporais económicas (Kirby,1999) e questionário DOSPERT de condutas de risco (Weber,2002). Esta investigação foi realizada no Centro de Mente, Cérebro e Comportamento da Universidade de Granada, sendo a amostra composta por 120 alunos da Faculdade de Psicologia da Universidade de Granada.Os resultados observados entre os diferentes grupos de indução foram significativos nas experiências 1 e 2, evidenciando uma redução da taxa de desconto quando o foco temporal e as decisões a tomar se situam na mesma época temporal. Na experiência 3, sobre condutas de risco, as diferenças não foram significativas, especulando-se que este questionário não seja adequado à experiencia por nem todas as decisões serem classificadas como intertemporais. O contraste entre os grupos de indução indica que a manipulação do foco temporal pode ser uma ferramenta importante para reduzir a taxa de desconto. Elevadas taxas de desconto têm sido associadas a vários comportamentos de risco, surgindo o foco temporal como uma possível ferramenta para o tratamento e prevenção destes problemas.Este projeto constitui um avanço na compreensão do tempo psicológico, evidenciando influências do foco temporal no nosso comportamento.