Дисертації з теми "CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity"
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Koskelo, E. (Eerik). "CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201403131171.
Повний текст джерелаShaw, Paul Anthony. "CEO pay-performance sensitivity in South African financial services companies." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/27027.
Повний текст джерелаDissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
Nellkrans, Gabriel, and Seyfi Dogan. "Pay-performance sensitivity during financial distress : Did the financial crisis change payperformance sensitivity?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-255729.
Повний текст джерелаSteyn, Gideon Francois. "The relationship between CEO compensation and future share returns in South Africa." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5272.
Повний текст джерелаAs a result of high economic inequality, widespread discontent with excessive chief executive officer (CEO) compensation levels is acute in South Africa (SA). Some commentators argue that instead of high levels of CEO pay causing inequality, it may be part of the solution if higher levels of CEO compensation translate into better company performance, so reducing unemployment. International studies investigating the relationship between CEO short-term cash compensation and current company performance generally report a weak or no relationship where accounting based measures of performance are used. Developments in the international literature reflect a stronger relationship when long-term incentive compensation (LIC) is included and total shareholder return (TSR) used to measure company performance. However, a concerning negative association between the highest paid CEOs in terms of excess LIC and future abnormal TSR is reported. In contrast, SA pay-performance research is largely not reflective of the developments in the international literature, with local studies mostly finding no pay-performance relationship, except where size-related accounting measures are used. As a result of the strong correlation between CEO pay and company size reported in the international literature, and local studies not adequately controlling for company size, the accuracy of the conclusions drawn in prior studies on the pay-performance sensitivity relationship in SA are brought into question. This study addresses the gaps in the SA literature by investigating the relationship between the size-adjusted excess CEO compensation and future abnormal TSR for the top 100 SA companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 2013. A positive relationship is found between future abnormal TSR and short-term cash compensation, but not LIC. The levels and structure of CEO compensation in SA is also described.
Forst, Arno. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation." VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1714.
Повний текст джерелаJIN, Man. "An analysis of the effects of the probability of informed trading (pin) on corporate diversification discount and CEO pay-performance sensitivity : evidence from China." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd/2.
Повний текст джерелаSingal, Manisha. "Corporate Governance and Strategic Behavior: A Study of Acquisitions and CEO Compensation Practices of Publicly-Owned and Family-Controlled Firms in S&P 500." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77369.
Повний текст джерелаPh. D.
Liu, Lichi, and 劉力綺. "Corporate Governance and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/49966797804158597635.
Повний текст джерела中國文化大學
會計學系
99
The Board is responsible for determining CEO compensation, board oversight on the ability of the past studies have shown that the company performance and CEO compensation have an effect. Therefore, the study of ownership structure and board of directors as the research variables, and the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as the dependent variable, investigate how the ownership structure and board of directors affect the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.
Shang-MingHuang and 黃上銘. "Stock Repurchase, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and CEO Ownership." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32596416859476354376.
Повний текст джерела國立成功大學
會計學系
102
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of stock repurchase, pay-performance sensitivity and CEO ownership. We try to answer three important repurchase questions: First, whether firms with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity tend to repurchase more. Second, whether firms with higher CEO ownership tend to buy back more. Finally, how pay-performance sensitivity and ownership together affect repurchase. We test sample comprising all TSE and over-the-counter (OTC) firms in Taiwan from 1998 to 2011 with empirical research. I find that pay-performance sensitivity does not significantly affect the stock repurchase. However, I do find a strong positive association between CEO ownership and stock repurchase. In addition, if we consider the effect of pay-performance sensitivity and CEO ownership simultaneously, the findings reveal a positive effect for pay-performance sensitivity, but a negative effect for CEO holding, suggesting a substitution effect.
Liu, Chia-Wei, and 劉嘉惟. "CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Inside Debt, and Firm Innovation." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92qjz9.
Повний текст джерела國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
105
This paper is to examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivities and inside debt affect firm innovation. According to agency theory, managers may damage shareholders’ wealth for maximizing their self-interest. Previous literatures have document that CEO compensation scheme is the way for fixing this agency problem. However, different CEO compensation schemes would lead CEOs to have different risk preferences. We try to argue that high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option would motive CEO to take high risky projects, saying in-house R&D. In other way, granting CEO more inside-debt would motive CEO to avoid risky projects, in terms of in-house R&D. By investigating S&P 500 firms from 2006-2015, we find that that if firms have high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option, they are willing to take downside risk from the innovation activities. Furthermore, firms with high CEOs’ inside debt have less risky projects, in terms of external patent acquisition. This paper tries to contribute the literatures to provide competent evidences for the influences of debt-like and equity-like compensations on innovation activities.
Hou, Pei-Xiu, and 侯佩秀. "The Influence of CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity on Voluntary Disclosures." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/96997093875939865961.
Повний текст джерелаLyu, Yunru, and 呂昀儒. "The Relationship between Blockholder Monitoring and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38482483493703844616.
Повний текст джерела東海大學
企業管理學系碩士班
99
This study investigated the effect of blockholder monitoring the impact of CEO pay performance sensitivity.For this study, the performance indicators to measure by stock returns, and performance is divided into the external environment performance and internal capabilities performance. This study added a blockholder monitoring, blockholder ratio can strengthen the monitoring effect, and rate of change in blockholder can weaken the monitoring effect, observations CEO pay performance sensitivity will be affected. Divide the concept of performance into the external environment performance and internal capabilities performance and continue to observe the blockholder monitoring and CEO compensation and performance of the external environment, the performance sensitivity of the relationship between internal capabilities. In this study, the total CEO compensation, dividends into equity compensation and cash compensation, empirical results show that both the overall performance analysis only, or the performance down into external and internal environmental performance capability performance, performance on CEO pay has a positive relationship. Shows the overall performance of both the external and internal environmental performance capability performance, performance pay has highly pay performance sensitivity. The study also found that Taiwan's companies to blockholder ratio of positive results is not obvious, because there may be among Taiwan companies as blockholder holding interaction, resulting in weak oversight role; but Taiwan's blockholder turnover of listed companies weaken monitoring results are obvious, the more frequent changes in blockholder, monitoring results weaker, due to more frequent changes in blockholder, the CEO of the company's business there is the problem of asymmetric information, can not suppress the external environmental performance and CEO compensation connectivity; in the above results, CEO total compensation and CEO equity have similar results, but the result of CEO cash is difference, because CEO equity has more incentive effect and more flexible. In the performance divide, should strengthen the internal capacity of the link performance and CEO pay, reduce external environmental performance, so that it can highlight the CEO in the management of the importance of capacity; and changes in blockholder significantly larger, thus reducing the change in major shareholders to increase shareholder ownership rate compared to more efficient and be able to monitor blockholder have positive effects.
Pei-HsuanChiang and 江沛璇. "The Effect of Mandatory XBRL Adoption on CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/5x859e.
Повний текст джерелаHong, Shu-Li, and 洪淑莉. "The relationships among CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity, corporate governance and earning management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/66290378281595105827.
Повний текст джерела雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
96
This study investigates the relationship between the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and the CEO’s behavior of earnings management. The CEO’s behavior of manipulating accounting earnings by discretionary accruals (DA) may be related to the effective superintendence on the board of directors. Generally speaking, the board of directors designs the compensation scheme according to CEO’s achievements, and it will decrease the CEO’s behavior of manipulating accounting earning if the corporate governance mechanism works. On the contrary, it will increase the CEO’s behavior of manipulating accounting earning if the corporate governance mechanism doesn’t work. We find that the association between CEO pay and reported income has positive influences on discretionary accruals, and the corporate governance index has negative influences on discretionary accruals.
Wu, Si-Xuan, and 吳思萱. "The impact of the credit risk and Pay-Performance Sensitivity on CEO turnover." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/2c744z.
Повний текст джерела中原大學
會計研究所
103
The credit rating is the score which evaluates company’s future operational condition rated by professional institution. It also reflects the company’s credit risk and solvency. Therefore, the credit rating can also be considered an indicator of executives’ performance. Except for financial industry companies, I use companies listing in Taiwan stock exchange during 2009 to 2013 to conduct this research. And I use the score of credit rating as the level of credit risk. First, I investigate whether the credit risk will have impact on CEO turnover rate. Then I tend to find out whether high Pay-Performance Sensitivity will moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. Finally, I try to learn whether the compensation committee will moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. Empirical results show that the credit risk has a positive effect on CEO turnover. Moreover, I find Pay-Performance Sensitivity negatively moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover. However, it seems that the compensation committee could not moderate the relationship between credit risk and CEO turnover.
Chen, Yi-Han, and 陳奕翰. "The Impact of the Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Report on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/bg6adv.
Повний текст джерела中原大學
會計研究所
105
This study examines the impact of mandatory disclosing corporate social responsibility (CSR) report on CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity. Firms are divided into two groups. One has better social responsibility (award firms), which is based on the Excellence in Corporate Social Responsibility conducted by CommonWealth Mangazine. Another is the firm that had issued CSR reports but did not get the award (non-award firms). Since the mandatory disclosure is implemented from 2014, the data of Taiwan listed companies from 2012 to 2015 are collected. The result shows that before the mandatory disclosure, the CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity does not have significant change for the award firms before and after mandatory disclosure. Finally, the CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity has increased for the non-award firms after mandatory disclosure, comparing before the mandatory disclosure. This research enhances the understanding of the relation of CEO''s pay-performance sensitivity and disclosure regulatory changes.
Park, Jinhong. "Say on Pay, CEO Pay Sensitivities, Firm Risk and Agency Costs of Debt." Thesis, 2022. https://hdl.handle.net/2440/136414.
Повний текст джерелаThesis (MPhil) -- University of Adelaide, Business School, 2022
Liang, Shu-Wei, and 梁書瑋. "The Effect of Establishment of Compensation Committee and Its Quality on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59672458556770517236.
Повний текст джерела東吳大學
會計學系
102
This study examine whether establishment of compensation committee (hereafter, CC) and its quality can improve the association between CEO cash compensation and accounting performance (i.e., the pay-performance sensitivity, PPS). Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms over the period spanning 2009-2012, the empirical results can support our argument that CC establishment have a positive effect on PPS. However, we do find that the higher CC quality, the positive association between CEO compensation and accounting earnings is more pronounced while we focus on the period of CC establishment. Overall, our findings indicate several compensation committee characteristics (e.g., meetings attendance, members’ directorship and tenure) have significant benefits in improving corporate governance mechanism of monitoring CEO compensation. Therefore, CC quality is dominated by its members’ attributes, that is, whether CC play a role of improving PPS depends on the characteristics of its committee members.
Chen, Hui-Wen, and 陳惠文. "The Impact of Overlapping Financial Experts on CEO Compensation, Pay-Performance Sensitivity, and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/64283019449907256627.
Повний текст джерела國立臺灣大學
會計學研究所
101
The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of overlapping financial experts on CEO compensation, pay-performance sensitivity, and earnings management. The results support Chang et al. (2012) that financial experts sitting on both compensation and audit committees have an association with discretionary accruals and take conservative action by awarding CEO less equity-based compensation to reduce monitoring cost. Furthermore, the results show that the number of outside directorships held by overlapping directors has a positive relation with incentive-based compensation and earnings quality. The results present that financial experts are more experienced and knowledgeable if they hold more outside appointments. However, the negative impact caused by overlapping board structure on earnings management does not reduced even though financial experts are experienced and knowledgeable. Consist with Chang et al. (2012), this study finds no significant association between overlapping financial experts and pay-performance sensitivity.
LAI, YI-AN, and 賴顗安. "The Influence of Independent Directors and Non-controlling Directors on CEO Pay Performance Sensitivity–Evidence From China." Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/pejpm6.
Повний текст джерела國立臺北科技大學
經營管理系
107
In this research use the data of China companies from 2008 to 2017 to investigate independent directors and non-controlling directors’ effect on CEO pay performance sensitivity. The empirical results prove that independent directors cannot improve CEO pay performance sensitivity, while non-controlling directors can improve CEO pay performance sensitivity, indicating that non-controlling directors is more effective in supervising senior management. This study further compares whether the enterprise do not have a CEO duality, and whether it is a state-owned enterprise, proving out that when a company has a CEO duality or it is a non-state-owned enterprise, non-controlling directors can effectively supervise senior management.