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Статті в журналах з теми "CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity"
Cho, MyoJung, and Salma Ibrahim. "Non-financial performance measures and pay-performance sensitivity." Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting 20, no. 2 (October 11, 2021): 185–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfra-01-2021-0018.
Повний текст джерелаAmzaleg, Yaron, Ofer H. Azar, Uri Ben-Zion, and Ahron Rosenfeld. "CEO control, corporate performance and pay-performance sensitivity." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 106 (October 2014): 166–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2014.07.004.
Повний текст джерелаGong, James Jianxin. "Examining Shareholder Value Creation over CEO Tenure: A New Approach to Testing Effectiveness of Executive Compensation." Journal of Management Accounting Research 23, no. 1 (December 1, 2011): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-10105.
Повний текст джерелаAbraham, Rebecca, Judith Harris, and Joel Auerbach. "CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity: A Multi-Equation Model." Technology and Investment 05, no. 03 (2014): 125–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ti.2014.53013.
Повний текст джерелаAaen, Thomas, and Rainer Lueg. "Performance pay sensitivity: Do top management incentives align with shareholder value creation?" Corporate Ownership and Control 19, no. 3 (2022): 168–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv19i3art13.
Повний текст джерелаKim, Taekyu, and Injoong Kim. "CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity in KOSPI and KOSDAQ Firms." Korean Data Analysis Society 22, no. 4 (August 30, 2020): 1291–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.37727/jkdas.2020.22.4.1291.
Повний текст джерелаAbraham, Rebecca, Judith Harris, and Joel Auerbach. "Disruptive Technology as Antecedent to CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Technology and Investment 06, no. 02 (2015): 83–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ti.2015.62009.
Повний текст джерелаBussin, Mark. "CEO pay-performance sensitivity in the South African context." South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 18, no. 2 (May 28, 2015): 232–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v18i2.838.
Повний текст джерелаShin, Jae Yong, and Jeongil Seo. "Less Pay and More Sensitivity? Institutional Investor Heterogeneity and CEO Pay." Journal of Management 37, no. 6 (June 11, 2010): 1719–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206310372412.
Повний текст джерелаTinaikar, Surjit, and Kun Yu. "Pay performance sensitivity and earnings restatements." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 3 (2014): 273–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i3c2p5.
Повний текст джерелаДисертації з теми "CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity"
Koskelo, E. (Eerik). "CEO compensation and pay-for-performance sensitivity." Master's thesis, University of Oulu, 2014. http://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:oulu-201403131171.
Повний текст джерелаShaw, Paul Anthony. "CEO pay-performance sensitivity in South African financial services companies." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/27027.
Повний текст джерелаDissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2012.
Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)
unrestricted
Nellkrans, Gabriel, and Seyfi Dogan. "Pay-performance sensitivity during financial distress : Did the financial crisis change payperformance sensitivity?" Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Företagsekonomiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-255729.
Повний текст джерелаSteyn, Gideon Francois. "The relationship between CEO compensation and future share returns in South Africa." Thesis, University of the Western Cape, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/5272.
Повний текст джерелаAs a result of high economic inequality, widespread discontent with excessive chief executive officer (CEO) compensation levels is acute in South Africa (SA). Some commentators argue that instead of high levels of CEO pay causing inequality, it may be part of the solution if higher levels of CEO compensation translate into better company performance, so reducing unemployment. International studies investigating the relationship between CEO short-term cash compensation and current company performance generally report a weak or no relationship where accounting based measures of performance are used. Developments in the international literature reflect a stronger relationship when long-term incentive compensation (LIC) is included and total shareholder return (TSR) used to measure company performance. However, a concerning negative association between the highest paid CEOs in terms of excess LIC and future abnormal TSR is reported. In contrast, SA pay-performance research is largely not reflective of the developments in the international literature, with local studies mostly finding no pay-performance relationship, except where size-related accounting measures are used. As a result of the strong correlation between CEO pay and company size reported in the international literature, and local studies not adequately controlling for company size, the accuracy of the conclusions drawn in prior studies on the pay-performance sensitivity relationship in SA are brought into question. This study addresses the gaps in the SA literature by investigating the relationship between the size-adjusted excess CEO compensation and future abnormal TSR for the top 100 SA companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for the period 2011 to 2013. A positive relationship is found between future abnormal TSR and short-term cash compensation, but not LIC. The levels and structure of CEO compensation in SA is also described.
Forst, Arno. "Insider Entrenchment and CEO Compensation in Entrepreneurial Firms: An Empirical Investigation." VCU Scholars Compass, 2009. http://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/etd/1714.
Повний текст джерелаJIN, Man. "An analysis of the effects of the probability of informed trading (pin) on corporate diversification discount and CEO pay-performance sensitivity : evidence from China." Digital Commons @ Lingnan University, 2011. https://commons.ln.edu.hk/fin_etd/2.
Повний текст джерелаSingal, Manisha. "Corporate Governance and Strategic Behavior: A Study of Acquisitions and CEO Compensation Practices of Publicly-Owned and Family-Controlled Firms in S&P 500." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/77369.
Повний текст джерелаPh. D.
Liu, Lichi, and 劉力綺. "Corporate Governance and CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/49966797804158597635.
Повний текст джерела中國文化大學
會計學系
99
The Board is responsible for determining CEO compensation, board oversight on the ability of the past studies have shown that the company performance and CEO compensation have an effect. Therefore, the study of ownership structure and board of directors as the research variables, and the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation as the dependent variable, investigate how the ownership structure and board of directors affect the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation to reduce conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers.
Shang-MingHuang and 黃上銘. "Stock Repurchase, Pay-Performance Sensitivity and CEO Ownership." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32596416859476354376.
Повний текст джерела國立成功大學
會計學系
102
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of stock repurchase, pay-performance sensitivity and CEO ownership. We try to answer three important repurchase questions: First, whether firms with greater pay-for-performance sensitivity tend to repurchase more. Second, whether firms with higher CEO ownership tend to buy back more. Finally, how pay-performance sensitivity and ownership together affect repurchase. We test sample comprising all TSE and over-the-counter (OTC) firms in Taiwan from 1998 to 2011 with empirical research. I find that pay-performance sensitivity does not significantly affect the stock repurchase. However, I do find a strong positive association between CEO ownership and stock repurchase. In addition, if we consider the effect of pay-performance sensitivity and CEO ownership simultaneously, the findings reveal a positive effect for pay-performance sensitivity, but a negative effect for CEO holding, suggesting a substitution effect.
Liu, Chia-Wei, and 劉嘉惟. "CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Inside Debt, and Firm Innovation." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92qjz9.
Повний текст джерела國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
105
This paper is to examine whether CEO pay-performance sensitivities and inside debt affect firm innovation. According to agency theory, managers may damage shareholders’ wealth for maximizing their self-interest. Previous literatures have document that CEO compensation scheme is the way for fixing this agency problem. However, different CEO compensation schemes would lead CEOs to have different risk preferences. We try to argue that high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option would motive CEO to take high risky projects, saying in-house R&D. In other way, granting CEO more inside-debt would motive CEO to avoid risky projects, in terms of in-house R&D. By investigating S&P 500 firms from 2006-2015, we find that that if firms have high CEO pay-performance sensitivity to option, they are willing to take downside risk from the innovation activities. Furthermore, firms with high CEOs’ inside debt have less risky projects, in terms of external patent acquisition. This paper tries to contribute the literatures to provide competent evidences for the influences of debt-like and equity-like compensations on innovation activities.
Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "CEO Pay-performance Sensitivity"
Zhang, Changzheng, and Jie Xie. "Empirical Study on Effect of Managerial Discretion on CEO Pay-Performance Sensitivity." In 2008 International Conference on Risk Management & Engineering Management. IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icrmem.2008.23.
Повний текст джерелаZhang, Changzheng, and Zhuoqin Gao. "Effect of CEO Power on Executive Pay-Performance Sensitivity: A literature Review." In 2015 International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Medicine. Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/emim-15.2015.93.
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