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1
Ruppelt, Hans-Jürgen. "Competition Law and its Application in Germany." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 8, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 117–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907345054.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract L’economia tedesca è sempre stata caratterizzata da una struttura molto concentrata, in cui le imprese facevano frequente ricorso ai cartelli. Alia fine dell’ultima guerra, gli alleati (ed in particolare gli Stati Uniti) hanno insistito perché la concentrazione fosse ridotta ed i cartelli fossero eliminati, introducendo cosi la libera concorrenza nell’economia.La legge ha introdotto un generale divieto di cartellizzazione, con alcune esenzioni legali che consentono specifiche intese.L’applicazione della legge attraverso un organismo indipendente, l’Ufficio Federale dei Cartelli, si è basata esclusivamente sugli aspetti concorrenziali, con esclusione quindi degli aspetti di «interesse pubblico». L’unica eccezione è costituita dal potere di autorizzazione di cartelli e concentrazioni da parte del Ministro, che tuttavia vi ha fatto ricorso molto raramente.Nell’ambito di applicazione della legge sono rientrate non soltanto le attività dirette a limitare la concorrenza da parte dei privati, ma anche le distorsioni del mercato prodotte da interventi pubblici, come regolamentazione, sussidi e protezionismo. Negli anni più recenti, in particolare, la politica della concorrenza si è ispirata all’idea di modificare l’equilibrio tra settore privato e settore pubblico, riducendo quest’ultimo mediante deregolamentazione e privatizzazione.La legge tedesca riguarda essenzialmente quattro gruppi di limitazioni della concorrenza: accordi orizzontali, restrizioni verticali, abuso del potere di mercato e concentrazioni.Gli accordi orizzontali sono proibiti e, di conseguenza, nulli. Coloro che vi abbiano preso parte sono passibili di una multa che può giungere fino ad un ammontare pari a tre volte il valore degli utili così conseguiti. Si tratta, peraltro, di un criterio di difficile applicazione, essendo molto ardua la determinazione dell’incremento di utili ottenuto con un accordo.Una lacuna del sistema era costituita dal fatto di escludere alcune forme di collusione che a stretto rigore non rientravano nella categoria degli «accordi». È stato necessario emendare la legge, includendovi esplicitamente le «azioni concertate».Un secondo problema riguarda l’inclusione o meno nel concetto di «restrizione della concorrenza” dell’obbligo per le parti dell’accordo di mettere in atto comportamenti contrari alla concorrenza. Secondo l’interpretazione degli organi giudiziari tale obbligo si deve presumere.Per quanto riguarda le deroghe, l’Ufficio Federale dei Cartelli tende ad essere alquanto rigido.Per gli «accordi verticali», la legge tedesca, in contrasto con l’art. 85 del Trattato CEE e con la legge italiana, introduce specifiche regole. Essi sono, in genere, legali, con la sola eccezione degli accordi per la determinazione del prezzo, che sono proibiti di per sé, a meno che non riguardino il settore dell’editoria.Gli interventi per accordi verticali sono stati poco frequenti e, a quanto sembra, nella maggior parte dei casi tali accordi non dovrebbero essere stati influenzati dalla legislazione sulla concorrenza.Per quanto riguarda l’abuso di potere di mercato, il vecchio adagio statunitense vale anche per la Germania: le dimensioni non danno luogo, di per sé, ad un pericolo. Analogamente, una posizione dominante, come tale, non può essere ritenuta dannosa, anche se è ampiamente diffusa l’opinione secondo cui non debba essere consentito l’abuso di posizione dominante.Sotto il profilo applicativo, peraltro, bisogna identificare due fondamentali presupposti: una «posizione dominante” e un «comportamento abusivo».Il controllo del comportamento abusivo persegue, sia in Germania che in Italia, due obiettivi: impedire alle imprese dominanti di stabilire prezzi troppo elevati, realizzando profitti monopolistici (abuso di prezzi), e proteggere la libertà di competere delle altre imprese (pratiche restrittive).Per quanto riguarda l’abuso di prezzi, l’esperienza tedesca non è stata molto incoraggiante, soprattutto per la ben nota difficoltà nella definizione del «giusto prezzo».Hanno avuto maggiore successo, invece, i procedimenti nei riguardi di pratiche restrittive. Anche in questo caso non e facile applicare la normativa concorrenziale, specie per quanto riguarda i casi «marginali», come i casi di collegamenti tra imprese che non sembrano evidenziare comportamenti anti-competitivi.L’introduzione della regolamentazione delle concentrazioni è avvenuta in Germania soprattutto per le difficoltà nel perseguire gli abusi di posizione dominante. Diversamente dalla legge italiana, il sistema tedesco non prevede un minimo fatturato nazionale, ma fa riferimento al valore del fatturato nel suo complesso, dovunque sia stato conseguito.Notevoli difficoltà potranno derivare dalla definizione del concetto di «controllo». Dal punto di vista pratico sembra conveniente combinare le caratteristiche di flessibilità e certezza giuridica con una definizione generale che specifichi il maggior numero possibile di fattispecie.Le caratteristiche più significative dell’attività di controllo delle concentrazioni svolta in Germania sono l’effetto sospensivo della notificazione che precede la concentrazione e un criterio strettamente concorrenziale. L’esperienza dimostra che è molto difficile far venir meno una concentrazione, una volta che sia stata effettuata. Per questo motivo si richiede che le concentrazioni che eccedono una determinata soglia siano comunicate in anticipo.Sebbene l’Ufficio Federale dei Cartelli abbia a disposizione quattro mesi per completare la sua investigazione, circa i tre quarti delle procedure sono completate entro quattro settimane.Vi è una netta distinzione di compiti tra l’Ufficio Federale dei Cartelli e il Ministro dell’Economia. Il primo si occupa degli aspetti strettamente inerenti alla concorrenza, senza tener conto degli altri benefici che possono derivare dalla concentrazione. Il Ministro, invece, per considerazioni d’interesse pubblico, può autorizzare una concentrazione che l’Ufficio Federale dei Cartelli aveva bloccato. Sino ad ora (dal 1973) soltanto sei autorizzazioni sono state concesse dal Ministro e non sembra che esse abbiano dato luogo ai risultati positivi che erano attesi.
2
Warlouzet, Laurent. "La politica di concorrenza comunitaria: un successo tardivo (1950-1989)." MEMORIA E RICERCA, no. 30 (July 2009): 17–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/mer2009-030002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
- This articles shows that the development of the European Competition Policy was both progressive and based on a supranational dynamic. Whereas important powers were devoted to the European institutions in this field in the Treaties of Paris (1951) and Rome (1957) and in an important regulation of 1962, the Commission was not able to create a strong Competition Policy in those years. However, these decisions were important to lay the basis of the strengthening of the Commission's powers in the Eighties. This confirms the historical institutionalism of Paul Pierson. The strengthening of the European Competition Policy stems from a supranational dynamic as it is based on the Commission's initiatives, the Court of Justice's ruling and on the activism of European companies. The Commission couldn't control the whole process but it was able to take advantage of a favorable environment to strengthen its powers in the Eighties. This process has eventually peaked in the 1989 merger regulation.Parole chiave: Politica di concorrenza, Intese, Cartelli, Commissione europea, Corte di Giustizia delle Comunitŕ europee, Atto unico europeo Competition Policy, Ententes, Cartels, European Commission, Court of Justice of the European Community, Single European Act
3
Bertilorenzi, Marco. "La strutturazione del commercio mondiale dell'alluminio Tecnologia, traders e cartelli (1886-1914)." ITALIA CONTEMPORANEA, no. 282 (December 2016): 90–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/ic2016-282005.
Повний текст джерела
4
Cavallo, Jo Ann, and Alessandro Napoli. "Il racconto e i colori: "storie" e "cartelli" dell'Opera dei Pupi catanese." Italica 81, no. 1 (April 1, 2004): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/27668884.
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5
Charrier, Guy. "Parallèle entre la loi italienne pour la protection de la concurrence et le système français." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 8, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907345045.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract La nuova legge italiana per la protezione della concorrenza e del mercato presenta una notevole analogia, sia nei concetti che nei principali meccanismi applicativi, con le principali legislazioni dei Paesi membri della CEE e soprattutto con quelle che sono state introdotte negli anni più recenti.Il campo d’applicazione riguarda, almeno in principio, tutti i settori di attività, sia nel sistema italiano che in quello francese, poiché nessuna deroga è prevista, salvo per alcune particolari attività, come gli audio-visivi, la stampa, le banche e le assicurazioni.Questa estensione del campo di applicazione della legislazione si spiega con il fatto che essa riguarda tutte le pratiche anti-concorrenziali che vadano a detrimento del buon funzionamento del mercato e che tali pratiche siano suscettibili di provenire da tutti gli operatori economici.In Francia, peraltro, vige una distinzione tra comportamenti diretti a falsare il mercato, e che ricadono sotto le categorie di cartelli e di abuso di posizione dominante, di cui si occupa il Consiglio della concorrenza, e le pratiche restrittive, come il rifiuto di vendere, la subordinazione delle vendite, le discriminazioni e l’imposizione di prezzi, che sono di competenza dei tribunali perché in principio riguardano soltanto i rapporti tra imprese.Un secondo aspetto riguarda l’applicazione delle regole della concorrenza alle persone pubbliche. In principio, le disposizioni della legge italiana circa le imprese pubbliche (art. 8) e quelle della legge francese (art. 53) rispondono soltanto in parte alla questione. Nel diritto francese, quando una persona pubblica agisce da privato, è sottoposta alle leggi che riguardano il comportamento dei privati. Una difficoltà sorge, invece, quando questa persona pubblica, agendo nell’ambito dei suoi poteri, genera sul mercato effetti che danneggiano la concorrenza. Una recente sentenza del Tribunale dei conflitti ha concluso che le regole della concorrenza non si applicano alle persone pubbliche se non nella misura in cui esse diano luogo ad attività di produzione (di distribuzione o di servizi).La legge italiana non dà alcuna definizione del concetto di concorrenza nè dà alcun elemento che ne consenta la giustificazione economica. Altrettanto avviene con la legge vigente in Francia, ove sono i testi delle decisioni che forniscono indicazioni al riguardo.Il principio generate del divieto dei cartelli, come anche l’elenco dei casi suscettibili di costituire intese di carattere anti-concorrenziale, sono presentati in modo molto simile sia nella legge italiana che in quella francese. Ambedue riprendono, d’altronde, la formulazione dell’art. 85 del Trattato di Roma.Tutto fa pensare che l’Autorità italiana si troverà di fronte a casi analoghi a quelli di cui si è in varie occasioni occupato il Consiglio della concorrenza francese: cartelli orizzontali (accordi sui prezzi, sulla ripartizione dei mercati, sull’esclusione di un’impresa del mercato, ecc.); intese verticali (risultanti da accordi tra un produttore ed i suoi distributori nell’ambito di contratti di distribuzione selettiva o esclusiva); imprese comuni (la cui creazione può rientrare nel campo della proibizione di cartelli o costituire un’operazione di concentrazione); intese tra imprese appartenenti allo stesso gruppo (nel quadro dei mercati pubblici, il Consiglio ha ritenuto che non sia contrario alle norme concorrenziali, per imprese con legami giuridici o finanziari, rinunciare alla loro autonomia commerciale e concertarsi per rispondere a delle offerte pubbliche).Sull’abuso di posizione dominante, così come per i cartelli, i due sistemi italiano e francese presentano molte somiglianze. Tuttavia, contrariamente al diritto francese ed a quello tedesco, nella legislazione italiana non si fa alcun riferimento alle situazioni di «dipendenza economica». Peraltro, l’identificazione di questo caso è alquanto complessa e, sinora, il Consiglio non ha rilevato alcun caso che rientri nello sfruttamento abusivo di una situazione di dipendenza economica. Pertanto, si può forse concludere che il legislatore italiano sia stato, a questo riguardo, più saggio di quello francese. Più in generale, per quanto riguarda i casi di abuso di posizione dominante, il Consiglio deBa concorrenza ha seguito un’impostazione piuttosto tradizionalista.Anche sul controllo delle concentrazioni, il testo della legge italiana richiama quello francese e anche quello della normativa comunitaria, pur se è diversa la ripartizione delle competenze tra Autorità incaricata della concorrenza e Governo. Nella legge italiana, d’altra parte, vi sono delle norme relative alla partecipazione al capitale bancario che fanno pensare ad un dibattito molto vivo su questo tema.I livelli «soglia” per l’obbligo di notifica delle concentrazioni sono più elevati in Francia. Bisognerà poi vedere con quale frequenza il Governo italiano farà ricorso all’art. 25, che gli conferisce il potere di fissare criteri di carattere generale che consentono di autorizzare operazioni di concentrazione per ragioni d’interesse generale, nel quadro dell’integrazione europea.L’interesse delle autorità amministrative francesi nei riguardi delle concentrazioni, che un tempo era molto limitato, è divenuto più intenso negli anni più recenti, anche se i casi di divieto di concentrazioni sono stati sinora molto limitati.In conclusione, si può ricordare che un organismo competente in materia di protezione della concorrenza ha un triplice compito: pedagogico (attraverso la pubblicazione delle decisioni, delle motivazioni e delle ordinanze su questioni di carattere generale e sui rapporti attinenti al funzionamento del mercato), correttivo (per distogliere gli operatori economici da comportamenti anti-concorrenziali) e, infine, dissuasivo (poiché l’esperienza di applicazione delle leggi relative alla concorrenza dimostra che la loro efficacia dipende in modo decisivo dalla comminazione di sanzioni).
6
Kinnucan, Henry W. "Price Bargaining Without Supply Control." Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 24, no. 1 (April 1995): 119–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1068280500003671.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Primary food producers are permitted to bargain as a group for higher prices. Supply response, however, is critical to the long-run success of producer cartels. This article presents a model that elucidates that role of supply response in agricultural price bargaining when no overt action is taken to limit quantity and participation in the cartel is voluntary. Free-riding, for example, is seen as having a dual nature: it undermines the cartel's influence at the negotiating table but it enhances the cartel's ability to sustain a negotiated price increase by attenuating supply response. That price bargaining can result in significant transfers from processors to producers when demand is inelastic and supply is uncontrolled is highlighted in the empirical application.
7
Albano, Gian Luigi, and Maria Grazia Santocchia. "A case study on bid rigging in centralized procurement of audit consulting services in Italy." Journal of Public Procurement 22, no. 2 (March 17, 2022): 145–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jopp-08-2021-0050.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose The aim of this case study is to review the in-depth (and successful) investigation carried out in 2016 by the Italian Competition Authority [Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (AGCM)] on a nation-wide (multi-lot) framework agreement for consulting services. We also critically assess the tender design and emphasize which dimensions may have facilitated the uncovered anticompetitive agreement. Design/methodology/approach The case study borrows from the official Antitrust Authorities’ findings and from the tender documents to paint a comprehensive picture of the cartel’s strategy. Findings The case study emphasizes that AGCM’s the “conjectured logic” of the cartel’s behaviour (endogenous evidence) did coincide with those pieces of evidence seized by police forces for criminal crimes at the cartel members’ premises (exogeneous evidence). This infrequent feature of bidding rings investigations underlines the importance of theoretical as well as practical analyses of cartels’ behaviour in public procurement markets. Social implications As the antitrust investigation was triggered by a confidential report sent by the awarding authority (Consip, the Italian national central purchasing body), the case study also emphasizes the importance of informal as well as formal co-operation between awarding authorities, especially central purchasing bodies, and competition authorities. Originality/value The case study belongs to a small set of applied research papers attempting at building a bridge between public procurement design, particularly of sizeable framework agreements, and the mechanisms devised by cartels to “game” procurement procedures. All this is accomplished by looking at all design dimensions that were exploited by cartel’s members.
8
Wang-Toutain, Françoise. "Book Review: The Five-Colored Clouds of Mount Wutai: Poems from Dunhuang, written by Mary Anne Cartelli." T’oung Pao 100, no. 4-5 (April 10, 2014): 512–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685322-10045p08.
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9
Hyytinen, Ari, Frode Steen, and Otto Toivanen. "An Anatomy of Cartel Contracts." Economic Journal 129, no. 621 (January 8, 2019): 2155–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12633.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract We study the contracts of 898 legal Finnish cartels. Cartels that exclusively allocate markets, either geographically or in the product/production space, are dominant in manufacturing. They are often bilateral and include a vertical dimension. Structural industry characteristics predict the type of a cartel, e.g., consistent with theory, quota cartels are more common in manufacturing and when buyers are primarily industrial. The contracts of quota cartels include more (governance) clauses. Pure pricing cartels are the dominant cartel type in non-manufacturing and are more common when demand is primarily from retail buyers. Pricing cartels are larger than other types of cartels.
10
MacCulloch, Angus. "The “Public” Wrong of Cartels and the Article 101 TFEU “Object Box”." Antitrust Bulletin 65, no. 3 (June 3, 2020): 361–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x20929120.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The criminalization of cartel behavior in the UK turned attention to the criminal wrong at the heart of cartels. An understanding of the true nature of the cartel problem can also be used to develop a better understanding of Art 101 TFEU. This article uses the literature on the wrongfulness of cartels to examine how cartel behavior has the “object” of restricting competition within the terms of Art 101 TFEU. It pays particular attention to cases at the periphery of cartel behavior. The literature focuses on the importance of free markets as public institutions. Cartels are perceived as being a species of “cheating” which deserves opprobrium as it goes against the legitimate expectations of market participants. A reexamination of the cartel periphery cases involving information exchange and cartel facilitation using this lens shows a novel understanding of how these cases fit within the Art 101 TFEU “object box.”
11
Connor, John M. "Global Antitrust Prosecutions of International Cartels: Focus on Asia." World Competition 31, Issue 4 (December 1, 2008): 575–605. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2008046.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
International cartelists today face antitrust investigations and possible fines in a score of national and supranational jurisdictions. This article aims at providing quantitative information about the size and impacts of international cartel activity in Asia and uses a sample of modern private cartels to evaluate the relative effectiveness of three prominent Asian antitrust authorities. The sample consists of legal and economic information on 433 international cartels detected in Asia and the rest of the world during 1990–2007.The need for assertive anti–cartel enforcement in Asia is demonstrated by the large affected commerce and economic injuries of known international cartels. Affected sales of detected Asian–region cartels combined with global cartels that fixed prices in Asia totals at least US$1.1 trillion in 1990–2007. The losses imposed on Asian consumers were at least $500 billion. While more than $45 billion in penalties has been imposed world wide, it is doubtful that such monetary sanctions can deter modern international cartels. Optimal cartel deterrence is frustrated by the failure of compensatory private suits to take hold outside of North America, a reluctance to act against global cartels, and the low fines in most Asian jurisdictions. Of the three selected jurisdictions, the Korean FTC has the best record of anti–cartel enforcement in Asia, but even the KFTC?s surcharges are recouping less than 15 percent of damages to its citizens. Without significant increases in cartel detection, in the levels of expected fines or civil penalties, or expansion of the standing of buyers to seek compensation,international price fixing will remain rational business conduct.
12
Williams, Mark. "Cartels and Collusion: Failing Competition Policy in Hong Kong." World Competition 28, Issue 3 (September 1, 2005): 313–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2005020.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Hard core cartels have received increased international attention since the 1990s from many developed nations and from international organisations, especially the OECD. Cartel-busting has become a priority for many competition authorities. Penalties have been substantially increased, with many jurisdictions introducing criminal sanctions including the possibility of imprisonment for individual executives who organise cartel activities. The general opprobrium visited upon cartels is not, however, universally accepted. The Hong Kong authorities have an ambivalent attitude to cartel activity that is driven by an ostensible ideological commitment to ``free markets’’ at all costs. The Hong Kong government has a politico-economic agenda that refuses to acknowledge the pernicious effects of cartel activity and, in any event, denies that cartels are a significant problem in the territory. This article seeks to briefly examine the recent trend towards tougher cartel enforcement internationally. Hong Kong’s cartel policy is then contrasted with international developments and critically analysed. Cartel activity in Hong Kong is described and explained. The future development of competition policy in Hong Kong is considered.
13
Shepherd, Simon. "Thomas Cartelli. Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the Economy of Theatrical Experience. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. xv + 241 pp. $28.95." Renaissance Quarterly 46, no. 4 (1993): 864–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3039053.
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14
Burnett, Mark Thornton. "Marlowe, Shakespeare, and the Economy of Theatrical Experience. By Thomas Cartelli. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991. Pp 241. $28.95." Theatre Research International 18, no. 1 (1993): 61–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0307883300017594.
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15
Crowe, Jonathan, and Barbora Jedličková. "What's Wrong with Cartels?" Federal Law Review 44, no. 3 (September 2016): 401–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0067205x1604400303.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Cartels have a significantly negative impact on economic welfare. Anti-cartel competition law–such as the provisions of pt IV div 1 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)–tries to tackle this negative impact through civil and criminal remedies. The prohibition of cartels is most commonly justified on economic grounds. However, reference is also often made to broader moral grounds for proscribing cartels–for example, it is commonly stated that cartels are deceptive, unfair or engaged in a form of cheating. This article advances a unified account of the moral status of cartels that integrates both economic and moral factors. It does so by emphasising the relationship of cartel behaviour to the moral duty to promote the common good. Cartels are wrong because they undermine the role of open and competitive markets as a salient response to an important social coordination problem in a way that leads to seriously harmful economic outcomes. This combination of factors supplies a robust justification for both civil and criminal sanctions in appropriate cases, thereby affording a principled foundation for the current framework of cartel regulation in Australia.
16
Iida, Takeshi. "International R&D formations and strategic environmental policy." Environment and Development Economics 25, no. 5 (June 1, 2020): 509–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x20000145.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractWe examine relations between strategic environmental policy, international R&D cartels and research joint ventures (RJVs), using a third-country model with Cournot duopoly. We indicate that forming an R&D/RJV cartel reduces governments' incentives to extract rent from consumers in the third country. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that social welfare under R&D cartels with full information sharing, i.e., RJV cartels, cannot surpass that under R&D/RJV competition, whereas forming an R&D/RJV cartel works well for environmental investment. Among the policy implications, we show that governments can maximize global welfare by collectively determining whether to allow R&D/RJV cartels.
17
Tuinstra, Jan, and Daan L. in ’t Veld. "Market-Induced Rationalization and Welfare-Enhancing Cartels." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 14, no. 1 (October 24, 2013): 189–202. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2013-0005.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract We show that incomplete cartels in quantity-setting oligopolies may increase welfare, without any efficiencies or synergies being internalized by cartel formation. The main intuition is that the cartel has an incentive to contract output and that the firms outside the cartel react to this by expanding output. If the outsiders are more efficient than the cartel firms, average production costs go down. We model collusion in a market structure with imperfect substitute goods. Even for relatively moderate differences in efficiency, total welfare may increase due to this market-induced rationalization, whereas the cartel remains profitable. We discuss why the effect can be relevant for sectors where new, superior products are developed. Because anti-cartel enforcement is costly, it is important for competition authorities to realize that not all cartels lead to a welfare loss.
18
MARCHANT, ALEXANDRE. "«FRENCH CONNECTIONS EN AMERIQUE LATINE »: aux racines des circuits contemporains de la drogue." Outros Tempos: Pesquisa em Foco - História 14, no. 24 (December 21, 2017): 137–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.18817/ot.v14i24.604.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Résumé: La continentalisation et la mondialisation du trafic de drogue dans les Amériques semble avoir débuté avec l”™émergence des grands cartels colombiens et mexicains dans les années 1980. Elles plongent en réalité leurs racines dans le systá¨me mis en place des années auparavant par les mafias marseillaises exportatrices d”™héroá¯ne dans le Nouveau Monde au temps de la French Connection. Du sud au nord du continent, des criminels français expatriés ont institué des réseaux, des itinéraires et des pratiques qui ne disparurent pas du jour au lendemain avec l”™effondrement de la filiá¨re française au début des années 1970. Bien au contraire, les cartels naissants de la cocaá¯ne ont cherché á intégrer d”™anciens trafiquants de la French Connection pour mettre á profit leur savoir-faire, avant de perfectionner leurs méthodes pour aboutir á de nouveaux équilibres entre Amériques et Europe dans le trafic international de stupéfiants au tournant des années 1980-1990.Mots-clefs: Trafic. Mafia. Cartel. «FRENCH CONNECTIONS NA AMÉRICA LATINA »: nas raázes dos circuitos contemporá¢neos da droga. Resumo: A continentalização e a mundialização do tráfico de droga nas Américas parecem ter começado com a emergência dos grandes cartéis colombianos e mexicanos nos anos 1980. Mas, na realidade, elas se enraizaram, muitos anos antes, no sistema implantado, pelas máfias marselhesas exportadoras de heroána no Novo Mundo, nos tempos da French Connection. Do sul ao norte do continente, criminosos franceses expatriados instituáram redes, itinerários e práticas que não desapareceram do dia para a noite com a queda da filial francesa no começo dos anos 1970. Ao contrário, os cartéis nascentes da cocaána buscaram integrar antigos traficantes da French Connection para tirar proveito de suas experiências, antes mesmo de aperfeiçoarem seus métodos, para alcançar novos equilábrios entre Américas e Europa no tráfico internacional de entorpecentes na virada dos anos 1980-1990.Palavras-chave: Tráfico. Máfia. Cartel. « FRENCH CONNECTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA »: at the roots of drug contemporary routes.Abstract: Continentalization and globalization of drug trafficking in the Americas seem to have begun with the emergence of Colombian and Mexican cartels in the 1980s. However, in reality they were entrenched many years before in the embedded system by the Mafias from Marselha which were exporters of heroin in the ”New World” throughout the period of the French Connection. From the south to the north of the continent, expatriate French criminals instituted networks, itineraries and practices, which did not abruptly disappear with the collapse of the French branch in the early 1970s. On the other hand, cocaine's emerging cartels sought to integrate former French Connection traffickers to take advantage of their experiences, before perfecting their methods to achieve new equilibrium between Americas and Europe with the international traffic of drugs during the years 1980-1990.Keywords: Traffic. Mafia. Cartel. «FRENCH CONNECTIONS EN AMÉRICA LATINA »: en las raáces de los circuitos contemporáneos de la droga. Resumen: La continentalización y la mundialización del tráfico de drogas en las Américas parecen haber comenzado con la emergencia de los grandes carteles colombianos y mexicanos en los años 1980. Pero, en realidad, se enraizaron, muchos años antes, en el sistema implantado por las mafias marsellesas exportadoras de heroána en el Nuevo Mundo, en los tiempos de French Connection. Del sur al norte del continente, criminosos franceses expatriados establecieron redes, itinerarios y prácticas que no desaparecieron del dáa para la noche con la caáda de la filial francesa a principios de los años 1970. Al contrario, los carteles nacientes de la cocaána buscaron integrar a antiguos traficantes de la French Connection para aprovechar sus experiencias, antes incluso de perfeccionar sus métodos, para alcanzar nuevos equilibrios entre Américas y Europa en el tráfico internacional de estupefacientes en el cambio de los años 1980-1990.Palabras clave: Tráfico. Mafia. Cartel.
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Spindler, Zane A., and Xavier de Vanssay. "A Public Choice Perspective on Cartels." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2000): 3–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569200x15665365495005.
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Abstract Like interest groups or clubs, cartels might be regarded as associations for voluntary provision of certain unique public goods. In some markets and some technological circumstances, such public good provision might provide a rationale for cartel survival where otherwise they might be expected to fail. There might even be circumstances in which cartels serve the ‘general’ or ‘public’ interest in the process of serving their own interest. In this case, anti-cartel public policy might be reassessed and based on distribution rather than efficiency grounds. The efficiency gains from cartels might then be dissipated by factional competition over distribution of such gains.
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Bos, Iwan, Wilko Letterie, and Nina Scherl. "INDUSTRY IMPACT OF CARTELS: EVIDENCE FROM THE STOCK MARKET1." Journal of Competition Law & Economics 15, no. 2-3 (June 2019): 358–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhz017.
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ABSTRACT This paper conducts an event study analysis to empirically assess the industry-wide impact of cartels. Using a sample of recent European cartel cases, we estimate the effect of the surprise inspection and final decision on the stock market value of cartel and noncartel firms. The overall effect of both events is negative for cartel members and statistically insignificant for noncartel members. However, the impact of the inspection is significantly negative for European noncartel suppliers and for noncartel suppliers in nonchemicals industries. This is consistent with the theory that cartels can create additional damages through positively affecting the performance of their competitors.
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Burnett, Mark Thornton. "Repositioning Shakespeare: National Formations, Postco-lonial Appropriations. By Thomas Cartelli. London & New York: Routledge, 1999. Pp. xi + 233. £15.99 Pb." Theatre Research International 25, no. 3 (2000): 297–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0307883300019787.
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Hennecke, Raphael. "Ein Erziehungskartell zur «Heilung der Geister»? Ludwig Erhards Bundeswirtschaftsministerium und die gescheiterte Wettbewerbsordnung der Konsumseifenindustrie von 1954/55." Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte 64, no. 2 (September 1, 2019): 187–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/zug-2019-0004.
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AbstractThis article deals with a case study from competition policy and decartelization in West Germany in the early to mid 1950 s. Whereas much research has focused on the discussions about the German cartel law of 1958 and its long process of formation, this article takes a closer look at the possibilities that Ludwig Erhard and his Ministry of Economics already had under the Allied Laws of 1947 that remained in place until 1957. This is demonstrated by a case study about the soap cartel of 1954/55. While Erhard and most of his civil servants were aware that this cartel would not be able to solve the soap industry’s problems, they still decided to push the Allied authorities towards approving it to demonstrate the inadequacy of cartelization. Thereby, they dealt a blow to those leaders of industry associations arguing against a strict ban on cartels. One of Erhard’s most influential opponents, Fritz Berg, had praised the soap cartel, which allowed more internal competition than simple price fixing cartels, as a model for future cartels and an example proving the disadvantages of a flat-out cartel ban. By letting the cartel fail under the conditions of a rapidly modernizing market instead of banning it, Erhard dealt a major blow to Berg’s argument. This way, Berg and his allies could not blame the failure of the soap industry on decartelization.
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Nix, Justin, Michael R. Smith, Matthew Petrocelli, Jeff Rojek, and Victor M. Manjarrez. "The Use of Social Media by Alleged Members of Mexican Cartels and Affiliated Drug Trafficking Organizations." Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 13, no. 3 (September 1, 2016): 395–418. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jhsem-2015-0084.
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Abstract Focusing on Mexican cartels and affiliated drug trafficking organizations, this article examines how self-proclaimed cartel members use social media to further the criminal activities of their organizations. Employing an open-source, intelligence-driven methodology, the authors identified, followed, and mapped the connections between and among 75 alleged cartel members over a period of 4 months. Results indicated that cartel members actively use Facebook to plan, organize, and communicate in real-time. These findings provide tentative validation to the utility of using open-source social media platforms to study the social structure and operations of Mexican drug cartels. Implications for law enforcement, homeland security, and the intelligence enterprise are discussed.
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Varga, Norbert. "The Practice of Supervisory Rights in Hungarian Cartel Law with Special Attention to the Duties of the Minister and the Legal Director." Krakowskie Studia z Historii Państwa i Prawa 15, no. 3 (September 29, 2022): 401–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.4467/20844131ks.22.027.16175.
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Hungary introduced provisions on cartels with the enactment of Act XX of 1931. To protect good morals and public interests, the Act regulated the tools of state intervention and supervision. This legal field was the summarization of the proceedings of cartel supervisory authorities, in which not only executive state bodies but also judiciary organs took part. The paper focuses on the development of the Hungarian cartel law, with special attention to the practice of the courts and the aims of the State related to the supervisory power over the cartels before the codification of the Hungarian cartel law. The main aim of the study is to put an emphasis on the tasks of the responsible Minister and the legal director, mainly by analyzing the related primary sources. The purpose of this study is also to explain the tasks of the responsible Minister after the Cartel Act came into force, and the demonstration of the practice related to the proceedings. The main question is what the functions of the supervisory authorities related to the cartels were. In connection with the legal director, I would like to illustrate his task as a representative of state interests in the mainly cartel-related lawsuits.
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Momtaz, Mahmoud A. "Revisiting the Imprisonment Sentence under the Egyptian Competition Regime." World Competition 40, Issue 4 (December 1, 2017): 637–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2017039.
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This article addresses the Egyptian competition regime’s adoption of type II errors (under enforcement) in hardcore cartel cases. This article provides an analysis of the Egyptian Cement Cartel Case, and draws general conclusions drawn from it. This article explores the extent to which the fine imposed in the aforementioned case (the maximum fine at the time) was sufficient enough to recoup the cartel’s overcharges and to create the necessary deterrence effect for future anticompetitive practices in general and from creating cartels in particular. This article further explores an alternative approach to addressing concerns about the adequacy of a fine sentence in light of the applicability of an imprisonment sanction impeded within the Egyptian Penal Code. Moreover, this article examines the limits of this alternative approach, and how it could be practically enforced by Egyptian courts. Interviews with senior judicial figures in the Egyptian legal system were conducted to explore the applicability and limitations of the imprisonment approach. The assessment is not limited to qualitative data, however, but also encompasses quantitative data to further support the findings. As a result, it was found that imprisonment sanctions would eventually result in better enforcement policies. That is to say that fines were found not to be the optimal sanctioning mechanism since they are either extremely low or impossibly high.
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Quaid, Jennifer A. "Making Sense of the Shift in Paradigm on Cartel Enforcement: The Case for Applying a Desert Perspective." McGill Law Journal 58, no. 1 (January 7, 2013): 149–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1013388ar.
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Soon after the coming into force of changes to the criminal provisions in the Competition Act, the commissioner of competition signalled that cartel enforcement would start to reflect a new mindset, one that treats cartels as truly criminal. But while the impetus for this shift in paradigm is well-intentioned—to give effect to a stronger criminal law mandate following the amendments—it is poorly explained, because its defenders continue to refer to the predominant deterrence rationale used in competition law, even though applying a harm-based view of crime and punishment to cartels fails to explain why criminal enforcement is needed. I believe that applying a desert perspective offers a compelling alternative explanation for this shift toward treating cartels as truly criminal. Drawing on the work of Arthur Ripstein, I offer an account of cartel enforcement that focuses on the inherently wrongful disregard for competition that characterizes cartels. I argue that seeing cartels as a particularly serious misuse of the competitive system, one that is so fundamentally at odds with the notion of a competitive marketplace that it cannot be tolerated, is what justifies recourse to the consistent and uniquely public response of the criminal law. Seen in this light, bringing a more criminal law-oriented mindset to bear on cartel enforcement makes sense in way that this shift in paradigm does not when justified in deterrence terms.
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Putra, I. Putu Ari Santika, Ni Luh Made Mahendra Wati, and I. Nyoman Sutama. "Pengaruh Sistem Kartel terhadap Stabilitas Persaingan Usaha di Indonesia." Jurnal Preferensi Hukum 1, no. 2 (September 15, 2020): 116–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.22225/jph.1.2.2348.116-120.
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A cartel is an agreement made by a business actor with its competitors to gain excessive profits, which is stated in article 11 of Law No. 5 of 1999 concerning anti-monopoly and unfair business competition in Indonesia, the influence of cartels in business competition can cause unfair competition, damage market stability, and shut down competition in a particular market. The objectives presented in this study are to determine the forms of cartels that usually occur in limiting unfair business competition in Indonesia, and to determine the factors used by KPPU in identifying early indicators of cartel systems. This study uses a normative legal method with rationality which examines the influence of the cartel system on the stability of business competition in Indonesia, which appears to have experienced norm blur. The data source used in solving problems is the statutory approach. Literatures, journals and various related documents. The results of the discussion show that cartels have several types, namely regional cartels, production, prices, conditions, profit sharing, the influence of the cartel system in business competition which has a negative impact which causes unfair business competition, as well as harms various parties ranging from business actors, consumers, to the government. Then, in identifying the occurrence of cartels, there are several factors used by KPPU, namely structural factors consisting of the level of market concentration, number of companies, company size, homogeneity of goods or services, multi-market contacts, supply and production capacity, ownership linkages, ease of entry. specific market share, the character of demand. The next factor is the behavioral factor which is divided into two parts, starting from transparency and information exchange.
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Schinkel, Maarten Pieter. "Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe." World Competition 30, Issue 4 (December 1, 2007): 539–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2007038.
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The European Commission has made clear in a number of recent publications that undertakings that collude to fix prices or share markets should expect fines based on affected commerce, as well as private antitrust damage claims. Research on discovered cartels characterises a modern international cartel in terms of illegal gains, duration of the infringement and success on appeal. This article offers a back-of-the-envelope calculation into the net effective (expected) liability of a representative modern international cartel in Europe. To that end, the history of European cartel enforcement is surveyed in summary statistics. The exercise leads to the conclusion that the European Commission’s recent commitments to punishing cartels are likely to remain insufficient to deter collusion, unless European enforcement also produces a high (perceived) probability of discovery across the board. This calls for active cartel detection.
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Stephan, Andreas. "An empirical evaluation of the normative justifications for cartel criminalisation." Legal Studies 37, no. 4 (December 2017): 621–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lest.12165.
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A growing number of jurisdictions treat ‘hardcore’ cartel conduct as crime, in the belief that the threat of incarceration is necessary for deterrence. The significant economic harm caused by cartels is generally undisputed, but there is disagreement over whether cartel conduct is morally offensive enough to justify criminalisation. Critics argue that it is another example of ‘over-criminalisation’, seeking to regulate an activity that is morally ambiguous. Those in favour have sought to formulate normative justifications for why cartel conduct should be crime. Many of these rely on the assumption that members of society expect markets to be competitive and believe cartels are undesirable. This paper makes a significant contribution by testing this question empirically. Public surveys from the UK, Germany, Italy and the US are used to critically analyse the extent to which normative justifications for cartel conduct have empirical backing.
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Andrews, Susan. "The Five-Colored Clouds of Mount Wutai: Poems from Dunhuang. By Mary Anne Cartelli . Leiden: Brill, 2013. xii, 224 pp. $122.00 (cloth)." Journal of Asian Studies 73, no. 3 (August 2014): 804–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021911814000710.
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Colby, Darren. "Chaos from order: a network analysis of in-fighting before and after El Chapo’s arrest." Connections 41, no. 1 (January 1, 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.21307/connections-2021.023.
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Abstract The effect of leadership decapitation—the capture or killing of the leader of an armed group—on future violence has been studied with competing conclusions. In Mexico, leadership decapitation has been found to increase violence and in-fighting among drug cartels. However, the causal pathways between leadership decapitation and in-fighting are unclear. In this article, it is hypothesized that leadership decapitation will weaken alliances between armed actors, lead to greater preferential attachment in networks of cartels and militias, and result in greater transitive closure as cartels seek to expand their power. These hypotheses are tested with a stochastic actor oriented model on a network dataset of episodes of infighting among cartels and the militias formed to opposed them between the five years before and after Joaquín, “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, the former leader of the Sinaloa Cartel, was arrested in 2016. The results show that alliances have virtually no effect on the decision of cartels and militias to fight each other; weaker organizations faced a higher reputational cost after El Chapo’s detention; and post-arrest cartel in-fighting did not increase as a result of uncertainty about the relative balance of power among cartels.
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Howe, Martin. "Reflections on the Italian Law for the Protection of Competition and the Market." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 8, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 135–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907345081.
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Abstract La nuova legge italiana per la protezione della concorrenza e del mercato è oggetto di grande interesse nel Regno Unito, a motivo dell’intenzione del governo di modificare il sistema britannico di regolamentazione della concorrenza, soprattutto per quanto riguarda i cartelli.La nuova legge deve ancora essere presentata, ma un libro bianco è stato preparato dal governo.La necessità di cambiare la legislazione al riguardo è emersa, in parte, perché essa è piuttosto antica (la prima legge è del 1948) e per vari aspetti inefficace, ed in parte per la difficoltà di conciliarla con la regolamentazione comunitaria.L’industria britannica teme che la diversità tra sistema nazionale e sistema comunitario di tutela della concorrenza possa tradursi in procedure concorrenti e con risultati discordanti, cosa che metterebbe in svantaggio le imprese britanniche rispetto a quelle degli altri partners comunitari.È rimarchevole il fatto che la legge italiana sia non soltanto modellata sulla base della legge comunitaria, ma che essa affermi che la legge nazionale non sarà applicata quando la Comunità europea abbia giurisdizione.Nel Regno Unito, invece, si insiste sulla possibilità di compiere indagini a livello nazionale, pur accettando il primato della legislazione comunitaria, in caso di contrasto. Si ammette che pratiche o accordi vietati dalla Commissione non possono essere consentiti, ma si sostiene che possono essere vietati, a livello nazionale, accordi e pratiche ammessi a livello comunitario.Peraltro, l’apparentemente chiara distinzione contenuta nella legge italiana tra i compiti della legislazione nazionale e quelli della legislazione comunitaria rischia di venir meno tutte le volte che i due ordinamenti interpreteranno le leggi in modo diverso. Questa possibility era stata alla base dell’opposizione del Regno Unito al conferimento alla Commissione europea della giurisdizione esclusiva per le fusioni di «dimensione comunitaria».Il sistema britannico è basato sul concetto di «interesse pubblico», che è per sua natura impreciso, anche se esso viene applicato in modo pragmatico e flessibile, cosa da non sottovalutare se si tiene conto del fatto che in questo campo le opinioni convenzionalmente accolte possono cambiare.Vi sono tuttavia numerosi vantaggi in un sistema che, come quello italiano, è basato su proibizioni, e di essi tiene conto il libro bianco governativo: dà messaggi più chiari alle industrie su cosa sia consentito, conferisce poteri investigativi più precisi all’Autorità della concorrenza e può anche stabilire sanzioni per comportamenti illegali, con possibili effetti deterrenti.L’Autorità italiana dovrebbe dare assoluta priorità alla eliminazione degli accordi decisamente anti-concorrenziali, come quelli diretti alla fissazione dei prezzi, alle domande ed offerte concordate, ed alla suddivisione del mercato. Si tratta di accordi che hanno raramente una giustificazione di carattere efficientistico o di altra natura.I cartelli su cui è necessario concentrarsi sono quelli di carattere orizzontale, mentre i cartelli verticali non sembrano rilevanti, almeno di regola. Pertanto, l’avere inserito anche i cartelli verticali nella legislazione italiana (conformemente a quella europea) complica molto il lavoro dell’Autorità (a motivo dell’intenso lavoro burocratico che ne conseguira) senza effettivamente contribuire alla tutela della concorrenza, che potrebbe in questo caso avvenire attraverso il ricorso alla categoria dell’abuso di posizione dominante.Per quanto riguarda le concentrazioni, sebbene quelle orizzontali siano il modo più semplice mediante cui si può giungere all’abuso di posizione dominante, bisogna riconoscere che esse costituiscono una parte molto controversa della politica della concorrenza. Vi è il problema di stabilire le dimensioni della concentrazione da sottoporre a controllo, nonché quello della prevalenza di altre considerazioni, attinenti, per esempio, alla promozione dello sviluppo regionale, rispetto ai principii della concorrenza.A proposito delle concentrazioni, bisogna distinguere il caso in cui le attività in questione siano esposte alla concorrenza internazionale da quello in cui non lo siano. In quest’ultimo caso, gli effetti delle concentrazioni devono essere esaminati con attenzione maggiore, per verificare se possano aver luogo benefici sotto il profilo di una maggiore efficienza o sotto altri aspetti. Si tratta, comunque, di valutazioni molto complesse, che non possono risolversi con una semplice formula circa il tasso di concentrazione.La repressione dell’abuso di posizione dominante è indubbiamente una parte essenziale della legislazione per la tutela della concorrenza. Tale è quindi anche nel Regno Unito, dove peraltro l’inesistenza di proibizioni rende difficile ottenere effetti deterrenti. Peraltro, un limite all’accoglimento del sistema previsto dall’art. 86 del Trattato CEE (così come del corrispondente articolo 3 della legge italiana) è costituito dalla difficoltà di definire l’«impresa dominante” e, ancor più, l’«abuso», con la conseguenza che si rischia di rendere ancora più difficile la vita delle imprese, che si troverebbero di fronte al divieto di compiere atti «illegali” che non sono precisamente definiti.Sebbene siano state numerose nel Regno Unito le indagini in materia di abuso di posizione dominante, nella maggior parte dei casi esse hanno condotto alla conclusione della loro infondatezza. È probabile che l’Autorità italiana abbia esperienze analoghe.Per quanto possano essere diverse, da Paese a Paese, le leggi sulla concorrenza e gli stessi ordinamenti, nonché i sistemi economici e sociali, è sorprendente la somiglianza tra i problemi che le autorità responsabili della tutela della concorrenza si trovano di fronte.
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Jablonskis, Martynas. "Strategic leniency: insights from game theory and empirical evidence." Vilnius University Open Series, no. 6 (December 28, 2020): 68–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/os.law.2020.7.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Strategic leniency signifies potential exploits of leniency that could generate detrimental effects. Leniency could be exploited in three distinct ways: (1) used to punish cartel deviator; (2) used as a cartel exit strategy; (3) used as a way to report false cartels hoping that rivals will be fined. Strategic leniency has roots in game theory and has been used in theoretical works on leniency. However, it is difficult to verify, whether firms actually conceive leniency strategically. The article addresses the problem by analysis of 42 cartel cases, investigated by the European Commission, throughout the years 2010–2018. We find some support for the strategic leniency, but evidence is more indicative, rather than conclusive. We also find that 2002 leniency reform in the European Union generated no immediate disruptive effect on pre-reform cartels. Besides the article argues for insufficiency of leniency to uncover cartels in a form of concerted practices, and spots a seeming legal gap: there are no legal rules in current Leniency Notice to prevent abuses of leniency. Overall, the success of leniency should not be overstated.
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Lessing, Benjamin. "Logics of Violence in Criminal War." Journal of Conflict Resolution 59, no. 8 (June 4, 2015): 1486–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022002715587100.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
What kind of war is Mexico’s drug war? The prominent “criminal insurgency” approach helpfully focuses attention on cartel–state conflict, but unnecessarily redefines insurgency as “state-weakening,” eliding critical differences in rebels’ and cartels’ aims. Whereas rebels fight states, and cartels fight with one another, to conquer mutually prized territory and resources, cartels fight states “merely” to constrain their behavior and influence policy outcomes. This distinction yields a typology with theoretical consequences: decisive victory plays an important role in most models of civil war but is impossible or undesirable in wars of constraint. Theories of criminal war must therefore explain how ongoing coercive violence can be preferable to pacific strategies. I distinguish two such coercive logics of cartel–state conflict: violent lobbying and violent corruption. Lobbyings' more universalistic benefits elicit free riding, so turf war among cartels should make it rarer than violent corruption. This prediction accords with qualitative and quantitative evidence from Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil.
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Lavoie, Chantal. "South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy: A Five-Year Review." World Competition 33, Issue 1 (March 1, 2010): 141–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2010008.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Five years since the adoption of South Africa’s Corporate Leniency Policy (CLP) in 2004, it is time to take stock. The CLP has proved a formidable tool for assisting the Competition Commission of South Africa in cartel enforcement. Few cartels were uncovered prior to 2004. Since then, major cartels have been dismantled and punished under the Competition Act, mostly as a result of increasing applications for immunity under the CLP. The CLP offers cartel members immunity from fines and from prosecution in return for information on the cartel. The stakes are high: only the first cartel member to approach the Commission gets immunity. The CLP sets out the framework and the conditions for being granted immunity. Recent amendments to the CLP, such as the addition of a marker procedure and oral statements procedure, have further enhanced the CLP’s attractiveness and reach. However, recent legislative amendments introducing criminal liability for persons involving their firms in cartel conduct are expected to affect the future of the CLP. This paper analyses the current provisions of the CLP and its impact on cartel enforcement. Finally, the scope for improvements and the future of the CLP will also be considered.
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Shastitko, A. "To Allow for Cartels?" Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 6 (June 20, 2015): 143–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2015-6-143-150.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Opportunities for cartels study within the context of comparative analysis of mechanisms of governance structural alternatives are shown. The correlation between cartels and horizontal agreements restricting competition is described. Characteristics of antitrust control regimes of horizontal agreements are identified. The Russian agenda for cartel deterrence is presented.
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Klimašauskienė, Danguolė, and Vincentas Giedraitis. "FIGHTING CARTELS: AN APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY POLICIES." Ekonomika 90, no. 1 (January 1, 2011): 39–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15388/ekon.2011.0.957.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The paper focuses on the theory and practice of antitrust action in detecting and deterring cartels and analyzing the development of the modern leniency policy. Drawing from game theory and following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel formation and sustainability and a statistical analysis of cartel prosecutions, our attempt is to show that leniency programs, accompanied by strong enforcement powers and effective sanctions, increase the inherent instability of cartels and therefore have proven to represent a functional and successful tool for detecting and punishing, as well as preventing the formation of anticompetitive agreements.
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Editorial, Editorial. "Primer Lugar: El sol en casa." Educación Química 5, no. 2 (August 31, 2018): 122. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/fq.18708404e.1994.2.66785.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p>Durante el XlII Congreso Nacional de Educación Química, celebrado en Cancún, Quintana Roo, en Noviembre pasado se celebró el concurso de carteles estudiantiles. Educación Química se comprometió apremiar a los tres primeros lugares con la publicación de su cartel. En esta ocasión recibimos puntualmente los carteles de ESIQIE yue ocuparon elprimero y el tercer lugares.</p>
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Barta, Zoltán. "Publication games: In the web of reciprocity." PLOS ONE 17, no. 10 (October 26, 2022): e0270618. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0270618.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The present processes of research assessment, i.e. focusing on one or a few, related, scientometrics, foster questionable authorship practices, like gifting authorship to non-contributing people. An especially harmful one of these unethical practices is the formation of publication cartels, where authors offer gift authorship to each other reciprocally. Here, by developing a simple model and a simulation of the publication process I investigate how beneficial cartels can be and what measure can be used to restrict them. My results indicate that publication cartels can significantly boost members’ productivity even if paper counts are weighted by the inverse of author number (the 1/n rule). Nevertheless, applying the 1/n rule generates conflicts of interest both among cartel members themselves and between cartel members and non-members which might lead to the self-purification of the academic publishing industry.
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Storli, Espen. "Cartel Theory and Cartel Practice: The Case of the International Aluminum Cartels, 1901–1940." Business History Review 88, no. 3 (2014): 445–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007680514000385.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The study of cartels is important to economists as well as business historians, but, on the whole, there has been little cross cultivation between the two academic fields. This article examines cartel theory developed by economists in the context of the historical case of international aluminum cartels in existence before 1940. By analyzing three basic theoretical questions—when cartels appear, when they break down, and when they are successful—in light of the empirical evidence of the aluminum industry, the article argues that economics and history, although they have very different approaches, can profit from using each other's methods when studying cartels.
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Green, Matthew N. "Subverting the Organizational Cartel: Explaining Cross-Party Leadership Selection in U.S. State Houses." American Politics Research 48, no. 4 (December 6, 2019): 475–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673x19892002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the U.S. House of Representatives, the majority party constitutes an organizational cartel that monopolizes the selection of chamber leaders. But in state legislatures, that cartel power is sometimes circumvented by a bipartisan bloc that outvotes the leadership preferences of a majority of the majority party. Drawing from an original data set of instances of cross-party organizational coalitions at the state level, I use statistical analysis to test various hypotheses for when these coalitions are more likely to form. The analysis reveals that party ideology does not adequately explain the violation of these cartels; rather, violations depend on the costs associated with keeping the party unified and the benefits that come from selecting the chamber’s top leadership post. This finding underscores the potential vulnerability of organizational cartels and suggests that governing parties are strategic when deciding how fiercely to defend their cartel power.
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Sushkevich, A. G., and V. S. Sokur. "Export Cartels: the Problem of Antitrust Regulation." Russian competition law and economy, no. 2 (August 20, 2021): 26–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2021-2-26-26-32.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The legal assessment of export cartels today is one of the most pressing problems in the field of antitrust regulation, including in relation to transnational markets. The authors analyze the essence of the export cartel phenomenon, judicial and other law enforcement practice in cases of export cartels, identify its characteristic features and propose ways to solve the problem, including in relation to the Eurasian Economic Union.
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Hyytinen, Ari, Frode Steen, and Otto Toivanen. "Cartels Uncovered." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 10, no. 4 (November 1, 2018): 190–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160326.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
How many cartels are there, and how long do they live? The answers to these questions are important in assessing the need for competition policy. We present a Hidden Markov Model that takes into account that often it is not known whether a cartel exists or not. We take the model to data from a period of legal cartels—Finnish manufacturing industries 1951–1990. Our estimates suggest that once born, cartels are persistent; by the end of the period, almost all industries were cartelized. (JEL D43, K21, L12, L13, L41, L60)
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Kunsch, David W., Karin Schnarr, and W. Glenn Rowe. "Effects of the environment on illegal cartel activity." Journal of Strategy and Management 9, no. 3 (August 15, 2016): 344–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jsma-09-2015-0075.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose – Using resource dependency theory, the purpose of this paper is to examine what elements in the business environment may be associated with the formation and continuance of cartels. Design/methodology/approach – The authors employ a unique data set of 148 cartel data points from the 1970s to 2008 which have at least one American company involved to quantitatively test causal relationships. The authors also interview key class action anti-trust attorneys for their views and opinions on the impact of these environmental factors on cartel formation and continuance. Findings – The authors find statistically significant relationships between the pursuit and maintenance of industry profits and the dynamism in the industry, and illegal behavior as represented through price fixing by business cartels. The authors find that in the attorneys’ opinion, it is also the pursuit of individual corporate profits and munificence that are associated with these cartels. Practical implications – This research furthers the understanding of organizational deviance which is critical given its impact on organizations, individuals, regulators, law enforcement, and the general public. Originality/value – This research is a first step in considering cartel activity in a way that encompasses external influences in a new and innovative manner and as a tool to help researchers and practitioners better understand how organizational deviance, as manifested through illegal corporate activity, can be anticipated, identified, and prevented.
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ROSA JUNIOR, JOAO DALLA. "Cartelas De Cores: Uma Proposta Metodológica." Modapalavra e-periódico 13, no. 28 (March 31, 2020): 74–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5965/1982615x13272020074.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
O presente artigo tem por objetivo propor uma metodologia de criação de cartelas de cores a partir da identificação das etapas de projeto. A proposta consiste em estabelecer a cartela como uma síntese da relação de variáveis que direcionam a seleção de cores por meio de critérios objetivos. A metodologia se apoia no diagrama do funil de decisões apresentado Baxter e demarca 3 etapas específicas: marca, tendências e tema-moodboard. As etapas são contextualizadas nas fases de pesquisa e geração de ideias e detalhadas de acordo com a prática de criação de cartelas de cores para o desenvolvimento de produtos.
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Ziarko, Łukasz. "Application of Association Analysis to Detect Collusive Behaviour in Public Tenders." Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica 6, no. 351 (December 15, 2020): 7–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6018.351.01.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The purpose of this study is to examine the conditions required for the application of association analysis in the identification of the collusive behaviour of contractors in public tenders. It also focuses on determining the values of the confidence and lift measures that will describe the rules specific to a tender cartel. Worldwide research has aimed to develop effective and easy‑to‑use screening tests to identify cartel cases in public procurement. The recent research focuses on price (its distribution, variance, range) and classifiers allowing for detection of contractors whose mode of operation deviates from that commonly observed. This study follows the direction of current research. The main results of the study include the confirmation of the applicability of the method for the detection of colluding entities and the determination of the value of the confidence and lift measures specific to cartel cases. The policymakers, law enforcement agencies, contracting authorities and competitors of the cartels can use the proposed method to eliminate or at least to limit the scale of the problem. The main shortcoming of the application of the results is the inability to apply them to cartels pursuing an avoidance strategy. Further research will be conducted to develop a conceptual application of association analysis to all cartel strategies.
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Na’aim, Mohd Safri Mohammed, Ramalinggam Rajamanickam, Muhammad Faliq Abd Razak, Nadzirah Idris, and Farhah Abdullah. "The Use of Leniency Programme in Detecting Cartels in Malaysia." Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 8, no. 2 (July 1, 2019): 226–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ajis-2019-0034.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract The cartel is regarded as a desease that inflicts on the open market economy. Whilst its presence is detrimental to the public, the most serious issue is its secrecy, which has posed a major problem to competition authorities all over the world. To address this, many countries including Malaysia have introduced a leniency programme for the detection of cartels by persuading their members to approach the authorities to admit involvement in the cartel activities and assist the authorities to expose other cartel participants. The objective of this paper is to conduct a study on the legal framework of the cartel and Malaysia’s leniency programme. The paper contains a detailed analysis of the Competition Act 2010 (Act 712) (CA 2010), the Guidelines on Leniency Regime (Leniency Guidelines) by the Malaysian Competition Commission (MyCC) and academic research in this area. The findings show that while the leniency programme is available under the Leniency Guidelines, data on leniency applications made to date are not available on the MyCC’s website. In addition, the MyCC’s decisions published on its website revealed that of six cartels that were found to have committed infringement, none had been first detected through the leniency programme. Therefore, the effectiveness of the programme has yet to be proven.
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Permata Budi Asri, Dyah, Raden Murjiyanto, Rooseno Hertanto, and Edy Sriyono. "Optimal deterrence: Exploring business cartels in Indonesia and their impact on the economy." Problems and Perspectives in Management 18, no. 4 (December 28, 2020): 504–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18(4).2020.40.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
A business cartel is a business that is carried out by business actors to obtain market power by regulating the market by fixing prices, for example, by limiting the availability of commodities on the market. This paper examines in detail business cartel practices in Indonesia, explores their impact on the economy, and analyzes KPPU as an unfair business eradication body. In so doing, this paper analyzes eight business cases in Indonesia to describe and evaluate the practices of economic cartels in the industry. Those cases were randomly chosen for different periods and different industrial sectors. Using a qualitative analysis method, it is found that business cartels, unfortunately, are still rather common practice in Indonesia. It is also found that business cartels harm economic development, citizens and customers, since they tend to be monopolistic practices so that the customers will have to pay high prices for limited commodities. In addition, KPPU needs to be reformed, and the amendment of current antitrust law also needs to be executed. Consequently, judges and lawmakers should understand the balance of business interest and public interest at the same time.
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Zachary, Paul, and William Spaniel. "Getting a Hand By Cutting Them Off: How Uncertainty over Political Corruption Affects Violence." British Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 (March 5, 2018): 457–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000746.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Criminal violence differs from other conflicts because illegal cartels primarily use violence to eliminate rivals rather than overthrow the state. However, politicians’ ability to influence cartel behavior remains unclear. This article argues that politicians alter the use of violence by setting their jurisdiction’s police enforcement levels, but that cartels can bribe politicians to look the other way. Because cartels are uncertain about politicians’ corruptibility, not every bribe is successful. Following an election, cartels must invest resources into learning politicians’ level of corruption. Cartels only increase their level of violence after successfully bribing political leaders, which implies that local violence levels should increase the longer parties remain in office. The study formalizes this argument and tests its implications using data on homicides and political tenure from Mexico. The results link incumbency to violence and suggest Mexico experiences an additional 948 homicides for each year of increased political tenure after holding an election.
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Velazquez-Moreno, E., M. S. González-Velázquez, and B. De la Peña-León. "Diseño y validación de material didáctico para una intervención educativa de enfermería en cuidadores primarios." Enfermería Universitaria 17, no. 4 (May 3, 2021): 390–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/eneo.23958421e.2020.4.787.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Introducción: El cuidador es una persona que en sí misma requiere cuidado, existe poca evidencia sobre la validación de material dirigido a cuidadores primarios de adultos en el domicilio.
Objetivo: Diseñar y validar el material didáctico de apoyo en una propuesta de intervención educativa de enfermería para mejorar el autocuidado de cuidadores primarios de personas con enfermedades crónicas no transmisibles.
Material y Métodos: Investigación metodológica para validación de diez carteles. Evaluación por cuatro expertos y diez cuidadores primarios. La investigación se desarrolló en cuatro fases: a) valoración de las necesidades en salud y determinación de los contenidos, b) elaboración de material didáctico, c) jueceo y validación técnica, d) validación con población. Se evaluaron los aspectos de atracción, comprensión, involucramiento y aceptación con un cuestionario dicotómico de ocho preguntas por cartel. Se calculó el coeficiente V de Aiken como indicador de aprobación. Se tomó el valor de 0.7 y superior como punto para la validación.
Resultados: En la primera ronda de evaluación por los expertos se modificaron tres carteles por su bajo coeficiente de comprensión-atracción y se reelaboró un cartel. En la segunda versión de los carteles se alcanzaron coeficientes superiores a 0.81. Sin embargo, los cuidadores puntuaron dos carteles con valores inferiores al estándar, por lo que luego de tomar su opinión al respecto se modificaron aspectos de diseño.
Discusión: Las recomendaciones de los expertos en el área y particularmente los intereses de los cuidadores primarios fueron la base para mejorar el diseño del material didáctico.
Conclusiones: Tras ajustar elementos de la atracción y comprensión de los carteles se concluyó que el Material Didáctico (MD) es adecuado para su implementación en una Internvención Educativa (IE) dirigida a mejorar el autocuidado de cuidadores primarios.