Книги з теми "Belief-disagreement"
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1
Sethi, Rajiv. Public disagreement. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009.
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2
The epistemology of religious disagreement: A better understanding. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
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3
Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution. Oxford University Press, 2018.
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4
Challenges To Moral And Religious Belief Disagreement And Evolution. Oxford University Press, 2014.
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5
Pittard, John. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190051815.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. This book contests this conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident religious (or irreligious) belief even in the face of persistent disagreement. Part I argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing highly sanguine approaches to disagreement that allow for an unproblematic privileging of one’s first-person perspective. According to the position defended in part I, justified confidence in the face of religious disagreement is likely to require that one have rational insight into reasons that favor one’s outlook. It is argued that many of the rational insights that are crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning but only through having the right sort of emotional experiences. Part II considers the implications for religious commitment of accepting the impartiality requirement favored by “disagreement skeptics.” Challenges are raised to the assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality rules out confident religious belief. But it is further argued that such a commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one’s favored form of religious life and might lead to normative uncertainty that would prevent rational engagement in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever.
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Benton, Matthew A., and Jonathan L. Kvanvig, eds. Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198849865.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This volume explores many issues at the intersection of the epistemology of disagreement and religious epistemology. Epistemological questions about the significance of disagreement have advanced in concert with broader developments in social epistemology concerning testimony, the nature of expertise and epistemic authority, the role of institutions, group belief, and epistemic injustice, among others. During this period, related issues in the epistemology of religion have re-emerged as worthy of new consideration, and available to be situated with new conceptual tools. Does disagreement between, and within, religions, challenge the rationality of religious commitment? How should religious adherents think about exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist frameworks as applied to religious truth, or to matters of salvation or redemption? This volume engages in careful reflection on religious diversity and disagreement, offering ways to balance epistemic humility with personal conviction. Recognizing the place of religious differences in our social lives, it provides renewed efforts at how best to think about truths concerning religion.
7
Moss, Sarah. Knowledge and belief. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0008.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This chapter uses probabilistic knowledge to defend compelling positions in contemporary epistemological debates. The chapter starts by developing a knowledge norm for probabilistic belief and applying this norm to debates about what you should believe when you find out that you disagree with an epistemic peer. By contrast with existing views of peer disagreement, the knowledge norm defended in this chapter can yield the intuitive verdict that disagreeing epistemic peers should adopt imprecise credences, thereby suspending judgment about probabilistic contents that they disagree about. Probabilistic knowledge is also used in this chapter to give a theory of knowledge by statistical inference, as well as to defend dogmatism about perceptual knowledge from a wide range of recent objections.
8
Alexander, Joshua. Making Sense of Disagreement. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2018.
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9
Alexander, Joshua. Making Sense of Disagreement. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 2018.
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10
Frances, Bryan. Disagreement. Polity Press, 2014.
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11
Disagreement. Polity Press, 2014.
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12
Disagreement. Polity Press, 2014.
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13
Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2019.
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14
Fully Informed Reasonable Disagreement and Tradition Based Perspectivalism. Peeters Publishers & Booksellers, 2016.
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15
Kraft, James. Epistemology of Religious Disagreement: A Better Understanding. Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
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16
Moss, Sarah. The case for probabilistic contents. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.003.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This chapter develops and defends the thesis that we can believe probabilistic contents. Probabilistic contents are not merely propositions about probabilities; rather, they are sets of probability spaces over propositions. For example, you have .6 credence that Jones smokes just in case you believe a certain set of probability spaces, namely those that assign .6 probability to Jones smoking. A central question of this chapter is why we should think that credences are beliefs in probabilistic contents, as opposed to attitudes of degreed belief in propositions. The answer is that the contents of belief are the objects that play various theoretical roles, such as explaining rational action, grounding relations of disagreement between subjects, and grounding relations of consistency and entailment between beliefs—and probabilistic contents do in fact play each of these roles.
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Shafer-Landau, Russ, ed. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198805076.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This series is devoted to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersection of ethical theory and metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The chapters included in the series provide a basis for understanding recent developments in the field. Chapters in this 12th volume cover moral imperatives as bodily imperatives; difficult cases and the epistemic justification of moral belief; moral testimony; non-naturalism and supervenience; the grounding argument against non-reductive moral realism; moral law; the puzzle of moral science; disagreement; normative language in context; using Frege–Geach to illuminate expressivism; expressivism and varieties of normality; and the predicament of choice.
18
Skipper, Mattias, and Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, eds. Higher-Order Evidence. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829775.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
We often have reason to doubt our own ability to form rational beliefs, or to doubt that some particular belief of ours is rational. Perhaps we learn that a trusted friend disagrees with us about what our shared evidence supports. Or perhaps we learn that our beliefs have been afflicted by motivated reasoning or other cognitive biases. These are examples of higher-order evidence. While it may seem plausible that higher-order evidence should somehow impact our beliefs, it is less clear how and why. Normally, when evidence impacts our beliefs, it does so by virtue of speaking for or against the truth of their contents. But higher-order evidence does not directly concern the contents of the beliefs that they impact. In recent years, philosophers have become increasingly aware of the need to understand the nature and normative role of higher-order evidence. This is partly due to the pervasiveness of higher-order evidence in human life, for example in the form of disagreement. But it has also become clear that higher-order evidence lies at the heart of a number of central epistemological debates, spanning from classical disputes between internalists and externalists to more recent discussions of peer disagreement and epistemic akrasia. Many of the controversies within these and other debates stem, at least in part, from conflicting views about the normative significance of higher-order evidence. This collection brings together, for the first time, a distinguished group of leading and up-and-coming epistemologists to explore a wide range of interrelated issues about higher-order evidence.
19
Maunder, Chris, ed. The Oxford Handbook of Mary. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198792550.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The Oxford Handbook of Mary includes chapters on textual, literary, and media analysis; theology; Church history; art history; studies on devotion in a variety of forms: liturgy, hymns, homilies, prayer, pilgrimage, lived belief and practice; also cultural history; folk tradition; gender analysis; apparitions; and apocalypticism. These have been contributed by a range of scholars, established names in Marian Studies, writing about Mary the mother of Jesus from within their own expertise. The group is international in scope, from the three countries of North America; various nations in Europe; Jerusalem; Taiwan; Australia. As well as those of no religious affiliation, chapters have been written by Jewish, Muslim, and Christian academics, the last group including priests from within the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Anglican traditions. What is shared between everyone in this diverse group is a commitment to academic rigour as well as a special interest in Mary the mother of Jesus, who is known as the Theotokos, Mother of God. The Handbook looks at both Eastern and Western perspectives and tries to correct imbalance in previous books on Mary towards the West. There is also a chapter on Mary in Islam, and on pilgrimages shared by Christian, Muslim, and Jewish adherents. Mary can be a source of theological disagreement, but the emphasis of this volume is on Mary’s rich potential for inter-faith and inter-denominational dialogue and shared experience.
20
Vogt, Katja Maria, and Justin Vlasits, eds. Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190946302.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Pyrrhonian skepticism is defined by its commitment to inquiry. The Greek work skepsis means inquiry—not doubt, or whatever else later forms of skepticism took to be at the core of skeptical philosophy. The book proposes that Sextus Empiricus’s legacy in the history of epistemology is that he developed an epistemology of inquiry. The volume’s authors investigate epistemology after Sextus, both ways in which he has influenced the history of philosophy and ways in which he and the Pyrrhonian tradition he represents ought to contribute to contemporary debates. As a whole, the book aims to (re)instate Sextus as an important philosopher in these discussions in much the same way that Aristotle has been brought into discussions in contemporary ethics, action theory, and metaphysics. Sextus provides a fresh take on contemporary debates because he approaches issues of perception, disagreement, induction, and ignorance from the perspective of inquiry. The volume’s contributions address four core themes of Sextus’s skepticism: (1) appearances and perception, (2) the structure of justification and proof, (3) belief and ignorance, and (4) ethics and action. These themes are explored in some historical authors whose work relates to Sextus, including Peripatetic logicians, Locke, Hume, Nietzsche, and German idealists; and they are explored as they figure in today’s epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and ethics.
21
Moss, Sarah. Probabilistic Knowledge. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198792154.001.0001.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Traditional philosophical discussions of knowledge have focused on the epistemic status of full beliefs. This book argues that in addition to full beliefs, credences can constitute knowledge. For instance, your .4 credence that it is raining outside can constitute knowledge, in just the same way that your full beliefs can. In addition, you can know that it might be raining, and that if it is raining then it is probably cloudy, where this knowledge is not knowledge of propositions, but of probabilistic contents. The notion of probabilistic content introduced in this book plays a central role not only in epistemology, but in the philosophy of mind and language as well. Just as tradition holds that you believe and assert propositions, you can believe and assert probabilistic contents. Accepting that we can believe, assert, and know probabilistic contents has significant consequences for many philosophical debates, including debates about the relationship between full belief and credence, the semantics of epistemic modals and conditionals, the contents of perceptual experience, peer disagreement, pragmatic encroachment, perceptual dogmatism, and transformative experience. In addition, accepting probabilistic knowledge can help us discredit negative evaluations of female speech, explain why merely statistical evidence is insufficient for legal proof, and identify epistemic norms violated by acts of racial profiling. Hence the central theses of this book not only help us better understand the nature of our own mental states, but also help us better understand the nature of our responsibilities to each other.