Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Avoidance actions in insolvency proceedings"

Upon a request for a preliminary ruling on the articulation between Article 13 of the European Insolvency Regulation n° 1346/2000 and Article 12(1)(b) of Rome I Regulation, the Court of Justice of European Union has confirmed in a decision on April 22, 2021 that a payment made in perfor-mance of a contract by a third party is subjected to the law applicable to that contract and not to the law of the Member State opening the insolvency proceedings where the payment is challenged by an avoidance action. The decision raises some reflections on the correlation between the European Insolvency and Rome I Regulations as well as the effectiveness of avoidance action in insolvency proceedings.

AbstractWith the development of the internal market, the need to establish rules ensuring the protection of creditors in insolvency proceedings with a cross-border effect is increasing. Mechanisms at national level are difficult to provide the desired protection for foreign creditors. Since 26.06.2017 EU has a new Regulation 848/2015 which repeals the current Regulation 1346/2000. Despite the radical changes, it is attempting to implement this legislative act, the main objective of insolvency proceedings remains unchanged, namely, to achieve fair satisfaction of creditors. One of the mechanisms for the realisation of this objective are avoidance actions with international element for filling the insolvency estate. In view of the specifics of the procedure, the standard civil law mechanisms such as the Actio Pauliana are not impossible but are extremely inadequate and difficult to prove. In the practice of the Member States, many issues arise concerning the determination of jurisdiction and applicable law, creation of preconditions for the abuse in searching the most favourable legal system (forum shopping), there are differences in the so-called ‘suspicious periods’ and transactions concluded with affiliates. On this basis a fundamental jurisprudence of the CJEU has been enacted, the achievement of which will be the subject of this paper.

AbstractCross-border transactions and resultant legal proceedings often cause problems. One major problem is knowing which law should govern the transaction and any legal proceedings. Cross-border insolvencies in the EU are subject to the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings (EIR) but this legislation does not determine which substantive insolvency law rules apply in a given insolvency. There are many differences in the insolvency rules applicable in the various EU Member States and this has caused concern in relation to the avoidance of transactions entered into by an insolvent prior to the opening of insolvency proceedings. In light of this, the paper examines options to address divergence between national avoidance rules. One option, harmonization, is analysed as well as its possible benefits and drawbacks.

Only the harmonisation of laws is seen as being able to solve legal uncertainty resulting from legal diversity, but, notwithstanding the advent of the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, thus far there is no real harmonisation of insolvency laws in the EU. There are indications that the European Commission (EC) has been considering the formulation of a scheme for the harmonisation of the rules that apply in insolvency proceedings to permit the avoidance of transactions entered into prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings. On this basis this article identifies and analyses those factors that will need to be considered and addressed in the formulation of any harmonised scheme, as well as ascertaining the problems that these factors may cause in the construction of such a scheme. This is a critical issue, for it is all well and good to say that there should be harmonisation, but how that is done, what must be taken into account and what is included in any harmonised scheme is another matter and requires careful thought and consultation.

Only the harmonisation of laws is seen as being able to solve legal uncertainty resulting from legal diversity, but, notwithstanding the advent of the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, thus far there is no real harmonisation of insolvency laws in the EU. There are indications that the European Commission (EC) has been considering the formulation of a scheme for the harmonisation of the rules that apply in insolvency proceedings to permit the avoidance of transactions entered into prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings. On this basis this article identifies and analyses those factors that will need to be considered and addressed in the formulation of any harmonised scheme, as well as ascertaining the problems that these factors may cause in the construction of such a scheme. This is a critical issue, for it is all well and good to say that there should be harmonisation, but how that is done, what must be taken into account and what is included in any harmonised scheme is another matter and requires careful thought and consultation.

In February 2009, the ECJ rendered the Deko Marty judgment in which it decided that courts of Member States having jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings on the basis of the EU Insolvency Regulation also have jurisdiction to hear actions which derive directly from insolvency proceedings and are closely linked to them. The author discusses this judgment in the light of the recent trend of insolvencification: the policy to re-label company law provisions that aim to protect creditors by transforming these provisions into provisions of insolvency law.

In order to improve and accelerate the insolvency with cross border implications, theCouncil has adopted the Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 oninsolvency proceedings establishing the common norms on the jurisdiction, recognition andapplicable law in this area, European norm which does not harmonizes the national materiallaw systems in the area of insolvency, thus it can be identified significant differences at anational legislative level regarding the insolvency in relation to fundamental considerationsof politics, structure and content, in other words, there are not unique insolvencyproceedings, with applicability throughout the European union. Nevertheless we consider thata first step in the achievement of a legislative uniformity was already taken, at least regardingthe unity regulation of certain preventive proceedings which will allow the avoidance ofinsolvency of the debtor, mentioning in this respect Law No 381/2009 on the preventiveconcordat and the ad-hoc mandate, whose provisions are taken from the new code on thepreventive proceedings of insolvency and of insolvency, code which eases the directapplication of the Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000.

In October 2012, the United Kingdom Supreme Court (the Court), by a 4-1 majority, signaled a sweeping return to a more traditional approach to the enforceability of foreign judgments in avoidance in Rubin v. Eurofinance SA. The Court rejected the more liberal rule previously advocated by the Court of Appeal, which gave English courts discretion to allow enforcement of in personam judgments in avoidance where they were related to insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings. The central issue in Rubin v. Eurofinance was whether an in personam judgment, entered in default but made as part of, or pursuant to, insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings abroad could be enforced at English common law. The Court held that the American default judgment at issue in Rubin was not enforceable in English courts.

Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 (the Insolvency Regulation) is as a general rule based on the lex fori. The Regulation does however contain some exceptions to this rule. One of these is found in Article 13 that may be invoked in so–called avoidance actions.

Secured claims have priority over other claims in the event of debtor insolvency with respect to the distribution of the debtor’s encumbered assets. Numerous writings have discussed the necessity of security instruments in the context of growth and development of the economy. Credit is indeed necessary for the economy’s development, but, at the same time, credit is the cause of insolvency. This can be put another way: efficient credit develops the economy, while inefficient credit causes insolvency. The author argues on this basis that restriction of the secured creditor’s rights in insolvency proceedings means not less credit but more effective credit. A security-holder whose rights are limited is going to lend more responsibly and monitor the activity of the debtor more intensively and effectively, because the risk of loss would otherwise increase. Better monitoring should lead also to earlier intervention by the secured creditor in the actions of the debtor, which can be expected to increase the number of cases of rescue of debtors headed for insolvency. The author suggests the option of removing a small amount from the secured creditor and distributing it among the unsecured creditors to make the credit system more efficient and reduce injustice. Implementing this option would not harm the interests of the secured creditor as much as it helps to render the whole system more efficient.

La thèse intitulée « Les actions qui découlent directement de la procédure d'insolvabilité et qui y sont étroitement liées dans le cadre du règlement UE 2015/848 sur les procédures d'insolvabilité » se concentre sur les critères de détermination des juridictions compétentes en matière de litiges découlant de la procédure d'insolvabilité dans le contexte de procédures transfrontalières. Selon son Article 1(1)(b), les procédures d'insolvabilité sont exclues du champ d'application du règlement (UE) n° 1215/2012 (« Règlement Bruxelles ») et devraient être couvertes par le règlement (UE) n° 848/2015 ('Règlement Insolvabilité'). Pour cette raison, en principe, l'interprétation de deux règlements devrait, autant que possible, combler les lacunes réglementaires entre les deux instruments. Le texte du nouvel article 6 Règlement Insolvabilité prévoit désormais que les juridictions compétentes en vertu de l'article 3 du Règlement Insolvabilité soient compétentes dans le cadre de toutes les actions qui découlent directement de la procédure d'insolvabilité et y sont étroitement liées. Toutefois, ce principe (appelé la vis attractiva concursus « réduite » ), malgré quelques clarifications ont été fournies par la Cour de Justice, ne résoudra pas la question et l'interprétation du champ d'application du Règlement Insolvabilité par rapport au Règlement Bruxelles est encore douteuse, car il y a encore beaucoup de zones grises dans l'interprétation de cette règle. Le but de la thèse est d'analyser ce qui est attendu en matière de litiges découlant de la procédure d'insolvabilité et d'analyser les cas où il est controversé qu'elles entrent dans le champ d'application du règlement (UE) n° 848/2015 plutôt que dans celui du règlement n° 1215/2012
The thesis, entitled "Actions deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and closely linked with them under regulation EU 2015/848 on insolvency proceedings", focuses on the criteria for determining the courts having jurisdiction for disputes arising in the context of cross-border Insolvency proceedings. According to its Article l(l)(b), insolvency proceedings are excluded from the scope of Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 ('Brussels Regulation') and should be covered by Regulation (EU) No 848/2015 ('EIR). For this reason, in principle, the interpretation of the two regulations should, as far as possible, fill in the regulatory gaps between the two instruments. The text of the new Article 6 EIR now provides that any action with cross-border elements that prove to be 'directly deriving from Insolvency proceedings and closely linked with them' must be attracted to the jurisdiction of the Member State opening the insolvency procedure under Article 3 EIR. Nevertheless, this principle (referred to as the 'reduced' vis attractiva concursus), despite some clarifications provided by the European Court of Justice, does not resolve the issue, and the interpretation of the scope of application of the Insolvency Regulation and the Brussels Regulation's remains questionable, as there are still many grey zones in the interpretation of this rule. The aim of the thesis is to analyse what kind of actions should be regarded as 'directly deriving from' and 'closely linked with' insolvency proceedings, and to analyse those cases where it is controversial whether the action should fall within the scope of the EIR rather than the Brussels Regulation

La questione delle azioni individuali che derivano direttamente dal fallimento e ad esso ineriscono (nel seguito, c.d. “azioni ancillari”) nel contesto europeo è stata storicamente affrontata con riferimento all’ambito di applicazione della Convenzione di Bruxelles del 1968 sulla competenza giurisdizionale, il riconoscimento e l’esecuzione delle decisioni in materia civile e commerciale (la “Convenzione di Bruxelles”). In mancanza (all’epoca) di una disciplina comunitaria sull’insolvenza transfrontaliera, con la nota sentenza Gourdain, la CGE ha interpretato la nozione di azione ancillare sotto il prisma dell’esclusione relativa a “i fallimenti, i concordati e le procedure affini”, prevista dall’articolo 1(2)(2) della Convenzione di Bruxelles. È stato in quell’occasione che la Corte ha ritenuto che le azioni in qualche modo riferibili al fallimento sono escluse dal campo di applicazione della Convenzione di Bruxelles (oggi Regolamento Bruxelles Ibis) a condizione che esse derivino direttamente dal fallimento e si inseriscano stretta¬mente nell'ambito del procedimento concorsuale (così coniando quella che, negli anni, è stata definita la “Formula Gourdain”). Le incertezze interpretative derivanti da una formulazione così ambigua, allora riferita al solo ambito di applicazione della Convenzione di Bruxelles, non venivano rimosse (e, anzi, forse erano acuite) dall’introduzione di una specifica disciplina relativa alle procedure di insolvenza. Ed infatti, il successivo Regolamento (CE) 1346/2000 (il “Regolamento Insolvenza”), da un lato conteneva una grave lacuna normativa, poiché nulla diceva in tema di giurisdizione sulle azioni ancillari e, dall’altro lato, anche laddove le menzionava (per fini diversi dalla giurisdizione), si limitava a riprodurre la Formula Gourdain. Il nebuloso quadro normativo appena descritto è stato in parte chiarito dal Regolamento (UE) 2015/848 (il “Regolamento Recast”), che ha provveduto a rimediare alla predetta omissione, prevedendo espressamente la vis attractiva (dimezzata) europea, ai sensi della quale la competenza giurisdizionale sulle azioni ancillari spetta ai giudici dello Stato membro in cui è aperta la procedura. Se è stato così chiarito l’aspetto “dinamico”, relativo alla giurisdizione, resta, invece, parzialmente immutato il problema di una definizione autonoma di azione ancillare, i cui confini, anche nel Regolamento Recast, continuano ad essere delineati dalla Formula Gourdain. Indicazioni solo parziali possono trarsi dal Considerando 35 Regolamento Recast e, soprattutto, dalle pronunce della CGE, che pur consentendo, in parte, di avanzare una più definita sistematizzazione della nozione di azioni ancillari, rivelano sostanzialmente un orientamento ondivago, che non consente di rintracciare (ancora) un criterio generale, certo e condiviso sul punto. Si può allora ipotizzare che, ai fini della normativa europea, ancillari siano quelle azioni che sottendono una pretesa che sorge ex novo dal fallimento, il cui DNA, potremmo dire, è ontologicamente legato all’insolvenza. Si tratta di un numero assai ridotto di azioni quali (prevedibilmente) la revocatoria; le azioni di responsabilità nei confronti di organi della procedura, e le azioni che derivano dallo scioglimento dei contratti esercitato dal curatore per un’espressa previsione della legge concorsuale. Per contro, non sarebbero ancillari tutte le altre azioni rispetto a cui il fallimento si pone quale evento neutro (es. quelle che presentano con il fallimento un legame solo occasionale e quelle che preesistevano nel patrimonio del fallito). Permangono, tuttavia, notevoli dubbi rispetto a quelle azioni, collocabili in un’incerta twilght-zone, al confine tra il diritto civile, commerciale e il diritto fallimentare che, preesistenti al fallimento, sono in qualche misura influenzate dall’apertura di una procedura concorsuale. Nel solco di queste preliminari osservazioni, la tesi si ripropone di analizzare specificatamente il tema delle azioni ancillari nella disciplina europea, non solo indagandone gli aspetti processuali (in particolare, della giurisdizione), ma valutando anche una possibile individuazione di una nozione autonoma di azione ancillare e l’elaborazione di un catalogo di azioni che, pur nelle differenze proprie di ogni ordinamento nazionale, rivelino uno jus commune europaeum che consenta di inquadrarle nell’ambito di applicazione del Regolamento Recast.
Historically, the topic of individual actions directly deriving from and closely linked with insolvency proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Annex Actions”) has been addressed in the European scenario with reference to the scope ratione materiae of the Brussels Convention dated 1968 on the jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (the “Brussels Convention”). In the absence (at that time) of Community rules on cross-border insolvencies, in the Gourdain judgment the ECJ interpreted the notion of Annex Actions under the prism of the exception relating to “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings”, set forth by Article 1(2)(2) Brussels Convention. It was on that occasion that the Court held that actions which are related to insolvency proceedings are excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention (now the Brussels 1a Regulation), with the proviso that they derive directly from insolvency proceedings and are closely linked with them (thus coining what has been called, over the years, the “Gourdain Formula”). The interpretative uncertainties arising from such an ambiguous wording - at the time referring only to the scope of application of the Brussels Convention - were not removed (and possibly were even exacerbated) by the introduction of the European regime on insolvency proceedings. Indeed, the Regulation (EC) 1346/2000 (the “Insolvency Regulation”), on the one hand, revealed a serious regulatory gap, since it did not provide for a rule on the jurisdiction of Annex Actions and, on the other hand, even where it mentioned them (for purposes other than jurisdiction), it laconically restated the Gourdain Formula, with no further clarifications. The nebulous legislative framework described above has been partly clarified by Regulation (EU) 2015/848 (the “Recast Regulation”), which has remedied the aforementioned omission, expressly providing for the (halved) European vis attractiva concursus. According to that principle, the courts of the Member State in the territory of which insolvency proceedings are opened, are vested with the jurisdiction to hear and determine Annex Actions. The impact of the reform over the “dynamic” profile of the vis attractiva concursus must be positively assessed since it has dispelled many of the doubts concerning the allocation of jurisdiction on Annex Actions. Yet, the problem of the autonomous definition of Annex Actions remains partially unsolved, because also under the Recast Regulation, the contours of that concept continue to be defined by the vague Gourdain Formula. Only partial indications can be drawn from Recital 35 Recast Regulation and, above all, from the extensive case-law of the ECJ. The latter, however, allows only to some extent to draw a systematic notion of Annex Actions, as it substantially reveals a wavering orientation, which does not permit to trace (yet) a general criterion, certain and shared on this point. It is suggested that, for the purposes of the European legislation, Annex Actions are those actions underpinning a right or obligation which stems from the opening of insolvency proceedings, whose DNA, we might say, is ontologically linked to insolvency proceedings. They would count a very small number of actions such as (predictably) avoidance actions, liability actions against the trustee and other bodies of the procedure, and actions arising from the termination of contracts exercised by the trustee by virtue of the express powers conferred upon him by insolvency law. On the contrary, all other actions in respect of which the procedure is a neutral (legal) event should not be characterised as Annex Actions (e.g. actions that have only an occasional link with insolvency proceedings and those that existed in the legal sphere of the insolvent debtor prior to the opening of the procedure). However, considerable doubts remain with respect to the characterisation of some actions, which can be placed in an uncertain twilight-zone at the crossline between civil, commercial law and bankruptcy law. Although the legal foundation of those action exists even before insolvency proceedings, they prove to be affected by the opening of the procedure to such an extent that they may be considered as different actions. In the wake of these preliminary observations, the thesis aims to specifically analyse the topic of Annex Actions under the European regime of cross-border insolvencies. Not only it investigates the procedural aspects of the issue (in particular, the jurisdiction), but it also assesses whether it is possible to draw an autonomous notion of Annex Action and elaborate a catalogue of actions, which, despite the differences inherent in each national system, reveal a jus commune europaeum that allows to trace them back under the umbrella of the Recast Regulation.
La thèse intitulé « les actions qui découlent directement de la procédure d’insolvabilité et qui y sont étroitement liées dans le cadre du Règlement UE 2015/848 sur les procédures d'insolvabilité » se concentre sur les critères de détermination des juridictions compétentes en matière de litiges découlant de la procédure d’insolvabilité dans le contexte de procédures transfrontalières. Selon son Article 1(1)(b), les procédures d’insolvabilité sont exclues du Règlement (UE) n° 1215/2012 concernant la compétence judiciaire, la reconnaissance et l’exécution des décisions en matière civile et commerciale (« Règlement Bruxelles ») et devraient relever du champ d’application du Règlement (UE) n° 848/2015 relatif aux procédures d’insolvabilité (« Règlement Refondu »). Pour cette raison, en principe, l’interprétation de deux susmentionnés Règlements devrait, autant que possible, combler les lacunes entre les deux instruments. Le texte du nouvel article 6 du Règlement Refondu prévoit désormais que les juridictions compétentes en vertu de son article 3 soient compétentes également pour toutes les actions qui découlent directement de la procédure d’insolvabilité et y sont étroitement liées. Toutefois, ce principe (appelé la vis attractiva concursus européenne), malgré quelques clarifications ont été fournies par la Cour de Justice, ne résoudre pas la question et l’interprétation du champ d’application du Règlement Refondu par rapport au Règlement Bruxelles est encore douteuse, car il y a encore beaucoup de zones grises dans l’interprétation de cette règle. L'objectif de la thèse est d'analyser quel type d'actions doit être considéré comme « découlant directement » et « étroitement lié » aux procédures d'insolvabilité, et d'analyser les cas où il est controversé de savoir si l'action doit entrer dans le champ d'application du Règlement Refondu plutôt que dans celui du Règlement Bruxelles.

The thesis aims to reconstruct the procedural rules that apply whenever the simulation of contract becomes an issue within a civil proceeding.To this end, a different method is followed from that commonly used by the courts and in the scholarly literature, which have mostly deduced the content of these rules assuming, as a starting point, a certain solution to the problem of the nature of simulated contracts. The courts, that still adhere to the traditional doctrine of nullity of the simulated contract, state that the rules of the civil code dedicated to the action and the objection of nullity shall also apply to the action and objection of simulation. Part of the scholars, rejecting such premises, uphold interpretative solutions that are at odds with those supported by the courts. On the contrary, in this thesis, the legal notion of simulation is assumed as a starting point. Such a legal notion describes the set of facts that lead to a simulation of a contract and to the legal consequences set forth in articles 1414 and ff of the civil code; these facts are thus material to the process in which the simulation is an issue. Hence, the first part of the thesis (chapters 1 to 4) aims at framing the legal notion of simulation within the main categories of civil procedure, and starts from the definition of the legal notion of simulation by critically assessing the two main conceptions of the simulation phenomenon that emerge from the conspicuous literature on the subject: a “negative” conception, which sees the simulation as the lack of an essential element of the contract, and a “positive” conception, which sees the simulation as an agreement between the parties with the aim of excluding the legal effects of a contract between them (simulation agreement). The arguments in support of this last conception are set forth; after that, the question of the structure of the so-called “concealed contract” and the role of the simulation agreement on its formation and effectiveness is examined. The framing of the simulation in the fundamental categories of the process is then carried out through the observation of the legal effects that the simulation activity produces with regard to third parties, and the procedural classification of the substantial categories referred to in Articles 1415 and 1416 of the Italian Civil Code (in particular, unopposability). Finally, the objective scope of the process in which the ascertainment of the simulation of a contract is requested (action of simulation) is defined by critically examining the prevailing doctrine, according to which the said action aims at ascertaining the lack of a “contractual relationship”. Another doctrine is then examined, according to which simulation and nullity may be described as authonomous legal effects capable of being ascertained within a judgment having the force of res judicata. The second part (chapters 5 and 6) is dedicated to the discussion of selected issues of “procedural dynamics”, namely: a) the objection of absolute simulation, and the problem wether the judge may decide upon it ex officio in both the processes aimed at enforcing a simulated contract, and in those that aim, on the contrary, at the declaration of nullity, or at the annulment, rescission or termination of the same contract; b) the multiple facets that the issue of absolute simulation presents in the course of a forced expropriation proceeding undertaken against an “apparent owner”; c) the form of the concealed contract and the extent to which the simulants may prove a relative simulation by witnesses, particularly in the event that the relative simulation of the price of a sale contract is alleged as an objection to an avoidance action promoted by the bankruptcy trustee; d) the stading to an action of simulation; e) the objective scope of the res judicata in the same action.
La tesi mira a ricostruire la disciplina processuale della simulazione negoziale, ossia le regole concernenti l'attività compiuta nel processo dalle parti e dal giudice, ogniqualvolta la simulazione di un negozio giuridico sia oggetto di allegazione, prova e decisione (nella forma della mera cognizione o dell'accertamento). Si segue, a tal fine, un metodo diverso da quello comunemente impiegato dalla giurisprudenza e dalla dottrina, le quali hanno perlopiù dedotto il contenuto di tali regole a partire dalla soluzione di volta in volta prescelta al problema della qualificazione del contratto simulato. La giurisprudenza, muovendo dalla tesi della nullità del contratto simulato, conclude per la diretta applicabilità delle norme del codice civile dedicate all'azione e all'eccezione di nullità. Parte della dottrina, discostandosi da quella premessa, propone soluzioni applicative di segno opposto. Al contrario, nel presente lavoro, la centralità solitamente assegnata al contratto simulato, è occupata dalla simulazione, ossia dalla fattispecie degli effetti che gli artt. 1414 e seguenti designano quali “effetti della simulazione”. Detta fattispecie è infatti quanto forma oggetto dell'attività dei soggetti del processo (l'allegazione, la prova, la cognizione e l'accertamento). La ricostruzione della disciplina processuale della simulazione muove pertanto dalla collocazione della fattispecie simulatoria entro le categorie che informano il contenuto di quella disciplina, e cioè la qualificazione della simulazione come tema di prova, come questione di merito oggetto di mera cognizione, nonché, infine, come oggetto del processo e dell'accertamento munito di autorità di cosa giudicata. La prima parte della tesi (capitoli da 1 a 4) si occupa esattamente di tale inquadramento, prendendo le mosse dalla definizione della fattispecie simulatoria e dalla discussione critica delle due opposte concezioni del fenomeno simulatorio che emergono dalla cospicua letteratura sul tema: una concezione “negativa”, che vede nella simulazione una forma qualificata di difetto della fattispecie negoziale, e una concezione “positiva”, che ravvisa la fattispecie simulatoria in un negozio distinto da quello simulato (il c.d. accordo simulatorio). Enunciate le ragioni a sostegno di quest'ultima concezione, si prende in esame la questione della struttura del contratto dissimulato e del ruolo dell'accordo simulatorio sulla formazione e l'efficacia del medesimo. L'inquadramento della simulazione nelle categorie fondamentali del processo prosegue mediante l'osservazione degli effetti giuridici che l'attività simulatoria produce riguardo ai terzi, e l'inquadramento processuale delle categorie sostanziali richiamate negli artt. 1415 e 1416 c.c. (segnatamente, l'inopponibilità). Infine, si definisce l'oggetto dell'azione di simulazione, mettendo di fronte la prevalente tesi che detto oggetto fa coincidere con il rapporto fondamentale contrattuale, e quella minoritaria che addita le azioni di simulazione e nullità quali esempi di processi di accertamento di situazioni giuridiche preliminari. Si sottopone quindi a critica la tesi del rapporto fondamentale. La seconda parte (capitoli 5 e 6) è dedicata alla discussione di profili scelti di dinamica processuale, segnatamente: l'eccezione di simulazione assoluta, e il problema della sua rilevabilità d'ufficio nei processi diretti all'esecuzione del contratto simulato, nonché in quelli che mirano, al contrario, alla dichiarazione della nullità, ovvero all'annullamento, alla rescissione o alla risoluzione dello stesso contratto; le molteplici sfaccettature che presenta la cognizione della simulazione assoluta nel corso (o a lato) dell'espropriazione forzata intrapresa contro il titolare apparente; la forma del contratto dissimulato e l'ampiezza dei poteri istruttori dei simulanti che intendano dar prova della simulazione relativa, e per suo tramite del contratto dissimulato, particolarmente nel caso in cui la simulazione relativa del prezzo venga addotta per contrastare l'azione revocatoria promossa dal curatore fallimentare contro una compravendita immobiliare “a prezzo vile”; la legittimazione ad agire nell'azione di simulazione; i limiti oggettivi del giudicato di accertamento della simulazione.

THE TITLE OF THE DIPLOMA THESIS AND ABSTRACT TITLE: Transaction Avoidance in Insolvency Proceedings Comparison of Czech and British Legislation ABSTRACT: The general goal of transaction avoidance in insolvency proceedings is to prevent the adverse effects of economic entity's collapse that might be multiplied both by an interest of the collapsing entity to dispose the residual property to connected or associated subjects and by a plurality of creditors with conflicting interests and logical motivation not to be subjected to the mandatory rules of the insolvency proceedings. The current attitude and status of Czech legislation and jurisprudence to transaction avoidance is affected by the fact that within the socialism (and the related decadence of jurisprudence) this legislation could not sufficiently evolve which resulted in a situation that Czech legislation is currently dealing with multiple theoretical and practical deficiencies that neighboring legal systems have dealt with many decades ago. The main goal of this theses is to provide thorough analysis of both Czech and (with regards to the content limit of this theses) also the British legislation and to point out the most crucial deficiencies in Czech legislation and possible inspiration in the British legislation. The theses is divided into four...

Dissertação de Mestrado em Ciências Jurídico-Forenses apresentada à Faculdade de Direito
Os efeitos processuais da declaração da insolvência interferem drasticamente com a vida das ações em curso sendo que, muitas vezes, o destino dessas ações não está previsto na lei. As ações de impugnação de um despedimento ilícito, pendentes aquando da declaração de insolvência da entidade empregadora são um dos casos.A discordância a nível doutrinal e jurisprudencial é abundante, o que consequentemente levou o Supremo Tribunal de Justiça a pronunciar-se sobre a questão, fixando que a instância onde tais ações correm se extingue por inutilidade superveniente da lide com o trânsito em julgado da declaração de insolvência.O presente trabalho tem como objetivo analisar a questão em toda a sua dimensão, começando pelo Direito do Trabalho onde iremos explanar as características da ação de impugnação do despedimento ilícito e os direitos que essa ilicitude acarreta para o trabalhador. De seguida analisaremos o Direito Processual Civil para demonstrar que apesar da declaração de insolvência do empregador, ainda permanecem interesses juridicamente relevantes que justifiquem a continuação da ação a instância laboral. Por último, o Direito da Insolvência analisando a possibilidade de permanência da ação laboral, em questão, em paralelo com o processo de insolvência.Defende-se, assim, a possibilidade de o trabalhador/credor reclamar os créditos no processo de insolvência com a permanência da instância da ação laboral, não se verificando com esta solução qualquer prejudicialidade para o princípio da igualdade, apenas se tratando de forma diferente o que seja diferente. Constatamos que esta será a melhor forma de garantir a primazia do direito de ação e do princípio da tutela jurisdicional efetiva.Neste sentido, apelamos à necessidade de regulamentar devidamente esta questão de modo a serem ultrapassadas as divergências decisórias geradoras de insegurança para os destinatários das mesmas.
The procedural effects of the insolvency declaration drastically interfere with the life of the ongoing actions, and often the fate of these actions is not foreseen by law. The actions of impugement of an unlawful dismissal pending in the declaration of insolvency employer are one of the cases.The disagreement at the doctrinal and jurisprudential level is abundant, which consequently led the Supreme Court of Justice to set a ruling on the issue, fixing that the instances where such actions take place are extinguishable by superfluity of the dispute with the final decision of the declaration of insolvency. The present work aims to analyze the question in all its dimension, beginning with the labor law, where we will explain the characteristics of the action of impugement of illicit dismissal and the rights that this illegality entails to the worker. We will then analyze the civil procedural law to demonstrate that despite the employer's declaration of insolvency, there still remains relevant juridical interests that justify the continuation of the action in the labor court. Lastly, the insolvency law analyses the possibility of permanence of employment in parallel with the insolvency proceedings.It is therefore argued that the worker should claim his credits in the insolvency proceedings with the permanence of the labor action, without beig found, with this solution, any prejudice to the creditor’s principle of equality, only treating differently what is different. We find that this solution will be the best way to guarantee the primacy of the right of action and the principle of effective judicial protection.In this regard, we appeal to the need to dutifully regulate this issue in order to overcome the decision-making disagreements that generate insecurity for the recipients of the same.

The third edition of Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies considers all the possible ways in which a vulnerable transaction might be attacked, as well as practical issues that can arise in a typical transaction avoidance case. This new edition has been fully updated to reflect recent legislative amendments arising from the revision of the Insolvency Rules 1986, which came into force in 2017. The text also now incorporates an international dimension, which includes an analysis of the revised EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings. There is also comprehensive coverage of important new case law. Written by a team of well-known specialists, Transaction Avoidance in Insolvencies provides a detailed account of this complex area from a practical perspective.

This book provides a critical examination of modern English corporate insolvency law, in particular the procedures under the Insolvency Act 1986, from both conceptual and functional points of view. It focuses throughout on identifying a rational explanation for the form that the rules and institutions of the modern law take or, where there is no such rational explanation, the history which has resulted in the present position. A central theme of the book is that the nature and fundamental purpose of insolvency proceedings themselves dictate many of the features of English insolvency proceedings. For example, collective execution on behalf of creditors necessitates definition of the insolvent estate and the provision of rules concerning provable debts and transaction avoidance. Many key features of the insolvency procedures are therefore essentially matters of practicality rather than principle, albeit practicalities applied justly and fairly. The book covers the nature and purpose of insolvency law; the procedures; the administration, supervision and regulation of insolvency proceedings; the insolvent estate and transaction avoidance; investigation and wrongdoing by directors; phoenixism and pre-packing; distribution of the insolvent estate; and, lastly, cross-border insolvency. It examines the various principles of insolvency law in the context of practice, drawing upon historical perspectives where appropriate. By explaining how the law takes the form that it does, the book promotes an understanding of the present law and institutions as a whole, and shows how this understanding might inform future developments.

This chapter provides an overview of the law of set-off in Austria. The right of set-off in Austria is governed by general rules found in sections 1438–1443 of the Austrian Civil Code. The Austrian Insolvency Code also outlines restrictions on and extensions of the right of set-off and various modifications to the general rules. The chapter first considers set-off between solvent parties, focusing on contractual set-off, capital maintenance and other restrictions, set-off in the context of legal proceedings, and statutory set-off. It then explains set-off against insolvent parties by discussing the extension of the right of set-off in insolvency, restrictions on the right of set-off in insolvency, exceptions to the general rule on set-off, claims arising by reason of the opening of insolvency proceedings, set-off and prohibition of creditor preferences, and avoidance and fraudulent transfers. Finally, it examines issues arising in cross-border set-off.

This chapter discusses the law on creditor claims in Belgium. Legislators have limited the power of secured creditors to take individual enforcement actions with regard to their collateral, notwithstanding the opening of insolvency proceedings. For bankruptcy proceedings, the Bankruptcy Act of 8 August 1997 (BA) introduced a ‘cooling-off period’, imposing a temporary stay on individual enforcement actions by secured creditors. For judicial reorganization proceedings, the 31 January 2009 Act on the Continuity of Enterprises (BCA) imposes a general stay on enforcement actions, which also affects secured and preferential creditors. The remainder of the chapter looks into insolvency claims, administration claims, and non-enforceable claims in turn. Each part covers: the definition and scope of the claim; rules for submission, verification, and satisfaction or admission of claims; ranking of claims; and voting and other participation rights in insolvency proceedings.

They key questions analysed in this chapter are (a) whether there are avoidance powers available in the pre-insolvency proceedings or in the out-of-court workout procedures; and (b) whether the national law of the countries surveyed provide any special protection from avoidance for agreements achieved in such proceedings or workouts. As an illustrative example: if, for instance, new finance is agreed, either by individual arrangement or as part of a restructuring plan, are these arrangements exempted, under specific circumstances, from avoidance actions?

Article 16 EIR deals with the avoidance or cancellation of fraudulent, undervalued, or preferential transactions in order to enable the recapture of assets transferred or encumbered by the debtor prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings. The commentary highlights the power of the insolvency practitioner to disturb settled transactions to protect the collective interests of the creditors. It explains how problems in the conflict of laws may arise when the law governing the insolvency proceedings and the law governing the act being challenged are different. It mentions actions relating to the voidness, voidability, or unenforceability of legal acts detrimental to the general body of creditors that Art. 7 EIR subjects to the law of the Member State where the insolvency proceedings are opened.

The key issue in considering entitlements to any sums realized as a result of an avoidance action is whether the recoveries will be caught within the scope of any fixed or floating charge that the company has granted. This vexed question has now been addressed under statute with the insertion of section 176ZB into the Insolvency Act 1986, so that where an office holder has brought a claim, or made an assignment of an avoidance action to recover, in England and Wales, a preference, transaction at an undervalue or extortionate credit transaction or, in Scotland, a gratuitous alienation or unfair preference, any sums recovered will not be treated as part of the company’s net property and so they will be unavailable to meet the claims of floating-charge holders. The position is the same in relation to actions for fraudulent trading and wrongful trading claims.

Laws dealing with the problem of debt avoidance were a feature of English law long before the enactment of laws providing for insolvency proceedings. Thus an enactment in 1376, during the reign of Edward III, provided that property given by debtors to friendly third parties remained available to be taken in execution by the debtor’s creditors, whereas the founding statute providing for a bankruptcy law was not enacted until 1542, during the reign of Henry VIII. This illustrates a point which remains equally true today, namely that transaction avoidance overlaps with insolvency law but can go wider. For example section 423, dealing with transactions defrauding creditors, can be invoked by a victim of the transaction even though no insolvency proceedings are taking place.

Preference laws have long played a part in maintaining creditor entitlements in the period leading up to the commencement of formal insolvency proceedings. The general rationale of the preference provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 is that if in the period leading up to insolvency proceedings the debtor.

Significant differences in format and underlying policies may be noted in transaction avoidance provisions worldwide; indeed varying avoidance provisions are only one aspect of the lack of uniformity in the world’s insolvency laws. These differences may assume great practical importance in the insolvencies of companies or individuals with dealings in more than one country. The insolvency laws of more than one jurisdiction may be invoked: for example, a company may be wound up in more than one country, or enter into concurrent rescue procedures, such as a British administration procedure and a US Chapter 11 procedure. In addition, litigation arising out of the insolvency proceedings may be pursued in more than one country. Recourse to the laws of an overseas jurisdiction may occasionally be had where the laws of the country in which the winding up is being conducted are inadequate to deal with the issues that have arisen.

Article 6 EIR refers to the jurisdiction for actions that derive directly from the insolvency proceedings and are closely linked with them. It establishes international jurisdiction for actions that are closely connected to insolvency proceedings, which are subject to several requirements and brought in the same Member State where the insolvency proceedings have been opened. It also provides the insolvency practitioner the additional option to take an action based on general civil or commercial law in the jurisdiction where the defendant is normally resident. The rule aims to end a long dispute over the correct venue for actions that are closely connected to insolvency proceedings. The commentary points out that the controversy over jurisdiction between ‘related actions’ concerns the relationship between the EIR and the Brussels I Regulation.

As the 1996 Bankruptcy Law was amended seven times, the legislator decided to pass a new Bankruptcy Law in 2015. Although the aim of the Amendment to the Bankruptcy Law 2017 is primarily to facilitate pre-bankruptcy proceedings by prescribing realistic deadlines for taking certain actions in the proceedings, the observed errors and omissions made throughout the Bankruptcy Law are corrected and doubts about the application of certain provisions are removed. The new goal of the Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 2022 (which is scheduled to enter into force on 31 March 2022, 87th Session of the Government of the Republic of Croatia, 02.12.2021) is to ensure efficient, simple and flexible management of the procedure, with precisely defined deadlines and clear consequences actions taken, but primarily to harmonize the Bankruptcy Law with the Acquis Communautaire and the general trend of deviation from traditional, formal bankruptcy proceedings by opening a wide area to private regulation, with all related opportunities and risks. The parallel issue of the implementation and regulation of the institute of consumer bankruptcy as a subtype of bankruptcy is one of the most current issues in the revision of the Consumer Bankruptcy Act (amendments should enter into force in March 2022). The reason for this modest endeavour is the need to change certain solutions, often without taking into account the proposals and suggestions of case law resulting from six years of application, but also the obligation to implement solutions of the Restructuring and Insolvency Directives. Therefore, the author will analyse the most important features of the Final Proposal of the Bankruptcy Law from February 2022 and the Final Proposal of the Consumer Bankruptcy Law from February 2022, emphasizing those provisions that have undergone the most changes as well as those that most improve the efficiency of (pre) bankruptcy and consumer bankruptcy procedures.