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1
Bartky, Elliot. "Aristotle and the Politics of Herodotus's History." Review of Politics 64, no. 3 (2002): 445–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500034975.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the Poetics, Aristotle criticizes Herodotus by claiming that poetry is more philosophical and more serious than history. Aristotle's remark may be understood as a defense of poetry against Herodotus's attempt to supplant the political teaching of the poets and the wise men. Aristotle aligns poetry with philosophy because the poets' political teaching serves the city at the same time that it anticipates political philosophy. In the second section of the article Herodotus's quarrel with the political teaching of the poets, especially Homer, is considered in light of Aristotle's account of the poets. Approaching Herodotus in this manner underscores the significance, for Aristotle, of the politics of Herodotus's History. The third section of the article begins with a discussion of Herodotus's indebtedness to, and difference from, the pre-Socratic philosophers, and goes on to consider Herodotus's quarrel with the wise men. Herodotus's quarrel with the poets and the wise men provides us with a better idea of why Aristotle sought to associate poetry with philosophy, and distinguish them from history.
2
BOŽILOVIĆ, JELENA. "ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN THE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE." Kultura polisa, no. 44 (March 8, 2021): 173–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.51738/kpolisa2021.18.1r.3.02.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Aristotle’s understanding of political community is strongly linked with the view on political naturalism and the concept of a man as a moral being. According to Aristotle, man (by nature) achieves his human potential by living in a community, however, the political community on its own, as the largest and the most significant among all communities, enables citizens to fully develop their virtue through their participation in political life. For this reason, a man and the community are joined in a relationship resulting in mutual creation of ethics: by living in a polis, an individual develops virtue, and conversely, his virtuous actions in the community enable a polis to endure on ethical principles. This conception is found in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics, and is encompassed in the theory of virtue, theory of citizenship and a detailed consideration of the forms of political systems. Although elitist and exclusivist, Aristotle’s ethical and political views remain intact in terms of the value ascribed to the “the philosophy of human life”, as his legacy continues to inspire modern social thought. The aim of this paper is to show the connection Aristotle makes between a political community and ethical principles while pointing to their universal importance through the analysis of Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.
3
FRANK, JILL. "Citizens, Slaves, and Foreigners: Aristotle on Human Nature." American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 (February 2004): 91–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055404001029.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
To most readers, Aristotle's many references to nature throughout the first book of thePoliticsimply a foundational role for nature outside and prior to politics. Aristotle, they claim, pairs nature with necessity and, thus, sets nature as a standard that fixes the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion in political life. Through readings of Aristotle on the nature of citizens, slaves, and foreigners in thePolitics, this essay argues, in contrast, that, to Aristotle, nature, especially human nature, is changeable and shaped by politics. Through an analysis of Aristotle's philosophical and scientific treatments of nature in theMetaphysicsandPhysics, this essay demonstrates that in order to preserve what he takes to be characteristic and also constitutive of a distinctively human way of living—prohaireticactivity—Aristotle is especially keen to guard against any assimilation of nature to necessity.
4
Trott, Adriel M. "Logos and the Political Nature of Anthrōpos in Aristotle’s Politics." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 27, no. 2 (2010): 292–307. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000172.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Departing from Aristotle’s two-fold definition of anthrōpos (human) as having logos and being political, the argument of this article is that human beings are always fundamentally political for Aristotle. This position challenges the view that ethical life is prior to or beyond the scope of political life. Aristotle’s conception of the political nature of the human is developed through a reading of the linguistic argument at Politics 1.2; a careful treatment of autos, or self, in Aristotle; and an examination of the political nature of anthrōpos in the context of Aristotle’s candidates for the best life in Politics VII.1–3 and Nicomachean Ethics X.6–8. From this consideration the compatibility between Aristotle’s claims that anthrōpos is fundamentally political and that the highest end of the human is achieved in theoria is maintained, since even in pursuing the theoretic life, human beings take up the practical question of what the best life is.
5
JOCHIM, JORDAN. "From Tyrannicide to Revolution: Aristotle on the Politics of Comradeship." American Political Science Review 114, no. 4 (August 11, 2020): 1266–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055420000507.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Treatments of collective action in political science, classical Greek history, and democratic theory often focus on the episodic and public-facing dimensions of dissent. This article turns to Aristotle for an account of solidaristic political action whose scale and tempo is sometimes obscured by such engagements. Revisiting The Athenian Constitution’s account of the tyrannicides of 514 BCE and the democratic revolution of 508/7 BCE, I argue for the centrality of comradeship to Aristotle’s discussions of these episodes. I demonstrate that Aristotle’s attention to the politics of comradeship is also legible in Politics 5—which notes the dangers political clubs (hetaireiai) pose to tyranny—as well as Aristotle’s references to comrades (hetairoi) in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. This article contributes to our understanding of the birth of Athenian democracy and how comradeship—a vice, to Aristotle, under ordinary political circumstances—becomes a virtue.
6
Shuster, Amy L. "The Problem of the Partheniae in Aristotle’s Political Thought." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 28, no. 2 (2011): 279–308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000189.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article examines Aristotle’s discussion of the Spartan revolt of the Partheniae in Politics V.7. Aristotle appears to use the Partheniae as examples of two sources of instability within so-called aristocracies, but the analysis of this case raises delicate interpretive issues. Sections I–III draw upon surviving accounts of the Parthenian revolt from Antiochus, Ephorus and Myron of Priene in order to illuminate the significance of this example for Aristotle’s ethical and political thought. Section IV reconstructs the state of the Spartan constitution around the time of the revolt in order to understand what Aristotle might have thought about what precipitated the revolt. This article argues that generational politics is at stake in the revolt, and Section V locates the revolt’s politics within its broader historical and cultural context. In the end, this article finds that Aristotle may have intended to leave the interpretation of this example ambiguous due to his own unresolved views towards the politics at stake in this revolt.
7
Lindsay, Thomas K. "The “God-Like Man” Versus the “Best Laws: Politics and Religion in Aristotle's Politics." Review of Politics 53, no. 3 (1991): 488–509. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500015266.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
While Plato's political dialogues give much attention to the relation of the legal and the divine, this subject receives scant notice in Aristotle's Politics. But this is not a sign that Aristotle neglects or dismisses the subject; it is in fact perfectly consistent with what the author understands to be Aristotle's view of the proper political relation of laws and gods. This view emerges indirectly, and only after reflection on the substance and manner of Aristotle's “umpiring” of a staged debate over the rule of the “best laws” versus that of the “best man” (Politics III). From the standpoint of the highest, Aristotle finds law to be both regime-derivative and somewhat prudence-impeding. At the same time, the “apolitical” character of the best man's rule necessitates the rule of law, and with it —for largely utilitarian reasons — Aristotle's public acquiescence in the apotheosis of the legal. But this teaching, and its basis, emerge fully only when the Politics' relative “silence” is interpreted in light of the open statements of a text much less palatable and thus much less accessible to statesmen and citizens (and even to political scientists): the Metaphysics. The Politics' obliqueness, argues the author, owes to the fact that Aristotle's final understanding of the relation of laws and gods cannot be fully disclosed publicly if it is to achieve its end of improving public life.
8
Tsalla, Helen. "Aristotle on Political Norms and Monarchy." Politeia 1, no. 3 (2019): 45–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/politeia20191319.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Constitutions differ in kind, according to Aristotle (Politics, III), and the perverted ones are posterior to the nondeviant ones. This paper interprets Aristotle’s treatment of monarchy in light of his distinction in Posterior Analytics (I) between the order of being (constitutional types) and the order of experience (existing constitutions). The paper moves from an analysis of political definitions (Politics, III) and their psychological implications to Aristotle’s analysis of kingship as a species of constitutional correctness. It becomes apparent that, when discussing the relation between a political community and the rule befitting it, Aristotle is consistently using cognates of potency (dunamis) whereby a form already present in a thing becomes the principle of formal actualization of another. Such a mutual relation between rulers and ruled and between their psychological powers sheds light on Aristotle’s inclusion of kingship among proper constitutions, even in the absence of shared governance, and to his willingness to suggest policies that preserve even tyrannies.
9
Segev, Mor. "Aristotle on Plato’s Republic VIII-IX: Politics v. 12, 1316a1-b27." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 35, no. 2 (September 17, 2018): 374–400. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340190.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Toward the end of Politics V. 12, Aristotle criticizes Plato’s discussion of political change in Republic VIII-IX. Scholars often reject Aristotle’s criticism, especially because it portrays Plato’s discussion, allegedly unfairly, as developing a historically testable theory. I argue that Aristotle’s criticism is adequate, and that the seriousness with which he considers Plato’s account of political change as an alternative to his own is both warranted and instructive. First, apart from criticizing Plato’s account for its historical inaccuracies, Aristotle also exposes theoretical insufficiencies and internal inconsistencies within it. Second, Aristotle’s criticisms of historical inaccuracies in Plato’s discussion of political change are not misdirected, since there are reasons to think that Plato does intend that discussion to accord with the historical facts.
10
Bartky, Elliot. "Plato and the Politics of Aristotle's Poetics." Review of Politics 54, no. 4 (1992): 589–620. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500016077.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article challenges the view that Aristotle's Poetics provides a defense against Plato's assault on poetry. I argue that Aristotle's discussion of poetry is at least as critical of the poetic depiction of the city and the gods as is the Platonic account. In the Poetics Aristotle does break with Plato in order to establish poetry's independence from philosophy. Aristotle's account of poetry as an independent activity should not, however, be read as a defense of poetry against Plato's subordination of poetry to philosophy. Instead, it is argued that Aristotle establishes poetry's independence from philosophy as a corrective to Plato's resort to poetry, thereby establishing that philosophy is completely autonomous from poetry.
11
Cherry, Kevin M. "A Series of Footnotes to Plato's Philosophers." Review of Politics 80, no. 2 (2018): 257–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670517001267.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractIn her magisterial Plato's Philosophers, Catherine Zuckert presents a radically new interpretation of Plato's dialogues. In doing so, she insists we must overcome reading them through the lens of Aristotle, whose influence has obscured the true nature of Plato's philosophy. However, in her works dealing with Aristotle's political science, Zuckert indicates several advantages of his approach to understanding politics. In this article, I explore the reasons why Zuckert finds Aristotle a problematic guide to Plato's philosophy as well as what she sees as the character and benefits of Aristotle's political theory. I conclude by suggesting a possible reconciliation between Zuckert's Aristotle and her Plato, insofar as both the Socrates whom Plato made his hero and Aristotle agree that political communities will rarely direct citizens toward virtue by means of law and that we must instead look to informal means of doing so.
12
Terchek, Ronald J., and David K. Moore. "Recovering the Political Aristotle: A Critical Response to Smith." American Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 905–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2586215.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Thomas Smith presents an Aristotelian view of the common good that resembles much contemporary political theory in that it focuses on ethics rather than politics. Smith contends that Aristotle is a potent remedy to a society in crisis due to its unconcern about the common good. Against Smith's apolitical reading of Aristotle, we examine how Aristotle's views of common advantage, the multiple needs of citizens, and political friendship support neither harmonizing conceptions of the good nor a personal “radical conversion” that makes the common good our primary political concern. In engaging the political Aristotle, we find instead that he is concerned with the necessary conflict that resists attempts to arrive at the common advantage, with the material basis of good citizenship, and with the institutions and practices that foster a good deliberative politics.
13
Bates, Clifford Angell. "The centrality of politeia for Aristotle’s Politics: Aristotle’s continuing significance for social and political science." Social Science Information 53, no. 1 (March 2014): 139–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0539018413510364.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Political theorists today are addressing issues of global concern confronting state systems and in so doing are often forced to confront the concept of Homo sapiens as a ‘political animal’. Thus theorists considering Aristotle’s Politics attempt to transcend his polis-centric focus and make the case that Aristotle offers ways to address these global concerns by focusing on Empire. This article, contra Dietz et al., argues that Aristotle’s political science is first and foremost a science of politeia and that this approach to the operation and working of political systems is far superior to recent attempts at regime analysis in comparative politics. Thus Aristotle’s mode of examining political systems offers much fruit for those interested in approaching political phenomena with precision and depth as diverse manifestations of the political communities formed by the species Aristotle called the ‘political animal’. From this perspective, focusing on the politeia constituting each political community permits an analysis of contemporary transformations of political life without distorting what is being analyzed.
14
Deslauriers, Marguerite. "Thumos in Aristotle’s Politics VII.7." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 36, no. 1 (March 22, 2019): 57–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340195.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Aristotle claims that the citizens of the best city should be both intelligent and spirited at Politics VII.7 1327b19-38. While he treats intelligence as an unqualified good, thumos (‘spirit’) is valuable but problematic. This paper has two aims: (i) to consider the political value of spirit in Aristotle’s Politics and in particular to identify the ways in which it is both essential to political excellence and yet insufficient for securing it, and (ii) to use this analysis of the role of spirit in the political realm to explain Aristotle’s exclusion of women from political authority, even in the context of the household. I analyze spirit as a physical phenomenon and as a type of desire, before considering its moral and affective aspects. I then return to the role of spirit in political life and examine its importance for the activity of ruling. In the last section I consider the implications of this analysis of spirit for the social and political roles Aristotle assigns to men and women.
15
Finlayson, James Gordon. "“Bare Life” and Politics in Agamben's Reading of Aristotle." Review of Politics 72, no. 1 (2010): 97–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670509990982.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractGiorgio Agamben's critique of Western politics inHomo Sacerand three related books has been highly influential in the humanities and social sciences. The critical social theory set out in these works depends essentially on his reading of Aristotle'sPolitics. His diagnosis of what ails Western politics and his suggested remedy advert to a “biopolitical paradigm,” at the center of which stand a notion of “bare life” and a purported opposition betweenbiosandzoē. Agamben claims that this distinction is found in Aristotle's text, in ancient Greek, and in a tradition of political theory and political society stemming from fourth-century Athens to the present. However, a close reading of Aristotle refutes this assertion. There is no such distinction. I show that he bases this view on claims about Aristotle by Arendt and Foucault, which are also unfounded.
16
Remer, Gary. "Rhetoric, Emotional Manipulation, and Political Morality." Rhetorica 31, no. 4 (2013): 402–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rh.2013.31.4.402.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Notwithstanding the widespread assumption that Aristotle forges a better relationship among rhetoric, the emotions, and political morality than Cicero, I contend that Cicero, not Aristotle, offers a more relevant account of the relationship among these terms. I argue that, by grounding his account of emotional appeals in the art of rhetoric, Aristotle does not evade the moral problems originating in emotional manipulation. Moreover, Aristotle's approach to emotional appeals in politics is, compared to Cicero's, static, unable to adapt to new political circumstances. I suggest that Cicero's approach to the rhetorical emotions is more acceptable to a modern audience than Aristotle's because it is ethically based while also responsive to political realities. Cicero accommodates emotional appeals to circumstance based on his belief in decorum as a moral principle. Further, I show that emotional manipulation in Cicero is not as problematical as it initially appears.
17
Mirhady, David C. "Aristotle and the Law Courts." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 23, no. 2 (2006): 302–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000098.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the Politics, Aristotle recognizes participation in law courts as an essential element in citizenship, yet there has been relatively little scholarship on how he sees this participation being realized. References to law courts are sprinkled widely through the Politics, Rhetoric, and Ethics, as well as the Athenaiôn politeia, where their importance is revealed most clearly. Ernest Barker took great pride in the English administration of law: if he had returned to write a more thorough treatment of Aristotle’s political thought, he might well have focused on the courts.
18
Tilly, Charles. "Rhetoric, Social History, and Contentious Politics: Reply to Critics." International Review of Social History 49, no. 1 (April 2004): 132–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020859003001421.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Aristotle's vigorous vindication of rhetoric pairs it with dialectic. Dialectic, for Aristotle, combines logical propositions with induction from rigorous evidence in an effort to prove a case beyond doubt. Rhetoric parallels dialectic, but combines arguments with examples in an effort to persuade. Neither one amounts to science, which for Aristotle requires irrefutable establishment of general principles. political: arguing for or against a proposed course of action;forensic: attacking or defending someone;ceremonial: praising or condemning someone.
19
Brancacci, Aldo. "Aristotele e Diogene il Cinico." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 11, no. 1 (December 23, 2020): 67–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2020.1.3.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper I examine the testimonium of Aristotle’s Rhetoric concerning Diogenes the Cynic (SSR V B 184). This piece of evidence is the most ancient source of Diogenes and proves that Aristotle was familiar with his writings. I also study the testimonium on Diogenes that is handed down by Theophrastus (SSR V B 172), which confirms the interest of the ancient Peripatos in this philosopher. Finally, I examine a passage of Book 1 of the Politics where Aristotle refers to the thesis on the abolition of money. I argue that such a thesis could be ascribed to Diogenes. In particular, I attempt to demonstrate that several theses of political philosophy put forward by Diogenes should be considered as constituting a polemical overthrow of the corresponding theses of Aristotle in Book 1 of his Politics.
20
Garrett, Jan. "Aristotle, Ecology and Politics." Social Philosophy Today 6 (1991): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/socphiltoday1991627.
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21
Rahe, Paul A. "Aristotle and Modern Politics." American Journal of Jurisprudence 62, no. 1 (April 27, 2017): 29–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajj/aux010.
Повний текст джерела
22
MISHURIN, Alexander. "Some Remarks on the First Book of Aristotle’s Politics." WISDOM 10, no. 1 (June 25, 2018): 114–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v10i1.208.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This article is devoted to a sequential analysis of the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. It suggests an interpretation of the classical problem of natural hierarchy of men as it described in the first book of the treatise. In this book, Aristotle examines seven commonly held definitions of a slave – four “natural” and three “conventional” ones – and then offers his own eighth definition, placed right in the middle between nature and convention. The article exclusively deals with the first book of Politics and avoids invoking other books of the treatise as well as other works of Aristotle because in classical political philosophy every statement is highly contextualized and could not be simply quoted in order to prove or disprove any point of view without preceding deep examination.
23
Berger, Chris. "Making Liberal Democracy Ethical: Aristotle on the Unity of Ethics and Politics." Agora: Political Science Undergraduate Journal 3, no. 1 (February 21, 2013): 73–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/agora19041.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Contemporary liberal democracy recognizes a fundamental distinction between matters of “public” and “private” domain that amounts to a separation of ethics from politics. Such a distinction is, however, a recent one insofar as the history of political thought is concerned. Political and ethical matters can and in fact have been thought of and practiced as a single project. Aristotle is one philosopher who has approached ethics and politics not as two distinct subjects but as a single unified project: the project of living well. This essay examines Aristotle’s ethical-political project and engages with contemporary thinkers who have grappled with Aristotle’s political philosophy as a possible remedy for the problems currently confronting liberal democratic politics. It argues that the best remedy for the ills of liberal democracy that arise out of the continued prevalence of relativism in liberal democratic discourse is a re-thinking of liberal education that unites ethical and political considerations. The author contends that Aristotle’s political philosophy offers us a vantage point from which this unity may be perceived and, hopefully, implemented.
24
Riyanto, Astim. "PENGETAHUAN HUKUM KONSTITUSI MENJADI ILMU HUKUM KONSTITUSI." Jurnal Hukum & Pembangunan 45, no. 2 (June 30, 2015): 184. http://dx.doi.org/10.21143/jhp.vol45.no2.2.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Pengetahuan konstitusi (constitution) secara intensif telah muncul sejak abad ke-4 sebelum Masehi. Hal itu dimulai dengan penyelidikan oleh Aristoteles/Aristotle (384-322 sebelum Masehi) mengenai konstitusi (politeia) terhadap 158 negara kota (polis) dari 186 negara kota (polis) di zaman Yunani kuno yang berjaya dari abad ke-6 sebelum Masehi sampai dengan abad ke-2 sebelum Masehi. Hasil penyelidikan Aristoteles/Aristotle tersebut dituangkan dalam bukunya Politica (Politics). Pengetahuan konstitusi berubah menjadi pengantar studi hukum konstitusi oleh Prof. Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922) yang dituangkan dalam bukunya An Introduction to Study of The Law of The Constitution (1885). Pada tahun 2007 oleh Astim Riyanto di depan suatu komunitas akademisi di suatu universitas di Indonesia, yang dituangkan dalam suatu makalah, dideklarasikan hukum konstitusi (the law of the constitution) menjadi ilmu hukum konstitusi (science of the law of the constitution). Pendeklarasian hukum konstitusi menjadi ilmu hukum konstitusi dipimpin oleh pakar Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Sri Soemantri Martosoewignjo.Pengetahuan konstitusi (constitution) secara intensif telah muncul sejak abad ke-4 sebelum Masehi. Hal itu dimulai dengan penyelidikan oleh Aristoteles/Aristotle (384-322 sebelum Masehi) mengenai konstitusi (politeia) terhadap 158 negara kota (polis) dari 186 negara kota (polis) di zaman Yunani kuno yang berjaya dari abad ke-6 sebelum Masehi sampai dengan abad ke-2 sebelum Masehi. Hasil penyelidikan Aristoteles/Aristotle tersebut dituangkan dalam bukunya Politica (Politics). Pengetahuan konstitusi berubah menjadi pengantar studi hukum konstitusi oleh Prof. Albert Venn Dicey (1835-1922) yang dituangkan dalam bukunya An Introduction to Study of The Law of The Constitution (1885). Pada tahun 2007 oleh Astim Riyanto di depan suatu komunitas akademisi di suatu universitas di Indonesia, yang dituangkan dalam suatu makalah, dideklarasikan hukum konstitusi (the law of the constitution) menjadi ilmu hukum konstitusi (science of the law of the constitution). Pendeklarasian hukum konstitusi menjadi ilmu hukum konstitusi dipimpin oleh pakar Hukum Tata Negara Indonesia Sri Soemantri Martosoewignjo.
25
Lockwood, Thornton. "Servile Spartans and Free Citizen-soldiers in Aristotle’s Politics 7–8." Apeiron 51, no. 1 (January 26, 2018): 97–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2016-0055.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract In the last two books of the Politics, Aristotle articulates an education program for his best regime in contrast to what he takes to be the goal and practices of Sparta’s educational system. Although Aristotle never refers to his program as liberal education, clearly he takes its goal to be the production of free male and female citizens. By contrast, he characterizes the results of the Spartan system as ‘crude’ (φορτικός), ‘slavish’ (ἀνδραποδώδης), and ‘servile’ (βάναυσος). I argue that Aristotle’s criticisms of Spartan education elucidate his general understanding of Sparta and provide an interpretative key to understanding Politics 7–8. But although Aristotle contrasts the goals and methods of Spartan education with that of his own best regime, the citizens of his best regime are more like Spartan citizen-soldiers than Athenian participatory-citizens.
26
Santoro, Alessio. "A City of Guardians: Refocusing the Aim and Scope of Aristotle’s Critique of Plato’s Republic." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 36, no. 2 (June 28, 2019): 313–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340212.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract In Politics 2.2-5 Aristotle criticises the state described in Plato’s Republic. The general consensus in the secondary literature (in particular after E. Bornemann) is that Aristotle’s critique is unfair and too narrow in scope. Aristotle unjustifiably ignores significant parts of Plato’s Republic and unreasonably assumes that the community of wives, children and property extends to the whole of Kallipolis. Although R. Mayhew’s defence of Aristotle’s criticism has mitigated this negative assessment, the problem has remained unresolved. This paper questions the traditional view and suggests an explanation of Aristotle’s selective reading of Plato’s Republic. Based on what turns out to be a reasonable interpretation of Plato’s text, Aristotle does not extend Plato’s communism to the whole city, but rather reduces Plato’s city to the community of the guardians. As a result, Aristotle’s arguments in fact hit the mark and present Aristotle as a much fairer reader than is usually acknowledged.
27
Janssens, David. "Easily, At a Glance: Aristotle's Political Optics." Review of Politics 72, no. 3 (2010): 385–408. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003467051000029x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractIn book VII of the Politics, Aristotle requires that the best regime be eusunoptos, “easily taken in at a glance.” Throughout the history of political thought, the attendant ideal of the polis as a compact and surveyable society was particularly influential. However, closer scrutiny of the way in which Aristotle uses eusunoptos suggests that it designates a problem rather than a solution, to wit, the problems of defining political unity and of attuning the individual and the common good. Exploring the different contexts in which eusunoptos occurs in Aristotle's works, this paper argues that it has political, rhetorical, and poetical meanings that cannot be entirely distinguished from each other. As such, the notion is shown to be germane to the general design of book VII, which constructs the best regime in order to bring to light the limits of politics.
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Gicheva-Gocheva, Dimka. "The Influence of Herodotus on the Practical Philosophy of Aristotle." Labyrinth 18, no. 2 (December 30, 2016): 104. http://dx.doi.org/10.25180/lj.v18i2.49.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The approach of this paper is a retrospective one. It is an attempt to show that many important ideas of Herodotus, a great ancestor of Aristotle, have influenced his practical philosophy. The paper focuses specially on several topics from the Histories of Herodotus, which have found a resonance in the Nicomachean ethics and in the Politics of Aristotle. The main ones in respect of the ethical theory are: the different forms of justice and the just as for example the super-human justice, the just in the family relations, the judicial just and the just in the polis or the larger human community. Book Epsilon of the Nicomachean Ethics is indebted to Herodotus in several points. In respect of Aristotles' political theory, there are two topics in the History of Herodotus which deserve a special interest: firstly, the conversation of the three noble Persians, who discuss the six basic types of political order and organization of power-and-submission in a state or city-state (in book ІІІ, 80-82); this becomes a paradigm for the next typologies of Plato (in the Republic and the Statesman) and Aristotle (in the Politics); secondly, the importance of personal freedom, the equity of the speaking (discussing?) men on the agora, and the supremacy of law for the well-being of any community and its peaceful future. The legacy of Herodotus is obvious in many anthropological and ethical concepts of Aristotle, especially in his most read and quoted ethical writing and in his Politics
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DIETZ, MARY G. "Between Polis and Empire: Aristotle's Politics." American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (May 2012): 275–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055412000184.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Aristotle lived during a period of unprecedented imperial expansionism initiated by the kings of Macedon, but most contemporary political theorists confine his political theorizing to the classical Greek city-state. For many, Aristotle's thought exhibits a parochial Hellenocentric “binary logic” that privileges Greeks over non-Greeks and betrays a xenophobic suspicion of aliens and foreigners. In response to these standard “polis-centric” views, I conjure a different perceptual field—“between polis and empire”—within which to interpret Aristotle'sPolitics. Both theorist and text appear deeply attentive to making present immediate things “coming to be and passing away” in the Hellenic world. Moreover, “between polis and empire,” we can see thePoliticsactually disturbing various hegemonic Greek binary oppositions (Greek/barbarian; citizen/alien; center/periphery), not reinforcing them. Understanding thePoliticswithin the context of the transience of the polis invites a new way of reading Aristotle while at the same time providing new possibilities for theorizing problems of postnational citizenship, transnational politics, and empire.
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Levy, Harold L. "Does Aristotle Exclude Women from Politics?" Review of Politics 52, no. 3 (1990): 397–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670500016971.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Virtually all scholars interpret Aristotle to exclude women from politics. I will argue that Aristotle does not directly investigate this question, and that his text does not require such an interpretation. First, the article will show that scholars have overlooked the basic problem for interpreters of Aristotle, and that they have prematurely foreclosed counterinterpretation of the text. Second, it will show that the text is open to this particular counterinterpretation: very guardedly, Aristotle implies reasons for including women in politics.
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Schall, James V. "Aristotle: Religion, Politics, and Philosophy." Perspectives on Political Science 27, no. 1 (January 1998): 5–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10457099809602349.
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Young, Charles M. "The Politics of Aristotle (review)." Journal of the History of Philosophy 37, no. 2 (1999): 356–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/hph.2008.0864.
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AMBLER, WAYNE. "Aristotle on Nature and Politics:." Political Theory 15, no. 3 (August 1987): 390–410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591787015003007.
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Jaulin, Annick. "Natural politics according to Aristotle." Filozofija i drustvo 29, no. 2 (2018): 157–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1802157j.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
What does Nature mean in the famous Aristotelian formula ?man is, by nature, a political animal?? Within the context of the discussion with the Socratic assertions in Plato?s Republic, Nature means that polis is not the result of deficiency, but the expression of a positive desire. Thus, for human beings, there is no state of nature before political life. This does not mean that everything that is political is natural.
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Khan, Carrie-Ann Biondi. "Aristotle, Citizenship, And The Common Advantage." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek Political Thought 22, no. 1 (2005): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-90000067.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In the early chapters of Book III of his Politics, Aristotle engages in a discussion of citizenship and it quickly becomes apparent that the issues involved in citizenship are more complex than many may realize. This discussion has led to disputes over what Aristotle’s account of citizenship is and whether it leads to an incoherence in his political theory, specifically whether his account makes it impossible to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate types of constitutions. After discussing the interpretive controversy over Aristotle’s account of citizenship, I consider two arguments with promising solutions regarding its alleged incoherence with Aristotle’s overall political theory. I argue that neither one of these attempted solutions — provided by Donald Morrison and David Keyt — ultimately proves adequate. What emerges from this examination is not an alternative solution, but the surprising conclusion that Aristotle’s account of citizenship, when conjoined with his classification of constitutions, does not lead to any incoherence at all.
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Biondi, Carrie-Ann. "ARISTOTLE ON THE MIXED CONSTITUTION AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 2 (May 29, 2007): 176–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070215.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Contemporary political discourse is marked with the language of democracy, and Western countries in particular seek to promote democracy at home and abroad. However, there is a sublimated conflict in general political discourse between a desire to rely on alleged political experts and a desire to assert the supposed common sense of all men. Can the struggle between the democratic and aristocratic values embodied in this conflict be reconciled? The question is perennial, and raises issues that are central to constitutional design. Aristotle, developing in significant ways insights made by his teacher Plato, grapples with it in his Politics. Aristotle's views on these matters are relevant—by way of the American Founders'—to contemporary American politics and modern democracies generally. During the eighteenth century, the Founders, some of whom explicitly reached back to Aristotle's work, also struggled—especially in The Federalist Papers—with these thorny issues of constitutional design. They created the U.S. Constitution in part to address these very same problems and issues. We are living in some ways, then, in the shadow of Aristotle's political theorizing, albeit as transposed by the American Founders. Both Aristotle and some of the American Founders theoretically favor aristocracy over democracy, but concede that in practice a blend of the two has to be integrated into the fundamental structure of political society. We need to reconnect with these important political discussions in order to come to terms with aristocratic and democratic values in our current circumstances.
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Berti, Enrico. "My Walks With Aristotle." Peitho. Examina Antiqua 7, no. 1 (March 17, 2016): 55–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pea.2016.1.3.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In connection with the ongoing celebration of Aristotle’s Year that has been announced by UNESCO, the Poznan Archaeological Reserve – Genius Loci organized a series of lectures “Walks with Aristotle” that refer to the famous name of the Peripatos school. This invitation has been accepted by one of the greatest scholars of Aristotle, Professor Enrico Berti from the University of Padua, who has been publishing for more than 50 years various studies on the philosophy of the Stagirite as well as on the history of philosophy. Recently, his very instructive book, entitled Aristotle’s Profile, has appeared in Polish translation (Poznań 2016). Professor Berti’s presentation provides an overview of his most important achievements. Included in these are his forthcoming works: his new translation and commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics as well as his monograph Aristotelismo which reconstructs the diverse interpretations of Aristotle’s doctrines through centuries: from logic to epistemology, from physics to psychology and zoology, from metaphysics to ethics and politics and lastly from rhetoric to poetics.
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Eggers, Nicolai Von. "Fra konstituerende magt til destituerende magt:." Slagmark - Tidsskrift for idéhistorie, no. 72 (August 15, 2015): 93–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.7146/sl.v2015i72.107204.
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The Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s conception and critique of sovereignty has won him wide and well-deserved acclamation. In this article, however, it is argued that Agamben’s conception of sovereignty is somewhat misplaced, and, as a consequence, his positive political project of developing a ‘destituent power’ (as opposed to constituent power) is highly deficient in terms of construing a popular and viable political alternative. The critique of Agamben is developed through a close reading of Aristotle’s Politics and his notion of kurion. It is argued that Agamben’s flawed conception of sovereignty reemerges symptomatically in his extremely problematic reading of Aristotle’s Politics, and that a viable political alternative to both Agamben’s own project and the conception of politics that he criticizes can be developed through an alternative and closer reading of Aristotle.
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Kraut, Richard. "NATURE IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND POLITICS." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 2 (May 29, 2007): 199–219. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070227.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Aristotle's doctrine that human beings are political animals is, in part, an empirical thesis, and posits an inclination to enter into cooperative relationships, even apart from the instrumental benefits of doing so. Aristotle's insight is that human cooperation rests on a non-rational propensity to trust even strangers, when conditions are favorable. Turning to broader questions about the role of nature in human development, I situate Aristotle's attitude towards our natural propensities between two extremes: he rejects both the view that we must bow to whatever nature dictates, and also the view that nature is generally or always to be suppressed or overcome. This middle position requires that Aristotle hold nature and goodness apart, so that the latter can serve as a standard for evaluating the former. He holds that nature does not treat all human beings alike: just as some are handicapped in their development by a deficiency in their natural abilities or propensities, others are extraordinarily fortunate and have so powerful a disposition to act well that they easily acquire good habits and skills of practical reasoning. Further, he recognizes that sociable inclinations and natural virtues have to compete in the human soul with other natural forces that make ethical life extraordinarily difficult. That is why things so often go so badly for us: we need not only to subdue the external environment, but to overcome certain inner natural obstacles as well. Even so, for Aristotle ethical life is not generally alienated from nature, as it is for other philosophers.
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Everson, Stephen. "Aristotle on the Foundations of the State." Political Studies 36, no. 1 (March 1988): 89–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1988.tb00218.x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Aristotle's Politics shows an apparent tension between a recognition of the desirability of individual liberty and his claim that ‘none of the citizens belongs to himself but all belong to the state’. We can start to resolve that tension by considering Aristotle's doctrine of man as a political animal. Artistotle offers a particular account of the nature of man according to which his specifically human capacities cannot be realized outside of the state. This is not an account adopted arbitrarily for Aristotle's political theory but follows directly from his analysis of substances in the Physics. On Aristotle's account of human nature, man is essentially rational and virtuous and the political theory allows the rational and virtuous man to be as free as possible without intefering with others. Some are less rational and are subject to authority in virtue of this. We can see that Aristotle's theory has advantages over rights-based theories since Aristotle has an account of what constitutes human flourishing, without which one cannot found rights claims.
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Levin, Michael. "Natural Subordination, Aristotle On." Philosophy 72, no. 280 (April 1997): 241–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100056862.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Few passages from the ancients scandalize modern readers as does Aristotle's Politics I, 2-5. Aristotle begins with a distinction he apparently finds obvious: [T]hat which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a slave.
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Cheng, Eric. "Aristotelian Realism: Political Friendship and the Problem of Stability." Review of Politics 81, no. 4 (2019): 549–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670519000500.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractThis paper argues that the pursuit of stability is the primary concern of Aristotle's understanding of political friendship. Specifically, I argue that Aristotle chooses to understand political friendship to be a “special sort” of utility/advantage friendship, applicable to multiple regime types of varying degrees of (in)equality, because he fears what might happen when citizens in any polity develop mutual animosity. Turning to the contemporary liberal democratic context, I note that Aristotle provides us with a strong positive argument for why we ought to take political friendship seriously. However, I stipulate that contemporary liberal democracies present obstacles to the realization of classical political friendship. I thereby conclude by suggesting that citizens can potentially be political friends when they understand politics and their social relations through the “metaphor” of political friendship.
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Keyt, David. "THE GOOD MAN AND THE UPRIGHT CITIZEN IN ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS AND POLITICS." Social Philosophy and Policy 24, no. 2 (May 29, 2007): 220–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052507070239.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
This essay deals with Aristotle's complex account in Politics III.4 of the good man and the upright citizen. By this account the goodness of an upright citizen is relative to the city of which he is a citizen, whereas the goodness of a good man is absolute. Aristotle holds that the goodness of a good man and the goodness of an upright citizen are identical in one case only, that of a full citizen of his ideal city. In a non-ideal city the two are always distinct. One would expect, then, that cases would arise where the goodness of an upright citizen would demand, and the goodness of a good man forbid, the very same action. Aristotle, however, never discusses such cases directly, and many scholars have thought that he skirts the issue entirely. I argue, on the contrary, that Aristotle believes that there are cases where a good man will act differently from an upright citizen and that, consequently, he believes, as we would hope he would believe, that there are limits to political obligation.
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Jagannathan, Dhananjay. "Every Man a Legislator: Aristotle on Political Wisdom." Apeiron 52, no. 4 (October 25, 2019): 395–414. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/apeiron-2018-0034.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract I argue that Aristotle’s unmodern conception of politics can only be understood by first understanding his distinctive picture of human agency and the excellence of political wisdom. I therefore undertake to consider three related puzzles: (1) why at the outset of the Nicomachean Ethics [NE] is the human good said to be the same for a city and for an individual, such that the NE’s inquiry is political? (2) why later on in the NE is political wisdom said to be the same state of soul as practical wisdom? (3) why in the Politics does Aristotle identify practical wisdom as the peculiar excellence of rulers when deliberation was said to be the common work of all citizens insofar as they are genuinely citizens? While these puzzles have individually received treatment in the literature, they have seldom been treated together. Taken independently, the passages in question can seem to express a more familiar conception of politics. In particular, each of the sameness claims made in (1) and (2) has too easily been assimilated to a more modern conception of the relation of ethics to politics and thereby domesticated. As I hope to show, in (1) Aristotle is not simply asserting that the human good in a city supervenes on the good as achieved by its inhabitants (since this by itself, while true, would fall short of establishing the political character of his inquiry in the NE); and in (2) he is not claiming only that political wisdom is a species of practical wisdom, but is rather asserting a more thoroughgoing identity between various types of deliberative excellence that are conventionally distinguished and assigned different names. Working through these passages will provide a sufficient basis for tackling (3), the question about the respective excellences of rulers and citizens. I will show that, despite his restriction of the exercise of practical wisdom to rulers, Aristotle imagines that non-ruling citizens will also exercise their political agency and thereby require a distinct rational excellence. More precisely, for Aristotle, there are two forms of political agency, deliberation on behalf of one’s community, which is perfected by practical-political wisdom, and the comprehension (sunesis) exercised by citizens on the basis of the view of life preserved by their character-virtues. Understood this way, the division of labor between rulers and citizens does not generate two spheres of activity, political and private, which could have unrelated excellences or concern distinct goods.
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LOCKWOOD, THORNTON C. "ὁμόνοια: The Hinge of Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics?" Dialogue 59, № 1 (березень 2020): 7–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217319000337.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Scholarship on the political ramifications of Aristotle’s account of friendship has focused on “political friendship” and has lost sight of the importance of his account of “like-mindedness” or “concord” (ὁμόνοια). Such a focus is mistaken for a number of reasons, not least of which is that, whereas Aristotle has a determinate account of like-mindedness, he has almost nothing to say about political friendship. My paper examines the ethical and political aspects of like-mindedness in light of a disagreement between Richard Bodéüs and René Gauthier about the autonomy of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics as a work of ethical theory.
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Berry, Matthew. "The Natural Part of Political Justice in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics." Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 25, no. 1 (2020): 1–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/epoche2020108167.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Scholars have advanced many different interpretations of Aristotle’s discussion of “the naturally just” in the Nicomachean Ethics. Most of these interpretations, however, pay insufficient attention to the context into which Aristotle introduces the concept, and in particular to Aristotle’s discussion of political justice, of which “the naturally just” is only a part. This paper seeks to recover that context and to offer a new interpretation of “the naturally just” as the part of political justice that is derived from the nature of republican politics, rather than from the agreement of fellow citizens.
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Miller, Benjamin. "Virtue, Knowledge, and Political Instability in Aristotle’s Politics: Lessons from the Eudemian Ethics." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 38, no. 2 (May 7, 2021): 261–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340325.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract I argue that we cannot fully understand Aristotle’s position on political stability and state preservation in the Politics with paying close attention to his Eudemian Ethics. We learn from considering the Politics and the Eudemian Ethics in concert that even ‘correct’ regimes are unstable when citizens do not possess full virtue. Aristotle introduces his formal account of the knowledge requirements for virtue in Eudemian Ethics 8.3, and he applies these knowledge requirements as an explanation for state decline in Politics 2.9 when discussing the Spartans. If we primarily focus on the Nicomachean Ethics as Aristotle’s single essential ethical work, we will not learn the lesson he intends his readers to take away from the Spartan discussion in the Politics: that virtue requires correct understanding of the hierarchy and structure of the good life. This knowledge prevents the erosion of the virtues of character and the decline of political regimes.
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Jochim, Jordan. "Aristotle, Tyranny, and the Small-Souled Subject." Political Theory 48, no. 2 (May 26, 2019): 169–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591719851802.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Political theorists converge in identifying modern techniques of domination as habit-formative and psychologically invasive, in contrast to earlier, more blatantly coercive forms of repression. Putting Aristotle on tyranny in conversation with Michel Foucault on subject formation, this article argues for continuity across the pre- and postmodern divide. Through a close reading of the “three heads of tyranny” in Politics 5.11 (1314a13-29)—those being the tyrant’s efforts to form subjects who (1) have small thoughts (2) are distrustful of one another, and (3) are incapable of action—I argue that central to Aristotle’s account of tyrannical domination is how tyrants cultivate the ethical vice of “small-souledness” ( Nicomachean Ethics 1123b7), thus producing subjects with humbled desires for a proportionate distribution of political power. This article deepens our appreciation of the social and psychological registers of Aristotle’s theorization of domination and gives reasons for continuing to take Aristotle’s insights into tyranny seriously today.
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Samaras, Athanasios. "Aristotle’s Best City in the Context of His Concept of Aretē." Polis: The Journal for Ancient Greek and Roman Political Thought 36, no. 1 (March 22, 2019): 139–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/20512996-12340199.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract The text of the Politics itself establishes beyond reasonable doubt that Aristotle’s best city is, in the philosopher’s own terms, an aristocracy: in Books III and IV Aristotle defines aristocracy as the regime that aims at the best, has virtue as its mark, does not allow citizenship to artisans and wage-earners, and distributes offices by merit. Books VII and VIII unequivocally attribute all these essential characteristics of aristocracy to Aristotle’s best city. In addition, his conception of the virtue of the citizens of this polis conforms to the traditional aristocratic interpretation of the term. Aristotle – citizenship – kaloskagathos – aristocratic virtue
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Nielsen, Karen. "Dirtying Aristotle's Hands? Aristotle's Analysis of 'Mixed Acts' in the Nicomachean Ethics III, 1." Phronesis 52, no. 3 (2007): 270–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156852807x208017.
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AbstractThe analysis of 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1 has led scholars to attribute a theory of 'dirty hands' and 'impossible oughts' to Aristotle. Michael Stocker argues that Aristotle recognizes particular acts that are simultaneously 'right, even obligatory', but nevertheless 'wrong, shameful and the like'. And Martha Nussbaum commends Aristotle for not sympathizing 'with those who, in politics or in private affairs, would so shrink from blame and from unacceptable action that they would be unable to take a necessary decision for the best'. In this paper I reexamine Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts' in Nicomachean Ethics III, 1, maintaining that Aristotle denies that there are acts that are (i) voluntary under the circumstances, (ii) right, all things considered, under the circumstances, but nevertheless (iii) shameful or wrong for moral or prudential reasons under the circumstances. The paper defends this interpretation with reference to Aristotle's discussion of shame in EN IV, 9 and Rhetoric II, 6, as well as his overall meta-ethical commitment to a position I call 'mitigated circumstantial relativism'. By focusing on Aristotle's analysis of putatively 'mixed acts', we come closer to a true appreciation of Aristotle's ethical theory, even though 'mixed act' is not, I argue, a category in Aristotle's considered ontology of action.