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Статті в журналах з теми "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
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Mahmood, Faiq, Amir Inam Bhutta, and Muhammad Usman. "Effect of Executive Ownership on the Relationship between Agency Cost and Equity Mispricing." Global Social Sciences Review IV, no. IV (October 30, 2019): 171–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.31703/gssr.2019(iv-iv).23.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The purpose of the current work is to investigate the influence of agency cost on equity mispricing for the firms listed on Pakistan Stock Exchange during the period from 2008 to 2016. Agency cost is estimated by asset utilization ratio, mispricing is computed by book- to -market ratio and some firms characteristic such as size, profitability and leverage are taken as control variables. Balanced panel method is used to estimate the results. The sample is divided into two parts on the basis of stock mispricing; undervalued and overvalued firms. The influence of agency costs is then separately examined on both sub-samples. Moreover, the effect of managerial ownership on the relationship between agency cost and mispricing is investigated. Results show that agency cost is positively linked with equity mispricing. Moreover, findings demonstrate that for undervalued firms, effect of agency costs is stronger but for overvalued firm, it is weaker and negative. Results are consistent with previous studies.
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Sackley, William H. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity." CFA Digest 35, no. 4 (November 2005): 91. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v35.n4.1790.
Повний текст джерела
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Jensen, Michael C. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity." Financial Management 34, no. 1 (March 2005): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-053x.2005.tb00090.x.
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Kałdoński, Michał, and Tomasz Jewartowski. "Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and Earnings Management in Companies Listed on WSE." Economics and Business Review 3 (17), no. 1 (2017): 7–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.18559/ebr.2017.1.2.
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Jensen, Michael C. "The Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity and the Current State of Corporate Finance." European Financial Management 10, no. 4 (December 2004): 549–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1354-7798.2004.00265.x.
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Liu, Chia-Ying, Shiu-Chen Huang, and Shieh-Liang Chen. "The Effects of Agency Costs and Insiders’ Shareholdings on Financing Choices." Asian Journal of Finance & Accounting 8, no. 1 (April 16, 2016): 127. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ajfa.v8i1.9288.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
<p><span style="font-size: medium;">This paper investigates the effects of debt agency cost and equity </span><span style="font-size: medium;">agency cost of current and prior periods on the financing choices of long-term debts, seasoned equity offering, and private equity financings. It also examines the effects of the shareholdings of insiders on the association between both debt and equity agency costs and the choice of financing methods. </span></p>The findings show that both prior and current debt agency costs are positively related to seasoned equity offerings of current period, and both prior and current debt agency costs are positively related to private equity financing of current period regardless of whether the models consider the factor of insiders’ shareholdings. As for equity agency cost, the document indicate that both current and prior equity agency costs are negatively related to current seasoned equity offerings, however, only prior equity agency costs are negatively related to current seasoned equity offerings under considering shareholdings of insiders. Moreover, the shareholdings of insiders would affect the positive association between the corporate debt agency cost and seasoned equity offerings and the positive association between the corporate equity agency cost and debt financing.
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Warr, Richard S., William B. Elliott, Johanna Koëter-Kant, and Özde Öztekin. "Equity Mispricing and Leverage Adjustment Costs." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, no. 3 (January 17, 2012): 589–616. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109012000051.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractWe find that equity mispricing impacts the speed at which firms adjust to their target leverage (TL) and does so in predictable ways depending on whether the firm is over- or underlevered. For example, firms that are above their TL and should therefore issue equity (or retire debt) adjust more rapidly toward their target when their equity is overvalued. However, when a firm is undervalued but needs to reduce leverage, the speed of adjustment is much slower. Our findings support the role of equity mispricing as an important factor that alters the cost of making capital structure adjustments.
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Bargeron, Leonce, and Alice Bonaime. "Why Do Firms Disagree with Short Sellers? Managerial Myopia versus Private Information." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 55, no. 8 (October 18, 2019): 2431–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000851.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Though short sellers on average succeed at identifying overvalued equity, firms often signal disagreement with short sellers by repurchasing stock when short interest increases. We investigate whether this disagreement reflects a myopic defense of inflated prices, or positive private information. These repurchases appear motivated by managers’ private information, not agency issues, even when managerial benefits to short-termism are enhanced or monitoring is weaker. Managers’ informational advantage relates to subsequent news, earnings, and risk, but is attenuated if activists target management or insiders sell. A trading strategy based on our findings earns 7.5% annually.
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Krishnaswamy, C. R. "An analysis of the performance of private equity: Agency cost approach." Corporate Ownership and Control 6, no. 3 (2009): 424–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv6i3c4p1.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this paper, we explore the effects of agency costs on the performance of private equity. We discuss why private equity firms generally have much lower agency costs. We show using Capital Asset Pricing Model approach that private equity funds would be better off by investing in firms with low beta than high beta firms.
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Majeed, Muhammad Ansar, Xianzhi Zhang, and Muhammad Umar. "Impact of investment efficiency on cost of equity: evidence from China." Journal of Asia Business Studies 12, no. 1 (January 2, 2018): 44–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jabs-09-2015-0163.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of investment efficiency on cost of equity capital. Design/methodology/approach Prior research indicated that any governance mechanism which reduces the agency conflict reduces the cost of equity capital. This study provides empirical evidence that investment efficiency represents such governance mechanism which reduces agency conflict and hence cost of equity. The authors use price earning growth ratio (Easton, 2004) and Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) model for the measurement of cost of equity while investment efficiency measure of Biddle et al. (2009) have been employed to examine the association. We also use Chen et al. (2013) measure of investment efficiency for robustness. Findings The results show that investment efficiency is negatively associated with cost of equity. It was also found that there is a strong relationship of investment efficiency with cost of equity for non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs), while no significant relationship is found for state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, overinvestment is significantly associated with cost of equity capital. However, no significant relationship was found between underinvestment and cost of equity. Originality/value The results provide empirical support to the argument that investment efficiency acts as a mechanism which represents lower agency conflict. Moreover, the findings provide evidence that government act as “deep pocket” while NSOEs are punished by investors for inefficient resource allocation. This study also proposes that there is a positive relationship between overinvestment and cost of equity.
Дисертації з теми "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
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Raoli, Elisa. "Market misvaluation and earnings management. Evidence from Italian financial market." Doctoral thesis, Luiss Guido Carli, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/11385/200809.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Classical and behavioural finance theory overview. Classical finance theory. Market Inefficiencies. Behavioural Finance Theory. Investors’ Sentiment. Stock market overvaluation and undervaluation. Earnings management. Earnings management definition. The relationship between earnings and stock market. The relation between earnings management and stock market incentives. Detecting Earnings Management. The agency theory of overvalued equity and earnings management. Empirical evidences supporting the Jensen’s agency cost of overvalued equity and earnings management. Hypothesis Development. The Italian Insider System. The Italian institutional contest. Earnings management in Italy. Sample, Data and Variables’ Description. Sample description and data gathering. Variables’ description. Dependent variable: Change in Current Accruals and Change in Discretionary Accruals. Independent variable: Change in Market to Book Ratio. Control Variables. Model Specification and Descriptive Statistics. Model Specification. Descriptive statistics. Primary test – Changes in Total Accruals as a Dependent Variable. Robustness checks. Alternative sample composition. Alternative model specification.
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Hijazi, Bassem. "Bank Loans as a Financial Discipline: A Direct Agency Cost of Equity Perspective." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2006. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc5411/.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In a 2004 study, Harvey, Lin and Roper argue that debt makers with a commitment to monitoring can create value for outside shareholders whenever information asymmetry and agency costs are pronounced. I investigate Harvey, Lin and Roper's claim for bank loans by empirically testing the effect of information asymmetry and direct agency costs on the abnormal returns of the borrowers' stock around the announcement of bank loans. I divide my study into two main sections. The first section tests whether three proxies of the direct agency costs of equity are equally significant in measuring the direct costs associated with outside equity agency problems. I find that the asset utilization ratio proxy is the most statistically significant proxy of the direct agency costs of equity using a Chow F-test statistic. The second main section of my dissertation includes and event study and a cross-sectional analysis. The event study results document significant and positive average abnormal returns of 1.01% for the borrowers' stock on the announcement day of bank loans. In the cross sectional analysis of the borrowers' average abnormal stock returns, I find that higher quality and more reputable banks/lenders provide a reliable certification to the capital market about the low level of the borrowers' direct agency costs of equity and information asymmetry. This certification hypothesis holds only for renewed bank loans. In other words, in renewing the borrowers' line of credit, the bank/lender is actually confirming that the borrower has a low level of information asymmetry and direct costs of equity. Given such a certificate from the banks/lenders, shareholders reward the company/borrower by bidding the share price up in the capital market.
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Zhu, Yin. "Essays on accounting and incentives in Chinese equity markets." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2015. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/essays-on-accounting-and-incentives-in-chinese-equity-markets(74adb2ee-0cfc-40f6-8d62-392ab7bbdc1b).html.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
In this thesis, I exploit accounting issues in the Chinese context with a particular focus on the role of government. The thesis consists of three empirical essays, examining how the state coordinates among the state-owned enterprises in executive compensation (essay 1), how the government regulates the dividend payouts of listed firms (essay 2) and how the delisting regulation influences the accounting choices of listed firms (essay 3).The first essay examines relative performance evaluation (RPE) in China. Previous studies of RPE for executive compensations in Western developed markets have produced mixed findings. This is partly because the dispersion of share ownership in Western capital markets does not closely correspond with the single-principal/multi-agent theoretical setting assumed by Holmstrom (1982). In this study, I exploit the existence of a large number of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China to examine RPE in a setting closer to the theoretical assumption. I find that SOEs are more likely to use RPE for executive compensation than non-SOEs. This is consistent with better cross-firm coordination in executive contracting among SOEs under a common “state” principal than among non-SOEs with dispersed principals similar to Western firms. Furthermore, I find a more pronounced RPE effect among SOEs that are larger or have poorer past performance. This implies that the state principal has greater incentives to monitor strategically important firms or those in distress. The second essay examines the market reaction to and earnings management choices around changes in the regulations requiring a higher minimum dividend payout in China to shed new light on the determinants of dividend payout policy. I find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that paid less than the new required minimum payout than for those that paid more than the new required minimum, consistent with agency cost explanations of dividend payout. In addition, I find that low dividend payers exhibit a greater tendency to manage their earnings downwards to comply with the earnings-based threshold, and investors can “see through” such earnings management behaviors. My findings support the view of DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2009) that agency costs of free cash flow retention are an important part of the dividend payout story. The third essay explores the earnings-based delisting rule in China that provides particularly strong motivation to manage earnings above the loss/profit threshold. I identify two groups of firms that successfully avoid being ST-ed, i.e. firms with a one-year loss before returning to profit, and firms with consecutive small profits. I provide a comprehensive examination of earnings management in terms of accruals management, real earnings management and non-operating income, to investigate whether Chinese firms manage earnings either to avoid reporting a loss or to avoid reporting two consecutive losses. Though there are mixed results sensitive to the research design for earnings management pattern in the two groups of firms, this study provides insights into earnings management induced by a government regulation.
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Puleo, Michael. "Insider Share-Pledging and Firm Investors." Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2016. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/386109.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Business Administration/FinancePh.D.
Corporate insiders frequently borrow from lending institutions and pledge personal equity shares as collateral for the loan. Using manually collected pledge data for January 2007-December 2011, I examine how this phenomena affects firm investors and analyze agency conflicts between pledging managers and (a) outside shareholders, and (b) bondholders. Pledging potentially influences investor risk through changing managerial incentives and/or contingency risk from ill-timed margin calls. Findings suggest influential insiders extract private benefits of control at the expense of outside shareholders through pledging. Difference-in-differences regressions utilizing an exogenous shock to lending supply indicate pledging corresponds with a 9.9% relative increase in stock volatility – controlling for changes in fundamentals – and support a causal interpretation of the relation between pledging and equity risk. Despite apparently harming equity investors however, further analysis suggests pledging benefits bondholders, and corresponds with an economically and statistically significant reduction in yield spreads on corporate bonds. Robustness tests evidence reductions in risky financing when insiders pledge, corroborating the negative relation between pledging and cost of debt and consistent with mitigated agency conflicts between managers and bondholders.
Temple University--Theses
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Burkhardt, Kirsten. "Le rôle des sociétés de capital-investissement dans la formation d'alliances stratégiques." Thesis, Dijon, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014DIJOE009/document.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Ce travail analyse le rôle des sociétés de capital-investissement dans la formation d’alliances stratégiques sur le marché français du capital-investissement. Après nous être fait une idée de l’importance du phénomène à l’aide des informations nouvelles que nous avons générées par notre propre enquête, nous apportons une explication au phénomène observé. L’analyse théorique se fait sous l’angle de la création de valeur actionnariale, en recourant conjointement aux théories contractuelles et cognitives. Les théories sociologiques des réseaux viennent compléter les principaux arguments de ces deux cadres théoriques. Le modèle explicatif qui en découle est ensuite mis à l’épreuve empirique à l’aide d’une étude multi-méthodes à visée infirmationniste, combinant une analyse économétrique et une étude de cas multiples. Nos résultats permettent de conclure que les sociétés françaises de capital-investissement jouent un rôle tant intentionnel que non intentionnel dans la formation d’alliances stratégiques pour leurs participations. Ces rôles mettent en avant une intervention tant passive qu’active des sociétés françaises de capital-investissement. Bien que l’argumentation cognitive trouve, dans son ensemble, plus de support que l’argumentation contractuelle, l’analyse fait ressortir l’intérêt de recourir à une utilisation conjointe des théories contractuelles et cognitives qui se révèlent complémentairesThis research analyses the role of Private Equity firms in the formation of strategic alliances within the field of the French Private Equity market. We start to provide evidence of its importance from new survey information, before offering an explanation of the organizational phenomenon. The study addresses the questions of how and why Private Equity firms act as relational intermediaries to help their portfolio companies form alliances. Both questions are investigated in the light of the Private Equity firms’ contribution to the value creation process that comes with alliance formation. Answers are provided by means of three jointly used theoretical frameworks: (1) mainstream theories (transaction cost theory and the positive theory of agency); (2) the knowledge based view; and 3) social network theories to complement the resulting from jointly use of the previous two theories. The theoretical construct is then tested empirically by means of a multi-method study with explanatory design, based on the pattern of joint evidence from both statistical tests and a multiple case study. Results show that French Private Equity firms do play a role in alliance formation. This role can be intentional as well as non-intentional. Furthermore, although arguments from the knowledge-based perspective finds more support in explaining this behavior than from the mainstream theories, our study highlights the benefits of the joint use of these theories and the complementary nature of them to better explaining the phenomenon as a whole
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HUANG, YU-CHEN, and 黃昱甄. "Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/01100880424095238787.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士國立臺北大學
會計學系
94
The main purpose of this study is to explore the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. A series of papers by Jensen (2002; 2005) demonstrate that, when a firm’s equity is overvalued that it will not, except by pure luck, be able to deliver the financial performance the market requires justifying that valuation, managers are likely to take actions designed to meet the market’s optimistic expectations and sustain the overvaluation, instead of disseminating information disappoint capital markets. They are more likely to generate the appearance of improved performance in the short run. Such actions, however, may sacrifice equity value of the firms in the long run. Kothari, Loutskina, Nikolaev (2005) find that, there is a positive relation between leading period returns and year zero accruals for high accrual-decile firms, however the price reverses in subsequent year. In addition, investment-financing decisions and insider trading activity also correspond with the agency theory of overvalued equity. This study uses Earnings-Based Valuation Model to estimate the theoretical value of a firm’s equity with public available information and management foresight information. The difference between actual and theoretical value is misvaluation. By comparing with the misvaluations which happen in different situations, we test whether asymmetric information exists or not. Moreover, taking assets utilization rate, discretional expense rate and firm size as the proxies of agency costs to examine the connection between agency costs and misvaluation. Research data were collected from TSEC listed companies issued seasoned equity from 1994 to 2002, and the major findings are summarized as follows: 1.SEO companies are more likely to issue equity when stock price are overestimated. 2.Misevaluation based on management foresight information is more than misvaluation based on public available information, and the result shows that when the equity is overvalued, information asymmetries is more serious. 3.There is a significantly negative relation between assets utilization rate and misvaluation, as well as firm size and misevaluation. However, as we separate samples into over-group and under-group by positive or negative value of misevaluation, such significant relation only exists in over-group. This finding implied that the relation between agency costs and misvaluation may not be linear.
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孫惠莉. "Threshold Effect in the Relationship between Overvalued Equity and Agency Costs-Evidence from TSE-listing Hi-tech Companies." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/08202896953135855304.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士逢甲大學
會計學系
101
The study is based on TSE-listing high-tech companies from 1997 to 2005 to probe into the relationship between overvalued equity and agency costs. The present study adopts panel smooth transition regression model (PSTR) to examine the effect of overvalued/undervalued equity (PF) on agency costs. The empirical evidence confirms the non-linear relationship between the market value of equity and agency costs. When the PF ranges from 0.4631 to 1.3351, the PF is negative relevant to the free cash flow. However, when the PF is above 1.3351 or below 0.4631, it is positive relevant to the free cash flow. Meanwhile, when the PF is below 1.569, the PF is positive relevant to the management’s share; however, when it is above 1.569, the PF is negative relevant to the management’s share. The former literature mostly went to extremes, roughly categorizing the market value of equity into the overvalued and the undervalued groups. The present study confirms the non-linear relationship between the PF and the agency costs to improve the former literature.
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Huang, Hong-Fei, and 黃鴻飛. "Does Managerial Ability Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/mh65jd.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
102
This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm''s CEO''s ability, the more serious the firm''s B-E agency problem. Furthermore, we find that the instability in a firm''s CEOs’ ability also significantly affect the firm''s B-E agency problem.
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Chang, Yi-Huan, and 張翊桓. "Does Firm Location Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?" Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54125249309753847366.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士國立臺灣大學
財務金融學研究所
101
This study explores the relation between the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) and firm location by using the B-E agency proxy developed by Taylor (2010). By employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years, we hypothesize that remotely located firms are more likely to suffer higher B-E agency problem because geographic location limits the ability of minority equity investors to monitor the boards of remotely located firms. We use five different variables to represent location and remoteness of the firm’s headquarters. The empirical results of this study show that a firm’s location significantly affects its B-E agency problem. Higher distance to major city worsens the B-E agency problem.
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Chen, Guo-Chang, and 陳國彰. "A Study of the Relationships Between Corporate Governance and the Equity Capital Cost for Taiwan Listing Electronic Companies by Central Agency Problems." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57135979041366215808.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
碩士國立交通大學
經營管理研究所
94
Based on the central agency problem between controlling shareholder and minor shareholders, this research uses the five dimensions, which namely ownership structure, board composition, manage pattern, abnormal relatet party transaction, and stock overinvestment of controlling shareholder amounting to fourteen variables, to investage the relationships between central agency problem and the equity capital cost for Taiwain listing electronic companies. Empirical results are summarized below:1.In terms of ownership structure, the larger the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholder is, the larger the positive incentive effect is, and leads to higher equity capital cost.2.When the deviation between the voting rights and the cash flow rights is larger, it implys larger negative invasion effect and results in higher equity capital cost.3.In terms of the board composition, when controlling shareholder members occupy fewer directors or supervisor sits and the company has more independent directors or supervisors, the board is less dominated by controlling shareholder and leads to the lower equity capital cost. 4.In terms of management pattern, when the shares held by institutional investors are higher, the external monitors are better for the companies and lead to lower equity capital cost.5.In terms of abnormal related party transaction, there is no obvious relationships between the variable and the equity capital cost.6.In terms of stock overinvestment of the controlling shareholder, when the pledged share ratio and the overinvestiment ratio is higher, stock overinvestment behavior of the controlling shareholder is more apparent and results in higher equity cpital cost. We combine the fourteen variables into one Corporate Governance Index (CGI) and have shown that index is negatively related to equity capital cost. Higer CGI leads to lower equity cost because the central agency problem is slight and the interests of the minor shareholder could be less deprived by the controlling shareholder.
Книги з теми "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
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Thompson, R. Steve. U.K.management buyouts deals: Debt, equity and agency cost implications. Nottingham: Centre for Management Buy-Out Research, 1990.
Знайти повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
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Owen, Geoffrey, Tom Kirchmaier, and Jeremy Grant. "Michael Jensen on Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity." In Corporate Governance in the US and Europe, 21–24. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230512450_2.
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"Agency Cost Mitigation." In Corporate Governance and Responsible Investment in Private Equity, 47–72. Cambridge University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108641838.004.
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Wirtz, Peter. "Entrepreneurial Finance and the Creation of Value." In Advances in Business Strategy and Competitive Advantage, 552–68. IGI Global, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/978-1-4666-8348-8.ch030.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The O.M. Scott case study published in 1989 has come to be a classic in modern corporate finance. High leverage traditionally appears as a strong incentive to refrain from sub-optimal investment behavior by self-interested managers. Thus reducing managerial agency cost has been considered as an essential driver of enhanced value in much of financial modeling. The present chapter attempts a somewhat different, albeit complementary, mainly resource based interpretation of the very rich empirical material contained in Baker and Wruck's description of the Scott-LBO. In fact, a close reading of the case suggests that the observed significant increase in operating performance post-LBO is to a great extent the consequence of yet unexplored cognitive changes induced by the private equity firm leading the operation. One may hypothesize that concepts of cognitive value and cognitive cost are relevant to entrepreneurial finance, especially in the case of funding highly innovative young ventures.
Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Agency cost of overvalued equity"
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Wan, Congying, and Jian Xu. "The Impact of Equity Structure Reform on the Relationship between Equity Structure and Equity Agency Cost: An Empirical Analysis of Retail Listed Companies." In 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2009.5301172.
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