Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Access to a judge"

The temporary removal of a judge from the administration of justice is a relatively new measure to ensure criminal proceedings in criminal procedural law and is carried out by the High Council of Justice. At the same time, as evidenced by the practice of its implementation, there are certain issues that necessitate their study and discussion. Therefore, the procedure of temporary suspension of a judge from the administration of justice is characterized by features that are due to the special legal status of judges. It is the need to ensure the independence of judges that provides for a special procedure for their removal. At the same time, the temporary removal of a judge is a measure that involves the removal from justice of judges in respect of whom there are reasonable doubts about their suitability for office, high rank of judge, to confirm or deny the relevant information. This is necessary to maintain confidence in the judiciary as a whole. The purpose of the article is to study the procedural procedure for the application of temporary suspension of a judge from the administration of justice. The article examines the procedural procedure for the application of temporary suspension of a judge from the administration of justice. It is emphasized that the institution of temporary suspension of judges exists for the timely suspension of a judge. The peculiarities of the procedural order of application of temporary suspension of a judge from the administration of justice have been determined. It is concluded that based on the results of the consideration of the petition, the High Council of Justice may make the following decisions: on the temporary suspension of a judge from the administration of justice in connection with criminal prosecution or on the denial of such a petition. It was found that the suspension did not restrict access to the court premises, as well as to the materials of previously distributed cases. Therefore, if a judge is removed without a precautionary measure in the form of round-the-clock house arrest / detention, the court will continue to go to work. A judge may also continue to perform administrative functions as chairman of the court or judgespeaker. Continue lecturing at the School of Judges, or continue to take bribes.

The authors examine the content of the terms access to the court and access to justice. These terms can be considered identical in a system based on the material rule of law (material legal state), that respects its principles. Social reality, sometimes, however, proves the opposite. The successfulness of ensuring (guaranteeing) the access to justice is determined, first and foremost, by the quality of the personal substrate of the judicial authorities – mainly judges themselves. The authors identify which personal characteristics are crucial in this regard. These include the judge´s level of professionalism (due professional care), moral integrity and communication competence. In order to consider the judicial decision-making process as the process (procedure) leading to justice, all of these requirements must be met at the same time.

Jan Crawford has reported that President Donald Trump is strongly considering appointing Judge Neil Gorsuch of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit to the U.S. Supreme Court. I do not know Judge Gorsuch, but I do know his opinion in Prost v. Anderson, which is a rather wonky case on a somewhat technical area of federal habeas law. Prost provides an interesting insight into Judge Gorsuch’s jurisprudence. The case concerns an issue on which the courts of appeals disagree, so it provides a nice glimpse into how Judge Gorsuch might address matters that are reasonably susceptible to different resolution, as many of the Supreme Court’s cases are. Prost illustrates how Judge Gorsuch will balance competing considerations of fairness and administrability in criminal law. While there is much to like about Prost—it is well written, clearly reasoned, and adopts an administrable rule—the opinion also raises some concerns. The opinion overvalues proceduralism relative to substantive rights in a way that will have the effect of eroding litigants’ access to courts.

AbstractAlthough the figure of the wise judge may be a universal trope, respect is not automatically accorded every person who passes judgment on another. To be perceived as legitimate, judges must occupy an institutional status with the power to decide controverted cases and must have access to specialized or even sacred knowledge and moral authority. Historically, Asian judges could claim legitimacy through their connection to transcendent legal principles, such as dhamma or dao or shari’a. In contemporary Asia, however, conceptions of law and legal legitimacy have become pluralistic, contested, and contradictory. Judges may to some extent retain a connection to the sacred and the transcendent, yet that connection is no longer sufficient in itself to insulate their judgments—or their character—from criticism. How, then, can the “good judge” be distinguished from judges who fall short of the mark? In this Special Issue, five distinguished scholars explore the crisis of legitimation as it affects judging and judgment in Sri Lanka, India, China, Indonesia, and Thailand.

If his Supreme Court posture on free expression cases continues to favor free expression about half of the time, Justice Scalia will be a pleasant surprise. But in access and reputation cases, the odds of Scalia backing the press are more like 1 to 3.

Temporary access to things and a document as an institution that restricts human rights and freedoms in criminal proceedings and its main properties have been studied. Attention is drawn to the problem of numerous risks of human rights violations during the application of temporary access to things and documents due to unfounded and weak argumentation of investigators' requests for temporary access, as well as a superficial assessment of circumstances by the investigating judge due to overload of requests. Statistical data have been studied, which indicate the need for consistent reform of judicial control in the direction of studying the materials and making informed decisions. Temporary access to things and documents in the criminal process is part of the institution of measures to ensure criminal proceedings. It attracts the attention of scholars because it has a rather complicated procedure for obtaining a decision on temporary access to things and documents, which must be provided by the investigating judge based on the results of the petition. The mechanism of judicial control indicates that this measure to some extent restricts the rights, freedoms or legitimate interests of a person – a participant in criminal proceedings or a third party. Related to this is the problem of the measure under investigation, which is the risk of violation of the rights of individuals, because every year the investigating judges receive a large number of requests for temporary access, and there are specific features in terms of providing temporary access to things and documents containing legally protected secret.

Everyone has the right to a fair examination and resolution of his or her case by an independent, impartial, lawfully constituted court acting in conformity with this Code. These guarantees take the form of the constitutional principle of free access to justice, the violation of which is sanctioned by declaring absolute nullity of procedural acts obtained or adopted contrary to this principle. There is sufficient evidence to show that the appointment of investigating judges during the period 2015-2018 was in violation of the provisions of Article 151 of Law No. 514/1995 on the Organization of Judges - that, in the editorial office up to January 12, 2018, which regulated that an investigating judge may hold that dignity only if he has previously held the position of judge for at least 3 years. Unfortunately, these deviations, whether consciously or mistakenly admitted by the Superior Council of Magistracy, have had and will have the most unexpected consequences, because those investigating judges accused of violating the law have committed a series of procedural acts that are thus rendered null and void.

Currently, the process is underway to bring the entire array of legislative sources defining the judicial system and the status of judges in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation. In the legislative strategy, it seems important to resolve the issue of the higher legal education required for judges. The article substantiates a broad approach to understanding the higher legal education required for a judge, within the framework of which both a higher legal education of a general nature (universal) and a legal education of a special orientation are permissible. This conclusion is based: a) on the basis of the circumstances of the development of the system of higher legal education in Russia, which acts as a social regulator of the formal qualification requirement for the education of a candidate for a judge; b) on the requirements of access to the judicial profession, which imply the possibility of entering the judicial profession for representatives of different professional groups.

Abstract “Intervention” is not synonymous with “care.” For an intervention to constitute care—which patients should have a right to access—it must be technically feasible and licit. Now these criteria do not prove sufficient; numerous archaic interventions remain feasible and legally permissible, yet are now bywords for spurious care. Therefore, we propound another necessary condition for an intervention to become care: the physician must rationally judge the intervention to be conducive to the patient’s good. Consequently, the right of access-to-care relies on physicians being free to practice medicine in accord with their consciences, conscience being the rational faculty with which they judge the reasonableness of even mundane medical decisions. Since physicians operate as part of a community, it is further necessary to consider when central bodies may reasonably compel physicians to engage in interventions that the physician believes are not consistent with the patient’s good and/or are not congruent with the purposes of medicine.