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Статті в журналах з теми "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
Tardeli, Rodrigo Martiniano. "DIREITO E MORAL EM HERBERT HART/RIGHT AND MORAL IN HERBERT HART." Revista Diorito 1, no. 1 (August 1, 2017): 21. http://dx.doi.org/10.26702/rd.v1i1.7.
Повний текст джерелаKORZHENYAK, ANASTASIA, and ANTON MIKHAILOV. "THE LEGAL DOCTRINE OF JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND AS THE EVOLUTION OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL POSITIVIST TRADITION." Sociopolitical Sciences 11, no. 5 (October 28, 2021): 73–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2223-0092-2021-11-5-73-78.
Повний текст джерелаDerussi, Fabiano. "O Conceito De Sistema Jurídico: Um Olhar Sobre a CISG." Teorias do Direito e Realismo Jurídico 1, no. 1 (December 7, 2015): 242. http://dx.doi.org/10.26668/indexlawjournals/2525-9601/2015.v1i1.312.
Повний текст джерелаSimioni, Rafael Lazzarotto, and Rodrigo Barbosa. "Regras de reconhecimento e a legitimidade da decisão jurídica em Hart." Revista Debates 10, no. 3 (December 22, 2016): 153. http://dx.doi.org/10.22456/1982-5269.69360.
Повний текст джерелаKoval, Sofya V. "The History and Foundations of Criticism of H.L.A. Hart’s Legal Positivism in R. Dworkin’s Philosophy of Law." Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 62, no. 7 (October 10, 2019): 124–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.30727/0235-1188-2019-62-7-124-142.
Повний текст джерелаStrikaitė-Latušinskaja, Goda. "Can We Make All Legal Norms into Legal Syllogisms and Why is That Important in Times of Artificial Intelligence?" Access to Justice in Eastern Europe 5, no. 1 (December 15, 2021): 8–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.33327/ajee-18-5.1-a000095.
Повний текст джерелаDiaz Romero, Ubaldina. "Una aproximación a las fuentes: La regla de reconocimiento en la teoría de Herbert L. A. Hart." Estudios de Filosofía, November 9, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.348545.
Повний текст джерелаRio, Laura Souza Pires do. "A religião como fundamento ético para os direitos humanos segundo o pensamento de John Finnis." HORIZONTE - Revista de Estudos de Teologia e Ciências da Religião, December 31, 2019, 1651. http://dx.doi.org/10.5752/p.2175-5841.2019v17n54p1651.
Повний текст джерелаBalon, Jan, and John Holmwood. "Race, nation and empire; the forgotten sociology of Herbert Adolphus Miller." Journal of Classical Sociology, October 3, 2022, 1468795X2211263. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1468795x221126330.
Повний текст джерелаBalon, Jan, and John Holmwood. "Immigration, Domination, and ‘Proportional Patriotism’: Recovering the Sociology of Herbert Adolphus Miller." American Sociologist, March 19, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12108-022-09530-7.
Повний текст джерелаДисертації з теми "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
López, Pérez Nicolás. "H. L. A. Hart y las sirenas cientificistas. Una genealogía de la tradición analítica de la filosofía del derecho de los siglos XX y XXI." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2016. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/136654.
Повний текст джерелаEsta tesis presenta una reflexión metateórica de la historia de la filosofía del derecho de los siglos XX y XXI al interior de la tradición analítica. Para dicho propósito se divide en tres ejes argumentativos. El primero presenta la elucidación de la noción de tradición analítica en filosofía, a partir de la distinción entre “tradiciones y concepciones filosóficas” propuesta por M. E. Orellana Benado, con el fin de dar cuenta de sus orígenes, rasgos distintivos y discusiones más relevantes. El segundo ofrece una comprensión iusfilosófica de la tradición analítica en el siglo XX. Sobre la base de: la Teoría Pura del Derecho (1934) de Hans Kelsen y El Concepto de Derecho (1961) de H. L. A. Hart. Analizando las dos aproximaciones metodológicas de este último (al derecho como sociología descriptiva y como teoría jurídica analítica) y sus puntos centrales. Finalmente, revisa las consecuencias que trajo la publicación de la segunda edición de El Concepto de Derecho (1994) con el Postscript, añadido por sus editores, texto en el que Hart responde a sus críticos. El tercer eje argumentativo muestra en dos partes el desarrollo de la filosofía jurídica analítica de los tres primeros lustros del siglo XXI. Una de ellas considera la importancia y actualidad de los proyectos de Kelsen y Hart, mientras que la otra indagará en el surgimiento de nuevas concepciones iusfilosóficas como el naturalismo jurídico, el pragmatismo jurídico, el Law & Economics y los estudios críticos del derecho
Delatorre, Rogério. "A interpretação/aplicação judicial do direito e a discricionariedade judicial: um diálogo com pensamento de Ronald Dworkin e Herbert Hart." Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/10923/2438.
Повний текст джерелаThis work addresses some of the most important issues about judicial discretionary powers. Positivist perspectives are reviewed and it is suggested methods to surpass its doctrine, whose teachings have not been adequate enough to explain a plausible interpretation of Law. It is defended that the act of enforcing the law is unique and demands interpretation, comprehension and application of Law. Therefore, it is argued in this research that hermeneutical philosophy approach (GADAMER) is essential because the linguistic turning point has ceased traditional separation of subject and object, and it is understood that well-founded interpretation shall be present when both elements are put together. These issues have been framed from the debates between the law philosophers Herbert Hart and Ronald Dworkin. According to Herbert Hart, a soft positivist, it is allowed, in hard cases (based on problems of uncertainty about rights), to enforce rules in different manners, and the judge may use his creative power when facing the open texture of the rules. On the other hand, Ronald Dworkin denies discretionary powers to judges because they must give “the right answer” in all cases grounded on pre-existing moral principals. It is sustained in this research that the “right answer approach” (DWORKIN) is not compatible with democratic values in a constitutionally pluralistic community, and in every case the adjudicator must reach the “best answer” (JUAREZ FREITAS) among all possibilities.
Nesta dissertação questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a superação das posturas positivistas, as quais não se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fenômeno da interpretação do direito. A idéia central é a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito é único e implica a interpretação, a compreensão e a aplicação do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermenêutica filosófica (GADAMER) é fundamental, pois a viragem lingüística rompeu com a tradicional separação entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpretação somente ocorre na devida união entre ambos. A partir das discussões travadas pelos jusfilósofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin traçamos os contornos desta questão. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos difíceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente à textura aberta das regras o juiz irá dispor de seu poder de criação do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricionário, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a “resposta correta”, baseado nos princípios morais pré-existentes à decisão judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a “única resposta correta” (DWORKIN) não corresponde aos ideais democráticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a “melhor resposta” (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que estão à sua disposição.
Bilhalva, Gabriel Vieira. "A construção do método em O conceito de direito." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/131755.
Повний текст джерелаWith the publication of Herbert Hart’s “The Concept of Law”, a whole new range of problems were introduced in legal theory and they became the core of debates in legal philosophy from the second half of the 20th century, especially for legal positivism. The issue of method is relevant within this set of problems. The central theses of “The concept of Law” rely directly on corresponding theses about the possibility of a descriptive legal theory that takes into account the internal perspective of the participants of a legal system. The way Hart structures this theory is unique because, differently from other authors within a positivist tradition, he does not use a concept of science or scientific methods in order to develop the theory. The question is not about importing methods so as to obtain advances. In contrast, Hart advocates that, to obtain a better theoretical comprehension of the law, we need to meet the specifications of the object while developing the theory. In other words, in order to know which type of method will be used in law theory, it is necessary to know in advance the exact features of the object, so as to format a method that is adequate for those characteristics.
Campos, Fernando Rosa. "Filosofia da linguagem do século XX no conceito de direito de Herbert Hart." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/185972.
Повний текст джерелаThe main goal of this paper is to establish to what extent the work “The Concept of Law” was influenced by philosophical theories of language from the 20th century. First are considered some passages of this work, together with some pronouncements of its author Herbert Hart that appear to confirm that his theses were so influenced. Then are shown some interpretations that recognize the influence between the author and theses from the philosophy of language, together with other interpretations that deny this relationship. Special attention is given to the perception of Ronald Dworkin of the subject given its historical relevance and the fact that it recognize a relationship between these theses and uses it as basis for criticism of the arguments expressed in The Concept of Law. Once these distinctive interpretations are stablished, the main ideas and goals of the Oxford language philosophers, given their relationship and proximity to Hart, are exposed. Once these theses are dealt with, varied moments of the bibliography of Herbert Hart are considered in order to show the connection between his works and the language theses here exposed. After these point are considered and a distinct understanding of the subject is developed the criticism of Dworkin and other authors are retaken. This last point aims to show how the understanding developed in this paper also develops a defense of Hart’s theory from some mischaracterizations of his work.
Delatorre, Rog?rio. "A interpreta??o/aplica??o judicial do direito e a discricionariedade judicial : um di?logo com pensamento de Ronald Dworkin e Herbert Hart." Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2009. http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/4046.
Повний текст джерелаNesta disserta??o questionamos alguns dos aspectos mais importantes da teoria da discricionariedade judicial. Criticamos e propomos a supera??o das posturas positivistas, as quais n?o se mostram adequadas para bem explicar o fen?meno da interpreta??o do direito. A id?ia central ? a defesa de que o ato aplicativo do direito ? ?nico e implica a interpreta??o, a compreens?o e a aplica??o do direito. Propomos, assim, que a abordagem da hermen?utica filos?fica (GADAMER) ? fundamental, pois a viragem ling??stica rompeu com a tradicional separa??o entre o sujeito e o objeto, e se passou a entender que a boa interpreta??o somente ocorre na devida uni?o entre ambos. A partir das discuss?es travadas pelos jusfil?sofos Herbert Hart e Ronald Dworkin tra?amos os contornos desta quest?o. Para Hart, um positivista brando, frente aos casos dif?ceis (baseados nos problemas da incerteza do direito), permite-se que as regras sejam aplicadas de diversas maneiras, e frente ? textura aberta das regras o juiz ir? dispor de seu poder de cria??o do direito. Por outro lado, Ronald Dworkin nega que o juiz tenha poder discricion?rio, pois em todo e qualquer caso tem a responsabilidade de encontrar a resposta correta, baseado nos princ?pios morais pr?-existentes ? decis?o judicial. Defende-se, ao final, que a ?nica resposta correta (DWORKIN) n?o corresponde aos ideais democr?ticos de uma sociedade constitucionalmente pluralista, e em todo caso o juiz deve procurar a melhor resposta (JUAREZ FREITAS) entre as possibilidades que est?o ? sua disposi??o.
Lacroix, Sébastien. "Étude philosophique du renversement juridique canadien concernant l'aide médicale à mourir, à la lumière du débat Hart-Dworkin." Master's thesis, Université Laval, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11794/27253.
Повний текст джерелаOn February 6th 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada issued an anonymous, unanimous landmark judgment. In Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), the Court recognized that a blanket prohibition of physician-assisted dying violates the constitutional rights of certain individuals. Indeed, a competent adult person should be allowed to seek help from a doctor to end her life if she meets two criteria: clearly consent to the termination of life and have a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring suffering that is intolerable to the said individual. This legal decision constitutes an judicial overrule, because a reverse judgment was made in 1993. In fact, twenty-two years ago, the Supreme Court ruled five to four in favour of the ban on assisted suicide. In Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the majority ruled that the protection of the sanctity of life in all circumstances, both for vulnerable people for capable adults, was reason enough not to invalidate the sections of the Criminal Code concerned with assisted suicide. The majority then feared that any opening to assisted suicide would cause a gradual widening of the eligibility criteria, what many have called the argument of the “slippery slope”. As part of this thesis, the Rodriguez-Carter judicial overrule will be analyzed in light of the debate between H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dworkin. While the former is known for his defence of a new version of soft positivism, the latter offers a new and innovative theory, named interpretivism. The goal is simple: to establish which of these two theories best explains the Canadian legal overrule regarding physician-assisted dying. The initial hypothesis is that both theories may explain said reversal, but one will do so better than the other.
Abarzúa, Navarrete Sebastián Andrés, and Vargas Marcelo Hernán Valenzuela. "El derecho como forma de alcanzar la justicia." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2014. http://www.repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/116688.
Повний текст джерелаNuestra memoria intenta mostrar que es posible pensar un más allá del derecho positivo en la conexión que creemos necesaria con la moral y que el ideal de justicia es posible si se parte desde esta perspectiva. Para llegar hasta allí comenzaremos por esbozar lo que entenderemos por Positivismo Jurídico, mostrando sus cimientos y analizando a sus principales exponentes para posteriormente explicar la existencia de una moral interna en el derecho y como puede ser ésta el camino para conectarse con la justicia apreciando la relación de alteridad que debe haber entre ambos conceptos si se quiere hacer frente a la urgente amenaza que significa la irrupción del estado de excepción.
Bligh, Grégory. "Les bases philosophiques du positivisme juridique de H.L.A. Hart." Thesis, Paris 2, 2016. http://www.theses.fr/2016PA020076.
Повний текст джерелаThis thesis bears on the implicit epistemology and methodological considerations underlying the legal philosophy of H.L.A. Hart (1907-1992), the major representative of XXth century legal positivism in the English speaking world, and Oxford chair of jurisprudence (1952-1968). His work remains little known in France.We will seek to answer the view that Hart might not really have been durably influenced by ordinary language philosophy. We will address these questions by examining a corpus of earlier (overlooked) articles which he published as a young Oxford linguistic philosopher. This “early work” consists of the articles which Hart published before he in was elected to the Oxford chair of jurisprudence. Our view is that the work in general philosophy which he did in this early period is crucial to understand some of the positions which he defends in his legal writings. This thesis will thus show that Hart was active in the epistemological debate opposing the Oxford philosophers and the British representatives of logical atomism and logical empiricism. It will also show that these early positions are carried over into his later jurisprudence, including his major work The Concept of Law (1961).Shedding light on these philosophical foundations of Hart’s legal theory will ultimately allow us to reconstruct the debate opposing his own “analytical positivism” and Continental forms of positivism, such as Hans Kelsen’s normativism or Alf Ross Scandinavian legal realism. It will also allow us to draw important parallels between Hartian legal theory and that of the francophone philosopher Chaïm Perelman
Chechik, Grigorina. "The Hart-Dworkin debate and the separation thesis of legal positivism." Thesis, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-08-1957.
Повний текст джерелаtext
"法律與道德的關係: 論哈特與狄奧堅的爭辯". 1988. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5895510.
Повний текст джерела手稿本及手稿本複印本.
Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988.
Shou gao ben ji shou gao ben fu yin ben.
Includes bibliographical references: leaves [13]-[16]
Liu Jiexiong.
Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988.
引言 --- p.1
Chapter 第一部份 --- 哈特對法律道德關係的看法 --- p.14
Chapter (甲) --- 社會律則的一般分析 --- p.14
Chapter (一) --- 社會律則的意義 --- p.14
Chapter (二) --- 社會律則兩方面的陳述 --- p.16
Chapter (三) --- 義務 --- p.18
Chapter (乙) --- 道德 --- p.21
Chapter (一) --- 道德的意義 --- p.21
Chapter (二) --- 道德的基本成份 --- p.22
Chapter (三) --- 道德的特質 --- p.30
Chapter (丙) --- 法律 --- p.36
Chapter (一) --- 基始律則──義務律 --- p.36
Chapter (二) --- 從屬律則──轉變律、審裁律和認可律 --- p.37
Chapter (三) --- 法律的成份 --- p.47
Chapter (丁) --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.48
Chapter 第二部份 --- 狄奧堅對哈特的批評 --- p.61
Chapter (甲) --- 一個基本的概念──原則 --- p.62
Chapter (一) --- 原則的意思 --- p.62
Chapter (二) --- 原則和律則 --- p.67
Chapter (三) --- 原則的來源 --- p.70
Chapter (乙) --- 對哈特法律理論的批評 --- p.72
Chapter (一) --- 哈特的兩個選擇 --- p.73
Chapter (二) --- 第一個選擇──至少有些原則具有法律的約束力 --- p.76
Chapter (三) --- 第三個選擇──任何原則不具有法律的約束力 --- p.76
Chapter (四) --- 哈特法律理論的兩難 --- p.88
Chapter (五) --- 認可律的漏洞 --- p.90
Chapter (丙) --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.100
Chapter 第三部份 --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之評估 --- p.103
Chapter (一) --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之論題 --- p.103
Chapter (二) --- 爭辯的爭論點 --- p.103
Chapter (三) --- 第一個爭論點 --- p.106
Chapter (四) --- 第二個爭論點 --- p.116
Chapter (五) --- 狄奧堅理論的毛病 --- p.124
結語 --- p.131
Книги з теми "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
Wald, Alan M. Jewish Internationalists. University of North Carolina Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5149/northcarolina/9781469635941.003.0001.
Повний текст джерелаЧастини книг з теми "A.(Herbert Lionel Adolphus)"
Henkel, Thomas. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus." In Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_9772-1.
Повний текст джерелаVega-Gomez, Juan. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus." In Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, 1–9. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_904-1.
Повний текст джерелаAtria, Fernando, and Neil MacCormick. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus (1907–1993)." In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 873–75. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-74173-1_166.
Повний текст джерелаHenkel, Thomas. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus: The Concept of Law." In Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (KLL), 1–2. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-476-05728-0_9773-1.
Повний текст джерелаLacey, Nicola. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus (1907–92)." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 536–39. Elsevier, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-08-097086-8.61044-9.
Повний текст джерелаLacey, N. "Hart, Herbert Lionel Adolphus(1907–92)." In International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 6476–79. Elsevier, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/b0-08-043076-7/00355-7.
Повний текст джерела"MERTON, Lionel Francis Herbert (1919– 1974)." In Dictionary Of British And Irish Botantists And Horticulturalists Including plant collectors, flower painters and garden designers, 2147. CRC Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1201/b12560-1115.
Повний текст джерела