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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "World War, 1939-1945 – Germany – Fiction"
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Robison, William B. "Lancastrians, Tudors, and World War II: British and German Historical Films as Propaganda, 1933–1945". Arts 9, n.º 3 (10 de agosto de 2020): 88. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/arts9030088.
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In World War II the Allies and Axis deployed propaganda in myriad forms, among which cinema was especially important in arousing patriotism and boosting morale. Britain and Germany made propaganda films from Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 to the war’s end in 1945, most commonly documentaries, historical films, and after 1939, fictional films about the ongoing conflict. Curiously, the historical films included several about fifteenth and sixteenth century England. In The Private Life of Henry VIII (1933), director Alexander Korda—an admirer of Winston Churchill and opponent of appeasement—emphasizes the need for a strong navy to defend Tudor England against the ‘German’ Charles V. The same theme appears with Philip II of Spain as an analog for Hitler in Arthur B. Wood’s Drake of England (1935), William Howard’s Fire Over England (1937), parts of which reappear in the propaganda film The Lion Has Wings (1939), and the pro-British American film The Sea Hawk (1940). Meanwhile, two German films little known to present-day English language viewers turned the tables with English villains. In Gustav Ucicky’s Das Mädchen Johanna (Joan of Arc, 1935), Joan is the female embodiment of Hitler and wages heroic warfare against the English. In Carl Froelich’s Das Herz der Königin (The Heart of a Queen, 1940), Elizabeth I is an analog for an imperialistic Churchill and Mary, Queen of Scots an avatar of German virtues. Finally, to boost British morale on D-Day at Churchill’s behest, Laurence Olivier directed a masterly film version of William Shakespeare’s Henry V (1944), edited to emphasize the king’s virtues and courage, as in the St. Crispin’s Day speech with its “We few, we proud, we band of brothers”. This essay examines the aesthetic appeal, the historical accuracy, and the presentist propaganda in such films.
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Chugunov, Dmitriy. "On the Value Approach to the Description of the Newest German-language Literature". Izvestia of Smolensk State University, n.º 2(58) (3 de julho de 2022): 46–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.35785/2072-9464-2022-58-2-46-59.
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The article expresses a hypothesis about the need to search for criteria for describing the latest literary process. An assessment of the literary history of Germany after 1945 shows that the situation of the turning point (1990s), which divided the post-war and after the post-war literature, at the beginning of the 21st century, began to transform into something else, to the description of which the
approaches have to be determined.
In the context of human civilization entering into the era of a new understanding of oneself in general and of the individual in particular, retrospective use of the terms «literary direction», «style» or «literary period» does not work. As a possible way, the author of the article proposes a value approach, as one of
the criteria – an appeal to the Christian component of modern texts. Thus, fiction
is understood as a sensitive seismograph reflecting the spiritual quest and de-
mands of the society in the era of civilizational transformations.
Highlighting key value characteristics in literary texts allows us to show
the search for a way out of postmodern indifference to the world, the change in
the playful ambivalence of creativity by the expression of the author’s unambigu-
ous moral position. Comparison of individual works of E. Heidenreich, D. Dörrie, B. Schlink, W. Hilbig, T. Dückers, J. Winkler, S. Lewicharoff, using the theses of K. Jaspers and J. Habermas helps us to represent the actual significance of the stated criterion for describing a modern literary history.
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Khvorova, Liudmila E. "Yu.S. Semenov: from “Seventeen Moments of Spring” to “The Third Map”. “Encryption” of historical facts". Neophilology, n.º 4 (2023): 822–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/2587-6953-2023-9-4-822-834.
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In a study based on the material of the author’s (source) text of the said novel (1973), a “verification” of the key provisions that became the basis of its complex polyphonic conflict was carried out. To achieve this goal, we mainly used the receptive method, which is widespread in modern literary research practice. The concept of “artistic historicism” is emphasized, both its similarities and differences from the realities of history, the details of the historical process. The understanding of the original artistic and documentary style of Yu. Semenov is continued – the specifics of historicism as the “ciphering” of historical facts, which began in the first part of the study. The author’s hypothesis about the “exit” of the conflict embedded within the artistic paradigm of the novel’s text on the geopolitical and psychological levels – into the real vicissitudes of world history in the middle of 20th – 21st centuries was analytically tested. In this regard, the key statements of documentary-fiction characters (A. Dulles, W. Churchill and W. Schellenberg), deliberately removed by the director from the film version (intertext) of the novel, are emphasized and studied. The emergence of a real global geopolitical conflict between the West and Russia of the era of “peace at war” (the author’s term of the article), formed in the spring of 1945, in the days of the approaching defeat of Nazi Germany, but originating in June 1941, is traced (Yu. Semenov’s novel “ Third card"). In conclusion, the foundations of this scientific research are formulated with verification of historical, geopolitical facts set out in the report of a modern Russian statesman, Director of the FSB of Russia, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation N.P. Patrushev (“They want to turn Russia into Muscovy”: document dated January 10, 2023).
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Dalimunthe, Anantha Andhikatama, Guntur Eko Saputro e Lukman Yudho Prakoso. "Impact of Economic Currency Counterfeiting in Germany in World War II (1939-1945)". Wahana Didaktika : Jurnal Ilmu Kependidikan 21, n.º 1 (31 de janeiro de 2023): 228–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.31851/wahanadidaktika.v21i1.11160.
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In World War II one of the German strategies was the counterfeiting of currency to be used to purchase goods or services. Therefore, it is important to understand the background and consequences of currency counterfeiting in World War II. As a strategy used to weaken a country's economy, as well as the consequences of counterfeiting the currency using several stages including the heuristic stage, namely the stage of collecting primary data sources in the form of archives, news, newspapers, and secondary data in the form of books, articles then verifying or historical criticism, efforts to assess compatibility with events during the period (1939-1945) then interpretation (interpretation) so that the writing is objective data taken from several countries involved in World War II, then writing is done as a whole and analyzing in time order. Some of the impacts arising from the counterfeiting of currency by Germany are as follows: Inflation and economic instability, Harm to civil society, Financial loss to other countries. Germany also received severe political and economic sanctions at the end of World War II for counterfeiting currency and engaging in economic practices that harmed other countries. Sanctions were imposed on Germany at that time. With historical research conducted by heuristics, verification of historical criticism, interpretation, and historiography, we can better understand the counterfeiting of currency in World War II and its relevance for the present.
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Seifert, Achim. "Compensation for Forced Labour During World War II in Nazi Germany". International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 17, Issue 4 (1 de dezembro de 2001): 473–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/394556.
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55 years after the end of World War II and after long and difficult negotiations with victims' organizations, the German Parliament passed the ‘Act Establishing the Foundation “Remembrance, Responsibility and Future”’ on 2 August 2000 which provides compensation payments for persons who were subjected to forced labour in the German war economy between 1939 and 1945. With this new legislation, a long debate that began at the end of World War II, is finally coming to an end. This article outlines the different steps in the compensation debate and analyzes the new German compensation legislation of 2 August 2000.
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BRYDAN, DAVID. "Axis Internationalism: Spanish Health Experts and the Nazi ‘New Europe’, 1939–1945". Contemporary European History 25, n.º 2 (12 de abril de 2016): 291–311. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777316000084.
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AbstractMany of the forms and practices of interwar internationalism were recreated under the auspices of the Nazi ‘New Europe’. This article will examine these forms of ‘Axis internationalism’ by looking at Spanish health experts' involvement with Nazi Germany during the Second World War. Despite the ambiguous relationship between the Franco regime and the Axis powers, a wide range of Spanish health experts formed close ties with colleagues from Nazi Germany and across Axis and occupied Europe. Many of those involved were relatively conservative figures who also worked with liberal international health organisations in the pre- and post-war eras. Despite their political differences, their opposing attitudes towards eugenics and the tensions caused by German hegemony, Spanish experts were able to rationalise their involvement with Nazi Germany as a mutually-beneficial continuation of pre-war international health cooperation amongst countries united by a shared commitment to modern, ‘totalitarian’ forms of public health. Despite the hostility of Nazi Germany and its European collaborators to both liberal and left-wing forms of internationalism, this phenomenon suggests that the ‘New Europe’ deserves to be studied as part of the wider history of internationalism in general and of international health in particular.
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Harviainen, Tapani. "The Jews in Finland and World War II". Nordisk Judaistik/Scandinavian Jewish Studies 21, n.º 1-2 (1 de setembro de 2000): 157–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.30752/nj.69575.
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In the years 1989–1944 two different wars against the Soviet Union were imposed upon Finland. During the Winter War of 1989–1940 Germany remained strictly neutral on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact&&Great Britain and France planned intervention in favour of Finland. When the second, so-called Continuation War broke out in the summer of 1041, Finland was co-belligerent of Germany, and Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941. De jure, however, Finland was never an ally of Germany, and at the end of the war, in the winter 1944–1945, the Finnish armed forces expelled the German troops from Lapland, which was devastated by the Germans during their retreat to Norway. Military service was compulsory for each male citizen of Finland. In 1939 the Jewish population of Finland numbered 1 700. Of these, 260 men were called up and approximately 200 were sent to serve at the front during the Winter War.
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Lotchin, Roger W. "A Research Report". Southern California Quarterly 97, n.º 4 (2015): 399–417. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/ucpsocal.2015.97.4.399.
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Public opinion polls taken between 1939 and 1945 questioned Americans’ attitudes toward Japan and Germany and toward the people of Japan and Japanese Americans. The polls’ quantified responses provide previously overlooked data that should be taken into account by scholars of Japanese American and World War II history.
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BRODIE, THOMAS. "German Society at War, 1939–45". Contemporary European History 27, n.º 3 (23 de julho de 2018): 500–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777318000255.
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The actions, attitudes and experiences of German society between 1939 and 1945 played a crucial role in ensuring that the Second World War was not only ‘the most immense and costly ever fought’ but also a conflict which uniquely resembled the ideal type of a ‘total war’. The Nazi regime mobilised German society on an unprecedented scale: over 18 million men served in the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, and compulsoryVolkssturmduty, initiated as Allied forces approached Germany's borders in September 1944, embraced further millions of the young and middle-aged. The German war effort, above all in occupied Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, claimed the lives of millions of Jewish and gentile civilians and served explicitly genocidal ends. In this most ‘total’ of conflicts, the sheer scale of the Third Reich's ultimate defeat stands out, even in comparison with that of Imperial Japan, which surrendered to the Allies prior to an invasion of its Home Islands. When the war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945 Allied forces had occupied almost all of Germany, with its state and economic structures lying in ruins. Some 4.8 million German soldiers and 300,000 Waffen SS troops lost their lives during the Second World War, including 40 per cent of German men born in 1920. According to recent estimates Allied bombing claimed approximately 350,000 to 380,000 victims and inflicted untold damage on the urban fabric of towns and cities across the Reich. As Nicholas Stargardt notes, this was truly ‘a German war like no other’.
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Goncharenko, Anatoliy, Andriy Lebid e Kateryna Murashko. "SOCIAL STABILITY AND FOOD SECURITY OF THE GERMAN POPULATION DURING WORLD WAR II 1939–1945". Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), n.º 61 (2023): 27–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2022.61.3.
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The article investigates the problem of social stability and food securement of the German population during the Second World War 1939–1945. It is found that the centralized system of food security introduced in Germany during the Second World War played an important role in providing the population with a minimum set of provisions. The policy of the Nazi regime towards its citizens in order to save food is highlighted. It was established that the successful solution of the problem of food security of the population was one of the primary tasks for the Third Reich, on which the victory over the enemy, the normal functioning of the state and the leading branches of the national economy depended. It is characterized how, under the existing restrictions of totalitarianauthoritarian Germany, decisions were made in favour of some and at the expense of others
Teses / dissertações sobre o assunto "World War, 1939-1945 – Germany – Fiction"
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Bennet, Victor Kenneth. "Public opinion and propaganda in national socialist Germany during the war against the Soviet Union /". Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10371.
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Byers, Catherine P. "Reporting wartime Germany : perceptions of American journalists in Berlin, 1939-1941". Virtual Press, 1986. http://liblink.bsu.edu/uhtbin/catkey/478643.
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"Reporting Wartime Germany" is a study of the memoirs, diaries, and other works of American journalists who were in Berlin during the early wartime years, 1939-1941. It analyzes their perceptions of the changes which occurred during that important period. Manipulation of politics and political power is discussed, along with growth of resistance to the regime, and the apparent inability of the regime to negotiate with foreigners in good faith. The role of newspapers, periodicals, radio and the motion picture industry as media of propaganda is studied; the system of education, control of religion, and attempts to regulate artistic endeavors are surveyed. Particular attention is paid to the use of literature and art as means of directing the minds of the Berliners. Various forms of culture, including opera and the theater, are analyzed in terms of their importance as a"-form of escape for the Berliners. Other types of entertainment, such as nightclubs, restaurants, and vaudeville, along with spectator sports, are also included. Analysis is offered concerning the immediate loss of such "luxuries" as adequate transportation, liquor, coffee and tea, and cigarettes, the shortage of housing and the rationing of such staples as food and clothing, and the impact these changes in lifestyle had on the Berliners. The gradual change in attitude perceived by the Americans, from acceptance of conditions to fear that the war might be lost, is described. Because of the need to verify the often highly subjective reports of the journalists, there are extensive notes which include references to accounts by others who were in Berlin, either contemporaneously or earlier or later than the first wartime years, and also to significant secondary works. Thus this study presents a broad overview of Berlin during the early wartime years, as seen by foreigners with many different perspectives. The similarities and differences in their perceptions are noted. The discrepancies are stressed, with verifying sources for different viewpoints included in the notes. The conclusion drawn is that the real changes perceived by the Americans occurred in 1933, when the Nazis came to power, and after the summer of 1941 following the beginning of the Russian campaign. More importantly, the study underlines the importance of using and carefully comparing multiple sources for any type of historical inquiry. The study underscores how well-meaning and supposedly objective observers of the same scene can often differ significantly in their perceptions, interpretation, and reporting of specificevents and major trends.
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Doubler, Michael D. "Closing with the enemy : American combined arms operations in the war against Germany, 1944-1945 /". The Ohio State University, 1991. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/26692664.html.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1991.Advisor: Allan R. Millett, Dept. of History. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.
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Ludewig, George Frederick. "A childhood shaped by World War II". Access to citation, abstract and download form provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company; downloadable PDF file, 72 p, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1885544251&sid=6&Fmt=2&clientId=8331&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
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Zellhuber, Andreas. ""Unsere Verwaltung treibt einer Katastrophe zu - " : das Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete und die deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der Sowjetunion 1941-1945 /". München : Vögel, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014784199&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.
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Panthaki, Neville. "The Reichsmark & the ruble a study of two totalitarian systems and their economies in conflict /". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape17/PQDD_0027/MQ33502.pdf.
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Bernheim, Robert B. "The Commissar Order and the Seventeenth German Army : from genesis to implementation, 30 March 1941-31 January 1942". Thesis, McGill University, 2004. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=85128.
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An essential and critical component of the orders German front-line formations received in the ideological war against the Soviet Union was the Commissar Order of 6 June 1941. This order, issued by the High Command of the Armed Forces prior to the German invasion of the Soviet Union, required that front-line military formations, as well as SS and police units attached to the Army, immediately execute Soviet political commissars among prisoners of war. Soviet political commissars were attached to the Red Army at virtually every operational level, and were viewed by both Hitler and the High Command as the foremost leaders of the resistance against the Nazis because of their commitment to Bolshevik ideology. According to the Commissar Order, "Commissars will not be treated as soldiers. The protection afforded by international law to prisoners of war will not apply in their case. After they have been segregated they will be liquidated."While there is no paucity of information on the existence and intent of the Commissar Order, this directive has only been investigated by scholars as a portion of a much greater ideological portrait, or subsumed in the larger context of overall Nazi criminal activities during "Operation Barbarossa."
Examining the extent to which front-line divisions carried out the charge to shoot all grades of political commissars is necessary if we are to understand the role and depth of involvement by front-line troops of the Wehrmacht in a murderous program of extermination during the German attack and occupation of the Soviet Union. Such an examination has simply not taken place to-date. My dissertation seeks to address this issue. The result is both a narrative on the genesis of the Commissar Order and its attendant decrees and agreements between the Army leadership and the SS ( SD) and Security Police, and a quantitative analysis of how many commissars were reported captured and shot by the front-line forces of the 17th Army over a seven month period.
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Ehlers, Robert S. "BDA Anglo-American air intelligence, bomb damage assessment, and the bombing campaigns against Germany, 1914-1945 /". Connect to this title online, 2005. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc%5Fnum=osu1114180918.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005.Document formatted into pages; contains xiii, 680 p. Includes bibliographical references. Abstract available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2006 April 22.
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Fahey, John T. "Britain 1939-1945: The economic cost of strategic bombing". Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/664.
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The strategic air offensive against Germany during World War II formed a major part of Britain's wartime military effort and it has subsequently attracted the attention of historians. Despite the attention, historians have paid little attention to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain. This thesis attempts to redress this situation by providing an examination of the economic impact on Britain of the offensive. The work puts the economic cost of the offensive into its historical context by describing the strategic air offensive and its intellectual underpinnings. Following this preliminary step, the economic costs are described and quantified across a range of activities using accrual accounting methods. The areas of activity examined include the expansion of the aircraft industry, the cost of individual aircraft types, the cost of constructing airfields, the manufacture and delivery of armaments, petrol and oil, and the recruitment, training and maintenance of the necessary manpower. The findings are that the strategic air offensive cost Britain £2.78 billion, equating to an average cost of £2,911.00 for every operational sortie flown by Bomber Command or £5,914.00 for every Germany civilian killed by aerial bombing. The conclusion reached is the damage inflicted upon Germany by the strategic air offensive imposed a very heavy financial burden on Britain that she could not afford and this burden was a major contributor to Britain's post-war impoverishment.
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Fahey, John T. "Britain 1939-1945: The economic cost of strategic bombing". University of Sydney. History, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/664.
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The strategic air offensive against Germany during World War II formed a major part of Britain�s wartime military effort and it has subsequently attracted the attention of historians. Despite the attention, historians have paid little attention to the impact of the strategic air offensive on Britain. This thesis attempts to redress this situation by providing an examination of the economic impact on Britain of the offensive. The work puts the economic cost of the offensive into its historical context by describing the strategic air offensive and its intellectual underpinnings. Following this preliminary step, the economic costs are described and quantified across a range of activities using accrual accounting methods. The areas of activity examined include the expansion of the aircraft industry, the cost of individual aircraft types, the cost of constructing airfields, the manufacture and delivery of armaments, petrol and oil, and the recruitment, training and maintenance of the necessary manpower. The findings are that the strategic air offensive cost Britain �2.78 billion, equating to an average cost of �2,911.00 for every operational sortie flown by Bomber Command or �5,914.00 for every Germany civilian killed by aerial bombing. The conclusion reached is the damage inflicted upon Germany by the strategic air offensive imposed a very heavy financial burden on Britain that she could not afford and this burden was a major contributor to Britain�s post-war impoverishment.
Livros sobre o assunto "World War, 1939-1945 – Germany – Fiction"
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Zayas, Alfred M. De. The Wehrmacht War Crimes Bureau, 1939-1945. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989.
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Moore, Philip N. What if Hitler won the war? Atlanta, GA: Ramshead Press International Corp., 1998.
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Suddreth, Bruce. The German officer. Hickory, NC: Dromedia Pub., 1997.
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Baddock, James. Emerald. New York: Walker, 1991.
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Baddock, James. Emerald. Upton-on-Severn: Malvern Publishing, 1987.
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Henshall, Philip. Vengeance: Hitler's nuclear weapon: fact or fiction? Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1998.
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Fast, Howard. The bridge builder's story. Hampton Falls, N.H: Beeler Large Print, 1996.
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Junge, Maleen. Mothercross. Barntown-Wexford, Ireland: Ballindinas Press, 2015.
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Knauss, Sibylle. Evas Cousine: Roman. 2a ed. München: Claassen, 2000.
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Knauss, Sibylle. Eva's cousin. Waterville, Me: Thorndike Press, 2002.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteCapítulos de livros sobre o assunto "World War, 1939-1945 – Germany – Fiction"
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Polonsky, Antony. "War and Genocide 1939–1945". In Jews in Poland and Russia: A Short History, 308–79. Liverpool University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3828/liverpool/9781906764395.003.0010.
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This chapter explores how the outbreak of the Second World War initiated a new and tragic period in the history of the Jews of north-eastern Europe. The Polish defeat by Nazi Germany in the unequal campaign that began in September of 1939 led to a new partition of the country by Germany and the Soviet Union. Though Hitler had been relatively slow to put the more extreme aspects of Nazi antisemitism into practice, by the time the war broke out, the Nazi regime was set in its deep-seated hatred of the Jews. Following the brutal violence of Kristallnacht on November 9–10, 1938, when up to a hundred Jews were murdered in Germany and Austria and over 400 synagogues burnt down, Hitler, disconcerted by the domestic and foreign unease which this provoked, decided to entrust policy on the Jews to the ideologues of the SS. They were determined at this stage to enforce a ‘total separation’ between Jews and Germans, but wanted to do so in an ‘orderly and disciplined’ manner, perhaps by compelling most Jews to emigrate. The Nazis did not act immediately on the genocidal threat of ‘the annihilation of the Jews as a race in Europe’, but during the first months of the war, a dual process took place: the barbarization of Nazi policy generally and a hardening of policy towards Jews.
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Milner, Marc. "The Battle of the Atlantic, 1939–1945". In The Oxford Handbook of World War II, 154–72. Oxford University Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199341795.013.17.
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Abstract The Battle of the Atlantic is a misnomer for the six-year long struggle over the movement of merchant shipping in the Atlantic Ocean. It was not a discrete battle in the conventional sense, but a series of campaigns initiated by the Germans to either defeat the Western Allies outright or impede the development of their military power and strategy. Only in the winter of 1940–1941, when Great Britain was essentially alone and isolated, could German efforts at sea have won the war through a blockade of Britain. However, they lacked the resources to do so. Thereafter, Germany focused on checking the growth of Allied military power, especially the potential for a Second Front, and relied increasingly on U-boats (submarines). Losses to Allied merchant shipping remained high until 1943, when increased numbers of Allied escorts and aircraft employing improved equipment, tactics, and naval intelligence combined to effectively check Germany’s submarine campaign.
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Martin, Campbell-Kelly. "An interlude: the Second World War, 1939-1945". In ICL, 103–25. Oxford University PressOxford, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198539186.003.0006.
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Abstract On 3 September 1939 Britain declared war on Germany, and in December 1941 war was declared upon Japan. Victory in Europe came on 8 May 1945, and Victory over Japan the following August. The six years of war were a hiatus in the economic development of Britain, for in that period everything was sacrificed to the national war effort: ‘Foreign investments were sold, women conscripted, capital was run down and not replaced, civilian consumption was drastically reduced, exports were cut back.’ British industry was in the van of the contribution to the national war effort, and its control over its own destiny was almost completely curtailed.
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Weinberg, Gerard L. "2. World War II begins". In World War II: A Very Short Introduction, 20–32. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199688777.003.0003.
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The German attack on Poland began on September 1 1939, and triggered the declaration of war on Germany by Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. Germany and the Soviet Union were agreed on a dual attack on Poland from the West and East, which left Poland unable to defend itself. An important aspect of the war between Germany and the Allies was the war of the oceans. The battles between warships, targets on merchant ships, and the use of submarines in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans continued from 1939 up until Germany's surrender in May 1945 and drew in many Baltic and Scandinavian countries.
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Dinnerstein, Leonard. "Antisemitism at High Tide: World War II (1939-1945)". In Antisemitism in America, 128–49. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195037807.003.0007.
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Abstract In retrospect it becomes apparent that the rising tide of antisemitism in America paralleled increased national involvement with European affairs. As the possibility of war increased, Franklin D. Roosevelt ended innovative New Deal initiatives in 1938 and shifted his interests toward foreign policy. The Germans had marched into Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938 and on September 1, 1939, less than ten days after the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1939 shook the world, Germany invaded Poland. World War II began as Great Britain and France entered the fray on the side of Poland on September 3, 1939.
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Warren, Heather A. "Making a New International Order in the War Years 1939—1945". In Theologians of a New World Order, 94–115. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195114386.003.0007.
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Abstract When Germany Conquered Poland in September 1939, the consensus of prominent Americans was that the event should not alter U.S. neutrality. Liberals and conservatives alike preached this position. Liberals worried the war would divert attention and money from domestic problems; conservatives feared the repetition of higher taxes and government expansion of the Great War. Pacifists advocating mediation made strange bedfellows with the America First Committee, arguing that there was no danger of invasion if Germany won in Europe. Behind this public ratio-nale was a fundamental pride, a right of America to avoid entanglement in another “Old World war.” The attitude vexed the European ecumenical leaders. Visser ‘t Hooft wrote to Cavert, “[T]here is very great disappointment among all those who are working in international movements” because “America is giving so little response to the demands for help.” World Council headquarters in Geneva, like the city itself, became the hub of a maze of wartime dealings. Diplomats, resistance movement agents, influential refugees, and church leaders from many nations congregated at the office, so information about Europe at war was available there as nowhere else. The World Council staff had a German, Hans Schonfeld, and a Swede, Nils Ehrenstrom, whose contacts in the German diplomatic corps supplied news from the German-occupied countries and inside the reich itself.
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Law, Ricky W. "Forging Alliances". In The Oxford Handbook of World War II, 94–115. Oxford University Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199341795.013.3.
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Abstract This chapter traces the history of the Axis alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan from its origins after World War I to its defeat in 1945. The rise of Hitler and Nazism played an indispensable role in the formation of the Axis. Nazi ideology nurtured affinity with Italian Fascists and Japanese militarists, while Nazi diplomacy departed from traditional German foreign policy. In 1936, Germany reached separate arrangements with Italy and Japan. Germany and Italy concluded the Pact of Steel in 1939. The next year, Japan joined the military alliance to create the Tripartite Pact. German battlefield successes drew Italy, Japan, and other countries closer to Germany. The Axis acquired common enemies in late 1941, but its member states focused on their own distinct campaigns rather than helping each other. What had made the Axis possible in peacetime, its members’ discrete territorial ambitions, turned out to be its greatest weakness in war.
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Aly, Gotz, e Susanne Heim. "Forced Emigration, War, Deportation and Holocaust". In The Fate Of The European Jews, 1939-1945 Continuity or Contingency?, 56–73. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195119312.003.0005.
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Abstract For a brief moment, it seemed that the many events taking place in 1995 to mark the end of the Second World War would make it possible, as so many Germans hoped, finally to close the book on the painful chapter of Nazism. But this expectation soon proved to be illusory. Steven Spielberg’s film “Schindler’s List,” the publication of Victor Klemperer’s diaries and finally Daniel J. Goldhagen’s book Hitler’s Willing Executioners (to name only the most notable examples) caused the issue to flare up time and again. In Germany, any attempt to “overcome” the past engenders new controversies; and the vehemence of the debate makes clear how little National Socialism is “history.”
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Kelanic, Rosemary A. "The Oil Strategies of Nazi Germany". In Black Gold and Blackmail, 92–114. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0006.
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This chapter analyzes four cases that span the Nazi era in Germany. From the beginning of the Nazi regime in March of 1933 until its defeat in April of 1945, the chapter identifies three major turning points: (1) Adolf Hitler's announcement of the Four-Year Plan in September of 1936; (2) the imposition of an Anglo-French naval blockade against Germany on September 3, 1939; and (3) the shift from blitzkrieg to attrition warfare against the Soviet Union in December of 1941. This divides the case into four distinct periods: March 1933 to August 1936; September 1936 until September 3, 1939; September 4, 1939, until the end of December 1941; and January 1942 through the end of the war in April 1945. Hitler's anticipatory strategies changed over time, in tandem with his country's coercive vulnerability, intensifying from self-sufficiency before World War II to indirect control at the war's start to, finally, direct control after Operation Barbarossa failed to speedily defeat the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). One would expect that Hitler, as the most expansionist leader of the twentieth century, would engage in conquest to get oil; yet primarily, he sought oil security through less extreme measures.
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Allen, Gene. "The Shadow of War". In Mr. Associated Press, 185–206. University of Illinois Press, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.5622/illinois/9780252045103.003.0009.
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Between 1939 and 1941, Cooper continued to pay close attention to the operations of AP’s Berlin bureau. His policy of doing everything necessary to avoid the AP correspondent’s expulsion led him consistently to overstate the degree of freedom that international journalists in Germany exercised under the Nazis. In 1945 Cooper became embroiled in controversy after Edward Kennedy, AP’s Paris bureau chief, scooped the world by announcing the German surrender. AP’s president accepted the U.S. Army’s claim that Kennedy had violated an agreement to hold the news until it was officially released, forcing Cooper’s hand and leading to Kennedy’s dismissal.