Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Wilkinson Plough Co. Limited"

Kiswani Wholesalers and Distributors (KWD) is a proposed Limited Liability Company (LLC) that will be co-owned by two partners and operated in New York State, serving four counties of Rockland, Westchester, Orange and Dutchess. The company will be dealing in medicines sold over the counter, health and beauty products, general merchandise and male enhancement drugs. These product lines offer the company a unique product mix that will enable it to penetrate and sustain a steady market base in the market for profitability. The proposed company has identified four market segments: convenience stores, supermarkets, grocery stores, gas stations and other small retail shops that will be its customers. It intends to target the first four segments of its market in the first year of operation. KWD will employ a marketing strategy that will put it ahead of its competitors and its SWOT analysis shows that it will compete favorably in the business environment into which it intends to venture.Key success factors will be the experienced ownership and management and skilled and qualified persons who will implement the success strategies of pricing, marketing and sales to deliver high outputs that will enable the firm to break even in the ninth month of operation. Upon commencement of its operations, KWD will plough back its profits for purposes of expansion, which is inevitable for every organization in all industries. Its books of account as projected are so promising that the owners will confidently acquire $ 24,000 of the total capital from a bank loan and contribute $20, 000 personally as the other $15,000 is gained from credit facilities by the suppliers in a 21-day credit term. With a small size workforce of only five personnel for the startup phase, KWD will be able to have efficient operations that will steer the firm to rapid growth and profitability.

Introduction Lower limb muscle strength is an important predictor of sports performance, injury risk and frailty in ageing. The strength of a muscle is determined by its geometry and neuronal factors. Muscle geometry can be subdivided into architecture and morphology. Muscle morphology describes shape characteristics such as anatomical cross-sectional area (ACSA), thickness or volume (Maden-Wilkinson et al., 2021). Muscle architecture is determined by muscle fascicle length and the insertion angle of the muscle fascicles in the aponeuroses and describes the orientation of the muscle fibers relative to their force generation axis (Lieber & Friden, 2000). Muscle geometry is associated to physical performance and strength in humans (Maden-Wilkinson et al., 2021; Werkhausen et al., 2022) and is therefore a main research interest. A cost-effective and participant friendly method to validly and reliably assess muscle geometry is ultrasonography. However, a major limitation of ultrasonography is the subjectivity of image acquisition and the time-consuming image analysis (Ritsche et al., 2021; Ritsche, Wirth, et al., 2022; Ritsche et al., 2023). Moreover, image characteristics are massively influenced by the ultrasonography device used (Ritsche, Schmid, et al., 2022) as well as the muscle region scanned (Monte & Franchi, 2023). This poses constraints on the generalizability of existing automated image analysis approaches. The goal of this series of studies is therefore to optimize the ultrasonography acquisition and data analysis procedures by developing open-source software packages. Secondly, we aim to apply these methods in a sports performance context and describe the relevance of muscle geometry. Methods To streamline the time-consuming and subjective process of image analysis, we developed open-source and user-friendly software packages for muscle geometry analysis in lower limb muscles. We developed a semi-automated algorithm “ACSAuto” for assisted analysis of muscle ACSA using common image filtering processes (Ritsche et al., 2021). Given the limited generalizability and required user input of this approach, we developed two fully automated software applications, “DeepACSA” and “DL_Track_US”, using convolutional neural networks for more time efficient and robust analysis of lower limb muscle geometry (Ritsche et al., 2023; Ritsche, Wirth, et al., 2022; Ritsche et al., in press). We compared the predictions in an unseen test set to the current state-of-the-art, manual analysis, in order to evaluate the performance of our algorithms. To broaden the application of ultrasonography for evaluating muscle geometry in a sports context, we investigated the validity of a low-cost mobile ultrasonography device compared to a high-end counterpart in assessing various muscle architectural parameters in healthy adults (Ritsche, Schmid, et al., 2022).The mobile ultrasonography setup consisted of a smartphone and a portable probe, enabling practitioners high flexibility in the assessment of muscle architecture. We further investigated the link between muscle geometry and performance among soccer players. In one study, we focused on the m. biceps femoris long head in under-13 to under-15 youth players, assessing architecture and morphology at the mid-muscle point and correlating these with their sprint times and maximum velocity (Ritsche et al., 2020). In a further study, we analyzed the mm. vastus lateralis and rectus femoris in both youth and adult players of both sexes, evaluating muscle geometry at various muscle lengths alongside their knee extension strength during isometric and isokinetic conditions (Ritsche et al., in preparation and under review). Results Both ACSAuto and DeepACSA showed high comparability in assessing lower limb muscle ACSA with standard error of measurement lower than one cm2 (SEM ranging from 1.2 to 9.5%; Ritsche et al., 2021; Ritsche, Wirth, et al., 2022). Moreover, DeepACSA provided fast and objective analysis comparable to manual segmentation with no supervision of the analysis process needed. The time needed for analysis was reduced by a factor of 10. DL_Track_US demonstrated high comparability to manual muscle architecture analysis of images and videos, i.e. dynamic situations, (Ritsche et al., 2023; Ritsche et al., in press) and a reduction in the duration of analysis by a factor of 100. The mobile ultrasonography system showed a high degree of reliability and comparability only for m. gastrocnemius medialis architecture assessment, with a standard error of measurement lower than 10% for all architectural parameters (Ritsche, Schmid, et al., 2022). Thus, its reliability and comparability depended on the muscle assessed. We observed relevant correlations between muscle ACSA in young and adult male soccer players as well as in female soccer players and performance (Ritsche et al., 2020; Ritsche et al., unpublished). Moreover, we observed changes in muscle geometry with age and differences between males and females. Specifically, m. biceps femoris ACSA was strongly correlated with 30m sprint times and maximal velocity (r = -0.61 and r = 0.61, respectively), highlighting its importance in athletic performance (Ritsche et al., 2020). M. vastus lateralis ACSA at 50% of muscle length was most frequently related to knee extension strength (r = 0.40 - 0.53), which was observed in both sexes and across several age groups of male soccer players (Ritsche et al., in preparation and under review). Relevant correlations occurred more frequently in older age groups and higher knee extension velocities. Interestingly, we did not observe relevant correlations between muscle architecture and performance in the mm. biceps femoris and vastus lateralis. Discussion/Conclusion The results of this series studies so far led to three main insights. Firstly, the development of the “ACSAuto”, “DeepACSA” and “DL_Track_US” tools, utilizing semi-automated and fully automated analysis techniques applying deep learning algorithms, marked another step forward in overcoming the subjectivity and time consuming image evaluation. In a user-friendly way, these tools enable reproducible and objective analyses of muscle geometry in ultrasonography images. Secondly, with technological advancements, assessing muscle geometry with ultrasonography is possible using a smartphone and a probe, and often gives comparable results to high-end devices (Ritsche, Schmid, et al., 2022). This allows for a broader and more versatile application of muscle geometry assessment. However, our results highlight the need for a selective approach based on the muscle group being assessed and technical improvements of existing devices. Lastly, our findings across several investigations reveal a relevant positive correlation between muscle ACSA and performance metrics such as sprint times and knee extension strength (Ritsche et al., 2020; Ritsche et al., unpublished), corroborating previous research (Maden-Wilkinson et al., 2021; Monte & Franchi, 2023). The relationship was more pronounced in older age groups, suggesting that muscle geometry's influence on performance may amplify with athletic maturity. Apart from that, we observed the relationship in the m. vastus lateralis to be region- and contraction velocity-dependent. In agreement with Werkhausen et al. (2022), no relation of muscle architecture with strength when assessed in a static resting position was observed. This highlights the need for a potential shift towards assessing changes in muscle geometry during contraction rather than in static situations when evaluating the relation between muscle geometry and performance. Finally, remaining challenges include the comparability of muscle geometry assessment in the literature, the analysis methods used and the low generalizability of available automated analysis approaches (ours included). There is a clear need for methodological consensus on the assessment of muscle geometry when using ultrasonography, and more versatile analysis approaches are needed to enable an easy, generalizable and reproducible analysis of images and videos. Therefore, future works should target to establish assessment and analysis guidelines of muscle geometry in ultrasonography images to increase the comparability and reproducibility of results. Moreover, assessing changes in muscle geometry during contraction rather than during rest should be focused. References Lieber, R. L., & Friden, J. (2000). Functional and clinical significance of skeletal muscle architecture. Muscle Nerve, 23(11), 1647–1666. https://doi.org/10.1002/1097-4598(200011)23:11%3C1647::aid-mus1%3E3.0.co;2-m Maden-Wilkinson, T. M., Balshaw, T. G., Massey, G. J., & Folland, J. P. (2021). Muscle architecture and morphology as determinants of explosive strength. European Journal of Applied Physiology, 121(4), 1099–1110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00421-020-04585-1 Monte, A., & Franchi, M. V. (2023). Regional muscle features and their association with knee extensors force production at a single joint angle. European Journal of Applied Physiology, 123, 2239-2248. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00421-023-05237-w Ritsche, P., Bernhard, T., Roth, R., Lichtenstein, E., Keller, M., Zingg, S., Franchi, M. V., & Faude, O. (2020). M. biceps femoris long head architecture and sprint ability in youth soccer players. International Journal of Sports Physiology and Performance, 16(11), 1616-1624. https://doi.org/10.1123/ijspp.2020-0726 Ritsche, P., Schmid, R., Franchi, M. V., & Faude, O. (2022). Agreement and reliability of lower limb muscle architecture measurements using a portable ultrasound device. Frontiers in Physiology, 13, Article 981862. https://doi.org/10.3389/fphys.2022.981862 Ritsche, P., Seynnes, O., & Cronin, N. (2023). DL_Track_US: A python package to analyse muscleultrasonography images. Journal of Open Source Software, 8(85), Article 5206. https://doi.org/10.21105/joss.05206 Ritsche, P., Wirth, P., Cronin, N. J., Sarto, F., Narici, M. V., Faude, O., & Franchi, M. V. (2022). DeepACSA: Automatic segmentation of cross-sectional area in ultrasound images of lower limb muscles using deep learning. Medicine & Science in Sports & Exercise, 54(12), 2188-2195. https://doi.org/10.1249/MSS.0000000000003010 Ritsche, P., Wirth, P., Franchi, M. V., & Faude, O. (2021). ACSAuto-semi-automatic assessment of human vastus lateralis and rectus femoris cross-sectional area in ultrasound images. Scientific Reports, 11, Article 13042. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-92387-6 Werkhausen, A., Gløersen, Ø., Nordez, A., Paulsen, G., Bojsen-Møller, J., & Seynnes, O. R. (2022). Rate of force development relationships to muscle architecture and contractile behavior in the human vastus lateralis. Scientific Reports, 12, Article 21816. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-022-26379-5

Literacy and language development is a central aspect of educational theory and practice. One area of literacy and rowlanguage research that has had a lot of attention is dialogic teaching (Bakhtin, 1984; Freire, 1970; Murphey, Wilkinson, Soter, Hennessey, & Alexander, 2009; Reznitskaya & Gregory, 2013). However, there is limited research on how high school students use their classroom discourse to construct meaning, especially in argumentation. The purpose of this data analysis is to investigate the emergence of argumentation literacy in a Socratic circle. Socratic circles, a literacy practice consisting of two concentric circles of students focused around a piece of text, are used to provide students with the opportunity to co-construct meaning through classroom dialogue (Copeland, 2005). The emergence and construction of argumentation is analyzed by applying discourse analysis to a video of a high school classroom,. Findings from this analysis reveal that through the use of exploratory talk, three discourse patterns emerge that are in line with argumentation practices: (1) generalizations, (2) communicative struggles, and (3) co-construction of ideas. Results of the analysis are discussed to inform theory and instruction on dialogic teaching and the use of Socratic circles to develop argumentation-related forms of literacy.

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Obscured in contemporary climate change discourse is the fact that under even the most serious mitigation scenarios being envisaged it will be virtually impossible to avoid runaway ecosystem collapse; so great is the momentum of global greenhouse build-up (Anderson and Bows). And under even the best-case scenario, two-degree warming, the ecological, social, and economic costs are proving to be much deeper than first thought. The greenhouse genie is out of the bottle, but the best that appears to be on offer is a gradual transition to the pro-growth, pro-consumption discourse of “ecological modernisation” (EM); anything more seems politically unpalatable (Barry, Ecological Modernisation; Adger et al.). Here, I aim to account for how cheaply EM has managed to allay ecology. To do so, I detail the operations of the co-optive, definitional strategy which I call the “high-ground” strategy, waged by a historic bloc of actors, discourses, and institutions with a common interest in resisting radical social and ecological critique. This is not an argument about climate laggards like the United States and Australia where sceptic views remain near the centre of public debate. It is a critique of climate leaders such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the Netherlands—nations at the forefront of the adoption of EM policies and discourses. With its antecedent in sustainable development discourse, by emphasising technological innovation, eco-efficiency, and markets, EM purports to transcend the familiar dichotomy between the economy and the environment (Hajer; Barry, ‘Towards’). It rebuts the 1970s “limits to growth” perspective and affirms that “the only possible way out of the ecological crisis is by going further into the process of modernisation” (Mol qtd. in York and Rosa 272, emphasis in original). Its narrative is one in which the “dirty and ugly industrial caterpillar transforms into an ecological butterfly” (Huber, qtd. in Spaargaren and Mol). How is it that a discourse notoriously quiet on endless growth, consumer culture, and the offshoring of dirty production could become the cutting edge of environmental policy? To answer this question we need to examine the discursive and ideological effects of EM discourse. In particular, we must analyse the strategies that work to continually naturalise dominant institutions and create the appearance that they are fit to respond to climate change. Co-opting Environmental Discourse Two features characterise state environmental discourse in EM nations: an almost universal recognition of the problem, and the reassurance that present institutions are capable of addressing it. The key organs of neoliberal capitalism—markets and states—have “gone green”. In boardrooms, in advertising and public relations, in governments, and in international fora, climate change is near the top of the agenda. While EM is the latest form of this discourse, early hints can be seen in President Nixon’s embrace of the environment and Margaret Thatcher’s late-1980s green rhetoric. More recently, David Cameron led a successful Conservative Party “detoxification” program with an ostentatious rhetorical strategy featuring the electoral slogan, “Vote blue, go green” (Carter). We can explain this transformation with reference to a key shift in the discursive history of environmental politics. The birth of the modern environmental movement in the 1960s and 70s brought a new symbolic field, a new discourse, into the public sphere. Yet by the 1990s the movement was no longer the sole proprietor of its discourse (Eder 203). It had lost control of its symbols. Politicians, corporations, and media outlets had assumed a dominant role in efforts to define “what climate change was and what it meant for the world” (Carvalho and Burgess 1464). I contend that the dramatic rise to prominence of environmental issues in party-political discourse is not purely due to short-term tactical vote-winning strategy. Nor is it the case that governments are finally, reluctantly waking up to the scientific reality of ecological degradation. Instead, they are engaged in a proactive attempt to redefine the contours of green critique so as to take the discourse onto territory in which established interests already control the high ground. The result is the defusing of the oppositional element of political ecology (Dryzek et al. 665–6), as well as social critique in general: what I term the gentrification of climate change. If we view environmentalism as, at least partially, a cultural politics in which contested definitions of problem is the key political battleground, we can trace how dominant interests have redefined the contours of climate change discourse. We can reveal the extent to which environmentalism, rather than being integrated into capitalism, has been co-opted. The key feature of this strategy is to present climate change as a mere aberration against a background of business-as-usual. The solutions that are presented are overwhelmingly extensions of existing institutions: bringing CO2 into the market, the optimistic development of new techno-scientific solutions to climate problems, extending regulatory regimes into hitherto overlooked domains. The agent of this co-optive strategy is not the state, industry, capital, or any other manifest actor, but a “historic bloc” cutting across divisions between society, politics, and economy (Laclau and Mouffe 42). The agent is an abstract coalition that is definable only to the extent that its strategic interests momentarily intersect at one point or another. The state acts as a locus, but the bloc is itself not reducible to the state. We might also think of the agent as an assemblage of conditions of social reproduction, in which dominant social, political, and economic interests have a stake. The bloc has learned the lesson that to be a player in a definitional battle one must recognise what is being fought over. Thus, exhortations to address climate change and build a green economy represent the first stage of the definitional battle for climate change: an attempt to enter the contest. In practical terms, this has manifest as the marking out of a self-serving division between action and inaction. Articulated through a binary modality climate change becomes something we either address/act on/tackle—or not. Under such a grammar even the most meagre efforts can be presented as “tackling climate change.” Thus Kevin Rudd was elected in 2007 on a platform of “action on climate change”, and he frequently implored that Australia would “do its bit” on climate change during his term. Tony Blair is able to declare that “tackling climate change… need not limit greater economic opportunity” and mean it in all sincerity (Barry, ‘Towards’ 112). So deployed, this binary logic minimises climate change to a level at which existing institutions are validated as capable of addressing the “problem,” and the government legitimised for its moral, green stand. The Hegemonic Articulation of Climate Change The historic bloc’s main task in the high-ground strategy is to re-articulate the threat in terms of its own hegemonic discourse: market economics. The widely publicised and highly influential Stern Review, commissioned by the British Government, is the standard-bearer of how to think about climate change from an economic perspective. It follows a supremely EM logic: economy and ecology have been reconciled. The Review presents climate change, famously, as “the greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (Stern et al. viii). The structuring horizon of the Stern Review is the correction of this failure, the overcoming of what is perceived to be not a systemic problem requiring a reappraisal of social institutions, but an issue of carbon pricing, technology policy, and measures aimed at “reducing barriers to behavioural change”. Stern insists that “we can be ‘green’ and grow. Indeed, if we are not ‘green’, we will eventually undermine growth, however measured” (iv). He reassures us that “tackling climate change is the pro-growth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries” (viii). Yet Stern’s seemingly miraculous reconciliation of growth with climate change mitigation in fact implies a severe degree of warming. The Stern Review aims to stabilise carbon dioxide equivalent concentrations at 550ppm, which would correspond to an increase of global temperature of 3-4 degrees Celsius. As Foster et al. note, this scenario, from an orthodox economist who is perceived as being pro-environment, is ecologically unsustainable and is viewed as catastrophic by many scientists (Foster, Clark, and York 1087–88). The reason Stern gives for not attempting deeper cuts is that they “are unlikely to be economically viable” (Stern et al. 231). In other words, the economy-ecology articulation is not a meeting of equals. Central to the policy prescriptions of EM is the marketising of environmental “bads” like carbon emissions. Carbon trading schemes, held in high esteem by moderate environmentalists and market economists alike, are the favoured instruments for such a task. Yet, in practice, these schemes can do more harm than good. When Prime Minister Kevin Rudd tried to legislate the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme as a way of addressing the “greatest moral challenge of our generation” it represented Australia’s “initial foray into ecological modernisation” (Curran 211). Denounced for its weak targets and massive polluter provisions, the Scheme was opposed by environmental groups, the CSIRO, and even the government’s own climate change advisor (Taylor; Wilkinson). While the Scheme’s defenders claimed it was as a step in the right direction, these opponents believed it would hurt more than help the environment. A key strategy in enshrining a particular hegemonic articulation is the repetition and reinforcement of key articulations in a way which is not overtly ideological. As Spash notes of the Stern Review, while it does connect to climate change such issues as distributive justice, value and ethical conflicts, intergenerational issues, this amounts to nothing but lip service given the analysis comes pre-formed in an orthodox economics mould. The complex of interconnected issues raised by climate change is reduced to the impact of carbon control on consumption growth (see also Swyngedouw and While, Jonas, and Gibbs). It is as if the system of relations we call global capitalism—relations between state and industry, science and technology, society and nature, labour and capital, North and South—are irrelevant to climate change, which is nothing but an unfortunate over-concentration of certain gases. In redrawing the discursive boundaries in this way it appears that climate change is a temporary blip on the path to a greener prosperity—as if markets and capitalism merely required minor tinkering to put them on the green-growth path. Markets are constituted as legitimate tools for managing climate change, in concert with regulation internalised within neoliberal state competition (While, Jonas, and Gibbs 81). The ecology-economy articulation both marketises “green,” and “greens” markets. Consonant with the capitalism-environment articulation is the prominence of the sovereign individual. Both the state and the media work to reproduce subjects largely as consumers (of products and politics) rather than citizens, framing environmental responsibility as the responsibility to consume “wisely” (Carvalho). Of course, what is obscured in this “self-greening” discourse is the culpability of consumption itself, and of a capitalist economy based on endless consumption growth, exploitation of resources, and the pursuit of new markets. Greening Technology EM also “greens” technology. Central to its pro-growth ethos is the tapering off of ecosystem impacts through green technologies like solar, wind, tidal, and geothermal. While green technologies are preferable to dependence upon resource-intensive technologies of oil and coal, that they may actually deliver on such promises has been shown to be contingent upon efficiency outstripping economic growth, a prospect that is dubious at best, especially considering the EM settlement is one in which any change to consumption practices is off the agenda. As Barry and Paterson put it, “all current experience suggests that, in most areas, efficiency gains per unit of consumption are usually outstripped by overall increases in consumption” (770). The characteristic ideological manoeuvre of foregrounding non-representative examples is evident here: green technologies comprise a tiny fraction of all large-scale deployed technologies, yet command the bulk of attention and work to cast technology generally in a green light. It is also false to assume that green technologies do not put their own demands on material resources. Deploying renewables on the scale that is required to address climate change demands enormous quantities of concrete, steel, glass and rare earth minerals, and vast programs of land-clearing to house solar and wind plants (Charlton 40). Further, claims that economic growth can become detached from ecological disturbance are premised on a limited basket of ecological indicators. Corporate marketing strategies are driving this green-technology articulation. While a single advertisement represents an appeal to consume an individual commodity, taken collectively advertising institutes a culture of consumption. Individually, “greenwash” is the effort to spin one company’s environmental programs out of proportion while minimising the systemic degradation that production entails. But as a burgeoning social institution, greenwash constitutes an ideological apparatus constructing industry as fundamentally working in the interests of ecology. In turn, each corporate image of pristine blue skies, flourishing ecosystems, wind farms, and solar panels constitutes a harmonious fantasy of green industry. As David Mackay, chief scientific advisor to the UK Government has pointed out, the political rhetoric of green technology lulls people into a false sense of security (qtd. in Charlton 38). Again, a binary logic works to portray greener technologies—such as gas, “clean coal”, and biomass combustion—as green. Rescuing Legitimacy There are essentially two critical forces that are defused in the high-ground strategy’s definitional project. The first is the scientific discourse which maintains that the measures proposed by leading governments are well below what is required to reign in dangerous climate change. This seems to be invisible not so much because it is radical but because it is obscured by the uncertainties in which climate science is couched, and by EM’s noble-sounding rhetoric. The second is the radical critique which argues that climate change is a classic symptom of an internal contradiction of a capitalist economy seeking endless growth in a finite world. The historic bloc’s successful redefinition strategy appears to jam the frequency of serious, scientifically credible climate discourse, yet at the level of hegemonic struggle its effects range wider. In redefining climate change and other key signifiers of green critique – “environment”, “ecology”, “green”, “planet”—it expropriates key properties of its antagonist. Were it not that climate change is now defined on the cheery, reassuring ground of EM discourse, the gravity of the alarming—rather than alarmist (Risbey)—scientific discourse may just have offered radical critique the ammunition it needed to provoke society into serious deliberations over its socioeconomic path. Radical green critique is not in itself the chief enemy of the historic bloc. But it is a privileged element within antagonistic discourse and reinforces the critical element of the feminist, civil rights, and student movements of the 1960s and 1970s. In this way ecology has tended to act as a nodal point binding general social critique: all of the other demands began to be inscribed with the green critique, just as the green critique became a metaphor for all of the others (Laclau). The metaphorical value of the green critique not only relates to the size and vibrancy of the movement—the immediate visibility of ecological destruction stood as a powerful symbol of the kernel of antagonistic politics: a sense that society had fundamentally gone awry. While green critique demands that progress should be conditional upon ecology, EM professes that progress is already green (Eder 217n). Thus the great win achieved by the high-ground strategy is not over radical green critique per se but over the shifting coalition that threatens its legitimacy. As Stavrakakis observes, what is novel about green discourse is nothing essential to the signifiers it deploys, but the way that a common signifier comes to stand in and structure the field as a whole – to serve as a nodal point. It has a number of signifiers: environmental sustainability, social justice, grassroots democracy, and peace and non-violence, all of which are “quilted” around the master-signifiers of “ecology”, “green”, or “planet”. While these master-signifiers are not unique to green ideology, what is unique is that they stand at the centre. But the crucial point to note about the green signifier at the heart of political ecology is that its value is accorded, in large part, through its negation of the dominant ideology. That is to say, it is not that green ideology stands as merely another way of mapping the social; rather, the master-signifier "green" contains an implicit refutation of the dominant social order. That “green” is now almost wholly evacuated of its radical connotations speaks to the effectiveness of the redefinitional effort.The historic bloc is aided in its efforts by the complexity of climate change. Such opacity is characteristic of contemporary risks, whose threats are mostly “a type of virtual reality, real virtuality” (Beck 213). The political struggle then takes place at the level of meaning, and power is played out in a contest to fix the definitions of key risks such as climate change. When relations of (risk) definition replace relations of production as the site of the effects of power, a double mystification ensues and shifts in the ground on which the struggle takes place may go unnoticed. Conclusion By articulating ecology with markets and technology, EM transforms the threat of climate change into an opportunity, a new motor of neoliberal legitimacy. The historic bloc has co-opted environmentalist discourse to promote a gentrified climate change which present institutions are capable of managing: “We are at the fork in the road between order and catastrophe. Stick with us. We will get you through the crisis.” The sudden embrace of the environment by Nixon and by Thatcher, the greening of Cameron’s Conservatives, the Garnaut and Stern reports, and the Australian Government’s foray into carbon trading all have their more immediate policy and political aims. Yet they are all consistent with the high-ground definitional strategy, professing no contraction between sustainability and the present socioeconomic order. Undoubtedly, EM is vastly preferable to denial and inaction. It may yet open the doors to real ecological reform. But in its present form, its preoccupation is the legitimation crisis threatening dominant interests, rather than the ecological crisis facing us all. References Adger, W. Neil, Tor A. Benjaminsen, Katrina Brown, and Hanne Svarstad. ‘Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourses.’ Development and Change 32.4 (2001): 681–715. Anderson, Kevin, and Alice Bows. “Beyond ‘Dangerous’ Climate Change: Emission Scenarios for a New World.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 369.1934 (2010): 20–44. Barry, John, and Matthew Paterson. “Globalisation, Ecological Modernisation and New Labour.”Political Studies 52.4 (2004): 767–84. Barry, John. “Ecological Modernisation.” Debating the Earth : the Environmental Politics Reader. Ed. John S. Dryzek & David Schlosberg. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. ——-. “Towards a Model of Green Political Economy: From Ecological Modernisation to Economic Security.” Global Ecological Politics. Ed. John Barry and Liam Leonard. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing, 2010. 109–28. Beck, Ulrich. “Risk Society Revisited.” The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social Theory. Ed. Barbara Adam, Ulrich Beck, & Joost Van Loon. London: SAGE, 2000. Carter, Neil. “Vote Blue, Go Green? 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