Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Tanzania African National Union"

The article is devoted to the allied relations between Tanganyika and Zanzibar and the creation of a union state – Tanzania. 2024 is the 60th anniversary of the union between the two formerly sovereign states. The author dwells on the key events in the history of Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Tanzania in the 60s of the 20th century: the Zanzibar Revolution of January 1964 – an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, anti-Sultan, anti-Arab armed uprising; the fall of the Zanzibar Sultanate, ruled by Britain; elections in Zanzibar, in which the Afro-Shirazi Party and the Nationalist Zanzibar Party competed; independence of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) became the leading and only party in Tanganyika; the ASP (AfroShirazi Party) became the leading and only party in Zanzibar. In 1977, the parties united into the Revolutionary Party, or CCM (Chama Cha Mpinduzi), which has dominated the political arena in Tanzania even after the introduction of multiparty system in the 1990s The article examines the model of African socialism – the Tanzanian ujamaa and its fate in subsequent years in already liberal, multiparty, capitalist Tanzania, under all presidents: Nyerere, Mwinyi, Mkapa, Kikwete, Magufuli, Suluhu. Reminders of Tanzanian socialism and ujamaa in the text of the Union Constitution remain unchanged for the time being

In 2022, the 100th anniversary of Julius Nyerere (1922-1999), the leader of Tanganyika, the founder and first president of Tanzania, an outstanding African politician and statesman, was celebrated. His political legacy in Tanzania, as well as the socio-political dynamics in Tanganyika and Zanzibar are the milestones in the recent history of the East African region, in the history of ideology, national question, national movements on the continent. His name is associated with both African nationalism and pan-Africanism. The achievements of Nyerere as a nationalist - “gathering”, creating, structuring, stabilizing and preserving a multi-tribal Tanzania as an integral state unit - are at the same time the success of Nyerere as a pan-Africanist, since the Tanganyika-Zanzibar union is a relatively successful experience in the political unification of two previously separate sovereign territories.

Over the past thirty years, there has been an increased drive towards decentralisation in Africa with the adoption of national constitutions that guarantee varying degrees of protection to local governments. In 2014, the African Union (AU) adopted the African Charter on Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development (2014) to guide the decentralisation project for member states. The Charter acknowledges that the protection of local autonomy in decentralised legal frameworks is necessary for local governments to deliver on their developmental mandates. In this article, we explore from a comparative law perspective, how local autonomy is protected in the constitutions of South Africa and Tanzania. We also consider legislation regulating decentralisation in South Africa and Tanzania, comparing the similarities, differences, and challenges to local autonomy in these two countries in view of their different national legal frameworks. The comparative legal analysis helps to show the unique nature of the systems of decentralisation in both countries and lessons that can inform law reform. Although there are comparative studies on subnational autonomy in Africa, none has specifically compared local government autonomy in South Africa and Tanzania. The research is based on a critical and integrated analysis of primary and secondary sources of law.

The African wild dog (Lycaon pictus) is among the species that have declined to the point where it is now listed as endangered by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN, 2012). Formerly, the African wild dog population was estimated to span 39 African countries, but today, they have disappeared from much of their former habitats, now occupying just 7% of their former geographic range. They are presently found in only 14 countries primarily in the southern part of the continent, including South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana. The largest populations are presently found in northern Botswana, the Selous Game Reserve in Tanzania, and in Kruger National Park in South Africa. In East Africa, the largest population is found in Tanzania and Kenya in the Serengeti-Maasai-Mara ecosystems and in the Selous Game Reserve. The current, global population is estimated to be between 3000-5000 which is comprised of less than 1400 mature individuals. Methodically, this study deeply underscored these data from critical library research i.e., archival sources, books and articles, and other published literatures across the globe which are pertinent to this research topic.

The October Russian Revolution of 1917 inaugurated the era of social transformation challenging the dominance of global capitalism. 1 It set in motion two lineages, one tracing its ancestry directly to October and its Marxist leader Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. Among these must be included the Chinese revolution of 1949, the Vietnamese revolution of 1945, and the Cuban revolution of 1959. The second lineage is that of national liberation movements in the former colonized countries of Africa and Asia. Tanzania’s independence movement Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) under the leadership of Julius Nyerere was one such national-popular movement that questioned both capitalism and imperialism with its blueprint called the Arusha Declaration: policy of socialism and self-reliance proclaimed in 1967. This essay focuses on Nyerere’s philosophical and political outlook and his contentious relationship with Marxism. It also documents the intellectual history of Marxist ideas in Tanzania.

AbstractMany regional currency institutions were established in subSaharan Africa under colonial rule. Surprisingly, a number of these colonial institutions survived the transition to national independence, and several have survived to the present day (e.g., the West African franc zones and the Southern African rand zone). In order to understand why some of these regional institutions survived while others collapsed, we have to look carefully at member countries' domestic politics at the time of independence. This study looks at the stop-and-go pattern of postcolonial cooperation in East Africa to provide an understanding of the choice between regional cooperation and the breakup of regional institutions. Newly independent governments in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania faced a choice between continuing regional institutional ties and dissolving regional institutions to issue their own national currencies. We argue that governments maintained regional currencies only when past institutions had created a domestic political constituency for continued regionalism. The most important historical legacy of colonial institutions was the way domestic political coalitions were reshaped. This study suggests, therefore, that there is a political mechanism to path dependence: past institutions continue to shape the present through changes in political alignments.

The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (the EAC Treaty) was signed on 30 November 1999 between the Republics of Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. Burundi and Rwanda acceded to the Treaty in 2007 and South Sudan in 2016. The East African Community (EAC) is the fastest growing Regional Economic Community (REC) in Africa, with a comparatively well-functioning Customs Union, a partly functioning Common Market, a fast-approaching Monetary Union, and an ultimate destination of a Political Federation. The EAC Treaty is an international treaty and its international status has been canvassed both by the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) – the EAC’s judicial organ – and the national courts of Partner States. As might be expected, the former has been progressive and supranationalist in its interpretation of the Treaty while the latter have dabbled in a ‘push and pull’ approach attempting, on the one hand, to limit the application of the Treaty in order to protect constitutional supremacy while fully accepting, on the other hand, its application in regard to ordinary national legislation. Amidst this discourse, an appreciation of the generally binding nature of ratified international treaties has emerged among national courts so that EAC law (herein referred to as Community law) – itself a manifestation of an international Treaty – could be a major beneficiary.

Integrated maritime and blue economy policies are changing ocean governance by introducing new policy drivers, reshaping institutional frameworks, as well as demanding new management instruments (e.g., Maritime Spatial Planning (MSP)). This started in 2007 though the European Union Integrated Maritime Policy approach, and in 2009 the Africa Union initiated a similar process, leading both to the Africa integrated maritime strategy as well as a blue economy strategy. Several countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, began to look to blue economy as a booster to socioeconomic welfare and initiated the development of national strategies, together with the necessary adaptation of institutional and legal networks. Case studies address those processes at the transition from the Atlantic to the Indian Oceans, focusing on Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, as well as several African Small Islands Developing States (SIDS), particularly Cape Verde, S. Tomé and Príncipe, Seychelles, Madagascar and Mauritius. Findings show that all countries covered in the case studies are developing national ocean and/or blue economy strategies and adapting their governmental, institutional, and legal frameworks, although there is a deeper political impact in SIDS. Overall, these new policy drivers are leading to a new model of ocean governance by addressing integrated maritime policies and blue growth strategies, as well as introducing MSP as a new EEZ governance tool.

InFebruary 1967, Tanzania, formed from the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, declared its intention to purpue a policy of ‘socialism’ and self-reliance. In the famous Arusha Declaration, the Tanganyika African National Union called for the Government to exercise control over the means of production and move away from over-reliance on foreign assistance in development. It stressed the need to strengthen agriculture and thereby improve the lives of the majority of the population which earned their livelihood in this sector. Finally, T.A.N.U. called for changes in the party to ensure that it contained only committed socialists. Closely linked to this was a leadership code for senior officals in ministries and parastatals which prohibited them from owing stock or holding directorships in private corporations. Renting out house was also declared impermissible.

Abstract During the 2015 general election campaigns in Tanzania, a controversy arose between the ruling party and the opposition coalition, concerning the proposed constitution draft and the position of Zanzibar within the Union. Beyond this controversy, there have existed the impacts of Islamic revivalism on the one hand, and a fear for the perpetuation of Islam in Tanzania on the other – issues which have played a significant role in the country since Independence. In this paper, we focus in particular upon popular Muslim preachers, such as Ponda Issa Ponda, who complain that the National Muslim Council of Tanzania [BAKWATA] is just an extension of the mainstream government – an organisation which is unsympathetic to Muslims’ interests, which violates Muslims’ rights, and which functions contrary to its own purpose. This complaint draws on long-term memory, reaching back even further than the 1968 banning of the East African Muslims Welfare Society [EAMWS]. Two interesting questions are addressed here concerning a central state’s involvement in religious affairs under multi-party rule: How has the Tanzanian government managed religious diversity? And how should its management style be evaluated, given the perspective that has developed with the shift in focus from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ in policy and management sciences?

Kenya and South Africa can be described as dominant party systems, under the dominance of the Kenya African National Union CKANU) and the African National Congress CANC) respectively. A dominant party system is in essence a democracy. The spirit of democracy may, however, apparently be contradicted by the weight of party dominance, thus questioning the content of and prospects for democracy under party dominance in both Kenya and South Africa. The study is a comparative analysis of party dominance in Kenya and South Africa. The main objective is to exan1ine the relationship between party dominance and democracy in both countries. It seeks to find out how party dominance is reproducing itself and surviving the post 1990 transition processes in Kenya and South Africa. More importantly, the study also seeks to find out how party dominance impacts upon institutions that support or uphold democratization and subsequently democracy. The findings of the study demonstrate that party dominance has reproduced itself and survived the post-1990 period, and is also impacting upon democratization and democracy. The dominant parties take a similar trajectory in pursuit of dominance over the state and its apparatuses. However, they differ when it comes to their relationship with the civil society. That between KANU and civil society is antagonistic, as the ruling party seeks to augment political power through authoritarian dominance of the latter to, while that of the ANC and civil society is responsive, as the former seeks to enhance political stability in the country. The impact of party dominance upon institutions that support democracy takes similar and different trajectories in both countries. Similarities arise with respect to the detrimental impact upon institutions of the Executive that ensure accountability and transparency, evident in the increasing cases of corruption, nepotism and political patronage appointments. Similarly, there has been a detrimental impact upon the Legislature regarding parliamentary proceedings. Parliamentary committees and opposition parties are being rendered ineffective as organs of ensuring transparency and accountability, and are often subject to delegitimation. The impact of party dominance on the Judiciary, however, differs in both countries. In Kenya, the judiciary continues to suffer from excessive interference from the Executive and the ruling party, whereas in South Africa the judicial system remains largely independent with regard to the application of justice, despite constant criticisms from the dominant party. The study concludes that South Africa is, gradually, going the Kenyan way. If this condition is left unchecked there is the possibility that South Africa could eventually end up a psuedo-democracy like Kenya, where formal democratic political institutions such as multiparty elections, exist to mask the reality of authoritarian dominance. The thesis recommends that strengthening civil society organizations, opposition political parties, and state institutions in both countries to ensure greater accountability and transparency, will reverse this detrimental effect of party dominance. It also recommends meaningful constitutional reforms that will guarantee greater independence of these institutions, and the decentralization of governmental and political power to check and limit the powers of the dominant party. Also recommended are areas for further research.
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Includes bibliographical references.
The National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) was established in 1924 as a forum for white South African students. The rise of Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s and the establishment of the ultra-nationalist Afrikaanse Studentebond (ANS) led to the disaffiliation from NUSAS of the student bodies of the Afrikaans-medium universities. Until the end of the Second World War, two groups of students jostled for control of NUSAS. The first championed the ideal of a broad white South African national feeling and worked for the return of the Afikaans-speaking centres, while the second group, predominantly left-wing radicals based at Wits, called for NUSAS to become a racially more inclusive organisation and admit Fort Hare to membership.

Magister Artium - MA (History)
This dissertation examines the relationships of solidarity that developed between the Mozambican people and the Zimbabwean liberation movement ZANU, between 1975 and 1980, considering them in their multifarious aspects and attempting to understand the dynamics at work. Scholars have not paid sufficient attention to Mozambique's role as the host country of the Zimbabwean liberation movement. This dissertation is intended to fill this gap in the literature, by engaging critically with the history of ZANU-Mozambique relations, seen from the perspective of the Mozambicans themselves. My argument is that Mozambican support to ZANU was marked by a spirit of mutual cooperation and brotherhood between people who shared a similar historical and cultural background, which is a major factor behind the support offered by Mozambican people to ZANU. But, this solidarity was also the consequence of an authoritarian effort by the Mozambican ruling party, FRELIMO. to impose a specific political and ideological consciousness. This consciousness was shaped through the creation of legal instruments to ensure popular support such as the creation of the Solidarity Bank in 1976; by the use of an authoritarian discourse which relied on a 'vocabulary of ready-made ideas'1; and by the use of such methods as the cartoon figure, Xiconhoca, stigmatising all those who did not support solidarity with ZANU as traitors or sell-outs.

Cette thèse de doctorat s’intéresse au principal syndicat sud-africain, le National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), fondé en 1982. Partant de ses premières années, au cours de la dernière décennie du régime d’apartheid, elle retrace sa trajectoire, en tant qu’organisation syndicale, dans l’après apartheid. L’industrie des mines emploie aujourd’hui près d’un demi-million de travailleurs en Afrique du Sud et cette recherche, entamée à l’automne 2009, a été marquée par les grandes grèves de mineurs qui ont débuté en janvier 2012. Plusieurs mines de platine visitées avant et, pour certaines, après ces conflits, ont été affectées et, notamment, celle où a été perpétré le « massacre de Marikana ». Le 16 août 2012, des unités de la police antiterroriste ont ouvert le feu sur les grévistes et tué 34 mineurs. Cette répression étatique d’une violence inégalée depuis l’apartheid n’a pas pour autant mis un terme aux grèves qui ont atteint leur paroxysme au cours du premier semestre 2014
Based on a case study of South Africa’s largest union – the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), this dissertation puts the current mining crisis in historical perspective. Beyond mining, it proposes keys to understand South Africa’s “negotiated” transformation from apartheid to democracy. It concludes that this country currently experiences what one can call the “end of the post-apartheid consensus”; a moment in which shared elitist conceptions of political and socioeconomic change developed during South Africa’s 1990s transition are starting to be decisively challenged. Departing from the NUM’s early years, in apartheid’s last decade, it analyses the union’s trajectory as a mineworker’s organisation after the end of while minority rule. Questioning NUM representations, in traditional struggle iconography, as a militant and revolutionary organisation, it argues that this union was also historically developed into a disciplined union, structured by and around strong core leadership. In other words, the main questions raised here here are : how are we to understand, in time, tensions between militancy on the one hand, and organisation on the other hand? How are we to accound in non-linear terms for the build up to 2012 Marikana strike and massacre, in a democratic context in which labour relations has supposedly become less adversarial and more workers friendly? What, in the NUM’s organisational ethos, can help us understand what happened, not as if Marikana was the expression of fundamental and untenable contradictions – class betrayal by another name, but as the result of sometimes unintended consequences of a nevertheless conscious and deliberate process aimed at organisation building and development? The main hypothesis that is put to work here is that NUM founders strategically built a centralised and efficient organisation, in order to survive in the mines’ repressive environment. This, in turn, generated tensions, which were to remain, between the grassroots and the top the organisation. In order to fulfil its organisational goals, the union also crucially invested in leadership development, at the expense of membership development. While claiming to be a socialist union that produced professional organisers and revolutionaries, the NUM nevertheless gave birth to professional negotiators who were more inclined towards negotiation than conflict. If the NUM achieved tremendous gains for workers through collective bargaining, the 2012 strikes and their aftermath have shown that mineworkers still aspire to militancy at the grassroots, and that they are ready to fight in order to transform the mining industry. This implies that the workers’ bread and butter demands are also rooted in more structural claims, which have gradually brought the “post-apartheid consensus”, which until 2012 prevailed as a shared narrative of how mining was to be democratised, into question
La presente tesi di dottorato si interessa del principale sindacato sudafricano il National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), fondato nel 1982. Partendo dai primi anni della sua creazione, che corrispondono all’ultimo decennio del regime dell’apartheid, ne ripercorre la traiettoria in quanto organizzazione sindacale nel postapartheid. L’industria mineraria impiega all’incirca mezzo milione di lavoratori in Sudafrica e la presente ricerca, avviata nell’autunno del 2009, si è svolta in parte durante gli importanti scioperi di minatori iniziati a gennaio 2012. Diverse miniere di platino visitate prima e, in alcuni casi, dopo le manifestazioni sono state protagoniste di questi eventi. Un esempio fra tutti è la miniera in cui si è perpetrato il “massacro di Marikana”. Il 16 agosto 2012, alcune unità della polizia antiterroriste hanno aperto il fuoco sui manifestanti e ucciso 34 minatori. Nonostante una repressione statale di tale violenza non si fosse più verificata dai tempi dell’apartheid, gli scioperi sono proseguiti e la situazione ha raggiunto il suo parossismo nel corso del primo semestre 2014

Includes abstract.
Includes bibliographical references.
The aim of this study was to compare changes in the physical and morphological characteristics of South Africa’s National U/20 rugby union players (Forwards and Backs) over a 12 year period from 1998 - 2010. This period spans an era starting just after the onset of professionalism of the game to the modern era where the influence of professionalism has filtered down to junior (U/20) levels. Any changes in morphology and physical ability of the players can be attributed to the changes in the demands of the game and reflect the characteristics that are required for a player to be successful at that level. Players who were U/20 at the time of representing the Junior South African National Team National over a period spanning from 1998 – 2010 were used for the study. A total of 453 players, split into two groups, Forwards (n = 256) and Backs (n = 197), underwent measurements of body mass, stature, body fat percentage, muscular endurance (pull ups), muscular strength (1RM bench press, sprint times (10m and 40m) and aerobic capacity (Multistage shuttle run test). All Tests were conducted once a year in either January or December of that year. Data are represented as means ± 95 % confidence intervals. A Levene’s test of homogeneity was used to determine whether the variance for each variable was equal. A two-way analysis of variance was used to determine whether there were significant differences for either main effect of ‘year’ or ‘position’ or for the interaction between ‘year x position’. If the main effect of ‘year’ or interaction (“year x position”) was significant, a Tukey post hoc test was used to identify specific differences. Statistical significance was accepted when p < 0.05.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Stabilization and Reconstruction))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2010.
Thesis Advisor(s): Lawson, Letitia. ; Second Reader: McNab, Robert M. "June 2010." Description based on title screen as viewed on July 14, 2010. Author(s) subject terms: Zimbabwe, Mugabe, structural adjustment program, democracy, autocrat, state sponsored violence, ZANU, ZAPU, Nkomo, Movement for Democratic Change, Tsvangirai, Fifth Brigade. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-55). Also available in print.

This thesis postulates that the inability of the post-apartheid government to deal decisively with the “legacies of apartheid education” is linked to the macro-educational policy trajectory endorsed by the African National Congress government in the early 1990s. It notes that post-apartheid education policymaking shows similarities with the National Party reforms initiated towards the end of the 1980s in education. In the late 1980s the apartheid government implemented a broad educational framework consonant with the rise of neo-liberal restructuring emerging internationally. It is argued that the teacher unions, and the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) in particular, were active role-players in shaping the new educational trajectory and discourse and that it was particularly because of the acquiescence of the unions that the government was able to embark on the road of neo-liberal restructuring with very little organised opposition. SADTU’s weak opposition to the rising influence of neo-liberal educational restructuring greatly facilitated the creation of a two-tier education system that South Africa is grappling with today, one for the rich and one for the poor.
Thesis (PhD (Education Policy Studies))--University of Pretoria, 2008.
Education Management and Policy Studies
PhD
unrestricted

It is widely recognized that human-wildlife conflicts can reduce farmers’ support for long-term species conservation. The subject of human-elephant conflicts is highly relevant in villages around Babati District in North Central Tanzania because of the closeness to Tarangire National Park. The purpose of this study is therefore to examine local farmers’ attitudes toward elephants and the attitudes’ effects on conservation efforts. Primary data was collected through a qualitative approach of semi-structured interviews with twelve farmers in four villages around Babati, with Wildlife Officer Nashon Macokesha at Babati District Council and with Allan Carlson, Nature Conservation Expert at WWF. A thematic analysis was done to make comparisons between the answers from farmers, Macokesha and Carlson. The Theory of Planned Behavior and the Value-Belief-Norm theory were also used to analyze the underlying factors of the farmers’ attitudes.   The results of this study show that around half of the farmers have positive attitudes toward elephants, while the other half think negatively of them. Elephants were identified as the most problematic species and crop-raiding as the most problematic type of human-elephant conflict. The problems that farmers experience do to crop-raiding and other types of human-elephant conflicts include the direct effects of lost livelihood and income and indirect effects like health impacts and security issues. The result also indicates that factors affecting farmers’ attitudes toward elephants include: 1) the proportion of available land affected by elephants, 2) the closeness of farmers’ fields to Tarangire National Park, 3) the lack of compensation, 4) the ability to affect the decision-making concerning the human-elephant conflicts and 5) the information about and knowledge of elephants and their importance. The underlying cause of the human-elephant conflicts is identified to be the spatial overlap of the two species. To prevent human-elephant encounters in the first place, thereby reducing the risk of human-elephants conflicts, better land use planning can be used to avoid settlement and cultivation close to protected areas. Buffer zones can be established around national parks and reserves to reduce the overlap between humans and wildlife. Mitigation through preventive and deterrent methods like lighting fires, making noises, using chili-dung or chili-grease to scare elephants off farmers’ fields can also be used. Another alternative is to switch from growing high-risk crops that elephants prefer to crops like chili or sesame which rarely gets eaten by elephants.
Att konflikter mellan människor och djurliv kan minska bönders stöd för artbevarande åtgärder är välkänt bland forskare. Konflikter mellan människor och elefanter är vitt förekommande i byar i Babati-distriktet i norra Tanzania på grund av närheten till nationalparken Tarangire. Syftet med denna studie är därför att undersöka bönders attityder till elefanter och attitydernas effekter för bevarandeåtgärder. Primärdata samlades in genom ett kvalitativt upplägg med semistrukturerade intervjuer med tolv bönder i fyra byar i Babati, med Wildlife Officer Nashon Macokesha på Babati District Council samt med Allan Carlson, naturvårdsexpert på WWF. En tematisk analys utfördes för att jämföra svaren mellan bönderna, Macokesha och Carlson och the Theory of Planned Behavior samt the Value-Belief-Norm theory användes för att analysera de underliggande orsakerna bakom böndernas attityder.   Resultatet från denna studie visar att ungefär hälften av bönderna har positiva attityder till elefanter, medan den andra hälften har negativa åsikter om dem. Elefanter identifierades som den mest problematiska arten för bönderna och förstörandet av grödor som den mest problematiska typen av konflikt mellan människor och elefanter. Problemen som bönderna upplever till följd av dessa konflikter inkluderar direkta effekter som förlorad inkomst och försämrade försörjningsmöjligheter, men också indirekta effekter som hälso- och säkerhetsproblem. Faktorer som enligt resultaten i denna studie kan påverka böndernas attityder till elefanter innefattar: 1) andelen tillgänglig mark som påverkas av elefanter, 2) närheten från böndernas mark till nationalparken Tarangire, 3) bristen på kompensation, 4) möjligheten att påverka beslutsprocessen gällande konflikten mellan människor och elefanter samt 5) information och kunskap om elefanter och deras betydelse. Den underliggande orsaken till konflikterna mellan människor och elefanter identifieras vara överlappet i användnings­områden mellan de båda arterna. För att förhindra möten mellan människor och elefanter, och därmed minska risken för konflikter, behövs bättre markanvändningsplanering så att bosättning och jordbruk undviks i närheten av skyddade områden. Buffertzoner kan också anläggas runt nationalparker och reservat för att minska överlappet mellan människor och djur. Avskräckande åtgärder, som att tända eldar, göra oväsen, tända chilibriketter eller sätta upp chili-rep, för att hålla elefanter borta från böndernas åkrar kan också användas. Ett annat alternativ är att bönderna byter från att odla högriskgrödor som elefanter föredrar till att odla grödor som chili eller sesam, vilka sällan eller aldrig äts av elefanter.

Abstract Since its launch in 2002 the African Union (AU) has advanced post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks and institutions as part of the broad project of deepening local solutions to African problems. This chapter argues that while the AU has made significant strides in building norms around peace, security, stability, and governance, it faces tremendous obstacles in realizing the vision and objectives articulated in the 2006 Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy. It, therefore, urges national ownership of peacebuilding as well as a deepening and advancing of normative frameworks amongst various stakeholders. Conflict prevention is viewed as key to sustained peacebuilding in Africa. The chapter concludes that in the absence of mobilization of local resources and capacity, the AU will remain unprepared for the complex and multiple tasks entailed in peacebuilding.

AbstractThe importance of worker education around the presence of foreign national migrants “beyond the apartheid workplace” (Webster & von Holdt, 2005: 4) is undisputed. Our intention is to establish the extent to which worker education programmes benefit foreign-national migrants and also to establish the possible challenges in the implementation of the related legislation and policies. The current context of neoliberal capitalism and growing informalisation of work (Webster & von Holdt, 2005; Muller & Esselaar, 2004) is particularly important, as it tends to challenge the existence and effectiveness of worker education while promoting divisions among the workers. During the apartheid era, worker education was a resource used by the trade union movement to address struggles in the workplace and those percolating to the communities (see Xulu-Gama, 2018; Von Holdt, 2002; Webster, 1985; Friedman, 1987). Worker education always took into consideration the history of the South African workplace, which made it relevant, comprehensive, critical and progressive (Hamilton, 2014).

AbstractWhile media narratives tend to suggest an exodus from Africa to Europe, the majority of migrants from Africa move to destinations within the region. Although the African Union Commission and Member States have formulated various policies to govern migration, there is little understanding of the implementation outcomes of these policies on the ground. This chapter draws on a review of policy documents to examine the continental, regional, and national level migration policies implemented over the years in Africa. While the African Union and regional economic blocs have been making efforts to promote free movement of persons, implementation has been poor due to lack of political will to fully implement free movement policies. Additionally, while many of the individual countries have formulated migration related policies that seek to harness the benefits of migration for economic development, resources constraints have affected the implementation of these policies. The findings indicate that to improve migration governance in Africa requires the commitment of governments to implement regional frameworks in their respective countries. There is also a need to invest in capacity training of relevant actors, and better coordination of efforts to address the needs of labour migrants on the continent.

AbstractThis chapter seeks to address the concerns associated with data regulation on the African continent. In particular, the paper zooms in on three major aspects of data regulation that hold the reigns to the potential development of the continent. These are the free flow of data, the adoption of open data regimes and cybersecurity. This will be in the general context of Africa, with a focus on regulatory instruments from the different bodies at continental and sub-regional level as well as some national legislation from countries that have developed any legislative instruments that address the same concerns. Emphasis will also be paid to the strides that have been taken by the European Union, the first continental body that has taken a geographically concerted approach to comprehensive data regulation. The aim is to draw lessons from such efforts with the intention of determining an appropriate African centred approach to data regulation, particularly in the context of increased inter-African trade as envisaged by the Agreement on the African Free Continental Trade Area and an enhanced digital economy as motivated for in the Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030).

AbstractCollaboration has been highlighted internationally as a key skill for learning, working, and living in the twenty-first century. However, to teach it well, enhance its performance, and measure its growth, it is essential to have a clear and consistent definition of the skill. There are a number of frameworks that describe collaboration in a way that is meaningful to learning and growth. Despite some differences across frameworks, it is clear there is a common core set of contributing subskills. This suggests that collaboration is of global interest, and that there are components that transcend national or cultural specificities. Notwithstanding, definitions and frameworks need to be suitable for the context in which they will be applied, ensuring the approach is integrated and sustainable in education systems. One focus of the ALiVE project was to develop a collaboration framework suitable and relevant for the sub-Saharan African context. The approach included auditing frameworks internationally, curricula regionally, and conducting an ethnographic study. The resulting framework was used in the development of assessment tasks to sample the skill among adolescents in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The issues highlighted in this chapter reveal the need for further study of collaboration in specific contexts in order to understand local variations and ensure optimal approaches to measurement.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and the African continent has increasingly attracted the attention of historians and literary critics alike, with Angola frequently treated as a fruitful case study. This chapter traces the socio-cultural microhistory of the transmission of the work of Maksim Gorky (1868–1936) in Angola––a transmission which underpinned, crucially, the development of a littérature engagé during the struggle for Angolan independence from the Portuguese Empire in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Gorky’s influence on the generation of Angolan writers active in the 1950s and 1960s––often regarded as the Geração Cultura, after the literary bulletin Cultura (1957–1961), which resided at the heart of the cultural movement supporting the drive for independence––has been explicitly acknowledged. With José Luandino Vieira as a case study, this chapter seeks to determine the ways in which Maksim Gorky’s work influenced, through processes of translation, transmission, and adaptation, a critical moment in the emergence of an Angolan national literary culture. Through comparative analyses between source and target texts, and drawing on extant scholarship of translation and ideology, this chapter analyses the ‘degrees of mediation’ between Gorky’s work and its instrumentalization by the 1950s generation of Angolan authors, and Luandino Vieira specifically. The ‘degrees of mediation’ traced in this paper fall into two main categories: first, both the translation of the Russian author into Brazilian Portuguese––with particular emphasis on the novel Mother (1906)––and its transnational dissemination across the Atlantic; second, in light of the translations then available to Angolan authors, the transposition of aspects of Gorky’s oeuvre into the early writings of José Luandino Vieira.

This paper describes a learning journey which started with a COL-supported webinar series addressing ‘Learning Design leading to Sensitisation for Online Course Development using OER’. The webinar OER materials were hosted on Moodle and required participants to complete a series of related online activities interspersed between the synchronous sessions. The high-level output of this stage was the drafting of an institutional, faculty, or departmental action plan to propagate deeper understanding and new skills at an institutional level. The second stage was the refinement of these Action Plans using a Results-Based Management approach, with the third stage being the COL-supported implementation of these plans. // In a COL collaboration with the Southern African Development Community Centre for Distance Education (SADC-CDE), the first cohort of 39 participants were drawn from four educational institutions: College of Open Schooling (COS) at Botswana Open University (BOU); Institute for Adult Education (IAE) in Tanzania; Lesotho Distance Teaching Centre (LDTC); and Namibia College of Open Learning (NAMCOL). COS BOU, LDTC, and NAMCOL continued this journey through to the final (3rd) implementation stage. // A revised webinar programme was repeated for the West African Sub-region (WASR) under a COL collaboration with the Regional Training and Research Institute for Distance and Open Learning (RETRIDOL). This involved 39 participants from Cameroon, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia, drawn from educational institutions and national education ministries. Although this cohort did not progress to the 2nd stage of action plan refinement supported by COL, intentions were to refine plans at a national level for the WASR States. // Throughout the webinar series regular online reflections were encouraged using the Moodle blog, and a final reflection based on the Brookfield Critical Incident Questionnaire was undertaken at the conclusion of each cohort experience. Useful feedback was obtained indicating factors that sparked engagement and what constituted challenges for each cohort. // Finally, findings relating to the two cohorts’ engagement and experience of their journeys are presented, and achievements of participating institutions and countries with reference to their goals and plans are recognised. Lessons learned by the project leader and collaborators are identified, and potential improvements suggested. The projects took place during the Covid-19 pandemic within which all participating institutions and the facilitator were in lockdown in their home countries (2020/2021) and experienced associated challenges.

Improvements in instructional coherence have been shown to have large impacts on student learning, yet analysis of such coherence, especially in developing countries and at a systems level, is rare. We use an established methodology, the Surveys of Enacted Curriculum (SEC), and apply it to a developing country context to systematically analyze and quantify the content and coherence of the primary curriculum standards, national examinations, and actual teaching delivered in the classroom in Uganda and Tanzania. We find high levels of incoherence across all three instructional components. In Uganda, for example, only four of the fourteen topics in the English curriculum standards appear on the primary leaving exam, and two of the highest-priority topics in the standards are completely omitted from the exams. In Tanzania, only three of fourteen English topics are covered on the exam, and all are assessed at the “memorization” level. Rather than aligning with either the curriculum standards or exams, teachers’ classroom instruction is poorly aligned with both. Teachers tend to cover broad swathes of content and levels of cognitive demand, unrelated to the structure of either the curriculum standards or exams. An exception is Uganda mathematics, for which standards, exams, and teacher instruction are all well aligned. By shedding light on alignment deficits in the two countries, these results draw attention to a policy area that has previously attracted little (if any) attention in many developing countries’ education policy reform efforts. In addition to providing empirical results for Uganda and Tanzania, this study provides a proof-of-concept for the use of the SEC methodology as a diagnostic tool in developing countries, helping education systems identify areas of instructional (in)coherence and informing efforts to improve coherence for learning.

Since the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s, policymaking at a national and continental level has increasingly turned to agricultural commercialisation as the foundation for Africa’s long-term nutrition and food security. However, socio-economic inequalities, land tenure and food insecurity, as well as livelihood and income precarities remain widespread challenges. The effects of shocks, such as COVID-19, have overlaid emergent and entrenched patterns of social differentiation that shape access to resources, markets, and other opportunities for those involved in commercial agriculture. This paper considered the impacts of COVID-19 on value chains in Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, to ask: 1) What can political settlements analyses tell us about agricultural value chains and responses to COVID-19 in the countries studied? 2) How are structures and power relations throughout the value chains and actors’ responses to COVID-19 related to social differentiation in the context of African agriculture?

Realities such as the COVID-19 pandemic have expedited the move to online operations, highlighting the undeniable fact that the world is continuing to go digital. This emphasises the need for policymakers to regulate in a manner that allows them to harness digital trade benefits while also avoiding associated risk. However, given that digital trade remains unco-ordinated globally, with countries adopting different approaches to policy issues, national regulatory divergence on the matter continues, placing limits on the benefits that countries can obtain from digital trade. Given these disparities, ahead of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Phase II Negotiations, African countries have been considering the best way to harmonise regulations on issues related to digital trade. To do this effectively, AfCFTA members need to identify where divergencies exist in their domestic regulatory systems. This will allow AfCFTA members to determine where harmonisation is possible, as well as what is needed to achieve such harmonisation. This report analyses the domestic regulations and policies of four focus countries – South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and Senegal – comparing their regulatory approaches to five policy issues: i) regulation of online transactions; ii) cross-border data flows, data localisation, and personal data protection; iii) access to source code and technology transfer; iv) intermediary liability; and v) customs duties on electronic transmissions. The study highlights where divergencies exist in adopted approaches, indicating the need for the four countries – and AfCFTA members in general – to carefully consider the implications of the divergences, and determine where it is possible and beneficial to harmonise approaches. This was intended to encourage AfCFTA member states to take ownership of these issues and reflect on the reforms needed. As seen in Table 1 below, the study shows that the four countries diverge on most of the five policy issues. There are differences in how all four countries regulate online transactions – that is, e-signatures and online consumer protection. Nigeria was the only country out of the four to recognise all types of e-signatures as legally equivalent. Kenya and Senegal only recognise specific e-signatures, which are either issued or validated by a recognised institution, while South Africa adopts a mixed approach, where it recognises all e-signatures as legally valid, but provides higher evidentiary weight to certain types of e-signatures. Only South Africa and Senegal have specific regulations relating to online consumer protection, while Nigeria and Kenya do not have any clear rules. With regards to cross border data flows, data localisation, and personal data protection, the study shows that all four focus countries have regulations that consist of elements borrowed from the European Union (EU) General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In particular, this was regarding the need for the data subject's consent, and also the adequacy requirement. Interestingly, the study also shows that South Africa, Kenya and Nigeria also adopt data localisation measures, although at different levels of strictness. South Africa’s data localisation laws are mostly imposed on data that is considered critical – which is then required to be processed within South African borders – while Nigeria requires all data to be processed and stored locally, using local servers. Kenya imposes data localisation measures that are mostly linked to its priority for data privacy. Out of the four focus countries, Senegal is the only country that does not impose any data localisation laws. Although the study shows that all four countries share a position on customs duties on electronic transmissions, it is also interesting to note that none of the four countries currently have domestic regulations or policies on the subject. The report concludes by highlighting that, as the AfCFTA Phase II Negotiations aim to arrive at harmonisation and to improve intra-African trade and international trade, AfCFTA members should reflect on their national policies and domestic regulations to determine where harmonisation is needed, and whether AfCFTA is the right platform for achieving this efficiently.

Given the constraints faced by the health care infrastructure in responding to the AIDS crisis in sub-Saharan Africa, and the limitations of traditional educational approaches in motivating people to modify their sexual behavior within the African context, community-based efforts at AIDS prevention, and care of those affected, are the first lines of defense against the disease. Thus, they deserve greater scrutiny, to learn from the experiences and to continue and expand their efforts. The “Community-Based AIDS Prevention and Care in Africa: Building on Local Initiatives” project is being carried out by the Population Council with support from Glaxo Wellcome. The project, which integrates HIV/AIDS prevention and care activities at the community level, focuses on five countries in East and Southern Africa (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). The first phase identified essential components that make community-based efforts successful. The second phase includes dissemination of findings from Phase I in the five participating countries, developing and implementing action-oriented research activities to strengthen the client-support capabilities of selected local initiatives, and reporting research results. This document is a report on the implementation of the first activity under Phase II.

This report maps the African landscape of Open Science – with a focus on Open Data as a sub-set of Open Science. Data to inform the landscape study were collected through a variety of methods, including surveys, desk research, engagement with a community of practice, networking with stakeholders, participation in conferences, case study presentations, and workshops hosted. Although the majority of African countries (35 of 54) demonstrates commitment to science through its investment in research and development (R&D), academies of science, ministries of science and technology, policies, recognition of research, and participation in the Science Granting Councils Initiative (SGCI), the following countries demonstrate the highest commitment and political willingness to invest in science: Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. In addition to existing policies in Science, Technology and Innovation (STI), the following countries have made progress towards Open Data policies: Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, South Africa and Uganda. Only two African countries (Kenya and South Africa) at this stage contribute 0.8% of its GDP (Gross Domestic Product) to R&D (Research and Development), which is the closest to the AU’s (African Union’s) suggested 1%. Countries such as Lesotho and Madagascar ranked as 0%, while the R&D expenditure for 24 African countries is unknown. In addition to this, science globally has become fully dependent on stable ICT (Information and Communication Technologies) infrastructure, which includes connectivity/bandwidth, high performance computing facilities and data services. This is especially applicable since countries globally are finding themselves in the midst of the 4th Industrial Revolution (4IR), which is not only “about” data, but which “is” data. According to an article1 by Alan Marcus (2015) (Senior Director, Head of Information Technology and Telecommunications Industries, World Economic Forum), “At its core, data represents a post-industrial opportunity. Its uses have unprecedented complexity, velocity and global reach. As digital communications become ubiquitous, data will rule in a world where nearly everyone and everything is connected in real time. That will require a highly reliable, secure and available infrastructure at its core, and innovation at the edge.” Every industry is affected as part of this revolution – also science. An important component of the digital transformation is “trust” – people must be able to trust that governments and all other industries (including the science sector), adequately handle and protect their data. This requires accountability on a global level, and digital industries must embrace the change and go for a higher standard of protection. “This will reassure consumers and citizens, benefitting the whole digital economy”, says Marcus. A stable and secure information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure – currently provided by the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) – is key to advance collaboration in science. The AfricaConnect2 project (AfricaConnect (2012–2014) and AfricaConnect2 (2016–2018)) through establishing connectivity between National Research and Education Networks (NRENs), is planning to roll out AfricaConnect3 by the end of 2019. The concern however is that selected African governments (with the exception of a few countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Ethiopia and others) have low awareness of the impact the Internet has today on all societal levels, how much ICT (and the 4th Industrial Revolution) have affected research, and the added value an NREN can bring to higher education and research in addressing the respective needs, which is far more complex than simply providing connectivity. Apart from more commitment and investment in R&D, African governments – to become and remain part of the 4th Industrial Revolution – have no option other than to acknowledge and commit to the role NRENs play in advancing science towards addressing the SDG (Sustainable Development Goals). For successful collaboration and direction, it is fundamental that policies within one country are aligned with one another. Alignment on continental level is crucial for the future Pan-African African Open Science Platform to be successful. Both the HIPSSA ((Harmonization of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa)3 project and WATRA (the West Africa Telecommunications Regulators Assembly)4, have made progress towards the regulation of the telecom sector, and in particular of bottlenecks which curb the development of competition among ISPs. A study under HIPSSA identified potential bottlenecks in access at an affordable price to the international capacity of submarine cables and suggested means and tools used by regulators to remedy them. Work on the recommended measures and making them operational continues in collaboration with WATRA. In addition to sufficient bandwidth and connectivity, high-performance computing facilities and services in support of data sharing are also required. The South African National Integrated Cyberinfrastructure System5 (NICIS) has made great progress in planning and setting up a cyberinfrastructure ecosystem in support of collaborative science and data sharing. The regional Southern African Development Community6 (SADC) Cyber-infrastructure Framework provides a valuable roadmap towards high-speed Internet, developing human capacity and skills in ICT technologies, high- performance computing and more. The following countries have been identified as having high-performance computing facilities, some as a result of the Square Kilometre Array7 (SKA) partnership: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zambia. More and more NRENs – especially the Level 6 NRENs 8 (Algeria, Egypt, Kenya, South Africa, and recently Zambia) – are exploring offering additional services; also in support of data sharing and transfer. The following NRENs already allow for running data-intensive applications and sharing of high-end computing assets, bio-modelling and computation on high-performance/ supercomputers: KENET (Kenya), TENET (South Africa), RENU (Uganda), ZAMREN (Zambia), EUN (Egypt) and ARN (Algeria). Fifteen higher education training institutions from eight African countries (Botswana, Benin, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania) have been identified as offering formal courses on data science. In addition to formal degrees, a number of international short courses have been developed and free international online courses are also available as an option to build capacity and integrate as part of curricula. The small number of higher education or research intensive institutions offering data science is however insufficient, and there is a desperate need for more training in data science. The CODATA-RDA Schools of Research Data Science aim at addressing the continental need for foundational data skills across all disciplines, along with training conducted by The Carpentries 9 programme (specifically Data Carpentry 10 ). Thus far, CODATA-RDA schools in collaboration with AOSP, integrating content from Data Carpentry, were presented in Rwanda (in 2018), and during17-29 June 2019, in Ethiopia. Awareness regarding Open Science (including Open Data) is evident through the 12 Open Science-related Open Access/Open Data/Open Science declarations and agreements endorsed or signed by African governments; 200 Open Access journals from Africa registered on the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ); 174 Open Access institutional research repositories registered on openDOAR (Directory of Open Access Repositories); 33 Open Access/Open Science policies registered on ROARMAP (Registry of Open Access Repository Mandates and Policies); 24 data repositories registered with the Registry of Data Repositories (re3data.org) (although the pilot project identified 66 research data repositories); and one data repository assigned the CoreTrustSeal. Although this is a start, far more needs to be done to align African data curation and research practices with global standards. Funding to conduct research remains a challenge. African researchers mostly fund their own research, and there are little incentives for them to make their research and accompanying data sets openly accessible. Funding and peer recognition, along with an enabling research environment conducive for research, are regarded as major incentives. The landscape report concludes with a number of concerns towards sharing research data openly, as well as challenges in terms of Open Data policy, ICT infrastructure supportive of data sharing, capacity building, lack of skills, and the need for incentives. Although great progress has been made in terms of Open Science and Open Data practices, more awareness needs to be created and further advocacy efforts are required for buy-in from African governments. A federated African Open Science Platform (AOSP) will not only encourage more collaboration among researchers in addressing the SDGs, but it will also benefit the many stakeholders identified as part of the pilot phase. The time is now, for governments in Africa, to acknowledge the important role of science in general, but specifically Open Science and Open Data, through developing and aligning the relevant policies, investing in an ICT infrastructure conducive for data sharing through committing funding to making NRENs financially sustainable, incentivising open research practices by scientists, and creating opportunities for more scientists and stakeholders across all disciplines to be trained in data management.