Siga este link para ver outros tipos de publicações sobre o tema: Special forces (Military intelligence).
Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Special forces (Military intelligence)"
Crie uma referência precisa em APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, e outros estilos
Veja os 50 melhores artigos de revistas para estudos sobre o assunto "Special forces (Military intelligence)".
Ao lado de cada fonte na lista de referências, há um botão "Adicionar à bibliografia". Clique e geraremos automaticamente a citação bibliográfica do trabalho escolhido no estilo de citação de que você precisa: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
Você também pode baixar o texto completo da publicação científica em formato .pdf e ler o resumo do trabalho online se estiver presente nos metadados.
Veja os artigos de revistas das mais diversas áreas científicas e compile uma bibliografia correta.
1
Asanbai, А. Zh, e B. А. Kashkarbaev. "Possibilities of using military intelligence forces and means in special military action". Proceeding "Bulletin MILF" 54, n.º 2 (30 de junho de 2023): 15–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.56132/2791-3368.2023.2-49-02.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The publication examines the trends in the use of forces and means of military intelligence, taking into account modern conditions and factors and the nature of modern warfare. The analysis of the experience of conducting military intelligence in modern military conflicts is presented and its role in special military operations is noted. The author's views on the improvement of the organizational and staff structure of the reconnaissance company of the mechanized brigade are given. The ways of increasing the capabilities of intelligence agencies in the course of obtaining intelligence data by equipping intelligence units with unmanned aerial vehicles are proposed.
2
Mammadov, R. А. "The application of special operations forces combat tactics". Proceeding "Bulletin MILF" 58, n.º 2 (15 de junho de 2024): 92–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.56132/2791-3368.2024.2-49-08.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Special Operations Forces (SOF) are pivotal assets in contemporary military endeavors, undertaking missions demanding precision, stealth, and adaptability. This article scrutinizes the critical imperative of refining combat tactics for SOF units. It delineates multifaceted strategies for tactical enhancement, including rigorous training regimes and immersive simulation exercises. Moreover, it emphasizes the integration of cutting-edge technologies, such as advanced weaponry, surveillance systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and cyber capabilities, to augment situational awareness and mission efficacy. Effective collaboration and information sharing among diverse military branches and intelligence agencies are underscored as indispensable for maximizing operational impact. By perpetually evolving their tactics, SOF units can adeptly navigate the intricate dynamics of modern warfare, effectively countering emerging threats and ensuring mission success in today's ever-evolving security milieu. The article explores the importance of enhancing the application of combat tactics for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in modern military operations. It discusses various strategies for tactical improvement, including training and simulation, integration of technology, collaboration, and information sharing among different branches of the military and intelligence agencies. By continuously refining and innovating their tactics, SOF units can stay ahead of emerging threats and achieve mission success with greater efficiency and precision in today's dynamic security landscape.
3
Vashchenko, O. A. "The subject of criminal trespass in forensic characteristics of obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations". Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, n.º 1 (20 de março de 2024): 566–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2024.01.99.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article states that Russia's military aggression against our country created, among other things, the need to make changes to domestic legislation in order to criminalize certain activities of people. In particular, by supplementing the Criminal Code of Ukraine with Article 114-1 "Obstructing the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations.” And with the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the territory of Ukraine, unfortunately, the number of the specified criminal offenses only increased: 7 criminal offenses in 2021, 76 in 2022, 159 in 2023.
It has been established that the subject of a criminal offense in the studied category of criminal offenses will be the lawful activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and other military formations in a special period.
It has been investigated that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are a military formation that, according to the Constitution of Ukraine, is entrusted with the defense of Ukraine, the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability. And other military formations include the State Border Service of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Special Service of Transport, the State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, as well as the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine
It was concluded that the subject of criminal trespass is a criminal offense provided for in Art. 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine is the legal activity of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service, the State Service for Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine and the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine. The obstruction itself may consist of a certain intervention aimed at complicating the successful performance of the tasks of the Armed Forces and other military formations within the framework of their legitimate activities. Such obstacles can arise both in the form of actions that pose a threat to society, and in the form of inaction. In the first case, obstruction can be manifested in active measures aimed at creating physical barriers (for example, damage to vehicles) and/ or informational barriers (for example, spreading disinformation). In the second case, it may arise due to non-fulfillment or improper fulfillment of legal obligations (for example, sabotage), which as a result leads to the corresponding obstruction.
4
Korablev, Yurii Y., Igor Y. Pugachev, Esedulla M. Osmanov e Sergey Y. Dutov. "The need to strengthen the physical fitness of the special operations military forces and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation". Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities, n.º 185 (2020): 153–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/1810-0201-2020-25-185-153-165.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
We consider the provisions of the need to strengthen the physical fitness of the special operations forces and the Main Intelligence Directorate, caused by the tendency to add to the special groups lineup people who possess high-level skills in modern computer technologies. In the special operations forces units and the Main Intelligence Directorate, there is a high selection of employees in terms of physical condition and perfect mastery of the electronic equipment skills, while at the same time, the equipment is constantly being improved. On a massive scale, objectively team cannot equally possess the skills of working with computer technology, only particularly unique specialists are able to perfectly work in this direction. The life of these military personnel in the process of warfare must be preserved first of all. This causes a tendency to increase the level of physical fitness of the personnel of these special forces, especially when exercising the load against the backdrop of complex fatigue.
5
BEBYK, V. "Іnformation and communication wars and information and communication forces". INFORMATION AND LAW, n.º 3(46) (5 de setembro de 2023): 86–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2023.3(46).287154.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article analyzes the basic categories of the theory of information and communication wars: theater of information and military operations, information and communication forces, intelligence, counterintelligence, etc. It is proven that in the conditions of the formation of the global information society, the spiritual sphere of society becomes a special theater of military operations, in which there are fierce battles for control over the global social consciousness, the consciousness of nations, social groups and individuals. Modern information and communication technologies, the virtualization of information space and time, the development of manipulative psychotechnologies, the formation of information and communication troops create quite effective opportunities to achieve the goals and objectives of information and hybrid wars.
6
Yasynovskyi, Pavlo. "Types of military formations as part of a criminal offense under art. 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine". Visegrad Journal on Human Rights, n.º 6 (14 de março de 2024): 194–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.61345/1339-7915.2023.6.30.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
In the context of constantly changing geopolitical realities and expanding terrorist threats, the problem of military formations in the context of a criminal offense is becoming more relevant than ever. This article will examine the current state of this problem, determine its relevance and suggest possible ways to protect against this type of threat. The purpose of the work is to define the types of “military formation” and to establish their typical features. The methodological basis of the study is a combination of theoretical and practical approaches, within which general scientific and special legal methods are applied. The author analyzes the concept of “military formation” and identifies its types at the regulatory, legal and theoretical and legal levels. The article focuses on the issues related to the types of military formations and their inherent features, and their place in the criminal offense under Article 114-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. The author concludes that legislative regulation of military formations in the area of criminal offenses requires immediate attention and effective measures. This issue is global, and therefore international cooperation and development of special forces are key factors for protection against crime. Our research allows us to distinguish the types of military formations: The Armed Forces of Ukraine and their structural subdivisions, characterized by the presence of all mandatory features of such formations as military; the National Guard of Ukraine and the Foreign Intelligence Service; military formations of the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service; other military formations, which include the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the State Protection Department of Ukraine, etc.
7
SAKA, Luqman. "A Fitful Path: Nigeria’s Faltering Counterterrorism Operation against the Boko Haram in the Northeast". BULLETIN OF "CAROL I" NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY 12, n.º 4 (18 de janeiro de 2024): 102–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.53477/2284-9378-23-51.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Nigeria’s security environment continues to be tense, tenuous and fluid. From all indications and yardsticks of policy planning and implementation, the country’s security architecture seems to be unraveling. As the nation’s security establishments confront multiple security crises especially in Northern Nigeria, their policy and operational reactions continue to be reactive. While the Boko Haram insurgency rages, a decade after the commencement of military operations against the group, military successes in the Northeast are at best modest. Following a decade of commitment of military resources including billions of dollars deployed to the procurement of armament and military hardware, expansion of forces’ strength and creation of special operation formations, one can ask why have the military operations continued to falter and security architecture unravel? The study was anchored on the qualitative research approach and sourced data from published and openly available official documents, scientific publications and newspapers articles, reports, opinion pieces and commentaries. Making use of this open-sourced information, this study explains faltering military operations and Nigeria’s worsening security environment to the failure of security planning, poor civil-military relations including lack of depth in intelligence agencies penetration of local communities across Northern Nigeria, rivalry among the three arms of the Nigerian Armed Forces, persistency of the poor culture of intelligence information sharing and lack of synergy and poor coordination among Nigeria’s security establishments. This study recommends that more attention need to be paid to intelligence gathering, synergy and coordination among the security establishments in the bids to enhance the prospects of Nigeria’s counter-terrorism operation and other military engagements across the country.
8
Ivanov, V. V. "ACTIONS OF THE US AND SOUTH VIETNAM SPECIAL DIVISIONS ON THE "HO CHI MINA TRAIL" IN 1961-1967. BASED ON THE MEMOIRS OF AMERICAN WAR PARTICIPANTS". History: facts and symbols, n.º 4 (8 de dezembro de 2021): 151–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.24888/2410-4205-2021-29-4-152-161.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article devoted to the analysis of the actions of special forces of US and South Vietnam during 1961–1967. One of the main tasks of these units during Vietnam war – destruction main objects of «Ho Chi Minh Trail» in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The work is built with the assistance of a memoir – translations memories combatants in South Vietnam and Laos, soldiers and commanders of Army of US, South Vietnam and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The materials housed in the monographs of American and Vietnam researchers of the Indochina conflict, 1960–1970-s.In the early 1960s, in the setting of active infiltration teams of PAVN from DRV administration of USA adopted decision to send to Indochina units of special forces (Green Berets). Many of the military personnel who served in Vietnam belonged to 5th and 7th Special Forces Groups. Some Green Berets were assigned to the U.S. Military Assistance Command’s Studies and Observation Group (SOG) for making top secret intelligence operations and helped train the South Vietnamese special forces (LLDB). The most Green Berets defended South Vietnam’s border from infiltration from DRV. Apart from Green Berets, special units of the US NAVY were also active in South Vietnam. The main task of the special forces of the NAVY was the blockade of all waterways supplying partisans from North Vietnam and Cambodia by means of ambushes, sabotage, laying of mines and raids on bases of PAVN. In 1965-1967s mixed teams of Green Berets and LLDB conducted long-range reconnaissance missions into Laos and directed air strikes against the «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The U.S. aircraft bombed the «Ho Chi Minh Trail» daily, targeting areas based on electronic detection devices and intelligence gained by covert teams that infiltrated the area. However, these efforts could not slow down the movement of troops of PAVN, supplies southward along the «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The author paid attention to the creation units of special forces as part of army units of US Army situated in South Vietnam during 1965–1967. Special attention is paid by the author to the analysis secret operations of Green Berets against «Ho Chi Minh Trail». The author concluded that the special forces of USA and South Vietnam failed to achieve the set goals.
9
McGhee, Stephen, Deborah Kenny, Alicia Rossiter, Katherine Ling, Susan Sheehy, Linda H. Yoder, William T. Bester, Kelly Wolgast e Alan Finnegan. "Working Together for a Common Goal: The International Armed Forces Community Nursing Research Collaboration". Building Healthy Academic Communities Journal 7, n.º 2 (16 de novembro de 2023): 15–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.18061/bhac.v7i2.9617.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Over the past 19 years, millions of military service members from the United States (U.S.) and United Kingdom (U.K.) served alongside each other in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. and U.K. clearly recognize the sacrifices that the members of their armed forces have made for their respective countries. Sir Winston Churchill described the special relationship which has facilitated cooperation between the U.S. and U.K. in economic activities (trade and commerce), intelligence sharing, and the planning and execution of military operations and military medicine. It would be to the benefit of all, especially the military members, veterans, and family members, if nursing also joined in this collaborative effort. Ensuring the efforts of NATO nurse scientists and educators working to advance military, veteran, and their families’ health are aligned requires outlining key priorities across nations and identifying resources that can facilitate collaborations. To that end, with the support of the American Academy of Nursing (AAN), the International Armed Forces Community Nursing Research Collaboration (IAFNRC) was established. This manuscript provides detailed insight into the work of the IAFNRC.
10
Khirkh-Ialan, V., e V. Bakhvalov. "CONCEPTUAL SCHEME SYSTEM FOR MODELING OF TACTICAL SITUATION ON THE BASIS OF GEOINFORMATION SYSTEM". Visnyk Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Military-Special Sciences, n.º 2 (39) (2018): 78–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2217.2018.39.78-84.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The analysis of the directions of geoinformation systems use in the military sphere indicates the need to develop domestic simulation systems for combat operations simulation and the creation of a system for a tactical military situation simulation using geoinformation systems for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The article proposes a conceptual scheme of a system of simulation of a tactical situation on the basis of GIS technologies, which is proposed to be used for planning intelligence and special operations, the definition of objectives, the analysis of terrain and the mutual visibility of opposite sides, management of combat. Keywords: combat simulation system, geoinformation system, geospatial simulations.
11
Hlibovuch, I. V., V. P. Yahodzinskyi, O. A. Desyatka, D. O. Barkovskyi, D. P. Polozenko, Ya S. Slivinskyi, M. M. Krasnopolskyi e O. V. Didenko. "Requirements of the professional and combat activities of the military personell of the Special Operations Forces to their physical and psychological preparedness". Scientific Journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. Series 15. Scientific and pedagogical problems of physical culture (physical culture and sports), n.º 11(157) (1 de dezembro de 2022): 146–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.31392/npu-nc.series15.2022.11(157).33.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The aim of the article is to find out the requirements of the professional combat activity of servicemen of the Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to their physical and psychological preparedness. Methods: theoretical analysis and generalization of scientific and methodical literature, Internet data networks, documentary method. On the basis of the analysis of open literary sources, the peculiarities of the professional and combat activities of servicemen of the Special Operations Forces (SOF) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and NATO member countries have been clarified. Their purpose and main tasks are disclosed. The historical aspects of the formation of the SOF have been studied. The typical tasks of the SOF have been clarified, including: modern combat operations and raids; psychological operations; work of "civil administration"; obtaining intelligence information on the front line; creation of agency networks; aid; search, evacuation and delivery of prisoners, hostages; preparation for coups, overthrow of regimes; introduction into the structure of military organizations and special services for the purpose of espionage or destruction of people who pose a threat to the state; anti-terrorist operations; detection, identification, determination of targets for own means of destruction. This determines the high requirements for the physical and psychological training of the personnel of the SOF.
12
Melnyk, Serhii, e Olexandr Cherviakov. "Implementation of NATO standards in the training system for the Security Service of Ukraine". Problems of Legality, n.º 153 (16 de junho de 2021): 8–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.21564/2414-990x.153.231555.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Incorporation of North Atlantic Alliance standards into domestic legislation, that governs relations in the security and defense sector is one of the key requirements for Ukraine to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan and further deepen Euro-Atlantic integration with a view to acquiring Alliance membership. An Important condition for these tasks is the implementation of NATO standards and procedures in the legislation governing military education. In the process of standardizing and achieving the state of compatibility of the security and defense sector of Ukraine with the relevant NATO forces, the specificity of the application of standards in improving the system of training specialists for the Security Service of Ukraine should be highlighted separately. According to this development course, military education today includes formal and informal (general training) components, and the improvement of professional competence (special training). Professional training of military specialist according to NATO standards is carried out at the appropriate levels of management: operational, tactical, strategic. It remains compulsory for officers to have received a higher education in the relevant educational programs. Taking into account the specific nature of the professional activities of the members of the special service, the tasks assigned to them and the functions performed for that purpose, namely, countering intelligence and subversive activities, combating terrorism, counter-intelligence and defending national statehood, Ensuring the security of the State in cyberspace, etc., the training system for the Security Service may be differentiated according to its functional direction and institutionalized in the military education system or outside it. At the same time, an important basis for the development of the educational component in the Security Service of Ukraine will remain the recruitment of teaching staff from among persons with practical experience. Despite the format of the model chosen, training for the security forces should be based on NATO standards, with a conceptually new piece of legislation.
13
Pokaychuk, Vitaliy. "The essence and relationship between the concepts of "security forces" and "law enforcement forces"". Naukovyy Visnyk Dnipropetrovs'kogo Derzhavnogo Universytetu Vnutrishnikh Sprav 4, n.º 4 (29 de dezembro de 2020): 47–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.31733/2078-3566-2020-4-47-53.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article examines the essence and differentiated concepts of "security forces" and "law enforcement forces" based on the analysis of the current legislation and the theory of national security. The problems of national security, which are one of the most important, complex and multifaceted and integral phenomena of social and political life, are investigated. National security theory is a meta-science that combines the applied aspects of social, military, humanities, technical, psychological, biological and other sciences to explore the nature, content, methods, forms and means of ensuring the security of the individual and social communities of different levels. Therefore, in the study of national security, many categories are used, including the following: security, national security, national interests, national security facilities, national security entities, security factors, threats, danger, national security system, national security principles, national security functions, etc. On the basis of the analysis of key norms of the Law of Ukraine "On National Security of Ukraine" it is concluded that the changed approach to the formation of key legal acts based on the change of the vector of formation of threats to national security and national interests. Such an approach is in line with current requirements because, as historical experience shows, focusing solely on the interests of the state, developing its economic and military potential and subordination to these goals of the interests of individuals, the emergence of internal conflicts, ultimately leads to a process of disintegration. It is noted that while the legislator even divides the security and defense sector of Ukraine into four interconnected components, the composition of the security and defense sector nevertheless lists the entities without belonging to any of the four components. Depending on functional function, the security forces should include: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Security Service of Ukraine, intelligence agencies, State Security Service of Ukraine, State Service for Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine, and Military Law Enforcement Service. In line with this goal, it should be noted that although the notion of "law enforcement is encompassed by a broader range of public relations, it includes not only activity in special circumstances, but also the day-to-day service of using the term" security force "in national security activities. moreover, the one defined at the legislative level is more relevant. The legislative definition of "security forces" prompts, at least, the start of a scientific search to clarify the passport of the specialty 21.07.05 - combat service of law enforcement forces and to make changes and additions to the List of scientific specialties.
14
Ciolponea, Constantin-Adrian. "The Integration of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in Current Combat Operations". Land Forces Academy Review 27, n.º 4 (1 de dezembro de 2022): 333–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/raft-2022-0042.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Abstract The accelerated evolution of Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) leads to the need to integrate UAS into operations, sometimes with unexpected results. In particular for special operations forces, reconnaissance, surveillance and deep precision strike, will remain main missions for which the utilization of UAV it is becoming critical. Whether we talk about missions such as: direct actions, objective security, force close protection, Imagery intelligence (IMINT) close fire support, maneuver, or combat resupply, UAS can cover a large spectrum of potential missions. However, when integrating UAS in military operations, the most intriguing developments are the impacts on the decision-making process, on the balance between the human factor and artificial intelligence, on force structure design.
15
Kashirin, Vasily. ""The Tartar raid in great multitude was committed": Khan Qirim Girai's incursion into the Russian Empire province of Yelisavetgrad in the winter of 1769". Slavs and Russia, n.º 2019 (2019): 8–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2618-8570.2019.1.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article is devoted to the depredatory and massive incursion of the Crimean Khanate forces commanded by Khan Qirim Girai into Yelisavetgrad province of the Russian Empire (former Novoserbia) in January 1769, at the very beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774. 2019 was marked by the 250th anniversary of this milestone event that became the last full-scale Tatar raid into Russian lands. There has been no special research devoted to this topic so far while in the existing historical works the assessments of the consequences of the Khan Qirim Girai's incursion and the actions of Russian military commanders, general en chef Pyotr Rumyantsev in particular, seem one-sided and biased. The article covers the prerequisites and preparations for the incursion, Russian military commanders' intelligence data, parties' plans and forces, their actions as well as recreation of detailed timeline and geographical scope; disputes among Russian military leaders and the reasons for their misfortunes are also analysed; records of losses and material damage are presented in this paper. Along with the well-known sources the author uses the documents from the Russian State Military Historical Archive and the Manuscripts Department of the Russian State Library that have not been introduced into scientifi c discourse.
16
Manin, Iaroslav, e Aleksandra Evgen'evna Klimashina. "State security of Israel: international and national legal aspects". Национальная безопасность / nota bene, n.º 2 (fevereiro de 2023): 1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0668.2023.2.39932.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The object of the study is Israeli international and national legal relations to ensure the defense of the country and the security of the state, the subject is normative legal acts establishing the regime of protection of Israel from internal and external threats. The article discusses the international treaties of the State of Israel concerning weapons of mass destruction and the fight against terrorism, as well as Israeli documents on defense and security management. The authors pay attention to the genesis and evolution of the Israeli armed forces and special services, the peculiarities of their functioning. The institute of military duty and conscription for military service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), current problems of the activities of the Mossad and AMAN intelligence services, as well as the general security service - Shin Bet (SHABAK) are considered in detail. The above practice of military administration in the State of Israel is relevant in the conditions of modern militarism. The researchers propose to use the Israeli experience of legislative regulation in the field of national defense and state security in the current Russian historical conditions. The scientific novelty of the work consists in presenting the reader with original information on the subject of the article, relevant conclusions and suggestions. The main ones are the conclusions about the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Israel, its deliberate postponement of the application of international legal acts on weapons of mass destruction in order to develop them and deter opponents. It is proposed, by analogy with Israeli legislation, to deprive Russian citizenship for crimes against the foundations of the constitutional order and security of the Russian Federation, extremism and terrorism. The article substantiates the introduction of universal military duty for Russian citizens using, by analogy, the Israeli system of deferrals from military service. It is proposed to train ordinary and non-commissioned personnel of the domestic armed forces in working professions, as in Israel, and the official granting of unlimited powers to Russian intelligence abroad.
17
Cormac, Rory. "Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and Special Forces in contemporary British policy". International Relations 31, n.º 2 (28 de julho de 2016): 169–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0047117816659532.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The United Kingdom has long engaged in covert action. It continues to do so today. Owing to the secrecy involved, however, such activity has consistently been excluded from debates about Britain’s global role, foreign and security policy and military planning: an important lacuna given the controversy, risk, appeal and frequency of covert action. Examining when, how and why covert action is used, this article argues that contemporary covert action has emerged from, and is shaped by, a specific context. First, a gap exists between Britain’s perceived global responsibilities and its actual capabilities; policy elites see covert action as able to resolve, or at least conceal, this. Second, intelligence agencies can shape events proactively, especially at the tactical level, while flexible preventative operations are deemed well suited to the range of fluid threats currently faced. Third, existing Whitehall machinery makes covert action viable. However, current covert action is smaller scale and less provocative today than in the early Cold War; it revolves around ‘disruption’ operations. Despite being absent from the accompanying debates, this role was recognised in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review, which placed intelligence actors at the heart of British thinking.
18
Terzić, Miroslav. "Effects of the use of robotized combat systems during the conflict in Ukraine from 24.02.2022". Bastina, n.º 62 (2024): 363–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/bastina34-49656.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This study analyses the use of robotic combat systems during the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine (special military operations of the armed forces of the Russian Federation) in two periods. The first period refers to the beginning of the special military operation (24 February 2022) until the declaration of partial mobilization in the Russian Federation and the holding of referendums in four regions of Ukraine on joining the Russian Federation. The second period includes the conflict after the annexation of the Donetsk People's Republic, Luhansk People's Republic, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions to the Russian Federation. The study critically examines the concept of using unmanned aerial vehicles as well as the way of fighting against unmanned aerial vehicles in certain combat situations during a special military operation. This study hypothesis that the success of using robotic combat systems depends on the experience in combating unmanned aircraft, the reliability of the command and information system, electronic warfare systems, and anti-aircraft defence systems. The side that planned a layered approach in combating drones (good intelligence assessment, use of electronic warfare systems, anti-aircraft defence systems, and efficient and effective application of lessons learned) had more success in suppressing the use of drones.
19
Butuzov, V., D. Kovtoniuk e I. Luhovskyi. "SPECIFIC FEATURES OF ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCTING OF PERSONAL INTELLIGENCE BY INTELLIGENCE UNITS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF UKRAINE DURING PARTICIPATION IN COUNTERING ARMED AGGRESSION". STATE SECURITY 1, n.º 1 (2023): 13–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.33405/2786-8613/2023/1/1/288257.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article examines the peculiarities of organization and conduct of personal intelligence by the defense forces of Ukraine based on the analysis of experience in performing reconnaissance tasks during the repulsion of full-scale armed aggression by the russian federation. It clarifies the list of main tasks of personal intelligence in modern conditions and discusses the problematic issues related to the collection of intelligence information from the local population. It describes general approaches to obtaining information through the analysis of social media and monitoring services used for this purpose. Furthermore, it outlines the ways to further develop the capabilities of personal intelligence within the National Guard of Ukraine. Personal intelligence, in this article, refers to a complex of measures and actions carried out by designated units using methods of acquiring information from human resources (sources) in order to provide intelligence information to military command (staff) for the purpose of preparing and conducting combat (special) operations by military units (subunits) of the defense forces of Ukraine. It provides detailed information that helps confirm or refute intelligence information, enables obtaining answers to specific questions, and increases the reliability of information used by defense management authorities for decision-making. Conducting personal intelligence through obtaining information from the local population is one of the effective methods of collecting intelligence information in dynamic combat situations. This approach involves interacting with individuals residing in territories occupied by the enemy or having access to valuable information concerning enemy actions, population attitudes, significant events, and other intelligence-relevant aspects. In addition to obtaining information from the local population, gathering intelligence from open sources is a particular tool that helps collect valuable data for the effective execution of reconnaissance tasks by intelligence units within the National Guard of Ukraine formations. The acquisition of intelligence information from the local population and open sources is an integral component of reconnaissance activities. These processes assist reconnaissance units in having a comprehensive understanding of the situation, ensuring the timeliness and accuracy of intelligence information, thereby contributing to the successful accomplishment of tasks and ensuring national security by the National Guard of Ukraine formations. The experience of organizing and conducting personal intelligence activities to provide reconnaissance support for operations of the defense forces in countering the aggression of the russian federation allows drawing conclusions that intelligence from open sources, including the actions of the population regarding documenting and disseminating information about enemy activities, significantly contributes to enhancing the capabilities of reconnaissance support for defense operations in repelling armed aggression.
20
Нестеренко, О. В. "System of subjects ensuring national security and defence of Ukraine". Law and Safety 77, n.º 2 (24 de junho de 2020): 33–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.32631/pb.2020.2.04.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The author of the article substantiates the relevance and timeliness of the systematization of the subjects of national security and defense of Ukraine.
On the basis of generalization and analysis of the current legislation in the field of national security and defense, the author has defined the system of subjects of national security and defense of Ukraine as follows:
1) management subsystem (the President of Ukraine);
2) controlled subsystem: security forces – law enforcement and intelligence agencies, state agencies of special purpose with law enforcement functions, civil defence forces and other agencies; Defense Forces – the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as other military formations, law enforcement and intelligence agencies, special purpose agencies with law enforcement functions formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine; defense-industrial complex; citizens and public associations;
3) auxiliary parts of the system (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, judicial agencies, international institutions).
It has been offered to amend Part 1 of the Art. 12 of the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine”, supplementing the four interconnected components of the security and defense sector with a fifth one – leadership in the field of national security and defense. At the end of the list contained in Part 2 of the Art. 12 of the Law of Ukraine “On National Security of Ukraine”, we consider it necessary to add the phrase “and other authorized agencies”, since the existing list of agencies that are part of the security and defense sector is not exhaustive. The main subjects of national security and defense of Ukraine have been characterized.
21
Khalidi, Ahmad Samih. "Introduction: On the Limitations of Military Doctrine". Journal of Palestine Studies 45, n.º 2 (2016): 127–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2016.45.2.127.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This special document is an original English translation of a 2015, thirty-three page (in Hebrew), Israel Defense Forces (IDF) strategy paper, marking the first time that the IDF has published an official account of its fundamental driving principles. An introductory essay by Ahmad Samih Khalidi, “On the Limitations of Military Doctrine,” places the strategy document in the context of Israel's failures in the 2006 Lebanon war. The document, itself headed by a short letter from Israeli chief of staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot, encompasses a broad spectrum of grand strategy analysis, prediction, and recommendation, against a complex matrix of operational, tactical, and logistical measures. It comprises three main parts: first, a succinct “Strategy Document” that describes Israel's strategic and operational environment and that delineates the basic principles guiding its military actions (chapters 1–3); second, a description of the IDF's command structure and procedures (chapter 4); and third, the prescription of a series of follow-up steps (chapter 5). In brief bullet points, the strategy document covers national goals, threat perceptions, the domestic, regional, and international contexts, technical and technological challenges, the main functions and roles of the IDF, the different conditions (or “operating statuses”) for the use of force, the importance of cyberwarfare, intelligence, questions of legitimacy, issues of command and control, resource utilization, defense capabilities, special operations, and the priorities for five years. Israel's traditional concerns with the threat from Arab states are downgraded in favor of the threat posed by sub- or non- state actors (Hamas and Hezbollah), and “distant” players (Iran).
22
Maksimenko, Y., V. Mamich, Н. Вratchenko e O. Rosmasnin. "THE ISSUE OF PROCESSING LARGE AMOUNTS OF DATA DURING THE OPERATION OF INTELLIGENCE". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy 1, n.º 13 (30 de dezembro de 2020): 280–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2020.13.1.280-285.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Currently, intelligence agencies from various sources receive a large amount of intelligence information that needs to be reviewed, processed, and analyzed. The purpose of information processing is timely planning and preparation for the effective use of troops (forces). Computer equipment without special software is not able to satisfy the ever-growing needs for information processing and timely presentation of the necessary information to the highest headquarters. The widespread adoption of modern information technologies is an absolute requirement of the time and has become an integral difference between the work of modern intelligence agencies. In the course of their activities, they have accumulated large volumes of data that require generalization, processing and the ability to extract useful analytical information. The article discusses the problems of processing large amounts of data during the work of the intelligence agency. The contradictions between the large volumes of accumulated information and the inability of traditional data processing tools to realize the analytical potential of this information are considered. The functioning of the information model of intelligence agencies is built. The tasks of supporting the information model in the required state, the requirements for the data bank and its subsystems are considered. Systems of military facilities are complexes of interconnected pidssemy and elements of subgroups, forces, enemy assets, infrastructure, which pose a threat to our troops and are important. The databank for the intelligence agencies should be divided into the main subsystems. The order and ability to access certain data is justified. Based on the analysis, recommendations are given for creating a structured database in intelligence agencies. Keywords: data bank, information model, data processing, intelligence agencies, intelligence information.
23
Korolyov, Vyacheslav Yu, Maksim I. Ogurtsov e Anatoliy I. Kochubinskyi. "Identification of Technical Objects in the Special Networks According to the Principle of "Friend or Foe"". Control Systems and Computers, n.º 4 (294) (novembro de 2021): 3–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/csc.2021.04.003.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Introduction. In recent years, military conflicts are moving to a fundamentally new level of development, which is associated with the widespread use of geographically distributed large groups of remotely controlled robotic systems, the rapid growth of information volumes, a significant increase in the speed of its processing, instant messaging to increase situational awareness, management, rapid response, etc. Purpose. The article is devoted to solving an urgent scientific problem — the development of an algorithm for state identification of military objects and personnel. The problems of using modern cryptographic algorithms for state identification, which use data obtained by other stations of the air defense system and radio intelligence, combined in a special network, are considered. Results. A new encryption key exchange protocol and a rationale for choosing a cryptographic algorithm that can be used in real-time systems with low computational performance are proposed. To ensure the stability of the use of electronic warfare tools, it is proposed to use software-defined radio stations based on programmable logic matrices as a hardware basis, since they allow changing the type of signal-code structures, which also applies frequency ranges without replacing radio engineering blocks. Conclusions. With the increase in the number of remotely controlled military equipment objects on the battlefield, the problem of positioning military personnel and equipping them with network communication means requires a review of the methods and algorithms used for state recognition. The paper proposes a new algorithm for state identification of objects and identification of military personnel using symmetric cryptographic algorithms and the use of a secure Protocol for exchanging information received from the network of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. This approach can potentially increase the performance and quality of the identification system.
24
ZHURAVEL, VALERY P. "NEW THREATS TO RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: PROBLEMS OF COUNTERACTION". Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia 226, n.º 6 (2020): 85–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.38197/2072-2060-2020-226-6-85-98.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article reveals real and potential threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region by the NATO. According to the author, these include: the strengthening of the military presence in the Arctic of the Arctic Ocean coastal States and other NATO countries; the increase in the combat capabilities of groups of coalition and national Armed Forces (Navy) of the United States and NATO; the development of naval-based missile defences and early warning systems; the expansion of the United States military satellite constellation to the Arctic; increased activity by the special services of foreign states in conducting intelligence activities in the Arctic and in the frontier territory of the Russian Federation; conduct of multinational military exercises and transfer of combat training areas to the Arctic; the desire of a number of foreign countries to give the Northern Sea Way the status of an international transport highway, and of the Norwegian leadership to change the status of Spitsbergen, to reduce and eventually completely displace the Russian Federation from the archipelago; increasing attempts to discredit the activities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. The article discusses the measures of the Russian Federation to strengthen the defensive capability in the Arctic direction, paying special attention to the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
25
Ganin, Аndrey. "The idea of Bolshevism overtakes the Red Ukrainian Army” White intelligence report on the state of the Ukrainian Soviet troops. 1919". Slavic Almanac, n.º 1-2 (2019): 484–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2019.1-2.7.01.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This is a publication of the report of a white scout on the situation of the Ukrainian Soviet troops by the summer of 1919. The published document was found in the collection of the Hoover archives in the United States. The report is undoubtedly of interest to researchers, as it reflects the difficult process of creating the Red army in Ukraine. The report also testifies about the difficult relationship between the senior Soviet military officials. A knowledgeable White agent provided the command of the anti-Bolshevik Armed forces in the South of Russia with detailed information that can generally be considered reliable. The data sent by the agent is characterized by considerable accuracy, since it was compiled basing on true combat schedules of the troops on the Ukrainian Soviet front. The access to such information testified that, apparently, the agent served in the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR or in the headquarters of the Ukrainian Soviet front. The high awareness of the White scout gives special value to his report, including the personal characteristics of various Soviet officials, the description of complex and contradictory relationships between them, as well as an assessment of the general situation in the field of Soviet military construction in Ukraine in 1919.
26
Zinko, R., P. Kazan, D. Khaustov e O. Bilyk. "FEATURES OF APPLICATION OF SMALL RECONNAISSANCE ROBOT". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy, n.º 11 (27 de dezembro de 2019): 29–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2019.11.29-38.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
A small intelligence robot (SSR) is a special military intelligence means. It is used to obtain information about the enemy - the collection of intelligence, the search for targets and target indication, observation of the situation, etc. The use of a small intelligence robot is assumed in various natural and climatic conditions: in temperate terrain, on soils with low bearing capacity, at low temperatures, in the desert, on sandy and marshy soils, on rocky soils, in elevated temperature and dustiness of air, and also in conditions highlands In the article an overview of modern developments of remotely controlled robotic military complexes, principles of their construction and perspective directions of development in the armed forces are reviewed. The issues of robotization of existing weapons and military equipment are considered. Every sample of a SSR used in combat action must possess all combat characteristics at once in an optimal ratio between them, ensuring its maximum effectiveness. Ignoring any of the properties or enhancing one property at the expense of others will not enable the full realization of the small surveillance robot. It is reasonable to select the relevant properties at the design stage, using the possibilities of mathematical modeling. The set of tactical and technical characteristics of the SSR allowed forming this. Its characteristics determine the scope and possibilities of application. The mathematical model of the SSR motion is written in the Matlab Simulink environment. Recorded mathematical model of SSR motion, formed single test cycle and input data allowed to conduct computer simulation of motion in possible conditions of operation of small surveillance robot.The single trial cycle presented contains a set of individual sites and reproduces the testing test cycle of a real polygon. On the basis of the developed tactical and technical characteristics of the SSR, the experimental sample was made. An example of the use of SSR for the intelligence of the settlement and at keeping the node of barriers has been provided. The efficiency of performing intelligence units’ tasks and reducing the risk of human losses are shown.
27
Snyders, Hendrik. "‘Patriotic pigeons’: pigeon politics and military service in war-time South Africa, c.1899 – 1945". African Research & Documentation 122 (2013): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305862x00024201.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Contrary to P.S Thompson's contention that the Great War in Natal was “chiefly the concern of the British community”, contemporary evidence indicated that this and other conflicts were equally the concern of the ‘animal community’ including that of pigeons. In fact, history abounds with the tales of pigeons fulfilling a critical intelligence role in both local and overseas conflicts, including the Anglo-Boer War, First World War and World War Two. Indeed, in all cases special war measures were promulgated to regulate the keeping, general treatment, utilisation and transport of the birds. The Dickin Medal, also known as the Victoria Cross for Animals and awarded to recognise conspicuous bravery and devotion to duty of animals and birds associated with or under the control of any branch of the Armed Forces or Civil Defence Units under the British Imperial Army, was awarded to 32 pigeons.
28
Alexandrov, Viacheslav. "Security and defense sector of Ukraine in the mechanism of realization of the defense function of the state". Law Review of Kyiv University of Law, n.º 4 (30 de dezembro de 2020): 78–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.36695/2219-5521.4.2020.13.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article highlights the aspects of the Security and Defense Sector’s defense function. Based on the analysis of the legislationof Ukraine, the specifics of the normative regulation of the content of the category “defense”, as well as the diversity of doctrinal understandingof this category are highlighted. It is noted that the defense function of the state is realized, in fact, by all elements of the powermechanism. In this way, the state of readiness of the state “defense forces” necessary for the flow of armed aggression is achieved.Along with this, it was noted that within the framework of the state mechanism, it is expedient to single out those structures whosecompetence directly provides for the implementation of the defense function.The structure of the security and defense sector contains four components, which are differentiated according to their functionalpurpose and legal nature. In particular, these are: 1) security forces; 2) defense forces; 3) defense-industrial complex; 4) public associationsthat voluntarily participate in ensuring national security. It is also worth noting that the institutional components of Ukraine’ssecurity and defense sector belong to both the state apparatus and civil society institutions.The content of the categories “security forces” and “defense forces” is distinguished. Security forces are law enforcement andintelligence agencies, state bodies of special purpose with law enforcement functions, civil defense forces, as well as other bodiesentrusted by the Constitution and laws of Ukraine with functions to ensure the national security of Ukraine. In turn, the defense forcesinclude the Armed Forces of Ukraine, as well as other military formations, law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies formedin accordance with the laws of Ukraine, as well as special purpose bodies with law enforcement functions, which are assigned by theConstitution and laws of Ukraine. The main institutional element of the Security and Defense Sector is the Armed Forces of Ukraine.It is the Armed Forces that protect the sovereignty of the state and territorial integrity, as well as ensure the inviolability of state borders.Emphasis is placed on the function of the National Guard of Ukraine and the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine as important componentsof the security and defense sector.It is noted that today the subordination of military institutions and law enforcement agencies to various ministries and authoritiesis a factor that may negatively affect their interaction in the process of performing the tasks provided by law. Therefore, we consider itexpedient for the President of Ukraine, as the Head of State and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, toadopt a normative act on cooperation between the Security and Defense Sector in the process of armed defense of Ukraine’s territorialintegrity and state sovereignty.
29
Mamich, Victor, Yuri Dushkin, Artur Chkalov, Maksym Halaktionov e Dmytro Tsapryka. "ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNITIES IMPROVEMENT OF OPTICAL-ELECTRONIC MEANS OF INTELLIGENCE". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy, n.º 15 (30 de setembro de 2021): 15–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2021.15.15-20.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The analysis of possibilities of improvement and application of optoelectronic means of reconnaissance is carried out in the work, it is noted that it will provide considerable increase of combat possibilities of armament and military equipment at their use on purpose. It is proposed to consider new concepts for the integration of the system of optoelectronic intelligence in all spheres of life of units and subdivisions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Ways of improvement and modernization of optoelectronic means of reconnaissance, which work on new organizational and physical principles, are considered. Research of problematic issues of improvement and application of optoelectronic means of reconnaissance, detailed analysis of existing and perspective optoelectronic means of reconnaissance will solve the main problem of application of means of reconnaissance at night and in difficult meteorological conditions, which will provide necessary reliable information control points and fire means defeat information that will allow you to perform combat missions with sufficient accuracy. It is noted that the previously insufficiently solved part of the general problem of using intelligence at night is of special importance. Today it is proposed to use opto-electronic means of intelligence based on: television matrices of the infrared range; microbolometric matrices of the infrared range; electronic optical converters of infrared range. It is noted that the enemy places increased demands on optoelectronic means of reconnaissance, using new long-range, high-precision, all-weather means of destruction, high mobility of troops, their mobile and decisive actions during combat. Keywords: optoelectronic means, armament and military equipment, new concepts, integration, tactical and technical characteristics, conditions of visibility restriction.
30
Akhtulov, A. L., K. A. Chutkov e D. S. Agafonov. "The Method of Process of Formation of the Tactical and Technical Requirements for Armored Armament and Technology at the Organization of Production". Vestnik IzhGTU imeni M.T. Kalashnikova 26, n.º 2 (19 de julho de 2023): 69–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.22213/2413-1172-2023-2-69-75.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The experience of conducting a Special military operation confirms the need to improve the characteristics of domestic weapons and military equipment in order to effectively counter Western weapons. Effective counteraction can be provided by improving the basic properties of the combat effectiveness of weapons and military equipment. Taking into account the high level of effectiveness of the intelligence means used by the enemy, which make it possible to quickly determine the location of weapons and military equipment complexes used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, as well as the use of high-precision weapons with satellite guidance systems on the target, a special role is played by such a property of combat effectiveness as mobility. Military tracked vehicles, which are the main means of ensuring the mobility of troops, are represented by a large variety, which is associated with their functional purpose. Regardless of the functional purpose, the main evaluation indicator of military tracked vehicles is their combat effectiveness, one of the most important properties of which is mobility. The improvement of the main mobility indicators should begin with a revision of the tactical and technical requirements for weapons and military equipment complexes, after which it is necessary to search for ways to achieve the newly formed tactical and technical requirements. At this stage, methods of assessing the impact of the use of a particular technical solution on the characteristics of weapons and military equipment in general are of particular importance. For a comparative assessment of tracked vehicles of various designs, as well as to assess the impact of the use of new technical solutions on the main indicators of mobility characteristics, a methodology is needed to assess the impact of diesel engine characteristics on the mobility indicators of a military tracked vehicle. The article presents a methodology for assessing the influence of diesel engine characteristics on the mobility indicators of military tracked vehicles, which allows calculating the average speed of a military tracked vehicle depending on the obtained characteristics of a diesel engine based on the probabilistic operating modes of the engine. The developed technique is implemented in a software package for electronic computers.
31
Zinko, R., P. Kazan, D. Khaustov e O. Bilyk. "FEATURES OF APPLICATION OF SMALL RECONNAISSANCE ROBOT". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy 1, n.º 13 (30 de dezembro de 2020): 50–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2020.13.1.50-60.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
A small intelligence robot (SSR) is a special military intelligence means. It is used to obtain information about the enemy – the collection of intelligence, the search for targets and target indication, observation of the situation, etc. The use of a small intelligence robot is assumed in various natural and climatic conditions: in temperate terrain, on soils with low bearing capacity, at low temperatures, in the desert, on sandy and marshy soils, on rocky soils, in elevated temperature and dustiness of air, and also in conditions highlands In the article an overview of modern developments of remotely controlled robotic military complexes, principles of their construction and perspective directions of development in the armed forces are reviewed. The issues of robotization of existing weapons and military equipment are considered. Every sample of a SSR used in combat action must possess all combat characteristics at once in an optimal ratio between them, ensuring its maximum effectiveness. Ignoring any of the properties or enhancing one property at the expense of others will not enable the full realization of the small surveillance robot. It is reasonable to select the relevant properties at the design stage, using the possibilities of mathematical modeling. The set of tactical and technical characteristics of the SSR allowed forming this. Its characteristics determine the scope and possibilities of application. The mathematical model of the SSR motion is written in the Matlab Simulink environment. Recorded mathematical model of SSR motion, formed single test cycle and input data allowed to conduct computer simulation of motion in possible conditions of operation of small surveillance robot. The single trial cycle presented contains a set of individual sites and reproduces the testing test cycle of a real polygon. On the basis of the developed tactical and technical characteristics of the SSR, the experimental sample was made. An example of the use of SSR for the intelligence of the settlement and at keeping the node of barriers has been provided. The efficiency of performing intelligence units’ tasks and reducing the risk of human losses are shown. Keywords: small surveillance robot, design, mathematical modeling, combat use.
32
Гаценко, С., С. Мордвінов, М. Адаменко, В. Георгієв e О. Печорін. "ПОВІТРЯНОДЕСАНТНА ПІДГОТОВКА ОСОБОВОГО СКЛАДУ. АСПЕКТИ АНАЛІЗУ РОЗВИТКУ ТА ЇХ ЗАКОНОМІРНОСТІ". Collection of scientific works of Odesa Military Academy, n.º 19 (30 de junho de 2023): 179–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.37129/2313-7509.2023.19.179-188.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Reorganization measures in the armed forces of Ukraine led to a reduction in airborne service specialists, but there is currently no talk of a reduction in actual issues of airborne training (AP) in units and military units. On the contrary, these measures once again emphasized and exacerbated the need to immediately solve a number of problems in this area. An effective and fairly established system of airborne training has unanimously become obsolete. It works reliably, but the circumstances that have developed in the period after the events of 2014 until now and the requirements that have arisen to the training system, finally discovered that the existing system does not satisfy the new views on the modern structure of airborne support and the use of airborne troops in particular. The war of 2022 emphasized the importance of comprehensive training of intelligence units, military units of the Airborne Assault Forces (ASF), Special Operations Forces (SSO), Marines (MP) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: all those who proved during the eight months of Russian-Ukrainian open aggression their efficiency is practical. The PDP program from the beginning of its creation and partial modernization constantly bore signs of preparation for the classic use of mass airborne assaults developed during the years of the Soviet Union's existence, but the practical combat actions of both sides of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict so far indicate the fallacy of the indicated direction. In the article, a review of the patterns of changes in the conditions and means of using parachutes for the development of the educational, methodological and material base over time is carried out. The consequences of untimely consideration of a number of issues regarding new approaches to airborne personnel training in the future are analyzed. Keywords: airborne training, instruction, training base, airborne support.
33
Kotliarov, Valerii. "PECULIARITIES OF THE STATE SYSTEM OF STRATEGIC PLANNING OF NATIONAL SECURITY UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF INFORMATIZATION OF SOCIETY". Ukrainian Journal of Applied Economics and Technology 7, n.º 4 (26 de dezembro de 2022): 225–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.36887/2415-8453-2022-4-33.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The inefficiency of the national security system is one of the biggest threats to Ukraine's national security. The strategic planning in the field of security and defense has been developed to identify the means, including the future structure of forces, which would allow the institutions of the defense and security sector to deal with potential future threats effectively. The purpose of this study is development of theoretical and practical measures to increase the effectiveness of strategic management of national security processes based on goal setting, forecasting, and planning in the context of informatization of society. The object of study there is a process of forming the state system of strategic planning of national security of Ukraine. The relevance of this study is due to the need for legal regulation and improvement of the state system of strategic planning of national security of Ukraine. To achieve the goal of the study special scientific methods of legal knowledge were used. The results of the analysis showed that ensuring national security must rely on the principle of systematization, which means that the security and defense sector of Ukraine is considered as a single object of forecasting and planning. This study substantiates the main directions of systemic reform of the security and defense sector, which have been carried out in Ukraine to ensure the protection of the constitutional order, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state in the face of armed aggression. The priorities should be implemented through key tasks, such as the establishment of a comprehensive strategic analysis of military threats to Ukraine's national security, coordination of intelligence activities, development of joint intelligence capabilities of the defense forces to obtain complete and reliable warning information for timely decision-making guaranteeing the military security of the state. Keywords: national security, state system, strategic planning, national security strategy, threats to the public administration system, informatization of society.
34
Vergolyas, O. O. "Directions for improving the legal support of special information operations". Uzhhorod National University Herald. Series: Law, n.º 65 (25 de outubro de 2021): 215–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2307-3322.2021.65.39.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article is devoted to the definition of problematic aspects and prospects for improving the information and legal support of special information operations (hereinafter - SIO), because currently there is no sufficient legal basis for the development of methodological principles for their implementation. SIOs have a special place in the system of means of counteracting threats to the national security of Ukraine as an independent means of implementing information and psychological measures and as an auxiliary tool in the implementation of political, economic, military and other measures. At the same time, SIOs can be implemented while providing not only information, but also other components of national security, which is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. As special operations in general, including SIOs, are now considered under Ukrainian law as a form of hostilities, it is virtually impossible to conduct SIOs of a protective nature, including counterintelligence SIOs on the territory of Ukraine. Thus, the current legislation does not provide for conducting SIOs against citizens of Ukraine (except for those who are members of terrorist groups and illegal armed groups), as well as conducting SIOs in Ukraine outside the territory where martial law is imposed, outside the area of anti-terrorist operations or other places (areas) of training and use of the Armed Forces. However, both the intelligence and counterintelligence aspects of SIO are manifested at all stages of SIO, regardless of their direction, offensive or defensive nature. Therefore, the issue of urgent need is to provide the authority to conduct the SIO to the Security Service of Ukraine while depriving it of the status of a military formation, which will ensure compliance with the requirements of Art. 17 of the Constitution of Ukraine, as well as the effective conduct of SIO in the interests not only of defense but also of anti-terrorist, anti-criminal, information and other components of national security of Ukraine. Similar powers should also be given to the intelligence agencies of Ukraine, as well as to other entities of the security and defense sector in accordance with their competence. No less important is the actual normative consolidation of the definition of SIO at the level of law and the construction of a modern model of SIO and the formation of the algorithm for conducting SIO.
35
Trifunović, Darko, e Zoran Bjelica. "Cyber War - Trends and Technologies". National security and the future 21, n.º 3 (1 de março de 2021): 65–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.37458/nstf.21.3.2.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Cyberspace has become an indispensable part in which special operations such as cyber war or warfare take place. The role of special war as the use of so-called soft power was emphasized. The country's number of potential adversaries in cyber warfare is unlimited, making highly endangered aspects of cyber civilian infrastructure, which is essentially military readiness, including the mobilization of forces through the civilian sector, also a likely target. A special type of cyber war or warfare is hybrid warfare. This type of warfare is increasingly resorted to because it is extremely cheaper than the conventional method of warfare and at the same time brings exceptional results. The first thing that affects cyber security policy analysts comes with the issue of neutrality, as well as the huge variety of assessments about future attack and defense technologies. There is also a consideration that the new (problematic) cyber technology will be deployed in a short period of time, in time periods, in just a few days in terms of warnings. Second, is the trends in cyber-attack and defense technologies and who is following those processes. Third, decision making technology having in mind high-performance computers, technologies that are well known, although rapidly evolving, are increasingly seen as a basic means of managing cyber defense at the national military and security level, as well as a new weapon in the hands of opponents. Fourth, role of intelligence in planning future scenarios for defense against hybrid or any other cyber threat/s.
36
Magomedov, D. S. "Partnership of the USA and African Countries in the Fight Against Terrorism under the Administrations of J.W. Bush and Barack Obama". Outlines of global transformations: politics, economics, law 11, n.º 5 (3 de dezembro de 2018): 164–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.23932/2542-0240-2018-11-5-164-181.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article examines the place of African countries in the US counter-terrorism strategy under the administrations of G.W. Bush and B. Obama. It is alleged that at the turn of the 2010-s the significance of this trend has increased due to the intensification of Islamists in the countries of West Africa and the new round of the civil war in Somalia. This led to an intensification of the military presence and tightened cooperation with the allies, on which the Americans also sought to entrust the main struggle against the radicals. There are several directions of counterterrorism policy: the provision of technical assistance to partner countries for the development of special forces; the building of subregional mechanisms for coordinating counter-terrorism actions; intensification of cooperation in the financial sphere; carrying out separate military operations, mainly by UAV forces. In the end, itwas the African direction that turned out to be the most successful example of Obama’s “leading from the behind” strategy. Despite the fact that under the influence of the Arab Spring and the rise of the ISIS in the Middle East in 2011-2014, there was an escalation of violence in the region, in general, the main goals of combating Islamist terrorism by the end of 2016 were achieved by the USA. In Somalia, Nigeria and Libya, Americans relied on the local forces concerned, restricting participation by coordinating allies, providing intelligence and striking individual blows. The French intervention in Mali in 2013 enabled the Europeans to shift the main burden of fighting local Islamists. In addition, Egypt, receiving abundant military assistance from the United States, did not allow the expansion of the ISIS’s zone of operations in the Sinai Peninsula, but it was not possible to fully cope with the small local branch due to the instability of relations with local tribes that remain outside the control of the central government.
37
Timofeev, Alexey Y. "The centenary of World War I in Serbia: A war of monuments". Slavic Almanac, n.º 3-4 (2020): 127–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.31168/2073-5731.2020.3-4.1.07.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The anniversary of the First World War in Serbia has become an oc-casion for exacerbating public discussion and drawing attention to the rise of revisionism in NATO countries. Fear of a revision of the history of World War I infl uenced Serbian society and elites on the eve of the centenary. The concerned Serb elites responded with a wide range of events organized in Serbia and Republika Srpska. Within the framework of the commemorative events dedicated to the anniversary, monuments, installed and restored by the Serbian authorities and their foreign part-ners, have received special signifi cance. These were monuments to the Serbian patriot G. Princip, to the famous Iron Regiment, to the woman volunteer-soldier Milunka Savic. They are traditional fi gures of the Ser-bian memory of the First World War. At the same time, Serbian authori-ties did not succeed in their attempt to perpetuate in monumental forms the head of the Serbian military intelligence D. Dimitrievic-Apis, the leader of the Serbian nationalist organization Black Hand, which patron-ized the Mlada Bosna organization that prepared the assassination on Franz Ferdinand. The Russian-Serbian monuments of the First World War in Serbia presenting Nicholas II and the military brotherhood of the two peoples were of special signifi cance. All new monuments have become memorial sites and at the same time attractive points for vari-ous political forces expressing their sympathies and antipathies through symbolic gestures towards them.
38
Viedienieiev, Dmytro, e Oleksandr Semeniuk. "ESSENTIAL FEATURES AND FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS OF MODERN UNCONVENTIONAL (HYBRID) CONFLICT". Strategic Panorama, n.º 1-2 (7 de dezembro de 2021): 30–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.53679/2616-9460.1-2.2021.02.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
In the article the authors argue that the strategy and arsenal of hybrid (asymmetrical, unconventional) warfare in the contemporary world are fundamentally based on the qualitative changes that took place at the turn of the XXI century as a result of radical changes in the balance of power in the international arena, chaos in international relations, the development of new types of lethal and non-lethal weapons, new technologies of constructing and dismantling social communities with predetermined characteristics. These changes involved the conceptual framework, structure, strategy and tactics, forms and methods of the military and political confrontation between modern states and their blocks, as well as between states and non-governmental organisations.
The authors identify the essential features and functional components of hybrid warfare, such as its latency phases; the remote undermining of national defense capabilities by non-military and non-contact means; breaching the international law of war; the integrated use of military methods as well as specific means of non-military, diplomatic, financial and economic, humanitarian pressure on a victim state. They also include the extensive use of anti-government groups and movements; illegal armed groups, separatists, irredentists, radical ethnic and religious groups, extremist organizations, and artificially constructed destructive groups; the privileged role of intelligence services, special operations forces and their use for engineering a powerful anti-government infrastructure designed to destabilize the legitimate state system; the priority role of targeted influence on public opinion through the extensive use of methods of information and psychological warfare and cyberwarfare.
39
Voytikov, Sergey S. "Materials of the Serpukhov Uezd Committee of the RCP(B) as a Source on the History of the Soviet Military Construction in 1918–19, on the “Stavka” Case on the “Conspiracy in the Field Staff” of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and on the Reaction of the Bolshevik Leadership to the Explosion in Leontievsky Lane". Herald of an archivist, n.º 4 (2020): 1168–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2020-4-1168-1183.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The Central State Archive of the City of Moscow (TsGA of Moscow) holds documents that expand existing notions on the Soviet military construction of 1918-19, the formation of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Soviet Russia, and the “third wave” of mass Red terror in 1919. These documents are mostly found in the seemingly insignificant fond of the Serpukhov uezd committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Since in the autumn 1918 – summer 1919, the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was located in Serpukhov and its military commissar, head of the registration department, and founder of the Soviet military intelligence, S. I. Aralov actively worked in the Serpukhov uezd committee, the committee protocols are of great importance for studying the formation of the Red Army and its special services. The documents on admission to the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and party registration of the Field Staff senior officials, brothers Alexei and Pavel Vasiliev contain new information on the personnel continuity in the Operational Department of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs of the RSFSR and the Field Staff. Protocols of the reports of the old Bolshevik A.A. Antonov at sessions of the Serpukhov uezd bodies of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) clarify the existing notions on the calamity of June 1919, which took place on the eve of the events associated with the arrest of the first Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic J. J. V?cietis and some of his employees in July 1919, the cleaning of the Field Staff initiated by the old Bolshevik, longtime associate of Lenin S.I. Gusev who replaced S.I. Aralov at his posts. There are also documents containing information on the Bolshevik leadership reaction to the events related to the explosion in the building of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on September 25, 1919, when 12 Bolsheviks were killed and 55 received wounds of varying severity. These materials complement and correct data from the documents stored in the federal archives, in particular, in the Russian State Military Archive, which keeps documents on the history of the Red Army in 1918-41. For instance, it turns out that it was decided to arrest the bourgeoisie and other “counter-revolutionaries” with their subsequent imprisonment in a concentration camp created specifically for this purpose in Serpukhov district.
40
Hakman, Serghei. "Particularitățile includerii Basarabiei și a nordului Bucovinei în componența Uniunii Sovietice". Analele Bucovinei 58, n.º 2 (1 de dezembro de 2022): 519–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.56308/ab/2022.2.11.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
"The author considers a set of military propaganda measures taken by Soviet troops to seize the territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Regular units of the USSR Armed Forces which were united in a specially created Southern Front, whose troops were concentrated on the border with Romania, were used to achieve this goal. On June 28, 1940, Soviet troops crossed the Dniester and entered Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Romanian units were ordered to withdraw in an organized manner. The Red Army exceeded the agreed rate of evacuation of Romanian troops, violated the line of demarcation, which led to local incidents. There were cases of disarmament of Romanian soldiers. There were armed clashes, a result of which were loses of both sides, including killed. In turn, the Red Army also felt hostility, encountering minefields, anti-tank barriers, trenches, mined or dismantled railways and bridges. Both Soviet and Romanian military units took certain military-administrative measures against the civilian population, which had different motives and forms of manifestation. The low level of morale of the retreating Romanian army led to the disintegration of entire military units, whose soldiers dropped their weapons and fled home. At the same time, there were serious violations of military discipline among the Red Army, for which the soldiers were punished, including the death penalty. Immediately after the Red Army entered Bessarabia and the Northern part of Bukovina, a huge Soviet propaganda machine began to operate. A large number of newspapers and special literature were distributed among the population and soldiers; and posters and slogans were hung in the streets and houses. Politicians of the Red Army organized rallies and demonstrations to awaken in the souls of the Bessarabians and Bukovinians “love for the liberators and a sense of confidence in the Soviet authority”. The annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Soviet Union in June-July, 1940 can be considered a well-thought-out and carefully prepared political-diplomatic and military-propaganda campaign. These territories were occupied by the Red Army according to all the rules of military art (all components of the military operation were used: military force, local military pressure, military intelligence, propaganda and propaganda service), thanks to which the USSR achieved its goal. "
41
RUTAR, BORIS. "SISTEM ZNANSTVENE ANALIZE DRUŽBENEGA OkOLJA V PODPORO POVELJEVANJA". CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CHALLENGES, VOLUME 2012/ ISSUE 14/2 (30 de junho de 2012): 91–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.33179/bsv.99.svi.11.cmc.14.2.5.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Zaradi okoliščin, v katerih so se znašle zahodne vojaške organizacije pri izvajanju po- konfliktnih operacij, je bilo nujno najti ustrezne načine obveščevalne priprave bojišča, ki bi zamenjali osredotočenost na nasprotnika z osredotočenostjo na prebivalstvo. Kot del širše reorganizacije in evolucije obveščevalne dejavnosti so oborožene sile ZDA uveljavile koncept družbene geografije, ki vključuje znanstvenike s področja druž- boslovja. Namen prispevka je predstaviti in osvetliti sistem znanstvene analize druž- benega okolja v podporo poveljevanja (HTS) in pomen družboslovnih znanosti ter poudariti vlogo sistema pri podpori bojnemu odločanju. Avtor predstavi dosežke in uporabnost sistema znanstvene analize družbenega okolja na primeru Afganistana ter sklene z ugotovitvijo, da je treba kljub očitnim pomanjkljivostim sistema nadaljevati njegov razvoj, še posebno z večjo udeležbo vseh držav članic Nata. Due to the circumstances encountered by western military organizations when executing post conflict operations, the urgent need for more adequate intelligen- ce preparation of the battlefield arose, where the enemy-orientated intelligence should be replaced by a population-centric one. As part of a broad reorganization and evolution of the intelligence community, the US Armed Forces introduced the concept of Human Terrain System based on the active participation of social science academia. The aim of the article is to present the Human Terrain System and the im- portance of the social sciences, as well as to highlight its importance in support of military decision making. The author uses Afghanistan as a model to demonstrate the system’s results and utility. In the conclusion, he argues that, regardless of its obvious shortcomings, the development of the Human Terrain System should continue with special emphasis being put on greater involvement of all NATO member states
42
Schreiner, James. "Foreword by Guest Editor LTC James H. Schreiner, PhD, PMP, CPEM". Industrial and Systems Engineering Review 7, n.º 1 (31 de dezembro de 2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.37266/iser.2019v7i1.pp1.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This special issue of the Industrial and Systems Engineering Review highlights top papers from the 2019 annual General Donald R. Keith memorial capstone conference held at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. Following careful review of 48 academic paper submissions, eight were selected for publication in this journal. Each paper incorporated features of systems or industrial engineering and presented detailed and reflective analysis in the topic. Three general bodies of knowledge in the papers include: systems engineering and decision analysis, modeling and simulation, and artificial intelligence
Systems Engineering and Decision Analysis topics included three unique contributions. The work of Flanick et al. examined adaptability in Hyper-Enabled Operator systems and recommended how each technology might address capability gaps for special operations forces. Wilby et al. employed a scalable predictive statistical model for decision support to significant work package prioritization for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers nationally significant inland waterway infrastructure. Contributions by Shi et al. employed value focused thinking and a robust cost model to enable decision quality for PM Cargo CH-47 technologies.
Modeling and Simulation works also included three unique contributions. Recognized as ‘best paper’ at the 2019 conference, work by Cooley et al. developed a senior leader engagement model using sparse K-means clustering techniques to greatly improve the planning and execution for AFRICOM leadership. Lovell et al. employed robust military simulation models to evaluate and propose solutions Soldier Search and Target Acquisition protocols. Work by Drake et al. employed vehicle Routing Problem simulation software to enhance United Health Services material handling challenges across NY State thus enabling quality optimization choices.
Finally, two unique contributions in artificial intelligence examined key text mining technologies. Shi et al. employed text mining and Latent Dirichlet Allocation modeling to derive insights through trends and clustering narratives on U.S. Army Officer Evaluation Reports and describe success. Similarly, text mining techniques by Senft et al. helped to examine and show similarities in success narratives across genders thus providing valuable insights for promotion boards.
Congratulation to the 2019 undergraduate scholars and all authors who provided valuable contributions through thoughtful and steadfast intellectual efforts to their fields of study!
LTC James H. Schreiner, PhD, PMP, CPEM
Director, Operations Research Center
Department of Systems Engineering
United States Military Academy
Mahan Hall, Bldg 752, Room 305
West Point, NY 10996, USA
james.schreiner@westpoint.edu
43
Novikov, M. V. "Советские военные советники в Китайской Республике в 1938–1943 гг. (по материалам воспоминаний) Новиков М.В." Вестник гуманитарного образования, n.º 4(32) (16 de fevereiro de 2024): 53–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.25730/vsu.2070.23.054.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article examines the specifics of the activities of Soviet military advisers sent to the Republic of China in 1938–1943 to assist in the construction of a modern army at that time, in planning and conducting defensive and offensive operations. The organizational structure of the soviet apparatus is presented, including 4 chief military advisers (M. I. Dratvin, A. I. Cherepanov, K. M. Kachanov, V. I. Chuikov). It is noted that the staff of advisers included representatives of all branches of the armed forces: combined arms, artillery, aviation, tank, engineering, communications, air defense, logistics, intelligence, as well as military doctors. Based on the memoirs, the features of the advisers' activities in the Chinese theater of operations, the specifics of relations with Chinese military leaders are considered. According to memoirists, Soviet officers sent to China did not receive special training to perform the functions of advisers, the experience of advisers who worked in China in the 1920s. It was not generalized, and the instructions of the representatives of the People's Commissariat of Defense were of the most general nature: it is necessary to help the Chinese comrades. In the memoirs, several problems stand out in the work of advisers with Chinese generals: the presence in the command structure of the Chinese armed forces of feudal generals who received military education in military academies of Western countries and Japan and had their own idea of the tasks of combating Japanese aggression; the gap in military ranks (Soviet majors – advisers to Chinese generals); the age barrier (the advisers were much younger than the Chinese generals, to whom they had to advise something); the language barrier. The advisers attributed attachment to traditions and intolerance to criticism, even the most reasonable, to the psychological characteristics of Chinese generals. Related to this were recommendations for a special approach to Chinese generals. The issue of the relationship between the leaders of the Kuomintang and the CPC, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong during the war is being considered. It is emphasized that the recall of advisers to the USSR in 1943 It was primarily associated with the growing scale of American military assistance to China, including advisers. Рассматриваются особенности деятельности советских военных советников, командированных в 1938–1943 гг. в Китайскую Республику для оказания помощи в строительстве современной по тому времени армии, в планировании и проведении оборонительных и наступательных операций. Представлена организационная структура советнического аппарата, включая 4-х главных военных советников (М. И. Дратвин, А. И. Черепанов, К. М. Качанов, В. И. Чуйков). Отмечается, что в аппарате советников были представители всех родов войск: общевойсковые, артиллерийские, авиационные, танковые, инженерные, специалисты по связи, ПВО, тылу, разведки, а также военные врачи. На основе воспоминаний рассматриваются особенности деятельности советников на китайском театре военных действий, специфика взаимоотношений с китайскими военачальниками. По свидетельству мемуаристов, направленные в Китай советские офицеры не проходили специальное обучение для выполнения функций советников, опыт советников, работавших в Китае в 1920-е гг. обобщен не был, а инструкции представителей наркомата обороны носили самый общий характер: надо помочь китайским товарищам. В воспоминаниях выделяется несколько проблем в работе советников с китайскими генералами: наличие в командном составе китайских вооруженных сил генералов-феодалов, получивших военное образование в военных академиях западных стран и Японии и имевших свое представление о задачах борьбы с японской агрессией; разрыв в воинских званиях (советские майоры – советники китайских генералов); возрастной барьер (советники были значительно моложе китайских генералов, которым они должны были что-то советовать); языковой барьер. К числу психологических особенностей китайских генералов советники относили привязанность к традициям и нетерпимость к критике, даже самой разумной. С этим были связаны рекомендации особого подхода к китайским генералам. Рассматривается вопрос, связанный со взаимоотношениями в ходе войны руководителей Гоминьдана и КПК, Чан Кайши и Мао Цзэдуна. Подчеркивается, что отзыв советников в СССР в 1943 г. был связан прежде всего с ростом масштабов американской военной помощи Китаю, в том числе советниками.
44
Dermer, Philip J. "Trip Notes on a Return to Israel and The West Bank: Reflections on U.S. Peacemaking, the Security Mission, and What Should be Done". Journal of Palestine Studies 39, n.º 3 (2010): 66–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/jps.2010.xxxix.3.66.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The following document, previously unpublished, was written in March 2010 by a recently retired ( June 2009) U.S. Army colonel with thirty years experience in the Middle East, including tours of duty and advisory roles (in both military/security and civilian domains) from North Africa to the Persian Gulf. The subject of the informal report is the author's first two trips as a "civilian" to Israel and the West Bank, where he had served two tours of duty, most recently as U.S. military attachéé in Tel Aviv during Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement from Gaza and the formation of the U.S. Security Coordinator's (USSC) mission to reform Palestinian Authority (PA) security forces. Written as an internal document for military colleagues and government circles, the report has been circulating widely——as did the author's earlier briefings on travel or missions in Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and especially Iraq——among White House senior staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency, CENTCOM (U.S. Central Command), EUCOM (U.S. European Command), and the USSC team. The document's focus is the state of the "peace process" and the current situation in the West Bank, with particular attention to the PA security forces and the changes on the ground since the author's last tour there ended in mid-2007. But the real interest of the paper lies in the message directed at its intended audience of military and government policy officials——that is, its frank assessment of the deficiencies of the U.S. peace effort and the wider U.S. policy-making system in the Israel-Palestine arena, with particular emphasis on the disconnect between the situation on the ground and the process led by Washington. The critique has special resonance in light of the emerging new thinking in the administration fueled by the military high command's unhappiness (expressed by CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus and Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral Michael Mullen) with the State Department's handling of Middle East diplomacy, especially with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, on the grounds that diplomatic failures are having a negative impact on U.S. operations elsewhere in the region. For most JPS readers, the report has additional interest as an insider's view of the U.S. security presence in the Israel-Palestine arena. It also reflects a military approach that is often referenced but largely absent in public discourse and academic writings. The author, in addition to his tours of duty and peacekeeping missions in various Middle Eastern countries, has served as advisor to two U.S. special Middle East envoys, the U.S. negotiating team with Syria, General Petraeus, Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, Vice President Dick Cheney, and, more generally, to CENTCOM, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among others. In retirement, he has worked with CENTCOM as a key primary subject matter expert in the development of analyses and solutions for its area of responsibility, leads predeployment briefings for army units heading to Iraq, and travels frequently to Iraq and elsewhere in the region as an independent consultant. He is currently in Afghanistan with the CENTCOM commander's Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence. The report, made available to JPS, is being published with the author's permission.
45
Bielous, M., N. Bielous e O. Bokii. "FORMALIZATION OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN AVIATION MANAGEMENT". Наукові праці Державного науково-дослідного інституту випробувань і сертифікації озброєння та військової техніки 18, n.º 4 (1 de dezembro de 2023): 7–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.37701/dndivsovt.18.2023.01.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Currently, fighter aircraft is one of the most important components in the war with the russian federation. It is used to gain superiority in the air during combat, destroy means of air attack, air support of the Ground Forces, the Naval Forces, provision of aerial intelligence data to control bodies, aerial damage to enemy aviation, land and sea formations, objects of the state and military administration, rear facilities and military-economic potential, transport communications, performance of other special tasks. To ensure high efficiency of combat use, tactical (fighter) aviation brigades are equipped with automation equipment. The experience of the combat use of fighter aircraft during wars and local military conflicts of the last decade shows that ensuring high efficiency of aircraft control is achieved by automating control processes through the use of modern software and mathematical support of the automated control system, based on fundamentally new approaches, in including the use of a single formal system for presenting the knowledge of combat control officers. However, the capabilities of aviation and air defense control systems to solve logical and analytical problems are limited. In the existing complex of automation tools, the final result of the task of determining the impact on the target is evaluated qualitatively – if it is possible for the fighter to enter a given tactically advantageous position relative to the target. The existing SPMZ ASU uses mathematical models, the systems of restrictions of which do not allow to fully use the existing potential of the available composition of information sources, to form recommendations based on incomplete, inaccurate input information, which negatively affects the quality of aviation management. Thus, the need to automate decision- making processes in aviation management using the latest information technologies is urgent. One of the promising directions of formalization of decision-making processes in aviation management is the creation of models that provide for the formalization of the mental activity of decision-makers. The purpose of the article. Automation of decision-making processes in aviation management using the latest information technologies. One of the promising directions of formalization of decision-making processes in aviation management is the creation of models that provide for the formalization of the mental activity of decision-makers.
46
Kamiński, Mariusz Antoni. "Kontrola tajnych operacji wywiadu przez Kongres Stanów Zjednoczonych Ameryki". Przegląd Sejmowy 5(160) (2020): 35–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.31268/ps.2020.64.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
In democratic countries, the so-called covert actions are the most controversial element of the intelligence services activities. Covert actions are secret operations aimed, inter alia, at influencing the political, economic or military situation of other countries (e.g., inspiring coups d’état, paramilitary actions, assassinations, training and financing of armed troops or the use of “black” propaganda). Covert actions are a powerful tool in the hands of the executive, but they should be effectively controlled by the legislative authority. The purpose of the article is to analyze the powers of the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States of America to control covert actions. The author presents current legal and organizational solutions and also indicates how, under the influence of successive covert action scandals, legal provisions have changed in the direction of extending the powers of the Congress in the field of control. At the same time, the author presents problems with the interpretation of some legal solutions in the context of the supervision of the Congress after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the extension of covert actions to include actions of special forces and targeted killings of terrorists.
47
Borovyk, M. O. "Countering hostile sabotage and reconnaissance groups by the National Police of Ukraine units in the context of martial law". Law and Safety 92, n.º 1 (29 de março de 2024): 152–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.32631/pb.2024.1.14.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article is devoted to the study of ways to improve the tactical and special readiness of police officers to counteract sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the border areas and in the areas of active hostilities. The author identifies additional powers of the police under the martial law regime, including the following: conducting joint operations against sabotage and reconnaissance forces of the aggressor (enemy) and paramilitary or armed groups which are not regulated by the laws of Ukraine.
To address the objectives of the study, the analysis of the sources of international and national law providing for the use of sabotage and reconnaissance groups by the parties to the conflict is carried out, the essence and hierarchical structure of these groups are revealed, and the objects against which the use of sabotage measures is prohibited are identified. The article also provides a list of objects of the warring parties which, according to international humanitarian law, may be subject to damage.
The organisational features of the basics for defensive combat by the units of the ground forces of certain countries, in particular, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, are considered. According to the military doctrine of these countries, the purpose of defence is to disrupt the enemy’s offensive actions, inflict maximum losses in manpower and equipment, and gain time to concentrate forces in the chosen direction for the offensive.
The article describes the signs that can be used to identify members of Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups. These signs are the following: the execution of certain actions, including conducting intelligence activities, destabilising the situation by committing criminal offences (explosions, murders, assaults, robberies) under the guise of domestic crimes, spreading false information and discrediting the authorities during direct communication with the local population.
The tactical methods of combating sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the territory of the controlled border area are highlighted. The experience of counter-sabotage measures by the security and defence forces of Ukraine, one of the elements of which is an ambush, is studied.
A model of sabotage protection and its use in the educational process of higher education institutions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine is proposed, which provides for a comprehensive combination of command and staff exercises with tactical and special exercises in two stages and involvement of cadets in ensuring public safety and order in border settlements.
48
Milenković, Miloš, e Milovan Subotić. "Non-military aspects of strategic deterrence". Vojno delo 74, n.º 4 (2022): 52–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/vojdelo2204052m.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Nowadays state and its citizens are exposed to a wide range of threats that are not necessarily of a military character, which requires a systemic and strategic response. The main hypothesis of the paper is that the very change in the perception of security, as well as the increasingly diverse manners of endangering it, which are also reflected in the theories of modern wars, impose on state the obligation to expand the concept of strategic deterrence to other spheres of social activities, in addition to the military, which still remains crucially important. In order to better understand the concept of strategic deterrence, the authors try to provide answers to the questions: who should be deterred and what from? In addition to armed aggression, which strategic deterrence is primarily aimed at, the paper indicates that the focus has to also be on all other phenomena and activities that lead to the destabilisation of society, the collapse of institutions, some form of intrastate conflict and, ultimately, the collapse of state and/or violent regime change. Having in mind that deterrence is, in essence, a matter of perception, a special part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of the situation in Serbia, that is, the perception of its internal weaknesses that affect the ability of strategic deterrence. For the purpose of this analysis, in the paper the authors use some databases and reports by international organizations, which make it possible to do a comparative analysis with other countries and monitor its trends. Theoretical assumptions and analysed data are used as a basis for answering the question: how to deter? For strategic deterrence to be effective, first of all it must not be partial and has to encompass all domains of national power. In this sense, it is pointed out that military power is important, but not sufficient. Moreover, in the context of strategic deterrence, the importance of strengthening the international position of state through cooperation with others, as well as attracting foreign investment, is emphasized. Finally, as a key condition for the credibility of strategic deterrence, the authors emphasize political stability and the functioning of institutions. Bearing in mind the expansion of the context of strategic deterrence, important institutions in this regard are, in addition to the military, police, intelligence and security services, certainly also the judiciary, financial institutions, educational and health system, cultural and information institutions, etc. For a country that has not managed to ensure the minimum of unity within its society for strategic decisions, or at least the absence of extreme polarisation, as well as the proper functioning of the state apparatus and other segments of society, there are not armed forces that could defend it. Such a state will not be externally attacked by potential enemies, but internally. Precisely due to this, the authors conclude that without a comprehensive and systemic approach, without strong and efficient institutions, without establishing a functional and democratic society, there is no successful deterrence.
49
Yahodzinskyi, V. P., O. M. Kisilyuk, D. P. Polozenko, O. A. Desyatka, V. O. Novytskyi, R. G. Bukov e M. M. Krasnopolskyi. "Comparative characteristics of power capabilities of cadets of various sports sections (armsport, crossfit, kettlebell lifting, powerlifting)". Scientific Journal of National Pedagogical Dragomanov University. Series 15. Scientific and pedagogical problems of physical culture (physical culture and sports), n.º 6(126) (20 de julho de 2020): 115–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.31392/npu-nc.series15.2020.6(126).25.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Power sports have always been very popular among servicemen. This is especially evident in recent times, when such power sports, as armsport, crossfit, kettlebell lifting, powerlifting have received some development. The article presents a comparative analysis of the power capabilities of cadets who specialize in various power sports. The study involved male cadets of the 4th year of various faculties (n=53) of the Military Academy (Odessa), who in the process of training were engaged in power sports: armsport (n=12), crossfit (n=16), kettlebell lifting (n=15), powerlifting (n = 10). In addition, the results of cadets-athletes were compared with the results of cadets of the faculty of training specialists of airborne assault troops and military intelligence and special purpose, who did not attend sports sections of the academy (n=60). Analysis of the power of the cadets was carried out on the following exercises: pull-up, lifting by coup, lifting by strength on the crossbar, 24 kg kettlebell snatch, push-up on the parallel bars, push-up. The conducted researches testified to the high level of development of power qualities of cadets of all sections of academy in power sports. There was no significant difference between the results of cadets of different power sports in most exercises. It is established that the power capabilities of cadets who are engaged in various power sports are significantly better than those of cadets who are not engaged in sports. This suggests that any of the studied power sports can be an effective means of developing and improving the power opportunities of future officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
50
Boichuk, V. Yu. "Special Features of the Crime’s Subject Under the Article 330 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine". Law and Safety 72, n.º 1 (26 de março de 2019): 53–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.32631/pb.2019.1.06.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
On the basis of the analysis of criminal and legal literature, certain provisions of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and court practice of their application, the author has determined that the description of special features of the crime’s subject through the construction of “in connection with the performance of official duties” used by the legislator in the disposition of the Art. 330 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine indicates the identity of the subject to the category of officials. At the same time, taking into account the dualism of criminal and legal approaches to the definition of the term of “an official” in the descriptions of a victim and the crime’s subject, the author has emphasized on the application of the more narrow concept laid down in Part 3 of the Art. 18 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine and the Resolution of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of Ukraine dated from April 26, 2002 No. 5 “On judicial practice in cases of bribery”.
As a result, the author has come to the conclusion that a special subject of the crime under the Art. 330 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine may be officers of the departments of the National Police of Ukraine, the State Investigation Bureau, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the Office of State Security, the State Fiscal Service of Ukraine, the State Penal Service of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, officials of the President’s Administration of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Supreme High Command General Headquarters of Ukraine, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, the General Staff of Armed Forces of Ukraine, the unions, military units and units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the State Special Transport Service, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, the Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, regional, district, city and district in the cities, state administrations and local self-government agencies, as well as officials of enterprises, institutions and organizations that carry out state defense orders, conduct research and perform development in the defense area, etc.