Siga este link para ver outros tipos de publicações sobre o tema: Soviet Union.
Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Soviet Union"
Crie uma referência precisa em APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, e outros estilos
Veja os 50 melhores artigos de revistas para estudos sobre o assunto "Soviet Union".
Ao lado de cada fonte na lista de referências, há um botão "Adicionar à bibliografia". Clique e geraremos automaticamente a citação bibliográfica do trabalho escolhido no estilo de citação de que você precisa: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
Você também pode baixar o texto completo da publicação científica em formato .pdf e ler o resumo do trabalho online se estiver presente nos metadados.
Veja os artigos de revistas das mais diversas áreas científicas e compile uma bibliografia correta.
1
Nechemias, Carol. "Sources on the Soviet Union". Political Science Teacher 1, n.º 2 (1988): 1–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s089608280000012x.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The Soviets have complained that they know more about us than we know about them. While the veracity of this view is difficult to assess, the level of American ignorance about the USSR clearly is appalling. Many Americans do not know which side the Soviets fought on in World War II and are taken aback to discover that not all Soviet citizens are Russians. Those who engage in serious study of the Soviet Union disagree, sometimes vociferously, regarding the fundamental nature and future prospects of the USSR but an understanding of the terms of the debate should form a part of American education.For those teachers seeking to address this need by developing new courses on the Soviet Union, the first obstacle involves resources: How do I find—and select—readings for my students? And where do I secure materials which will provide me with the background necessary to deliver lectures on topics like collectivization and socialist realism? With the current growth of interest in the USSR more high school and college instructors find themselves in the position of offering courses about the Soviet Union, while, at the same time, they seek to move from being relative novices to reasonably accomplished (and confident) teachers of Soviet politics and society.Although every academic trained in Soviet area studies probably has his or her own recipe concerning “How to teach about the Soviet Union,” there are some fundamental approaches—and texts—which reflect a certain underlying consensus about what kinds of materials should be included in the student diet.
2
Laird, Sally. "Soviet Union". Index on Censorship 17, n.º 5 (maio de 1988): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03064228808534406.
Texto completo da fonte
3
Balzer, Harley. "Soviet Union". Comparative Education Review 33, n.º 2 (maio de 1989): 281–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/446851.
Texto completo da fonte
4
Kerr, Stephen T. "Soviet Union". Comparative Education Review 34, n.º 2 (maio de 1990): 283–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/446939.
Texto completo da fonte
5
Malkova, Zoya. "Soviet Union". Comparative Education Review 35, n.º 2 (maio de 1991): 383–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/447035.
Texto completo da fonte
6
Avis, George. "Soviet Union". Comparative Education Review 36, n.º 2 (maio de 1992): 271–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/447124.
Texto completo da fonte
7
ANY, CAROL. "SOVIET UNION". Russian History 35, n.º 1-2 (2008): 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633108x00265.
Texto completo da fonte
8
Rywkin, Michael. "VII. “Federation, Confederation, or Disintegration?”". Nationalities Papers 21, n.º 2 (1993): 163–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999308408287.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Is the Soviet Union heading towards a new federation, a new confederation, or simply disintegration? At this point, the Soviets themselves do not know, and this is due in part to the fact that they seem confused about the meaning of these terms. Professor Rywkin analyzed recent trends in the Soviet Union, noting three competing principles currently being voiced in the Soviet Union.
9
Campbell, John C., e Vladimir Voinovich. "The Anti-Soviet Soviet Union". Foreign Affairs 65, n.º 2 (1986): 406. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043039.
Texto completo da fonte
10
Tomof, Kiril. "Italian opera in Stalin’s Soviet Union". Contemporary Musicology, n.º 3 (2019): 107–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.56620/2587-9731-2019-3-107-149.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This article explores the role of Italian opera in Soviet musical life from the end of World War II through the beginning of the Cold War. Italian opera provided inspiration for Soviet musical careers, exemplars against which Soviet musical development was measured, and simple musical enjoyment for Soviet audiences. The article analyzes two archival source bases that shed light on these dynamics. One source is box office data from the opera and ballet theaters in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Soviet Union's national republics. Analysis of this data demonstrates that operas by Italian composers provided a solid backbone of consistency in opera programming against which the tumultuous pursuit of a distinctively Soviet, multinational opera played out. Some especially famous operas were also so popular that they kept audiences coming to the theaters. The other archival source is bureaucratic correspondence regarding an effort to recruit Italian opera pedagogues to visit the USSR’s conservatories. Analysis of the correspondence uncovers Soviet bureaucrats’ insecurity about cultural development just as Soviet influence was expanding into Eastern Europe. It also reveals Soviet perceptions of Italian musical elites facing the complexities of the Cold War division of Europe. The article contributes to our understanding of the connection between performances of Italian opera and the construction of a Soviet musical culture that placed a very high value on opera as an advanced form of musical expression. It reveals that even during a period often considered the most insular in Soviet history, Soviet musicians and cultural administrators were engaging with their counterparts in the West. Finally, it demonstrates that the distinction between “international” and “transnational” cultural exchange that is often key to the way scholars of globalization analyze interactions that cross national borders is not as important in a Soviet context in which society was essentially embedded in the state bureaucracy.
11
Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 1)". Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, n.º 1 (1 de junho de 2018): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3364.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
12
Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 2)". Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, n.º 2 (30 de novembro de 2019): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.2999.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
13
Zubov, A. B. "The Soviet Union". Russian Social Science Review 35, n.º 3 (maio de 1994): 37–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/rss1061-1428350337.
Texto completo da fonte
14
SELTZER, RICHARD. "FORMER SOVIET UNION:". Chemical & Engineering News 70, n.º 50 (14 de dezembro de 1992): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cen-v070n050.p008.
Texto completo da fonte
15
Carnovale, Marco. "The Soviet Union". International Spectator 25, n.º 4 (outubro de 1990): 284–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03932729008456720.
Texto completo da fonte
16
Slider, Darrell. "The Soviet Union". Electoral Studies 9, n.º 4 (dezembro de 1990): 295–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0261-3794(90)90014-y.
Texto completo da fonte
17
Linden, Carl A. "The Soviet Union". NASSP Bulletin 74, n.º 522 (janeiro de 1990): 52–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/019263659007452210.
Texto completo da fonte
18
Sun, Yizhi. "The Soviet Union and the May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai". Problemy dalnego vostoka, n.º 4 (2022): 128. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013128120021382-1.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This article focuses specifically on the Soviet factor in The May Thirtieth Movement in Shanghai, including the degree of central and local Soviet authorities' involvement in the preparation and course of the Movement and financial assistance to Chinese strikers. It also examines Soviet intelligence activities in Shanghai during this period. Until May 30 the central organs of the USSR and the RCP(b) were not the initiators of the Movement. The largest workers' movement in Shanghai occurred spontaneously and was not under the control of the Comintern or the Politburo. However, we cannot completely deny the existence of attempts to organize and control the Movement by the Soviet Consulate as early as the first days of the strikes and it has been documented that the practical actions of Soviet agents began even before the Politburo began to pay attention to the Shanghai events. The All-Union Central Trade Union Council represented the "legal" support for the strikers by the Soviet authorities. The arrival of a delegation of Soviet trade unions in Shanghai was open and contained no elements of secret diplomacy. In the field of "secret politics", G.N. Voitinsky was sent to Shanghai to lead the Movement through the CCP. During the May Thirtieth Movement, Soviet intelligence had to work in intensified mode. However, in the Shanghai municipal police files we can only find references to the activities of Soviet spies at the beginning of the Movement. The reason for this is that all police attention in July and August was concentrated on the so-called "Dosser case", which was essentially of a small scale, but was hyped up by the Shanghai press and the Municipal Council of International Settlement. Nevertheless, one should not exaggerate the influence of the Soviets on the May Thirtieth Movement. The Soviets could only control, through the CCP and the General Trade Union, the workers' and partly the students' part of the strikes. The leading role in the May Thirtieth Movement was still held by the Shanghai merchants, not by the Politburo and the Comintern.
19
Franckx, Erik. "Marine scientific research and the Soviet Arctic". Polar Record 27, n.º 163 (outubro de 1991): 325–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0032247400013085.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractScientific cooperation in the Arctic has gained momentum during the last two years. The changing attitude of the Soviet Union, the most advanced Arctic state in this respect, has played a crucial role in this evolution. This article, which focusses on non-Soviet research efforts in Soviet Arctic waters, concludes that the Soviet Union has lately given a clear signal by allowing foreigners, after many years of repeated refusal, to conduct marine scientific research close to its own coasts. In doing so the Soviets have further clarified the legal status of their northern waters.
20
YEŞILBURSA BEHÇET, KEMAL. "FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)". History and Modern Perspectives 2, n.º 1 (30 de março de 2020): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2658-4654-2020-2-1-92-105.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.
21
MENDRAS, MARIE. "The French Connection: An Uncertain Factor in Soviet Relations with Western Europe". ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 481, n.º 1 (setembro de 1985): 29–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716285481001003.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
France's long relationship with the Soviet Union has varied according to the political climate. The crucial factors in the French-Soviet relationship are the state of U.S.-Soviet affairs and Moscow's objectives in Western Europe. Mendras reviews the history of French-Soviet relations from the de Gaulle years. By the early 1970s, she argues, détente with the United States and the recognition of postwar borders in central Europe reduced the instrumentality and priority of France in Soviet policy. In the 1980s, as their relations with the United States deteriorated, the Soviets took a renewed interest in France. But the Socialist government in Paris, more critical of the USSR than were its predecessors, has developed a policy that the Soviets denigrate as “Europeanist” and “Atlantist” and no longer truly independent. Although recent events have made the French leadership more receptive to the Soviet Union, bilateral relations will remain essentially a diplomatic ritual.
22
Suvorov, Mikhail N. "The Soviet Union in two Arab novels". RUDN Journal of Studies in Literature and Journalism 27, n.º 3 (12 de outubro de 2022): 523–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-9220-2022-27-3-523-531.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The study aims to analyze the representation of the Soviet Union in two Arab novels, “Ice” (2011) by Egyptian Sun‘allah Ibrahim and “Time of the Red Reed Pipe” (2012) by Kuwaiti Thurayya al-Baqsami. Within the vast expanse of the Arab “emigrant” literature one can find relatively few works of fiction that have to do with the USSR despite the fact that in the 1960-1980s thousands of Arab students studied in the country. Among a couple dozen Arab writers who wrote some fiction about the USSR very few spent more than a couple of months in the country, and their works, as a rule, present idealized and rather superficial images of the Soviet Union. Unlike these authors, Sun‘allah Ibrahim and Thurayya al-Baqsami spent in the 1970s quite a long time in Moscow in the status of ordinary students, and for this reason their novels present a much more realistic picture of the Soviet Union. Without any noticeable warmth towards their Soviet hosts, the writers consider many negative features of Soviet social and economic life as commodity shortage, low quality of Soviet goods and services, illegal currency operations, etc. The two authors’ representations of the Soviet Union stand in contrast to the Soviet’s own idea of how the people from the developing countries perceived the “country of victorious socialism.”
23
Daniels, Robert V. "The Soviet Union in Post‐Soviet Perspective". Journal of Modern History 74, n.º 2 (junho de 2002): 381–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/343412.
Texto completo da fonte
24
Pipes, Richard. "The Soviet Union Adrift". Foreign Affairs 70, n.º 1 (1990): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20044695.
Texto completo da fonte
25
Daniloff, Nicholas, e James Cracraft. "The Soviet Union Today". Russian Review 44, n.º 2 (abril de 1985): 215. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/129196.
Texto completo da fonte
26
Olcott, Martha Brill. "The Soviet (Dis)Union". Foreign Policy, n.º 82 (1991): 118. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1148644.
Texto completo da fonte
27
Goble, Paul A. "Forget the Soviet Union". Foreign Policy, n.º 86 (1992): 56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1149188.
Texto completo da fonte
28
Rich, Vera. "Soviet Union: Corruption continues". Nature 323, n.º 6088 (outubro de 1986): 483. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/323483b0.
Texto completo da fonte
29
Hemans, Simon. "Whither the Soviet Union?" RUSI Journal 135, n.º 3 (setembro de 1990): 21–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071849008445450.
Texto completo da fonte
30
Rich, Vera. "Soviet Union: Phobos mission". Nature 315, n.º 6020 (junho de 1985): 533. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/315533b0.
Texto completo da fonte
31
Rywkin, Michael. "From the Soviet Union". Nationalities Papers 16, n.º 1 (1988): 94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0090599200002427.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Until Gorbachev's glasnost', Soviet treatment of nationalities problems within the USSR ranged from carefully worded ethnographic studies to utterly dishonest articles in the political press. Much of this has changed, and we are now able to read some revealing works in the pages of avant-garde Soviet publications. Among the latter, Vikukaar (Tallin) and its Russian Raduga edition (which is not the exact twin of its Estonian counterpart), are remarkable by their frankness.
32
HRH. "From the Soviet Union". Nationalities Papers 16, n.º 2 (1988): 259. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905998808408086.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
IntroductionThis article by Zenon Pozniak is the last of a two-part series on the question of bilingualism. Part one, an article by Maté Hint, appeared in Volume XVI, Number 1 (Spring 1988) pp. 94-105.
33
Rich, Vera. "Soviet Union: Mapping pollution". Lancet 338, n.º 8777 (novembro de 1991): 1261. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0140-6736(91)92118-l.
Texto completo da fonte
34
Singer, Daniel. "Wither the Soviet Union?" Monthly Review 41, n.º 3 (1 de julho de 1989): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.14452/mr-041-03-1989-07_1.
Texto completo da fonte
35
Bunce, Valerie. "The empire strikes back: the evolution of the Eastern bloc from a Soviet asset to a Soviet liability". International Organization 39, n.º 1 (1985): 1–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300004859.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The structure of the Soviet bloc would appear to be ideal for the maximization of Soviet domestic and foreign interests. The actual ledger of Soviet gains and losses from control over Eastern Europe, however, reveals a different picture. Over the postwar period Eastern European contributions to Soviet national security, economic growth, and domestic stability have declined. This decline in the value of empire to the Soviets is a function of three factors. The first is growing regime-society tensions in Eastern Europe as a result of East Europe's dependence on the Soviet Union and the derivative structures of its Stalinist political economies. The second is the Soviet role within the bloc as a political and economic monopoly and monopsony. And the third is the unexpected costs, both to the Soviet Union and to Eastern Europe, that attended the bloc's reunion in the early 1970s with a global capitalist system in crisis.
36
Clark, Terry D. "A House Divided: A Roll-call Analysis of the First Session of the Moscow City Soviet". Slavic Review 51, n.º 4 (1992): 674–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2500131.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The March 1990 elections to republican and local Soviets in the USSR resulted in the transfer of power from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to the nascent democratic movement in a number of republics and localities. Among these was the Moscow City Soviet (Mossoviet). Of the 472 people's deputies elected to the Mossoviet, the clear majority were elected under the umbrella of the political bloc Democratic Russia. Running on a platform calling for the rejection of continued CPSU control of political life in the Soviet Union and Moscow, Democratic Russia's candidates won decisively in a majority of the electoral districts.
37
Marácz, László. "The Hungarian Fencing Elite in the Service of the Soviet Union". Erdélyi Társadalom 20, n.º 2 (15 de setembro de 2022): 81–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.17177/77171.278.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The Soviet Union was not part of the international sports circuit during the Interwar period. After the Bolshevik October Revolution, the newly formed communist state focused on developing its own political structures, which also affected sports in the Soviet Union. After the Second World War, the policy of isolation was given up and the Soviet sports management targeted the Olympic Games as a platform to demonstrate the superiority of the communist system by planning to win the Olympic medal tally. The Soviets considered fencing a class-hostile, ‘bourgeois sport’ and did not promote it among civilians during the Interwar period. This radically changed as soon as the Soviet political and sports leadership decided to participate in the Helsinki Olympic Summer Games of 1952. The 21 medals that the Olympic fencing competition had to offer became interesting for the medal ranking. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, knowledge and experience in fencing became highly relevant for the USSR. The geopolitical relations had changed after the Second World War; now, the Soviet Union was ruling over Central and Eastern Europe, and Hungary became one of its satellites. Hungary had a long fencing tradition and dominated international and Olympic fencing competitions, especially in saber, during the Interwar period. By the end of 1951, a delegation of Hungarian elite fencers and coaches was brought to Moscow to prepare Soviet fencers for the 1952 Olympic Games. Based on this exchange and its follow-up sessions in the first half of the 1950s, the success of the Soviet fencing team progressed quickly, and in the course of the 1960s, the Soviets took over the Hungarian hegemony in the Olympic discipline of fencing.
38
Yazid, Mohd Noor. "Keruntuhan Soviet Union 1991 dan Struktur Politik Antarabangsa: Satu Analisis". Malaysian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities (MJSSH) 5, n.º 10 (2 de outubro de 2020): 10–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.47405/mjssh.v5i10.519.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Artikel ini membincangkan keruntuhan Soviet Union dalam bulan Disember 1991 dan impaknya kepada struktur politik antarabangsa. Struktur politik antarabangsa bermula dari tahun 1945 hingga 1991 telah didominasi oleh dua buah kuasa besar iaitu Soviet Union dan Amerika Syarikat. Apabila sebuah daripada kuasa besar ini runtuh (iaitu Soviet Union), maka struktur politik dunia hanya didominasi oleh sebuah kuasa besar sahaja, iaitu Amerika Syarikat. Dalam dekad pertama selepas runtuhnya Soviet Union, amat jelas bahawa struktur politik antarabangsa bersifat unipolar, khususnya di benua Eropah. Sebelum runtuhnya Soviet Union 1991, benua Eropah terbahagi kepada dua kawasan pengaruh yang jelas, iaitu Eropah Barat dan Eropah Timur. Eropah Barat dikuasai oleh Amerika Syarikat dan Eropah Timur dikuasai oleh Soviet Union. Selepas runtuhnya Soviet Union, pihak Amerika Syarikat telah meluaskan pengaruhnya ke bahagian timur benua Eropah yang sebelum ini dikuasai oleh Soviet Union. Negara-negara bekas komunis telah menjadi anggota NATO. Selepas runtuhnya Soviet Union telah memberikan kesan kepada struktur politik dunia daripada bersifat bipolar kepada unipolar. Keadaan ini jelas berlaku dalam dekad pertama dan mula berubah kepada satu struktur baru selepas berakhirnya dekad pertama.
39
Avey, Paul C. "Confronting Soviet Power: U.S. Policy during the Early Cold War". International Security 36, n.º 4 (abril de 2012): 151–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00079.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Many self-identified realist, liberal, and constructivist scholars contend that ideology played a critical role in generating and shaping the United States' decision to confront the Soviet Union in the early Cold War. A close look at the history reveals that these ideological arguments fail to explain key aspects of U.S. policy. Contrary to ideological explanations, the United States initially sought to cooperate with the Soviet Union, did not initially pressure communist groups outside the Soviet orbit, and later sought to engage communist groups that promised to undermine Soviet power. The U.S. decision to confront the Soviets stemmed instead from the distribution of power. U.S. policy shifted toward a confrontational approach as the balance of power in Eurasia tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. In addition, U.S. leaders tended to think and act in a manner consistent with balance of power logic. The primacy of power over ideology in U.S. policymaking—given the strong liberal tradition in the United States and the large differences between U.S. and Soviet ideology—suggests that relative power concerns are the most important factors in generating and shaping confrontational foreign policies.
40
Miszewski, Dariusz. "Slavic idea in political thought of underground Poland during World War II". Review of Nationalities 7, n.º 1 (1 de dezembro de 2017): 67–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pn-2017-0003.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Abstract After the German invasion in 1941, the USSR declared to be the defender of the Slavic nations occupied by Germany. It did not defend their allies, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, against the Germans in the 1938-1941. In alliance with Germans it attacked Poland in 1939. Soviets used the Slavic idea to organize armed resistance in occupied nations. After the war, the Soviet Union intended to make them politically and militarily dependent. The Polish government rejected participation in the Soviet Slavic bloc. In the Polish political emigration and in the occupied country the Slavic idea was really popular, but as an anti-Soviet idea. Poland not the Soviet Union was expected to become the head of Slavic countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe.
41
Melkonyan, Ashot A., Karen H. Khachatryan e Igor V. Kryuchkov. "Проблемы советского национально-государственного строительства (историко-критический анализ на примере Армении)". Oriental studies 16, n.º 2 (1 de junho de 2023): 340–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.22162/2619-0990-2023-66-2-340-352.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Introduction. Throughout the shaping of the Soviets, the Armenian nation passed its historical way of development as a union member and grew to be administratively represented by two Soviet Armenian ethnic entities — the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ranked a union republic) and Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (a territory within the Azerbaijan SSR). The First Republic was established in late May 1918 to be replaced by the Second Republic, or Soviet Armenia, in early December 1920. In 1920–1922, the latter was officially referred to as ‘independent Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia’, and then as a territory within the Transcaucasian Soviet Federation (1922–1936) and the Soviet Union (1936–1991). After Transcaucasian Federation was abolished in 1936, Soviet Armenia was incorporated into the USSR as a self-sufficient union republic under the name Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. Goals. The study seeks to show the process of nation-state building in the USSR through the example of Armenia. Materials and methods. The article analyzes archival materials represented by official documents and acts dealing with Soviet nation-state building, as well as collections of laws and party decrees. The main research methods employed are the historical/comparative and historical/genetic ones. Results. Soviet Armenia within the USSR, as well as other Soviet republics and autonomies, was no independent state in the conventional sense, but at the same time it was endowed with many attributes and symbols of statehood. Finally, it was Soviet Armenia that — for first time in the history of Armenian statehood — obtained its own Constitution. Conclusions. Soviet Armenia was a nation in the unified Soviet state, and in the conditions of seven decades of unlimited power of the Communist Party preserved and developed the Armenian Soviet statehood to a maximum possible then and there. Most Armenian historians believe the present-day independent Third Republic would never have emerged (since 1991) but for the period of Soviet Armenia.
42
BRIDGES, BRIAN. "‘An Ambiguous Area’: Mongolia in Soviet-Japanese relations in the mid-1930s". Modern Asian Studies 54, n.º 3 (6 de agosto de 2019): 730–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0026749x1800015x.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractThe Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) became the focus of intense competition between the Soviet Union and Japan in the 1930s, when it was more commonly known as Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Union viewed the MPR as an ideological and strategic ally, and was determined to defend that state against the increasingly adventurist actions of the Japanese military based in northern China. Japanese ambitions to solve the so-called ‘Manmo’ (Manchuria-Mongolia) problem led the Soviets to initiate ever-closer links with the MPR, culminating in the 1936 pact of mutual assistance which was intended to constrain Japanese pressure. Using unpublished Japanese materials as well as Russian and Mongolian sources, this article demonstrates how the Soviet leadership increasingly viewed the MPR as strategically crucial to the defence of the Soviet Far East.
43
Shearman, Peter. "Big brother: the Soviet Union and Soviet Europe". International Affairs 64, n.º 2 (1988): 300. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2621896.
Texto completo da fonte
44
Campbell, John C., e Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. "Big Brother: The Soviet Union and Soviet Europe". Foreign Affairs 66, n.º 4 (1988): 884. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20043537.
Texto completo da fonte
45
Greenfeld, Liah. "Soviet Sociology and Sociology in the Soviet Union". Annual Review of Sociology 14, n.º 1 (agosto de 1988): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.so.14.080188.000531.
Texto completo da fonte
46
Lewis, Paul G. "Big brother: the Soviet Union and Soviet Europe". Studies in Comparative Communism 23, n.º 1 (março de 1990): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0039-3592(90)90063-r.
Texto completo da fonte
47
Alexeev, Michael, Clifford Gaddy e Jim Leitzel. "Economics in the Former Soviet Union". Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, n.º 2 (1 de maio de 1992): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.6.2.137.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
One of the most notable, but least discussed, aspects of the halting attempts during the past six years to reform the economies of the Soviet Union, and now those of its successor states, has been the prominent role played by professional economists. Not since the mid-1920s has the Soviet political leadership felt so strongly the need to draw upon the expertise of the economics profession to help determine its course of action. In this paper, we attempt to characterize the current state of economics in the former Soviet Union, investigate the implications that the condition of Soviet economics has for reform, and suggest possible future directions for the discipline. Our information comes from four main sources: professional publications of Soviet and Western economists, published remarks by Soviet economists, personal interviews and discussions which we conducted with young Soviet economists in the summers of 1990 and 1991, and a questionnaire administered to Soviet economists and graduate students in the Soviet Union.
48
Shafer, Susanne M. "Exit the Soviet Union, Expand the European Union". European Education 29, n.º 3 (outubro de 1997): 3–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/eue1056-493429033.
Texto completo da fonte
49
Cohen, Stephen F. "Was the Soviet System Reformable?" Slavic Review 63, n.º 3 (2004): 459–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1520337.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Stephen F. Cohen presents a critical analysis of the prevailing view that Mikhail Gorbachev's six-year attempt to transform the Soviet Union along democratic and market lines proved that the system was, as most specialists had always believed, unreformable. Ideological, conceptual, and historical assumptions underlying the nonreformability thesis are reexamined and found wanting, as are the ways in which generalizations about “the system” and “reform” are usually formulated. Cohen then asks how each of the system's basic components—the official ideology, the Communist Party and its dictatorship, the nationwide network of Soviets, the monopolistic state economy, and the union of republics—actually responded to Gorbachev's policies. Citing developments from 1985 to 1991, Cohen argues that all of those components, and thus the system itself, turned out to be remarkably reformable. If so, he concludes, most explanations of the end of the Soviet Union, which rely in one way or another on the unreformability thesis, are also open to serious question.Five distinguished scholars respond to Cohen's article.
50
Wiedlack, Katharina. "A feminist becoming? Louise Thompson Patterson’s and Dorothy West’s sojourn in the Soviet Union". Feminismo/s, n.º 36 (3 de dezembro de 2020): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.14198/fem.2020.36.05.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This article follows the socialist activist Louise Thompson (later Patterson) and the writer Dorothy West on their infamous journey to Soviet Russia to shoot a film about North American anti-Black racism in 1932. The film about the US history of racial oppression was ultimately never made, but the women stayed in the Soviet Union for several months, travelling to the Soviet republics, meeting famous Soviets, and experiencing Soviet modernization. Looking at the travel writings, correspondence, and memoirs of Thompson and West through the lens of intersectionality, this article analyses the women’s distinctly gendered experiences and their experience of socialist women’s liberation movements. It argues that a close reading of the literary writing, travel notes, letters, and memoirs and their biographical trajectories after they returned to the United States reveals how their experiences in the Soviet Union created a feminist consciousness within the two women that crucially altered their political and personal views of Black women’s agency and significantly altered their life trajectories.