Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Southern-European immigrants"

This article contributes to the literature on the models of immigrants’ labour market incorporation in Western Europe by analysing the employment returns to tertiary education for both natives and immigrants. By using yearly EU-LFS data (2005–2013) for a selection of Western European countries, cross-country differences in the employment returns to tertiary education are analysed separately by immigrant status and gender. In Continental Europe, where immigrant-native employment gaps before the crisis were much larger than in Southern Europe, immigrants are found to benefit more from tertiary education, and their returns are also higher than for natives, while the opposite holds in Southern European countries. The same pattern is found irrespective of gender, but cross-country differences are more pronounced among women. The article also documents that the crisis contributed to a cross-country convergence, although limited to men, in the degree of immigrant employment disadvantage, which increased substantially in Southern Europe while remaining unchanged or slightly declining in all other countries. Nevertheless, although immigrant-native employment gaps grew as high as in Continental Europe, immigrant men in Southern Europe are still found to benefit from lower returns to tertiary education than their native counterparts.

We systematically reviewed the peer-reviewed literature to establish the prevalence of cardiovascular disease (CVD) among immigrants in Australia and whether being an immigrant is a CVD risk factor. Of 23 studies identified, 12 were included. Higher prevalence of CVD was found among Middle Eastern, South Asian and some European immigrants. Higher prevalence of CVD risk factors was found among Middle Eastern and Southern European immigrants. Higher alcohol consumption was found among immigrants from New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Ireland. Smoking and physical inactivity were highly prevalent among most immigrants.

Integration is a two-way process depending on host countries, and the immigrants. Immigrants' successful integration in the host countries is an important issue bringing benefits for both immigrants and the host countries. Immigrants receiving countries' migration policies, actions, and peoples' perception towards accepting foreign citizens is an essential factor in the successful integration process. However, the integration process in a specific geographical region, such as Europe, also differs from one country to another. The integration process depends on the socioeconomic position, and development of the host and home countries. It also depends on the types of migration, migrants' status, etc. Therefore, this study tries to investigate and explain the typology and socioeconomic characteristics of European immigrant receiving countries regarding integration policies. It discusses the relationship between Human Development Index, Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index, Social Progress Index, Gross National Income, Internet users % of the population, Ranking of Happiness, Happiness Ranking for the Foreign-Born, KOF Globalization index, and Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX). This study uses a descriptive-analytical method, to show the socioeconomic characteristics of European immigrant-receiving countries. To show the strength of the relationship between the indexes, the study used pairwise correlation analysis (sig. level, 0.01). The main results of the study show that Northern and Western European countries have more favorable integration policies for immigrants than Southern and Eastern European countries. Moreover, there is a mutual positive interrelationship between all the indexes. The happier the citizens of the host countries are, the happier the immigrants are and the more favorable the integration policies are for immigrants.

This article uses census microdata to address key issues in the Mexican immigration debate. First, we find striking parallels in the experiences of older and newer immigrant groups with substantial progress among second- and subsequent-generation immigrants from southern and eastern Europe and Mexican Americans. Second, we contradict a view of immigrant history that contends that early–twentieth–century immigrants from southern and eastern Europe found well–paying jobs in manufacturing that facilitated their ascent into the middle class. Both first and second generations remained predominantly working class until after World War II. Third, the erosion of the institutions that advanced earlier immigrant generations is harming the prospects of Mexican Americans. Fourth, the mobility experience of earlier immigrants and of Mexicans and Mexican Americans differed by gender, with a gender gap opening among Mexican Americans as women pioneered the path to white–collar and professional work. Fifth, public–sector and publicly funded employment has proved crucial to upward mobility, especially among women. The reliance on public employment, as contrasted to entrepreneurship, has been one factor setting the Mexican and African American experience apart from the economic history of most southern and eastern European groups as well as from the experiences of some other immigrant groups today.

Contract Labor played a critical role both in financing European trans-Atlantic migration and in providing a hirable labor force to work the estates of the New World. During the seventeenth century at least three-quarters of the Chesapeake colonists arrived under some form of short term contract (Walsh, 1977: 111). By the American Revolution, a majority of English, German, and southern Irish emigrants still used servant contracts to finance their migration to Pennsylvania (Grubb, 1985). For the year 1773, 61% of the 387 southern Irish immigrants, 18% of the 1,420 Ulster immigrants, 25% of the 382 Scotch immigrants, and 52% of the 174 English immigrants to Pennsylvania entered servitude. For the years 1771–1773, out of 747 German adult male immigrants to Pennsylvania 58% entered servitude. For 1785–1804, 45% of the 7,837 German immigrants to Pennsylvania entered servitude.

In May of 1896, Richard Bartholdt, a Republican from Missouri and a German immigrant, stood on the floor of the House of Representatives and introduced a bill that would set off months of debate in the Fifty-Fourth Congress. The bill was H.R. 7864, which required all male immigrants between the ages of sixteen and sixty to prove they were literate in either English or some other language. While congressmen on all sides of the issue made passionate arguments for and against this bill, they nevertheless found some areas of agreement. The supporters and opponents of restriction all regarded southern and eastern European immigrants as racially different than those of northwestern European descent. Further, all congressmen understood the purpose of the bill to be as much about improving the United States citizenry racially as intellectually. Richard Bartholdt clearly stated the racial reasoning behind the literacy test when he introduced the bill to the House.

Immigration policies in Italy and Spain — even the restrictive policies put in place over the last several years — emphasise the importance of immigrant ‘integration'. At the same time, immigrants are welcome largely on the grounds that they fill important niches in the labour market, such as low-end jobs in construction, agriculture, and domestic service, that locals shun. This article explores the relationship between immigrants’ economic function in this southern flank of the European fortress, and their ability to integrate into the host society. Specifically, it argues that it is immigrants’ ‘otherness’ that is their calling card — their passport — in these new countries of immigration, and that their full integration into Spanish and Italian societies presumably would spell an end to their utility as ‘others'. Further, it documents the difficulties of integrating those who are legally and economically marginalised and for whom that marginality is seen as their chief virtue. The author makes comparisons with ‘Americanisation’ programmes in industrialising America and suggests that in both cases, the contradiction between the cheap labour of immigrants and the need to integrate them helps explain both the motivation for integration efforts and their complications.

In several Western European countries, a significant share of social rental housing stock has been sold since the 1980s as part of government policies aimed at promoting homeownership societies. Research has shown that tenure conversion has contributed to increasing socio-spatial segregation of lower-income groups, with diverging spatial patterns of homeownership among immigrants. This paper examines the impact of recent public housing privatization schemes in Milan in relation to micro-segregation and peripheralization processes of foreign populations, which represent distinctive features of immigrant residential distribution in this city. By employing name analysis, an unconventional approach in segregation studies, I inferred the geographical origins of homebuyers and mapped their distribution across the city. The findings reveal divergent purchasing behaviors, whereby Italians predominantly acquire properties in semi-central areas currently undergoing urban regeneration. In contrast, immigrants tend to concentrate their acquisitions in peripheral post-war public housing neighborhoods or in areas predominantly inhabited by residents with similar geographical origins. This paper contributes to the existing literature on ethnic residential segregation in Southern European cities by shedding light on the underexplored role of public housing privatization policies in shaping specific residential patterns and housing outcomes among different groups.

Immigrants’ access to housing is often the outcome of self-settlement practices within a context of limited social policies that often characterizes Southern European metropolises. Hence, immigrants are facing multiple constraints and remain vulnerable towards diverse socioeconomic fluctuations. This article focuses on the housing practices followed by Albanian immigrants, the largest immigrant group in Athens’s municipality, to examine how spatial inequalities are intertwined with ethnicity in the Greek capital. The objective is twofold: to discuss ethnic segregation on the micro-scale of Athenian central neighborhoods and examine how immigrants’ housing practices are being challenged within a rapidly changing socio-spatial context. The methodology follows a mixed approach, aiming at identifying differentiations and inequalities both on the macro- and micro-spatial scale. First, differentiations among Greeks, Albanians, and other third-country nationals in Athens (2011) are traced and compared, based on quantitative data. Second, for the purpose of highlighting micro-geographies in the city, this article presents an analysis of collected narratives of Albanian immigrants, through semi-structured interviews held in 2023. The main results indicate that the population under study finds itself in an “in-between” socio-spatial condition: an “in-between”, compared to the housing experiences of Greek households and other third-country nationals, that produces (and reproduces) segregation trends visible on the micro-scale. Moreover, this article attempts to highlight how the lack of housing policies put in peril the successful self-settlement practices of Albanian immigrants, in the current context of financialization of the Athenian housing market.

This chapter surveys the “neighborhood” music of Detroit’s many subcultures in a city based on massive migration for auto industry work: European immigrants (including Polish, Armenian, Greek, Croatian, and others); southern white immigrants, with a focus on country music; and African Americans from the South, bringing jazz, blues, church, and other community musical expressions. Details include the networks and institutions each community built in Detroit, with regional and national connections.

In the late nineteenth century, Italians and Eastern European Jews joined millions of migrants around the globe who left their countries to take advantage of the demand for unskilled labor in rapidly industrializing nations, including the United States. Many Americans of northern and western European ancestry regarded these newcomers as biologically and culturally inferior--unassimilable--and by 1924, the United States had instituted national origins quotas to curtail immigration from southern and eastern Europe. Weaving together political, social, and transnational history, Maddalena Marinari examines how, from 1882 to 1965, Italian and Jewish reformers profoundly influenced the country’s immigration policy as they mobilized against the immigration laws that marked them as undesirable. Strategic alliances among restrictionist legislators in Congress, a climate of anti-immigrant hysteria, and a fickle executive branch often left these immigrants with few options except to negotiate and accept political compromises. As they tested the limits of citizenship and citizen activism, however, the actors at the heart of Marinari’s story shaped the terms of debate around immigration in the United States in ways we still reckon with today.

Lattimer, Pennsylvania, is the location for one of labor’s forgotten massacres, a result of the xenophobic fears prevalent during the turn of the twentieth century. On September 10, 1897, about four hundred strikers of eastern and southern European descent marched to close the Lattimer colliery. Without warning, the men were fired upon by the local sheriff and his posse. The shooters stood trial for the killing of the protestors and were acquitted. Though Lattimer is one of the largest tragedies in U.S. labor history, a type of amnesia attached to the event, and the massacre has been largely forgotten in the national public memory. Many attempts to memorialize the Lattimer massacre failed, as labor and capital struggled to control memory of the event. Eventually, in 1972, the town erected a monument at the site. While Lattimer is a lesson about past labor and immigration practices, it is also about the ways in which contemporary communities perceive and deal with new immigrants. Today, northeastern Pennsylvania has experienced a new influx of immigrants from Latin America. Many belonging to the established local population are treating the new immigrants with the same prejudices and distain their own ancestors received several generations ago. Though local reaction to the immigrants reflects the larger national dialogue on immigration, there are those who struggle to change the anti-immigration rhetoric.

The book combines memoir, interview, and archival sources to survey the musical life of the author’s hometown, Detroit, in his youth during the city’s heyday, 1940s–1960s. After an opening chapter on the formation of personal musical identity, the focus shifts to the formative role of the public school system in educating and shaping the careers of waves of highly talented youth, many of whom became leading figures in African American and classical music nationally. Next comes a panorama of the “neighborhood” subcultural musics of European, southern white, and southern black immigrants to Detroit, followed up by a close-up of the Jewish community’s special case. “Merging Traffic” considers the way that industry, labor, the counterculture, Motown, and the media brought many streams of music together. A final retrospective chapter cites the work of Detroit writers and artists who, like the author, have been looking back at the city’s impact on their work. This is the first-ever comprehensive survey of the musical life of any American city in a given time period.

Nationalism: Past as Prologue began as a single volume being compiled by Ad Akande, a scholar from South Africa, who proposed it to me as co-author about two years ago. The original idea was to examine how the damaging roots of nationalism have been corroding political systems around the world, and creating dangerous obstacles for necessary international cooperation. Since I (Bruce E. Johansen) has written profusely about climate change (global warming, a.k.a. infrared forcing), I suggested a concerted effort in that direction. This is a worldwide existential threat that affects every living thing on Earth. It often compounds upon itself, so delays in reducing emissions of fossil fuels are shortening the amount of time remaining to eliminate the use of fossil fuels to preserve a livable planet. Nationalism often impedes solutions to this problem (among many others), as nations place their singular needs above the common good. Our initial proposal got around, and abstracts on many subjects arrived. Within a few weeks, we had enough good material for a 100,000-word book. The book then fattened to two moderate volumes and then to four two very hefty tomes. We tried several different titles as good submissions swelled. We also discovered that our best contributors were experts in their fields, which ranged the world. We settled on three stand-alone books:” 1/ nationalism and racial justice. Our first volume grew as the growth of Black Lives Matter following the brutal killing of George Floyd ignited protests over police brutality and other issues during 2020, following the police assassination of Floyd in Minneapolis. It is estimated that more people took part in protests of police brutality during the summer of 2020 than any other series of marches in United States history. This includes upheavals during the 1960s over racial issues and against the war in Southeast Asia (notably Vietnam). We choose a volume on racism because it is one of nationalism’s main motive forces. This volume provides a worldwide array of work on nationalism’s growth in various countries, usually by authors residing in them, or in the United States with ethnic ties to the nation being examined, often recent immigrants to the United States from them. Our roster of contributors comprises a small United Nations of insightful, well-written research and commentary from Indonesia, New Zealand, Australia, China, India, South Africa, France, Portugal, Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Poland, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the United States. Volume 2 (this one) describes and analyzes nationalism, by country, around the world, except for the United States; and 3/material directly related to President Donald Trump, and the United States. The first volume is under consideration at the Texas A & M University Press. The other two are under contract to Nova Science Publishers (which includes social sciences). These three volumes may be used individually or as a set. Environmental material is taken up in appropriate places in each of the three books. * * * * * What became the United States of America has been strongly nationalist since the English of present-day Massachusetts and Jamestown first hit North America’s eastern shores. The country propelled itself across North America with the self-serving ideology of “manifest destiny” for four centuries before Donald Trump came along. Anyone who believes that a Trumpian affection for deportation of “illegals” is a new thing ought to take a look at immigration and deportation statistics in Adam Goodman’s The Deportation Machine: America’s Long History of Deporting Immigrants (Princeton University Press, 2020). Between 1920 and 2018, the United States deported 56.3 million people, compared with 51.7 million who were granted legal immigration status during the same dates. Nearly nine of ten deportees were Mexican (Nolan, 2020, 83). This kind of nationalism, has become an assassin of democracy as well as an impediment to solving global problems. Paul Krugman wrote in the New York Times (2019:A-25): that “In their 2018 book, How Democracies Die, the political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt documented how this process has played out in many countries, from Vladimir Putin’s Russia, to Recep Erdogan’s Turkey, to Viktor Orban’s Hungary. Add to these India’s Narendra Modi, China’s Xi Jinping, and the United States’ Donald Trump, among others. Bit by bit, the guardrails of democracy have been torn down, as institutions meant to serve the public became tools of ruling parties and self-serving ideologies, weaponized to punish and intimidate opposition parties’ opponents. On paper, these countries are still democracies; in practice, they have become one-party regimes….And it’s happening here [the United States] as we speak. If you are not worried about the future of American democracy, you aren’t paying attention” (Krugmam, 2019, A-25). We are reminded continuously that the late Carl Sagan, one of our most insightful scientific public intellectuals, had an interesting theory about highly developed civilizations. Given the number of stars and planets that must exist in the vast reaches of the universe, he said, there must be other highly developed and organized forms of life. Distance may keep us from making physical contact, but Sagan said that another reason we may never be on speaking terms with another intelligent race is (judging from our own example) could be their penchant for destroying themselves in relatively short order after reaching technological complexity. This book’s chapters, introduction, and conclusion examine the worldwide rise of partisan nationalism and the damage it has wrought on the worldwide pursuit of solutions for issues requiring worldwide scope, such scientific co-operation public health and others, mixing analysis of both. We use both historical description and analysis. This analysis concludes with a description of why we must avoid the isolating nature of nationalism that isolates people and encourages separation if we are to deal with issues of world-wide concern, and to maintain a sustainable, survivable Earth, placing the dominant political movement of our time against the Earth’s existential crises. Our contributors, all experts in their fields, each have assumed responsibility for a country, or two if they are related. This work entwines themes of worldwide concern with the political growth of nationalism because leaders with such a worldview are disinclined to co-operate internationally at a time when nations must find ways to solve common problems, such as the climate crisis. Inability to cooperate at this stage may doom everyone, eventually, to an overheated, stormy future plagued by droughts and deluges portending shortages of food and other essential commodities, meanwhile destroying large coastal urban areas because of rising sea levels. Future historians may look back at our time and wonder why as well as how our world succumbed to isolating nationalism at a time when time was so short for cooperative intervention which is crucial for survival of a sustainable earth. Pride in language and culture is salubrious to individuals’ sense of history and identity. Excess nationalism that prevents international co-operation on harmful worldwide maladies is quite another. As Pope Francis has pointed out: For all of our connectivity due to expansion of social media, ability to communicate can breed contempt as well as mutual trust. “For all our hyper-connectivity,” said Francis, “We witnessed a fragmentation that made it more difficult to resolve problems that affect us all” (Horowitz, 2020, A-12). The pope’s encyclical, titled “Brothers All,” also said: “The forces of myopic, extremist, resentful, and aggressive nationalism are on the rise.” The pope’s document also advocates support for migrants, as well as resistance to nationalist and tribal populism. Francis broadened his critique to the role of market capitalism, as well as nationalism has failed the peoples of the world when they need co-operation and solidarity in the face of the world-wide corona virus pandemic. Humankind needs to unite into “a new sense of the human family [Fratelli Tutti, “Brothers All”], that rejects war at all costs” (Pope, 2020, 6-A). Our journey takes us first to Russia, with the able eye and honed expertise of Richard D. Anderson, Jr. who teaches as UCLA and publishes on the subject of his chapter: “Putin, Russian identity, and Russia’s conduct at home and abroad.” Readers should find Dr. Anderson’s analysis fascinating because Vladimir Putin, the singular leader of Russian foreign and domestic policy these days (and perhaps for the rest of his life, given how malleable Russia’s Constitution has become) may be a short man physically, but has high ambitions. One of these involves restoring the old Russian (and Soviet) empire, which would involve re-subjugating a number of nations that broke off as the old order dissolved about 30 years ago. President (shall we say czar?) Putin also has international ambitions, notably by destabilizing the United States, where election meddling has become a specialty. The sight of Putin and U.S. president Donald Trump, two very rich men (Putin $70-$200 billion; Trump $2.5 billion), nuzzling in friendship would probably set Thomas Jefferson and Vladimir Lenin spinning in their graves. The road of history can take some unanticipated twists and turns. Consider Poland, from which we have an expert native analysis in chapter 2, Bartosz Hlebowicz, who is a Polish anthropologist and journalist. His piece is titled “Lawless and Unjust: How to Quickly Make Your Own Country a Puppet State Run by a Group of Hoodlums – the Hopeless Case of Poland (2015–2020).” When I visited Poland to teach and lecture twice between 2006 and 2008, most people seemed to be walking on air induced by freedom to conduct their own affairs to an unusual degree for a state usually squeezed between nationalists in Germany and Russia. What did the Poles then do in a couple of decades? Read Hlebowicz’ chapter and decide. It certainly isn’t soft-bellied liberalism. In Chapter 3, with Bruce E. Johansen, we visit China’s western provinces, the lands of Tibet as well as the Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang region, who would most assuredly resent being characterized as being possessed by the Chinese of the Han to the east. As a student of Native American history, I had never before thought of the Tibetans and Uighurs as Native peoples struggling against the Independence-minded peoples of a land that is called an adjunct of China on most of our maps. The random act of sitting next to a young woman on an Air India flight out of Hyderabad, bound for New Delhi taught me that the Tibetans had something to share with the Lakota, the Iroquois, and hundreds of other Native American states and nations in North America. Active resistance to Chinese rule lasted into the mid-nineteenth century, and continues today in a subversive manner, even in song, as I learned in 2018 when I acted as a foreign adjudicator on a Ph.D. dissertation by a Tibetan student at the University of Madras (in what is now in a city called Chennai), in southwestern India on resistance in song during Tibet’s recent history. Tibet is one of very few places on Earth where a young dissident can get shot to death for singing a song that troubles China’s Quest for Lebensraum. The situation in Xinjiang region, where close to a million Muslims have been interned in “reeducation” camps surrounded with brick walls and barbed wire. They sing, too. Come with us and hear the music. Back to Europe now, in Chapter 4, to Portugal and Spain, we find a break in the general pattern of nationalism. Portugal has been more progressive governmentally than most. Spain varies from a liberal majority to military coups, a pattern which has been exported to Latin America. A situation such as this can make use of the term “populism” problematic, because general usage in our time usually ties the word into a right-wing connotative straightjacket. “Populism” can be used to describe progressive (left-wing) insurgencies as well. José Pinto, who is native to Portugal and also researches and writes in Spanish as well as English, in “Populism in Portugal and Spain: a Real Neighbourhood?” provides insight into these historical paradoxes. Hungary shares some historical inclinations with Poland (above). Both emerged from Soviet dominance in an air of developing freedom and multicultural diversity after the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. Then, gradually at first, right wing-forces began to tighten up, stripping structures supporting popular freedom, from the courts, mass media, and other institutions. In Chapter 5, Bernard Tamas, in “From Youth Movement to Right-Liberal Wing Authoritarianism: The Rise of Fidesz and the Decline of Hungarian Democracy” puts the renewed growth of political and social repression into a context of worldwide nationalism. Tamas, an associate professor of political science at Valdosta State University, has been a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University and a Fulbright scholar at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. His books include From Dissident to Party Politics: The Struggle for Democracy in Post-Communist Hungary (2007). Bear in mind that not everyone shares Orbán’s vision of what will make this nation great, again. On graffiti-covered walls in Budapest, Runes (traditional Hungarian script) has been found that read “Orbán is a motherfucker” (Mikanowski, 2019, 58). Also in Europe, in Chapter 6, Professor Ronan Le Coadic, of the University of Rennes, Rennes, France, in “Is There a Revival of French Nationalism?” Stating this title in the form of a question is quite appropriate because France’s nationalistic shift has built and ebbed several times during the last few decades. For a time after 2000, it came close to assuming the role of a substantial minority, only to ebb after that. In 2017, the candidate of the National Front reached the second round of the French presidential election. This was the second time this nationalist party reached the second round of the presidential election in the history of the Fifth Republic. In 2002, however, Jean-Marie Le Pen had only obtained 17.79% of the votes, while fifteen years later his daughter, Marine Le Pen, almost doubled her father's record, reaching 33.90% of the votes cast. Moreover, in the 2019 European elections, re-named Rassemblement National obtained the largest number of votes of all French political formations and can therefore boast of being "the leading party in France.” The brutality of oppressive nationalism may be expressed in personal relationships, such as child abuse. While Indonesia and Aotearoa [the Maoris’ name for New Zealand] hold very different ranks in the United Nations Human Development Programme assessments, where Indonesia is classified as a medium development country and Aotearoa New Zealand as a very high development country. In Chapter 7, “Domestic Violence Against Women in Indonesia and Aotearoa New Zealand: Making Sense of Differences and Similarities” co-authors, in Chapter 8, Mandy Morgan and Dr. Elli N. Hayati, from New Zealand and Indonesia respectively, found that despite their socio-economic differences, one in three women in each country experience physical or sexual intimate partner violence over their lifetime. In this chapter ther authors aim to deepen understandings of domestic violence through discussion of the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of theit countries to address domestic violence alongside studies of women’s attitudes to gender norms and experiences of intimate partner violence. One of the most surprising and upsetting scholarly journeys that a North American student may take involves Adolf Hitler’s comments on oppression of American Indians and Blacks as he imagined the construction of the Nazi state, a genesis of nationalism that is all but unknown in the United States of America, traced in this volume (Chapter 8) by co-editor Johansen. Beginning in Mein Kampf, during the 1920s, Hitler explicitly used the westward expansion of the United States across North America as a model and justification for Nazi conquest and anticipated colonization by Germans of what the Nazis called the “wild East” – the Slavic nations of Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Russia, most of which were under control of the Soviet Union. The Volga River (in Russia) was styled by Hitler as the Germans’ Mississippi, and covered wagons were readied for the German “manifest destiny” of imprisoning, eradicating, and replacing peoples the Nazis deemed inferior, all with direct references to events in North America during the previous century. At the same time, with no sense of contradiction, the Nazis partook of a long-standing German romanticism of Native Americans. One of Goebbels’ less propitious schemes was to confer honorary Aryan status on Native American tribes, in the hope that they would rise up against their oppressors. U.S. racial attitudes were “evidence [to the Nazis] that America was evolving in the right direction, despite its specious rhetoric about equality.” Ming Xie, originally from Beijing, in the People’s Republic of China, in Chapter 9, “News Coverage and Public Perceptions of the Social Credit System in China,” writes that The State Council of China in 2014 announced “that a nationwide social credit system would be established” in China. “Under this system, individuals, private companies, social organizations, and governmental agencies are assigned a score which will be calculated based on their trustworthiness and daily actions such as transaction history, professional conduct, obedience to law, corruption, tax evasion, and academic plagiarism.” The “nationalism” in this case is that of the state over the individual. China has 1.4 billion people; this system takes their measure for the purpose of state control. Once fully operational, control will be more subtle. People who are subject to it, through modern technology (most often smart phones) will prompt many people to self-censor. Orwell, modernized, might write: “Your smart phone is watching you.” Ming Xie holds two Ph.Ds, one in Public Administration from University of Nebraska at Omaha and another in Cultural Anthropology from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, where she also worked for more than 10 years at a national think tank in the same institution. While there she summarized news from non-Chinese sources for senior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Ming is presently an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice, West Texas A&M University. In Chapter 10, analyzing native peoples and nationhood, Barbara Alice Mann, Professor of Honours at the University of Toledo, in “Divide, et Impera: The Self-Genocide Game” details ways in which European-American invaders deprive the conquered of their sense of nationhood as part of a subjugation system that amounts to genocide, rubbing out their languages and cultures -- and ultimately forcing the native peoples to assimilate on their own, for survival in a culture that is foreign to them. Mann is one of Native American Studies’ most acute critics of conquests’ contradictions, and an author who retrieves Native history with a powerful sense of voice and purpose, having authored roughly a dozen books and numerous book chapters, among many other works, who has traveled around the world lecturing and publishing on many subjects. Nalanda Roy and S. Mae Pedron in Chapter 11, “Understanding the Face of Humanity: The Rohingya Genocide.” describe one of the largest forced migrations in the history of the human race, the removal of 700,000 to 800,000 Muslims from Buddhist Myanmar to Bangladesh, which itself is already one of the most crowded and impoverished nations on Earth. With about 150 million people packed into an area the size of Nebraska and Iowa (population less than a tenth that of Bangladesh, a country that is losing land steadily to rising sea levels and erosion of the Ganges river delta. The Rohingyas’ refugee camp has been squeezed onto a gigantic, eroding, muddy slope that contains nearly no vegetation. However, Bangladesh is majority Muslim, so while the Rohingya may starve, they won’t be shot to death by marauding armies. Both authors of this exquisite (and excruciating) account teach at Georgia Southern University in Savannah, Georgia, Roy as an associate professor of International Studies and Asian politics, and Pedron as a graduate student; Roy originally hails from very eastern India, close to both Myanmar and Bangladesh, so he has special insight into the context of one of the most brutal genocides of our time, or any other. This is our case describing the problems that nationalism has and will pose for the sustainability of the Earth as our little blue-and-green orb becomes more crowded over time. The old ways, in which national arguments often end in devastating wars, are obsolete, given that the Earth and all the people, plants, and other animals that it sustains are faced with the existential threat of a climate crisis that within two centuries, more or less, will flood large parts of coastal cities, and endanger many species of plants and animals. To survive, we must listen to the Earth, and observe her travails, because they are increasingly our own.

AbstractA common perspective in migration studies is that of a North-South divide in European labour migration governance, with Southern European countries exhibiting a distinct – and generally less efficient – approach to the admission of migrants. Southern European states are known for their use of quotas, regularisations and the lack of emphasis on attracting highly skilled labour immigrants from outside of the European Union (EU). This chapter explores Italian labour immigration policy to assess whether its admission policy and practice has traditionally diverged from the Northern European approach and, if this has been the case, whether it has remained dissimilar since the disruption of the international financial crisis of 2008. I find similarities and differences between the Italian regime and labour immigration regimes in Northern Europe between the late 1990s and 2008. While the regulatory instruments (apart from general numerical limits on labour immigration) were like those used in Northern Europe, the Italian system was more open to permanent low and medium skilled labour immigration from outside the EU and had a more significant gap between its façade (laws) and practice than its neighbours in the North. The similarities with Northern European regimes have increased since 2008, as the system has become more selective, emphasising seasonal and occupational/sectoral permits, along with a stronger reliance on free movement and non-economic forms of immigration.

AbstractThe idea that most immigrant receiving countries face a crisis of control has become pervasive since the 1990s, when neoliberal globalisation, as well as securitarian and nationalist policies, gained space. Due to the several contradictions and inefficiencies of the global circulation framework, most countries are exposed to uncontrolled migration, including the North and South European ones. The challenge is stronger when borders separate regions with uneven development levels and the economic cycle is expanding. When irregular migration occurs, the basic ex-post policy choices are limited to ignore the problem, enact deportation strategies or create mechanisms for regularisation.In Southern European countries, irregular immigration became endemic. Until the mid-2000s, the most frequent policy approach adopted in these migration regimes was the enactment of extraordinary regularisation processes. Since then, some nations adopted an ongoing regularisation model. Using Portugal as a reference, we intend to examine how such processes were implemented and why they have been enacted. Because the features of the Portuguese case share elements with other countries, some comparative analysis is developed and positioned at the global European level, to evaluate the convergence or divergence hypothesis and the blurring of migration regimes’ boundaries.

AbstractThe main objective of this book has been to understand migration controls beyond national models and dichotomies that juxtapose “efficient” versus “inefficient” state policies. Specifically, this volume contributes to dispute some consolidated ideas about using the North-South divide as the main lens to interpret how European countries respond to common imperatives of control on the entry and residence of immigrants. In doing so, we argue that migration control policies and their results can be conceived of as a product of overlapping processes of convergence and divergence, driven by changing external contexts, different geopolitical and economic interests, and varying national constraints, all of which are engaged by a wide range of social actors.In the first part of this chapter, we focus on convergence dynamics by illustrating the increasing similarities between Northern and Southern European countries. Then, we point out some key drivers of this convergence. Drawing on previous chapters, we find this convergence appears mainly related to shifts in external constraints in the form of increasingly similar migration inflows and Europeanisation processes.The second part of the chapter focuses on divergence, addressing the relevance of nation-states’ geopolitical and economic interests in the European migration system and their institutional and structural constraints as crucial determinants of the logics and practices of migration control.

AbstractThis chapter addresses the use of regularisations and ex-post regulation measures as an instrument to produce knowledge on social problems. Regularisations, more than other migration regulation tools, were addressed to highlight the “efficacy gap” existing between Northern and Southern European control regimes and were the object of several confrontations between Northern and Southern European Member States. Especially in times of migration crises, the use of regularisations seemed to strengthen the stereotype on “weak” Southern European migration regimes, in which chaotic and unplanned regulation mechanisms dominate. Yet, in this chapter it is argued that the function of regularisations should be assessed beyond the dichotomic distinction between “weak” and “strong” migration control regimes in Southern and Northern Europe. Regularisations and ex-post regulation strategies should rather be observed as an instrument to overcome weak internal controls and to produce knowledge on the presence of irregular migrants. To this end, the Italian and German immigration regimes will be used as comparative examples since they represent two opposed migration patterns in Europe with opposed approaches to unauthorised residence. The aim of the comparison is not only to discuss how very different migration regimes produce knowledge on unauthorised residence on their territory, but also to highlight the importance of these measures for the stabilisation of precarious immigrant populations.

This chapter cites that Europeans who migrated to the United States had the goal of securing industrial jobs in the rapidly growing Northeastern and Midwestern urban centers between 1871 and 1910. It talks about the sheer magnitude of the transatlantic wave that triggered a debate over who was a desirable and, more importantly, who was an undesirable immigrant. It also refers to the large number of immigrants that came from East Central and Southern Europe. The chapter mentions how several citizens perceived the European immigrants that settled in urban areas to be a threat to American cities and, by extension, to the American nation. It discusses the European settlement and its relationship to poverty spreading in urban industrial centers that became a key point in the intense debate over the new immigrants.

This chapter shows how social workers saw European immigrants as culturally inept but nonetheless imagined them as “objects of reform” and so included them in their early social welfare efforts. Moreover, they became their defenders before a sometimes hostile public. They refuted assertions that southeastern European immigrants were paupers and worked to forge a competing construction, marshaling “evidence” to prove that the new immigrants were hardworking, thrifty, sober, and self-sufficient. Part of their confidence in these immigrants rested on their firm conviction that southern and eastern Europeans were capable of economic and racial assimilation. Indeed, looking around, they would have found much evidence confirming these beliefs: from high naturalization rates to growing socioeconomic mobility, all facilitated by the racial, labor, and political context in which these immigrants lived. Social workers then lobbied against national origin quotas and tried to protect European immigrants from harsh immigration and deportation laws.

Purpose – This research investigates to what extent local economic growth driven by tourism was able to prevent emigration from local areas. The relative economic prosperity of the Western Member States is considered to have had a large pull effect on immigrants following the enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern European states. A similar pattern has been established in Croatia, where a mass exodus of the population has been recorded in the years following the 2013 EU Accession. Methodology – To do so, we use the newly released Population Census data from 2021, along with data from the earlier Census, to create a panel dataset of all municipalities and cities in Croatia and estimate the role of tourism. These data sources overcome the measurement errors in previously available annual migration data from the Ministry of Interior and allow for a more disaggregated analysis using detailed variables on the age and sex profile of citizens. We estimate a linear regression model using Ordinary Least Squares with the difference in population change as the dependent variable and measures of tourism development as the independent variable. Findings – We find evidence that the size of tourism is negatively associated with the size of emigration from the local area. We then investigate the mechanisms behind the relationship between local tourism growth and emigration, testing whether tourism is more correlated with emigration of younger or older individuals, men or women. Contribution – This paper is the first to shed light into the empirical nexus between tourism growth as the cause of the retention of population. Policy wise, it gives important insights into understanding how economic opportunities are key for individuals’ decision to emigrate that could be relevant for policymakers interested in ways to retain local populations. Finally, methodologically, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first research to explore migration patterns using the 2021 Census.