Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Sophists (greek philosophy) – early works to 1800"

Abstract Euthydemus is included neither in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by Diels–Kranz nor in Sofisti. Testimonianze e frammenti by Untersteiner nor in Early Greek Philosophy by Laks and Most. Likewise, the great twentieth century works on the Sophists do not give space to him, at best mentioning him briefly. Yet Euthydemus is the author of a fragment, which was quoted by Plato in his Cratylus, and on which again there is no modern study. This paper sets out to study this fragment in depth, to review and discuss the various translations, both existing and possible, to study the context of Plato’s quotation, to clarify the exact meaning and the theoretical scope of this important fragment, and lastly to place Euthydemus in the Protagorean tradition, of which he is a notable product.

The article deals with the question of the influence of Greek philosophy on the formation of Hellenistic monarchies. According to one point of view, theories of Greek philosophers on kingship played an important role in the formation of absolutism in the Hellenistic monarchies. It is believed that it is in the classical Greek philosophy that the ideas on absolute monarchy as the best state structure and on the legal rights of an outstanding person to royal power were developed. In the course of the study, the author infers that Greek philosophy did not have a significant impact on the formation of absolutism in Hellenistic monarchies. The Greek philosophers’ doctrines of kingship were significantly different from the type of power that was characteristic of the Hellenistic monarchies. Leading political philosophers of the IV century BC Plato and Aristotle were supporters of two types of monarchy: a moderate monarchy in which the royal power is limited by law and an absolute monarchy based on the exceptional virtue of the king. In the Hellenistic monarchies, the unlimited power of the king was originally associated with military-political power. At the same time, the author finds that Greek philosophy had an indirect influence on the formation of absolute monarchies in the period of early Hellenism. This influence consisted in the fact that Greek philosophers criticized the sociopolitical system of Greece and the main types of polity of the state – democracy and oligarchy. Plato and Aristotle sharply criticized extreme forms of oligarchy and democracy in their works. At the same time, as the author has established, philosophers were supporters of moderate democracy and oligarchy. The sophists, the cynics and the Cyrenaics also actively criticized the values and traditions of polis. Thus, Greek philosophers unwittingly contributed to the weakening of the polis and the formation of absolute monarchies. The author has also found that Greek philosophers influenced the formation of the enlightened character of the rule of individual Hellenistic kings. Philosophers contributed to the upbringing of high moral qualities in the Hellenistic kings. This influence was especially evident in Alexander the Great, Ptolemy I Soter, Ptolemy II Philadelphus and Antigonus II Gonatas. In the final part of the article, the author comes to the conclusion that the main role in the formation of absolute monarchies in the period of early Hellenism was played by the ancient Eastern political traditions, as well as by the nature of the formation of Hellenistic kingdoms and their ethnic composition.

Abstract This article presents a review of research literature on the so-called Second Sophistic (late first–early third centuries CE), that marked the flowering of ancient Greek oratory and had a powerful influence on the beginning of the Christian eloquence. The scholars’ interest in this topic increased in the second half of the 19th century due to insufficient study of the material against the background of the well-researched classical literature of Ancient Greece (fifth to fourth centuries BCE). A comparative study of the two periods in the history of the development of ancient Greek eloquence led researchers to disappointing conclusions. The sophists’ increased attention to the form to the detriment of content, addiction to stylistic delights, imitation of the language and style of classical orators and the monotonous themes of speeches gave many researchers a reason to characterize this literature as secondary and unoriginal, devoid of strength and depth of thought. However, in recent decades, a different point of view has prevailed in science, according to which the literature of the Second Sophistic is fundamentally not reducible to the sum of clichéd speeches with a standard set of rhetorical techniques, as it might seem. A detailed analysis of the works of Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides from whom voluminous corpora have been preserved showed that the sophists generally enjoyed fairly unconstrained creative freedom despite the rigid stylistic and linguistic framework. This freedom concerns content of speeches, choice and arrangement of material, overcoming genre boundaries, varying language, and combining rhetorical techniques. All these factors allow us to conclude that a certain innovation coexisted with classical tradition in sophists’ texts. Furthermore, the abundant literature of the sophists influenced the development of both the rhetorical theory and the oratory of Late Antiquity. The outstanding Christian writers such as Basil the Great, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, and John Chrysostom studied eloquence from the famous teachers of their time – Himerius and Libanius, who followed the traditions of the oratory of the Second Sophistic.

Abstract This article reconsiders the methodological issues posed by the reception of archaic and classical poetry in imperial rhetorical texts. It argues that references to ancient poems and poets in the works of imperial sophists are always already the product of appropriation and rewriting, and that the study of sophists’ engagement with poetry should go beyond Quellenforschung to explore how and why poetic models were transformed in light of their new rhetorical and imperial contexts. To illustrate this approach and its contribution to our understanding of both ancient-reception phenomena and imperial rhetorical culture, the article focusses on Himerius of Athens, a fourth-century c.e. sophist and teacher of rhetoric whose fondness for lyric poetry has caused his Orations to be used as a quarry for lyric fragments and testimonia. Himerius’ treatment of carefully chosen lyric models is here discussed with attention to his self-presentation and rhetorical agenda to show how the sophist appropriated the voices of diverse lyric icons to promote his school and negotiate his position in relation to the imperial administration. This analysis restores Himerius’ intellectual significance within late imperial culture and society, but it also demonstrates how a more in-depth study of the reception of ancient poetry in imperial sophistic literature has the potential to illuminate the strategies of cultural politics used by imperial authors to (re)construct Greek tradition.

This dissertation is generally concerned with Plato's conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic' dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy' does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity. A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic' (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato's science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher. In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.

This dissertation re-examines a set of long-standing problems that arise from Aristotle’s defense of kingship in the Politics. Scholars have argued for over a century that Aristotle’s endorsement of sole rule by an individual of outstanding excellence is incompatible with his theory of distributive justice and his very conception of a political community. Previous attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction have failed to ease the deeper tensions between the idea of the polis as a community of free and equal citizens sharing in ruling and being ruled and the vision of absolute kingship in which one man rules over others who are merely ruled. I argue that the so-called “paradox of monarchy” emerges from misconceptions and insufficiently nuanced interpretations of kingship itself and of the more fundamental concepts of community, rule, authority, and citizenship. Properly understood, Aristotelian kingship is not a form of government that concentrates power in the hands of a single individual, but an arrangement in which free citizens willingly invest that individual with a position of supreme authority without themselves ceasing to share in rule. Rather than a muddled appendage tacked on to the Politics out of deference to Macedon or an uncritical adoption of Platonic utopianism, Aristotle’s defense of kingship is a piece of ideal theory that serves in part to undermine the pretensions of actual or would-be monarchs, whether warrior- or philosopher-kings.
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