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Swetly, Walter. "Metaontological skepticism". Diss., kostenfrei, 2009. http://d-nb.info/1001239997/34.
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Hawley, Patrick 1964. "Skepticism avoided". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/17644.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2003.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-126).
I evaluate three replies to skepticism, drawing conclusions about the meaning of "justified", the viability of foundationalism, the value of knowledge, and the role of belief in rational action. In the first chapter, I examine the following skeptical argument: Something is justified only if justified by a justified thing; circular and infinite chains of justification are illegitimate; therefore, no belief is justified. A linguistic investigation reveals that this argument contains two ambiguities not yet noticed by epistemologists. The linguistic observations favor foundationalism about justification, showing how the foundationalist can maintain his view, while explaining away the force of the skeptical argument. However, in the second chapter, I argue that foundationalism is unsatisfactory, for non-skeptical reasons. If a foundationalist tries to explain how some things can be basic, then she must endorse a certain kind of circularity. But a foundationalist should not endorse this circularity. Dissecting a single skeptical argument is an interesting although limited endeavour. In the third chapter, I argue that an entire class of skeptical arguments can be avoided. Distinguishing rational action from rational belief change, I claim that certain changes in belief cannot occur during a rational act. In particular, I argue, some skeptical conclusions cannot be accepted while performing an ordinary rational act. The main conclusion of this chapter is: to avoid acting irrationally, it is rational to avoid certain skeptical arguments. Sometimes it is better to concede to skepticism than to flee.
(cont.) In the fourth chapter, I argue that knowledge is no more valuable than stable true belief. This surprising claim supports the conclusion that skepticism about knowledge is harmless. Even if we cannot know anything about the external world-or even if we cannot know anything at all-we may have something just as valuable as knowledge: stable true beliefs.
by Patrick Hawley.
Ph.D.
3
Thorsrud, Harald Christian. "Cicero's academic skepticism /". Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Raskin, David Barry. "Donald Judd's skepticism /". Digital version accessible at:, 1999. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/main.
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Fitton, Emily. "Maimon's post-Kantian skepticism". Thesis, University of Essex, 2017. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/21131/.
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There is little doubt that Salomon Maimon was both highly respected by, and highly influential upon, his contemporaries; indeed, Kant himself referred to Maimon as the best of his critics. The appraisal and reformulation of the Kantian project detailed in Maimon’s Essay on Transcendental Philosophy played a significant role in determining the criteria of success for post-Kantian philosophy, and was thus crucial to the early development of German Idealism. Key aspects of Maimon’s transcendental philosophy remain, however, relatively obscure. In particular, it remains unclear to what degree Maimon’s skepticism is internal to the Kantian framework, and how this skepticism is related to Maimon’s so-called dogmatic rationalism. The central aim of this project is to present Maimon’s as a distinct form of post-Kantian skepticism: one which poses significant problems for Kant’s theoretical project and which motivates a reformulation of the critical framework. In Kant’s eyes, pre-Kantian forms of skepticism are insufficiently critical insofar as they involve a commitment to transcendental realism. By contrast, I argue that Maimon’s skepticism does not involve a commitment to transcendental realism and that it strikes at the heart of Kant’s critical project insofar as it constitutes what I term ‘critical’ as opposed to merely ‘empirical’ skepticism. I further argue that Maimon’s rationalism provides the materials for a response to this form of skepticism. This thesis contributes to contemporary debates in the history of philosophy concerning the nature of Maimon’s coalition system and its relation to German Idealism, but also provides an alternative perspective on contemporary problems in the philosophy of perception concerning, in particular, the possibility of non-conceptual intentional content.
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Gutherie, Luanne. "Contextualist Responses to Skepticism". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2007. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/22.
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External world skeptics argue that we have no knowledge of the external world. Contextualist theories of knowledge attempt to address the skeptical problem by maintaining that arguments for skepticism are effective only in certain contexts in which the standards for knowledge are so high that we cannot reach them. In ordinary contexts, however, the standards for knowledge fall back down to reachable levels and we again are able to have knowledge of the external world. In order to address the objection that contextualists confuse the standards for knowledge with the standards for warranted assertion, Keith DeRose appeals to the knowledge account of warranted assertion to argue that if one is warranted in asserting p, one also knows p. A skeptic, however, can maintain a context-invariant view of the knowledge account of assertion, in which case such an account would not provide my help to contextualism.
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Lorentz, Ben. "Nietzsche's Skepticism of Agency". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_hontheses/8.
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Nietzsche’s view of the self and will seems to culminate in a naturalistic account of human agency. If we understand Nietzsche as primarily a naturalist who thinks philosophy should more or less be modeled on the sciences whose investigations are restricted to empirical observation and whose explanations, like causal explanation, are natural (rather than supernatural), then ascribing a naturalistic account of human agency to Nietzsche is appropriate. However, I argue that attributing a naturalistic account of agency, or any account of agency to Nietzsche, misunderstands Nietzsche’s skepticism. I attempt to demonstrate the primacy of Nietzsche’s skepticism by showing how “his” naturalistic “account” of agency is best understood as an instrument in the service of his purely critical and deflationary project. To show the instrumental character of his “account,” I show how the account is used to oppose traditional notions of agency without itself becoming Nietzsche’s theory of agency.
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Stoutenburg, Gregory Douglas. "Knowledge, infallibility, and skepticism". Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/6505.
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I argue that to know that a proposition is true one must have justification for being certain that the proposition is true. That is, one must have infallible epistemic justification for believing the proposition. It is widely accepted among epistemologists that we rarely, if ever, have such strong justification for our beliefs. It follows that there is precious little that we know. That conclusion is unacceptable to many philosophers. I argue that the positions that lead to the skeptical conclusion are well-motivated and that the skeptical conclusion is implicitly accepted by ordinary speakers.
My dissertation has three main components: a metaphilosophical position, an epistemological position, and an error theory. First, the metaphilosophical position. One very important part of philosophy is the analysis of our ordinary concepts. Analysis of our concepts begins with reflecting on what we are inclined to say about various actual and possible cases when considered under specific descriptions. This traditional method has recently come under attack, due in part to the rise of semantic externalism. I agree with externalists that if ‘meaning is reference’ then there is little reason to think reflecting on our concepts from the armchair will provide insight to the nature of the concepts we investigate. I defend a version of semantic internalism which grounds meaning in factors with which subjects are directly acquainted. That view supports the traditional methodology. Furthermore, as the goal of philosophical analysis is to accurately describe concepts of philosophical interest, the only kind of objection that could be decisive against a proposed analysis is that it does not correctly describe our concept. That opens the door to a skeptical analysis of knowledge.
Second, the epistemological position. I argue that the unacceptability of sentences of the form “S knows that p but it is possible for S that not-p” is best explained by the hypothesis that our concept of knowledge requires having justification for being certain that what one believes is true. I offer as a criterion of justified certainty the idea that when one knows a proposition is true, one is in a position to decisively answer questions about one’s knowledge of that proposition. I survey a number of competing theories of knowledge and show that they allow for the possibility of knowledge when one fails my criterion of decisive answerability. Those views fail my criterion because according to those views there is nothing the subject is aware of that guarantees for the subject that the allegedly known proposition is true. On that basis, I contend that knowledge is direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the proposition one believes.
Third, the error theory. Of course, we rarely have direct awareness of the factors that constitute the truth of the propositions we believe. So, our knowledge attributions are generally false. Yet, they are overwhelmingly natural to make. I argue that competent speakers are often quick to recognize knowledge attributions as a kind of ‘loose talk’ akin to the way we loosely ascribe geometric properties to ordinary objects. We regularly call objects ‘square’ that are not even close to being square, and we are quick to recognize this when challenged. I argue that we do this because we are so accustomed to communicating using strict language to make false claims that we often do not attend to the literal falsity of what we are saying. While we accept very demanding standards for knowledge, the phenomenon of recognizing that our knowledge claims are regularly false is as pervasive as our use of loose speech.
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Larsson, Anders, e Josefine Wannehag. "Professionell skepticism : Sambandet mellan personlighetsdrag och professionell skepticism med kön som betingande faktor". Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Fakulteten för ekonomi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-19546.
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Att kunna tillämpa professionell skepticism i det dagliga arbetet är en viktig egenskap för dagens revisorer. Vad som påverkar den professionella skepticismen är emellertid inte utrett inom tidigare forskning. Frågan om personlighetsdrag har en påverkan på professionell skepticism med hänsyn till kön som en betingande faktor har vi inte funnit någon forskning om. För att uppfylla syftet har en kvantitativ ansats applicerats och data har samlats in genom en enkätundersökning som ekonomistudenter på Högskolan Kristianstad och Jönköping International Business School har deltagit i. Studien har tillämpat befintliga mätinstrument för att mäta de oberoende variablerna personlighetsdrag och den beroende variabeln professionell skepticism. Enkäten undersökte även ett antal kontrollvariabler hos respondenterna. Resultatet från studien indikerar att två av de i studien undersökta personlighetsdragen (samvetsgrannhet och öppenhet för erfarenhet) har ett positivt samband med professionell skepticism. Vidare konstaterades att en del av personlighetsdraget neuroticism, aspekten stress, har ett negativt samband med professionell skepticism. Studien kunde emellertid inte påvisa om kön har en modererande effekt på sambandet mellan personlighetsdrag och professionell skepticism. Kontrollvariabeln modersmål visade sig ha ett mycket signifikant samband med professionell skepticism. Detta är något som framtida forskning inom området bör undersöka ytterligare.To be able to apply professional skepticism in day-to-day work is an important attribute for today’s auditors. However, factors that affect the professional skepticism is not investigated in previous research. The question if personality traits affect the professional skepticism in consideration of gender as a moderating factor is an area where we have not found any previous research. To be able to fulfil the purpose a quantitative approach has been applied and the data has been collected through a survey distributed to economy students attending Högskolan Kristianstad and Jönköping International Business School. The study has applied existing measuring instruments to measure the independent variable personality traits and the dependent variable professional skepticism. The survey also explored a few control variables among the respondents. The results from the study indicate that two of the personality traits in the study (conscientiousness and openness) have a positive correlation with professional skepticism. Furthermore, the study found that a part of the personality trait neuroticism, the stress aspect, has a negative correlation with professional skepticism. The study has found no proof that support the belief that gender has a moderating effect on the correlation between personality traits and professional skepticism. The study showed that the control variable mother tongue has a significant correlation with professional skepticism. This is something that future research in the field should examine further.
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Wood, John. "Hegel's Critique of Ancient Skepticism". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/113.
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Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.
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Woodward, Jennifer. "CARTESIAN SKEPTICISM AS MORAL DILEMMA". UKnowledge, 2011. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/gradschool_diss/809.
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I argue that despite the fact that there can be no strong refutation of skepticism it remains that ignoring skeptical hypotheses and relying on one’s sensory experience are both sound epistemic practices. This argument comes in the form of arguing that we are justified in ignoring skeptical hypotheses on the grounds that (1) they are merely logically possible, and (2) the merely logically possible is rarely relevant in the context of everyday life. I suggest that (2) is true on the grounds that the context of everyday life is one in which our epistemic pursuit of truth is mixed with other pragmatic goals. The result of this mix is that the pursuit of truth can conflict with our goal of avoiding error in such a way that we must choose to prioritize one goal over the other.
The above choice implies that skepticism comes at an epistemic cost not acknowledge in the contemporary literature on external world skepticism. This epistemic cost of skepticism means that the relative risk of error involved in relying on sensory experience is not as epistemically problematic as has often been assumed. These considerations allow an anti-skeptical position in which relying on sensory experience is prima-facie justified despite the possibility of being a brain in a vat. In this paper I explore what such a position might look like and what the implications of such a view might be for relevant alternatives positions, the closure debate, and the concept of differing epistemic perspectives in contemporary epistemology.
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Salvatore, Nicola Claudio. "Wittgensteinian epistemology and Cartesian skepticism". Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1842/9742.
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This work starts from three complementary and interdependent questions: 1) How should we interpret Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategy as presented in On Certainty, and especially the elusive and yet central concept of ‘hinges’? 2) Can Wittgenstein’s strategy, when properly understood and developed, provide a satisfactory response to Cartesian skepticism? 3) Does a Wittgensteinian epistemology license epistemic relativism, and if so to what extent? In Chapter 1, I present Cartesian-style skepticism and its epistemological implications along with the Dretske-Nozick’s ‘relevant alternatives’ theory, based on the rejection of the Closure principle for Knowledge which underlies the skeptical challenge. After a brief discussion of the main concerns raised against this proposal, I argue that this line is untenable and that a successful anti-skeptical proposal has to retain Closure. Having shown the shortcomings of the Dretske-Nozick proposal, I then focus my attention on G. E. Moore’s famous anti-skeptical works, namely “A Defence of Common Sense” (1925, henceforth DCS) and “Proof of an External World”, (1939, henceforth PEW). In these seminal papers, Moore famously argued that it is possible to know several ‘obvious truisms of commonsense’ such as ‘There are external objects’, I have a body’ and so on and that this knowledge can offer a direct response to skeptical worries; the aim of this strategy is then to retain both Closure and our confidence in our everyday knowledge claims. After a detailed presentation of DCS and PEW I will discuss the problems of Moore’s direct response against the skeptic, drawing on the works of distinguished commentators such as Malcolm, Clarke, Stroud and Wright. Roughly, I argue that Moore’s strategy is both unnecessary and unconvincing: unconvincing because Moore’s knowledge-claims cannot refute Cartesian skeptical arguments; unnecessary for they can ‘work’ only within our everyday ‘non-philosophical’ context, thus when no skeptical hypothesis can be sensibly raised. Even if Moore’s anti-skeptical attempts have unanimously been considered unsatisfying, for several reasons his works have nonetheless been extremely influential, to the extent that quite a few contemporary anti-skeptical proposals can be fairly described as ‘Moorean’. In Chapter 2, I present and discuss the dominant ‘Moore-Inspired’ positions, namely Pryor’s Dogmatist Reading of PEW, Neta’s interpretation of the Proof, Greco’s reliabilist account, Fara’s ‘Second Proof’, DeRose’s ‘Moorean contextualism’ and Sosa ‘Neo-Mooreanism’. I criticise these accounts in turn, in order to show that all these strategies inherit the main problems of Moore’s treatment of skepticism and also have unpalatable consequences with regard to the so-called ‘value problem for knowledge’. After having extensively criticised both Moore’s and ‘Neo-Moorean’ epistemologies, in Chapter 3 I focus my attention on Wittgenstein’s On Certainty; given the obscurity and ambiguity of this work, in this chapter I present some of the less contentious aspects of Wittgenstein’s treatment of skepticism and I emphasise the role played by ‘hinges ’ in his anti-skeptical strategy. This will give me the background to assess the different ‘Wittgensteininspired’ anti-skeptical strategies I consider in Chapter 4, namely Conant’s ‘therapeutic’ reading, Wright’s ‘rational entitlement’ account, Williams’ ‘Wittgensteinian contextualism’, McGinn’s ‘framework’ reading and Pritchard’s ‘hinge commitment’ strategy. I argue that these proposals are wanting, both as plausible interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought and more importantly as viable anti-skeptical strategies. Moreover, I show that McGinn and Williams’ proposals can lead to a form of epistemic relativism, according to which our epistemic practices are the result of pre-rational, social commitments not subject to rational evaluation of any sort; a conclusion which is not more palatable than skepticism itself. Chapter 5 is devoted to presenting Moyal-Sharrock’s ‘non-epistemic’ reading of OC, for which ‘hinges’ such as ‘There are external objects’ or ‘I have a body’ are the expression of a pre-theoretical, animal certainty which she sees as constitutively different from knowledge. While I defend Moyal-Sharrock’s exegesis and her analogy between ‘hinges’ and 'rules of grammar’ as the most plausible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s thought, in this chapter I also criticise her ‘non-epistemic’ account; roughly, I argue that following this strategy we will be forced either to reject the Closure principle, thus inheriting the problems of the Dretske-Nozick’s line, or else to endorse skepticism. Moreover, I also consider some of the relativistic implications of Moyal-Sharrock’s account, which make her proposal vulnerable to the same objections I have raised against McGinn’s framework reading and Williams’ Wittgensteinian contextualism. In Chapter 6, I develop my own anti-skeptical proposal, which is informed by the analogy between ‘hinges’ and ‘rules of grammar’ and their peculiar status. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s reflections on grammatical rules, developed in the socalled second phase of his thought, and especially in his Philosophical Investigations, I argue that ‘hinges’ cannot be object of knowledge but are subject to an altogether different epistemic standing, namely understanding or ‘mastery of techniques’. A promising anti-skeptical implication of this account is that it will help us to dismiss Cartesian-style skepticism as the result of a logical error, based on a misleading way of representing the structure of our epistemic practices, which are not based on propositional beliefs but rather on non-propositional, normative rules. In the rest of Chapter 6, I consider a final problem that a Wittgensteinian epistemology so construed has to face in order to be considered a fully viable antiskeptical position; that is, whether Wittgenstein’s account of ‘hinges’ would lead to epistemic relativism of a kind that is generated by the proposals put forward by Williams, McGinn and Moyal-Sharrock. Chapter 7 is devoted to addressing this question in detail. Drawing on Wittgenstein’s views on mathematics, metrology and religious beliefs, I aim to show that his remarks on ‘hinges’ will help us to dissolve epistemic relativism rather than licensing it. This is so because following Wittgenstein’s remarks on the structure of reason the disagreement between epistemic communities committed to different ‘hinges’ (for instance a community which believes in oracles rather than in science) is either solvable, as different epistemic practices can be compared and assessed if they have similar aims, or is a pseudo-disagreement which stems from a misguided comparison between different practices.
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O'Day, Kenneth Bartels. "Moral skepticism and practical reason". Diss., The University of Arizona, 1995. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/187217.
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Three subtypes of alpha-2 adrenergic receptors (α₂AR) have been identified: α₂A, α₂B and α₂C. α₂ARs are known to mediate a number of functions in many tissues. It is not clear, however, what the distribution of α₂AR subtypes is in these tissues. The distribution of α₂AR subtypes is fundamental to understanding receptor function and the development of more effective and specific α₂-adrenergic agents for therapeutic use. The working hypothesis for this dissertation is that there are specific subtypes of α₂ARs in tissues and in cells that have discrete localizations and may subserve different physiological function. To test this hypothesis two specific aims have been raised. The first aim was: the generation of subtype-specific antibodies. Experiments were conducted to express fusion proteins containing part of the third intracellular loop of each α₂AR. Chickens were immunized with fusion proteins and antibodies were purified from the yolk of the chicken eggs. The antibodies have complete subtype specificity as characterized by immunofluorescence studies on COS-7 cells transfected with DNA encoding the α₂ARs. The second aim was: the immunohistochemical localization of α₂AR subtypes in the primary culture of rat spinal cord, anterior segments of human and rabbit eyes and transfected COS-7 cells. Experiments were conducted to localize the α₂AR subtypes in cultured cells and tissues using indirect immunofluorescence techniques. The immunofluorescence results were confirmed by alternative approaches, e.g. reverse transcription-PCR, ligand binding and cAMP assay. The experimental results showed that multiple α₂AR subtypes are expressed in one tissue and that specific subtypes of α₂ARs are expressed in different tissues. Using a dual-labeling technique, two subtypes were co-localized in the same neuronal cell of the rat spinal cord. Furthermore, the immunofluorescence studies on the transfected COS-7 cells showed that the three subtypes of α₂ARs displayed different subcellular localization. Taken together the results of the studies presented in this dissertation provide evidence in support of the working hypothesis. The present work has provided a new opening in the study of the localization of α₂AR subtypes. This information provides new insights into the understanding of α₂AR functions in tissues.
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Tien, Cheryl Marilyn. "Consumers' skepticism towards advertising claims". Thesis, Curtin University, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11937/2237.
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The purpose of this study is threefold. It investigates (a) how personal and social influences affect consumers’ skepticism toward advertising claims (CSA) and how CSA influences inferences of manipulative intent (IMI), (b) the mediating role of attitude toward the advertisement between IMI and product judgment and (c) the moderating roles of brand familiarity and perceived risk on consumers’ skepticism toward advertising, inferences of manipulative intent and product judgment.
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Rinard, Susanna (Susanna Margaret). "Reasoning one's way out of skepticism". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/68520.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, September 2011.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. "September 2011."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-53).
Many have thought that it is impossible to rationally persuade a skeptic that we have knowledge of the external world. My dissertation aims to show that this can be done. In chapter one I consider a common reason for complacency about skepticism. Many contemporary philosophers reject the skeptic's conclusion on the grounds that mere philosophical argument can't rationally undermine common sense. I consider the standard arguments for this view and find them wanting. I then argue in a positive vein that philosophy can overturn common sense, on the assumption (shared by my opponents) that science can overturn common sense. That the skeptic can't simply be ignored makes the task of convincing the skeptic all the more urgent. In the first half of chapter two I aim to convince the external world skeptic that her position is irrational. Whoever accepts the argument for external world skepticism is, I claim, thereby committed to accepting skepticism about the past, which commits them to accepting a complex argument for skepticism about complex reasoning. But if one accepts this argument, one's position is self-undermining in the following sense: one believes a proposition P while at the same time believing that one should not believe P. This combination of beliefs is not rational. But it is forced on anyone who accepts the argument for external world skepticism, making it irrational to accept that argument. I concluded in the first half of chapter two that one shouldn't believe skepticism, but this leaves open the possibility that one should suspend judgment on skepticism. Next I argue that this position is also irrational. However, this still doesn't quite establish that we should believe that skepticism is false, for we need to rule out the possibility that we are caught in an epistemic dilemma: that all attitudes one could take toward skepticism would be irrational. I go on to argue that epistemic dilemmas are not possible. With this claim in place, it follows that we ought to believe that skepticism is false. So it is possible to reason one's way out of skepticism.
by Susanna Rinard.
Ph.D.
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Wretman, Jennie, e Marie Samuelsson. "Professionell skepticism : nyckeln till revisorns objektivitet?" Thesis, Högskolan i Gävle, Avdelningen för ekonomi, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hig:diva-19526.
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Syfte: En revisors oberoende är en grundläggande faktor för att säkerställa god kvalitet och hög tillförlitlighet på revisionen. Denna studie skall belysa en egenskap som har ett samband med en högkvalitativ revision, och som utgör en stor och betydelsefull del av revisorsyrket; professionell skepticism. Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka om där finns några samband mellan professionell skepticism och tre andra faktorer: objektivitet klientidentifikation kvalitetsförsämrande handlingar Metod: Vi har vid genomförandet av studien använt en kvantitativ metod där vi skickade ut en enkät till 3337 auktoriserade samt godkända revisorer, varav 178 av dem besvarades. Svaren analyserades statistiskt för att kunna testa hypoteserna som utformats i studien. Resultat & slutsats: Resultatet av undersökningen visar ett positivt samband mellan objektivitet och professionell skepticism. Slutsatsen visar att en ökad professionell skepticism stärker objektiviteten hos revisorer. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Tid är i många fall en begränsande faktor, vilket också är fallet i denna uppsats. Längre tidshorisont skulle kunna resultera i en högre svarsfrekvens på enkäterna och därmed möjlighet till fler eller tydligare samband. En utveckling av frågeställningar för att mäta professionell skepticism, och som utgår från revisorsyrket, anser vi skulle vara en intressant idé för framtida forskning. Ett annat förslag är att undersöka om det finns skillnader i personlig skepticism och professionell skepticism. Att en revisor inte är skeptisk privat behöver inte betyda desamma inom professionen. Uppsatsens bidrag: Uppsatsen bidrar till forskningen gällande påverkansfaktorer på revisorers objektivitet/oberoende. Professionell skepticism har visat sig vara en viktig del av revisorernas profession. Vi har i studien visat ett tydligt samband mellan skepticism och objektivitet som kan användas i framtida forskningssyften. Nyckelord: Professionell skepticism, Revisorns objektivitet/oberoende, Klientidentifikation, Kvalitetsförsämrande handlingar.Aim: An auditor's independence is a fundamental factor for ensuring a good quality and high reliability audit. This study will shed light on a characteristic that is fundamental to be able to produce a high-quality audit, and which constitute a large and important part of the audit profession; professional skepticism. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether there is any connection between professional skepticism and these three factors: objectivity client identification RAQ acts Method: We have in the implementation of the study used a quantitative method where we sent out a survey to 3,337 authorized and approved auditors, of which we received 178 responses. The responses were statistically analyzed to test hypotheses developed in the study. Result & Conclusions: The results of the survey show a positive correlation between objectivity and professional skepticism. The conclusion shows that increased professional skepticism strengthens the objectivity of the auditors. Suggestions for future research: Time is often a limitation, which is the case in this thesis as well. Longer time horizon could have resulted in a larger number of replies on the survey and the possibility for stronger correlations between items. A further development of the questions regarding the professional skepticism aimed specifically to auditors might be a better way to look at it. Another suggestion is to investigate if there is a difference between personal skepticism and professional skepticism. Lack of skepticism in your personal trait does not necessarily mean the same for your profession. Contribution of the thesis: This paper contributes to the literature about auditor independence and its surrounding effects. The professional skepticism has proven to be a vital part of the auditor profession and we have been able to prove the correlation between auditor independence and professional skepticism that can be used in future research purposes. Key words: Professional skepticism, Auditor independence, Client identification, RAQ acts.
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York, Brian D. "Practical Skepticism: Sextus Empiricus and Zhuangzi". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1398426220.
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Lampros, Alex Bowman Brady. "The relationship between Hegel and skepticism". [University Park, Pa.] : Pennsylvania State University, 2009. http://honors.libraries.psu.edu/theses/approved/WorldWideIndex/EHT-28/index.html.
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Mueller, Michaela. "Epistemic Luck, Epistemic Agency, and Skepticism". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/194139.
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In my dissertation I develop an account of perceptual knowledge through thinking about epistemic luck, epistemic agency, and skepticism. Two conditions are, as I claim, necessary and sufficient to render a true belief an instance of perceptual knowledge. These conditions are the luck-precluding condition and evidence-based justification. The luck-precluding conditions are external conditions, consisting in physical regularities in the world that allow us to arrive through our evidence at the truth in a systematic way. I claim that these luck-precluding conditions also allow us to avoid Gettier cases. Evidence-based justification requires evidence as an internal condition. However, there are some external constraints as to when our evidence can reasonably be expected to lead to the kind of justification required for perceptual knowledge. This account of perceptual knowledge blends together internal and external requirements. The claim is that only given this match of internal and external requirements can we argue that the resulting set of necessary conditions is also sufficient for perceptual knowledge in that it allows us to avoid all problematic forms of epistemic luck.
20
Fosner, Carmen. "Infinitism, Skepticism, and the Regress Problem". Diss., Temple University Libraries, 2018. http://cdm16002.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p245801coll10/id/508128.
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PhilosophyPh.D.
It is a common view that rationally held beliefs require reasons sufficient to justify them. One debate about the nature of justification is defined by the Regress Problem, which offers four different accounts of the structure of sufficient reasons. I argue against the more popular foundationalist and coherentist responses to the problem, contending that infinitism, (the view that the structure of justification-conferring reasons supporting a belief is endless), can provide a viable theory of adequate justification. The version of infinitism I defend entails adopting an infinitist approach to propositional justification combined with a contextualist approach to doxastic justification. After the details of the foundationalist and coherentist solutions are discussed, I evaluate various versions of contextualism and describe how these different formulations can influence a response to the Regress Problem. To conclude, I articulate a contextualist-infinitist solution to the Regress Problem, arguing that this solution not only avoids the problems presented by foundationalism and coherentism, but also that it provides a viable account of how context-based factors influence knowledge claims by affecting our standards for justification.
Temple University--Theses
21
Gardner, Emily A. "Narrative Structure and Reader Skepticism in Frankenstein". University of Toledo Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=uthonors1387214518.
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22
Andrew, James B. "Hume, Skepticism, and the Search for Foundations". University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1396628762.
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23
Witt, John R. "Equipoise and Skepticism: Past, Present and Future". Thesis, Connect to resource online, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1805/1674.
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Thesis (M.A.)--Indiana University, 2008.Title from screen (viewed on June 2, 2009). Department of Philosophy, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI). Advisor(s): Eric Mark Meslin, John J. Tilley, Timothy D. Lyons. Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 48-52).
24
Leon, Felipe Edwin. "Armchair knowledge and modal skepticism a rapprochement /". Diss., UC access only, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=16&did=1871875161&SrchMode=1&sid=4&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1270059102&clientId=48051.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2009.Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 158-166). Issued in print and online. Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations.
25
Jordan, Jason M. "Causal Skepticism and the Destruction of Antiquity". Thesis, University of Oregon, 2011. http://hdl.handle.net/1794/12117.
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ix, 325 p.This dissertation examines the development of skeptical views concerning causation from the medieval to the early modern period. While causal skepticism is often overlooked by intellectual historians, I argue that, in spite of its typical motivation as a religious response to shibboleths of ancient philosophy that stood askance from the dogmas of Abrahamic theology, causal skepticism was the greatest intellectual development of post-antiquity and ultimately culminated into modern Science. The first chapter examines Hume's famous analysis of causation and serves as a foil for the prior history of causal skepticism addressed in the subsequent chapters. The second chapter addresses the dispute over causation in medieval Islamic philosophy. I argue that virtually the entirety of Hume's analysis was anticipated, and in some cases superseded, by al-Ghazali in the eleventh century. The third chapter examines Averroes' critique of al-Ghazali, as well as the development of Aristotelian causal metaphysics in the Christian West. The fourth chapter concerns the development of the nominalist tradition skeptical attitude towards efficient causal explanation in the aftermath of the anti-Aristotelian condemnations of 1277. The fifth chapter addresses the Cartesian occasionalist tradition and its skeptical stance on secondary causation and the relation between this causal skepticism and central doctrines of Cartesian physics and metaphysics. The sixth and final chapter of my dissertation concerns the collapse of occasionalism and its many offspring. My ultimate thesis is that the hallmarks of both modern philosophy and modern science trace their origin to the failure of occasionalism to resolve its own internal contradictions.
Committee in charge: Dr. Naomi Zack, Chairperson; Dr. Cheney Ryan, Member; Dr. Colin Koopman, Member; Dr. Malcolm Wilson, Outside Member
26
Smith, Joseph Wayne. "The progress and rationality of philosophy as a cognitive enterprise : an essay in metaphilosophy". Title page, contents and abstract only, 1985. http://web4.library.adelaide.edu.au/theses/09PH/09phs653.pdf.
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27
Kermode, Robert. "Why scepticism is not reasonable". Thesis, McGill University, 1990. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=60070.
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The thesis is argued that Wittgenstein's response, unlike either Moore's or Wright's, is the right answer to scepticism about the existence of an external world. Moore offers his brief 'proof' as an alternative to developed, theoretical responses, which fall prey to higher-order scepticism. As it fails to address the intuitions which give rise to scepticism, however, it seems merely dogmatic. Wright's more detailed argument invokes a principle to delineate factual from non-factual claims and thereby turns the sceptical argument on itself, but depends on our accepting this fundamental epistemological principle as a convention, which the sceptic need not. Wittgenstein declines to legitimate the sceptic by arguing with her, but presupposes that she has made a mistake. This mistake resides in a failure to acknowledge the level of agreement among speakers on which language depends, which includes taking it to be the case that there is an external world.
28
Boaheng, Paul B. "Skepticism and practical reasoning in Hume's ethical theory". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 2000. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp03/MQ51302.pdf.
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29
Smith, Jeremy Mark. "Conviction in the everyday : Joseph Conrad and skepticism". Thesis, McGill University, 1990. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=59889.
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Heart of Darkness, Chance, and Lord Jim can be described as philosophical works if considered in light of "ordinary language" philosophy. Conrad wrestled with skepticism much as Wittgenstein later would, but his struggle with the "bewitchment" of skeptical thinking took a narratival form. His champion was Marlow, raconteur of the three novels, who recurrently loses and recovers his words and his capacity to tell (to judge, to narrate). In these works the Marlovian investigation of human convention, linguistic and otherwise, is shown to be a necessary but perilous task. The possibility that we may be dissatisfied with the ordinary or transcendental conditions of living is dramatized in all three novels, often (but not only) by threats to marriage. Heart of Darkness demonstrates the loss of linguistic attunement that may follow upon taking human relation to be a problem of knowledge, and links this to Kurtz's world-devouring repudiation of the ordinary. Chance explores in melodramatic form the "germ of destruction at the source of our strength", and unmasks men's denial of women as one face of skepticism. Lord Jim presents skepticism, Romanticism, and fantasy as different versions of ontological dissatisfaction, and shows how a return to the ordinary requires a practice of reading and remembering (our words).
30
Ambrose, Darren Charles. "Beyond Hegel : Levinas and the persistence of skepticism". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2002. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/106447/.
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The first part of our thesis will explore the nature and history of the development of Hegel’s reconciliatory self-determining philosophical science, by demonstrating how Hegel radicalises and reformulates the essence of skepticism as the principle of determinate negation. We will attempt to elucidate precisely why the persistence of external skepticism represents nothing more for Hegel than abstract dogmatism and philosophical naivety. In the second part of our thesis we will concentrate upon early 19th century post-Hegelian skeptical responses to Hegel’s speculative idealism. We will argue that Schelling, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard all attempt to disrupt what they see as the oppressive self-satisfaction of Speculative Reason by elaborating a skeptical attack upon Hegelianism in the name of the particular. Each thinker attempts to articulate a skeptical opposition to what they respectively argue to be Hegel’s illegitimate effacement of the particular within the totality of speculative reason itself. They each seek to return to an irreducible point of entry take Hegel back with them, to take him back ‘outside’ of the system of reason and return him to the particular. We will begin by analysing Schelling’s attempts to confront Hegel with the ‘Real Being’ he accuses Hegel of effacing from the very beginning through the illegitimate identity of thought and being. We will then examine Feuerbach’s attempt to deconstruct Hegel’s dialectic of sense certainty in an effort to return Hegel to the irreducible sensory quality of Being. We conclude this part with an analysis of Kierkegaard’s arguments for what he understands as the ‘paradox’ of faith. We will show that Kierkegaard’s efforts are aimed at bringing Hegel into proximity with this paradoxical faith in order to demonstrate his failure to comprehend the true nature of faith. The skeptical attacks of all three thinkers will be rigorously examined in the light of Hegel’s understanding of the relationship between skepticism and philosophy that we will have outlined in the first part of our thesis. Our aim will be to show precisely how and why they ultimately fail to articulate a radically heterogeneous skeptical position with regard to Hegel’s speculative idealism. By demonstrating the precise nature of their failure we will set the scene for our discussion of Levinas’s skeptical relation to Hegel in the third part of this thesis. It will be our contention that Levinas successfully elaborates a response to Hegel’s speculative reason that clearly continues upon the trajectory initiated by the three 19* century post-Hegelian skeptics that we have examined, and that what ultimately marks his success in articulating a genuinely heterological thought will be the extent to which he precisely avoids the failures we have identified.
31
Bertram, Benjamin Glenn. "Skepticism and social struggle in early modern England /". Diss., Connect to a 24 p. preview or request complete full text in PDF format. Access restricted to UC campuses, 1997. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/ucsd/fullcit?p9804020.
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Blix, Leslie Helen. "Self Esteem: Its Overall Effect on Professional Skepticism". OpenSIUC, 2017. https://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/dissertations/1340.
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The performance evaluation process is both an important tool for accounting firms to assess the performance of employees and provides supervisors an opportunity to provide feedback to their subordinates. Supervisions, such as managers, will provide feedback to subordinates (senior auditors) numerous times throughout a fiscal year. Prior research has shown that performance evaluations are largely based on results of the subordinate based on task completion and budgeted hours. These types of performance evaluations have been linked to employee dissatisfaction and a decrease in overall job performance. Utilizing psychology based theories, an experimental task was conducted to investigate whether the manager’s feedback orientation (positive/negative and tasks/goals) within a senior auditor’s performance evaluation will increase an auditor’s self-esteem and professional skepticism. Results show that positive and goal-oriented performance evaluations do increase an auditor’s self-esteem and supportive performance evaluations increase an auditor’s professional skepticism. These results provide valuable information to accounting firms to assist with their current restructuring of the performance evaluation process.
33
Kifaya, Raja. "The role of skepticism in green consumer behaviour". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Brest, 2023. http://www.theses.fr/2023BRES0040.
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Le scepticisme du consommateur envers les entreprises va en augmentant. Cependant, les études sur les déterminants et les conséquences de ce phénomène sur les produits bio/vert font défaut. Afin de combler partiellement cette lacune, cette thèse porte sur le scepticisme vert en explorant et comparant des consommateurs issus de trois milieux culturels différents. Le premier essai vise à étudier la relation entre le scepticisme et le comportement d'achat des cosmétiques bio en se basant sur la théorie attitude-comportement-contexte (ABC). Le deuxième essai met en lumière l'effet psychologique du scepticisme sur le comportement de consommation verte. Le troisième essai aborde la question suivante : le scepticisme à l’égard des aliments biologiques pourrait-il expliquer en partie l'écart entre les nombreuses attitudes positives à l'égard des aliments biologiques exprimées par les consommateurs et leurs choix réels ? À partir des données collectées auprès des consommateurs en Tunisie, en Italie et en France, nous avons effectué une comparaison par pays, en adoptant l'approche de modélisation par équations structurelles. Les résultats ont révélé que le scepticisme vert est un puissant inhibiteur de l'adoption de produits bio et verts par les consommateurs dans les trois pays. Considérés ensemble, ces trois essais contribuent à la littérature en soulignant l'importance des déterminants psychologiques et inhibiteurs de la consommation de produits bio et vertsConsumer skepticism towards companies is on the rise. However, studies on the determinants and the consequences of this phenomenon on organic /green products are lacking. In order to partially fill this gap, this thesis focuses on green skepticism by exploring and comparing consumers from three different cultural backgrounds. The first essay investigated the relationship between, green skepticism and the purchasing behaviour of organic cosmetics, based on the attitude-behaviour- context (ABC) theory. The second essay aimed at providing a better understanding on the psychological effect of skepticism on green consumption behaviour. The third essay demonstrated whether organic food skepticism could partly explain the gap” or discrepancy between the great deal of positive attitudes towards organic food expressed by consumers and their actual choices. Based on data collected from consumers in Tunisia, Italy and France, we conducted a cross-country comparison adopting the structural equation modeling approach. Results revealed that green skepticism is strong inhibitor towards adoption of organic and green products among consumers in the three countries. Together, the three essays contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of the psychological determinants and inhibitors of the adoption of organic and green products
34
Buchanan, Reid. "Deflationary approaches to scepticism". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1999. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk1/tape9/PQDD_0031/NQ66196.pdf.
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Wills, Bernard Newman Kroeker P. Travis. "The conversion of skepticism in Augustine's "Against the Academics" /". *McMaster only, 2003.
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36
Temler, Cecilia, e Marcus Nilsson. "Kan professionell skepticism användas för att förutse revisorers beteende?" Thesis, Högskolan Kristianstad, Sektionen för hälsa och samhälle, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hkr:diva-9627.
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Auditors have a big role in society. The question of auditor independence has been debated frequently after the financial crisis. Long auditor tenure with clients has both advantages and disadvantages so the question is hard to solve. One of the traits that are encouraged with auditors is professional skepticism. An important part of professional skepticism is the personal skepticism of the auditor. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate if a high professional skepticism can increase auditor independence by increasing profession identification and decreasing client identification. Earlier research in Social Identity Theory has shown that client identification is negatively related to auditor independence and that profession identification is positively related to auditor independence. A quantitative method is used in this dissertation. A survey was sent to 1000 qualified Swedish auditor. 273 of those replied. The material was statistically analyzed to test the different hypothesis in the dissertation. Our survey showed that professional skepticism has no relation to client- and profession identification. There is however a weak positive relation between professional skepticism and auditor independence. The conclusion is that more research is needed to investigate if auditor independence really is affected by the auditor ’s professional skepticism.Revisorer har en stor roll i dagens samhälle. Efter finanskrisen har frågan om revisorns oberoende diskuterats flitigt. Det finns både för- och nackdelar med att en revisor varit länge på ett företag och därför är frågan svårlöst. En av egenskaperna som uppmuntras hos en revisor är professionell skepticism. En viktig del av den professionella skepticismen är revisorns personliga skepticism. Syftet med den här uppsatsen är att påvisa att en hög professionell skepticism hos revisorer kan motverka vissa oberoenderelaterade problem. Mer specifikt undersöks den professionella skepticismens påverkan på revisorns identifikation med klienten och med den egna professionen. Tidigare forskning inom Social Identity Theory har visat att identifikation med klienten är negativt relaterat till oberoende och att identifikation med den egna professionen är positivt relaterat till oberoende. I uppsatsen används en kvantitativ metod. En enkät skickades till 1000 kvalificerade svenska revisorer varav 273 svarade. Detta material analyserades statistiskt för att pröva hypoteserna i uppsatsen. Undersökning visar att professionell skepticism inte har någon påverkan på klient- och professionsidentifikation hos revisorn. Det finns däremot en svag positiv relation mellan professionell skepticism och revisorns oberoende. Slutsatsen blir därför att mer forskning behövs för att undersöka om revisorns oberoende faktiskt påverkas av revisorns professionella skepticism.
37
SKVIRSKY, ALEXANDRE ARANTES PEREIRA. "THE INTRODUCTION OF DOUBT IN SKEPTICISM IN THE RENAISSANCE". PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2015. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=25626@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIROCONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
Sexto Empírico não fala de dúvida, e não faz uso deste conceito em sua clássica descrição do cético pirrônico. No entanto, desde a sua redescoberta na década de 1430 no contexto do humanismo florentino e até os dias atuais, o ceticismo é interpretado através da dúvida. Na presente tese, primeiramente mostramos que não há uma conexão direta entre o ceticismo pirrônico e o conceito de dúvida. Em seguida, analisamos alguns dos modos pelos quais a dúvida é introduzida no ceticismo, particularmente no período que vai do início do século XV ao final do século XVI, conhecido como ceticismo renascentista. Sexto Empírico não fala de dúvida, e não faz uso deste conceito em sua clássica descrição do cético pirrônico. No entanto, desde a sua redescoberta na década de 1430 no contexto do humanismo florentino e até os dias atuais, o ceticismo é interpretado através da dúvida. Na presente tese, primeiramente mostramos que não há uma conexão direta entre o ceticismo pirrônico e o conceito de dúvida. Em seguida, analisamos alguns dos modos pelos quais a dúvida é introduzida no ceticismo, particularmente no período que vai do início do século XV ao final do século XVI, conhecido como ceticismo renascentista.
Sextus Empiricus does not speak of doubt, nor does he use this concept in his exposition of Pyrrhonian skepticism. However, since its rediscovery in the 1430s to the present day, skepticism has been interpreted through the concept of doubt. In the present thesis, we showed first that there is no explicit connection between Pyrrhonian skepticism and doubt. Then, we analyzed some ways through which the concept of doubt was introduced into skepticism, especially in the period from the beginning of the 15th to the end of the 16th century, known as Renaissance skepticism.
38
Paakkunainen, Hille. "Towards the autonomy of ethics: Skepticism, agency, and normative commitment". UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH, 2012. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3485866.
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(basar), Baskaya Dilek. "Camus: A Rebel At The Junction Of Existentialism And Skepticism". Phd thesis, METU, 2011. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12613263/index.pdf.
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ABSTRACT
CAMUS: A REBEL AT THE JUNCTION OF EXISTENTIALISM AND SKEPTICISM
(Basar) Baskaya, Dilek
Ph.D., Department of Philosophy
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. S. Halil Turan
May 2011, 190 pages
The purpose of this thesis is to examine Albert Camus&rsquos stance in existentialism and scepticism, to discuss his philosophy by referring to his life, which, in many respects, forms a foundation for his philosophy and to exhibit that he maintains his contemporariness in the 21st century. As existentialism is treated differently by different philosophers, the main concern of the thesis is to discuss how Camus handles it. This is done by focusing on his approach to issues appearing commonly in existentialism, such as the absurd, suicide, God, rebellion, freedom, and alienation and by scrutinising the link between existentialism and skepticism. According to Camus, the absurd is the paradoxical condition caused by a contradiction or a confrontation of two unequal concepts or situations. The merit, for Camus, is to survive despite the disillusionment the absurd brings about. Consequently, he is against suicide because he regards it as surrender to the absurd. Camus claims that it is man himself who can make his own life meaningful. Thus, man may question the existence of God and revolt metaphysically against the absurdity and injustice in the world. The metaphysical rebel can then establish the unity and order that he believes is lacking in the world. Camus attaches great importance to rebellion because it brings man freedom. And freedom is indispensable because being deprived of freedom means submission to an authority and, therefore, loss of human dignity. Alienation is a major issue for Camus, too, as it is a result of man&rsquo
s &lsquo
thrownness&rsquo
on to the world and displays the human situation. The thesis analyses the above items in detail with reference to all Camus&rsquo
s major works.
40
Rasso, Jason Tyler. "Psychological Distance| The Relation Between Construals, Mindsets, and Professional Skepticism". Thesis, University of South Florida, 2013. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/#viewpdf?dispub=3558436.
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In this study, I examine the influence of construals (interpretations) and mindsets on professional skepticism in auditors. Auditors have been criticized lately for not displaying enough professional skepticism, particularly in their audits of complex estimates (PCAOB 2008). Regulators speculate about and academic research shows a correlation between low professional skepticism and both audit failures and audit malpractice claims (Beasley et al. 2001; Anderson and Wolfe 2002). I hypothesize that prolonging the deliberative mindset in the audit judgment and decision-making process can increase professional skepticism in auditors.
Experienced auditors take part in a 1 x 3 between-participants experiment in which they play the role of a senior auditor charged with evaluating a client's fair value estimate. I manipulate the type of mindset (deliberative or implemental) invoked by the evidence documentation instructions and have a third condition in which participants do not have to document audit evidence. Using multiple measures of professional skepticism, I find that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition display higher professional skepticism than both auditors in the implemental mindset condition and auditors in the no documentation condition. I further analyze the types of textual responses entered by the auditors and offer direction for future research in this area.
41
Rasso, Jason. "Psychological Distance: The Relation Between Construals, Mindsets, and Professional Skepticism". Scholar Commons, 2013. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4565.
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In this study, I examine the influence of construals (interpretations) and mindsets on professional skepticism in auditors. Auditors have been criticized lately for not displaying enough professional skepticism, particularly in their audits of complex estimates (PCAOB 2008). Regulators speculate about and academic research shows a correlation between low professional skepticism and both audit failures and audit malpractice claims (Beasley et al. 2001; Anderson and Wolfe 2002). I hypothesize that prolonging the deliberative mindset in the audit judgment and decision-making process can increase professional skepticism in auditors.
Experienced auditors take part in a 1 x 3 between-participants experiment in which they play the role of a senior auditor charged with evaluating a client's fair value estimate. I manipulate the type of mindset (deliberative or implemental) invoked by the evidence documentation instructions and have a third condition in which participants do not have to document audit evidence. Using multiple measures of professional skepticism, I find that auditors in the deliberative mindset condition display higher professional skepticism than both auditors in the implemental mindset condition and auditors in the no documentation condition. I further analyze the types of textual responses entered by the auditors and offer direction for future research in this area.
42
Nickell, Erin Burrell. "An Examination of Issues Related to Professional Skepticism in Auditing". Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2012. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/5354.
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The third general standard of fieldwork requires auditors to maintain a skeptical mindset with regards to the collection and critical assessment of audit evidence. While professional skepticism is frequently referenced by professional standards, a lack of precision in defining the concept presumably leads to variation in how skepticism is exercised in practice. Drawing on theories from the fields of psychology, economics and organizational justice, this dissertation considers different perspectives of what constitutes sufficient professional skepticism and examines how those perspectives differ between audit practitioners and regulators. First, I consider competing perspectives of professional skepticism – neutral versus presumptive doubt – and whether asking auditors to adopt alternative perspectives of skepticism may have implications for audit efficiency and effectiveness. While, too little skepticism may endanger audit effectiveness and lead to audit failure or enforcement action, too much skepticism may arguably lead to unnecessary costs and inefficiency. Second, I consider whether the nature of the auditor-client relationship threatens an auditor's ability to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism. For example, theoretical perspectives from the fields of psychology and economics suggest that auditors may, consciously or unconsciously, be less skeptical of clients with whom they have developed close, positive working relationships or financial dependencies. More specifically, I consider whether skeptical behavior is impeded by management who display low-risk attitudes towards fraud or by client's who are considered to be highly important to the profitability of the local office. Finally, I examine how professional skepticism is defined from a regulator's perspective. When a public company is accused of fraudulent financial reporting, regulators may determine that the audit performed on the fraudulent financial statements was deficient. Prior research has suggested that in such cases, insufficient skepticism is often a leading cause of alleged audit failure. Within a fairness theory framework, this study examines enforcement actions against auditors between 1999 and 2009, and identifies certain factors that are associated with a citation for a lack of professional skepticism. Overall, results suggest that regulators approach the issue by determining whether auditors should have been more skeptical. Factors found to affect this determination include whether the auditor was perceived as having been aware of an elevated risk of fraud or whether the client was accused of having provided the auditor with false or misleading information during the course of their investigation.ID: 031001546; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Adviser: Greg Trompeter.; Title from PDF title page (viewed August 22, 2013).; Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Central Florida, 2012.; Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-75).
Ph.D.
Doctorate
Business Administration
Business Administration; Accounting
43
Lundin, Linnéa. "GREEN SKEPTICISM : How green intentions can lead to brown choices". Thesis, Luleå tekniska universitet, Institutionen för ekonomi, teknik, konst och samhälle, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ltu:diva-85606.
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Although much is known about the conscious consumer, very little is known about green advertising. Given the growing attention placed on environmental issues and the heavy reliance of the consuming public on mass media, the dire lack of credibility in green advertising is in a shocking state. In fact, there has been a pronounced increase in green messages in advertising since the 1960s. This increase in green messages does not inherentlymean that there is a favorable consumer brand attitude formation. Instead, consumers have become increasingly skeptical of the environmental claims made by some of these organizations. The existence of consumer skepticism, together with perceived deception, hashad a negative impact on credibility. The purpose of this essay is to understand how marketing efforts on product labels thathighlight environmental, social and ethical problems (known as green product labels) might increase the customers' skepticism. The chosen method to conduct the data collection was a survey. The survey was distributed through online forms through facebook and other socialmedia platforms and thus limited to focus on the consumers of a more connected kind, mainly those who partake in social media on a daily basis. Results show that the consumers are skeptical towards green efforts and green product labeling, but the perception of green labels are not directly influencing the amount of skepticism as these notions seem to come from outside sources. While not directly influenced by product labels the increase in skepticism towards these kinds of ads displaying green efforts implicates both practical and theoretical relevance. Consumers are becoming more aware of false claims and companies need to be aware of what influences consumer skepticism to be able to better match their ads with the target audiences.
44
Bohlin, Henrik. "Groundless knowledge : a Humean solution to the problem of skepticism". Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Almquist & Wiksell, 1997. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb370669862.
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Lopez, Theresa. "The Moral Mind: Emotion, Evolution, and the Case for Skepticism". Diss., The University of Arizona, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/293597.
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Recent work in empirical moral psychology has led to at least one point of consensus: intuitive, psychologically-spontaneous cognitive processes play a central and inescapable role in moral evaluation. However, among those who accept that intuitive processes play a central role there remains much debate concerning the underlying character of these intuitive processes, as well as their developmental and evolutionary origins. The two dominant approaches are represented by psychological sentimentalists, who hold that these underlying processes are essentially emotion-driven, and moral nativists, who hold that these processes are subserved by innate, tacitly-held moral principles. In the course of this dissertation I critically examine each of these prominent psychological accounts, and work to outline a novel alternative. Questions concerning the psychological processes involved in moral judgment are interesting in their own right, as well as for their potential relevance to debates in ethical theory. The observed role of intuitive processing in moral judgment challenges those traditions in psychology and philosophy according to which deliberate rational processes do or should dominate. Indeed, it is widely thought that the centrality of these intuitive processes serves to undermine the status of morality and the epistemic standing of moral beliefs. Both the sentimentalist and the nativist analyses of intuitive moral judgment have been used to ground challenges to the status of morality and moral belief. I build on my critiques of the empirical adequacy of the psychological and evolutionary claims grounding these challenges to develop ways to defeat them. When properly understood, neither of these accounts of intuitive moral psychology supports a global challenge to the epistemic standing of moral belief.
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Appley, Bryan C. "Inference to the best explanation and the challenge of skepticism". Diss., University of Iowa, 2016. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/3041.
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In this dissertation I consider the problem of external world skepticism and attempts at providing an argument to the best explanation against it.
In chapter one I consider several different ways of formulating the crucial skeptical argument, settling on an argument that centers on the question of whether we're justified in believing propositions about the external world. I then consider and reject several options for getting around this issue which I take to be inadequate. I finally conclude that the best option available to us at the moment is to argue that the antiskeptical view is the best explanation of our ordinary experiences
In chapter two I argue that, if we hope to ground what counts as defending antiskepticism in common sense, there is an argument against the possibility of ever knowing one has succeeded in defending antiskepticism. After showing that common sense is no place to look in setting a goal for our antiskeptical project, I present the view that what will be crucial to settling on our antiskeptical goal is coming to a successful analysis of the nature of physical objects. I suggest some minimal criteria that must be met by a view in order to be antiskeptical based on our intuitions about core skeptical cases, but acknowledge that a fully successful response to external world skepticism will require the antiskeptic to engage in some much more difficult analysis.
In chapter three I consider various views of the nature of explanation and conclude, tentatively, that explanation as it interests the antiskeptic is fundamentally causal.
In chapter four I consider and reject some of the core views on which best explanation facts are so fundamental that a project of attempting to vindicate probabilistically the virtues which make explanations epistemically good. In this chapter I show that views which analyze justification in terms of best explanation factors fail.
In chapter five I attempt to vindicate the various explanatory virtues probabilistically. In doing so I attempt to express or translate the various explanatory virtues in terms of probabilities in order to show that having those virtues makes a view at least prima facie more probable.
In chapters six and seven I explain and evaluate the various arguments to the best explanation against skepticism present in current philosophical literature. I attempt to show that extant arguments fail to appreciate the virtues possessed by classical (and some new) skeptical scenarios.
In chapter eight I briefly consider some options that may be open to the antiskeptic moving forward. All routes forward contain considerable obstacles, but there are some fruitful areas of research to pursue.
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Franklin, Anders. "En rund boll är en bra början : - Miniminivån som förslag till dellösning på demarkationsproblemet". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-118546.
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Abstrakt Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda hur miniminivån, genom tidig markering av vissa företeelser som icke-vetenskapliga, kan bereda mark för en fullständig (eller åtminstone mer fullständig) lösning på demarkationsproblemet. I uppsatsen redogörs huvudsakligen för begreppet miniminivån samt ett förslag till ett kriterium som krävs för att uppnå miniminivån, nämligen kriteriet för taktisk skepticism. Miniminivån utgör ett nödvändigt villkor för att en företeelse ska klassas som vetenskap. Innan en företeelse kan mätas mot kriterier bortom miniminivån, som tillsammans med kriterierna på miniminivån utgör ett tillräckligt villkor, måste miniminivåns kriterier uppfyllas. Detta kombinerar en monokriteriell ansats tydlighet med den flexibilitet som multikriteriella ansatser/ klusteransatser innehar genom dessas större mängd kriterier. ”Vetenskap” definieras i uppsatsen som bredare än det engelska ”science” som i vanliga fall motsvarar naturvetenskaperna. Ett allvarligt argument mot miniminivån är att det finns en risk att alla rimliga vetenskaps- kriterier är lika lämpliga att ha där. Skulle detta vara fallet har miniminivån bara lyckats göra frågan onödigt komplex. Därför formuleras ett krav och två desiderata som ställs på förslag som utgår från Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas S. Kuhn och Mario Bunge. Utifrån Mario Bunges resonemang formuleras kriteriet för taktisk skepticism som exkluderar förekomster av radikal dogmatism och radikal skepticism. Detta kriterium bedöms vara lämpligast av kandidaterna. En form av kreationism utvärderas utifrån kriteriet för taktisk skepticism, och bedöms ej uppfylla kriteriet. Vid en korrekt förståelse av miniminivån försvagas förtroendet för den sortens kreationism kraftigt med avseende på dess roll som kunskapsförmedlare. Det tidigare nämnda motargumentet bedöms därmed vara bemött. Det konstateras att miniminivån har potential att tjäna ett praktiskt syfte både före och efter jakten på en lösning på demarkationsproblemet.
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Lindner, Philip. "Det där är ingen icke-zebra! : epistemisk-deduktiv slutenhet och skepticism". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-52691.
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Departing from Fred Dretske’s groundbreaking article, this essay explore the epistemic closure principle: the principle that states that knowledge is closed under known implication. It also explores the relationship to skepticism, various attempts to challenge and defend the principle, as well as developing a new perspective where the skeptical premise is seen as an a priori justified tautology that can be overriden by a posteriori experience. I argue that Dretske’s illuminating example makes it clear that there is an unescapable choice between either rejecting a skeptical premise however intuitive it may seem or inextricably having to admit a skeptical conclusion.
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Koppang, Michael C. "Manitoba aboriginal treaties as vehicles for self-government, sentiments and skepticism". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk3/ftp04/mq23368.pdf.
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Burdman, Federico. "Skepticism and Idealism in G.E Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’”". Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú - Departamento de Humanidades, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/112958.
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G.E. Moore’s argument in Proof of an External World” seems to beg the question against the skeptic and to miss the point of the challenge posed by skeptical hypotheses. I propose an interpretation that frees the argument from both charges. Starting from a distinction between the way Moore understood his dialectical position against the idealist and the skeptic, I attempt to illuminate the conception of skepticism that lies behind his argument. I propose that the argument’s core is found in a strong anti-Cartesian statement, even though its relevance for epistemology is to be found in its potential as a stance regarding justification which is closer to the problematic of Pyrrhonic skepticism.El argumento de G.E. Moore en Prueba del mundo exterior” parece consistir en una flagrante petición de principio y adolecer de una incomprensión del desafío representado por las hipótesis escépticas. Aquí intentaremos una interpretación que evite ambos cargos. A tal fin, distinguiré entre los modos en que Moore concibe su posición dialéctica frente a sus rivales idealistas y escépticos, y abordaré la concepción del problema escéptico que subyace al planteo mooreano. Finalmente, defenderé que el núcleo del argumento consiste en una afirmación anticartesiana aun cuando su relevancia epistemológica se encuentra en su potencial como respuesta a una problemática sobre la justificación más cercana a un escepticismo de tipo pirrónico.