Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
FÜLLBRUNN, SASCHA. "COLLUSION OR SNIPING IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING AUCTIONS — A PRISONER'S DILEMMA". International Game Theory Review 13, n.º 01 (março de 2011): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021919891100285x.
Texto completo da fonteRosa, Benjamin V. "Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions". Games and Economic Behavior 132 (março de 2022): 189–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.009.
Texto completo da fonteKagel, John H., Yuanchuan Lien e Paul Milgrom. "Ascending Prices and Package Bidding: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 2, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2010): 160–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.3.160.
Texto completo da fonteEngelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, e Charles M. Kahn. "Low-Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions". Management Science 51, n.º 3 (março de 2005): 508–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0339.
Texto completo da fonteFox, Jeremy T., e Patrick Bajari. "Measuring the Efficiency of an FCC Spectrum Auction". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 5, n.º 1 (1 de fevereiro de 2013): 100–146. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.5.1.100.
Texto completo da fonteBrusco, Sandro, e Giuseppe Lopomo. "Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints". Economic Theory 38, n.º 1 (13 de fevereiro de 2007): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0217-8.
Texto completo da fonteZheng, Charles Z. "Jump bidding and overconcentration in decentralized simultaneous ascending auctions". Games and Economic Behavior 76, n.º 2 (novembro de 2012): 648–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.08.002.
Texto completo da fonteBRUSCO, SANDRO, e GIUSEPPE LOPOMO. "BUDGET CONSTRAINTS AND DEMAND REDUCTION IN SIMULTANEOUS ASCENDING-BID AUCTIONS". Journal of Industrial Economics 56, n.º 1 (março de 2008): 113–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6451.2008.00335.x.
Texto completo da fonteRiedel, Frank, e Elmar Wolfstetter. "Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending-bid auctions: a uniqueness result". Economic Theory 29, n.º 3 (13 de novembro de 2005): 721–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0039-5.
Texto completo da fonteSherstyuk, Katerina, e Jeremy Dulatre. "Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment". International Journal of Industrial Organization 26, n.º 2 (março de 2008): 557–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.005.
Texto completo da fonteTeses / dissertações sobre o assunto "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Pacaud, Alexandre. "Bidding efficiently in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions using Monte Carlo Tree Search". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024IPPAT003.
Texto completo da fonteSince its introduction in 1994 in the United States, the Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has become the privileged mechanism for spectrum auctions. As sometimes billions of euros are at stake in an SAA, and a mobile operator’s business plan highly depends on the auction outcome, establishing an efficient bidding strategy is crucial. Despite the importance of this problem, there is a lack of research dedicated to developing an efficient bidding strategy for the SAA. The intrinsic complexity of the SAA makes its analysis very challenging for auction theory and exact game resolution methods. Additionally, the mechanism introduces strategical issues such as the exposure problem, adding an extra layer of complexity to its study.This thesis proposes the use of Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to compute an efficient bidding strategy for the SAA. The six chapters of the thesis are structured as follows. The first chapter introduces spectrum auction mechanisms, highlighting their pros and cons. The second chapter details the bidding problem in the SAA, along with relevant related research.The third chapter provides a summary of adversarial search methods, with a specific focus on MCTS. Chapters four to six are dedicated to developing an efficient MCTS bidding strategy for the SAA. The fourth chapter considers a turn-based deterministic model of the SAA with perfect and complete information. Numerical experiments are only undertaken on small instances.The fifth chapter considers a n-player simultaneous move model of SAA with incomplete information. Extensive numerical experiments are undertaken on instances of realistic size. The sixth chapter extends the preceding game to incomplete information to introduce uncertainties. For each model, an algorithm that significantly outperforms state-of-the-art bidding strategies is proposed, notably by better tackling the exposure problem. Moreover, a final price prediction method is developed throughout the chapters, upon which each MCTS algorithm relies
Livros sobre o assunto "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Milgrom, Paul R. Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteMilgrom, Paul. Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction. The World Bank, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-1986.
Texto completo da fonteCapítulos de livros sobre o assunto "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Bousquet, Nicolas, Yang Cai e Adrian Vetta. "Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction". In Web and Internet Economics, 216–29. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_16.
Texto completo da fonteCramton, Peter. "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions". In Combinatorial Auctions, 99–114. The MIT Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0005.
Texto completo da fonteTrabalhos de conferências sobre o assunto "Simultaneous Ascending Auctions"
Pacaud, Alexandre, Marceau Coupechoux e Aurelien Bechler. "Monte Carlo Tree Search Bidding Strategy for Simultaneous Ascending Auctions". In 2022 20th International Symposium on Modeling and Optimization in Mobile, Ad hoc, and Wireless Networks (WiOpt). IEEE, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.23919/wiopt56218.2022.9930539.
Texto completo da fonteDu, Li, Qian Chen e Na Bian. "An Empirical Analysis of Bidding Behavior in Simultaneous Ascending-Bid Auctions". In 2010 International Conference on E-Business and E-Government (ICEE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icee.2010.70.
Texto completo da fonte