Artigos de revistas: "Setting mechanism"

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Gorokh, Artur, Siddhartha Banerjee e Krishnamurthy Iyer. "From Monetary to Nonmonetary Mechanism Design via Artificial Currencies". Mathematics of Operations Research 46, n.º 3 (agosto de 2021): 835–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1098.

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Nonmonetary mechanisms for repeated allocation and decision making are gaining widespread use in many real-world settings. Our aim in this work is to study the performance and incentive properties of simple mechanisms based on artificial currencies in such settings. To this end, we make the following contributions: For a general allocation setting, we provide two black-box approaches to convert any one-shot monetary mechanism to a dynamic nonmonetary mechanism using an artificial currency that simultaneously guarantees vanishing gains from nontruthful reporting over time and vanishing losses in performance. The two mechanisms trade off between their applicability and their computational and informational requirements. Furthermore, for settings with two agents, we show that a particular artificial currency mechanism also results in a vanishing price of anarchy.

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ANDERSON, J. T. "SCALE-SETTING WITHOUT THE HIGGS MECHANISM". Modern Physics Letters A 03, n.º 16 (novembro de 1988): 1629–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s021773238800194x.

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It is shown for the Higgs model that ɸ*ɸ must have a lower bound in order to assure the gauge convariance of Aµ and remove the non-analytic singularities of ϕ and Aμ. The boundary value is evaluated and provides a scale without the Higgs mechanism.

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3

Guo, Mingyu. "VCG Redistribution with Gross Substitutes". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, n.º 1 (4 de agosto de 2011): 675–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7883.

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For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit. However, in general, under the VCG mechanism, payments flow out of the system of agents, which reduces the agents' utilities. VCG redistribution mechanisms aim to return as much of the VCG payments as possible back to the agents, without affecting the desirable properties of the VCG mechanism. Most previous research on VCG redistribution mechanisms has focused on settings with homogeneous items and/or settings with unit-demand agents. In this paper, we study VCG redistribution mechanisms in the more general setting of combinatorial auctions. We show that when the gross substitutes condition holds, we are able to design mechanisms that guarantee to redistribute a large fraction of the VCG payments.

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Romano, Giulia, Gianluca Tartaglia, Alberto Marchesi e Nicola Gatti. "Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, n.º 6 (18 de maio de 2021): 5682–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16713.

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We study the problem of designing posted-price mechanisms in order to sell a single unit of a single item within a finite period of time. Motivated by real-world problems, such as, e.g., long-term rental of rooms and apartments, we assume that customers arrive online according to a Poisson process, and their valuations are drawn from an unknown distribution and discounted over time. We evaluate our mechanisms in terms of competitive ratio, measuring the worst-case ratio between their revenue and that of an optimal mechanism that knows the distribution of valuations. First, we focus on the identical valuation setting, where all the customers value the item for the same amount. In this setting, we provide a mechanism M_c that achieves the best possible competitive ratio, discussing its dependency on the parameters in the case of linear discount. Then, we switch to the random valuation setting. We show that, if we restrict the attention to distributions of valuations with a monotone hazard rate, then the competitive ratio of M_c is lower bounded by a strictly positive constant that does not depend on the distribution. Moreover, we provide another mechanism, called M_pc, which is defined by a piecewise constant pricing strategy and reaches performances comparable to those obtained with M_c. This mechanism is useful when the seller cannot change the posted price too often. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performances of our mechanisms in a number of experimental settings.

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Bigi, Adriana, Silvia Panzavolta e Katia Rubini. "Setting Mechanism of a Biomimetic Bone Cement". Chemistry of Materials 16, n.º 19 (setembro de 2004): 3740–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cm049363e.

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Biswas, Sharlene, e Chris Akroyd. "The governance of inter-firm co-development projects in an open innovation setting". Pacific Accounting Review 28, n.º 4 (7 de novembro de 2016): 446–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/par-03-2016-0030.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the governance of inter-firm co-development in an open innovation setting and show how a stage-gate product development process can be used to support this relationship. Design/methodology/approach The authors adopt a qualitative case-study approach informed by ethnomethodology. Data were obtained via semi-structured interviews and document analysis. Findings They found that in an open innovation setting – where the producing partner relies on a research partner for all product development activities – a stage-gate product development process can act as a governance mechanism, as it enables the development of trust and cooperation which supports the co-development relationship. Research limitations/implications The implication of this finding is that a stage-gate process can be a flexible governance mechanism, which can adapt over time in relation to the needs of the co-development partners in an open innovation setting. This also lays the groundwork for future research to explore the applicability of this tool in other settings, e.g. outsourcing arrangements as well as help guide the design and implementation of future governance mechanisms. Originality/value In the context of accounting research, this paper helps practitioners and academics understand how a stage-gate process can be used as a governance mechanism to manage and control co-development projects in an open innovation setting.

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Zhang, Lianzhen, Rangang Yu, Qingsong Zhang, Rentai Liu, Huijun Feng e Yuntian Chu. "Permeation grouting diffusion mechanism of quick setting grout". Tunnelling and Underground Space Technology 124 (junho de 2022): 104449. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tust.2022.104449.

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He, Di, Wei Chen, Liwei Wang e Tie-Yan Liu. "Online learning for auction mechanism in bandit setting". Decision Support Systems 56 (dezembro de 2013): 379–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dss.2013.07.004.

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Soudée, E., e J. Péra. "Mechanism of setting reaction in magnesia-phosphate cements". Cement and Concrete Research 30, n.º 2 (fevereiro de 2000): 315–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0008-8846(99)00254-9.

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Ruan, Zhi Gang, e Yi Xue Ren. "Specialties Problems and Countermeasures in Higher Vocational Road and Bridge Engineering". Applied Mechanics and Materials 556-562 (maio de 2014): 889–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.556-562.889.

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By analyzing the current situation of higher vocational road and bridge engineering setting in our country, this paper summarizes the problems existing in current professional settings. According to our country's vocational education development demand and road and bridge engineering industry needs, this paper puts forward improvement suggestions and countermeasures to various problems from the aspects of professional macro planning, the establishment of linkage mechanism of local education authorities and higher vocational colleges, and setting up professional evaluation mechanism.

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Liu, Yu Quan, Huang Sheng Hua e Li Wang. "Improved Control Model for Relay Protective Settings Remote Control and its Application". Applied Mechanics and Materials 313-314 (março de 2013): 347–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.313-314.347.

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For a long time, settings complexity makes the settings remote modification technology is difficult to be applied on the relay protective devices effectively. To solve the key technical problems of relay protective devices settings remote modification, this paper makes an in-depth research of setting group remote control model. The setting group remote control model based on protective relaying and fault information system is proposed with the setting group services mapping between IEC61850 and IEC60870-5-103. The setting group remote control models working mechanism is deeply analysed via the setting group views. Base on the analysis, an enhanced control flow and task block method are provided to avoid the edit setting group data being changed abnormally, which improves the reliability of setting group remote control remarkably. The setting group remote control model introduced in this paper is applied successfully and its reliability is approved.

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Curry, Michael, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, Stephen McAleer, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm, Niao He e Sven Seuken. "Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, n.º 9 (24 de março de 2024): 9626–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28819.

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Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing dynamic mechanisms for welfare is relatively well understood. However, there has been less work on optimizing for other goals (e.g., revenue), and without restrictive assumptions on valuations, it is remarkably challenging to characterize good mechanisms. Instead, we turn to automated mechanism design to find mechanisms with good performance in specific problem instances. We extend the class of affine maximizer mechanisms to MDPs where agents may untruthfully report their rewards. This extension results in a challenging bilevel optimization problem in which the upper problem involves choosing optimal mechanism parameters, and the lower problem involves solving the resulting MDP. Our approach can find truthful dynamic mechanisms that achieve strong performance on goals other than welfare, and can be applied to essentially any problem setting---without restrictions on valuations---for which RL can learn optimal policies.

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Gerstgrasser, Matthias, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart De Keijzer, Philip Lazos e Alexander Skopalik. "Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (17 de julho de 2019): 1973–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011973.

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We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral trade setting. In such a setting there is a single buyer and a single seller who holds a finite number k of identical items. The mechanism has to decide how many units of the item are transferred from the seller to the buyer and how much money is transferred from the buyer to the seller. We consider two classes of valuation functions for the buyer and seller: Valuations that are increasing in the number of units in possession, and the more specific class of valuations that are increasing and submodular.Furthermore, we present some approximation results about the performance of certain such mechanisms, in terms of social welfare: For increasing submodular valuation functions, we show the existence of a deterministic 2-approximation mechanism and a randomised e/(1 − e) approximation mechanism, matching the best known bounds for the single-item setting.

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Chen, Xujin, Xiaodong Hu, Tie-Yan Liu, Weidong Ma, Tao Qin, Pingzhong Tang, Changjun Wang e Bo Zheng. "Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling". Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 56 (27 de julho de 2016): 429–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.5100.

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This paper concerns the mechanism design for online scheduling in a strategic setting. In this setting, each job is owned by a self-interested agent who may misreport the release time, deadline, length, and value of her job, while we need to determine not only the schedule of the jobs, but also the payment of each agent. We focus on the design of incentive compatible (IC) mechanisms, and study the maximization of social welfare (i.e., the aggregated value of completed jobs) by competitive analysis. We first derive two lower bounds on the competitive ratio of any deterministic IC mechanism to characterize the landscape of our research. We then propose a deterministic IC mechanism and show that such a simple mechanism works very well for both the preemption-restart model and the preemption-resume model. We show the mechanism can achieve the optimal competitive ratio of 5 for equal-length jobs and a near optimal competitive ratio (within a constant factor) for unequal-length jobs.

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Savina, S. V. "MECHANISM SETTING MINIMUM WAGE: WORLD PECULIARITIES AND RUSSIAN FEATURES". Social & labor researches 40, n.º 3 (2020): 112–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.34022/2658-3712-2020-40-3-112-122.

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Amaya, Carlos Andrés. "Interest rate setting and the colombian monetary transmission mechanism". Ensayos sobre Política Económica, n.º 36 (junho de 2006): 48–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.32468/espe.5002.

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ANDERSON, J. T. "SCALE-SETTING WITHOUT THE HIGGS MECHANISM: NON-ABELIAN SYMMETRY". International Journal of Modern Physics A 07, n.º 01 (10 de janeiro de 1992): 201–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217751x92000132.

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For the non-Abelian Higgs model it is shown that the coupled equations of motion for Aμ, ϕ and ϕ* have nonanalytic singularities which must be removed if the equations are integrable. Current conservation is found to remove the singularities in the vector-field equation and give a mass scale independent of V and the Higgs mechanism. The self-consistent field solutions for Aμ and the ϕ fields give either (1) the Higgs mechanism, zero current and the pure-gauge solution, or (2) nonzero current, a gauge-covariant solution and the mass scale independent of V and the Higgs mechanism.

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Abe, Takaaki, Yukihiko Funaki e Taro Shinoda. "Invitation Games: An Experimental Approach to Coalition Formation". Games 12, n.º 3 (17 de agosto de 2021): 64. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g12030064.

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This paper studies how to form an efficient coalition—a group of people. More specifically, we compare two mechanisms for forming a coalition by running a laboratory experiment and reveal which mechanism leads to higher social surplus. In one setting, we invite the subjects to join a meeting simultaneously, so they cannot know the other subjects’ decisions. In the other setting, we ask them sequentially, which allows each subject to know his or her predecessor’s choice. Those who decide to join the meeting form a coalition and earn payoffs according to their actions and individual preferences. As a result, we obtain the following findings. First, the sequential mechanism induces higher social surplus than the simultaneous mechanism. Second, most subjects make choices consistent with the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the sequential setting and choose the dominant strategy in the simultaneous setting, when a dominant strategy exists. Finally, when the subjects need to look further ahead to make a theoretically rational choice, they are more likely to fail to choose rationally.

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Zhang, Hanrui, Yu Cheng e Vincent Conitzer. "Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, n.º 6 (18 de maio de 2021): 5789–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16725.

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We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove hardness results when the revelation principle does not necessarily hold, as well as when types have even minimally different preferences. In light of these hardness results, we focus on truthful mechanisms in the setting where all types share the same preference over outcomes, which is motivated by applications in, e.g., strategic classification. We present a number of algorithmic and structural results, including an efficient algorithm for finding optimal deterministic truthful mechanisms, which also implies a faster algorithm for finding optimal randomized truthful mechanisms via a characterization based on the notion of convexity. We then consider a more general setting, where the principal's cost is a function of the combination of outcomes assigned to each type. In particular, we focus on the case where the cost function is submodular, and give generalizations of essentially all our results in the classical setting where the cost function is additive. Our results provide a relatively complete picture for automated mechanisms design with partial verification.

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Henmi, Nobuhiko, e Michihiko Tanaka. "Amplifying Mechanism Vibration Settling by External Impact Damper". International Journal of Automation Technology 3, n.º 3 (5 de maio de 2009): 304–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/ijat.2009.p0304.

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Displacement amplifying mechanism for piezoelectric actuators using an elastic guide, such as parallel translation with flexure hinges, to avoid solid-friction-induced stick-slip movement has poor damping. Residual vibration lengthens settling time in quick driving. An impact damper uses collision energy rather than friction to dissipate vibration and operates without compromising the flexure guide’s non-stick-slip movement. Impact dampers are divided into external and loading impact dampers. An external impact damper is applied here to settle transient amplifying-mechanism vibration and to determine differences in damping by setting damper conditions appropriately. The impact damper effectively eliminates residual vibration in the step response.

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Narayana, Sushirdeep, e Ian A. Kash. "Fair and Efficient Allocations with Limited Demands". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, n.º 6 (18 de maio de 2021): 5620–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16706.

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We study the fair division problem of allocating multiple resources among a set of agents with Leontief preferences that are each required to complete a finite amount of work, which we term "limited demands". We examine the behavior of the classic Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF) mechanism in this setting and show it is fair but only weakly Pareto optimal and inefficient in many natural examples. We propose as an alternative the Least Cost Product (LCP) mechanism, a natural adaptation of Maximum Nash Welfare to this setting. We characterize the structure of allocation of the LCP mechanism in this setting, show that it is Pareto efficient, and that it satisfies the relatively weak fairness property of sharing incentives. While we prove that it satisfies the stronger fairness property of (expected) envy freeness in some special cases, we provide a counterexample showing it does not do so in general, a striking contrast to the "unreasonable fairness" of Maximum Nash Welfare in other settings. Simulations suggest, however, that these violations of envy freeness are rare in randomly generated examples.

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Berzins, D. W., S. Abey, M. C. Costache, C. A. Wilkie e H. W. Roberts. "Resin-modified Glass-ionomer Setting Reaction Competition". Journal of Dental Research 89, n.º 1 (4 de dezembro de 2009): 82–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022034509355919.

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Resin-modified glass ionomers (RMGI) set by at least 2 mechanisms dependent upon reactant diffusion prior to gelation. Each reaction’s kinetics and setting mechanism may rely on and/or compete with the other. In this study, we investigated RMGI setting reaction interactions using differential scanning calorimetry (DSC) by varying light-cure initiation times. A RMGI was analyzed with isothermal and dynamic temperature scan DSC with light-curing occurring immediately, or at 5 or 10 minutes after mixing as well as without light-activation. Results show that as time allowed for the acid-base reaction increased, the light-activation polymerization exotherm decreased. Conversely, analysis of DSC data suggests that earlier light-activation may limit the acid-base reaction and result in a different structured material. During early RMGI development, acid-base and light-polymerization reactions compete with and inhibit one another.

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Choi, Yoonseok, e Sunghyun Kim. "Testing an alternative price-setting behavior in the new Keynesian Phillips curve: Extrapolative price-setting mechanism". International Review of Economics & Finance 44 (julho de 2016): 253–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.019.

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Efimova, E. "Setting of Minimal Wages: Foreign Experience and Russian Practice". World Economy and International Relations, n.º 2 (2011): 24–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2011-2-24-35.

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The paper examines and compares the systems of minimum wage settings existing in foreign countries and the Russian Federation. The comparisons are made in the following directions: methods of minimum wage setting, coverage of the employees, frequency of adjustment and availability of sub-minimum rates for young workers. As a result of this analysis the author offers recommendations how to improve the mechanism for setting minimum wages in the Russian Federation at whole and its particular regions.

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Szweda, Jan, Zdenek Poruba, Roman Sikora e Jiří Podešva. "Computational Analysis of Mechanism Operability". Applied Mechanics and Materials 315 (abril de 2013): 879–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.315.879.

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This article deals with a way of interpretation the results of numerical simulations solved for the mechanism of lifting platform. Subject of analysis is the atypical design solution of lifting mechanism with one degree of freedom, which members are connected by revolute joints and linear sliding guidance. The mechanism movement is provided by linear hydromotors. Computational simulations are carried out by FEM, where linear coupling equations are used for modeling of revolute joints and linear sliding guidance is modeled by structural contact of rail and slider. The way of modeling and parameters setting of structural contact significantly affects the stability of numerical solutions and the obtained results. The authors assume that the interpretation of the observed behavior and results of the numerical simulations allow to deduce the mechanism operability and gives a clue for setting the gap of real bounds.

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Kantor, N. "Conditions for the effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting norms of administrative law: concepts and varieties". Analytical and Comparative Jurisprudence, n.º 6 (27 de dezembro de 2023): 451–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.24144/2788-6018.2023.06.77.

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Based on the analysis of various approaches, the conditions of effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting norms of administrative law are outlined: concepts and varieties, and the author's point of view is expressed on some fundamental aspects of the problem. It is noted that the conditions for the effectiveness of the goal-setting mechanism of administrative law norms in comparison with the effectiveness of the legal regulation mechanism, the effectiveness of administrative law norms or their implementation have their own specifics, but in general, the same theoretical models are the basis of their delineation. As the author notes, the conditions for the effectiveness of the goal-setting mechanism of administrative law are circumstances and/or features of reality of a general and special nature that ensure the effectiveness of the goalsetting process of administrative law. Secondly, it is advisable to divide the specified conditions into general and special ones. Among the general conditions for the effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting norms of administrative law, in particular, the following are outlined: compliance of the specified mechanism with general laws and principles of self-organization of society and other systemic phenomena; correlation of the goal-setting mechanism of administrative law norms with the needs of social development; compliance of the goal-setting mechanism with the specific historical conditions of the functioning of administrative law; compliance of the goal-setting mechanism with the real needs and interests of those subjects, the relations between which are regulated by the norms of administrative law, etc. Among the special factors of effectiveness of the mechanism of goal-setting of norms of administrative law, the following can be mentioned: the objective determination of the activity of the law-making subject during the determination of the goal and the assignment of norms of administrative law or their groups; features of administrative lawmaking as a result of the creative process; the level of legal awareness of subjects of relevant administrative legal relations; conformity of the goal-setting mechanism of administrative law norms to the theoretical and practical results of scientific research (social, precise, natural, technical, etc.), the objects of which are simultaneously objects of administrative legal relations, etc.

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Isaieva, N. І. "Strategic Goal-Setting as a System-Creating Factor of Strategizing the Socio-Economic Development of the Country". Business Inform 3, n.º 518 (2021): 6–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.32983/2222-4459-2021-3-6-11.

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The present day strategizing is a single technological complex and a continuous process of creating a National strategy for socio-economic development. The National strategy is a comprehensive document containing the most important directions, mechanisms, methods of public administration, which are based on long-term priorities, goals and objectives of the policy of public authorities. In order to implement the National strategy, documents of the State strategic management system are developed, agreed on long-term socio-economic goals and priorities. Therefore, the creation of a mechanism of goal-setting at the present stage of Ukraine’s development is a key direction in the formation of a strategizing system. The article is concerned with examining the theoretical principles of goal-setting, determining the place and role of strategic goal-setting in the process of strategizing the socio-economic development at the national level. It is substantiated that strategic goal-setting is a system-creating factor of strategizing and a fundamental process of development or actualization of the National strategy and forms a tree of goals consisting of the following mandatory elements: strategic vision, mission, priorities, value, general goal, strategic goals, operational goals. The analysis of problems of goal-setting in the strategies of socio-economic development of Ukraine, including in the regions, is carried out and recommendations for improving the system of strategic goal-setting are proposed. On this basis, the author has developed a comprehensive mechanism of strategic goal-setting for practical use in the process of creating or actualizing the strategies of different levels. The proposed strategic goal-setting mechanism is directed towards taking into account the specifics of an actor of strategizing, defining the conceptual bases for strategizing, formulation and approval of the goal tree in the construction of the National strategy for socio-economic development, and also includes standards for public participation in the process of strategic goal-setting.

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Touriya Bassidi, Lahcen Mountassir, Hicham Banouni, Hassan Nounah e Khalid Bouabid. "Ultrasonic Inspection of the Setting Mechanism of Glass Ionomer Cement". Russian Journal of Nondestructive Testing 56, n.º 12 (dezembro de 2020): 1005–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s1061830920120025.

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Kim, Jaejoong, Sang Wan Lee, Seokho Yoon, Haeorm Park e Bumseok Jeong. "Neurocomputational mechanism of controllability inference under a multi-agent setting". PLOS Computational Biology 17, n.º 11 (9 de novembro de 2021): e1009549. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1009549.

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Controllability perception significantly influences motivated behavior and emotion and requires an estimation of one’s influence on an environment. Previous studies have shown that an agent can infer controllability by observing contingency between one’s own action and outcome if there are no other outcome-relevant agents in an environment. However, if there are multiple agents who can influence the outcome, estimation of one’s genuine controllability requires exclusion of other agents’ possible influence. Here, we first investigated a computational and neural mechanism of controllability inference in a multi-agent setting. Our novel multi-agent Bayesian controllability inference model showed that other people’s action-outcome contingency information is integrated with one’s own action-outcome contingency to infer controllability, which can be explained as a Bayesian inference. Model-based functional MRI analyses showed that multi-agent Bayesian controllability inference recruits the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and striatum. Then, this inferred controllability information was leveraged to increase motivated behavior in the vmPFC. These results generalize the previously known role of the striatum and vmPFC in single-agent controllability to multi-agent controllability, and this generalized role requires the TPJ in addition to the striatum of single-agent controllability to integrate both self- and other-related information. Finally, we identified an innate positive bias toward the self during the multi-agent controllability inference, which facilitated behavioral adaptation under volatile controllability. Furthermore, low positive bias and high negative bias were associated with increased daily feelings of guilt. Our results provide a mechanism of how our sense of controllability fluctuates due to other people in our lives, which might be related to social learned helplessness and depression.

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Ross, D. K. "A mechanism for setting the scale for gauge coupling constants". Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General 21, n.º 4 (21 de fevereiro de 1988): 1103–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/0305-4470/21/4/035.

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Sotomayor, Marilda. "A Dynamic Price-Setting Mechanism for a Hybrid Matching Market". Brazilian Review of Econometrics 23, n.º 2 (2 de novembro de 2003): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.12660/bre.v23n22003.2727.

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After observing the problem of the intimate wear market of Nova Friburgo with the distribution of its product both in Brazil and abroad, we designed a dynamic allocation mechanism that sets the prices according to the demand from the buyers, based on their preferences, and that yields an allocation for the core of the market game in a finite number of steps. With this scheme, all agents are simultaneously present and all sellers sell to both national and international markets. We prove that the core allocation produced by this mechanism provides the lowest price among all outcomes for the core that maintains the same allocations of objects for international buyers as the final allocation. In addition, it coincides with the competitive allocation of minimum price equilibrium, when restricted to the national market, and with the allocation produced by the GaleShapley algorithm (1962), in which buyers make proposals and where there is a convenient tie-breaking rule, when all buyers are from abroad.

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Bondar, Ana-Nicoleta. "Biophysical mechanism of rhomboid proteolysis: Setting a foundation for therapeutics". Seminars in Cell & Developmental Biology 60 (dezembro de 2016): 46–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.semcdb.2016.09.006.

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Ladron de Guevara, P., e P. Patel. "Analysis of Using Irp as A Launch Price Setting Mechanism". Value in Health 20, n.º 9 (outubro de 2017): A744. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jval.2017.08.2063.

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Chen, Xu, Andre Sutrisno e Leslie J. Struble. "Effects of calcium on setting mechanism of metakaolin-based geopolymer". Journal of the American Ceramic Society 101, n.º 2 (6 de outubro de 2017): 957–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jace.15249.

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Das, Sankar Narayan, Swaprava Nath e Indranil Saha. "OMCoRP: An Online Mechanism for Competitive Robot Prioritization". Proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Planning and Scheduling 31 (17 de maio de 2021): 112–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icaps.v31i1.15953.

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We propose a collision-avoiding mechanism for a group of robots moving on a shared workspace. Existing algorithms solve this problem either (a) in an offline manner using the source-destination information of all the robots or (b) in an online manner with cooperative robots. We take a paradigm shift to the setting with competitive robots, that may strategically reveal their urgency of reaching the destinations and design online mechanisms that take decisions on-the-fly, reducing the overhead of an offline planning. We propose a mechanism OMCoRP in this setting that ensures truthful revelation of the robots' priorities using principles of economic theory and provides locally efficient movement of the robots. It is free from collisions and deadlocks, and handles dynamic arrival of robots. In practice, this mechanism gives a smaller delay for robots of higher priority and scales well for a large number of robots without compromising on the path optimality too much.

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Antonova, Anastasiia. "Price-Setting in Ukraine: Evidence from Online Prices". Visnyk of the National Bank of Ukraine, n.º 248 (30 de junho de 2019): 4–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.26531/vnbu2019.248.01.

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This study examines price duration and price-setting mechanisms in Ukraine using web-scraped prices. I found that the mean average duration of prices is about 2 months. Average price duration is lower for those products that are more exposed to temporary price changes (sales). Moreover, imported goods have a higher average price duration compared to domestic goods. In terms of the price-setting mechanism, the data supports timedependent price setting behavior over state-dependent. The evidence of time-dependent price setting is 1) the size of price change being positively related to the age of price; 2) many price changes of a size close to zero; and 3) the hazard function being non-increasing for the whole sample and tends to be flatter within relatively homogeneous groups of products.

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Ma, Tian Yang, e Shi Qi Li. "Analysis Methods of Mechanism Life from its Dynamic Performance". Applied Mechanics and Materials 365-366 (agosto de 2013): 249–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.365-366.249.

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With the dynamic mechanisms requirements on high performance and long Life, a Life-analysis method based on index of its dynamic performance is worked out. By setting a systematic model of mechanism with its parameters, synthesizing characteristic changes of key components as well as its adjustment ability to control the system, different conditions of the mechanisms Life have been worked out. Related tests proved its efficiency.

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Bao, Ergute, Yizheng Zhu, Xiaokui Xiao, Yin Yang, Beng Chin Ooi, Benjamin Hong Meng Tan e Khin Mi Mi Aung. "Skellam mixture mechanism". Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 15, n.º 11 (julho de 2022): 2348–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.14778/3551793.3551798.

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Deep neural networks have strong capabilities of memorizing the underlying training data, which can be a serious privacy concern. An effective solution to this problem is to train models with differential privacy ( DP ), which provides rigorous privacy guarantees by injecting random noise to the gradients. This paper focuses on the scenario where sensitive data are distributed among multiple participants, who jointly train a model through federated learning , using both secure multiparty computation ( MPC ) to ensure the confidentiality of each gradient update, and differential privacy to avoid data leakage in the resulting model. A major challenge in this setting is that common mechanisms for enforcing DP in deep learning, which inject real-valued noise , are fundamentally incompatible with MPC, which exchanges finite-field integers among the participants. Consequently, most existing DP mechanisms require rather high noise levels, leading to poor model utility. Motivated by this, we propose Skellam mixture mechanism (SMM), a novel approach to enforcing DP on models built via federated learning. Compared to existing methods, SMM eliminates the assumption that the input gradients must be integer-valued, and, thus, reduces the amount of noise injected to preserve DP. The theoretical analysis of SMM is highly non-trivial, especially considering (i) the complicated math of DP deep learning in general and (ii) the fact that the mixture of two Skellam distributions is rather complex. Extensive experiments on various practical settings demonstrate that SMM consistently and significantly outperforms existing solutions in terms of the utility of the resulting model.

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Liu, Shangkun, Wei Shen, Chase Q. Wu e Xukang Lyu. "Optimizing Temperature Setting for Decomposition Furnace Based on Attention Mechanism and Neural Networks". Sensors 23, n.º 24 (11 de dezembro de 2023): 9754. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/s23249754.

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The temperature setting for a decomposition furnace is of great importance for maintaining the normal operation of the furnace and other equipment in a cement plant and ensuring the output of high-quality cement products. Based on the principles of deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs), long short-term memory networks (LSTMs), and attention mechanisms, we propose a CNN-LSTM-A model to optimize the temperature settings for a decomposition furnace. The proposed model combines the features selected by Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (Lasso) with others suggested by domain experts as inputs, and uses CNN to mine spatial features, LSTM to extract time series information, and an attention mechanism to optimize weights. We deploy sensors to collect production measurements at a real-life cement factory for experimentation and investigate the impact of hyperparameter changes on the performance of the proposed model. Experimental results show that CNN-LSTM-A achieves a superior performance in terms of prediction accuracy over existing models such as the basic LSTM model, deep-convolution-based LSTM model, and attention-mechanism-based LSTM model. The proposed model has potentials for wide deployment in cement plants to automate and optimize the operation of decomposition furnaces.

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Kong, Yuqing, Grant Schoenebeck, Biaoshuai Tao e Fang-Yi Yu. "Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical Estimation". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, n.º 02 (3 de abril de 2020): 2095–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5583.

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We study learning statistical properties from strategic agents with private information. In this problem, agents must be incentivized to truthfully reveal their information even when it cannot be directly verified. Moreover, the information reported by the agents must be aggregated into a statistical estimate. We study two fundamental statistical properties: estimating the mean of an unknown Gaussian, and linear regression with Gaussian error. The information of each agent is one point in a Euclidean space.Our main results are two mechanisms for each of these problems which optimally aggregate the information of agents in the truth-telling equilibrium:• A minimal (non-revelation) mechanism for large populations — agents only need to report one value, but that value need not be their point.• A mechanism for small populations that is non-minimal — agents need to answer more than one question.These mechanisms are “informed truthful” mechanisms where reporting unaltered data (truth-telling) 1) forms a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium and 2) has strictly higher welfare than any oblivious equilibrium where agents' strategies are independent of their private signals. We also show a minimal revelation mechanism (each agent only reports her signal) for a restricted setting and use an impossibility result to prove the necessity of this restriction.We build upon the peer prediction literature in the single-question setting; however, most previous work in this area focuses on discrete signals, whereas our setting is inherently continuous, and we further simplify the agents' reports.

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Beyhaghi, Hedyeh, Negin Golrezaei, Renato Paes Leme, Martin Pál e Balasubramanian Sivan. "Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms". Operations Research 69, n.º 6 (novembro de 2021): 1805–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2121.

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How to optimize posted price mechanisms? The sequential posted-price (SPP) mechanism is one of the widely used selling mechanisms in practice. In this mechanism, the seller presents each buyer with a price sequentially and the buyer can either accept or reject the mechanism's offer. Despite the widespread use of the SPP mechanism, the problem of optimizing prices in this mechanism has not been fully addressed. In a paper entitled, “Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms,” H. Beyhaghi, N. Golrezaei, R. Paes Leme, M. Pal, and B. Sivan construct SPP mechanisms by considering the best of two simple pricing rules: one that imitates the optimal mechanism and the other that posts a uniform price (same price for every buyer). Their simple pricing rules can be easily generalized to the setting with multiple units and yield the first improvement over long-established approximation factors.

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Pei, Yan. "Algorithmic Mechanism Design of Evolutionary Computation". Computational Intelligence and Neuroscience 2015 (2015): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/591954.

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We consider algorithmic design, enhancement, and improvement of evolutionary computation as a mechanism design problem. All individuals or several groups of individuals can be considered as self-interested agents. The individuals in evolutionary computation can manipulate parameter settings and operations by satisfying their own preferences, which are defined by an evolutionary computation algorithm designer, rather than by following a fixed algorithm rule. Evolutionary computation algorithm designers or self-adaptive methods should construct proper rules and mechanisms for all agents (individuals) to conduct their evolution behaviour correctly in order to definitely achieve the desired and preset objective(s). As a case study, we propose a formal framework on parameter setting, strategy selection, and algorithmic design of evolutionary computation by considering the Nash strategy equilibrium of a mechanism design in the search process. The evaluation results present the efficiency of the framework. This primary principle can be implemented in any evolutionary computation algorithm that needs to consider strategy selection issues in its optimization process. The final objective of our work is to solve evolutionary computation design as an algorithmic mechanism design problem and establish its fundamental aspect by taking this perspective. This paper is the first step towards achieving this objective by implementing a strategy equilibrium solution (such as Nash equilibrium) in evolutionary computation algorithm.

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Ludwig, Jens, Jeffrey R. Kling e Sendhil Mullainathan. "Mechanism Experiments and Policy Evaluations". Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, n.º 3 (1 de agosto de 2011): 17–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.25.3.17.

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Randomized controlled trials are increasingly used to evaluate policies. How can we make these experiments as useful as possible for policy purposes? We argue greater use should be made of experiments that identify the behavioral mechanisms that are central to clearly specified policy questions, what we call “mechanism experiments.” These types of experiments can be of great policy value even if the intervention that is tested (or its setting) does not correspond exactly to any realistic policy option.

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Flammini, Michele, Bojana Kodric e Giovanna Varricchio. "Strategyproof Mechanisms for Friends and Enemies Games". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, n.º 02 (3 de abril de 2020): 1950–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5565.

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We investigate strategyproof mechanisms for Friends and Enemies Games, a subclass of Hedonic Games in which every agent classifies any other one as a friend or as an enemy. In this setting, we consider the two classical scenarios proposed in the literature, called Friends Appreciation (FA) and Enemies Aversion (EA). Roughly speaking, in the former each agent gives priority to the number of friends in her coalition, while in the latter to the number of enemies.We provide strategyproof mechanisms for both settings. More precisely, for FA we first present a deterministic n-approximation mechanism, and then show that a much better result can be accomplished by resorting to randomization. Namely, we provide a randomized mechanism whose expected approximation ratio is 4, and arbitrarily close to 4 with high probability. For EA, we give a simple (1+√2)n-approximation mechanism, and show that its performance is asymptotically tight by proving that it is NP-hard to approximate the optimal solution within O(n1−ɛ) for any fixed ɛ > 0.Finally, we show how to extend our results in the presence of neutrals, i.e., when agents can also be indifferent about other agents, and we discuss anonymity.

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Aziz, Haris, Hau Chan, Barton Lee, Bo Li e Toby Walsh. "Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, n.º 02 (3 de abril de 2020): 1806–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5547.

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We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard. However, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable, and the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time whenever the number of facilities is bounded, or when all facilities have identical capacities. We then consider the problem from a mechanism design perspective where the agents are strategic and need not reveal their true locations. We show that several natural mechanisms studied in the uncapacitated setting either lose strategyproofness or a bound on the solution quality %on the returned solution for the total or maximum cost objective. We then propose new mechanisms that are strategyproof and achieve approximation guarantees that almost match the lower bounds.

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Nur, Rahmat. "Setting The Principles of Democracy in The Appointment of A Single Candidate Spouse of Regional Heads". Jurnal Hukum Volkgeist 5, n.º 2 (24 de junho de 2021): 228–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.35326/volkgeist.v5i2.844.

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This research aims to analyzethe regulation of democratic principles in filling the position of regional head in single candidatepai. This study uses normative juridical research by conducting legal analysis of legislation related to the filling of local government positions and legal issues related to the Decision of the Constitutional Court No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015 on the constitutional requirements of regional head elections (candidates' spouses). The results showed the regulation of democratic principles in filling the position of regional head in the case of a single candidate pair can use two mechanisms, namely using the electoral mechanism (Basedon Law No. 10 of 2016 as a follow-up to the Decision of Mk No. 100/PUU-XIII/2015) or the mechanism of appointment, as long as the appointment is done by officials who have been directly elected. Furthermore, the arrangement of the mechanism of appointing a single candidate of regional head in Indonesia can follow what has been implemented in the United States that implements uncontested elections if after the nomination period ends still produces only one candidate, then the candidate's spouse is immediately considered valid as the spouse of the elected candidate and can be legally appointed as the head of the new period. Filling the position of regional head that there is only 1 (one) candidate pair is using the mechanism of appointment, while if there are 2 (two) pairs of candidates or more still use the election mechanism.

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Dou, Yihua, Huanhuan Pan, Shaokai Tong, Yinping Cao e Wenxiang Gao. "Study on the Interaction Mechanism of Packer Slips and Thick Wall Casing". Open Mechanical Engineering Journal 8, n.º 1 (16 de setembro de 2014): 230–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/1874155x01408010230.

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The slips should go into casing for certain depth to set the packer when well testing, but the casing may be damaged seriously if the setting force is too large. To make known the interaction mechanism of packer and casing, and then provide basis for the choice of hanging load of casing and shape optimization of slips, the maximum hoop stress of casing in the inner wall was deduced by the thick wall theory and the limited setting force was obtained by the strength theory. The changes of the limited setting force of casing with the variable length of packer and the face angle of slip teeth were discussed taking the general packer and casing as example. It was found that the limited setting force of casing increased with the length of slip when the packer and casing kept the same. The shorter the slip, the faster the force grows. Also, the limited setting force of casing increased non-linearly with the face angle of slip teeth. The smaller the angle, the faster the force grows.

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Sari, Candrika Citra. "CONVERSATION ANALYSIS: TURN-TAKING MECHANISM AND POWER RELATION IJ CLASSROOM SETTING". Celtic: A Journal of Culture, English Language Teaching, Literature and Linguistics 7, n.º 2 (23 de dezembro de 2020): 118–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.22219/celtic.v7i2.12598.

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Institutional conversation in the classroom has been known to be fully controlled by the teacher in order to achieve specific goals of the teaching and learning process. This study aims at finding out how teachers manage the flow of classroom interaction, how students may possibly take the floor and issue about power and hierarchy between teacher-students in teacher-fronted whole classroom interaction. The result is expected to give an overview or a reflection on how teachers encourage learning to happen by the way they use their power to manage the turn-taking mechanism in whole-class interaction. The data is in the form of unscripted classroom interaction in the field of language from YouTube. Specifically, the analysis is focussed on analyzing the turn-taking rules in a whole class interaction using Conversation Analysis (CA). The gesture is also one means of communication that accompanied verbal communication, and therefore to enrich the data, the gestures of the participants are also taken into consideration. This study found that teacher and students' turn is asymmetrical. However, the teacher possesses no absolute power in terms of controlling the turn-taking as students appeared to overlap the teacher’s talk to take the turn and try to perform an unfocalized effort to nominate themselves as the first speaker using gestures. The content of teachers’ TCU indicates that the teacher tries to stimulate the students’ critical thinking by posting an open-ended question, and evaluates and responds to students’ answers by using a follow-up question.

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Wang, Hai, Qian Jin Mao, Yue Gao, Zi Ming Wang e Su Ping Cui. "Effect and Mechanism of Sodium Fluosilicate on Setting Time of Cement". Materials Science Forum 898 (junho de 2017): 1978–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/msf.898.1978.

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Sodium fluosilicate (Na2SiF6) is prepared from by-product of phosphate fertilizer production. According to a certain percentage of Na2SiF6 mixed in the cement, the influence of different dosages on the setting time of cement under different water-cement ratio was discussed, and the effect of different forms of fluoride compounds on the setting time of cement were compared. The effect and mechanism of sodium fluosilicate on the hydration products of cement were researched by using the X-ray diffraction analysis and micro electron microscope. Experimental results show that the retarding effect of sodium fluosilicate on the coagulation time had a critical effect, and beyond a certain value, it sharply decreased the setting time. The critical dosage increased with the increase of water-cecment ratio. Compared with the retarding effect of Na2SiF6、MgSiF6、NaF and CaF2 on the coagulation time of cement, Na2SiF6 was the best. The incorporation of Na2SiF6 does not change the types of the hydration products, the main function of FN is hydrolyzed with Ca2+ ions to form CaF2 with a very low solubility.

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Cogswell, Lucy, e Rob McCulloch. "Extensor mechanism reconstruction in the setting of infected total knee arthroplasty". Journal of Bone and Joint Infection 5, n.º 4 (12 de junho de 2020): 184–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.7150/jbji.47622.

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