Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Plato. Republic"

CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO<br>A proximidade entre matemática e filosofia em Platão é algo historicamente estabelecido e que pode ser constatado desde o primeiro contato com a sua obra e com as linhas gerais de seu pensamento. Nesse sentido, encontramos em alguns dos seus principais Diálogos, particularmente em A República, concepções sobre a natureza da matemática relacionadas, sobretudo, à metodologia matemática. Na República Platão aborda criticamente aspectos referentes ao método e ao status epistemológico das disciplinas matemáticas em dois momentos. O primeiro no Livro VI, na célebre passagem da Linha Dividida (509d - 511e), e o segundo no Livro VII, por ocasião da descrição do programa de estudos preparatórios à dialética (521c-534e) e, em ambos, considerando-se o que Platão diz em outras oportunidades, o teor da crítica platônica surpreende. Na Linha, as disciplinas matemáticas são descritas como formas de conhecimento intermediárias entre a opinião e a dialética, a única a merecer o título de ciência legítima. No Livro VII para ilustrar a distinção entre o conhecimento alcançado pelas disciplinas matemáticas, de um lado, e pela dialética, de outro, é dito que apesar de apreender alguma coisa da essência o matemático estaria para o dialético como aquele que dorme e sonha está para aquele que está acordado e vivendo a realidade (533b - 534e). O objetivo desse trabalho, portanto, é investigar por que Platão considera as matemáticas ciências intermediárias e qual a noção de conhecimento que serve de critério para essa classificação.<br>The proximity between mathematics and philosophy in Plato is something historically acknowledged and that can be verified from the first contact with his work and with the general lines of his thought. Thus, one can find in some of his main Dialogues, particularly in the Republic, conceptions on the nature of mathematics mainly related to the mathematical methodology. In the Republic Plato approaches critically aspects regarding the method and the epistemological status of the mathematical disciplines in two moments. The first in Book VI, in the famous fragment of the Divided Line (509d - 511e), and the second in Book VII, while describing the program of preparatory studies to dialectics (521c-534e) and, in both cases, considering what Plato says in other fragments, the character of Plato s criticism surprises. In the Line, the disciplines of mathematics are described as a way of knowledge in-between opinion and dialectics, the last being the only one entitled to be considered a legitimate science. In Book VII, in order to show the distinction between the knowledge reached by mathematical disciplines, on one side, and the dialectics, on another, it is stated that despite learning some of the essence, the mathematician is for the dialectical as one who sleeps and dreams is for those who are awake and living reality itself (533b 534e). Therefore, the aim of this work is to investigate why Plato considers the disciplines of mathematics in-between sciences and what notion of knowledge was used as the criteria for that classification.

Orientador: Alcides Hector Rodriguez Benoit<br>Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas<br>Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T10:22:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 AraujoJunior_AnastacioBorgesde_D.pdf: 7995905 bytes, checksum: a9ad53c84d6a6ce4486337a449ef5cc1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2005<br>Resumo: Este trabalho trata do problema do não-ser na ontologia de Platão, a partir dos diálogos 'República', V (475 dI - 480 a13) e 'Timeu' (47 e3 - 52 d4). Com relação ao trecho da 'República', apresenta um exame do seu sentido ético-político - caracterizar o filósofo como aquele apto para governar a cidade fundada em argumentos racionais - assim como o seu sentido epistemológico - discriminar o ser e o parecer, ou seja, determinar a ciência e a opinião. Mas, o sentido ontológico da realidade do não-ser, estabelecido nessa passagem, não parece evidente. A pesquisa mostra, então, que há uma aporia ontológica contida na suposição da realidade do nãoser e que, esta paradoxal realidade aponta, a partir do testemunho de Aristóteles, para o diálogo 'Timeu', no qual Platão parece avançar nessa mesma aporia, ao estabelecer o não-ser como algo, originariamente, indeterminado, um ser noutro sentido, uma espécie de receptáculo que abriga em si todas as coisas que vem a ser, dando-Ihes morada temporária. Dessa perspectiva, o suposto dogmatismo platônico estaria acolhendo a possibilidade de algo impensável no ser, enquanto totalidade do que é. No extremo, a pesquisa sugere que Platão, no 'Timeu', reconhece que a inteligência tenha sido forçada a admitir, através do conceito de chôra, o ininteligível, o mistério do ser<br>Abstract: This work deals with the problem of non-being in Plato's ontology based on the dialogues in the 'Republie', V (475dl-480a13) and the 'Timaeus' (47 e3 - 52 d4). In relation to the passage in the 'Republie', it presents an examination of the ethie-politieal meaning - eharaeterizes the philosopher as the one able to govern the eity that was funded in rational arguments - as well as the its epistemologieal meaning -deseribe the being and the appearance, that is to say, to determine the science and the opinion. However, the ontologieal meaning of the reality of the non-being, whieh is established in this passage, doesn't seem evident. The researeh shows that there is an ontologieal aporia in the supposition of the reality of the non-being and that this paradoxal reality, based on Aristotle, points to the dialogue 'Timaeus' in whieh Plato seems to advanee in the same aporia when he identifies the non-being as something originally undetermined, a being in other sense, a sort of reeeiver that shelters in itself all the things that are be, giving them temporary residenee. In this perspeetive, the supposed platonie dogmatism would be aeeepting the possibility of something unthinkable about on the being, while totality of what is. In an extreme, this researeh suggest that Plato, in the 'Timaeus', reeognizes that the intelligenee might have been foreed to admit, through the eoneept of chôra, the unintelligible, the mystery of the being<br>Doutorado<br>Historia da Filosofia Antiga<br>Doutor em Filosofia

Myth and Argument in Plato's Phaedrus, Republic, and Phaedo investigates the role played by eschatological myth in the arguments of Plato's Phaedrus, Republic and Phaedo. It argues that a reconsideration of the agenda followed by Socrates in each of these dialogues brings into view the contribution made by the mythological narrative to their argumentative line. Each of the three chapters of my thesis analyses the nature of this contribution. The first chapter argues that the myth occupying the central pages of the Phaedrus contributes to developing one of the themes addressed in the dialogue, namely a link between the divine realm and the activities thought by Phaedrus to be unrelated to the religious sphere. By showing that Eros fosters imitation of the gods, the palinode makes an important contribution to this topic. The second chapter proposes that the myth of Er and passage 608c2-621d3 in which it is included are an essential part of the line of argument of the Republic. I analyse the aims Socrates sets in Book 2 for his investigation into justice, and show that they include the description of the positive consequences of justice along with the benefits it causes in and by itself. By listing the rewards just people will receive from other people and the gods, passage 608c2-621d3 gives a description of the positive consequences of justice. The third chapter argues that the argumentative line followed in the Phaedo finds its culmination in the eschatological myth. Socrates expresses a hope for post-mortem justice in his defence of the philosophical life. To render it plausible to his interlocutors he needs to show that the soul is both immortal and intrinsically intelligent. After vindicating these notions, Socrates presents in the concluding myth the image of an afterlife governed by ethical principles.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-29T15:08:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_5372_Imagem e imitação na Republica.pdf: 458238 bytes, checksum: 81ccd2881531646c674e3a31c21adbca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-24<br>Pretendemos com nosso estudo propor uma aproximação entre a arte e o pensamento antigo a partir das considerações platônicas sobre a mímesis, presentes nos Livros II e III, do diálogo a República, mais especificamente, nas passagens sobre a parte inicial da educação dos guardiões. Abordaremos o princípio da proposta paidêutica platônica procurando assinalar o seu caráter estético, calcado na dimensão sensível da pólis. Analisaremos a importância atribuída aos mitos, enquanto imagens privilegiadas da formação, e o lugar da mímesis nesta etapa do processo, que visa em última instância o amor ao belo.<br>We pretend in our study to propose a link between art and the ancient thinking through Plato’s considerations about mimesis, which are described on the Books II and III of the Republic dialogue. We will approach the principle of the platonic paideutic proposal highlighting its esthetic features, based on the sensible dimension of the Polis. We will analyze the importance given to the myths, as privileged images of the formation, and the position of mimesis on this process, which aims ultimately the love to the beauty.

AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS OF ASTERIOS STAMATIKOS, for the Master of Philosophy degree in Philosophy, presented on October 14, 2014, at Southern Illinois University Carbondale. "FIGHTING THE GOOD FIGHT: ΘΎΜΟϚ IN THE REPUBLIC" MAJOR PROFESSOR: Dr. Thomas Alexander This paper shows that the spirted part of the soul should be ranked above the appetitive part of the soul, according to the standards Plato set forth in The Republic. Plato exalted the rational part of the soul, but he likened the spirited part of the soul to the rational part in various ways. The moral goodness of the spirited part of the soul can be shown through the ways it is similar to the rational part. These ways include the similarities between the regimes based on the rational and spirited part of the soul, as well as the characteristics of the spirited part of the soul, which make it auxiliary to the rational part of the soul. The spirited part of the soul fights against injustice within the soul, allying itself with the rational part against the desirous part; spiritedness also rises up when it perceives evil external to the soul. The way in which Plato exalted the rational part of the soul allows for an argument like this to be made. One way he shows the superiority of the rational part of the soul is by condemning the other two parts. Plato praised the spirited part of the soul for the most part though, and some of the characteristics he attributed to the spiritedness were in accord with the virtues and social order of classical Athens.

Traditional interpretations of Plato see him either as an enemy of the imagination in his views of philosophic discussion, or as a purveyor of imaginative lies in his authoritarian and anti-democratic view of politics. Instead this thesis challenges both these interpretations by showing how the imagination is both philosophical and democratically political. In the Republic images and stories balance and enrich rational argumentation. I first analyze the imaginary aspects of Plato's ideal city. Secondly, I look more closely to the role of images in education and poetry by focusing on Plato's distinction between good and bad images. Thirdly, I discuss the role of images in relation to notions of the ideal and democracy. I propose that images are crucial in crafting and acquiring a vision of the ideal in speech. Finally, I end by stressing that philosophic discussion, and its use of images, not only contains democratic elements but that it also is more likely to thrive in a democratic space and context, marked by freedom of speech and pluralism.

O presente trabalho tem por objeto de estudo os usos do conceito de eleuthería na República de Platão. Tem-se por ponto de partida uma gama de conceitos relativos à noção de liberdade na antiguidade, propondo-se a analisar o diálogo segundo duas concepções antagônicas de eleuthería. A primeira delas é a mais comum na abordagem dos diálogos platônicos, trata-se da ideia de fazer o que se quer e esse sentido é encontrado, sobretudo, no exame da forma de governo democrática e do homem que corresponde a esse regime político. Para uma compreensão adequada desse sentido, propõe-se que se entenda o que está em jogo quando se tece uma crítica ao regime democrático. Esse sentido é tido como essencialmente negativo, pois traz consequências indesejáveis dentro do contexto em que é apresentado. Supõe-se que haja um outro sentido de eleuthería presente no diálogo, o qual não é tratado sistematicamente e que é apenas sugerido nas entrelinhas da mais bela cidade, a kallípolis. Diante da necessidade de mostrar que esse sentido pode integrar a economia da obra, parte-se de indícios textuais nos quais a liberdade não está associada à forma de governo democrática para mostrar que a caracterização de uma liberdade positiva parece ser possível. Esse sentido positivo estaria associado a um certo ideal de excelência. Por fim, sugere-se que de acordo com esse sentido positivo a expressão fazer o que se quer possa ser interpretada de uma forma completamente diversa da encontrada no contexto democrático.<br>The present work has as object of study the uses of the concept of eleuthería in Plato\'s Republic. As starting point we have a wide range of concepts related to the notion of freedom in antiquity, it is proposed the analysis of the dialogue according to two antagonical concepts of eleuthería. The first is the most common in Plato\'s dialogues, it is the idea of \"to do whatever one wants\" and this meaning is found, above all, when examining the democratic government and the corresponding man to this political regime. For an adequate comprehension of this meaning, it is proposed the understanding of what is at stake when a critique of the democratic regime is made. This meaning is held essentially as negative because it brings undesirable consequences in the context in which it is presented. It is supposed that there is other meaning of eleuthería present in the dialogue which is not sistematically addressed and is only suggested between the lines of the most beautiful city, the kallípolis. Facing the necessity of showing that this meaning can integrate the economy of the work, starting from textual indications in which freedom is not associated to the democratic way of government to show that the characterization of a positive freedom seems possible. This positive meaning could be associated to a certain ideal of excellency. In the end it is suggested that, according to this meaning the expression \"to do whatever one wants\" could be interpreted in a completely diverse way of the meaning found in the democratic context.

O objetivo deste trabalho pode ser resumido na tarefa de expor a análise que Platão faz da &#956;&#959;&#957;&#963;&#953;&#954;&#951; nos Livros II e III da República, demonstrando o papel central que desempenha na educação dos jovens e, por conseguinte, na constituição da &#960;&#959;&#955;&#953;&#964;&#949;&#953;&#953; , quais seus objetivos, e de que modo serve à relativização dos argumentos dirigidos contra a poesia no Livro X.<br>The aim of this work may be reduced to the task of presenting Platos analysis of &#956;&#959;&#957;&#963;&#953;&#954;&#951; in Republic II and III, demonstrating the central role it plays on the education of the young and thus, on the constitution of the &#960;&#959;&#955;&#953;&#964;&#949;&#953;&#953; , which are its objectives, and how it can mitigate Books X claims against poetry