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1
Mironova, E. M. "Russian Political Delegation, 1919–1920". Modern History of Russia 11, n.º 4 (2021): 871–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.403.
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Using materials from Russian archives as well as from the Leeds Russian Archive (Great Britain), this article traces stages of activity of the Russian Political Delegation (RPD). The Delegation was established in 1919 by the Russian Political Meeting (RPM) in Paris for direct participation in the Versailles Peace Conference. Its activities were authorized by Admiral Kolchak, Supreme Ruler of Russia. The article covers the formation of the RPD, which included Prince Lvov, N. V. Tchaikovsky, V. A. Maklakov, and S. D. Sazonov. Due to circumstances beyond its control, the Delegation did not get the opportunity to participate in the conference, and its international activities were quite limited. However, after the dissolution of the Russian Political Meeting, the Russian Political Delegation continued its activities, claiming the status of the foreign center of a White Movement. Its ranks aggravated the split between public figures and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Movement: social activists wanted the government of Omsk to remove S. D. Sazonov. Admiral Kolchak decided to retain control of his government over foreign missions, keep S. D. Sazonov as Minister, and asked the delegation to continue its work. In fact, in late 1919 and early 1920, the Russian Political Delegation managed to head the foreign mission of the White Movement. However, it was unable to cope with problems standing on its agenda. G. E. Lvov and N. V. Tchaikovsky, who used the situation of the Delegation members to influence affairs, diligently supported its existence. The last statements of the Russian Political Delegation refer to the end of 1920, the period of evacuation of the Wrangel’s army from Crimea. Analysis of the RPD’s activities provides an insight into challenges that in general were characteristic of the Movement and that eventually played their role in its defeat.
2
Baigorri-Jalón, Jesús. "Conference Interpreting in the First International Labor Conference (Washington, D. C., 1919)". Meta 50, n.º 3 (2 de novembro de 2005): 987–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/011609ar.
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Abstract Conference interpreting began at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where the League of Nations (LN) and its offsprings, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour Organization (ILO), were designed as tools of a new diplomacy by conferences. This meant the end of the virtual monopoly of French as the language of diplomacy and the presence of interpreters mediating between languages. This paper examines the context of the 1919 Washington International Labor Conference (ILC), the interpreting services, the interpreters’ working conditions, and proposes some conclusions. Sources include published records of the plenary meetings of the Washington ILC and unpublished documents from the Personnel files and other material from the archives of the ILO and the LN in Geneva.
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TREMBETSKYI, Andriy. "DMYTRO VITOVSKYI IN THE UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHIC DISCOURSE OF THE 1920–1930". Contemporary era 10 (2022): 275–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.33402/nd.2022-10-275-286.
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The paper analyzes investigations on the public, military, and state-making activities of Dmytro Vitovskyi (1887–1919) in the Ukrainian historiography of the interwar period of the 20th century. As noted, the first steps in analyzing the biography of the famous and reputable member of the Sich Rifleman, the State Secretary of Military Affairs of ZUNR were made in the 1920–1930s. It was during this period that scientists, social and political figures, and military associates distinguished the main thematic blocks of D. Vitovskyi's life path: 1) family environment, education; 2) participation in the USS Legion on the fronts of World War I; 3) cultural and educational work in Volyn and Podillia in 1916–1918; 4) organization and implementation of the November Uprising of 1918; 5) work as the State Secretary of Military Affairs of ZUNR (ZOUNR); 6) participation in Ukrainian delegation of the UNR at the Paris Peace Conference (May 1919–July 1919). The author characterizes the first article that started studies on the military and socio-political activities of D. Vitovskyi, written by an unknown author (probably an editor of the newspaper «Ukrainian Flag» Stepan Baran) titled «On August 4, 1919, died with a tragic death, by falling from an aircraft broken by the Polish border guard near Ratibor in Prussian Silesia, one of the leaders of the Halychyna-Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyi». The contribution to the research of Dmytro Vitovskyi's life of Mykhailo Lozynskyi, Vasyl Kuchabskyi, Ivan Krypiakevych, Myron Zaklynskyi, Osyp Dumin, authors of numerous memorists – Sich Riflemen members – is clarified. As investigated, the most fully military and public activities of D. Vitovskyi covered his friend from the USS Legion M. Zaklynskyi, while other authors focused on particular periods of his biography. Much attention from scientists and memorists was devoted to the moral and psychological traits of D. Vitovskyi in various military and everyday situations, and his ability to unite the team. Keywords Dmytro Vitovskyi, USS Legion, ZUNR, historiography.
4
Hovhannisyan, Lilit. "Cilicia in the Documents of the U.S. State Department in 1919−1920". Ցեղասպանագիտական հանդես 10, n.º 1 (20 de maio de 2022): 40–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.51442/jgs.0027.
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The diplomatic documents from the U.S. Department of State stored at the National Archives of the USA in Washington and Republic of Armenia in Yerevan, which were officially published in volumes by the U.S. Government yet in 1931-1947, contain remarkable material on Cilicia. They throw light upon the negotiations between the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and delegations representing those countries at the 1919-1920 Paris International Peace Conference on political status and borders of Cilicia, establishment of a mandate for it, withdrawal of British troops from the region, occupation of Cilicia and Syria by French troops. The documents of the State Department reveal the contradictions between the Great Powers on the above-mentioned issues, describe their interests in the region. Records for the meetings of the Council of Ten of February 4, Council of Four of March 20, May 14, 21, 31 and Council of Five of July 18, August 25, 1919 are valuable from this point of view. The “Scheme for settlement in the Turkish Empire” of May 21, 1919, reflects the position of the Prime Minister of Great Britain D. Lloyd George on Cilicia. The U.S. President W. Wilson’s approaches concerning Cilicia are reflected in reports of the U.S. Commissioners in Turkey C. Crane and H. King of August 28, 1919, and the chief of the military mission to Armenia General J. Harbord of October 16, 1919. The difficulty of the Turkish border demarcation through Cilicia is presented in a note issued by the Allied Supreme Council on April 26, 1920, to U.S. Secretary of State B. Colby. The U.S. State Department diplomatic documents confirm that the Allies were practically not interested in resolving the issue of ensuring the security of Cilicia and its Armenian population. Based on the 1916 Sykes-Picot Anglo-French secret agreement, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres provided for the transference of the mandate of Cilicia to France. It became the beginning of handing over the land to the Kemalist Turkey. Thus France, seeking to receive its state debt from Turkey, became an accomplice to the new genocide of Cilicia Armenians.
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PETRÁŠ, René. "Organisational aspects of the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)". Central European Papers 3, n.º 2 (1 de setembro de 2015): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.25142/cep.2015.016.
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DRECIN, Mihai D. "FREEMASONRY AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (JANUARY 1919 – JUNE 1920)". Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archaeology 12, n.º 2 (2020): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.56082/annalsarscihist.2020.2.21.
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The Romanian delegation - headed by Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu - accompanied by other well-known Romanian figures who were not part of the delegation, but represented the Romanian elite who had emigrated to the French capital, attended the Paris Peace Conference and recognised that the political decisions concerning the future borders of the nations emerging from the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire were made by the Roman Catholic Church, the Freemasonry and the Jewish Youth Organisation. These were the institutions behind the political decisions made by the political leaders of France (Georges Clémenceau), Great Britain (Sir David Lloyd George), the United States of America (Woodrow Wilson), and Italy (Vittorio Emanuele Orlando). When, after a conflict with the then French Prime Minister, who was failing to observe the provisions of the August 1916 Treaty concluded between Romania and the Triple Entente, Ion I.C. Brătianu left Paris, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod became his successor as head of the Romanian delegation. The Transylvanian political leader and some of his close associates would also become members of the Ernest Renan Masonic lodge in Paris, on 4 August 1919. The decision was made by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod after extensive consultations with Ion I.C. Brătianu, who had returned to Bucharest by then, and Iuliu Maniu, the Chairman of the Ruling Council in Sibiu. The masonic involvement of the Romanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was proof of the diplomatic abilities of its members as well as of the perfect cooperation with the local political decisionmakers, with the purpose of adjusting to the then current international context to the benefit of the country’s national interests. After Romania and Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon (4 July 1920) whose clauses were favourable to Romania, the Romanian freemasons would leave their Masonic lodges in the coming years.
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Dervishi, Erjon. "THE ALBANIAN QUESTION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE DURING 1919-1920". Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, Institute for Research and European Studies - Bitola 2 (2020): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.47305/jlia2020123d.
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Miazga, Nikolai. "Paris Peace Conference of 1919–1920 and Prospects of the Belarusian Statehood". Metamorphoses of history, n.º 23 (2022): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.37490/mh2022232.
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One of the most important outcomes of the First World War was the collapse of empires that existed in Central and Eastern Europe. The Entente countries and the United States at the final stage of the war put forward the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination. This created prerequisites for building of their statehood by a number of peoples of the region. Belarusians were among them. The BPR (Belarusian People's republic) and SSRB were proclaimed. The process of formation of the Belarusian national statehood took place in the context of new system of international relations formation and its success largely depended on foreign policy conditions. The main elements of a new international order for Europe were laid down at the Paris Conference. The "Belarusian" question did not receive an independent sound in Paris. The interests of Belarus were touched upon when the participants of the conference discussed "Polish" and "Russian" issues that were closely related to each other. The problem of defining the Polish eastern borders was of crucial importance for Belarus. The Entente states stood for the formation of an independent Polish state within ethnic borders. This created prerequisites for preserving the territorial integrity of Belarus. However, the Polish ruling circles overcame the negative attitude of the Entente towards the expansion of Poland beyond its ethnic borders with the help of a fait accompli policy. At the same time, the Poles positioned the concept of the federation in front of the Entente as realization of the right of the "Eastern Kresy" peoples, including Belarusians, to self-determination. The Polish expansion to the east did not meet real opposition from the Entente, as it was interested in Poland as an anti-Bolshevik force, an element of the "sanitary cordon". The BNR delegation, which arrived in Paris, did not find support from Western politicians in recognizing the independence of the Belarusian state. The decisions of the Paris Conference provided for the preservation of the integrity of Belarus, but not as an independent state, but as part of Russia.
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Barwiński, Marek. "Nationality issues on Polish maps prepared for the Paris Peace Conference 1919–1920". Polish Cartographical Review 55, n.º 1 (1 de janeiro de 2023): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pcr-2023-0009.
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Abstract The military and political outcome of World War I, and the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference, offered a real chance for the rebirth of Polish statehood. A key issue was the justification of Poland’s future territorial shape, in which ethnic issues played a significant role alongside historical, economic and strategic criteria. The aim of this paper is to show and discuss selected archival nationality maps, often of an expert nature, produced by Polish scholars for the purpose of negotiating the territorial extent of Poland during the Paris Peace Conference. To what extent were they an attempt at an objective representation of the national reality of the Polish territory, and to what a subjective perception and experience of space by the authors of the maps? What were the aims and ideas of their creators, what did they want to achieve? To what extent did the political reality of the time determine their behaviour?
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Cojocaru, Gheorghe. "Great Britain and the Paris treaty of Bessarabia of October 28, 1922. 100 years after the ratification". Revista de istorie a Moldovei, n.º 1-2(129-130) (novembro de 2022): 117–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.58187/rim.129-130.05.
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This article analyzes the position of Great Britain towards the union of Bessarabia with the mother country, Romania, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920. It is emphasized that English diplomacy firmly supported Romania’s rights over its province between the Prut and Dniester, also formulating certain conditionalities that the Romanian government had to take into account. England had a primary role in the drafting and signing of the Paris Treaty of Bessarabia on October 28, 1920. Among the Great Powers that signed the Treaty, Great Britain was the first to ratify it in 1922, urging the rest of the signatories to follow suit.
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Calcan, Gheorghe. "The International Image of Ion I. C. Brătianu in 1919". International conference KNOWLEDGE-BASED ORGANIZATION 23, n.º 2 (25 de junho de 2017): 265–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/kbo-2017-0125.
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Abstract Our paper aims to present how Ion I. C. Brătianu was perceived outside national borders in a very important moment of the Romanian national history, namely the international recognition of the Great Union, within the Peace Conference at Paris-Versailles in 1919 -1920. Ion I. C. Brătianu was at that moment Prime Minister and the leader of the Romanian delegation at Versailles. Foreign countries perceived him as a very powerful personality, capable to influence other states with similar interests in Central and South Eastern Europe. Brătianu stoutly and patriotically defended the Romanian interests. Therefore, although his position was correct, it came into conflict with the interests of the great powers. Brătianu would not give up his principles and decided to leave the Peace Conference. French media was objective in their accounts and proved favourable to the Romanian position.
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Konopska, Beata. "The cartographic materials auxiliary in the determination of the borders of Poland during the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920) in the light of archival records". Polish Cartographical Review 48, n.º 2 (1 de julho de 2016): 67–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pcr-2016-0006.
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Abstract The work indicated in Polish literature as the cartographic basis for the negotiations of Polish issues at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920) is Eugeniusz Romer’s Geograficzno-statystyczny atlas Polski (Geographical and Statistical Atlas of Poland). Given the complicated fate of the atlas, the position of its author in the Polish delegation, and the multidisciplinarity and importance of the conference, it is worth considering whether this atlas really played such an important role, or whether this is merely a statement, a repeated assignment of this role, to stave off concealment or lack of knowledge about other cartographic materials developed and used for the same purpose. Therefore, the main aim of this study was to determine the level of use of cartographic documents other than the Geographical and Statistical Atlas of Poland in lobbying and official negotiations of Polish issues before and during the Paris Peace Conference. The research task was associated with an extensive archival query, which confirmed the fact that dozens of maps survived, mainly manuscripts, which were prepared before and during the conference. It should be concluded that the maps of E. Romer’s atlas constituted one set of many equally important cartographic documents which were used by the negotiators at the Paris Peace Conference.
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Aleksander Moisiu, Vice Rector. "PROJECTS OF THE GREAT POWERS AND LITTLE ALBANIA 1919-1920 PROF. ASS. DR. LAVDOSH AHMETAJ",. EPH - International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 4, n.º 1 (10 de fevereiro de 2019): 10–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.53555/eijhss.v4i1.70.
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To complete the peace treaties with the countries that had lost the war and to better organize their post-war interests, prone to these interests, the five great winning powers made possible the organization of the Peace Conference, which opened on 18 January 1919 in Paris[1]. England, France, USA, Japan, and Italy struggled with all diplomatic and political means to influence each other in their respective interests. Thus, the main states, which were more voiced, but with more interest than others, dealt with the Albanian issue as a currency between them in order to preserve their interests intact: "on the basis of their general interests "[2].
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Griesser-Pečar, Tamara. "Prvo povojno leto v Evropi in svetu". Studia Historica Slovenica 20 (2020), n.º 2 (30 de setembro de 2020): 335–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.32874/shs.2020-10.
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In 1919 Paris was the centre of the world. At the Peace Conference, which began on January 19, 1919 and ended with the signing of the last treaty with the Ottoman state in August 1920, representatives of the great powers and associated states negotiated not only treaties with the Axis powers but also a new order for Europe and the world in order to bring about world peace in the 20th century. Four empires have disappeared from the map of the world, and many new countries have emerged. At the forefront were Wilson's points, notably the establishment of the League of Nations and the self-determination of nations. They negotiated also about the reparations for war damage, agreeing that the German Empire was responsible for the beginning of the First World War.
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Zawadzki, Mateusz. "Development of metadata for historical cartographic resources associated with the Paris Peace Conference (1919−1920)". Polish Cartographical Review 53, n.º 1 (1 de janeiro de 2021): 77–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pcr-2021-0007.
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Abstract In the era of interdisciplinary research supported by IT solutions, a special role is played by digital source repositories. The digital turn has contributed to their considerable development, and the application of new technologies has largely changed the current methods of research work. This facilitates pooling and structuring dispersed collections e.g. as part of thematic repositories, which collect and share thematically related resources. Metadata, which allow effective searching and identification of resources, are an important element of their function. The objective of the article is to present a procedure for the development of metadata aimed at creation of a thematic database of dispersed sources remaining after the Paris Peace Conference ending World War I. Based on the metadata development procedure, the author discusses the diagnosed problems associated with e.g. the specificity of the analyzed sources.
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SROGOSZ, Tadeusz. "THE MEMBERS AND THE EXPERTS OF THE POLISH DELEGATION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (1919–1920)". Historical archive. Scientific studies, n.º 20 (20 de dezembro de 2019): 84–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.26693/istarhiv2019.20.084.
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Dziedzic, Tadeusz. "David Lloyd George a sprawa polska na konferencji wersalskiej". Miscellanea Historico-Iuridica 19, n.º 2 (2020): 349–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/mhi.2020.19.02.16.
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The Treaty of Versailles was signed after several months of deliberations at a peace conference convened to Paris after the end of World War I on 28 June 1919 in Paris by Germany and the Entente countries. It entered into force on 10 January 1920, i.e., on the day of its ratification. Delegations of 27 winning countries participated in the peace conference in Paris. The treaty completely changed the map of Europe and the prevailing political order. Many small countries found their place on the map, including the Republic of Poland re-emerging on the maps of Europe, although in smaller territorial ownership than before the Partition of Poland. The Polish delegation, including among others: Ignacy Jan Paderewski and Roman Dmowski, tried their best to restore the Poles to their lands. Lands which, as a result of the Partition, came under the rule of three powers, namely: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. However, the peace conference in Paris showed much reluctance on the part of the Big Five, which decided about the fate of post-war Europe towards Poland. Expectations of the Poles that their case would be supported by friendly British, American, or French politicians turned out to be deceptive. Especially the French, who seemed very favourable to Poland, at the peace conference completely obeyed the will of the British, who even intended to prevent the Poles in their quest to restore the pre-partition Polish borders. The British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, who turned out to expose his unfavourable attitude towards the Polish cause, was so uncompromising in his position that no arguments invoked by the Polish delegation appealed to him.
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Mikheiev, Andrii. "The Image of Ukraine in Great Britain during 1919–1920s". Kyiv Historical Studies 12, n.º 1 (2021): 22–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2524-0757.2021.13.
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The article examines the evolution of the image of Ukraine in the intellectual discourse of the British Empire immediately after the First World War, i.e., during 1919–1920s. This period was marked, on the one hand, by the continuation of the national liberation struggle within Ukraine and, on the other hand, by discussions on the post-war arrangement of Europe and the world at the Paris Peace Conference. Great Britain, as one of the victors in the war, as well as one of the most powerful states at the time, took an active part in these discussions, and the future of Ukrainian lands significantly depended on its position. Therefore, it seems interesting to trace the image of Ukraine that has developed among British intellectuals and politicians at this time, because it also made impact on the attitude of British diplomats to the Ukrainian question at the Paris Peace Conference. To achieve that goal, the article will analyze the attempts of the UPR Directory to establish contacts with British diplomats, the works of the famous British geographer and geopolitician Gelford Mackinder, the views of a prominent British statesman of the 20th century, and during 1919–1920s the Minister of War Winston Churchill, a booklet on Ukraine, issued by the Foreign Office in 1920, as well as the position of the then first man in the UK, British Prime Minister David Lloyd-George. Such a comprehensive view will provide a better understanding of the British vision of the Central and Eastern Europe region in general, and Ukraine in particular, in the context of that time.
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Sergeev, Evgeny. "Great Britain and the Russian Question at the Initial Stage of the Paris Peace Conference, 1919—1920". ISTORIYA 10, n.º 6 (80) (2019): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.18254/s207987840006004-3.
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Spytska, Olena. "ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITY OF THE UKRAINIAN DELEGATION MANAGEMENT AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE 1919-1920 FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A NEW HISTORICAL SOURCE". City History, Culture, Society, n.º 5 (8 de novembro de 2018): 188–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/mics2019.05.188.
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The article highlights some organizational activities which provided personnel and financial support for UPR delegation’s work in the Paris Peace Conference 1919–1920. This work consisted of efforts to gain UPR’s independence recognition by leading and others states of the world; to get them to take into consideration interests of the Ukrainian people, because of the postwar geopolitical changes in Central Europe; to cooperate in political, military, commercial and economic fields with other countries. It characterizes main directions of personnel part of this work – the dynamics in personnel changes, efforts to engage qualified specialists and technical workers, control over delegation members’ business trips, financial expenses aimed at executing tasks, which were given to the delegation.
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Jędrzejczyk, Dobiesław. "Geopolitical Essence of Central Europe in Writings of Eugeniusz Romer". Miscellanea Geographica 11, n.º 1 (1 de dezembro de 2004): 199–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/mgrsd-2004-0023.
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Abstract Eugeniusz Romer maintained that the notion of Central Europe, introduced at the end of the 19th century by German geographers was of a distinct geopolitical character. The thesis that Poland is situated in a transitional zone between the Western and the Eastern Europe denies Poland the right to an independent political existence. Romer’s opinion was that the location of Poland is characterised by its bridge-like situation between the Baltic and the Black Seas. This location determines the geopolitical identity of Poland as well as its rights to independence. Romer’s arguments, supported by cartographic, demographic and ethnographic research became the basis for the determination of the area and the borders of Poland at the peace conference in Paris (1919 – 1920).
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Nowak, Andrzej. "Reborn Poland or Reconstructed Empire? Questions on the Course and Results of Polish Eastern Policy (1918–1921)". Lithuanian Historical Studies 13, n.º 1 (28 de dezembro de 2008): 127–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-01301010.
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The article presents the main geopolitical concepts of Polish foreign politics and military strategy between 1918 and 1921. The author discusses two general programmes of policy towards Poland’s neighbours to the East: the ‘federalist’ option associated with Józef Piłsudski, and the ‘incorporationist’ option of Roman Dmowski. The analysis is concentrated around the efforts to realize the former programme. Starting from a detailed analysis of Piłsudski’s instructions to the Polish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference at the end of 1918, through a special mission of Michał Römer sent to Lithuania in April 1919, and reasons of its failure, the author turns to a history of the ‘Ukrainian card’, played by Piłsudski in 1919 and 1920 in order to achieve a geopolitical counter-balance to any Russian/Soviet imperialism. Finally, the article deals with the meaning of the Piłsudski’s eastern policy as one of the main factors which stopped the westward drive of Soviet Russia for the next 20 years.
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Popenko, Ya V., I. V. Sribnyak e V. A. Shatilo. "The Treaty That Was Never Ratified: On the Centenary of the Signing of the Paris Protocol (October 28, 1920)". Rusin, n.º 62 (2020): 88–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/18572685/62/6.
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Romania’s foreign policy during the first decades of the 20th century was not accidental or spontaneous. It was implemented by the leadership of the Kingdom as part of a targeted program for the creation of “Greater Romania.” The foreign policy of Bucharest during the World War and formation of the Versailles system of international relations can be considered as indicative in terms of achieving national interests to gain the regional leader status in the Balkans. The article analyses the struggle around the “Bessarabian question” at the Paris Peace Conference during 1919–1920. This period became decisive for the Romanian Kingdom in the question of the recognition by the international community of its exclusive right to annex Bessarabia. The purposeful work of the Romanian politicians I. Bratianu, A. Vaida-Voevoda, A. Averescu and others in solving the “Bessarabian question” has undoubtedly yielded positive results for Romania. On October 28, 1920, the Paris, or Bessarabian, protocol was signed in Paris to legally recognize the annexation of Bessarabia to the kingdom. Thus, the long and the exhausting struggle of the Romanian diplomacy ended with the victory of Bucharest on the one hand, while on the other, this fateful document was never ratified by the individual participants, which automatically made it legally “incomplete” international act.
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Pater, Ivan. "SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PROCESSES IN GALICIA DURING 1919–1920 IN THE EVHEN CHYKALENKO'S ASSESSMENT (BASED ON "THE DIARY")". Ukraine: Cultural Heritage, National Identity, Statehood 31 (2018): 156–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.33402/ukr.2018-31-156-169.
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This paper reports on views of E. Chykalenko on social and political processes in Galicia at a dramatic time for the Ukrainians. Much attention is given to his contacts with the Galician community in the early ХХ century, help to Dnieper political immigrants in Lviv, anger at the Russian occupation authorities in Galicia during the Great War. It focuses on his perception of the Ukrainian Revolution, refusal to participate in political processes at that time, negative attitude towards the Bolshevik authorities, forced emigration. The author also highlights E. Chykalenko's position to the activities of the Ukrainian National Council (UNR), its president E. Petrushevych, his comparison of Galician and Dnieper social and political life in the Ukrainian dimension. The attitude to the Ukrainian-Polish war, the decisions of the Paris Peace Conference concerning Eastern Galicia, the reflections on the Galician politicians, the struggle of the Galician for state independence are revealed. Keywords Evhen Chykalenko, "The Diary", Galicia, Dnieper Ukraine.
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Marosvári, Attila. "A területgyarapítást célzó román és szerb propaganda Csanád vármegyében". Belvedere Meridionale 34, n.º 3 (2022): 26–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.14232/belv.2022.3.2.
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Csanád county was under Romanian military occupation from the end of April 1919 to the end of March 1920. The only exception to this was Makó, which was under French supervision for about two months, so the town was not taken over by the Romanians until mid-June 1919. The occupation of the county was in keeping with Romanian territorial aspirations, as the memorandum containing their demands for the Paris Peace Conference called for the borders which had been set out in the secret Treaty of Bucharest in August 1916. This would have included the whole of Csanád County. However, the great powers at the peace conference rejected the Romanian demands to annex these thoroughly Hungarian territories, and on June 13, 1919, they drew a narrower demarcation line, essentially corresponding to today’s border, which has not been subsequently changed. Romanian diplomacy, of course, used every means to get the boundary promised in the Treaty of Bucharest, which was much more favorable to them. One way to do this was to take advantage of the dissatisfaction and secessionist aspirations of the nationalities living in the disputed territory. This study takes into account the manifestations of Romanian territorial propaganda in Csanád – and more tangentially in neighboring Békés county – which targeted not only the relatively small number of ethnic Romanians, but also the Slovaks, who formed a slightly larger community. Although the focus of this study is on Romanian propaganda, for the sake of completeness, reference is also made to Serbian propaganda, as the Serbs also had territorial aspirations affecting Csanád county. One of the main findings of the study is that while Romanian propaganda focused primarily on the acquisition of territories, Serbian propaganda focused on winning over the people, which ultimately took the form of strengthening the intentions for the right of option which was also enshrined in the Treaty of Trianon.
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Davydova, T. N. "Relations between Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and France: on Problem of Recognition of ADR Independence at Paris Peace Conference of 1919—1920". Nauchnyy dialog, n.º 3 (2018): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.24224/2227-1295-2018-3-137-148.
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Tatoyan, Robert. "The Issues of the Number of Western Armenians and Ethnic Composition of the Population of Western Armenia at Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)". International Journal of Armenian Genocide Studies 6, n.º 1 (13 de novembro de 2021): 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.51442/ijags.0015.
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References to the issues of the number of Western Armenians and the ratio of Armenians to other ethnic groups in Western Armenia on the eve of the Armenian Genocide occupy a special place in the context of processes related to drafting a peace agreement with the Ottoman Empire and Armenia’s delineation after WWI. These issues were tackled by diverse Armenian official and non-official organizations struggling for the formation of an integral Armenian state, as well as Turkish authorities manipulating, inter alia, also demographic arguments against the Armenian claim for Western Armenia and the Entente Powers (particularly the United States of America and Great Britain) needing statistical data for deciding the fate of the Ottoman Empire. In the post-war processes the long-distance controversy of the Armenian and Turkish sides over the issues in question can be figuratively characterized as one of the stages – “battles” of the “statistical war” that emerged after 1878, i.e. following the entry of the Armenian Question into the international diplomatic agenda. This article aims to present and analyse the statistics on the number of Western Armenians and the ratio of Armenians in Western Armenia to other ethnic groups on the eve of the Armenian Genocide presented by Armenian and Turkish delegations at Paris Peace Conference, as well as data circulated by the US and British diplomacy. It will try to explain the connection between the delineation of Armenia and the number of Western Armenians, the demographic composition of Western Armenia on the eve of the Armenian Genocide. The calculations of the number of Western Armenians have had a certain effect on deliberations around demarcation of the border between the Republic of Armenia and the Ottoman Empire in the context of post-war world regulation.
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Park, Andrew Thomas. "Accommodating the post-war order: the Hotel Brauner Hirsch and the diplomacy of the Paris Peace Conference in Teschen Silesia, 1919–1920". Journal of Tourism History 13, n.º 1 (2 de janeiro de 2021): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1755182x.2021.1895328.
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Bakic, Dragan. "Nikola Pasic and the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, 1919-1926". Balcanica, n.º 47 (2016): 285–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc1647285b.
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This paper looks at Nikola Pasic?s views of and contribution to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS/Yugoslavia after1929) during the latest phase of his political career, a subject that has been neglected by historians. His activities in this field are divided into two periods - during the Paris Peace Conference where he was the head of the SCS Kingdom?s delegation and after 1921 when he became Prime Minister, who also served as his own Foreign Minister. During the peace conference, Pasic held strong views on all the major problems that faced his delegation, particularly the troubled delimitation with Italy in the Adriatic. In early 1920, he alone favoured the acceptance of the so-called Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum, believing that the time was working against the SCS Kingdom. The Rapallo Treaty with Italy late that year proved him right. Upon taking the reins of government, Pasic was energetic in opposing the two restoration attempts of Karl Habsburg in Hungary and persistent in trying to obtain northern parts of the still unsettled Albania. In time, his hold on foreign policy was weakening, as King Alexander asserted his influence, especially through the agency of Momcilo Nincic, Foreign Minister after January 1922. Pasic was tougher that King and Nincic in the negotiations with Mussolini for the final settlement of the status of the Adriatic town of Fiume and the parallel conclusion of the 27 January 1924 friendship treaty (the Pact of Rome). Since domestic politics absorbed much of his time and energy, the old Prime Minister was later even less visible in foreign policy. He was forced to resign in April 1926 on account of his son?s corruption scandal shortly before the final break-down of relations with Italy.
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Callahan, Michael D. "NOMANSLAND: The British Colonial Office and the League of Nations Mandate for German East Africa, 1916–1920". Albion 25, n.º 3 (1993): 443–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/4050877.
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One of the many problems facing the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was the future of the conquered German and Turkish territories in Africa, the Pacific, and the Middle East. Widespread anti-imperialist sentiment in Europe and the United States opposed direct annexation of the possessions, but wartime agreements and the security interests of the Allies prevented returning the conquered areas to their former rulers. In particular, many British leaders wanted to ensure that Germany could never again attempt world domination and were convinced that the restoration to Germany of its overseas possessions would pose a “grave political and military menace” to Britain's vital maritime connections with South Africa and India. After a long, often acrimonious debate, the Conference agreed on a compromise that placed the former German colonies and Ottoman provinces under the supervision of the League of Nations. This solution gave the Allies control of their acquisitions as “mandates” within a framework of international accountability. Great Britain received the most mandates, including Germany's largest colony of German East Africa. For the British leaders who had always advocated transforming German East Africa into a British colony, the new system seemed to make little practical difference. For the colonial officials in London and at the highest levels of colonial administration within the conquered possession, however, the mandates system presented serious problems and was not simply a disguise for annexation.
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Milosavljevic, Boris. "Drafting the constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (1920)". Balcanica, n.º 50 (2019): 225–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/balc1950225m.
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The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was internationally recognized during the Paris Peace Conference in 1919-20. Even though there was neither a provisional nor a permanent constitution of the newly-formed state, factually there was a state as well as a system of governance, represented by supreme bodies, the King and the Parliament. Many draft constitutions were prepared by different political parties and notable individuals. We shall focus on the official Draft Constitution prepared during the premiership of Stojan Protic. He appointed the Drafting Committee as a governmental (multi-ethnic) advisory team of prominent legal experts from different parts of the new state consisting of Professors Slobodan Jovanovic (President), Kosta Kumanudi and Lazar Markovic (Serbia), Professor Ladislav Polic (Croatia) and Dr Bogumil Vosnjak (Slovenia). After two months of work, the Committee submitted its draft to the Prime Minister. The leading Serbian legal scholar and president of the committee, Slobodan Jovanovic (1869-1958), was well-acquainted with the details of Austro-Hungarian and German legal traditions. Since he was an active participant and witness of the events that led to the creation of the new state, while also being an objective and critical historian, it is important to shed light on his firsthand account of the emergence of the state of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.
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Teichler, Hans Joachim. "Die deutsch-französischen Sportbeziehungen von 1919 bis 1942". STADION 47, n.º 1 (2023): 28–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0172-4029-2023-1-28.
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The article begins with Germany’s exclusion from the Olympic Games 1920 in Antwerp and 1924 in Paris. Whereas sports relations between Germany and France slowly returned to normal in bourgeois sports, French workers’ sportsmen already in 1922 visited the festival of the workers’ sport federation in Leipzig. After these preliminary remarks the article focuses on the National Socialist era. From 1933 to 1939 France was Germany’s most favoured sport partner. The German Reich used the Olympic Games of 1936 to present itself as a peace-loving country. However, as the occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland on March 7, 1936 shows – between the Winter Olympics in Garmisch-Partenkirchen (February 6–16) and the Summer Olympics in Berlin (August 1–16) – this was only camouflage. The article enlarges on the initially very positive, but in the end exceedingly critical French press coverage of the Olympic Games in Berlin. The harsh criticism of the “jeux défigurés” provoked the well-known reply by Coubertin, who expressed himself positively about the “Berlin Games illuminated by Hitlerist strength and discipline”. The German-French skiing leisure activities 1938, organized by the Hitlerjugend (HJ), were exploited by the propaganda as a symbol of common understanding. The gestures of understanding culminated in a joint cultural conference in Baden-Baden, where for the first time a bust of Coubertin was set up. In spite of the violation of the Munich Agreement and the occupation of Prague by German troops, several French sports associations came to athletic competitions to Germany in summer 1939. The article ends with the Reichssportführer’s futile attempts to continue sports relations with France during war time.
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Kalmo, Hent. "Enesemääramise paleus ja pragmaatika: Tartu versus Pariis". Ajalooline Ajakiri. The Estonian Historical Journal 173, n.º 3/4 (18 de outubro de 2021): 243–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.12697/aa.2020.3-4.04.
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The Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, signed between Estonia and Soviet Russia, has been credited with laying the foundation for stability in Eastern Europe in the interwar period. Ants Piip, a member of the Estonian delegation at Tartu, attributed this achievement to the equitable character of the agreement, comparing it favourably with the Treaty of Versailles, widely seen as a dictated peace already in the immediate aftermath of its signature. A similar view was expounded by the Soviet government, which portrayed the Tartu Peace Treaty as an expression of the principles underlying the November Revolution. It especially emphasised the self-determination of peoples, proclaimed repeatedly by the Soviet government as a sine qua non for a just peace. According to the Soviet narrative, the principle of selfdetermination had been hailed by the Entente only to be later betrayed at the Paris Peace Conference. The Tartu Peace Treaty, where the principle of self-determination figured prominently in Article II, thus became, in this telling, an ideological counter model to the results of the Paris Peace Conference. Despite their anti-Bolshevik outlook, Estonian diplomats and politicians inclined towards a comparable interpretation: they had accepted the Soviet peace proposal, with the offer to recognise their right to selfdetermination and independent statehood, only after the Allies had failed to live up to their promises at Paris.
The refence to the principle of self-determination in the Tartu Peace Treaty has not received much attention from historians. As Lauri Mälksoo has noted, it remains a well-nigh forgotten chapter in the history of international law. Mälksoo argued that the reference is all the more noteworthy since the Soviet government gave the principle a remarkably wide scope, joining to it the right to secession, which was not yet enshrined in general international law at the time. Assuming that the principle of selfdetermination was mentioned in the Tartu Peace Treaty at the initiative of the Soviet side, Mälksoo suggested two motives that might have prompted it: the need to recognise the fait accompli of Estonian independence, and the wish to justify within Russia itself the decision to relinquish territories that had formerly belonged to the Tsarist Empire. This article shows that the Estonian side was also keen to refer to the principle of self-determination, quite independently of Soviet wishes, as demonstrated by a draft peace treaty drawn up two months prior to the start of the Tartu negotiations by a commission of experts convened by the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs. This fact is indicative of the broader diplomatic significance that the Estonian delegation – and its head, Jaan Poska, in particular – attached to peace talks with the Bolsheviks. The article demonstrates that Poska did not start the negotiations in December of 1919 with the sõle aim of signing a peace treaty with Soviet Russia. Just as important, if not more so, was the prospect of using the talks to convince the Entente to recognise Estonian independence de jure.
The Estonian government had founded its claim to international recognition on the principle of self-determination. Upon the outbreak of the Bolshevik revolution, the Estonian Provisional Assembly had availed itself of the Soviet decree proclaiming the right of all peoples of Russia to selfdetermination, including secession and the formation of a separate state. Without being confident in the resolve of the Soviet government to adhere to the letter of its public pronouncements, Estonian politicians nonetheless saw the usefulness of invoking the decree, since the latter could be seen as ratifying Estonia’s decision to secede from Russia. They were already positioning themselves vis-à-vis the Entente Powers, whose freedom to recognise the nascent republic was constrained by rules of international law regarding the validity of secession. The principle of self-determination had great value for a seceding state, especially in circumstances where the mother country did not have a lawful government and was thus unable to consent to any separation of territories (as Russia was regarded in the eyes of most governments at the end of 1917). The Estonian position was buttressed by a string of diplomatic statements made by the Entente Powers in 1918, assuring Estonia that its status would be determined at a forthcoming peace conference in accordance with the principle of self-determination.
Such assurances filled Estonian diplomats with great optimism when they set out for the Paris Peace Conference at the beginning of 1919. The principle of self-determination was tantamount to independence in their mind. It was therefore with growing disappointment that they observed the unwillingness of France and Great Britain to recognise their independence at Paris, intent as the latter were to reconstitute their former eastern ally. This is not to say that Estonian claims were completely ignored. British politicians did not think that they were failing to honour their promises when offering Estonia internationally guaranteed autonomy, under the aegis of the League of Nations, instead of independence. Autonomy did not satisfy Estonians, however, who were canvassing all options at their disposal to arrive at their aim. The quest for ‘other ways’, beginning in earnest in the summer of 1919, has been mostly interpreted by scholars as a decision to reach a peace settlement with the Bolsheviks. The article shows that the Estonian strategy was more multi-faceted. International recognition remained their chief aim, and their receptiveness to Bolshevik peace feelers should be seen in this light. The emphasis placed on the principle of self-determination from the very start of negotiations with Soviet Russia in September of 1919 was a part of this Western-directed diplomatic approach. The Bolsheviks had their own aims in mind when foregrounding this principle. The consternation that the Treaty of Versailles had caused in Germany offered them an opportunity to depict the Paris Peace Conference as the latest manifestation of Great Power imperialism, to which the Soviet proposal of a ‘democratic peace’ (no annexations, no contributions, self-determination to all peoples) was allegedly the only viable alternative.
The peace talks between Estonia and Soviet Russia were thus caught in an ideological struggle between the Soviet government and the Western Allies concerning ‘just peace’. But they also fitted in with the – apparently contrary – Soviet strategy of abandoning outright military aggression and preparing the ground for ‘peaceful coexistence’ with capitalist states, with a view to buttressing the Soviet regime economically. The reference to the principle of self-determination in the Tartu Peace Treaty can be explained by all the considerations mentioned above. The Estonians had their sights set on reinforcing their international status by tying it to the principle. The Bolsheviks were showcasing their adherence to ‘democratic peace’ and contrasting their favourable attitude to small peoples with the hypocrisy of the Great Powers (the fact that it was Soviet Russia that had initiated the war with unprovoked military aggression in 1918 was conveniently ignored). Moreover, on a less public level, Soviet Russia was signalling that it was willing to consent to self-determination in the Russian borderlands in order to reach an agreement with its Western foes, and that it would rely on the long-term superiority of the Bolshevik system in lieu of head-to-head collision with capitalist states. In this last sense, the Treaty of Tartu marks a strategic turn for the Soviet government that became so consequential for the 20th century that the treaty with Estonia acquires truly foundational significance.
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Magocsi, Paul Robert. "The Ukrainian Question between Poland and Czechoslovakia: The Lemko Rusyn Republic (1918-1920) and Political Thought in Western Rus'-Ukraine". Nationalities Papers 21, n.º 2 (1993): 95–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905999308408278.
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During the closing months of World War I in late 1918 and the break-up of the historic multinational empires that for centuries had ruled most of East Central Europe, it became common practice for the varying ethnolinguistic or national groups to form councils whose goals were to determine their group's political future. These national councils, as they came to be known, seemed to appear everywhere, but perhaps most frequently in the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. It was not only the “large” former minorities like the Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Romanians, or Ukrainians who formed national councils, but many smaller groups acted in the same way. And, like the national councils of the larger groups who very soon created independent republics alone or in cooperation with their immediate neighbors, so, too, did some of these smaller groups proclaim their independence. Thus, in the newspapers of the time and scholarly monographs of today one can still find references to the Baranya, East Slovak, Hutsul, or Przemysl “republics” among others, which during the last few months of 1918 seemed to sprout up like mushrooms after a rainfall, but which for the most part ceased to exist when the borders of East Central Europe began to stabilize as a result of the Paris Peace Conference that opened its deliberations in early 1919.
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Blavatskyy, Serhiy. "The cartographic propaganda in the Ukrainian foreign-language press in Europe (1900―1920s)". Proceedings of Research and Scientific Institute for Periodicals, n.º 10(28) (janeiro de 2020): 43–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.37222/2524-0331-2020-10(28)-5.
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This paper seeks to develop new avenues for a study of the Ukrainian foreign-language press in Europe during the Ukrainian Revolution (1917―1921s). Specifically, it aims to explore the so-called «cartographic» argument in the editorial policies and content of these periodicals issued in West European languages in the West European countries. More specifically, we seek to study map propaganda on the basis of the content of the Ukrainian press published in the West European languages in Europe during the Paris Peace Conference (1919―1920s). The latter aimed at justifying the territorial integrity of Ukraine in terms of the Ukrainian terrains in the Eastern Europe and its representation in the European maps. It originated in the early 1900s, specifically, in Austria, and more specifically ― in the Ukrainian German-language reviews («Ruthenische Revue» and «Ukrainische Rundschau»). In our view, the Ukrainian post-WWI map propaganda was inspired by the Count M. Tyshkevych (Tyszkiewicz) and S. Sheloukhine, specifically, their groundbreaking work «Documents historiques sur l’Ukraine et ses relations avec la Pologne, la Russie et la Suede (1569―1764) publies avec notices explicatives et cartes par le C-te Michel Tyszkiewicz…» (Lausanne, 1919). We argue a specific correlation between map representation of respective stateless people and a justification of its nationstate aspirations in the European public sphere. Specifically, it has been argued that the cartographic propaganda was an element of strategic communication of the «territorialization of national identity» of Ukrainians in the internationally recognized borders of the UNR (according to the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty of Feb. 1918). The findings of this research prove an existence of continuum of map propaganda in the transnational media discourse transcending temporal and spatial boundaries. The follow-up studies on the research subject are to explore a persistence of the media patterns of map representation of the Ukrainian ethnic terrains in the media discourse, specifically, in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian «hybrid war» (since 2014). More specifically, a promising and relevant avenue is to study «map propaganda» over the question of belonging of the Crimea and its map representation in Ukrainian, Russian or in the Western public realms. Keywords: map propaganda, historical maps, ethnic terrains, Ukraine, Ukrainian, press.
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Perovšek, Jurij. "Ehrlich in uveljavljanje Slovencev kot naroda v Evropi". Res novae: revija za celovito znanost 8, n.º 1 (junho de 2023): 29–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.62983/rn2865.23a.2.
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Lambert Ehrlich made significant efforts for the establishment of Slovenes in the European framework immediately after the WW I. As a companion of the American inquiry commission of Sherman Miles, which had the assignment of determining the demarcation border between Austria and Yugoslavia in Carinthia, he consistently strove for the observance of the nationality criterion in the demarcation. Then, as an expert for Carinthia, he was visible in the struggle of the Yugoslav delegation for the Slovenian northern border at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919–1920. He also participated in the diplomatic struggle for the northeastern border in Styria and Prekmurje. His efforts forced the superpowers to know about the Slovenians and their desire to achieve the recognition of the Slovenian national space, i.e. the establishment of the desired national borders in the north, west and east. Later, with the well-known Višarje thought, he spiritually emphasized the Slovenes in the European dimension. After the occupation of Slovenia in 1941, he advocated a confederation between the Baltic, Adriatic and Aegean. The center of the union thus formed in Europe should be nationally United Slovenia. In 1942, for one of the key religious, moral, and political international factors, the Vatican prepared a special memorial on the situation in the »Ljubljana Province«. His ideal was to achieve recognition of Slovenians as a free and fully living European nation.
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JOHNSON, GAYNOR. "BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE, 1919–1939 Neville Chamberlain and appeasement. By R. Caputi. London: Susquehanna University Press, 2000. Pp. 271. ISBN 1-57591-027-6. £35.00. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919: peace without victory? Edited by M. Dockrill and J. Fisher. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xvi+97. ISBN 0-333-77630-5. £40.00. British foreign policy, 1919–1939. By P. W. Doerr. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998. Pp. xi+291. ISBN 0-7190-4672-6. £14.99. Neville Chamberlain. By D. Dutton. London: Edward Arnold, 2001. Pp. xii+245. ISBN 0-340-70627-9. £12.99. Austen Chamberlain and the commitment to Europe: British foreign policy, 1924–1929. By R. S. Grayson. London: Frank Cass, 1997. Pp. xviii+318. ISBN 0-7146-4758-6. £37.50. Lloyd George and the lost peace: from Versailles to Hitler, 1919–1940. By A. Lentin. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xvii+182. ISBN 0-333-91961-0. £40.00. Peacemakers: the Paris Conference of 1919 and its attempt to end war. By M. Macmillan. London: John Murray, 2001. Pp. xii+574. ISBN 0-7195-5939-1. £25.00. ‘The Times’ and appeasement: the journals of A. L. Kennedy, 1932–1939. Edited by G. Martel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Royal Historical Society, Camden Fifth Series. Pp. xvii+312. ISBN 0-521-79354-8. £40.00. Britain and the Ruhr crisis. By E. Y. O'Riordan. London: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. x+237. ISBN 0-333-76483-8. £40.00. The Neville Chamberlain diary letters,I: The making of a politician, 1915–1920. Edited by R. Self. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Pp. ix+423. ISBN 1-84014-691-5. £75.00. The Neville Chamberlain diary letters, II: The reform years, 1921–1927. Edited by R. Self. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. Pp. x+461. ISBN 1-84014-692-3. £75.00." Historical Journal 46, n.º 2 (junho de 2003): 479–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0018246x03003042.
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In the last eighty years, an enormous amount of scholarly attention has been devoted to explaining why Europe was at the centre of two cataclysmic conflicts in the first half of the twentieth century. The books considered here represent part of a resurgence of interest in British foreign policy in the interwar period and are primarily concerned with the policy of reconciliation towards the former Central Powers after the First World War, especially the appeasement of Germany. They offer a further opportunity to challenge the still-held misapprehension that appeasement was a strand of British policy that only appeared after Hitler's rise to power. They also offer a means of examining British foreign policy through sources inside and outside the government. Gordon Martel's volume illustrates the amount of journalistic pressure that was put on the British government to recognize and act on the likely threats to international peace. Austen and Neville Chamberlain, the sons of the great nineteenth-century Conservative politician, Joseph Chamberlain, were at the centre of the British foreign policy making process during the interwar period. Indeed, Robert Self's two volumes of letters written by Neville Chamberlain to his sisters illustrate how steeped in foreign and domestic politics the whole Chamberlain family was. Richard Grayson sees a long, unbroken attempt to accommodate Germany diplomatically starting with Austen Chamberlain and the treaty of Locarno. The importance of Neville Chamberlain's contribution to the history of British foreign policy is offered further recognition through surveys of the historiography of his premiership by David Dutton and Robert Caputi.
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Shaw, Stanford J. "Halide Edib (Adıvar)'s appeal to the American public for justice for the Turks". Belleten 67, n.º 249 (1 de agosto de 2003): 531–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.37879/belleten.2003.531.
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This article presents an appeal written in 1919-1920 by Turkey's first major woman writer, novelist and newspaper reporter Halide Edib (Adıvar), to the people of the United States, entrusted to Lewis Edgar Browne, who was covering the Turkish War for Independence and the Russian Revolution and Civil War for the Chicago Daily News while the Paris Peace Conference was going on. Halide Edib believed that the people of the United States were without bias in considering the problems of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I, and, that, as had been stated in President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, they wanted all the peoples of the Empire, including the Turks, to achieve independence in their own lands following the war. In her statement, she condemned the efforts then being made in Paris to blame on the Turks alone all the excesses and abuses that had gone in the war, pointing out that all the peoples of the Empire had sinned and been sinned against, all had suffered terribly from massacre and starvation, not only the Sultan's Christian subjects, and that the Turks, like the others, therefore deserved to achive independence in the areas of Anatolia and Thrace where they constituted large majorities of the population. In the end, this appeal fell on deaf ears. Halide Edib did not understand that the minds of the people of the Christian West had been so poisoned against Muslims by wartime propaganda that the accusations were being used as pretexts to deny to them rights that were being granted to their Christian neighbors. In the end, it was not such appeals for justice and understanding, then, but the force applied by the Turkish national resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk that achived an independent existance for the Empire's Turkish subjects as a result of the Lausanne Conference and the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
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Magadeev, Iskander Eduardovich. "The Ruhr Crisis of 1923 and the International Transition in Europe after the WWI". Genesis: исторические исследования, n.º 3 (março de 2024): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-868x.2024.3.40374.
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Article aims to analyze the impact of the Ruhr crisis 1923 on the history of the international relations in Europe after the WWI. This crisis, which began by the occupation of the Ruhr region by the French and Belgian troops and ended by the approval of the new reparation plan (Dawes plan) in 1924, played the crucial role in the transformation of the international order (so-called Versailles order), envisaged by the Paris peace conference of 1919–1920. Author scrutinizes such aspects, as the links between the Ruhr crisis and the specifics of the WWI ending, he discerns the crisis' consequences in the Western and Eastern Europe, the role of the Anglo-American mediation in the regulation of the Franco-German conflict, according to the British and US interests. The essay concludes that the Ruhr crisis made critical impact on the consolidation of the Versailles order. The events unfolded in 1923, created the conditions for the "international turn" of 1924–1925, including the formation of the Anglo-Franco-German "European concert" instead of the Entente disintegrated during the crisis. Author demonstrates the direct link between the events of 1923 and the further stabilization of Europe negotiated during the London (1924) and Locarno conferences (1925), though this link sometimes remains "under shadow" in the major studies of the international relations in Europe after WWI. Besides this, the novelty of the article is explained by the rarely used documents from the British and French archives analyzed by the author.
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Kravchuk, Oleksandr. "T. G. Masaryk and the Ukrainian Question in the Documents of the Representation of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in Prague". Scientific Papers of the Vinnytsia Mykhailo Kotsyiubynskyi State Pedagogical University. Series: History, n.º 34 (2020): 92–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.31652/2411-2143-2020-34-92-99.
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The purpose of the article is to analyze the representation’s report of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in Prague on the attitude of the president of Czechoslovakia T. G. Masaryk to the Ukrainian question. The research methodology is based on the research principles of historicism, scientificity, objectivity, general scientific methods (source analysis, historical and logical) and special historical methods (narrative and problem-chronological). The scientific novelty of the work is that the article on the basis of archival and published materials, in particular, the letters of the heads of the representation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in Prague to the foreign ministers of the state, analyzes the attitude of the first president of Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian question. Conclusions. Masaryk’s attitude to the Ukrainian question is considered in the context of establishing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in late 1918 – early 1919, the desire of ones in 1920-1923 to gain the support of Prague in ensuring the recognition of the Entente countries the independence of this state, discussion of the case of assisting for Ukrainian emigrants in Czechoslovakia. In the article were noted the changes in the position of the Czechoslovak president in the Ukrainian question. In his work «New Europe» (1918), he supported the idea of the uniting of the Dnieper region, Eastern Galicia and Bukovina considering it necessary to preserve it as part of the federal democratic Russian state. In early 1919 president of the Czechoslovak Republic was ready to recognize the independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which was revived during the anti-Hetman uprising. But made the final decision dependent on the position of the Entente states at the peace conference in Paris. The coverage of the perception of the Ukrainian question by T. G. Masaryk in 1920-1921 by the representatives of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in Prague testifies to his return to the concept set forth in the work «New Europe». Reports from representatives of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic allow a more complete study of the circumstances that made it impossible for it to gain political support from Czechoslovakia. Given this, as well as the issues of the Czechoslovak Republic’s policy in Transcarpathia and on emigration were raised in the reports of the representation, these documents are an important source for studying the history of Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations.
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Voron, Nataliia. "History and Culture of Ukraine on the Pages of Periodicals of the Ukrainian Historical and Philological Society in Prague (in 1939-1945s)". Scientific Papers of the Vinnytsia Mykhailo Kotsyiubynskyi State Pedagogical University. Series: History, n.º 34 (2020): 100–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.31652/2411-2143-2020-34-100-109.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The purpose of the article is to analyze the representation’s report of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in Prague on the attitude of the president of Czechoslovakia T. G. Masaryk to the Ukrainian question. The research methodology is based on the research principles of historicism, scientificity, objectivity, general scientific methods (source analysis, historical and logical) and special historical methods (narrative and problem-chronological). The scientific novelty of the work is that the article on the basis of archival and published materials, in particular, the letters of the heads of the representation of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic in Prague to the foreign ministers of the state, analyzes the attitude of the first president of Czechoslovakia to the Ukrainian question. Conclusions. Masaryk’s attitude to the Ukrainian question is considered in the context of establishing relations between Czechoslovakia and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in late 1918 – early 1919, the desire of ones in 1920-1923 to gain the support of Prague in ensuring the recognition of the Entente countries the independence of this state, discussion of the case of assisting for Ukrainian emigrants in Czechoslovakia. In the article were noted the changes in the position of the Czechoslovak president in the Ukrainian question. In his work «New Europe» (1918), he supported the idea of the uniting of the Dnieper region, Eastern Galicia and Bukovina considering it necessary to preserve it as part of the federal democratic Russian state. In early 1919 president of the Czechoslovak Republic was ready to recognize the independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which was revived during the anti-Hetman uprising. But made the final decision dependent on the position of the Entente states at the peace conference in Paris. The coverage of the perception of the Ukrainian question by T. G. Masaryk in 1920-1921 by the representatives of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic in Prague testifies to his return to the concept set forth in the work «New Europe». Reports from representatives of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic allow a more complete study of the circumstances that made it impossible for it to gain political support from Czechoslovakia. Given this, as well as the issues of the Czechoslovak Republic’s policy in Transcarpathia and on emigration were raised in the reports of the representation, these documents are an important source for studying the history of Czechoslovak-Ukrainian relations.
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A.V., Goncharenko. "THE PROBLEM OF NAVAL WEAPONS’ LIMITATION IN FOREIGN POLICY OF THE USA IN THE EARLY 20-IES OF XX CENTURY". Sums'ka Starovyna (Ancient Sumy Land), n.º 54 (2019): 64–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.21272/starovyna.2019.54.6.
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The article researches the position of the United States on the issue of naval arms restriction in the early 20-ies of the XX century. There are outlined causes, the course and the consequences of the intensification of Washington’s naval activity during the investigated period. It is explored the process of formation and implementation of the US initiatives to limit naval weapons before and during the Washington Peace Conference of 1921–1922. The role of the USA in the settlement of foreign policy contradictions between the leading countries of the world in the early 20-ies of the XX century is analyzed. In the early 20’s of the XX century there have been some changes in the international relations system and the role of the USA in it. Despite the isolation stance taken by Washington, the White House continues its policy of «open doors» and «equal opportunities», promoting the elimination of unequal agreements between foreign countries with China, and attempts to influence the position of European countries and Japan in the naval contest issues and limitation of naval weapons. Taking full advantages, which were giving the United States’ the richest country and world creditor status, the US Department of State has stepped up its US impact in the Asia-Pacific region. The new Republican administration succeeded in offsetting the failures of the Paris Decisions of 1919–1920 and began to СУМСЬКА СТАРОВИНА 2019 №LIV 75 construct a new model of international relations in which the United States would occupy a leading position. The success of US diplomacy at the Washington Peace Conference of 1921– 1922 contributed to this. However, the conflict between the former allies within the Entente was only smoothed out and not settled. The latter has led to increasing US capital expansion into Europe due to the significant economic growth in the country. Despite the fact that the Republicans’ achievements in US foreign policy on local issues have been much more specific than trying to solve the problem of a new system of international relations globally, these achievements have been rather relative. Leading countries in the world were still making concessions to the White House on separate issues, but in principle they were not ready to accept the scheme of relations offered by the States. That is why American foreign policy achievements have been impermanent. Key words: the
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Martorell Linares, Miguel. "“Procuraré morir matando o acabará mi vida”: el duelista y la muerte". Vínculos de Historia Revista del Departamento de Historia de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, n.º 12 (28 de junho de 2023): 105–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.18239/vdh_2023.12.05.
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RESUMENEl riesgo de morir en duelo fue consustancial a la cultura del honor. Incluso en países, como Francia o España, donde la muerte en duelo no era habitual. El nexo entre honor y vida, o entre sus contrarios, deshonor y muerte, permeaba el imaginario cultural de las élites liberales. La épica de los duelos giraba en torno a la probabilidad de que un combatiente pereciera, y aun cuando la muerte no fuese el objetivo buscado en el lance, siempre pesaba la incertidumbre: la amenaza de recibir una estocada dolorosa o la eventualidad de una lesión grave. La muerte planeaba sobre los desafíos y que acudiera, o no, al campo del honor dependía de diversas variables: la fogosidad de los rivales, la habilidad de los padrinos al concertar el duelo, que uno de los contendientes fuese militar, la naturaleza de la ofensa o que esta girara en torno a una mujer… También se cernía sobre el duelista la amenaza de la muerte eterna, pues la Iglesia condenaba los lances de honor y prohibía que los caídos en combate sin confesión recibieran sepultura sagrada. De todo lo anterior tratan las siguientes páginas, centradas en la cultura del duelo en España, enmarcada en el contexto internacional, y en la presencia en ella de la muerte. Palabras clave: honor, muerte, duelos, masculinidadTopónimos: España, EuropaPeriodo: Siglos xix y xx ABSTRACTThe risk of dying in a duel was consubstantial to the culture of honor, even in countries such as France or Spain, where death in a duel was not usual. The link between honor and life, or between their opposites, dishonor, and death, permeated the cultural imaginary of the liberal elites. The epic of duels revolved around the probability that a combatant would perish; and even when death was not the intended objective of the duel, uncertainty always weighed heavily: the threat of receiving a painful thrust or the eventuality of a serious injury. Death hovered over the challenges and whether it would come to the field of honor depended on several variables: the fierceness of the rivals, the skill of the godfathers in arranging the duel, whether one of the contenders was a military man, the nature of the offense or whether it revolved around a woman... The threat of eternal death also hung over the duelist, since the Church condemned duels and prohibited those who fell in combat without confession with receiving a sacred burial. The following pages deal with all of the above, focusing on the culture of mourning in Spain, framed in the international context and the presence of death in it. Keywords: honor, death, duels, masculinityPlace names: Spain, EuropePeriod: nineteenth and twentieth centuries REFERENCIASArmiñán, L. de, El duelo en mi tiempo, Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1950. Benítez Burraco, A., “Cómo funciona el arte de Pushkin: algunas reflexiones acerca del duelo entre Oneguin y Lenski”, Eslavística Complutense, 4 (2004) pp. 101-119.Banks, S.,“Killing with courtesy: The English Duelist. 1785-1845”, Journal of British Studies, 47/3 (2008) pp. 528-558.Blanco Rodríguez, E., “Rojo de vergüenza y condenado por cobarde: masculinidad, honor y duelos en la España decimonónica”, Ayer, 120 (2020), pp. 171-193.Blasco Herranz, I., “¿Re-masculinización de catolicismo? Género, religión e identidad católica masculina en España a comienzos del siglo xx”, en I. Blasco (ed.), Mujeres, hombres y catolicismo en la España contemporánea, Valencia, Tirant Lo Blanc, 2019, pp. 115-136.Borrego, A., Ensayo sobre la jurisprudencia de los duelos, por el conde de Chateauvillard, traducido del francés por A. Borrego, Madrid, 1891.Bravo, J., El concilio de Trento y el Concordato vigente, Madrid, 1887.Cañas de Pablos, A., “More Valuable Than Life Itself”: Military Honour and the Birth of Its Tribunal in Spain (1810–1870)”, Journal of Military Ethics, 21 (2022) pp. 304-319.Cervantes, A., Los duelos en Cuba, La Habana, Miranda, 1894. Chatauvillard, conde de, Essai sur le duel, París, Chez Bohaire, 1836.Chocano, M., “Pulsiones nerviosas de un orden craquelado: desafíos, caballerosidad y esfera política (Perú, 1883-1960)”, Histórica 35/1 (2011).Domenicheli, M., Cavaliere e gentiluomo. Saggio sulla cultura aristocrática in Europa (1513-1915), Roma, Bulzoni Editore, 2002. Echarri, F., Directorio Moral, Valencia, 1770. Esperón Fernández, A. J., “Honor y escándalo en la encrucijada del Sexenio Democrático: la opinión pública ante el duelo entre Montpensier y Enrique de Borbón”, en R. Sánchez y J. A. Guillén (eds.), La cultura de la espada. De honor, duelos y otros lances, Madrid, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 2019, pp. 245-287.Fernández de Córdova, F., Mis memorias íntimas, t. II, Madrid, Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1888. Estébanez, J., Lances de honor, Madrid, R. Velasco, 1909. Fetheringill Zwicker, J., Dueling students. Conflict, Masculinity, and Politics in German Universities, 1890-1914, The University of Michigan Press/Ann Arbor, 2011. Fontane, T., Effi Briest, Madrid, Alianza Editorial (ed. or.1895) 2004. Frevert, U., “Condición burguesa y honor. En torno a la historia del duelo en Inglaterra y Alemania”, en J. M. Fradera y J. Millán (eds.), Las burguesías europeas del siglo XIX. Sociedad civil, política y cultura, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2000, pp. 361-398.Gayol, S., Honor y duelo en la Argentina moderna, Buenos Aires, Siglo XXI, 2008.Guillén Barrendero, J. A., “Duelo, honor y nobleza en la Edad Moderna: un perfil de cultura nobiliaria”, en R. Sánchez y J. A. Guillén (eds.): La cultura de la espada. De honor, duelos y otros lances, Madrid, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 2019, pp. 43-63.Guillet, F., La mort en face. Histoire du duel de la Revolution à nos jours, Flammarion Paris, 2008. Hughes, S. C., Politics of the sword: dueling, honor, and masculinity in modern Italy, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 2007. Jover Zamora, J. M., Política, diplomacia y humanismo popular, Madrid, Turner, 1976. Kiernan, V., El duelo en la historia de Europa, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 1992.La entrada en el mundo o Guía práctica del joven cristiano, Madrid, 1883.Laguna Azorín, J. M., Los tribunales de honor. Su organización y funcionamiento. Validez legal de sus fallos, Madrid, 1914.Lehigh, J., Touché. The duel in literature, Harvard College, 2015.Lérmontov, M. Y., Un héroe de nuestro tiempo, Madrid, Akal, (ed. or. 1840) 2009. Luengo, J., “Masculinidad reglada en los lances de honor. Desafíos burgueses en el cénit de un fin de época (1870-1910)”, Rubrica Contemporánea, VII/13 (2018) pp. 59-79.Martorell Linares, M., Duelo a muerte en Sevilla, Coruña, Ediciones del Viento, 2016. —“El duelo en 1900: un delito especial”, en J. Alvarado Planas y M. Martorell Linares (coords), Historia del delito y del castigo en la Edad Contemporánea, Madrid, Dykinson, 2017, pp. 355-378.— “Camelot en 1900: el código del honor y el ideal del perfecto caballero”, en D. Martykanova y M. Wallin, Ser hombre, Sevilla, Universidad de Sevilla, 2022. Martykánová, D., “Los pueblos viriles y el yugo del caballero español. La virilidad como problema nacional en el regeneracionismo español (1890-1910)”, Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea, 39 (2017) pp. 19-37.Matos e Lemos, M., “O duelo em Portugal depois da implantaçao da república”, Revista de Historia das Ideas, 15 (1993), pp. 561-597.Maupassant, G., “Un cobarde”, en Sangre y otros relatos, Madrid, Ambrosio Pérez, 1902, pp. 49-66.McAleer, K., Dueling. The cult of honor in the Fin-de-Siecle Germany, Princeton University Press, 1997.Mosse. G. L., The image of man: The creation of modern masculinity, Oxford University Press, 1996.Navarro García, M., Máximas de moral militar, Madrid, 1920.Nisbett, R. y Cohen D., “Violence and Honor in the Southern United States”, en J. E. Dizard, R. Merrill Muth y S. P. Andrews (eds), Guns in America, New York University Press, 1999, pp. 264-275Martínez Torres, R., “Introducción” a Mijáil Yúrevich Lérmontov: Un héroe de nuestro tiempo, Madrid, Akal, 2009, pp. 5-34.Nye, R. A., Masculinity and males codes of honor in modern France, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1998.Núñez Florencio, R., Militarismo y antimilitarismo en España (1888-1906), Madrid, CSIC, 1990Onieva, A. J., Pushkin, Madrid, Epesa, 1969. Parker, D. S., “Law, Honor, and Impunity in Spanish America: The Debate over Dueling, 1870-1920”, Law and History Review 19/2 (2001) pp. 311-341.Piccato, P., The Tyranny of Opinion: Honor in the Construction of the Mexican Public Sphere, Durham, Duke University Press, 2010. Ponce Alberca, J. y Lagares García, D., Honor de oficiales: los tribunales de honor en el ejército de la España contemporánea (siglos XIX-XX), Barcelona, Carena, 2000. Ramos Domingo, J., Crónica e información en el sermonario español, Salamanca, Universidad Pontificia, 2008. Ramos Yzquierdo, L., Código del duelo extractado y traducido de varios autores nacionales y extrangeros, Cienfuegos, 1889.Rangel, D. M., “O código d’honra e as alterações na prática de duelar em Portugal nos séculos XIX-XX”, Cultura, Espaço Memoria 2 (2011) pp. 244-264.Reyfman, I., “The Emergence of Duel in Russia: Corporal Punishment and the Honor Code”, The Russian Review, 54 (1995) pp. 26-43.Ruiz Albéniz, V., ¡Aquel Madrid! (1900-1914), Madrid, Artes Gráficas Municipales, 1944. Ruiz Fornells, E., La educación moral del soldado, Toledo, 1899.Sánchez, R., “Honor de periodistas. Libertad de prensa y reputación pública en la España liberal”, en R. Sánchez y J. A. Guillén (coords.), La cultura de la espada. De honor, duelos y otros lances, Madrid, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, 2019, pp. 305-332.— “El duelo es una necesidad de los tiempos presentes»: opiniones sobre el carácter civilizador del duelo en la España del siglo XIX”, Memoria y civilización, 23 (2020), pp. 1-21.— “Aristocrats for Peace: The Anti-Duellist Conference of Budapest (1908)”, Ler História, 80 (2022) pp. 137-158. Sierra Valenzuela, E., Duelos, rieptos y desafíos: ensayo filosófico-jurídico sobre el duelo, Madrid, J. C. Conde y cía, 1878. Simpson, A., “Dandelions on the Field of Honor: Dueling, the Middle Classes, and the Law in Nineteenth-Century England”, Criminal Justice History, IX (1998) pp. 99-155.Sinor, D., “Duelling in Hungary between the two world wars”, Hungarian Studies 8/2 (1993) pp. 227-235.Tapia y Gil, A., Los suicidios en España, Madrid, 1900. Tovar, A., Código Nacional Mexicano del Duelo, México, Imprenta de Ireneo Paz, 1891.Urbina y Ceballos, J., marqués de Cabriñana, Lances entre caballeros, Madrid, Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1900. Varela Tortajada, J., El último conquistador: Blasco Ibáñez (1867-1928), Madrid, Tecnos, 2015. Vega Montes de Oca, D., Ligeras nociones de educación moral para el soldado, Madrid, 1901.Vida del Emmo. y Rvdo. Sr. Cardenal Arzobispo de Sevilla D. Marcelo Spínola y Maestre, Sevilla, 1924.Vílchez, J. F., “Cien años de la muerte de Suárez de Figueroa”, Cuadernos de periodistas, (julio 2004) pp.101-106.Yñiguez, E., Ofensas y desafíos, Madrid, Evaristo Sánchez, 1890.
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"Georgia at Paris Peace Conference (1919−1920)". History and Historians in the Context of the Time 18, n.º 1 (4 de junho de 2020). http://dx.doi.org/10.13187/hhct.2020.1.3.
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Stepanyan, Gevorg. "Musavat Azerbaijan’s Expansionist Aspirations At Paris Peace Conference (1919)". Journal of Armenian studies, 30 de outubro de 2023, 5–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54503/1829-4073-2023.2.5-26.
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Համաթյուրքականության (պանթյուրքիզմ) գաղափարախոսությունը սկզբնավորվել է տակավին XIX դարի 70–80-ական թվականներին Ռուսաստանի Ուֆա և Կազան քաղաքներում: XIX դարի վերջերից համաթյուրքականությունը թափանցեց նաև Օսմանյան կայսրություն, որտեղ այդ գաղափարախոսության հիմնադիրն է համարվում Զիյա Գյոքալփը: Վերջինիս առաջադրած քաղաքական-գաղափարախոսական դոկտրինի համաձայն, համաթյուրքականության առաջին փուլից՝ Օսմանյան կայսրության թրքացումից հետո պետք է իրականացվեր երկրորդ փուլը՝ օղուզական պետության ստեղծումը, որը պետք է ընդգրկեր Օսմանյան կայսրությունը, Արևելյան Այսրկովկասը և Իրանական Ազարբայջան (Ատրպատական) նահանգը: Առաջին աշխարհամարտում պարտված Քառյակ միության երկրների (Գերմանիա, Ավստրո- Հունգարիա, Բուլղարիա, Օսմանյան կայսրություն) հետ հաշտության պայմանագրեր կնքելու, պատերազմի արդյունքներն ամփոփելու և հետպատերազմյան խաղաղության պայմանները որոշելու նպատակով 1919 թ. հունվարի 18-ին Փարիզում հրավիրվեց Խաղաղության վեհաժողով, որն ընդմիջումներով շարունակվեց մինչև 1920 թ. հունվարի 21-ը: Идеология пантюркизма зародилась в 1870-х и 1880-х годах в российских городах Уфе и Казани. С конца XIX века пантюркизм проник и в Османскую империю, где основоположником этой идеологии считается Зия Гёкалп. Согласно предложенной Гекальпом политико- идеологической доктрине, после отуречивания населения Османской империи на первом этапе пантюркизма, на втором этапе должно было сформироваться Огузское государство, в которое должны были войти Османская империя, Восточное Закавказье и иранская провинция Азербайджан (Атропатена). С целью заключения мирных договоров с потерпевшими поражение в Первой мировой войне четырьмя союзными странами (Германия, Австро-Венгрия, Болгария, Османская империя), подведения итогов войны и определения условий послевоенного мира 18 января 1919 года в Париже была созвана мирная конференция, которая с перерывами продолжалась до 21 января 1920 года.
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Rahten, Andrej. "Diplomatska prizadevanja Ivana Žolgerja za Slovensko Štajersko in Prekmurje". Studia Historica Slovenica 18 (2018), n.º 2 (30 de outubro de 2018). http://dx.doi.org/10.32874/shs.2018-19.
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Category: 1.01 Original scientific paper Language: Original in Slovenian (Abstract in Slovenian and English, Summary in English) Key words: Ivan Žolger, Paris Peace Conference, Styria, Prekmurje, Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes Excerpt: The paper highlights the role of Styrian lawyer Ivan Žolger (1867–1925) in the diplomatic activities of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes regarding the demarcation in Styria and the affiliation of Prekmurje. From archival and memoir sources are presented Žolger's efforts at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919–1920, where he acted as an authorized delegate of the Yugoslav state.
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"Trianon és a Brit földrajz I." Földrajzi Közlemények 144, n.º 2 (30 de junho de 2020): 202–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.32643/fk.144.2.5.
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The ‘dismemberment’ of Hungary as a result of the Treaty of Trianon (1920) was a momentous event. This paper examines the reaction of British geographers to Hungary’s dramatic and extensive loss of territory and much-reduced national sovereignty. It considers two works by British geographers, Marion Newbigin (in 1920) and Alan Ogilvie (in 1922), who attempted to explain Hungary’s situation following the Treaty. To Hungary’s geographers, Trianon ruptured historical associations between nature and nation. Boundaries previously formed upon the Carpathians’ natural geography and the hydrography of the Great Hungarian Plain were now replaced by ethnic considerations, even although these proved difficult to effect in practice as the basis of the new boundaries. The paper explores maps produced by Hungarian geographers, and most notably Pál Teleki’s ‘Ethnographical Map of Hungary’ (1919)—the so-called ‘Carte Rouge’—which attempted to reveal Hungary’s ethnic identity and territorial integrity. The paper then examines Marion Newbigin’s ‘Aftermath: A geographical study of the peace terms’ (1920) and Ogilvie’s ‘Some aspects of boundary settlement at the peace conference’ (1922) as Britain’s geographers tried to explain and justify Trianon in terms of post-war geopolitics, ethnic diversity, and linguistic difference. For Newbigin, Hungary’s ethnic delimitation post-Trianon was largely dictated by the Western powers (principally by the American delegation to the 1919 Paris peace conference). In his work Ogilvie (a member of the British geographical delegation in Paris) shows that the principles on which Trianon was determined were often compromised in practice. The paper shows how the new geography of Europe and Hungary dictated by Trianon elicited different responses from different geographical communities.
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Novacescu, Ion. "Chestiunea Banatului intre politica nationala si politica de partid. Mari polemici politice si parlamentare (decembrie 1923) / The Banat Issue. Between National Policy and Party Politics. The Great Political and Parliamentary Debates From December 1923". Analele Banatului XXI 2013, 1 de janeiro de 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.55201/ofpa3454.
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e failure of Romanian foreign policy at the Paris Peace Conference (1919 – 1920) when it couldn't obtain the entire province of Banat for the country, and also the establishment of the border with Serbia on the field, provoked, in December 1923, an intense political and parliamentary controversy. For two weeks the opposition MPs and those of the Liberal Party (the government party) accused each other of the responsibility of this national failure. e parliamentary debates demonstrated the lack of method, strategy and unity of the Romanian political elite in promoting responsible and efficient foreign policies.
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Kovalevskaia, N. V., e J. A. Fedoritenko. "On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the Latvian statehood and the signing of the peace treaty between Latvia and Russia. Diplomatic struggle for recognition from the West". Diplomaticheskaja sluzhba (Diplomatic Service), n.º 2 (1 de fevereiro de 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.33920/vne-01-2102-05.
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In this article, the authors raise the problem of the political situation of Latvia on the world stage after the First World War and the formation of statehood in Latvia. The authors set themselves the task of studying the problem of relations between Latvia and Germany, Latvia and Soviet Russia in the established period, and analyzing the main provisions of the Paris Conference of 1919–1920. and the approaches of the participating countries to the Latvian issue. The logical conclusion of the above topic is the consideration of the stage of the struggle for diplomatic and legal recognition by the West in the post-war years and the national consolidation of Latvia, the signing and signifi cance of the Riga Peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and Latvia (1920) in the context of current political events.
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Arlov, Thor Bjørn. "Mining for Sovereignty? Norwegian Coal Companies and the Quest for Supremacy over Svalbard 1916-1925". Poljarnyj vestnik 25, n.º 1 (16 de junho de 2022). http://dx.doi.org/10.7557/6.6571.
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At the outbreak of the First World War there was virtually no Norwegian coalmining activity on the Spitsbergen archipelago. The handful of small coal companies that were formed in Norway around the turn of the century were either idle or had been bought up by foreign interests after a few years. During the war, however, several new private companies were established, most notably the Store Norske Spitsbergen Kulkompani in 1916. Two years later, in 1918–1919, the Norwegian government stated its desire to acquire full sovereignty over the archipelago. The wish was granted by the treaty of 9 February 1920 that came as a result of the peace negotiations in Paris. This paper reviews the role of the Norwegian coal companies in Norway’s quest for supremacy over Svalbard during and after the First World War. Were private enterprises an instrument of the Norwegian government’s ambitions or was it the other way around? It is argued that private companies were instrumental in moving the political authorities from a passive to an active stance regarding sovereignty during the last phase of the war and through the peace conference in 1919. Their primary concern was to protect their own vested interests. However, as soon as sovereignty was secured in 1920, it was the government that actively used the companies as instruments to improve Norway’s position on the archipelago before implementing the treaty and settling the property rights.
Note: I use the official toponym ‘Svalbard’, although before 1925 ‘Spitsbergen’ was more commonly used.