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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "Paris Peace Conference d 1919-1920"
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Mironova, E. M. "Russian Political Delegation, 1919–1920". Modern History of Russia 11, n.º 4 (2021): 871–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.403.
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Using materials from Russian archives as well as from the Leeds Russian Archive (Great Britain), this article traces stages of activity of the Russian Political Delegation (RPD). The Delegation was established in 1919 by the Russian Political Meeting (RPM) in Paris for direct participation in the Versailles Peace Conference. Its activities were authorized by Admiral Kolchak, Supreme Ruler of Russia. The article covers the formation of the RPD, which included Prince Lvov, N. V. Tchaikovsky, V. A. Maklakov, and S. D. Sazonov. Due to circumstances beyond its control, the Delegation did not get the opportunity to participate in the conference, and its international activities were quite limited. However, after the dissolution of the Russian Political Meeting, the Russian Political Delegation continued its activities, claiming the status of the foreign center of a White Movement. Its ranks aggravated the split between public figures and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Movement: social activists wanted the government of Omsk to remove S. D. Sazonov. Admiral Kolchak decided to retain control of his government over foreign missions, keep S. D. Sazonov as Minister, and asked the delegation to continue its work. In fact, in late 1919 and early 1920, the Russian Political Delegation managed to head the foreign mission of the White Movement. However, it was unable to cope with problems standing on its agenda. G. E. Lvov and N. V. Tchaikovsky, who used the situation of the Delegation members to influence affairs, diligently supported its existence. The last statements of the Russian Political Delegation refer to the end of 1920, the period of evacuation of the Wrangel’s army from Crimea. Analysis of the RPD’s activities provides an insight into challenges that in general were characteristic of the Movement and that eventually played their role in its defeat.
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Baigorri-Jalón, Jesús. "Conference Interpreting in the First International Labor Conference (Washington, D. C., 1919)". Meta 50, n.º 3 (2 de novembro de 2005): 987–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/011609ar.
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Abstract Conference interpreting began at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, where the League of Nations (LN) and its offsprings, the Permanent Court of International Justice and the International Labour Organization (ILO), were designed as tools of a new diplomacy by conferences. This meant the end of the virtual monopoly of French as the language of diplomacy and the presence of interpreters mediating between languages. This paper examines the context of the 1919 Washington International Labor Conference (ILC), the interpreting services, the interpreters’ working conditions, and proposes some conclusions. Sources include published records of the plenary meetings of the Washington ILC and unpublished documents from the Personnel files and other material from the archives of the ILO and the LN in Geneva.
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TREMBETSKYI, Andriy. "DMYTRO VITOVSKYI IN THE UKRAINIAN HISTORIOGRAPHIC DISCOURSE OF THE 1920–1930". Contemporary era 10 (2022): 275–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.33402/nd.2022-10-275-286.
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The paper analyzes investigations on the public, military, and state-making activities of Dmytro Vitovskyi (1887–1919) in the Ukrainian historiography of the interwar period of the 20th century. As noted, the first steps in analyzing the biography of the famous and reputable member of the Sich Rifleman, the State Secretary of Military Affairs of ZUNR were made in the 1920–1930s. It was during this period that scientists, social and political figures, and military associates distinguished the main thematic blocks of D. Vitovskyi's life path: 1) family environment, education; 2) participation in the USS Legion on the fronts of World War I; 3) cultural and educational work in Volyn and Podillia in 1916–1918; 4) organization and implementation of the November Uprising of 1918; 5) work as the State Secretary of Military Affairs of ZUNR (ZOUNR); 6) participation in Ukrainian delegation of the UNR at the Paris Peace Conference (May 1919–July 1919). The author characterizes the first article that started studies on the military and socio-political activities of D. Vitovskyi, written by an unknown author (probably an editor of the newspaper «Ukrainian Flag» Stepan Baran) titled «On August 4, 1919, died with a tragic death, by falling from an aircraft broken by the Polish border guard near Ratibor in Prussian Silesia, one of the leaders of the Halychyna-Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, Colonel Dmytro Vitovskyi». The contribution to the research of Dmytro Vitovskyi's life of Mykhailo Lozynskyi, Vasyl Kuchabskyi, Ivan Krypiakevych, Myron Zaklynskyi, Osyp Dumin, authors of numerous memorists – Sich Riflemen members – is clarified. As investigated, the most fully military and public activities of D. Vitovskyi covered his friend from the USS Legion M. Zaklynskyi, while other authors focused on particular periods of his biography. Much attention from scientists and memorists was devoted to the moral and psychological traits of D. Vitovskyi in various military and everyday situations, and his ability to unite the team. Keywords Dmytro Vitovskyi, USS Legion, ZUNR, historiography.
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Hovhannisyan, Lilit. "Cilicia in the Documents of the U.S. State Department in 1919−1920". Ցեղասպանագիտական հանդես 10, n.º 1 (20 de maio de 2022): 40–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.51442/jgs.0027.
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The diplomatic documents from the U.S. Department of State stored at the National Archives of the USA in Washington and Republic of Armenia in Yerevan, which were officially published in volumes by the U.S. Government yet in 1931-1947, contain remarkable material on Cilicia. They throw light upon the negotiations between the leaders of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and delegations representing those countries at the 1919-1920 Paris International Peace Conference on political status and borders of Cilicia, establishment of a mandate for it, withdrawal of British troops from the region, occupation of Cilicia and Syria by French troops. The documents of the State Department reveal the contradictions between the Great Powers on the above-mentioned issues, describe their interests in the region. Records for the meetings of the Council of Ten of February 4, Council of Four of March 20, May 14, 21, 31 and Council of Five of July 18, August 25, 1919 are valuable from this point of view. The “Scheme for settlement in the Turkish Empire” of May 21, 1919, reflects the position of the Prime Minister of Great Britain D. Lloyd George on Cilicia. The U.S. President W. Wilson’s approaches concerning Cilicia are reflected in reports of the U.S. Commissioners in Turkey C. Crane and H. King of August 28, 1919, and the chief of the military mission to Armenia General J. Harbord of October 16, 1919. The difficulty of the Turkish border demarcation through Cilicia is presented in a note issued by the Allied Supreme Council on April 26, 1920, to U.S. Secretary of State B. Colby. The U.S. State Department diplomatic documents confirm that the Allies were practically not interested in resolving the issue of ensuring the security of Cilicia and its Armenian population. Based on the 1916 Sykes-Picot Anglo-French secret agreement, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres provided for the transference of the mandate of Cilicia to France. It became the beginning of handing over the land to the Kemalist Turkey. Thus France, seeking to receive its state debt from Turkey, became an accomplice to the new genocide of Cilicia Armenians.
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PETRÁŠ, René. "Organisational aspects of the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)". Central European Papers 3, n.º 2 (1 de setembro de 2015): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.25142/cep.2015.016.
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DRECIN, Mihai D. "FREEMASONRY AND THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE (JANUARY 1919 – JUNE 1920)". Annals of the Academy of Romanian Scientists Series on History and Archaeology 12, n.º 2 (2020): 21–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.56082/annalsarscihist.2020.2.21.
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The Romanian delegation - headed by Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu - accompanied by other well-known Romanian figures who were not part of the delegation, but represented the Romanian elite who had emigrated to the French capital, attended the Paris Peace Conference and recognised that the political decisions concerning the future borders of the nations emerging from the former Austrian-Hungarian Empire were made by the Roman Catholic Church, the Freemasonry and the Jewish Youth Organisation. These were the institutions behind the political decisions made by the political leaders of France (Georges Clémenceau), Great Britain (Sir David Lloyd George), the United States of America (Woodrow Wilson), and Italy (Vittorio Emanuele Orlando). When, after a conflict with the then French Prime Minister, who was failing to observe the provisions of the August 1916 Treaty concluded between Romania and the Triple Entente, Ion I.C. Brătianu left Paris, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod became his successor as head of the Romanian delegation. The Transylvanian political leader and some of his close associates would also become members of the Ernest Renan Masonic lodge in Paris, on 4 August 1919. The decision was made by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod after extensive consultations with Ion I.C. Brătianu, who had returned to Bucharest by then, and Iuliu Maniu, the Chairman of the Ruling Council in Sibiu. The masonic involvement of the Romanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference was proof of the diplomatic abilities of its members as well as of the perfect cooperation with the local political decisionmakers, with the purpose of adjusting to the then current international context to the benefit of the country’s national interests. After Romania and Hungary signed the Treaty of Trianon (4 July 1920) whose clauses were favourable to Romania, the Romanian freemasons would leave their Masonic lodges in the coming years.
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Dervishi, Erjon. "THE ALBANIAN QUESTION AT THE PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE DURING 1919-1920". Journal of Liberty and International Affairs, Institute for Research and European Studies - Bitola 2 (2020): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.47305/jlia2020123d.
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Miazga, Nikolai. "Paris Peace Conference of 1919–1920 and Prospects of the Belarusian Statehood". Metamorphoses of history, n.º 23 (2022): 0. http://dx.doi.org/10.37490/mh2022232.
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One of the most important outcomes of the First World War was the collapse of empires that existed in Central and Eastern Europe. The Entente countries and the United States at the final stage of the war put forward the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination. This created prerequisites for building of their statehood by a number of peoples of the region. Belarusians were among them. The BPR (Belarusian People's republic) and SSRB were proclaimed. The process of formation of the Belarusian national statehood took place in the context of new system of international relations formation and its success largely depended on foreign policy conditions. The main elements of a new international order for Europe were laid down at the Paris Conference. The "Belarusian" question did not receive an independent sound in Paris. The interests of Belarus were touched upon when the participants of the conference discussed "Polish" and "Russian" issues that were closely related to each other. The problem of defining the Polish eastern borders was of crucial importance for Belarus. The Entente states stood for the formation of an independent Polish state within ethnic borders. This created prerequisites for preserving the territorial integrity of Belarus. However, the Polish ruling circles overcame the negative attitude of the Entente towards the expansion of Poland beyond its ethnic borders with the help of a fait accompli policy. At the same time, the Poles positioned the concept of the federation in front of the Entente as realization of the right of the "Eastern Kresy" peoples, including Belarusians, to self-determination. The Polish expansion to the east did not meet real opposition from the Entente, as it was interested in Poland as an anti-Bolshevik force, an element of the "sanitary cordon". The BNR delegation, which arrived in Paris, did not find support from Western politicians in recognizing the independence of the Belarusian state. The decisions of the Paris Conference provided for the preservation of the integrity of Belarus, but not as an independent state, but as part of Russia.
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Barwiński, Marek. "Nationality issues on Polish maps prepared for the Paris Peace Conference 1919–1920". Polish Cartographical Review 55, n.º 1 (1 de janeiro de 2023): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/pcr-2023-0009.
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Abstract The military and political outcome of World War I, and the deliberations of the Paris Peace Conference, offered a real chance for the rebirth of Polish statehood. A key issue was the justification of Poland’s future territorial shape, in which ethnic issues played a significant role alongside historical, economic and strategic criteria. The aim of this paper is to show and discuss selected archival nationality maps, often of an expert nature, produced by Polish scholars for the purpose of negotiating the territorial extent of Poland during the Paris Peace Conference. To what extent were they an attempt at an objective representation of the national reality of the Polish territory, and to what a subjective perception and experience of space by the authors of the maps? What were the aims and ideas of their creators, what did they want to achieve? To what extent did the political reality of the time determine their behaviour?
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Cojocaru, Gheorghe. "Great Britain and the Paris treaty of Bessarabia of October 28, 1922. 100 years after the ratification". Revista de istorie a Moldovei, n.º 1-2(129-130) (novembro de 2022): 117–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.58187/rim.129-130.05.
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This article analyzes the position of Great Britain towards the union of Bessarabia with the mother country, Romania, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920. It is emphasized that English diplomacy firmly supported Romania’s rights over its province between the Prut and Dniester, also formulating certain conditionalities that the Romanian government had to take into account. England had a primary role in the drafting and signing of the Paris Treaty of Bessarabia on October 28, 1920. Among the Great Powers that signed the Treaty, Great Britain was the first to ratify it in 1922, urging the rest of the signatories to follow suit.
Teses / dissertações sobre o assunto "Paris Peace Conference d 1919-1920"
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Imamoto, Shizuka. "Racial Equality Bill Japanese proposal at Paris Peace Conference : diplomatic manoeuvres and reasons for rejection /". Electronic version, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1959.14/699.
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Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Honours) at Macquarie University.Thesis (MA (Hons))--Macquarie University (Division of Humanities, Dept. of Asian Languages), 2006.
Bibliography: leaves 137-160.
Introduction -- Anglo-Japanese relations and World War One -- Fear of Japan in Australia -- William Morris Hughes -- Japan's proposal and diplomacy at Paris -- Reasons for rejection : a discussion -- Conclusion.
Japan as an ally of Britain, since the signing of Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, entered World War One at British request. During the Great War Japan fought Germany in Asia and afforded protection to Australia. After the conclusion of the War, a peace conference was held at Paris in 1919. As a victorious ally and as one of the Five Great Powers of the day, Japan participated at the Paris Peace Conference, and proposed racial equality to be enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. This Racial Equality Bill, despite the tireless efforts of the Japanese delegates who engaged the representatives of other countries in intense diplomatic negotiations, was rejected. The rejection, a debatable issue ever since, has inspired many explanations including the theory that it was a deliberate Japanese ploy to achieve other goals in the agenda. This thesis has researched the reasons for rejection and contends that the rejection was not due to any one particular reason. Four key factors: a) resolute opposition from Australian Prime Minister Hughes determined to protect White Australia Policy, b) lack of British support, c) lack of US support, and d) lack of support from the British dominions of New Zealand, Canada and South Africa; converged to defeat the Japanese proposal. Japanese inexperience in international diplomacy evident from strategic and tactical mistakes, their weak presentations and communications, and enormous delays in negotiations, at Paris, undermined Japan's position at the conference, but the reasons for rejection of the racial equality proposal were extrinsic.
Mode of access: World Wide Web.
xii, 188 leaves
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Scogin, Katie Elizabeth. "Britain and the Supreme Economic Council 1919". Thesis, North Texas State University, 1987. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc332330/.
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This dissertation attempts to determine what Britain expected from participation in the Supreme Economic Council (SEC) of the 1919 Paris Peace Conference and to what extent its expectations were realized. An investigation of available sources reveals that access to European markets and raw materials and a balance of power to prevent French, German, or Russian hegemony in Europe were British foreign policy goals that SEC delegates sought to advance.
Primary sources for this study include unpublished British Foreign Office and Cabinet records, published British, United States, and German government documents, unpublished personal papers of people directing SEC efforts, such as David Lloyd George, Austen Chamberlain, Cecil Harmsworth, Harry Osborne Mance, and John Maynard Keynes, and published memoirs and accounts of persons who were directly or indirectly involved with the SEC. Secondary accounts include biographies and histories or studies of the Peace Conference and of countries affected by its work.
Primarily concerned with the first half of 1919, this dissertation focuses on British participation in Inter-allied war-time economic efforts, in post-war Rhineland control, in the creation of the SEC, and in the SEC endeavors of revictualling Germany, providing food and medical relief for eastern Europe, and reconstructing European communications. It concludes with Britain's role in the attempt to convert the SEC into an International Economic Council in the last half of 1919 and with the transfer of SEC duties to the Reparations Commission and to the League of Nations.
Through participation in the SEC, Britain led in negotiating the Brussels Agreement and in establishing the Rhineland Commission and the German Economic Commission, reversing French attempts to control the Rhenish economy, preventing French hegemony in Europe, and gaining access to German markets for British goods. Although it failed to achieve its goals of strong eastern European states and access to markets and raw materials there, Britain led in restoration of communications and participated in the relief effort which saved the new states from anarchy in 1919.
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PROTT, Volker. "International concepts and practices of borders : experts, ethnicity, and the Paris system in the early interwar period". Doctoral thesis, 2013. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/28048.
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Defence date: 13 June 2013Examining Board: Professor Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, EUI (Supervisor); Professor A. Dirk Moses, EUI (Second Reader); Doctor Bernhard Struck, University of St Andrews (External Examiner); Professor Donald Bloxham, University of Edinburgh (External Examiner).
PDF of thesis uploaded from the Library digital archive of EUI PhD theses
The interwar period is key to the course international history took in the twentieth century. This thesis examines the conditions under which the new international order instituted after World War One led to violent local reactions. It traces American, British, and French expertise and policies from the peace planning processes begun just before the end of the First World War right up to the Paris peace talks in 1919. Furthermore, it addresses attempts by the League of Nations to stabilise the peace architecture in the 1920s and 1930s. The level of international politics is linked to two prominent 'Western' and 'Eastern' European case studies: the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France in 1918-19 and the Greco- Turkish conflict between 1919 and 1923. In both cases, border changes caused ethnic violence, albeit with very diverse outcomes. While France managed to contain the onset of ethnic cleansing, the Greek-Turkish conflict degenerated, resulting in a fully-fledged war that ended in the forced exchange of roughly 1.6 million civilians across the Aegean Sea. The study demonstrates that the use of ethnicity, as a concept and a political instrument, significantly shaped the course that conflict-prone local settings took. As a shorthand form of national self-determination, ethnicity informed expertise and political decisions on where to alter territorial borders. As a political instrument, it was a powerful tool for nationalist mobilisation. The dissertation concludes that one of the primary structural factors that contributed to the breakdown of the international order in the 1930s was the failure of the international community to provide an alternative to or to successfully contain ethnic and state-sponsored violence as the most effective means to 'correct' the perceived shortcomings of the Paris peace treaties.
Livros sobre o assunto "Paris Peace Conference d 1919-1920"
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Schelle, Karel. Paris peace conference, 1919-1920, and its influence. Brno: Novpress, 2009.
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Lansing, Robert. The Peace Negotiations. Fairfield: 1st World Library, 2006.
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Kidwai, Mushir Hosain. Paris Sulh Konferansı ve Osmanlının çöküşü. Çemberlitaş, İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1991.
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Macmillan, Margaret Olwen. Lessons of history: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919. [Ottawa, Ont.]: Dept. of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 2003.
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Lansing, Robert. The Big Four and others of the Peace Conference. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990.
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Meng, Xianzhang. Shi jie zui jin zhi ju shi. [Beijing: Beijing zhong xian tuo fang ke ji fa zhan you xian gong si, 2012.
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Nicolson, Harold. Peacemaking 1919: Being reminiscences of the Paris Peace Conference. Safety Harbor, FL: Simon Publications, 2001.
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Lovin, Clifford R. A school for diplomats: The Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1997.
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Sharp, Alan, e Sharp Alan. The Versailles settlement: Peacemaking in Paris, 1919. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
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Andelman, David. A Shattered Peace. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., 2009.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteCapítulos de livros sobre o assunto "Paris Peace Conference d 1919-1920"
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Marelja, Miran, Ozren Pilipović e Meta Ahtik. "The Protection of Minorities at the Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920)". In Postwar Continuity and New Challenges in Central Europe, 1918–1923, 35–51. New York: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003185017-4.
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Moffat, Ian C. D. "Vision versus Reality: The Paris Peace Conference and Russia, January–February 1919". In The Allied Intervention in Russia, 1918–1920, 165–85. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137435736_10.
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Osiander, Andreas. "The Peace Conference of Paris, 1919–1920". In The States System of Europe, 1640–1990, 249–315. Oxford University Press, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278870.003.0005.
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Pommier, Daniel. "The Wilsonian Moment of the Azerbaijani Delegation in Paris (1919-1920)". In Eurasiatica. Venice: Fondazione Università Ca’ Foscari, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.30687/978-88-6969-453-0/006.
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The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference fought for the international recognition of its country and for admission to the League of Nations. The analysis of mostly unpublished archival documents from the personal archives of head of delegation Əlimərdan Ələkbər oğlu sheds new light on the history of Azerbaijani diplomacy. Topçubaşov could rely above all on the tools of influence of public opinion, such as books, publications and magazines which were written in large numbers in Paris. The adoption, in Azerbaijani political communication, of languages and contents adapted to the Wilsonian culture was meant to justify the aspiration to self-determination, as other anti-colonial non-European elites attempted to do during the Paris Peace Conference.
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McFadden, David W. "The Bolsheviks and Economic Diplomacy, 1919-1920". In Alternative Paths, 267–93. Oxford University PressNew York, NY, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780195071870.003.0012.
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Abstract With the collapse of the Bullitt m1ss10n and the close of the Paris Peace Conference. Lenin and the Bolsheviks intensified their efforts to achieve a breakthrough with the United States. But now they shifted to a concentration on a predominantly economic strategy. Ludwig C. A. K. Martens had been appointed in January 1919 as the representative of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs for the purpose of economic and diplomatic contact in New York. He attempted to present his credentials to the State Department in late March, at nearly the time the Bullitt proposals were pending.4 Following a rebuff by the State Department, Martens devoted almost his entire attention to contacts with American businessmen. Bolshevik attempts to reach the United States State Department during the remainder of 1919 and 1920 were limited to occasional press interviews, radio, and written appeals. The waning months of the Wilson administration only strengthened this Bolshevik tendency to emphasize economic approaches, as the Soviets devoted their attention to preparation for what they believed would be a new Republican administration, motivated by the primacy of economic considerations.5
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"Creation and Dissolution of the League of Nations". In The United Nations System and its Predecessors, editado por Franz Knipping, 181–220. Oxford University PressOxford, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198764496.003.0003.
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Abstract Bibliographical references: J. C. Smuts: The League of Nations. A Practical Suggestion, London 1918; C. E. Fayle: The Fourteenth Point. A Study of the League of Nations, Paris 1919; H. Folry: Woodrow Wilson’s Case for the League of Nations, Princeton 1923; R. Redslob: Theorie de la Societe des Nations, Paris 1927; D. H. 1vfiller: The Drafting of the Covenant, 2 vols., New York 1928; F. vVilson: The Origins of the League Covenant, London 1928; G. Brustmann: Der crste Wilsonsche Vi:ilkerbundscntwurf und die tatsachlichen Vi:ilkcrbunds satzungen, Wiirzburg 1930; F. Bleiber: Die Entstehung der Vi:ilkcrbundssatzung. Handbuch des Vi:ilkerrechts, vol. 4, Stuttgart 1939; D. F. Fleming: The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920, New York 1968; D. Jacobs: An American Conscience: Woodrow Wilson’s Search for •world Peace, New York 1973; G. W Egerton: Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations: Strategy, Politics, and International Organization, 1914-1919, Chapel Hill 1978; T.J. Knock: Woodrow Wilson and the Origins of the League ofNations, Princeton 1982; id.: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New World Order, New York 1992; L. E. Ambrosius: Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: the Treaty Fight in Perspective, Cambridge, Mass. 1987.
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de Mazza, Ethel Matala. "Disputes over Germany’s War Guilt". In Guilt, 305–22. Oxford University Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197557433.003.0016.
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World War I constitutes a turning point in political and legal dealings with war crimes. Whereas peace treaties, especially since the Thirty Years’ War, used to evade questions of guilt and granted amnesty to the belligerent parties, the treaties sealed in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919–1920 moved away from this long-established custom. Drawing on recent studies in history and political science, this remarkable shift emerges both as result of and motor for the modernization of international relations. World War I served the Allies as precedent to prove their commitment to legal principles and to transform the battlefield of interstate conflicts into a sphere civilized by law. Against this backdrop, the productivity of guilt emerged in two ways. On the one hand, guilt became a category of legal importance and served as a powerful agent of change within the process of building transnational coalitions for new principles of international law. On the other hand, the bold advance of Kurt Eisner, then prime minister of Bavaria, who published secret documents in order to admit the guilt of imperial Germany, should be recognized as an early effort to accept political responsibility to foster new bonds between former enemies.