Bibliografias temáticas / Nash-bargaining model

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Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Nash-bargaining model"

Autor: Grafiati

Publicado: 21 de dezembro de 2024

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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "Nash-bargaining model"

Maude-Griffin, Roland, Roger Feldman * e Douglas Wholey *. "Nash bargaining model of HMO premiums". Applied Economics 36, n.º 12 (10 de julho de 2004): 1329–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0003684042000238938.

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Chan, Kenneth S. "Trade negotiations in a Nash bargaining model". Journal of International Economics 25, n.º 3-4 (novembro de 1988): 353–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(88)90060-8.

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Hema, P., N. R. Rejin Paul, Lenka Čepová, Bhola Khan, Kailash Kumar e Vladimira Schindlerova. "Complexity and Monitoring of Economic Operations Using a Game-Theoretic Model for Cloud Computing". Systems 11, n.º 2 (17 de janeiro de 2023): 50. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems11020050.

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In this study, a model is presented for allocating cloud computing resources based on economic considerations using tools from game theory. The model, called the Non-Cooperative Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (NCGRAA), is designed to achieve the optimum stage in cloud computing. In addition, the Bargaining Game Resource Allocation Algorithm (BGRAA) is introduced to the existing system to develop the billing process within the constraints of availability and fairness. This system-based algorithm implements methods for converging on and improving the Nash Equilibrium and Nash Bargaining solutions. While the Nash equilibrium helps to develop decision-making concepts with game theory, one of its main goals is to achieve the desired outcome and avoid deviation from the working stage. Nash Bargaining is a unique solution that occurs between two parties and takes into account the process of bargaining to provide a fair solution that is scale invariant and independent. In recent years, cloud computing has become a popular way to manage computing services and enable producers and consumers to interact. This process allows users to obtain goods at an affordable cost from sellers according to their expectations. This research investigates the economic operation monitoring of cloud computing using the gaming theory model. A Static Negotiation Analysis Method with a Bargaining Process (SNAM-BP) for a dynamic conceptual framework is presented to display the weighted relationship between primary issues and keywords used to evaluate the potential partnership of each country.

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Feng, Zhongwei, Fangning Li e Chunqiao Tan. "Alternating-Offers Bargaining with Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns". Behavioral Sciences 13, n.º 2 (1 de fevereiro de 2023): 124. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/bs13020124.

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The Rubinstein alternating-offers bargaining game is reconsidered, where players show fairness concerns and their fairness references are characterized by the Nash bargaining solution. The objective of this paper is to explore the impact of fairness concerns in the alternating-offer bargaining game. Alternating-offer bargaining with fairness concerns is developed. We construct a subgame perfect equilibrium and show its uniqueness. Then, it is shown that players’ payoffs in the subgame perfect equilibrium are positively related to their own fairness concern coefficient and bargaining power and negatively to the opponents’ fairness concern coefficient. Moreover, it is shown that the limited equilibrium partition depends on the ratio of discount rates of the two players when the time lapse between two offers goes to zero. Finally, the proposed model is applied to the bilateral monopoly market of professional basketball players, and some properties of equilibrium price are shown. Our result provides the implication that players should carefully weigh their own fairness concerns, bargaining power and fairness concerns of their opponents, and then make proposals, rather than simply follow the suggestion that the proposal at the current stage is higher than that at the past stages.

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Bastianello, Lorenzo, e Marco LiCalzi. "The Probability to Reach an Agreement as a Foundation for Axiomatic Bargaining". Econometrica 87, n.º 3 (2019): 837–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ecta13673.

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We revisit the Nash bargaining model and axiomatize a procedural solution that maximizes the probability of successful bargaining. Our characterization spans several known solution concepts, including the special cases of the Nash, egalitarian, and utilitarian solutions. Using a probability‐based language, we offer a natural interpretation for the product operator underlying the Nash solution: when the bargainers' individual acceptance probabilities are independent, their product recovers the joint acceptance probability.

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Demougin, Dominique, e Carsten Helm. "Moral Hazard and Bargaining Power". German Economic Review 7, n.º 4 (1 de dezembro de 2006): 463–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2006.00130.x.

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Abstract We introduce bargaining power in a moral hazard framework where parties are risk-neutral and the agent is financially constrained. We show that the same contract emerges if the concept of bargaining power is analyzed in either of the following three frameworks: in a standard principal-agent (P-A) framework by varying the agent’s outside opportunity, in an alternating offer game, and in a generalized Nash-bargaining game. However, for sufficiently low levels of the agent’s bargaining power, increasing it marginally does affect the equilibrium in the Nash-bargaining game, but not in the P-A model and in the alternating offer game.

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L.A, Papakonstantinidis. "The “Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Model”: from Social Welfare’s Philosophy towards a Rural Development Concept by Rural Tourism Approach: The WERT Case Study". INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 3, n.º 1 (2017): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/ijied.1849-7551-7020.2015.35.2001.

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The article is dealing with two interconnected problems based on the conjectures: a) social welfare is a condition for rural development and not the prerequisite for it; b) shape a new landscape (the “win-win-win”) based on critique of the “Impossibility Theorem (Kenneth Arrow 1951) through the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, John 1950). Specifically, this article discusses and analyses social welfare and rural development objectives integrating elements from the impossibility theorem, the bargaining theory, and the theory of agency by (a) reviewing the literature on coordination “social welfare” and “rural development” (b) reversing the focus from “voting” to “bargaining” and (c) underlining that Social choice is the perquisite of social welfare, using the “win-win-win Papakonstantinidis model’s solution as the bridge between “voting”(Arrow) and “bargaining”(proposal). This solution highlights the Role of Rural Community as an “Aggregation” corresponding to its “sensitization process”.

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Wang, Meiqiang, e Yongjun Li. "Supplier evaluation based on Nash bargaining game model". Expert Systems with Applications 41, n.º 9 (julho de 2014): 4181–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2013.12.044.

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Braun, Norman, e Thomas Gautschi. "A Nash bargaining model for simple exchange networks". Social Networks 28, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2006): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2004.11.011.

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Fallahnejad, Reza, Mohammad Reza Mozaffari, Peter Fernandes Wanke e Yong Tan. "Nash Bargaining Game Enhanced Global Malmquist Productivity Index for Cross-Productivity Index". Games 15, n.º 1 (24 de janeiro de 2024): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g15010003.

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The Global Malmquist Productivity Index (GMPI) stands as an evolution of the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI), emphasizing global technology to incorporate all-time versions of Decision-Making Units (DMUs). This paper introduces a novel approach, integrating the Nash Bargaining Game model with GMPI to establish a Cross-Productivity Index. Our primary objective is to develop a comprehensive framework utilizing the Nash Bargaining Game model to derive equitable common weights for different time versions of DMUs. These weights serve as a fundamental component for cross-evaluation based on GMPI, facilitating a holistic assessment of DMU performance over varying time periods. The proposed index is designed with essential properties: feasibility, non-arbitrariness concerning the base time period, technological consistency across periods, and weight uniformity for GMPI calculations between two-time versions of a unit. This research amalgamates cross-evaluation and global technology while employing geometric averages to derive a conclusive cross-productivity index. The core motivation behind this methodology is to establish a reliable and fair means of evaluating DMU performance, integrating insights from Nash Bargaining Game principles and GMPI. This paper elucidates the rationale behind merging the Nash Bargaining Game model with GMPI and outlines the objectives to provide a comprehensive Cross-Productivity Index, aiming to enhance the robustness and reliability of productivity assessments across varied time frames.

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Mais fontes

Teses / dissertações sobre o assunto "Nash-bargaining model"

Gómez, Natalia González. "Three essays on bargaining : On refutability of the Nash bargaining solution; On inter- and intra-party politics; A bargaining model with strategic generosity". Thesis, University of Warwick, 2012. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/56815/.

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This dissertation is a collection of three essays that share one common feature: all three of them relate to the literature on Bargaining. The first and second essay are joint work with my supervisor, Professor Andrés Carvajal. In our first essay we investigate the testable implications of the Nash bargaining solution. We develop polynomial tests of the NBS under different hypothesis about the default levels. For instance, with, and without observation from the outside econometrician of the levels of utility that the individuals would have obtained outside the negotiation. We use the Tarski-Seindenberg algorithm to characterize rationalizable data as those that satisfy a finite system of polynomial inequalities. In our second essay we introduce a new equilibrium concept for games of political competition. We model electoral competition within each party, assuming inner-party members have somewhat conflicting preferences. By using the bargaining protocol à la Baron and Ferejohn (1989) we explicitly model party members’ strategic interactions, their incentives and their decision of whom to elect. Our equilibrium concept attempts to model each member’s decision as if each player were uncertain about, (i) the faction that will eventually dominate the decision made by the other party and (ii) the faction that will dominate in the party’s nomination. In the last essay I focus on one of the classical problems in bargaining: the divide the dollar problem. In our framework we assume players’ utility functions mirror selfish and Rawlsian preferences. We derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria for different arrangements of player types and study why strategic generosity emerges under the bargaining protocol we assume.

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Nguyen, Quang Huy. "Facteurs sociaux et adoption de l’agriculture biologique : apport de l’analyse économique". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Strasbourg, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024STRAB006.

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L’objectif principal de cette thèse est d’examiner les facteurs sociaux qui influencent l’adoption de l’agriculture biologique. Nous avons dérivé et répondu aux questions centrales des chapitres pour réaliser cet objectif. Chaque chapitre analyse un groupe de facteurs (normes sociales, formation et conseils techniques, contrat de vente, certification et traçabilité, voisins et leadership; leadership et partage d’information). Une analyse économique différente est appliquée : régression méta-analyse ; expérience sur le terrain avec expérience de choix discret ; modèle théorique ; et expérimentation sur le terrain avec jeu de négociation de Nash. Cette thèse peut servir de référence pour la conception et la mise en œuvre d’expériences contextualisées de laboratoire sur le terrain avec des agriculteurs. Il s’agit de l’une des premières études à proposer un modèle théorique pour des expériences en laboratoire sur le terrain utilisant la négociation de Nash dans l’agriculture biologique
The primary object of this thesis is to examine the social factors influencing the adoption of organic agriculture. We derived and answered the central questions in the abovementioned chapters to realize this objective. Each chapter analyzed a group of factors (social norms; the training and technical advice, sales contract, certification and traceability, neighbors, and leadership; leadership and information sharing) comprehensively and applied respectively a different economic analysis to answer its question: meta-analysis regression; field experiment with discrete choice experience; theoretical model; and field experiment with Nash-bargaining game. This thesis may be a reference for designing and implementing contextualized lab-in-field experiments with farmers. It is one of the first studies to propose a theoretical building for lab-in-field experiments using Nash bargaining in organic agriculture

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Oliveira, Érica Diniz. "Essays on household taxation and competition between heterogeneous firms". reponame:Repositório Institucional do FGV, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10438/13304.

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Essa tese é constituída por três artigos: 'Tax Filing Choices for the Household', 'Optimal Tax for the Household: Collective and Unitary Approaches' e 'Vertical Differentiation and Heterogeneous Firms'.

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Straka, Richard. "Model strategického rozhodování ve vícehráčové hře s prvky kooperativního chování". Master's thesis, Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta informačních technologií, 2013. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-236212.

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This work concentrates on the study of mathematical models of human behaviour in dynamic games; in particular games with aspects of cooperation, implementation of a model and experimentation with the model. The game DarkElf was chosen for this project. It is a strategic, turn based game with economic and military features, where the decisions made by players are simultaneously implemented at a predetermined time.

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張民忠. "The Study of the Nash Bargaining Game by Linear Model". Thesis, 1998. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/3y5a2g.

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碩士
國防管理學院
資源管理研究所
86
This paper uses the concept of Game Theory to explain the complex competitive relationship between two players, and Utility Theory to be a criterion of strategy that players make. By this these theories, we can constract a Linear Bargaining Model, find optimal bargaining solution by equilibrium of pure strategy or mixed strategy, and make the best competitive strategy at the same time. In addition, the Linear Bargaining Model in this paper comes from Nash Bargaining Model and refine it. In this model, the Nash Bargaining Solution will be a special case. In other words, this paper reduces constraints placed on and generalizes the Nash Bargaining Model,

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Wang, Pang-Chun, e 王邦畯. "The Application of Data Envelopment Analysis and Nash Bargaining Model in the Rationalization Price Study of Equipment Maintenance". Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/70767433690245675248.

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碩士
國立臺北大學
企業管理學系
93
In the capital-intensive technological industries, equipments are important assets and high value-added sources. After long term using, equipments may inevitably break down, and appropriate maintenance is therefore needed for early prevention. Because there are more than 37 suppliers of Substation Equipment in Taipower and the prices among them for maintaining the GIS & GCB have noticeable difference, so the research about “Price Rationalization for the Examination and Maintenance of Substation Equipment” is very important to enhance the service quality and increase the cost-benefit. In this research rationalization of equipment maintenance expenditure is mentioned. Unlike the other ways of calculating cost, there are many expenditure items when executing equipment maintenance We see different expenditure of items as different dimensions, which is not comparable. Using Data Envelopment Analysis and Nash Bargaining Model, results show the rationalized expenditure item by item based on historical data. In this research we choose Taipower’s 161kv GIS equipment’s casual maintenance as case. Results reveal that in the 8 data we gathered 3 could be rationally reduced using the other 5 as benchmarks, and we can detect the rationalized value of future data when executing prevention maintenance from now on.

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EricYonathan e 陳利勇. "A Two-Step Computation Strategy for Designing Decentralized Supply Chains with Fair Profit Allocation Plans Using Nash Cooperative Bargaining Model". Thesis, 2019. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/98yf83.

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碩士
國立成功大學
化學工程學系
107
Traditional supply-chain management methods often treated the given system as a whole, without considering the conflicting interests of its participants. Game theory was adopted in a number of prior studies to identify fair prices and throughputs of the intermediates so as to maintain sustainable operations. In particular, the mathematical frameworks of a series of fictitious systems have already been proposed in the literature. The proper designs of distributed processing systems were generated to facilitate implementation of a decentralized optimization strategy. In these supply chains, the supplier-produced intermediates were bought by consumers to manufacture the final products. However, when the total profit of a supply chain is maximized without constraints, the maximum total profit may not be divided and allocated to every actor fairly. This deficiency could lead to various negative impacts, including dissatisfaction of actors, instability of coalition, loss of markets, and reduction in revenue. For this reason, a cooperative game theory has already been applied to generate fair-profit allocation plans among the supplier(s) and consumer(s) so as to establish a long-term working relationship. The present work developed a two-step approach addresses this issue. Finding the maximum total profit of the whole chain is the primary task of the first step, while the Nash cooperative bargaining approach is adopted in the second step so as to distribute the total proﬁt among the actors fairly. Consequently, the corresponding intermediate prices and throughputs can also be estimated as well. Various case studies in fictitious systems and the petroleum supply chain are provided as examples to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed approach. It can be observed from the optimization results of various case studies in fictitious systems and the petroleum supply chain that the goal to get the fair profit allocation plans can be achieved while still maintaining the maximum total profit of the whole chain.

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Livros sobre o assunto "Nash-bargaining model"

Sanfey, Peter J. The effects of bargaining power product price and profits on wages in a Nash-bargaining model. Canterbury: University of Kent at Canterbury, 1992.

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Bargain, Olivier. Cooperative models in action: Simulation of a nash-bargaining model of household labor supply with taxation. Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2005.

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Frost, Corin. The economics of the greenhouse effect: A Nash bargaining model of CO2 emission abatement. [s.l.]: typescript, 1992.

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Myles, Gareth D. Do unions reduce discrimination?: A model of Nash bargaining between a union and an employer with discriminatory tastes. Coventry: University of Warwick, Dept. of Economics, 1990.

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Myles, Gareth D. Do unions reduce discrimination?: A model of Nash bargaining between a union and an employer with employer with discriminatory tastes. Coventry: University of Warwick Department of Economics, 1990.

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Mark, Gertler. Unemployment fluctuations with staggered nash wage bargaining. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.

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Adam, C. Testing nash bargaining household models with time series data: Divorce law reform and female suicide in Canada. Oxford University, Institute of Economics and Statistics, 1997.

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Capítulos de livros sobre o assunto "Nash-bargaining model"

Ott, Notburga. "A Nash bargaining model for household decisions". In Microeconomic Studies, 33–45. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-45708-1_4.

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Bader, Felix. "Braun/Gautschi (2006): A Nash Bargaining Model for Simple Exchange Networks". In Schlüsselwerke der Netzwerkforschung, 79–82. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-21742-6_19.

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Okada, Akira. "A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem". In Game Equilibrium Models III, 7–33. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_3.

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Boyer, Marcel, e Anne Catherine Faye. "Music Royalty Rates for Different Business Models: Lindahl Pricing and Nash Bargaining". In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1453–59. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_761.

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Boyer, Marcel, e Anne Catherine Faye. "Music Royalty Rates for Different Business Models: Lindahl Pricing and Nash Bargaining". In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–7. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_761-1.

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Young, H. Peyton. "An Evolutionary Model of Bargaining". In Spontaneous Order, 57–81. Oxford University PressOxford, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198892908.003.0005.

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Abstract Individuals from two disjoint populations of bargainers are randomly matched to play the Nash demand game. They usually make their demands by choosing best responses based on an incomplete knowledge of precedents, but occasionally they choose randomly. There is no common knowledge. Over the long run, typically one division will be observed almost all of the time. This stochastically stable division is close to the Nash bargaining solution when all agents in a given population have the same utility function and gather the same amount of information. When each population is heterogeneous, a generalization of the Nash solution results. If there is some mixing between the two populations, the stochastically stable outcome is fifty–fifty division.

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Papadopoulos, Alecos. "The Nash Bargaining Two-tier Stochastic Frontier Model*". In Advances in Econometrics, 439–76. Emerald Publishing Limited, 2024. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/s0731-905320240000046015.

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Trabalhos de conferências sobre o assunto "Nash-bargaining model"

Song, Yanqiu, Dashuang Dai e Zheng Li. "Game Analysis Based on Nash Bargaining Model for Cooperative Innovation in Complex Product System". In 2009 International Conference on Management and Service Science (MASS). IEEE, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icmss.2009.5304644.

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Qin, Yanhong, e Hong Le. "Dynamic evolution of supply chain fairness based on Stackelberg and Nash bargaining game model". In 2019 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM). IEEE, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsssm.2019.8887703.

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Li, Xuemei, e Jinyu Li. "Combine Contract Model for Two-level Supply Chain Considering Nash Bargaining Fairness Concerns and Sales Effort". In 2018 8th International Conference on Logistics, Informatics and Service Sciences (LISS). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/liss.2018.8593250.

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Shankaran, Sriram, e Tom Vandeputte. "Game-Theoretic Models for Cooperative Equilibrium Solutions of Interacting Engineering Sub-Systems". In ASME Turbo Expo 2014: Turbine Technical Conference and Exposition. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/gt2014-25293.

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Although game-theoretical models to study social and economic problems have existed for a long time, they have been sparsely used for the design of engineering systems. This is due to the significant theoretical hurdles posed by game formulations for real engineering environments /problems. In this study we show our first attempt at adapting the frame-work of game-theoretical models for engineering problems, in particular the aero-mechanical optimization of a notional turbine blade. We pose the design problem as a series of games, starting with the determination of the Pareto front, the non-cooperative (disagreement) point and the optimal solution as the tangent intersection of the Pareto front and contours of the overall system objective. We present gradient-based algorithms that determine the Pareto front, the non-cooperative solution and the tangent solution. The solution to this series of games provides the basis of a new equilibrium concept namely, System Optimal Cooperative Solution (SOCS), which is the central theme of this paper. Finally we compare the SOCS solution against other cooperative solutions like Nash-Bargaining [1]. The results of this study show that in engineering environments previously known cooperative solutions like Nash-Bargaining and Kalai-Smordinsky [2] are not that important while the notion of a System Optimal Cooperative Solution, SOCS, is the equilibrium solution of relevance. For the particular example we consider, the SOCS is shown to be more favoring the aerodynamic performance when compared against the Nash-Bargaining equilibrium solution.

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Abdelghaffar, Hossam M., Hao Yang e Hesham A. Rakha. "Developing a de-centralized cycle-free nash bargaining arterial traffic signal controller". In 2017 5th IEEE International Conference on Models and Technologies for Intelligent Transportation Systems (MT-ITS). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/mtits.2017.8005732.

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