Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Multiculturalism – great britain"

The article is devoted to the problems of immigrants in multicultural Great Britain. Individuality and culture are dynamically linked to place, landscape and localization. Each such locality has its own immigration history, which affects living standards, education, and political views. The article shows that the term "multiculturalism" has been divided into the concepts of "common rights" and "minority rights".

This study is devoted to the multilayered and controversial problem of multiculturalism, in the context of national identity in the territory of modern Great Britain. The article deals with the problems of the transformation of the linguistic and cultural components of the life of the country, and the perception and acceptance of ethnic diversity by the population of Britain. Particular attention is paid to the emergence of new varieties of the English language - ethnolects and multiethnolects, resulting from the relationship between different ethnic groups in the context of multiculturalism. In the article, the author gives examples that testify to the fiasco of multiculturalism and reflects on the social and linguistic aspects of the process of integrating non-racial, non-religious migrants into European and, in particular, English society. The paper considers such a phenomenon as the “cancellation culture” of the white race. The questions of the formation of a hybrid identity are touched upon, as well as concerns are expressed about the possible negative impact of the osternization of Europe.

The article attempts to analyze the rhetoric and methods of promoting the ideas of far-right groups in the United States of America and Great Britain in the context of immigration processes and the multiculturalism policy connected with them. The authors draw attention to the tendency that right-wing radical groups hold different positions: from moderate to most radical. The focus of the study is on comparing the tactics and discourse of such organizations whose degrees of radicalism differ because of their positions on the problem of national identity. The study attempts to highlight the activities of previously unexplored right-wing radical groups in the United States and Great Britain. The focus is on “Proud Guys” and “Generation of Identity”, trying to create a socially acceptable image; Richard Spencer and Tomi Robinson, who are trying on the image of extreme right-wing leaders; Andrew Anglin and members of "National Action", who occupy ultra right positions in expressing their views. The study deals with a massive selection of sources: mass media materials, statistical reports of public organizations and accessible official resources of right-wing forces. The authors conclude that the modern far-right associations of the USA and Great Britain are similar on the agenda and in its implementation. The main enemies of the right radicals are immigrants, Muslims, Jews and feminists. In this sense, adepts of such ideas constitute a threat to the stability of a democratic society.

The present world is characterized by the growth of conflicts. Dividing lines and fractures are increasingly appearing in societies. Migration reinforces such phenomena. The West is no longer an area of stability and prosperity. Moreover, in the last two decades, the problem of integrating the descendants of migrants into society has become clear. In this regard, the scientific discussions of cultural identity acquire a high practical significance. The paper presents an analysis of the scientific discourse on the Muslim issue in the UK. The choice of the case is due to the fact that the UK is a typical Western state, where there is a steady trend to strengthen the cleavage of society. At the same time, it is noted that migration has become one of the key processes in the history of the United Kingdom. The authors apply the concepts of a divided society and responsible development. It is noted that in practice multiculturalism is changing to interculturalism as a more adequate concept of solving existing problems. According to the authors, the ethno-religious discourse on the issue of the Muslim diaspora in the UK consists of four areas: migration, school and higher education, gender, and radicalization of young people. Discourses on the problems of migration policy and functioning of diasporas, Muslim education, gender equality, and radicalization of Islamic youth can be considered derived from a higher discourse – the discourse of identity, which is based on value-worldview aspects. In conclusion, it is noted that negative processes are taking place in British society, which are of strategic importance for responsible development. According to the authors, success in overcoming divisions in British society will depend on coordinated planned actions at all levels (international, national, regional, local). “Indigenous” residents and the Muslim diaspora need to build a model of partnership, which implies mutual responsibility. The analysis of scientific discourses presented in the article inspires moderate optimism, as it offers well-founded and concrete solutions to the existing problems of British society. Although British society is divided, British scientific discourse has a common platform where researchers of different backgrounds and faiths successfully engage in dialogue.

Using the comparative and content analysis of European and British normative documents and regulatory laws the main approaches to improving the professional training of the British teacher ready to work in the context of internationalization have been defined: namely, competence, modernization of the content of vocational training, practical-oriented. The implementation of the competence approach involves the development of new standards for the professional teacher training of the British teacher based on European professional competences, including the following components: European identity, European knowledge, multiculturalism, European professionalism, European citizenship and European academic mobility of teachers. The modernization of the content of vocational and pedagogical training of the British teacher is carried out through the introduction the international dimension into the basic professional disciplines and disciplines of the social and humanitarian cycle, the introduction of special courses of international orientation («European space», «Pedagogy and European space in education»). The implementation of the practice-oriented approach to improving vocational and pedagogical training provides the performance of internships for teachers in higher educational institutions in Europe, organization of pedagogical practice of the students in one of the higher educational institutions of Europe or the world.

The review characterizes the publications of ten contemporary Turkish specialists analyzing the situation of Turkish migrants outside Turkey. Their experiences in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Great Britain, and the United States are described. Each section of the survey draws on field research on the lived religious experience of Turks in Europe and North America, shaped around religious and civic organizations dedicated to protecting the interests of the Turkish diaspora. The current situation of Turkish communities, which have become settled communities and have moved away from the goals of initial migration, is of importance to both host countries and Turkey itself. The studies characterized in this review purport to make an important contribution to understanding the culture of the contemporary West, which is undergoing enormous strain in its progression from liberal multiculturalism to conservatism.

The presence of Asian in Great Britain has added a new perspective to debates about notions such as ‘identity’, ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘Englishness’. East is East (Damien O’Donnell, 1999) explores the culture clash that occurs in the context of a half Pakistani and half British family living in early 1970’s Salford. Through its representation of an atypical family the film’s emphasis lies most conspicuously on its portrayal of the beginnings of contemporary multi-ethnic and multicultural British society. This way, the film highlights issues of cultural diversity, difference and hybridity while also raising questions about identity, belonging and the concept of Englishness. The aim of this essay will therefore be to examine how Daniel O’Donnell’s film East is East explores the paradoxical nature of “identities” inevitably swaying in between two cultures by looking at the diverse discourses on identity and how they have been constructed.

As the saying goes ‘good girls go to heaven, bad girls go everywhere!’, whose origin is uncertain, sometimes attributed to American actress and screenwriter Mae West, sometimes to editor-in-chief of Cosmopolitan magazine, Helen Gurvey Brown, it was taken up as a slogan by feminists who denounce the sexual norm imposed on women by religions. At a time when the influence of religious fundamentalism on State policies seems to be gaining ground (retreat on abortion laws in the United States, in Poland; Sharia courts in Great Britain, etc.), the object of this research note will be to question the articulations between British Muslim women, State multiculturalism and legislation. In Britain, since the 1980s, a network of sharia councils has developed to resolve disputes between Muslims, including resolving family problems. Sharia councils thus reveal the place of Muslim women in the United Kingdom on the issue of divorce. Extremely patriarchal, rarely feminist, often undemocratic, the sharia councils appear as places of power. The latter are often compared to Islamic courts, so-called ‘counseling’ religious services or ‘Islamic family services’ to which Muslims wishing to respect divine law and their religious precepts go – especially women. What does this mean for British Muslim women who use these services? How is the British government responding?

The purpose of this study is to analyze genre strategies in modern British multicultural literature on the example of A. Mukherjee's novel "A Man with a Great Future". The subject of the study is the genre dominants of the detective and historical novel in the work of A. Mukherjee, in particular elements of the classic English detective literature, as well as detective novels by Scottish writers of the XX century, who paid considerable attention to social issues in their works. The relevance of the article is determined by the relevance in modern humanities of scientific works devoted to the study of genres and genre models, including their transformation in modern world literature. The novelty of the work is determined by the low degree of study of A. Mukherjee's works, mainly from the point of view of genre specificity in the context of the expression of multicultural features of the text under consideration. The main research methods are biographical, comparative-historical and typological. As a result of the analysis, it is concluded that A. Mukherjee refers to the structure of the classical model of both the detective and historical novel, but adds a social and national context to the traditional genre dominants. The strategies of the detective and historical novel allow the author to reflect the patterns of historical determinism that determined the development of modern Britain and India, as well as to identify the origins of British multiculturalism, of which A. Mukherjee himself is a part.

Objective: The article aims to identify and evaluate the diversity management practices used in enterprises as well as the benefits and difficulties of diversity management. Research Design & Methods: Empirical research was carried out in 2018–2020 using a diagnostic survey with a survey technique. The study surveyed 130 managers representing various medical device industry enterprises from four countries – Germany, Great Britain, France, and Poland. Findings: The most frequently used diversity management practices were flexible working hours, integration activities for employees, and analysing employment structures and job satisfaction. The analysis results also confirm that the managers more often perceived the benefits of diversity management than the difficulties. At the same time, diversity management practices are implemented spontaneously in most companies. Implications / Recommendations: The results of the research may be a source of practical recommendations for companies from the medical device industry vis-à-vis the broader use of diversity management. It may help them think about how to implement such practices and activities in their everyday routines. The research presented herein focused on three selected dimensions of diversity – age, gender, and multiculturalism. In the future, wider, cross-sectional research covering wider dimensions of diversity management in more countries would be worth doing. Contribution: The presented research attempts to fill the gap in diversity management in the innovative and rapidly developing medical device industry.

London is home to the largest community of Polish migrants in Great Britain. The multicultural and superdiverse character of the city frequently – though not always – helps newly-arrived inhabitants to settle and decide to stay for longer or for ever. In 2016 there was a referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership in the European Union. It was a moment when many migrants (re)considered their presence and their position in the society of the United Kingdom. One of the largest affected groups of migrants were the Poles. The purpose of this article is to present the situation of Polish migrants on the eve of Brexit, from the perspective of life in a multicultural and superdiverse city – London. The spectre of Brexit has brought out social tensions, detectible to varying degrees depending on the social character of the place of residence in question. In this article I have tried to answer the question: To what extent have the social mood and the social status of migrants in their own perception changed due to Brexit in the context of London’s multiculturalism and superdiversity? The article was based on 25 in-depth interviews with Polish migrants living in London. The research was realised within the framework of the scientific program: “The process of the social (re)adaptation of Polish migrants in London when facing Brexit – change and redefinition of social status from an intragroup perspective” (Miniatura 2, NCN Register No.: 2018/02/X/HS6/02300). Interviews were carried out at the end of April and the beginning of May, and in October 2019.

Abstract Teaching English as a foreign language is rooted in the national interest of English-speaking countries that promote their own culture throughout the world. To some extent, ‘culture’ is a byword for what has come to be known as the modern nation. Mainly the UK and the US are in the spotlight of EFL teaching and learning. At the expense of other, less ‘sought-after’ varieties of English, British and American English make the case for British and American cultures. Essentially, this is all about Britishness and Americanness, as the very name of the English variety testifies to the British or the American standard. Of course, the other choice, i.e. not to make a choice, is a statement on its own. One way or another, the attempt to pick and choose shapes teaching and learning EFL. However, English is associated with teaching cultural diversity more than other prestige languages. Despite the fact that its status has everything to do with the colonial empire of Great Britain, English highlights the conflict between the use made of the mother tongue to stereotype the non-native speaker of English and current Anglo- American multiculturalism. Effectively, language-use is supposed to shed light on the self-identification patterns that run deep in the literary culture of the nation. Content and language integrated learning (CLIL) encompasses the above-mentioned and, if possible, everything else from the popular culture of the English-speaking world. It feels safe to say that the intractable issue of “language teaching as political action” (Cook, 2016: 228) has yet to be resolved in the classrooms of the Romanian public schools too.

В статье дается оценка книги В. И. Козлова об иммиграции и этнорасовых проблемах в Британии (1987) и анализируется сделанный им на период 1980-х годов прогноз развития ситуации. Автор сопоставляет перспективный сценарий 35-летней давности с современными реалиями и отмечает, что миграция и политика мультикультурализма привели к радикальным переменам в национальной и этнической идентификациях жителей страны. На примере Англии и Уэльса по итогам переписи 2011 и 2021 гг. анализируются сложные идентичности и перемены в пользу общебританской идентификации, особенно т.н. цветного населения страны, доля которого и роль в жизни Великобритании заметно выросли, вызывая реакцию английского национализма, но не отрицая вариант национального единения на основе культурно сложной британской идентичности. Высказаны идеи относительно изучения феномена культурного разнообразия и обновленного понимания этничности. The paper reviews V. I. Kozlov’s book on immigration and ethnic-racial problems in Great Britain (1987) and evaluates his forecast going back to the 1980s on the future evolution of the migration situation. The author compares the 35 years ago scenario with the nowadays realities and concludes that mass migration and the policy of multiculturalism have caused radical changes in the national and ethnic identities of the British population. On a basis of England and Wales 2011 and 2021 censuses he analyses multiply identities and changes in favor of Britishness identity versus Englishness, especially among the country's non-white population, whose role in this country’s life has grown greatly, causing a reaction of English nationalism, but not hindering the scenario of nation-building based on a culturally inclusive pan- British identity. The article includes elaborations on super- diversity debates and on how contemporary census practices destroy narrow understanding of ethnicity as culturally homogeneous groupings.

The Biopolitics of Mixing: Thai Multiracialities and Haunted Ascendancies.By JINTHANA HARITAWORN. Ashgate, 2012. $99.95Reviewed by Aedan HoarThe Biopolitics of Mixing builds upon Thai histories that were collected during Haritaworn’s qualitative research on experiences of Thai multiraciality in Britain and Germany. The narrative reaches back over a decade and maps out the connections and conclusions of Haritaworn’s journey with race and the question: “What are you?” or “Where do you come from?” By giving voice to the themes that emerged from Haritaworn’s research and interviews, this book maps a social environment that is created through the politics of mixed-raciality and its effect on our interpretations of mixed-race bodies.The book explores the celebratory nature of post-race politics which seeks to erase the history of colonization, replacing memories of oppression with a vision of a new age in which empire was simply a necessary stepping stone towards a future beyond race. Haritaworn makes the important argument that narratives of mixed-race and “tolerance” are used to drive campaigns of humanitarian militarism against “intolerant” cultures. In the process, this book exposes unsettling historical connections between the celebration of mixed-raciality as resulting in stronger genetics, and the racist, white-supremacist culture that was the driving force behind eugenics. Haritaworn’s research confronts the hegemonic narratives that effect the way that ability, gender, and race are represented in transnational politics of the body.Through weaving in histories from their interviews, Haritaworn traces connections in theory and geopolitics that let the reader critically examine the driving forces behind what makes mixed-raced people characterized as beautiful or inferior, celebrated or marginalized. The book draws on an extensive bibliography and historical examples of how mixed-raciality and multiculturalism have been used by racist cultures to re-invent state histories as progressive, inclusive, and liberating. Demonstrating the ways that mixed-race bodies are used to support hegemonic racist and heterosexual norms, this book is an eye-opening exploration of the ways that multiculturalism and “inclusivity” are being used to promote the current geopolitical power structures in neoliberalism.The Biopolitics of Mixing is wonderfully written and extremely reflexive in tone making it an essential resource for any reader who wants to critically examine the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, and disability. This book spends a great deal of time establishing Haritaworn’s positionality, mapping out the logic behind the research in a very accessible way. One thing that adds a great deal to the book is the use of footnotes, which seem to predict questions that the reader might have, adding yet another layer to the depth of the analysis. Haritaworn achieves an in-depth exploration of the construction of mechanisms used to place individual bodies within categories of race, gender, or sexuality. The Biopolitics of Mixing reveals how systemic racism is normalized in everyday interactions in multicultural society. The book takes readers on a journey where the assumptions we (and the author) take for granted about the intersectionalities of race, gender, poverty, ability, and sexuality are challenged in an effort to give voice to “that which had been left out” of Haritaworn’s original research model. In this way the reader is informed by Haritaworn’s personal journey that walks the book’s conclusions back through connections that were made over more than a decade of research. The Biopolitics of Mixing makes room for important discussions that challenge readers to reflect upon our own conceptualizations of the body and our relationship to geopolitical narratives. This book is a must read for students interested in Thai-histories, multi-raciality and multiculturalism, social-justice research, biopolitics or intersectional analysis.~AEDAN HOAR is a Masters Candidate in the Faculty of Environmental Studies at York University. His work examines colonization, land use planning, and social transformation through a biopolitical lens.

Less Developed Countries (LDCs) provide enormous opportunities for companies involved in the development of infrastructure. LDCs couple significant need with often insufficient 'in country' capability or expertise, meaning that foreign companies willing to expand operations into LDCs can find interesting and profitable opportunities. International infrastructure development naturally brings with it the sovereign risks associated with contracting with the government of a LDC. During the last thirty years, governments of LDCs have actively sought the execution of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) with other nations in an attempt to mitigate the appearance of sovereign risk and encourage greater international investment. This has included encouraging foreign companies in the delivery of infrastructure projects. In the last five years, however, worldwide political support for IIAs seems to be waning, as nationalism and populism threatens to replace globalism and multiculturalism as the dominant economic and political theories in the USA, Europe and Great Britain. In a global political landscape dominated by nationalistic rhetoric, we are unlikely to see continued popular support for the protection of foreign companies against national interests by way of IIAs. We are likely to see not only fewer new IIAs, but conceivably governments revoking their agreement to existing IIAs coupled with waning support for ICSID arbitrations. The author submits, however, that there will not necessarily be a marked increase in sovereign risk as a direct result, and that LDCs will continue to provide worthwhile markets and opportunities for infrastructure development. The author submits that IIAs never in any event provided complete protection, and that protection against sovereign risk remains available through the underlying contract and in many cases, through political risk insurance. Further, international participants should look at projects with shorter timeframes to secure the return on investment, and avoiding taking sole risk on project by operating in joint ventures.

One hundred years ago, the British Empire controlled a quarter of the world’s area and population. Today only a dozen tiny islands remain of this once great empire. However, the British left a huge and permanent legacy behind in terms of the English language, a rule of law, banking, Protestantism, team sports, and parliamentary institutions. While some historians, notably Niall Ferguson, hold that the British legacy was a positive one, most historians believe the legacy was a negative one. Instead of being liberal and democratic, the British Empire was anti-democratic. Instead of fostering free trade, the Empire was protectionist toward the outside world. Notions of class and hierarchy were crucial. This article examines the British legacy in two former colonies in Asia--one huge and one tiny: India and Hong Kong. While in Hong Kong, Britain’s legacy has been fairly positive, in India it is quite negative. The British Empire was not a prelude to a modern 21st century Western world of democracy, multiculturalism, and liberal economics. The British Empire was something different– snobbery, hierarchy, and individualism, and must be understood on its own terms.

The article is devoted to analyzing the peculiarities of the formation, management and current state of development of cultural and social diversity, including through the policy of multiculturalism, in the United Kingdom or, in particular, in Great Britain. This issue has been systematized due to the author’s own reflections and taking into account some corrections at the background of the political process in the United Kingdom both before and after the disintegration of the country from the European Union. As a result, the researcher clarified the parameters of cultural and social diversity evolution at the background of the stages of formation and development of the phenomenon and policy of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom. It has been found that both civil society and, at most, political actors in the United Kingdom both simultaneously reject and support cultural diversity as a political goal and set of practices. As a result, the rhetoric of mobilized or politicized, limited or defective and inclusive or integrative, but not polycentric multiculturalism takes shape in the country. However, in contrast, there has been theorized and reflected the irreconcilable and antagonistic opposition of multiculturalism to multiculture (social and cultural diversity), which inevitably contributes to the politicization of this issue in the United Kingdom.

In a time of devolution and fragmentation in the UK, The Great British Bake Off plays into the elements of heritage film and imperial nostalgia and especially all things considered ‘English’. However, the show also attempts to include a more diverse representation of the British people and recreate a national identity that leaves more space for ethnic minorities. Linking theories on national identity and theories on heritage film, this article examines how the GBBO format acts as heritage television which idealizes certain aspects of English history, as well as how the inclusion and celebration of contestants with an ethnic minority background adds to a portrayal of an idealized form of British multiculturalism. These findings lay the basis for a discussion on the connection between food culture and multiculturalism, and how GBBO tries to combine the past ‘glory’ of England with the present (multicultural) reality of Britain.

National identity in Great Britain is always interesting to discuss, as it dealt with England, Scotland, Walles, and Northern-Ireland identity, yet it is English identity that overshadowed British Identity. The problematic concept of English identity also brought up by Billy Bragg, a remarkable British musician, in his England, Half English-song in early 2000. This paper scrutinizes the question of “what does half English mean and what should be meant by full English?” using critical views on multiculturalism. The result shows that the basic idea of Bragg's works important in showing how the most changeable and essential signs of national culture and the clearer voices of its immigrant are perfect expressions of the "ultimate" Half-ness of England.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the peculiarities of the theatrical art of Western Muslim communities of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. on the example of Great Britain. Research methodology. The method of analysis and synthesis, the method of typological analysis, the historical and cultural method, the method of art research and theoretical generalisation was applied, which contributed to clarifying the peculiarities of the traditions of Islamic theatre and its development at the modern stage in Western Muslim communities, identifying the peculiarities and characteristic features of the theatres of the Muslim community of Great Britain . Scientific novelty. Peculiarities of theatrical art of Western Muslim communities were studied using the example of Great Britain; on the basis of the analysis of the productions of the "Khayaal Theatre" theatrical campaign, the peculiarities of the understanding of the place, role, and potential of theatrical art by representatives of modern Muslim communities in Europe were considered; the activity of the theatre of the multi-national Islamic school with education in English "SOBIS" (Cardiff) was analysed in the context of preserving the traditions of the Islamic theatre. Conclusions. The rich culture and spiritual experience of the Islamic world, represented in the productions of Western Muslim communities, exerts a noticeable influence on modern European society. The study revealed that the development of theatrical art in Western Muslim communities in the late 20th and early 21st centuries testifies to the selective integration of the leading trends of European performing arts, the attraction to multiculturalism, provided that traditional cultural and religious Islamic values are preserved. The originality of the scenographic solution, which has a direct connection with Islamic history, its visual and architectural heritage, expresses the ideas and values of Muslims. The main Muslim theatre companies in the UK are Khayaal Theatre, Ulfa Arts, Arakan Creative, Muju and others. Interactive forms of theatre, in particular forum-theatre, can become a powerful way of interacting and informing about the issues of British Muslim identity. Characteristic features of the activities of the theatres of the Muslim community of Great Britain are: honouring and popularising the philosophical-aesthetic, literary and artistic Islamic traditions; development of a diverse repertoire in order to reach a wide audience; promotion of intercultural dialogue, interaction of traditional and modern, mutual understanding between Muslims and people of other faiths and traditions.

CLARKSON, STEPHEN. Uncle Sam and US: Globalization, Neoconservatism, and the Canadian State. By W. Andy Knight 899WALLOT, JEAN-PIERRE, sous la direction de. La Commission Pepin-Robarts quelque vingt ans aprés. Le débat qui n'a pas eu lieu. Par Simon Langois 900MARTIN, MICHEL, dir. Andrée Ferretti : La passion de l'engagement. Discours et textes (1964-2001). Par Denyse Côté 902ABU-LABAN, YASMEEN and CHRISTINA GABRIEL. Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity, and Globalization. By Leslie A. Pal 905HALE, GEOFFREY, The Politics of Taxation in Canada. By Michael J. Prince 906NOLIN, PIERRE CLAUDE, Président. Le cannabis. Rapport du Comité spécial du Sénat sur les drogues illicites. Par Line Beauchesne 907TARDY, ÉVELYNE. Les femmes et les conseils municipaux du Québec. Par Jocelyne Praud 909PERL, ANTHONY. New Departures: Rethinking Rail Passenger Policy in the Twenty- First Century. By Dan Madar 912FREITAG, MICHEL, avec la collaboration d'Yves Bonny. L'oubli de la société : Pour une théorie critique de la postmodernité. Par Ulric Deschênes 913BERNSTEIN, STEVEN. The Compromise of Liberal Environmentalism. By Matthew Paterson 915LEISS, WILLIAM. In the Chamber of Risks: Understanding Risk Controversies. By James Tansey 916THÉRET, BRUNO. Protection sociale et fédéralisme. L'Europe dans le miroir de l'Amérique du Nord. Par Daniel Béland 917DELWIT, PASCAL, dir. Libéralismes et partis libéraux en Europe. Par Vincent Lemieux 920DRIVER, STEPHEN AND LUKE MARTELL. Blair's Britain. By Alexandra Dobrowolsky 921PALIER, BRUNO. Gouverner la Sécurité sociale. Par Jacinthe Michaud 922HOOK, GLENN D., JULIE GILSON, CHRISTOPHERW. HUGHES AND HUGO DOBSON. Japan's International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. By Tsuyoshi Kawasaki 927CHAPPELL, LOUISE A. Gendering Government: Feminist Engagement with the State in Australia and Canada. By Jill Vickers 929BALDEZ, LISA. Why Women Protest: Women's Movements in Chile. By Susan Franceschet 930HAYES, MICHAEL T. The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the Rule of Law. By Andrea Migone 931GAGNON, BERNARD. La philosophie morale et politique de Charles Taylor. Par Benoît Dubreuil 933MOSCHONAS, GERASSIMOS, Trans. GREGORY ELLIOT. In the Name of Social Democracy: The Great Transformation: 1945 to the Present; and PIERSON, CHRISTOPHER. Hard Choices: Social Democracy in the 21st Century. By David Laycock 935STANKIEWICZ, W. J. The Essential Stankiewicz: On the Importance of Political Theory. By Herminio Meireles Teixeira 937BLATTBERG, CHARLES. From Pluralist to Patriotic Politics: Putting Practice First. By Simone Chambers 940JANARA, LAURA, Democracy Growing Up: Authority, Autonomy, and Passion in Tocqueville's Democracy in America. By Catherine A. Holland 941

In its preamble, The Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism (WA) commits the state to becoming: “A society in which respect for mutual difference is accompanied by equality of opportunity within a framework of democratic citizenship”. One of the principles of multiculturalism, as enunciated in the Charter, is “equality of opportunity for all members of society to achieve their full potential in a free and democratic society where every individual is equal before and under the law”. An important element of this principle is the “equality of opportunity … to achieve … full potential”. The implication here is that those who start from a position of disadvantage when it comes to achieving that potential deserve more than ‘equal’ treatment. Implicitly, equality can be achieved only through the recognition of and response to differential needs and according to the likelihood of achieving full potential. This is encapsulated in Kymlicka’s argument that neutrality is “hopelessly inadequate once we look at the diversity of cultural membership which exists in contemporary liberal democracies” (903). Yet such a potential commitment to differential support might seem unequal to some, where equality is constructed as the same or equal treatment regardless of differing circumstances. Until the past half-century or more, this problematic has been a hotly-contested element of the struggle for Civil Rights for African-Americans in the United States, especially as these rights related to educational opportunity during the years of racial segregation. For some, providing resources to achieve equal outcomes (rather than be committed to equal inputs) may appear to undermine the very ethos of liberal democracy. In Australia, this perspective has been the central argument of Pauline Hanson and her supporters who denounce programs designed as measures to achieve equality for specific disadvantaged groups; including Indigenous Australians and humanitarian refugees. Nevertheless, equality for all on all grounds of legally-accepted difference: gender, race, age, family status, sexual orientation, political conviction, to name a few; is often held as the hallmark of progressive liberal societies such as Australia. In the matter of religious freedoms the situation seems much less complex. All that is required for religious equality, it seems, is to define religion as a private matter – carried out, as it were, between consenting parties away from the public sphere. This necessitates, effectively, the separation of state and religion. This separation of religious belief from the apparatus of the state is referred to as ‘secularism’ and it tends to be regarded as a cornerstone of a liberal democracy, given the general assumption that secularism is a necessary precursor to equal treatment of and respect for different religious beliefs, and the association of secularism with the Western project of the Enlightenment when liberty, equality and science replaced religion and superstition. By this token, western nations committed to equality are also committed to being liberal, democratic and secular in nature; and it is a matter of state indifference as to which religious faith a citizen embraces – Wiccan, Christian, Judaism, etc – if any. Historically, and arguably more so in the past decade, the terms ‘democratic’, ‘secular’, ‘liberal’ and ‘equal’ have all been used to inscribe characteristics of the collective ‘West’. Individuals and states whom the West ascribe as ‘other’ are therefore either or all of: not democratic; not liberal; or not secular – and failing any one of these characteristics (for any country other than Britain, with its parliamentary-established Church of England, headed by the Queen as Supreme Governor) means that that country certainly does not espouse equality. The West and the ‘Other’ in Popular Discourse The constructed polarisation between the free, secular and democratic West that values equality; and the oppressive ‘other’ that perpetuates theocracies, religious discrimination and – at the ultimate – human rights abuses, is a common theme in much of the West’s media and popular discourse on Islam. The same themes are also applied in some measure to Muslims in Australia, in particular to constructions of the rights of Muslim women in Australia. Typically, Muslim women’s dress is deemed by some secular Australians to be a symbol of religious subjugation, rather than of free choice. Arguably, this polemic has come to the fore since the terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001. However, as Aly and Walker note, the comparisons between the West and the ‘other’ are historically constructed and inherited (Said) and have tended latterly to focus western attention on the role and status of Muslim women as evidence of the West’s progression comparative to its antithesis, Eastern oppression. An examination of studies of the United States media coverage of the September 11 attacks, and the ensuing ‘war on terror’, reveals some common media constructions around good versus evil. There is no equal status between these. Good must necessarily triumph. In the media coverage, the evil ‘other’ is Islamic terrorism, personified by Osama bin Laden. Part of the justification for the war on terror is a perception that the West, as a force for good in this world, must battle evil and protect freedom and democracy (Erjavec and Volcic): to do otherwise is to allow the terror of the ‘other’ to seep into western lives. The war on terror becomes the defence of the west, and hence the defence of equality and freedom. A commitment to equality entails a defeat of all things constructed as denying the rights of people to be equal. Hutcheson, Domke, Billeaudeaux and Garland analysed the range of discourses evident in Time and Newsweek magazines in the five weeks following September 11 and found that journalists replicated themes of national identity present in the communication strategies of US leaders and elites. The political and media response to the threat of the evil ‘other’ is to create a monolithic appeal to liberal values which are constructed as being a monopoly of the ‘free’ West. A brief look at just a few instances of public communication by US political leaders confirms Hutcheson et al.’s contention that the official construction of the 2001 attacks invoked discourses of good and evil reminiscent of the Cold War. In reference to the actions of the four teams of plane hijackers, US president George W Bush opened his Address to the Nation on the evening of September 11: “Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). After enjoining Americans to recite Psalm 23 in prayer for the victims and their families, President Bush ended his address with a clear message of national unity and a further reference to the battle between good and evil: “This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace. America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time. None of us will ever forget this day. Yet, we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just in our world” (“Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”). In his address to the joint houses of Congress shortly after September 11, President Bush implicated not just the United States in this fight against evil, but the entire international community stating: “This is the world’s fight. This is civilisation’s fight” (cited by Brown 295). Addressing the California Business Association a month later, in October 2001, Bush reiterated the notion of the United States as the leading nation in the moral fight against evil, and identified this as a possible reason for the attack: “This great state is known for its diversity – people of all races, all religions, and all nationalities. They’ve come here to live a better life, to find freedom, to live in peace and security, with tolerance and with justice. When the terrorists attacked America, this is what they attacked”. While the US media framed the events of September 11 as an attack on the values of democracy and liberalism as these are embodied in US democratic traditions, work by scholars analysing the Australian media’s representation of the attacks suggested that this perspective was echoed and internationalised for an Australian audience. Green asserts that global media coverage of the attacks positioned the global audience, including Australians, as ‘American’. The localisation of the discourses of patriotism and national identity for Australian audiences has mainly been attributed to the media’s use of the good versus evil frame that constructed the West as good, virtuous and moral and invited Australian audiences to subscribe to this argument as members of a shared Western democratic identity (Osuri and Banerjee). Further, where the ‘we’ are defenders of justice, equality and the rule of law; the opposing ‘others’ are necessarily barbaric. Secularism and the Muslim Diaspora Secularism is a historically laden term that has been harnessed to symbolise the emancipation of social life from the forced imposition of religious doctrine. The struggle between the essentially voluntary and private demands of religion, and the enjoyment of a public social life distinct from religious obligations, is historically entrenched in the cultural identities of many modern Western societies (Dallmayr). The concept of religious freedom in the West has evolved into a principle based on the bifurcation of life into the objective public sphere and the subjective private sphere within which individuals are free to practice their religion of choice (Yousif), or no religion at all. Secularism, then, is contingent on the maintenance of a separation between the public (religion-free) and the private or non- public (which may include religion). The debate regarding the feasibility or lack thereof of maintaining this separation has been a matter of concern for democratic theorists for some time, and has been made somewhat more complicated with the growing presence of religious diasporas in liberal democratic states (Charney). In fact, secularism is often cited as a precondition for the existence of religious pluralism. By removing religion from the public domain of the state, religious freedom, in so far as it constitutes the ability of an individual to freely choose which religion, if any, to practice, is deemed to be ensured. However, as Yousif notes, the Western conception of religious freedom is based on a narrow notion of religion as a personal matter, possibly a private emotional response to the idea of God, separate from the rational aspects of life which reside in the public domain. Arguably, religion is conceived of as recognising (or creating) a supernatural dimension to life that involves faith and belief, and the suspension of rational thought. This Western notion of religion as separate from the state, dividing the private from the public sphere, is constructed as a necessary basis for the liberal democratic commitment to secularism, and the notional equality of all religions, or none. Rawls questioned how people with conflicting political views and ideologies can freely endorse a common political regime in secular nations. The answer, he posits, lies in the conception of justice as a mechanism to regulate society independently of plural (and often opposing) religious or political conceptions. Thus, secularism can be constructed as an indicator of pluralism and justice; and political reason becomes the “common currency of debate in a pluralist society” (Charney 7). A corollary of this is that religious minorities must learn to use the language of political reason to represent and articulate their views and opinions in the public context, especially when talking with non-religious others. This imposes a need for religious minorities to support their views and opinions with political reason that appeals to the community at large as citizens, and not just to members of the minority religion concerned. The common ground becomes one of secularism, in which all speakers are deemed to be indifferent as to the (private) claims of religion upon believers. Minority religious groups, such as fundamentalist Mormons, invoke secular language of moral tolerance and civil rights to be acknowledged by the state, and to carry out their door-to-door ‘information’ evangelisation/campaigns. Right wing fundamentalist Christian groups and Catholics opposed to abortion couch their views in terms of an extension of the secular right to life, and in terms of the human rights and civil liberties of the yet-to-be-born. In doing this, these religious groups express an acceptance of the plurality of the liberal state and engage in debates in the public sphere through the language of political values and political principles of the liberal democratic state. The same principles do not apply within their own associations and communities where the language of the private religious realm prevails, and indeed is expected. This embracing of a political rhetoric for discussions of religion in the public sphere presents a dilemma for the Muslim diaspora in liberal democratic states. For many Muslims, religion is a complete way of life, incapable of compartmentalisation. The narrow Western concept of religious expression as a private matter is somewhat alien to Muslims who are either unable or unwilling to separate their religious needs from their needs as citizens of the nation state. Problems become apparent when religious needs challenge what seems to be publicly acceptable, and conflicts occur between what the state perceives to be matters of rational state interest and what Muslims perceive to be matters of religious identity. Muslim women’s groups in Western Australia for example have for some years discussed the desirability of a Sharia divorce court which would enable Muslims to obtain divorces according to Islamic law. It should be noted here that not all Muslims agree with the need for such a court and many – probably a majority – are satisfied with the existing processes that allow Muslim men and women to obtain a divorce through the Australian family court. For some Muslims however, this secular process does not satisfy their religious needs and it is perceived as having an adverse impact on their ability to adhere to their faith. A similar situation pertains to divorced Catholics who, according to a strict interpretation of their doctrine, are unable to take the Eucharist if they form a subsequent relationship (even if married according to the state), unless their prior marriage has been annulled by the Catholic Church or their previous partner has died. Whereas divorce is considered by the state as a public and legal concern, for some Muslims and others it is undeniably a religious matter. The suggestion by the Anglican Communion’s Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, that the adoption of certain aspects of Sharia law regarding marital disputes or financial matters is ultimately unavoidable, sparked controversy in Britain and in Australia. Attempts by some Australian Muslim scholars to elaborate on Dr Williams’s suggestions, such as an article by Anisa Buckley in The Herald Sun (Buckley), drew responses that, typically, called for Muslims to ‘go home’. A common theme in these responses is that proponents of Sharia law (and Islam in general) do not share a commitment to the Australian values of freedom and equality. The following excerpts from the online pages of Herald Sun Readers’ Comments (Herald Sun) demonstrate this perception: “These people come to Australia for freedoms they have never experienced before and to escape repression which is generally brought about by such ‘laws’ as Sharia! How very dare they even think that this would be an option. Go home if you want such a regime. Such an insult to want to come over to this country on our very goodwill and our humanity and want to change our systems and ways. Simply, No!” Posted 1:58am February 12, 2008 “Under our English derived common law statutes, the law is supposed to protect an individual’s rights to life, liberty and property. That is the basis of democracy in Australia and most other western nations. Sharia law does not adequately share these philosophies and principles, thus it is incompatible with our system of law.” Posted 12:55am February 11, 2008 “Incorporating religious laws in the secular legal system is just plain wrong. No fundamentalist religion (Islam in particular) is compatible with a liberal-democracy.” Posted 2:23pm February 10, 2008 “It should not be allowed in Australia the Muslims come her for a better life and we give them that opportunity but they still believe in covering them selfs why do they even come to Australia for when they don’t follow owe [our] rules but if we went to there [their] country we have to cover owe selfs [sic]” Posted 11:28am February 10, 2008 Conflicts similar to this one – over any overt or non-private religious practice in Australia – may also be observed in public debates concerning the wearing of traditional Islamic dress; the slaughter of animals for consumption; Islamic burial rites, and other religious practices which cannot be confined to the private realm. Such conflicts highlight the inability of the rational liberal approach to solve all controversies arising from religious traditions that enjoin a broader world view than merely private spirituality. In order to adhere to the liberal reduction of religion to the private sphere, Muslims in the West must negotiate some religious practices that are constructed as being at odds with the rational state and practice a form of Islam that is consistent with secularism. At the extreme, this Western-acceptable form is what the Australian government has termed ‘moderate Islam’. The implication here is that, for the state, ‘non-moderate Islam’ – Islam that pervades the public realm – is just a descriptor away from ‘extreme’. The divide between Christianity and Islam has been historically played out in European Christendom as a refusal to recognise Islam as a world religion, preferring instead to classify it according to race or ethnicity: a Moorish tendency, perhaps. The secular state prefers to engage with Muslims as an ethnic, linguistic or cultural group or groups (Yousif). Thus, in order to engage with the state as political citizens, Muslims must find ways to present their needs that meet the expectations of the state – ways that do not use their religious identity as a frame of reference. They can do this by utilizing the language of political reason in the public domain or by framing their needs, views and opinions exclusively in terms of their ethnic or cultural identity with no reference to their shared faith. Neither option is ideal, or indeed even viable. This is partly because many Muslims find it difficult if not impossible to separate their religious needs from their needs as political citizens; and also because the prevailing perception of Muslims in the media and public arena is constructed on the basis of an understanding of Islam as a religion that conflicts with the values of liberal democracy. In the media and public arena, little consideration is given to the vast differences that exist among Muslims in Australia, not only in terms of ethnicity and culture, but also in terms of practice and doctrine (Shia or Sunni). The dominant construction of Muslims in the Australian popular media is of religious purists committed to annihilating liberal, secular governments and replacing them with anti-modernist theocratic regimes (Brasted). It becomes a talking point for some, for example, to realise that there are international campaigns to recognise Gay Muslims’ rights within their faith (ABC) (in the same way that there are campaigns to recognise Gay Christians as full members of their churches and denominations and equally able to hold high office, as followers of the Anglican Communion will appreciate). Secularism, Preference and Equality Modood asserts that the extent to which a minority religious community can fully participate in the public and political life of the secular nation state is contingent on the extent to which religion is the primary marker of identity. “It may well be the case therefore that if a faith is the primary identity of any community then that community cannot fully identify with and participate in a polity to the extent that it privileges a rival faith. Or privileges secularism” (60). Modood is not saying here that Islam has to be privileged in order for Muslims to participate fully in the polity; but that no other religion, nor secularism, should be so privileged. None should be first, or last, among equals. For such a situation to occur, Islam would have to be equally acceptable both with other religions and with secularism. Following a 2006 address by the former treasurer (and self-avowed Christian) Peter Costello to the Sydney Institute, in which Costello suggested that people who feel a dual claim from both Islamic law and Australian law should be stripped of their citizenship (Costello), the former Prime Minister, John Howard, affirmed what he considers to be Australia’s primary identity when he stated that ‘Australia’s core set of values flowed from its Anglo Saxon identity’ and that any one who did not embrace those values should not be allowed into the country (Humphries). The (then) Prime Minister’s statement is an unequivocal assertion of the privileged position of the Anglo Saxon tradition in Australia, a tradition with which many Muslims and others in Australia find it difficult to identify. Conclusion Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia, partly because it is perceived that their faith is under attack and that it needs defending (Aly). They construct the defence of their faith as a choice and an obligation; but also as a right that they have under Australian law as equal citizens in a secular state (Aly and Green). Australian Muslims who have no difficulty in reconciling their core Australianness with their deep faith take it as a responsibility to live their lives in ways that model the reconciliation of each identity – civil and religious – with the other. In this respect, the political call to Australian Muslims to embrace a ‘moderate Islam’, where this is seen as an Islam without a public or political dimension, is constructed as treating their faith as less than equal. Religious identity is generally deemed to have no place in the liberal democratic model, particularly where that religion is constructed to be at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy, namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. Indeed, it is as if the national commitment to secularism rules as out-of-bounds any identity that is grounded in religion, giving precedence instead to accepting and negotiating cultural and ethnic differences. Religion becomes a taboo topic in these terms, an affront against secularism and the values of the Enlightenment that include liberty and equality. In these circumstances, it is not the case that all religions are equally ignored in a secular framework. What is the case is that the secular framework has been constructed as a way of ‘privatising’ one religion, Christianity; leaving others – including Islam – as having nowhere to go. Islam thus becomes constructed as less than equal since it appears that, unlike Christians, Muslims are not willing to play the secular game. In fact, Muslims are puzzling over how they can play the secular game, and why they should play the secular game, given that – as is the case with Christians – they see no contradiction in performing ‘good Muslim’ and ‘good Australian’, if given an equal chance to embrace both. Acknowledgements This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. References ABC. “A Jihad for Love.” Life Matters (Radio National), 21 Feb. 2008. 11 March 2008. < http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lifematters/stories/2008/2167874.htm >.Aly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40.Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. “‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen.” M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). 13 April 2008 < http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08aly-green.php >.Aly, Anne, and David Walker. “Veiled Threats: Recurrent Anxieties in Australia.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 27.2 (2007): 203-14.Brasted, Howard.V. “Contested Representations in Historical Perspective: Images of Islam and the Australian Press 1950-2000.” Muslim Communities in Australia. Eds. Abdullah Saeed and Akbarzadeh, Shahram. Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2001. 206-28.Brown, Chris. “Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity.” Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. Eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 293-324. Buckley, Anisa. “Should We Allow Sharia Law?” Sunday Herald Sun 10 Feb. 2008. 8 March 2008 < http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/story/0,21985,231869735000117,00.html >.Bush, George. W. “President Outlines War Effort: Remarks by the President at the California Business Association Breakfast.” California Business Association 2001. 17 April 2007 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011017-15.html >.———. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation”. Washington, 2001. 17 April 2007 < http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html >.Charney, Evan. “Political Liberalism, Deliberative Democracy, and the Public Sphere.” The American Political Science Review 92.1 (1998): 97- 111.Costello, Peter. “Worth Promoting, Worth Defending: Australian Citizenship, What It Means and How to Nurture It.” Address to the Sydney Institute, 23 February 2006. 24 Apr. 2008 < http://www.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?doc=speeches/2006/004.htm &pageID=05&min=phc&Year=2006&DocType=1 >.Dallmayr, Fred. “Rethinking Secularism.” The Review of Politics 61.4 (1999): 715-36.Erjavec, Karmen, and Zala Volcic. “‘War on Terrorism’ as Discursive Battleground: Serbian Recontextualisation of G. W. Bush’s Discourse.” Discourse and Society 18 (2007): 123- 37.Green, Lelia. “Did the World Really Change on 9/11?” Australian Journal of Communication 29.2 (2002): 1-14.Herald Sun. “Readers’ Comments: Should We Allow Sharia Law?” Herald Sun Online Feb. 2008. 8 March 2008. < http://www.news.com.au/heraldsun/comments/0,22023,23186973-5000117,00.html >.Humphries, David. “Live Here, Be Australian.” The Sydney Morning Herald 25 Feb. 2006, 1 ed.Hutcheson, John S., David Domke, Andre Billeaudeaux, and Philip Garland. “U.S. National Identity, Political Elites, and Patriotic Press Following September 11.” Political Communication 21.1 (2004): 27-50.Kymlicka, Will. “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality.” Ethics 99.4 (1989): 883-905.Modood, Tariq. “Establishment, Multiculturalism and British Citizenship.” The Political Quarterly (1994): 53-74.Osuri, Goldie, and Subhabrata B. Banerjee. “White Diasporas: Media Representations of September 11 and the Unbearable Whiteness of Being in Australia.” Social Semiotics 14.2 (2004): 151- 71.Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1971.Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books 1978.Western Australian Charter of Multiculturalism. WA: Government of Western Australia, Nov. 2004. 11 March 2008 < http://www.equalopportunity.wa.gov.au/pdf/wa_charter_multiculturalism.pdf >.Yousif, Ahmad. “Islam, Minorities and Religious Freedom: A Challenge to Modern Theory of Pluralism.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20.1 (2000): 30-43.

Introduction I am a transmigrant who has moved back and forth between the West and the Rest. I was born and raised in a Muslim family in a predominantly Muslim country, Bangladesh, but I spent several years of my childhood in Pakistan. After my marriage, I lived in the United States for a year and a half, the Middle East for 5 years, Australia for three years, back to the Middle East for another 5 years, then, finally, in Australia for the last 12 years. I speak Bengali (my mother tongue), Urdu (which I learnt in Pakistan), a bit of Arabic (learnt in the Middle East); but English has always been my medium of instruction. So where is home? Is it my place of origin, the Muslim umma, or my land of settlement? Or is it my ‘root’ or my ‘route’ (Blunt and Dowling)? Blunt and Dowling (199) observe that the lives of transmigrants are often interpreted in terms of their ‘roots’ and ‘routes’, which are two frameworks for thinking about home, homeland and diaspora. Whereas ‘roots’ might imply an original homeland from which people have scattered, and to which they might seek to return, ‘routes’ focuses on mobile, multiple and transcultural geographies of home. However, both ‘roots’ and ‘routes’ are attached to emotion and identity, and both invoke a sense of place, belonging or alienation that is intrinsically tied to a sense of self (Blunt and Dowling 196-219). In this paper, I equate home with my root (place of birth) and route (transnational homing) within the context of the ‘diaspora and belonging’. First I define the diaspora and possible criteria of belonging. Next I describe my transnational homing within the framework of diaspora and belonging. Finally, I consider how Australia can be a ‘home’ for me and other Muslim Australians. The Diaspora and Belonging Blunt and Dowling (199) define diaspora as “scattering of people over space and transnational connections between people and the places”. Cohen emphasised the ethno-cultural aspects of the diaspora setting; that is, how migrants identify and position themselves in other nations in terms of their (different) ethnic and cultural orientation. Hall argues that the diasporic subjects form a cultural identity through transformation and difference. Speaking of the Hindu diaspora in the UK and Caribbean, Vertovec (21-23) contends that the migrants’ contact with their original ‘home’ or diaspora depends on four factors: migration processes and factors of settlement, cultural composition, structural and political power, and community development. With regard to the first factor, migration processes and factors of settlement, Vertovec explains that if the migrants are political or economic refugees, or on a temporary visa, they are likely to live in a ‘myth of return’. In the cultural composition context, Vertovec argues that religion, language, region of origin, caste, and degree of cultural homogenisation are factors in which migrants are bound to their homeland. Concerning the social structure and political power issue, Vertovec suggests that the extent and nature of racial and ethnic pluralism or social stigma, class composition, degree of institutionalised racism, involvement in party politics (or active citizenship) determine migrants’ connection to their new or old home. Finally, community development, including membership in organisations (political, union, religious, cultural, leisure), leadership qualities, and ethnic convergence or conflict (trends towards intra-communal or inter-ethnic/inter-religious co-operation) would also affect the migrants’ sense of belonging. Using these scholarly ideas as triggers, I will examine my home and belonging over the last few decades. My Home In an initial stage of my transmigrant history, my home was my root (place of birth, Dhaka, Bangladesh). Subsequently, my routes (settlement in different countries) reshaped my homes. In all respects, the ethno-cultural factors have played a big part in my definition of ‘home’. But on some occasions my ethnic identification has been overridden by my religious identification and vice versa. By ethnic identity, I mean my language (mother tongue) and my connection to my people (Bangladeshi). By my religious identity, I mean my Muslim religion, and my spiritual connection to the umma, a Muslim nation transcending all boundaries. Umma refers to the Muslim identity and unity within a larger Muslim group across national boundaries. The only thing the members of the umma have in common is their Islamic belief (Spencer and Wollman 169-170). In my childhood my father, a banker, was relocated to Karachi, Pakistan (then West Pakistan). Although I lived in Pakistan for much of my childhood, I have never considered it to be my home, even though it is predominantly a Muslim country. In this case, my home was my root (Bangladesh) where my grandparents and extended family lived. Every year I used to visit my grandparents who resided in a small town in Bangladesh (then East Pakistan). Thus my connection with my home was sustained through my extended family, ethnic traditions, language (Bengali/Bangla), and the occasional visits to the landscape of Bangladesh. Smith (9-11) notes that people build their connection or identity to their homeland through their historic land, common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. Though Pakistan and Bangladesh had common histories, their traditions of language, dress and ethnic culture were very different. For example, the celebration of the Bengali New Year (Pohela Baishakh), folk dance, folk music and folk tales, drama, poetry, lyrics of poets Rabindranath Tagore (Rabindra Sangeet) and Nazrul Islam (Nazrul Geeti) are distinct in the cultural heritage of Bangladesh. Special musical instruments such as the banshi (a bamboo flute), dhol (drums), ektara (a single-stringed instrument) and dotara (a four-stringed instrument) are unique to Bangladeshi culture. The Bangladeshi cuisine (rice and freshwater fish) is also different from Pakistan where people mainly eat flat round bread (roti) and meat (gosh). However, my bonding factor to Bangladesh was my relatives, particularly my grandparents as they made me feel one of ‘us’. Their affection for me was irreplaceable. The train journey from Dhaka (capital city) to their town, Noakhali, was captivating. The hustle and bustle at the train station and the lush green paddy fields along the train journey reminded me that this was my ‘home’. Though I spoke the official language (Urdu) in Pakistan and had a few Pakistani friends in Karachi, they could never replace my feelings for my friends, extended relatives and cousins who lived in Bangladesh. I could not relate to the landscape or dry weather of Pakistan. More importantly, some Pakistani women (our neighbours) were critical of my mother’s traditional dress (saree), and described it as revealing because it showed a bit of her back. They took pride in their traditional dress (shalwar, kameez, dopatta), which they considered to be more covered and ‘Islamic’. So, because of our traditional dress (saree) and perhaps other differences, we were regarded as the ‘Other’. In 1970 my father was relocated back to Dhaka, Bangladesh, and I was glad to go home. It should be noted that both Pakistan and Bangladesh were separated from India in 1947 – first as one nation; then, in 1971, Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan. The conflict between Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) and Pakistan (then West Pakistan) originated for economic and political reasons. At this time I was a high school student and witnessed acts of genocide committed by the Pakistani regime against the Bangladeshis (March-December 1971). My memories of these acts are vivid and still very painful. After my marriage, I moved from Bangladesh to the United States. In this instance, my new route (Austin, Texas, USA), as it happened, did not become my home. Here the ethno-cultural and Islamic cultural factors took precedence. I spoke the English language, made some American friends, and studied history at the University of Texas. I appreciated the warm friendship extended to me in the US, but experienced a degree of culture shock. I did not appreciate the pub life, alcohol consumption, and what I perceived to be the lack of family bonds (children moving out at the age of 18, families only meeting occasionally on birthdays and Christmas). Furthermore, I could not relate to de facto relationships and acceptance of sex before marriage. However, to me ‘home’ meant a family orientation and living in close contact with family. Besides the cultural divide, my husband and I were living in the US on student visas and, as Vertovec (21-23) noted, temporary visa status can deter people from their sense of belonging to the host country. In retrospect I can see that we lived in the ‘myth of return’. However, our next move for a better life was not to our root (Bangladesh), but another route to the Muslim world of Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. My husband moved to Dhahran not because it was a Muslim world but because it gave him better economic opportunities. However, I thought this new destination would become my home – the home that was coined by Anderson as the imagined nation, or my Muslim umma. Anderson argues that the imagined communities are “to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined” (6; Wood 61). Hall (122) asserts: identity is actually formed through unconscious processes over time, rather than being innate in consciousness at birth. There is always something ‘imaginary’ or fantasized about its unity. It always remains incomplete, is always ‘in process’, always ‘being formed’. As discussed above, when I had returned home to Bangladesh from Pakistan – both Muslim countries – my primary connection to my home country was my ethnic identity, language and traditions. My ethnic identity overshadowed the religious identity. But when I moved to Saudi Arabia, where my ethnic identity differed from that of the mainstream Arabs and Bedouin/nomadic Arabs, my connection to this new land was through my Islamic cultural and religious identity. Admittedly, this connection to the umma was more psychological than physical, but I was now in close proximity to Mecca, and to my home of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Mecca is an important city in Saudi Arabia for Muslims because it is the holy city of Islam, the home to the Ka’aba (the religious centre of Islam), and the birthplace of Prophet Muhammad [Peace Be Upon Him]. It is also the destination of the Hajj, one of the five pillars of Islamic faith. Therefore, Mecca is home to significant events in Islamic history, as well as being an important present day centre for the Islamic faith. We lived in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia for 5 years. Though it was a 2.5 hours flight away, I treasured Mecca’s proximity and regarded Dhahran as my second and spiritual home. Saudi Arabia had a restricted lifestyle for women, but I liked it because it was a Muslim country that gave me the opportunity to perform umrah Hajj (pilgrimage). However, Saudi Arabia did not allow citizenship to expatriates. Saudi Arabia’s government was keen to protect the status quo and did not want to compromise its cultural values or standard of living by allowing foreigners to become a permanent part of society. In exceptional circumstances only, the King granted citizenship to a foreigner for outstanding service to the state over a number of years. Children of foreigners born in Saudi Arabia did not have rights of local citizenship; they automatically assumed the nationality of their parents. If it was available, Saudi citizenship would assure expatriates a secure and permanent living in Saudi Arabia; as it was, there was a fear among the non-Saudis that they would have to leave the country once their job contract expired. Under the circumstances, though my spiritual connection to Mecca was strong, my husband was convinced that Saudi Arabia did not provide any job security. So, in 1987 when Australia offered migration to highly skilled people, my husband decided to migrate to Australia for a better and more secure economic life. I agreed to his decision, but quite reluctantly because we were again moving to a non-Muslim part of the world, which would be culturally different and far away from my original homeland (Bangladesh). In Australia, we lived first in Brisbane, then Adelaide, and after three years we took our Australian citizenship. At that stage I loved the Barossa Valley and Victor Harbour in South Australia, and the Gold Coast and Sunshine Coast in Queensland, but did not feel at home in Australia. We bought a house in Adelaide and I was a full time home-maker but was always apprehensive that my children (two boys) would lose their culture in this non-Muslim world. In 1990 we once again moved back to the Muslim world, this time to Muscat, Sultanate of Oman. My connection to this route was again spiritual. I valued the fact that we would live in a Muslim country and our children would be brought up in a Muslim environment. But my husband’s move was purely financial as he got a lucrative job offer in Muscat. We had another son in Oman. We enjoyed the luxurious lifestyle provided by my husband’s workplace and the service provided by the housemaid. I loved the beaches and freedom to drive my car, and I appreciated the friendly Omani people. I also enjoyed our frequent trips (4 hours flight) to my root, Dhaka, Bangladesh. So our children were raised within our ethnic and Islamic culture, remained close to my root (family in Dhaka), though they attended a British school in Muscat. But by the time I started considering Oman to be my second home, we had to leave once again for a place that could provide us with a more secure future. Oman was like Saudi Arabia; it employed expatriates only on a contract basis, and did not give them citizenship (not even fellow Muslims). So after 5 years it was time to move back to Australia. It was with great reluctance that I moved with my husband to Brisbane in 1995 because once again we were to face a different cultural context. As mentioned earlier, we lived in Brisbane in the late 1980s; I liked the weather, the landscape, but did not consider it home for cultural reasons. Our boys started attending expensive private schools and we bought a house in a prestigious Western suburb in Brisbane. Soon after arriving I started my tertiary education at the University of Queensland, and finished an MA in Historical Studies in Indian History in 1998. Still Australia was not my home. I kept thinking that we would return to my previous routes or the ‘imagined’ homeland somewhere in the Middle East, in close proximity to my root (Bangladesh), where we could remain economically secure in a Muslim country. But gradually I began to feel that Australia was becoming my ‘home’. I had gradually become involved in professional and community activities (with university colleagues, the Bangladeshi community and Muslim women’s organisations), and in retrospect I could see that this was an early stage of my ‘self-actualisation’ (Maslow). Through my involvement with diverse people, I felt emotionally connected with the concerns, hopes and dreams of my Muslim-Australian friends. Subsequently, I also felt connected with my mainstream Australian friends whose emotions and fears (9/11 incident, Bali bombing and 7/7 tragedy) were similar to mine. In late 1998 I started my PhD studies on the immigration history of Australia, with a particular focus on the historical settlement of Muslims in Australia. This entailed retrieving archival files and interviewing people, mostly Muslims and some mainstream Australians, and enquiring into relevant migration issues. I also became more active in community issues, and was not constrained by my circumstances. By circumstances, I mean that even though I belonged to a patriarchally structured Muslim family, where my husband was the main breadwinner, main decision-maker, my independence and research activities (entailing frequent interstate trips for data collection, and public speaking) were not frowned upon or forbidden (Khan 14-15); fortunately, my husband appreciated my passion for research and gave me his trust and support. This, along with the Muslim community’s support (interviews), and the wider community’s recognition (for example, the publication of my letters in Australian newspapers, interviews on radio and television) enabled me to develop my self-esteem and built up my bicultural identity as a Muslim in a predominantly Christian country and as a Bangladeshi-Australian. In 2005, for the sake of a better job opportunity, my husband moved to the UK, but this time I asserted that I would not move again. I felt that here in Australia (now in Perth) I had a job, an identity and a home. This time my husband was able to secure a good job back in Australia and was only away for a year. I no longer dream of finding a home in the Middle East. Through my bicultural identity here in Australia I feel connected to the wider community and to the Muslim umma. However, my attachment to the umma has become ambivalent. I feel proud of my Australian-Muslim identity but I am concerned about the jihadi ideology of militant Muslims. By jihadi ideology, I mean the extremist ideology of the al-Qaeda terrorist group (Farrar 2007). The Muslim umma now incorporates both moderate and radical Muslims. The radical Muslims (though only a tiny minority of 1.4 billion Muslims worldwide) pose a threat to their moderate counterparts as well as to non-Muslims. In the UK, some second- and third-generation Muslims identify themselves with the umma rather than their parents’ homelands or their country of birth (Husain). It should not be a matter of concern if these young Muslims adopt a ‘pure’ Muslim identity, providing at the same time they are loyal to their country of residence. But when they resort to terrorism with their ‘pure’ Muslim identity (e.g., the 7/7 London bombers) they defame my religion Islam, and undermine my spiritual connection to the umma. As a 1st generation immigrant, the defining criteria of my ‘homeliness’ in Australia are my ethno-cultural and religious identity (which includes my family), my active citizenship, and my community development/contribution through my research work – all of which allow me a sense of efficacy in my life. My ethnic and religious identities generally co-exist equally, but when I see some Muslims kill my fellow Australians (such as the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005) my Australian identity takes precedence. I feel for the victims and condemn the perpetrators. On the other hand, when I see politics play a role over the human rights issues (e.g., the Tampa incident), my religious identity begs me to comment on it (see Kabir, Muslims in Australia 295-305). Problematising ‘Home’ for Muslim Australians In the European context, Grillo (863) and Werbner (904), and in the Australian context, Kabir (Muslims in Australia) and Poynting and Mason, have identified the diversity within Islam (national, ethnic, religious etc). Werbner (904) notes that in spite of the “wishful talk of the emergence of a ‘British Islam’, even today there are Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Arab mosques, as well as Turkish and Shia’a mosques”; thus British Muslims retain their separate identities. Similarly, in Australia, the existence of separate mosques for the Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Arab and Shia’a peoples indicates that Australian Muslims have also kept their ethnic identities discrete (Saeed 64-77). However, in times of crisis, such as the Salman Rushdie affair in 1989, and the 1990-1991 Gulf crises, both British and Australian Muslims were quick to unite and express their Islamic identity by way of resistance (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 160-162; Poynting and Mason 68-70). In both British and Australian contexts, I argue that a peaceful rally or resistance is indicative of active citizenship of Muslims as it reveals their sense of belonging (also Werbner 905). So when a transmigrant Muslim wants to make a peaceful demonstration, the Western world should be encouraged, not threatened – as long as the transmigrant’s allegiances lie also with the host country. In the European context, Grillo (868) writes: when I asked Mehmet if he was planning to stay in Germany he answered without hesitation: ‘Yes, of course’. And then, after a little break, he added ‘as long as we can live here as Muslims’. In this context, I support Mehmet’s desire to live as a Muslim in a non-Muslim world as long as this is peaceful. Paradoxically, living a Muslim life through ijtihad can be either socially progressive or destructive. The Canadian Muslim feminist Irshad Manji relies on ijtihad, but so does Osama bin Laden! Manji emphasises that ijtihad can be, on the one hand, the adaptation of Islam using independent reasoning, hybridity and the contesting of ‘traditional’ family values (c.f. Doogue and Kirkwood 275-276, 314); and, on the other, ijtihad can take the form of conservative, patriarchal and militant Islamic values. The al-Qaeda terrorist Osama bin Laden espouses the jihadi ideology of Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian who early in his career might have been described as a Muslim modernist who believed that Islam and Western secular ideals could be reconciled. But he discarded that idea after going to the US in 1948-50; there he was treated as ‘different’ and that treatment turned him against the West. He came back to Egypt and embraced a much more rigid and militaristic form of Islam (Esposito 136). Other scholars, such as Cesari, have identified a third orientation – a ‘secularised Islam’, which stresses general beliefs in the values of Islam and an Islamic identity, without too much concern for practices. Grillo (871) observed Islam in the West emphasised diversity. He stressed that, “some [Muslims were] more quietest, some more secular, some more clamorous, some more negotiatory”, while some were exclusively characterised by Islamic identity, such as wearing the burqa (elaborate veils), hijabs (headscarves), beards by men and total abstinence from drinking alcohol. So Mehmet, cited above, could be living a Muslim life within the spectrum of these possibilities, ranging from an integrating mode to a strict, militant Muslim manner. In the UK context, Zubaida (96) contends that marginalised, culturally-impoverished youth are the people for whom radical, militant Islamism may have an appeal, though it must be noted that the 7/7 bombers belonged to affluent families (O’Sullivan 14; Husain). In Australia, Muslim Australians are facing three challenges. First, the Muslim unemployment rate: it was three times higher than the national total in 1996 and 2001 (Kabir, Muslims in Australia 266-278; Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 63). Second, some spiritual leaders have used extreme rhetoric to appeal to marginalised youth; in January 2007, the Australian-born imam of Lebanese background, Sheikh Feiz Mohammad, was alleged to have employed a DVD format to urge children to kill the enemies of Islam and to have praised martyrs with a violent interpretation of jihad (Chulov 2). Third, the proposed citizenship test has the potential to make new migrants’ – particularly Muslims’ – settlement in Australia stressful (Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79); in May 2007, fuelled by perceptions that some migrants – especially Muslims – were not integrating quickly enough, the Howard government introduced a citizenship test bill that proposes to test applicants on their English language skills and knowledge of Australian history and ‘values’. I contend that being able to demonstrate knowledge of history and having English language skills is no guarantee that a migrant will be a good citizen. Through my transmigrant history, I have learnt that developing a bond with a new place takes time, acceptance and a gradual change of identity, which are less likely to happen when facing assimilationist constraints. I spoke English and studied history in the United States, but I did not consider it my home. I did not speak the Arabic language, and did not study Middle Eastern history while I was in the Middle East, but I felt connected to it for cultural and religious reasons. Through my knowledge of history and English language proficiency I did not make Australia my home when I first migrated to Australia. Australia became my home when I started interacting with other Australians, which was made possible by having the time at my disposal and by fortunate circumstances, which included a fairly high level of efficacy and affluence. If I had been rejected because of my lack of knowledge of ‘Australian values’, or had encountered discrimination in the job market, I would have been much less willing to embrace my host country and call it home. I believe a stringent citizenship test is more likely to alienate would-be citizens than to induce their adoption of values and loyalty to their new home. Conclusion Blunt (5) observes that current studies of home often investigate mobile geographies of dwelling and how it shapes one’s identity and belonging. Such geographies of home negotiate from the domestic to the global context, thus mobilising the home beyond a fixed, bounded and confining location. Similarly, in this paper I have discussed how my mobile geography, from the domestic (root) to global (route), has shaped my identity. Though I received a degree of culture shock in the United States, loved the Middle East, and was at first quite resistant to the idea of making Australia my second home, the confidence I acquired in residing in these ‘several homes’ were cumulative and eventually enabled me to regard Australia as my ‘home’. I loved the Middle East, but I did not pursue an active involvement with the Arab community because I was a busy mother. Also I lacked the communication skill (fluency in Arabic) with the local residents who lived outside the expatriates’ campus. I am no longer a cultural freak. I am no longer the same Bangladeshi woman who saw her ethnic and Islamic culture as superior to all other cultures. I have learnt to appreciate Australian values, such as tolerance, ‘a fair go’ and multiculturalism (see Kabir, “What Does It Mean” 62-79). My bicultural identity is my strength. With my ethnic and religious identity, I can relate to the concerns of the Muslim community and other Australian ethnic and religious minorities. And with my Australian identity I have developed ‘a voice’ to pursue active citizenship. Thus my biculturalism has enabled me to retain and merge my former home with my present and permanent home of Australia. References Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London, New York: Verso, 1983. Australian Bureau of Statistics: Census of Housing and Population, 1996 and 2001. Blunt, Alison. Domicile and Diaspora: Anglo-Indian Women and the Spatial Politics of Home. Oxford: Blackwell, 2005. Blunt, Alison, and Robyn Dowling. Home. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Cesari, Jocelyne. “Muslim Minorities in Europe: The Silent Revolution.” In John L. Esposito and Burgat, eds., Modernising Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East. London: Hurst, 2003. 251-269. Chulov, Martin. “Treatment Has Sheik Wary of Returning Home.” Weekend Australian 6-7 Jan. 2007: 2. Cohen, Robin. Global Diasporas: An Introduction. Seattle: University of Washington, 1997. Doogue, Geraldine, and Peter Kirkwood. Tomorrow’s Islam: Uniting Old-Age Beliefs and a Modern World. Sydney: ABC Books, 2005. Esposito, John. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? 3rd ed. New York, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1999. Farrar, Max. “When the Bombs Go Off: Rethinking and Managing Diversity Strategies in Leeds, UK.” International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 6.5 (2007): 63-68. Grillo, Ralph. “Islam and Transnationalism.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30.5 (Sep. 2004): 861-878. Hall, Stuart. Polity Reader in Cultural Theory. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994. Huntington, Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilisation and the Remaking of World Order. London: Touchstone, 1998. Husain, Ed. The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw inside and Why I Left. London: Penguin, 2007. Kabir, Nahid. Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History. London: Kegan Paul, 2005. ———. “What Does It Mean to Be Un-Australian: Views of Australian Muslim Students in 2006.” People and Place 15.1 (2007): 62-79. Khan, Shahnaz. Aversion and Desire: Negotiating Muslim Female Identity in the Diaspora. Toronto: Women’s Press, 2002. Manji, Irshad. The Trouble with Islam Today. Canada:Vintage, 2005. Maslow, Abraham. Motivation and Personality. New York: Harper, 1954. O’Sullivan, J. “The Real British Disease.” Quadrant (Jan.-Feb. 2006): 14-20. Poynting, Scott, and Victoria Mason. “The Resistible Rise of Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Racism in the UK and Australia before 11 September 2001.” Journal of Sociology 43.1 (2007): 61-86. Saeed, Abdallah. Islam in Australia. Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 2003. Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991. Spencer, Philip, and Howard Wollman. Nationalism: A Critical Introduction. London: Sage, 2002. Vertovec, Stevens. The Hindu Diaspora: Comparative Patterns. London: Routledge. 2000. Werbner, Pnina, “Theorising Complex Diasporas: Purity and Hybridity in the South Asian Public Sphere in Britain.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30.5 (2004): 895-911. Wood, Dennis. “The Diaspora, Community and the Vagrant Space.” In Cynthia Vanden Driesen and Ralph Crane, eds., Diaspora: The Australasian Experience. New Delhi: Prestige, 2005. 59-64. Zubaida, Sami. “Islam in Europe: Unity or Diversity.” Critical Quarterly 45.1-2 (2003): 88-98. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Kabir, Nahid. "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective." M/C Journal 10.4 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>. APA Style Kabir, N. (Aug. 2007) "Why I Call Australia ‘Home’?: A Transmigrant’s Perspective," M/C Journal, 10(4). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0708/15-kabir.php>.