Siga este link para ver outros tipos de publicações sobre o tema: Metaphysics.
Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Metaphysics"
Crie uma referência precisa em APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, e outros estilos
Veja os 50 melhores artigos de revistas para estudos sobre o assunto "Metaphysics".
Ao lado de cada fonte na lista de referências, há um botão "Adicionar à bibliografia". Clique e geraremos automaticamente a citação bibliográfica do trabalho escolhido no estilo de citação de que você precisa: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
Você também pode baixar o texto completo da publicação científica em formato .pdf e ler o resumo do trabalho online se estiver presente nos metadados.
Veja os artigos de revistas das mais diversas áreas científicas e compile uma bibliografia correta.
1
Meixner, Uwe. "Playing God". Religions 10, n.º 3 (19 de março de 2019): 209. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel10030209.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Metaphysical modelling is a method in (epistemologically enlightened) metaphysics. It uses models for the philosophical analysis of metaphysico-epistemological situations. In this paper, the method is applied to a set of metaphysical questions that concern the relationship between God and the world, and the relationship between human beings and the world. The questions revolve around a center: What is it that ultimately determines reality? This complex metaphysical subject is treated in a simplified and downsized manner: on the scale of board games. As will be seen, the unusual perspective provided by the model leads to new insights and has a salutary corrective effect in the metaphysico-epistemological respect. The paper also provides an analysis and defense of analogical thinking in metaphysics (of which way of thinking metaphysical modelling is a special form).
2
Kim, Kwangsu. "Philosophy and science in Adam Smith’s ‘History of Astronomy’". History of the Human Sciences 30, n.º 3 (julho de 2017): 107–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0952695117700055.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This article casts light on the intimate relationship between metaphysics and science in Adam Smith’s thought. Understanding this relationship can help in resolving an enduring dispute or misreading concerning the status and role of natural theology and the ‘invisible hand’ doctrine. In Smith’s scientific realism, ontological issues are necessary prerequisites for scientific inquiry, and metaphysical ideas thus play an organizing and regulatory role. Smith also recognized the importance of scientifically informed metaphysics in science’s historical development. In this sense, for Smith, the metaphysico-scientific link (i.e. metaphysically coherent conjecture), was a basic criterion of scientific validation by Inference to the Best Explanation. Furthermore, Smith’s comments implicitly suggest that in scientific progress there is a dialectic between metaphysics and science. These themes are illustrated primarily through his writings on the history of astronomy.
3
Borda, Michał, e Rafał Tetela. "Kilka uwag o aktualności filozofii metafizycznej". Poznańskie Studia Teologiczne, n.º 31 (14 de setembro de 2018): 179–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/pst.2017.31.08.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article discusses the characteristics of a philosophical and cultural dispute with metaphysics and about metaphysics itself. The criticism of metaphysics and its revival in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is discussed here. In the first part, the most important philosophical directions dealing with issues of metaphysics are presented: metaphysical idealism, anti-metaphysical positivism and neo-positivism, analytic philosophy versus metaphysics on the example of L. Wittgenstein, the revision of the metaphysical tradition and new investigations in metaphysics. The second part of the article concerns the picture of natural metaphysics including the mathematical-empirical method of researching the world. In the conclusion of the article, a thesis is put forward on searching for new metaphysics which will include a wider sphere of rationality and existential and spiritual experience.
4
Allen, Sophie R. "What Matters in (Naturalized) Metaphysics?" Essays in Philosophy 13, n.º 1 (2012): 212–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eip201213113.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Can metaphysics ever really be compatible with science? In this paper, I investigate the implications of the methodological approach to metaphysical theorizing known as naturalized metaphysics. In the past, metaphysics has been rejected entirely by empirically-minded philosophers as being too open to speculation and for relying on methods which are not conducive to truth. But naturalized metaphysics aims to be a less radical solution to these difficulties, treating metaphysical theorizing as being continuous with science and restricting metaphysical methods to empirically respectable ones. I investigate a significant difficulty for naturalized metaphysics: that it lacks the methodological resources to comparatively evaluate competing ontological theories, or even to distinguish adequately between them. This objection is more acute when applied to robust realist versions of naturalized metaphysics, since the realist should be able to say which theory is true of the objective world. If this objection holds, then it seems that the commitment to naturalized metaphysics, or to robust realism about the categories and processes in metaphysics, will have to be relaxed.
5
Terekhovich, Vladislav. "Challenges in Constructing Scientific Metaphysics: A Case Study of the Everettian Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics". Voprosy Filosofii, n.º 5 (julho de 2024): 134–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/0042-8744-2024-5-134-139.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article continues the debate about whether classical “pure” metaphysics can explain scientific theories or science can generate its own metaphysical concepts. Two camps have emerged in modern analytic philosophy. The “metaphysician” camp defends the metaphysics of science by arguing that the fundamental concepts of classical metaphysics can be enriched, illustrated, or justified by examples from scientific theories. The “philosophers of science” camp views this as yet another invasion of metaphysics into their scientific territory. They advocate a scientific or naturalized metaphysics that strictly corresponds to modern scientific theories. Since the concept of possible worlds is a key element of mainstream analytic metaphysics, proponents of the metaphysics of science find it natural to appeal to the many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory. In turn, proponents of naturalized metaphysics often use popular metaphysical systems to justify the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. I will argue that the interpretation originally proposed by H. Everett remains only one of the ontologies of quantum theory, and attempts by philosophers of science to build a metaphysical construct on its basis encounter serious difficulties.
6
Wang, Hongjian. "Nihilismus zwischen traditioneller Metaphysik und Post‑Metaphysik. Kritische Untersuchung von Heideggers Nietzsche‑Interpretation". Studia Phaenomenologica 22 (2022): 237–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/studphaen20222212.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
In his interpretation of Nietzsche, Heidegger on the one hand acknowledges the anti‑metaphysical orientation of Nietzsche’s nihilism, but on the other hand considers Nietzsche to be the ultimate metaphysician. This location is based firstly on Heidegger’s reflections on the relationship between metaphysics and nihilism. By revealing the origin and end of metaphysics, it is to be shown that nihilism and metaphysics are two aspects of the same thing. Moreover, Heidegger expands the meaning of metaphysics by ascribing to it the distinction between the sensuous and supersensuous worlds, between beings and beingness. Based on the critique of Nietzsche, he is able to develop a post‑metaphysical philosophical conception. Nietzsche himself, however, is not addicted to metaphysics, and in his overcoming of metaphysics and his vision of post‑metaphysical thinking he is rather a precursor of Heidegger.
7
Kosykhin, Vitaly G., e Svetlana M. Malkina. "Metaphysics and Realism". Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 58, n.º 2 (2021): 216–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202158237.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article deals with the problem of the return of metaphysics within the framework of the ontological turn of philosophy and the situation of post-metaphysical thinking. The conditions for the possibility of modern metaphysical discourse in the projects of empirical metaphysics and historical ontology are revealed. Historical ontology as a meta-reflexion of philosophy over its own historical foundations is able to bridge the gap between the epistemological static nature of transcendental subjectivity and the ontological dynamism of the growth of scientific knowledge about reality by comprehending the conditions of interaction between science and metaphysics in conditions of post-metaphysical thinking and realistic reversal of ontology. Philosophical knowledge in the context of the ontological turn and the associated return of metaphysics becomes focused not so much on the sharp demarcation of science and metaphysics and postulating the incommensurability of their ontologies, but on identifying mutually enriching areas of research that could give a new impetus to their development.
8
Pinzani, Alessandro. "Do We Need a Metaphysics of Morals?" Dialogue and Universalism 31, n.º 3 (2021): 249–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du202131355.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This paper argues that Kant’s project of a metaphysics of morals represents a normative ideal grounded on the core ideas of Enlightenment. In the first section, it analyzes Kant’s concept of metaphysical principles of morals by establishing a connection between a metaphysics of morals and Kant’s concept of metaphysics in general and of metaphysics of nature in particular. It then discusses what is metaphysical in the Doctrine of Right and the Doctrine of Virtue. In its last section, it tackles the question of whether a non-metaphysical reading of Kant’s doctrines of right and of virtue is desirable if we want to remain faithful to Kant’s Enlightenment project.
9
Xia, Yu. "What Is Metaphysics? Heidegger’s Evolving Account of Metaphysics". Symposion 10, n.º 2 (2023): 275–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposion202310216.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
In this paper, I deal with Heidegger’s evolving account of metaphysics, since Heidegger’s persistent concern, the question of being, is a basic metaphysical question. To date, most Heidegger scholars have focused only on a particular stage of Heidegger’s philosophy: either his early attempt to deconstruct metaphysics, or his efforts to overcome metaphysics in the 1930s, or his late embrace of ‘releasement’ from metaphysics. However, these limited approaches fail to address Heidegger’s different understandings of metaphysics, which lie at the root of his changing approaches to the question of being. They also fail to explain whether there is any inner connection between the various approaches. Further, given Heidegger’s unremittingly negative attitude towards metaphysics, some scholars have even maintained that Heidegger thought it both possible and desirable to leave metaphysics behind altogether. I address these issues first by arguing that metaphysics for Heidegger has three interconnected meanings: initially it is the representation of the totality of things that are present-at-hand, a view subsequently developed into subjective representational thinking, and finally radicalized into an expression of the will to power. At each stage, Heidegger critiques the metaphysical tradition but never claims that it can be fully eliminated, since it is a mode of Dasein’s being and ultimately possiblized by being itself. For this reason, Heidegger’s own philosophy of being remains inseparable from metaphysics.
10
Jensen, Jeppe Sinding. "Religion, Philosophy, Scholarship and the Muddles Thereof". Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 28, n.º 1 (2 de dezembro de 2016): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15700682-12341355.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
For many centuries, the relations between philosophy and religion were very close—at times indistinguishable. That is not so in the modern secular academy, which houses philosophy along with the study of religion but without noticeable mutual relations between the two. Kevin Schilbrack has ably dealt with that situation in his latest publication ‘Philosophy and the Study of Religion’. Schilbrack’s diagnoses are acute and most scholars in the study of religion will consider them worth heeding—except, most likely, his calls for more metaphysical concerns based on ideas of ‘unmediated experience’. His arguments proceed from current philosophical positions and theories of situated cognition and his appeals are quite convincing. However, they do have one remarkable drawback as this critic sees it: That metaphysics move from the ontological realm to the epistemic (!). That is no mean feat, because as no one really seems to know what metaphysics are in this ‘post-metaphysic age’, Schilbrack’s proposal seems to indicate that metaphysics now become humanly approachable and intellectually tractable. As such, they could justifiably become an integral part of the study of religion—as could philosophy.
11
Rivera, Joseph. "God and Metaphysics in Contemporary Theology: Reframing the Debate". Theological Studies 77, n.º 4 (17 de novembro de 2016): 823–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0040563916666821.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Recent post-metaphysical trends in contemporary theology seek to overcome “metaphysics,” in order to free God-language from the trappings of onto-theology. This means that theology prioritizes the conventional discourse of the church over the universal ambitions of metaphysical language. This article offers a corrective to the “post-metaphysical” corrective by proposing a broader definition of metaphysics, one rooted in concrete experience. In this regard I constructively consider Jean-Yves Lacoste’s “conceptual rescue operation” metaphysics in his wide-ranging Être en danger (2011)
12
Tounsi, Mohammad. "metaphysics of physics: When the boundaries of science and metaphysics intertwine". International journal of health sciences 8, S1 (4 de abril de 2024): 515–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.53730/ijhs.v8ns1.14846.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The evolution of contemporary physics proved that science cannot abandon metaphysics, there is evidence that there are theories that engage in metaphysical topics or offer metaphysical solutions to scientific problems, there were many concepts and theories that were not based on experience because of the difficulty of testing them. This is the result of the great theoretical progress achieved in physical research, The evolution of contemporary physics has shown that the Positivism call for excluding metaphysics from science cannot be achieved, Metaphysics is found in the principles of science as we rely on postulates that cannot be demonstrated, such as the stability of the laws of nature, The necessity of metaphysics arises from the fact that the development of physics has proven the limitations of scientific experience, The theoretical aspect must advance because cognitive curiosity will not stop the human from asking questions, Metaphysical ideas can play a guiding role in theoretical research in physics,
13
Thomasson, Amie L. "Changing Metaphysics: What Difference does it Make?" Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (julho de 2018): 139–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000188.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractI have argued elsewhere for a deflationary conception of metaphysics, which takes well-formed metaphysical questions to be answerable using nothing more mysterious than empirical information and descriptive and normative conceptual work. Here I examine the ways in which our practices of metaphysics should change, if we adopt the deflationary reconception of metaphysics. Adopting this approach does not mean abandoning metaphysics, but it does lead to important differences regarding which debates and positions are worth taking seriously. It also requires us to reevaluate which criteria for choosing metaphysical views are appropriate – particularly where debates about existence are concerned.
14
Ross, Don. "A Flexible, Sloppy Blob?" American Philosophical Quarterly 60, n.º 1 (1 de janeiro de 2023): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.60.1.02.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Abstract Ladyman and Ross argue that analytic metaphysics is a misguided enterprise that should give way to a naturalized metaphysics that aims to reconcile everyday and special-scientific ontologies with fundamental physics as the authoritative source of knowledge on the general structure of the universe. Le Bihan and Barton (argue, as against this, that analytic metaphysics remains useful as a basis for the body of work in AI known as “applied ontology.” They stop short of claiming, however, that analytic metaphysics is useful as metaphysics. I consider a basis for making the stronger claim: Smith's project for building what he claims to be metaphysical foundations for applied ontology (and for AI generally). Ultimately, the stronger claim is rejected; but in the course of this dialectic new aspects of the naturalistic metaphysical project come to light, including relationships between it and the traditional metaphysical project of providing foundations for philosophical semantics of truth and reference.
15
Samraj, Tennyson. "Metaphysics: Intelligible Questions and the Explicable World of Intentionality". Athens Journal of Philosophy 1, n.º 4 (30 de novembro de 2022): 221–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajphil.1-4-3.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Metaphysics deals with the intelligible world of questions and the explicable world of intentionality. Metaphysics is explicable, and its explicability is connected to questions related to what there is to know about the nature of reality. While physics deals with what is and what else there is, metaphysics deals with the nature of reality and what else there is to know about the nature of reality. If the content of metaphysics is considered as "answers" to questions related to cosmology and consciousness, then metaphysical claims must be understood in the context of the questions that necessitate such claims. For without understanding the relevance of the questions, we cannot establish the 'truth' or 'falsity' of metaphysical claims. The relevance of the questions is the basis for establishing the veracity of the metaphysical distinctions. Hence, all metaphysical distinctions are a non-reductive explanation of what is considered as being reductive. The content of consciousness or intentionality deals with the following metaphysical distinctions, namely, the matter/mind, the essence/ existence, the space/time, the concrete/abstract, the particular/universal, and the contingent/necessary distinctions. These distinctions are made possible because of the questions raised by the intelligent mind. Two questions that connect physics and metaphysics are-- what is there and the nature of what is there. Two further questions that promote our interest in physics and metaphysics are: what else is there to know, and what else is there to know about the nature of reality. Reality and the nature of reality are the same. However, because the mind makes this distinction, we can state that what is physical is an empirical given, and what is metaphysical is a phenomenological or an existential given. Keywords: metaphysics, intentionality, subjectivity, creativity, freedom and time
16
Ahmed Fakhre Alam, Shaikh Zeeshan Ahmed Fakhre Alam, e Dr Narayan Shankar Gadade. "Epistemology of Advaita Vedanta". June-July 2023, n.º 34 (1 de junho de 2023): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.55529/jpps.34.1.5.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This present research work is about Epistemology of Vedanta particularly about Advait Vedanta and how epistemology and metaphysics are interconnected. Epistemology is one of the branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, structure, types, sources, method and validity of knowledge. Every system of Indian philosophy has its own epistemology. Epistemology and metaphysics are inter-related. Metaphysics is one of the main branch of philosophy. Every Indian school has its own metaphysics. Metaphysics deals with questions regarding reality like what is reality? whether it is material or spiritual? what exists? is the world real or not? out of what substance this world is made? whether reality is one, two or many? Etc. What then is the epistemology of Vedanta? Epistemology of any school of Indian philosophy is based upon its metaphysical views regarding reality. Therefore it is important that first of all we must know the metaphysics of Vedanta specially Advait Vedanta of Sri Shankaracharya. Metaphysics tells us what exist and epistemology tells us how we can know that. In this way epistemology serves the role of instrument for knowing metaphysical realities. Metaphysics comes first then comes epistemology.
17
Faritov, Vyacheslav T. "Post-metaphysical metaphysics L.P. Karsavina". Vestnik of Samara State Technical University. Series Philosophy 4, n.º 1 (11 de maio de 2022): 11–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.17673/vsgtu-phil.2022.1.2.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article is devoted to comprehending the path of Russian religious philosophy in the perspective of the crisis of European metaphysics. Based on the analysis of the concepts of L.P. Karsavin and F. Nietzsche, the article substantiates the thesis that Karsavins philosophy is characterized by a post-metaphysical orientation. A comparative analysis of the teachings of L. Karsavin and F. Nietzsche is carried out.
18
Rubsky, V. M. "POST-METAPHYSICAL CHANGING IN METAPHYSICS". Innovative Solution in Modern Science 7, n.º 26 (2 de dezembro de 2018): 88. http://dx.doi.org/10.26886/2414-634x.7(26)2018.6.
Texto completo da fonte
19
Arenhart, Jonas R. Becker, e Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo. "The spectrum of metametaphysics". Veritas (Porto Alegre) 66, n.º 1 (27 de dezembro de 2021): e41217. http://dx.doi.org/10.15448/1984-6746.2021.1.41217.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Scientific realism is typically associated with metaphysics. One current incarnation of such an association concerns the requirement of a metaphysical characterization of the entities one is being a realist about. This is sometimes called “Chakravartty’s Challenge”, and codifies the claim that without a metaphysical characterization, one does not have a clear picture of the realistic commitments one is engaged with. The required connection between metaphysics and science naturally raises the question of whether such a demand is appropriately fulfilled, and how metaphysics engages with science in order to produce what is called “scientific metaphysics”. Here, we map some of the options available in the literature, generating a conceptual spectrum according to how each view approximates science and metaphysics. This is done with the purpose of enlightening the current debate on the possibility of epistemic warrant that science could grant to such a metaphysics, and how different positions differently address the thorny issue concerning such a warrant.
20
Schaffer, Jonathan. "Laws for Metaphysical Explanation". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (julho de 2018): 1–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246118000164.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractI argue that, just like causal explanation requires laws of nature, so metaphysical explanation requires laws of metaphysics. I offer a minimal rendition of the argument for laws of metaphysics, assuming nothing about grounding or essences, and little about explanation. And I offer a positive and minimal functional conception of the laws of metaphysics, coupled with an argument that some laws of metaphysics are fundamental.
21
Switzer, Adrian. "The Traditional Form of a Complete Science". Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 22, n.º 44 (2014): 149–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica2014224422.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article treats as significant the formal coincidence between Kant’s presentation of the science of metaphysics in the “Architectonic of Pure Reason” chapter of the first Critique and Alexander Baumgarten’s presentation of the same in the Metaphysica. From his comments on Baumgarten in the metaphysics lectures, the article shows that for Kant metaphysics in its traditional form lacked completeness and systematic order. Kant fits completeness into his architectonic plan of a scientific metaphysics by Converting Baumgartian ontology into an “analytic of the understanding”; Kant achieves the systematicity by modeling a rational “idea of the form of the whole” after Baumgarten’s tree-like ordering of the special sciences of metaphysics. Thus, Kant realizes the completeness and systematicity in a theoretical presentation of the science of metaphysics that he finds lacking in Baumgarten precisely by borrowing from the latter his scheme for metaphysics.
22
Cruickshank, Justin. "Solidarity, critique and techno-science: Evaluating Rorty’s pragmatism, Freire’s critical pedagogy and Vattimo’s philosophical hermeneutics". Human Affairs 30, n.º 4 (27 de outubro de 2020): 577–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0051.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractThe critique of metaphysics can often entail a critique of liberalism. Rorty sought a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophy and the broader humanities, by linking the rejection of metaphysics to a justification for liberal democracy and reformism. He believed that the recognition of socio-historical contingency concerning interpretations of fundamental values and of truth, combined with a humanities education, would create a sense of solidarity that would motivate reforms. Freire argues that a dialogic form of education is as important as the humanities’ content. For Freire, people liberated by a critical education based on dialogue rather than a passive reception of information, can develop a radical critique of capitalism. Vattimo argues that while Heidegger saw techno-science as being the final phase in metaphysical domination, the contemporary development of information and communications technology creates a ‘Babel-like’ pluralism that undermines the ‘violence’ of metaphysic’s totalising thought. This can allow for the development of a post-metaphysical ‘weak communism’ that improves social justice. Rorty and Freire help to show that it is education, rather than technological developments, that can motivate a post-metaphysical politics of solidarity, and Vattimo and Freire are correct to argue that replacing reformism with radical critique is needed for social justice, although Vattimo’s weak communism only provides limited social justice.
23
Iakovlev, V. A. "GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF METAPHYSICAL PROGRAMS". Metaphysics, n.º 1 (4 de abril de 2022): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2022-1-19-28.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The paper analyzes the meaning and content of the concept of metaphysics in history. There are seven metaphysical programs of Antiquity, which largely determined the development of science. It is proved that metaphysics acts as the fundamental foundation of science and philosophy as a whole, their essential structure. Metaphysical principles are informational elements of the universe. The modern religious direction of metaphysical research is considered in detail.
24
Iakovlev, V. A. "GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF METAPHYSICAL PROGRAMS". Metaphysics, n.º 1 (4 de abril de 2022): 19–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2022-1-19-28.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The paper analyzes the meaning and content of the concept of metaphysics in history. There are seven metaphysical programs of Antiquity, which largely determined the development of science. It is proved that metaphysics acts as the fundamental foundation of science and philosophy as a whole, their essential structure. Metaphysical principles are informational elements of the universe. The modern religious direction of metaphysical research is considered in detail.
25
Nuzzo, Angelica. "The Idea of ‘Method’ in Hegel's Science of Logic — a Method for Finite Thinking and Absolute Reason". Hegel Bulletin 20, n.º 1-2 (1999): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0263523200001403.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Hegel's Science of Logic achieves its conclusion with a chapter on the ‘absolute Idea’ that parallels the ending of other works such as the ‘absolute Knowing’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the ‘absolute Spirit’ chapter of the Encyclopedia. However, the ending of the Logic claims special systematic attention due to the fact that Hegel presents here the ‘discourse on method’ of his philosophy. The method of philosophy — of philosophical thinking and philosophical knowing — is the method of speculative logic. This logic “takes the place” of the old metaphysics — of the traditional metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis — going beyond Kant's own critique and proposing a new science that establishes itself as the “eigentliche Metaphysik”. The project of concluding this new speculative metaphysics with a theory of method is complicated by the double systematic placing that Hegel attributes to his logic which, at the same time, figures as the very first and very last science of the whole system of philosophy. In this perspective, the absolute Idea of the Logic gains its double relation to the phenomenological ‘absolute knowing’ and to the highest moment of ‘absolute spirit’.
26
Moreira, Felipe G. A. "Overcoming Metametaphysics: Nietzsche and Carnap". Nietzsche-Studien 47, n.º 1 (1 de novembro de 2018): 240–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/nietzstu-2018-0010.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Abstract This essay focuses on the similarities between Nietzsche’s and Carnap’s views on metaphysics, without ignoring their obvious differences. The essay argues that Nietzsche and Carnap endorse but interpret differently an overcoming metametaphysics characterized by the conjunction of the following three claims: (O-i) an overcoming of metaphysics ought to be performed; (O-ii) this overcoming is to be performed by adopting a method of linguistic analysis that is suspicious of the metaphysical use of language and that interprets such use through a different use of language which aims to avoid metaphysics; and (O-iii) this overcoming contributes to the political task of resisting “diseased” metaphysical practices and promoting “healthy” non-metaphysical practices.
27
Maciaszek, Janusz. "Metafizyka zdarzeń Donalda Davidsona". Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, n.º 22 (1 de janeiro de 2009): 87–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.22.08.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Donald Davidson (1917–2002) is mainly known as a philosopher of language who based his theory of meaning on Tarski's definition of truth. His theory without meanings as entities is the core of a subtle and sophisticated philosophical system that resembles very complicated puzzles. If isolated every part of his system seems arbitrary and not justified. It concerns particularly his metaphysics of events which justification can be found in Davidson's views on language, cognition and psychology. Davidson himself usually applies the term "ontology" but in fact makes some metaphysical presuppositions. These presuppositions do not constitute metaphysical system but rather are used to explain the phenomenon of linguistic communication. The main categories of Davidsonian metaphysic: event, object and causal relation, are irreducible and can be described in various ways. In the paper I reconstruct Davidson's way from his philosophy of language to his metaphysic. I also indicate some consequences of his metaphysical views for his philosophy of science and psychology.
28
Sharkey, Sarah Borden. "Is Edith Stein’s Finite and Eternal Being a Kind of “Phenomenological Metaphysics”?" Symposium 25, n.º 2 (2021): 48–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/symposium202125215.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
One striking feature of Finite and Eternal Being is Edith Stein’s exceedingly rare use of the term “metaphysics.” She uses the term “formal ontology” numerous times, but the term “metaphysics” only appears a handful of times in the body of the text, and even those references are themselves a bit surprising. This could be explained in several ways, some of which may be quite innocent and have nothing to do with whether she understands her project as metaphysical. In the following, however, I would like to explore a differing explanation and argue that (at least, in part) her reason for avoiding describing her work as metaphysical is connected with the type of philosophical critique she wants to make of traditional metaphysics. I will not argue that Finite and Eternal Being should ultimately be read as a phenomenological analysis of being rather than any sort of metaphysical treatise, but I will argue that Stein has explicitly phenomenological reasons for being cautious about using the term “metaphysics.”
29
Copleston, Frederick. "Ayer and World Views". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 30 (setembro de 1991): 63–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007682.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
As we all know, in Freddie Ayer's famous book Language, Truth and Logic metaphysics received short shrift. Metaphysical assertions were dismissed as being all nonsensical (LTL, 2nd edn, 41). In the work in question Ayer clearly tended to equate metaphysics with what Professor W. H. Walsh was to describe as ‘transcendent’ (as distinct from ‘immanent’) metaphysics (Walsh, 1963). This tendency is also discernible, I think, in the 1949 debate between Ayer and myself on logical positivism. After all, my defence of metaphysics was largely prompted and certainly strengthened by what I believed to be the religious relevance of metaphysical philosophy. A lot of what Aristotle would have described as ‘first philosophy’ and what some later philosophers would have classified as ‘ontology’ Ayer would have called ‘philosophical analysis’. What he was primarily concerned with undermining was any claim by metaphysicians to be able to extend our knowledge of what exists, of the Absolute or God for example, by metaphysical arguments.
30
Rödl, Sebastian. "Das metaphysische Unternehmen". Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67, n.º 1 (5 de março de 2019): 98–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2019-0007.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Abstract In Barry Stroud’s book Engagement and Metaphysical Dissatisfaction, the eponymous dissatisfaction is said to be due to our inability to obtain certainty about the correspondence between the world and our ways of thinking it. In Stroud’s terms, this dissatisfaction is caused by the failure of the metaphysical enterprise. Beginning with Aristotle’s metaphysics, this paper discusses Stroud’s misunderstanding which stems from his particular construal of the object of metaphysics: There is no metaphysical enterprise and thus, there can be no metaphysical dissatisfaction.
31
Mills, Philip. "The Seduction of Metaphors". Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy 31, n.º 1/2 (12 de abril de 2024): 148–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5195/jffp.2023.1045.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Nietzsche’s metaphor of seduction suggests that language catches philosophers in the trap of metaphysics. Nietzsche uses the poetic powers of language to fight against this metaphysical language. However, his use of the metaphor of truth as a woman seems to seduce him back in metaphysics. Metaphors become seductive because of their rhetorical and performative power. One must therefore be wary of the seduction of metaphors when attempting at revaluating the metaphysics of language. Hélène Cixous undertakes such a task, using a poetic language in order to escape the metaphysical dualisms embedded in language without falling back into its traps.
32
Stoliarova, Olga. "The return of metaphysics as a subject matter of historical ontology: analytical review". Digital Scholar Philosopher s Lab 4, n.º 1 (2021): 126–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.32326/2618-9267-2021-4-1-126-143.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article (the publication consists of two parts) presents an analytical and historiographical overview of the problems that are substantively related to the question of the role, meaning and historical fate of metaphysics. The author focuses on the phenomenon of the return of metaphysics to the philosophy of our time. This phenomenon is proposed to be analyzed from the viewpoint of historical ontology, which deals with the ontological presuppositions of knowledge and their historical dynamics. In the first part, the author highlights two directions of the historical development of metaphysical problems, one of which expresses the immediate metaphysical position, and the other represents the criticism of this position. The author associates criticism of metaphysics with the development of science and the philosophy of science. The author shows the difference between the “analytical” and “continental” approaches to metaphysical problems. The consideration of metaphysics as a historical phenomenon is associated with Hegel’s metaphilosophical historicism. The alternative, non-historical, consideration of metaphysics is placed in the context of empiricism and positivism. The concepts of scientific realism are defined as a kind of positivistically restricted analytical metaphysics. The author highlights three points of growth of post-positivist philosophy and pays special attention to the relationship between post-positivist philosophy of science, history of science, metaphilosophical history of ideas, and sociology of science. The author traces the gradual formation of theoretical conditions for the rehabilitation of metaphysics in these research fields. The author demonstrates that the historicization of Kant’s “transcendental subject” creates a specific epistemological perspective that joins historicism with contextualism. Within this perspective, the question of the ontological presuppositions of empirical (primarily scientific) knowledge, their development and change becomes of great importance.
33
Knyazev, V. N. "ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE UNDERSTANDING OF METAPHYSICS IN THE HISTORY OF CULTURE". Metaphysics, n.º 3 (15 de dezembro de 2021): 128–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2224-7580-2021-3-128-141.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article examines the evolution of the concept of “metaphysics” in the history of culture. Metaphysics as the “first philosophy” of Aristotle has gone through a historically variable path as a consequence of the pluralistic nature of the very nature of philosophical knowledge. Solidarizing in the main thing - metaphysics is an understanding of the fundamental, fundamental principles of being - each independently thinking philosopher takes as a basis as principles different understandings of substances and its attributes. Questions of the relationship between the concepts of “metaphysics” and “ontology” in various historical and philosophical discourses are discussed. Based on this, metaphysical concepts in specific philosophical teachings and doctrines are quite variable in the history of culture, up to the positivist desire to expel metaphysics from science. The modern understanding of metaphysics in collaboration with the philosophy of science makes it possible to reveal the dialectical connection between metaphysics and science and, in particular, metaphysics and fundamental physics.
34
Marciniak, Dominik. "Dwie koncepcje badań metafizycznych rozwijane w XX wieku w filozofii polskiej". Człowiek i Społeczeństwo 53 (27 de junho de 2022): 223–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.14746/cis.2022.53.13.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The paper presents two different conceptions of metaphysics – scientistic and neoscholastic – developed in the 20th century by, among others, Polish philosophers: Stanisław Kamiński, Mieczysław Gogacz, Tadeusz Czeżowski and Zygmunt Zawirski. These authors refer to the problem of the possibility of conducting metaphysical research in contemporary philosophy. In this context, they examine issues such as the method, subject, and specificity of research carried out within metaphysics. In the summary, the discussed conceptions are compared with each other. The basic issues determining the similarities and differences between respective positions are the problem of the autonomy of metaphysics in relation to other sciences and the issue of the starting point (source of preliminary data) of metaphysical research. Findings regarding the latter issue turn out to be crucial for resolving the question of the appropriate model for research in metaphysics.
35
Karľa, Michal. "On Peirce’s Earliest Conception of Metaphysics". American Journal of Semiotics 37, n.º 3 (2021): 267–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ajs20223976.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
In this paper, I explore Peirce’s initial conception of metaphysics as developed in his “Treatise on Metaphysics” (1861–2: W 1.57–84). Peirce claimed therein that the idea of metaphysics was three-fold, with its three perspectives consisting of its definition, object, and method. Since Peirce defined metaphysics as the “philosophy of primal truths” (1861: W 1.59), I initially focus on elaborating upon what these “primal truths” are and illustrate that they are analytical propositions resulting from the logical analysis of the general constitution of a mental state (an image) to its elements. Next, I give account of how Peirce’s thoughts regarding the justification of metaphysical propositions resulted in his concluding that in metaphysical knowledge, like in any other, there is an element of faith. Finally, I conclude with remarks regarding Peirce’s notion of reflexivity as it is employed in his metametaphysics.
36
Wang, Ping, e Jian Wang. "Information Ontology as Anti-Metaphysics". Proceedings 47, n.º 1 (14 de maio de 2020): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings2020047052.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Followed by the general review of various kinds of information ontology as metaphysical thoughts, two main approaches can be illustrated. The basic feature of this kind of metaphysics is its theoretical explanation for the constructivism of the whole world. However, metaphysics is undermining its study of existence itself by taking existence as substantial entities, attempting to construct the whole world, or separating existence and thoughts. With the insight from anti-metaphysical approaches, this paper discusses three aspects of the information ontology.
37
Wang, Ping, e Jian Wang. "Information Ontology as Anti-Metaphysics". Proceedings 47, n.º 1 (14 de maio de 2020): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/proceedings47010052.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Followed by the general review of various kinds of information ontology as metaphysical thoughts, two main approaches can be illustrated. The basic feature of this kind of metaphysics is its theoretical explanation for the constructivism of the whole world. However, metaphysics is undermining its study of existence itself by taking existence as substantial entities, attempting to construct the whole world, or separating existence and thoughts. With the insight from anti-metaphysical approaches, this paper discusses three aspects of the information ontology.
38
Cho, Young-Tae. "Aristotle’s Metaphysical Politics and Political Metaphysics". Journal of Moral Education 24, n.º 3 (31 de dezembro de 2012): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.17715/jme.2012.12.24.3.1.
Texto completo da fonte
39
Chrystall, Andrew B. "McLuhan | Havelock | metaphysics". Explorations in Media Ecology 20, n.º 4 (1 de dezembro de 2021): 389–405. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/eme_00104_1.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The McLuhan <inline-graphic xlink:href="eme-20-4-389-f0001.jpg"/> Havelock correspondence turns on a question about the meaning(s) of events that transpired in Greece during the Archaic and High-Classical period ‐ perhaps the only time and circumstance in which the metaphysical and independent human being had been able to manifest themself amidst the vast amorphous resonance of tribal culture. Here, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary issue of Explorations in Media Ecology, this article uses the correspondence between two leading figures in the Media Ecology (anti-)canon as a leaping off point to talk about metaphysics and media. The focus is McLuhan. This article offers a portrait that shows the significance, if not centrality, of (Christian) metaphysics to McLuhan’s project, and how his metaphysical commitments inform and shape his ethics, politics and pedagogy. This article also makes the claims that: (1) McLuhan, in his theory and practice, asserted the primacy of mediation with respect to thinking about being and knowing, and (2) McLuhan’s insertion of media into metaphysics stands as an invitation to revisit and revise the history of metaphysics, especially when, under digital conditions, the merging of all pasts and presents is well advanced.
40
Bunnin, Nicholas. "A Moral Metaphysics and a Metaphysics of Morals: Xunzi and Kant". Journal of Chinese Philosophy 49, n.º 2 (18 de julho de 2022): 174–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15406253-12340058.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Abstract I explore two important ways of thinking that the philosophical understanding of morality requires metaphysics: the moral metaphysics I ascribe to Xunzi and Kant’s metaphysics of morals. Both Xunzi and Kant held that a metaphysics of nature is inadequate for a metaphysical understanding of human moral agency. Xunzi invoked the human Dao to allow for the agency of the heart-mind, and Kant invoked the Categorical Imperative to allow for the agency of the moral self. Both Xunzi and Kant stretched metaphysics through rejecting the wrong sorts of rigour as preventing us from having an appropriate understanding of metaphysics and morality. I turn to their different placements of humanity that reflect deep differences in Xunzi’s and Kant’s underlying metaphysics. Xunzi placed humanity as a virtue or power that allows our psychology to become a moral psychology. Kant placed humanity as an ideal that allows our psychology to be a moral psychology.
41
REMHOF, JUSTIN. "Nietzsche: Metaphysician". Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7, n.º 1 (2021): 117–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2019.42.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractPerhaps the most fundamental disagreement concerning Nietzsche's view of metaphysics is that some commentators believe Nietzsche has a positive, systematic metaphysical project, and others deny this. Those who deny it hold that Nietzsche believes metaphysics has a special problem, that is, a distinctively problematic feature that distinguishes metaphysics from other areas of philosophy. In this paper, I investigate important features of Nietzsche's metametaphysics in order to argue that Nietzsche does not, in fact, think metaphysics has a special problem. The result is that, against a long-standing view held in the literature, we should be reading Nietzsche as a metaphysician.
42
GILMAN, JAMES E. "The metaphysics of belief: a Wittgenstein and Collingwood convergence". Religious Studies 53, n.º 4 (15 de dezembro de 2016): 497–520. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412516000354.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
AbstractIn this article I make plausible ‘a metaphysics of belief’ by showing how Collingwood's metaphysics of absolute presuppositions helps us understand various comments and fragments by Wittgenstein regarding ‘the metaphysical subject’. For both, metaphysical beliefs are presuppositional; as such, they constitute twin foci – a terminus ad quem and a terminus a quo – without which the activity of thinking rationally, scientifically, and morally is impossible. Finally, although for both philosophers metaphysical beliefs are not susceptible to conventional modes of explanation, justification, and verification, both seem to suggest in various ways that metaphysical beliefs are nevertheless susceptible to a certain kind of ‘practical’ justification.
43
Danjuma, Christiana, Edith Ada Anyanwu e Odey Simon Robert. "Language and Critical Thinking as Vehicles of Environmental Ethics and Metaphysics". Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 14, n.º 3 (28 de outubro de 2023): 16–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.62865/bjbio.v14i3.76.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Language, metaphysics and environmental ethics are specific and universal aspects of culture. Language and critical thinking are phenomenal means of communicating and rationalising environmental and metaphysical issues, among other existential concerns in general. This study argues that language and critical thinking are vehicles of metaphysics and environmental ethics. It also argues that the kind of metaphysics and environmental ethics inherent to a people determine their attitude towards the environment. As some scholars affirm in the literature, this is where continental philosophy comes into environmentalism, because no philosophy is independent of culture and a larger number of environmental issues are peculiar to a place, while a few others obtain across places as universals. Thus, environmentalists look at environmental issues and metaphysical concerns from both specific and general contexts. It is realised that upon giving the issues at stake critical reflections, ethical principles are made or advanced using language constructively to express, disseminate and sustain them across ages. The study concludes that despite being neglected in metaphysical and environmental discourses, language plays a critical role in them, as (mis)representation of the two depends on how language is used to express and disseminate (un)critically constructed thoughts on environment and metaphysics.
44
Sia, Santiago. "Faith, Reason and Metaphysical Thinking: A Process Response to Fides et Ratio". E-Theologos. Theological revue of Greek Catholic Theological Faculty 2, n.º 2 (1 de janeiro de 2011): 123–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/v10154-011-0012-3.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Faith, Reason and Metaphysical Thinking: A Process Response to Fides et Ratio Metaphysics has been subjected to much criticism from various quarters, including philosophy. The document Fides et Ratio affirms and defends its significance for religious belief. Strongly supporting the link between faith and reason, it endorses the tradition of using philosophy, with specific reference to metaphysics, to express, develop and defend theological doctrines. The encyclical also discusses the importance of metaphysics for one's philosophical outlook in life.
45
Ivanov, Vitaly L. "The ontological constitution of res as simul totum and the doctrine of distinctions in Metaphysica of Nicholas Bonetus, OFM". Philosophy Journal 15, n.º 3 (29 de agosto de 2022): 50–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2022-15-3-50-69.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The article examines the doctrine of thing in the “Metaphysics” created in the early 1330s by an original Franciscan theologian and philosopher Nicholas Bonetus. The article points to the historical-philosophical significance of this work. In the scholastic tradition, Bonetus’s “Metaphysics’ is argued to be one of the first large and independent treatises on metaphysics, i.e. it is not related to the tradition of commenting on Aristotle. It is also the first treatise in the history of philosophy under the title “Metaphysics”, named so by the author himself. First, we present the biography of the author of the treatise and briefly characterize the structure of his four-part “Opus philosophicum”, as well as emphasize the importance of the division between metaphysics and natural theology, for the first time in the history of the scholastic tradition not only declared as a project, but also implemented by Bonetus. Secondly, we examine the place that book III of the “Metaphysics” occupies in Bonetus’s entire metaphysical treatise, and determine the two main themes of this book: the doctrine of res and the doctrine on distinctions and identities. Thirdly, through the analysis of the Ist and IIIrd books of “Metaphysics” we demonstrate the connection, opposition and partial coincidence of two fundamental concepts of Bonetus's metaphysics: the concept of being as being and the concept of thing. Additionally, the leading meaning of the concept of a thing as a simul totum, that is, a single “constituted whole” from metaphysical elements (formalities, quidditative and individual differencies, intrinsic modes, properties), is clarified. Finally, we analyze the relationship between the doctrine of res and the doctrine on distinctions in Bonetus and explain how the doctrine of real and formal distinction and identity is subordinated to the goal of analytics of the metaphysical “constitution of res” and is built into the treatise on the thing. This, in turn, allows us to conclude that the main difference between the “formalist treatise” on distinctions and identities (and this is exactly how the content of the IIIrd book of Bonetus’s “Metaphysics” was perceived in the subsequent Scotist tradition), in comparison with the corresponding treatises of Francis of Meyronnes and Peter Thomae, is precisely the role of the ontological concept of a thing as a “metaphysical whole” or individual in Bonetus that determines his understanding of “formalities”.
46
Sgarbi, Marco. "Metaphysics in Königsberg prior to Kant (1703-1770)". Trans/Form/Ação 33, n.º 1 (2010): 31–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0101-31732010000100004.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The present contribute aims to reconstruct, using the methodology of intellectual history, the broad spectrum of metaphysical doctrines that Kant could know during the years of the formation of his philosophy. The first part deals with the teaching of metaphysics in Königsberg from 1703 to 1770. The second part examines the main characteristics of the metaphysics in the various handbooks, which were taught at the Albertina, in order to have an exhaustive overview of all metaphysical positions.
47
Seide, Ansgar. "Johann Gottlieb Fichtes Auseinandersetzung mit der Idee einer induktiven Metaphysik im ersten Buch von Die Bestimmung des Menschen". Methodus 10, n.º 1 (2021): 48–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0718-2775-2021-1-48.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This paper reconstructs the first book of Fichte’s Die Bestimmung des Menschen as an implicit critique by Fichte of the idea of an inductive metaphysics, an idea that was developed explicitly by some philosophers in the German-speaking world only in the second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. It becomes clear which basic premises of Fichte’s philosophy are responsible for the rejection of the idea of an inductive metaphysics. In particular, the idea of an inductive metaphysics cannot be reconciled with Fichte’s strong claim of certainty. This claim was abandoned by the proponents of inductive metaphysics in the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, allowing the idea of an inductive metaphysics to become a serious candidate for approaching metaphysics. The analysis of Fichte’s text also shows that it is crucial for inductive metaphysics to work out a measure of the ranking of rival explanatory hypotheses so that a rational decision between competing metaphysical theories based on inferences to the best explanation becomes possible.
48
Picazo, Gustavo. "On The Persistence of Absolute Metaphysics". Logos & Episteme 13, n.º 4 (2022): 417–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202213434.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Greenwood (2019) casts doubts upon whether a certain view about social groups (the view that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership, by virtue of the maintenance of their structure or function) is a fundamental metaphysical truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social groups. In this note, I introduce a distinction between absolute and relative metaphysics, and argue that there are no 'fundamental metaphysical truths‘ (as Greenwood conceives of them) at all. If there is one thing that should not persist here, it is absolute metaphysics.
49
Erdem, Engin. "The Place of God in Metaphysics: A Short Analysis of Ibn Sīnā’s Critique of Aristotle". Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 17, n.º 1 (18 de maio de 2022): 53–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.17.1.4.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This article deals with Ibn Sīnā’s criticisms of Aristotle regarding what the place of God should be in the science of metaphysics. From Aristotle’s point of view, the existence of God is proved by the proof of motion in physics and is held as a subject matter in a science that comes after physics, which is metaphysics. According to him, metaphysics is the most sublime science because God is its subject matter. The most striking criticism against Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics was put forward by Ibn Sīnā. From Ibn Sīnā’s point of view, the most important problem encountered in Aristotle’s understanding of metaphysics is that ontology and theology are intertwined. According to him, God cannot be a subject matter in metaphysics, rather, proving the existence of God is the aim of metaphysics. The subject matter of metaphysics is being qua being, and its aim is to prove the Necessary Existent that is the principle of existence. Accordingly, for Ibn Sīnā, metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject and a theological science in terms of its aim. This new conception of metaphysics, developed by Ibn Sīnā, had a profound effect not only on Islamic thought but also on Western philosophy. In a way, the ontotheological notes of Islamic and Western thought from the Middle Ages to the present have progressed through the metaphysical symphony composed by Ibn Sīnā.
50
Hassanpoor, Alireza, e Javad Nazari. "An Analysis of Heidegger’s Critique of Metaphysics’ Approach to the Nothing from a Muslim Philosopher's perspectives". Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) Avance en línea (19 de julho de 2023): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/resf.73762.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Heidegger’s most significant critique of metaphysics is that the history of metaphysics is the history of the forgetting of being. However, he also criticizes metaphysics for forgetting the nothing. Metaphysics fails to adequately address both being and nothingness, neglecting the nothing and treating it as a conceptual abstraction without objective reference. Metaphysics reduces discussions of the nothing to mere figurative expressions. However, by drawing on the approach of a contemporary Muslim philosopher who examines the the problem of the nothing in particular and the fact-itself and reality in general, and the division of being into general, real, and specific, we can respond to Heidegger’s critique within the framework of metaphysics. According to this perspective, the nothing, like being, is an integral part of reality in a general and real sense. The nothing, with its nothingness, manifests itself in the external world without being reduced to the being. Thus, Heidegger’s statement that “nothing nihilates (or noths) itself” finds metaphysical justification.