Artigos de revistas: "Market power"

1

Weiss, Jürgen. "Market Power and Power Markets". Interfaces 32, n.º 5 (outubro de 2002): 37–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.32.5.37.74.

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2

Morris, John R. "Finding Market Power in Electric Power Markets". International Journal of the Economics of Business 7, n.º 2 (julho de 2000): 167–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13571510050084514.

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3

Raj, Aniket, Utkarsh Gupta, Prabhakar Tiwari e Asheesh K. Singh. "Market power analysis of the Indian power market". International Journal of Engineering, Science and Technology 13, n.º 1 (9 de julho de 2021): 39–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ijest.v13i1.6s.

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Emerging electricity reforms in the power market aims at removing the monopolistic oligopoly power market and promoting competition in the market by providing opportunities to more producers. This paper seeks to investigate various existing structures of the Power Market. Indian Energy Exchange (IEX) and Power Exchange India Limited (PXIL) facilitates transparent trading of electricity, a larger market spectrum and allows the participation of other players in the market. Market power is an indicator of an non-competitive market, that is increase in the market power will result in the degradation of competition. This research will help modify the current parameters (HHI Index and Concentration ratio) which are used for measuring the market power of the power markets. As there is always deviation in unconstrained cleared volume and actual cleared or scheduled volume, deviation arises due to the volume of electricity that could not be cleared because of congestion in the power exchange. The researchers have also examined the Indian Power market and analyzed different developed power markets of the world like the US Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection (PJM) and the Nordpool.

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4

Lines, Thomas. "Markets, prices and market power". International Journal of Green Economics 2, n.º 3 (2008): 295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijge.2008.021424.

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Ansink, Erik, e Harold Houba. "Market power in water markets". Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64, n.º 2 (setembro de 2012): 237–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2011.10.002.

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6

Twomey, Paul, e Karsten Neuhoff. "Wind power and market power in competitive markets". Energy Policy 38, n.º 7 (julho de 2010): 3198–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2009.07.031.

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7

Cope III, Robert F., David E. Dismukes e Rachelle F. Cope. "Modeling regional electric power markets and market power". Managerial and Decision Economics 22, n.º 8 (2001): 411–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.1031.

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8

Brennan, Donna, e Jane Melanie. "Market power in the Australian power market". Energy Economics 20, n.º 2 (abril de 1998): 121–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0140-9883(97)00010-8.

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9

Kaplow, Louis. "Market definition, market power". International Journal of Industrial Organization 43 (novembro de 2015): 148–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.05.001.

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10

Ito, Koichiro, e Mar Reguant. "Sequential Markets, Market Power, and Arbitrage". American Economic Review 106, n.º 7 (1 de julho de 2016): 1921–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141529.

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We develop a framework to characterize strategic behavior in sequential markets under imperfect competition and restricted entry in arbitrage. Our theory predicts that these two elements can generate a systematic price premium. We test the model predictions using microdata from the Iberian electricity market. We show that the observed price differences and firm behavior are consistent with the model. Finally, we quantify the welfare effects of arbitrage using a structural model. In the presence of market power, we show that full arbitrage is not necessarily welfare-enhancing, reducing consumer costs but increasing deadweight loss. (JEL D42, D43, L12, L13, L94, Q41)

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11

Borenstein, Severin, James Bushnell, Edward Kahn e Steven Stoft. "Market power in California electricity markets". Utilities Policy 5, n.º 3-4 (julho de 1995): 219–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0957-1787(96)00005-7.

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12

Aviram, Amitai. "Cyclical Market Power". Israel Law Review 36, n.º 1 (2002): 103–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700017908.

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Market power is not ubiquitous; it is limited to certain products, in certain areas, and to certain times. Understanding the limits of the market power possessed by a firm in a given case is essential to the correct assessment of the firm's behavior and its antitrust implications.The most common method used to identify the scope as well as the strength of a firm's market power is through the definition of relevant markets, calculation of market share and identification of relevant market conditions (e.g., barriers to entry). Correct assessment of suspected market power should relate to all the limits on that power. For that reason, when exploring the possibility that a certain firm possesses market power, a product market definition is of limited use without the support of the relevant geographic market definition.This is also true of temporal restraints on market power. Some firms may be expected to possess market power (within certain product and geographical bounds) continuously, until a substantial and unexpected change in the industry diminishes their market power or changes its boundaries.

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13

Bask, Mikael, Jens Lundgren e Niklas Rudholm. "Market power in the expanding Nordic power market". Applied Economics 43, n.º 9 (19 de agosto de 2009): 1035–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00036840802600269.

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14

Green, Richard. "Market power mitigation in the UK power market". Utilities Policy 14, n.º 2 (junho de 2006): 76–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2005.09.001.

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15

Ahn, Nam-sung, e Victor Niemeyer. "Modeling market power in Korea's emerging power market". Energy Policy 35, n.º 2 (fevereiro de 2007): 899–906. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2005.12.027.

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16

Paniah, Crédo, Cédric Herpson e Javier Gil-Quijano. "A Markov Decision Model for Cooperative Virtual Power Plants Market Participation". Journal of Clean Energy Technologies 3, n.º 4 (2015): 302–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.7763/jocet.2015.v3.213.

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17

Staten, Michael, John Umbeck e William Dunkelberg. "Market share/market power revisited". Journal of Health Economics 7, n.º 1 (março de 1988): 73–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(88)90006-9.

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18

Sirjani, Bahareh, e Morteza Rahimiyan. "Wind power and market power in short-term electricity markets". International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems 28, n.º 8 (24 de março de 2018): e2571. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/etep.2571.

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19

T’Syen, Koen. "Market Power in Bidding Markets: An Economic Overview". World Competition 31, Issue 1 (1 de março de 2008): 37–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2008004.

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Undertakings often claim to operate on a bidding market, where it is impossible to have market power (“bidding market defence”). This defence is only valid under four conditions: winner-takes-all, lumpy demand, absence of lock-in effects and easy entry. If fulfilled, one speaks of an ideal bidding market. Non-compliance with at least one condition invalidates the defence, and “ordinary” antitrust problems resurge: firms may exercise market power. The feasibility thereof depends, firstly, on whether the bidding process is better qualified as an ascending or a sealed-bid auction and, secondly, on whether it is a private or a common value auction. Three common ways of exercising market power in impure bidding markets are collusion, predation and entry deterrence. These strategies can be effectively tackled under Articles 81 or 82, except for tacit collusion. Therefore, competition authorities should use their powers under the Merger Regulation to avoid that mergers between bidders facilitate coordinated behaviour. Consequently, markets with bidding contests do not always lead to competitive outcomes. To avoid confusion, these markets should not be referred to as “bidding markets” but as “markets with a bidding process”. The concept “bidding market” is better reserved for ideal bidding markets. This article has been shortlisted for the 3rd Young Writer’s Competition Award.

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20

Pauly, Mark V. "Market power, monopsony, and health insurance markets". Journal of Health Economics 7, n.º 2 (junho de 1988): 111–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-6296(88)90011-2.

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21

Atkins, Karla, Jiangzhuo Chen, V. S. Anil Kumar, Matthew Macauley e Achla Marathe. "Locational market power in network constrained markets". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 70, n.º 1-2 (maio de 2009): 416–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.11.001.

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22

Sexton, Richard J. "Market Power, Misconceptions, and Modern Agricultural Markets". American Journal of Agricultural Economics 95, n.º 2 (24 de novembro de 2012): 209–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aas102.

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23

Hyytinen, Ari, e Otto Toivanen. "Monitoring and market power in credit markets". International Journal of Industrial Organization 22, n.º 2 (fevereiro de 2004): 269–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2003.06.001.

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24

Wang, P., Y. Xiao e Y. Ding. "Nodal Market Power Assessment in Electricity Markets". IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 19, n.º 3 (agosto de 2004): 1373–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tpwrs.2004.831695.

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25

Raper, Kellie Curry, e H. Alan Love. "Market power in tobacco: Measuring multiple markets". Agribusiness 23, n.º 1 (2007): 35–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/agr.20112.

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26

Berger, David, Kyle Herkenhoff e Simon Mongey. "Labor Market Power". American Economic Review 112, n.º 4 (1 de abril de 2022): 1147–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191521.

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We develop, estimate, and test a tractable general equilibrium model of oligopsony with differentiated jobs and concentrated labor markets. We estimate key model parameters by matching new evidence on the relationship between firms’ local labor market share and their employment and wage responses to state corporate tax changes. The model quantitatively replicates quasi-experimental evidence on imperfect productivity-wage pass-through and strategic wage setting of dominant employers. Relative to the efficient allocation, welfare losses from labor market power are 7.6 percent, while output is 20.9 percent lower. Lastly, declining local concentration added 4 percentage points to labor’s share of income between 1977 and 2013. (JEL E25, H71, J24, J31, J42, R23)

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27

Prey, Robert. "Locating Power in Platformization: Music Streaming Playlists and Curatorial Power". Social Media + Society 6, n.º 2 (abril de 2020): 205630512093329. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2056305120933291.

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Where does the “power” of platformization reside? As is widely recognized, platforms are matchmakers which interface between different markets or “sides.” This article analyzes platform power dynamics through three of the most important markets that Spotify—the leading audio streaming platform—is embedded within: the music market; the advertising market; and the finance market. It does so through the lens of the playlist. Playlists can be seen as a central example of how platforms like Spotify employ curation or “curatorial power” to mediate markets in the attempt to advance their own interests. At the same time, playlists are an outcome of the conflicting pressures and tensions between these markets. As such, they provide a lens through which to view broader structural dynamics within the platform economy. As this case study of Spotify demonstrates, platform “power” is an always unstable and shifting outcome of the ongoing attempt to coordinate between various markets and actors.

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28

Kaszyński, Przemysław, Aleksandra Komorowska e Jacek Kamiński. "Revisiting Market Power in the Polish Power System". Energies 16, n.º 13 (21 de junho de 2023): 4856. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/en16134856.

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The consequences of the liberalisation of electricity markets have been widely discussed in the literature emphasising the successes or failures of privatisation and deregulation. While most developed power systems have undergone a form of economic transformation, they still require to be monitored and analysed to assess market power. The Polish power system is an example wherein the potential of market power examined fifteen years ago was summarised as significant. Since then, the transformation process and changes in the ownership structure have taken place. This study focuses on the assessment of the potential of market power in the Polish electricity market. For this purpose, statistics on power companies were collected and processed. Then, structural and behavioural measures were applied, including concentration ratios, the entropy coefficient, the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), the Residual Supply Index (RSI), and the Lerner Index. The results reveal that, despite a dynamic increase in renewable capacity, market concentration has increased in recent years, achieving an HHI of 2020.9 in 2021. An increase in the Lerner Index of lignite and hard coal-fired units is also observed, indicating high mark-ups by the key market players. Based on quantitative analysis, policy recommendations are outlined to reduce the negative impact of market power on consumers.

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29

Hu, Desheng, Jeffrey Gleason, Muhammad Abu Bakar Aziz, Alice Koeninger, Nikolas Guggenberger, Ronald E. Robertson e Christo Wilson. "Market or Markets? Investigating Google Search’s Market Shares under Vertical Segmentation". Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media 18 (28 de maio de 2024): 637–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v18i1.31340.

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Is Google Search a monopoly with gatekeeping power? Regulators from the US, UK, and Europe have argued that it is based on the assumption that Google Search dominates the market for horizontal (a.k.a. “general”) web search. Google disputes this, claiming that competition extends to all vertical (a.k.a. “specialized”) search engines, and that under this market definition it does not have monopoly power. In this study we present the first analysis of Google Search’s market share under vertical segmentation of online search. We leverage observational trace data collected from a panel of US residents that includes their web browsing history and copies of the Google Search Engine Result Pages they were shown.We observe that participants’ search sessions begin at Google greater than 50% of the time in 24 out of 30 vertical market segments (which comprise almost all of our participants’ searches). Our results inform the consequential and ongoing debates about the market power of Google Search and the conceptualization of online markets in general.

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30

Bühler, Benno. "Market Power: Introduction". Competition Law & Policy Debate 5, n.º 2 (outubro de 2019): 16–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/clpd.2019.02.03.

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31

Bühler, Benno, e Lars Wiethaus. "Market Power: Introduction". Competition Law & Policy Debate 5, n.º 2 (1 de julho de 2019): 16–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/cpld.2019.02.03.

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32

Galtung, Andreas. "Significant Market Power". European Business Law Review 12, Issue 7/8 (1 de julho de 2001): 160–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/396526.

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33

Gabszewicz, Jean J., e Lisa Grazzini. "Taxing Market Power". Journal of Public Economic Theory 1, n.º 4 (outubro de 1999): 475–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00022.

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34

Damro, Chad. "Market power Europe". Journal of European Public Policy 19, n.º 5 (junho de 2012): 682–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.646779.

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35

Minkel, J. R. "Artificial Market Power". Scientific American 296, n.º 4 (abril de 2007): 28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/scientificamerican0407-28b.

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36

Weretka, Marek. "Endogenous market power". Journal of Economic Theory 146, n.º 6 (novembro de 2011): 2281–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.002.

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37

Guthmann, Rafael R. "Vanishing Market Power". Estudos Econômicos (São Paulo) 54, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2024): 135–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1980-53575415rrg.

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Abstract Perfect competition can be approximated in an environment with differentiated goods, heterogeneous firms, and frictions of trading. This paper considers an environment where sellers sell differentiated goods to buyers, and frictions of trading are represented by the buyers having incomplete consideration sets of the sellers in the market. Besides selling differentiated products, some sellers are more “prominent” and so are present in a larger number of buyers’ consideration sets. However, despite these imperfections, as the average number of sellers in the buyers’ consideration sets expands, the sellers’ market power vanishes and the equilibrium of the market approximates competitive conditions.

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38

Lo, K. L., e Y. A. Alturki. "Towards reactive power markets. Part 2: Differentiated market reactive power requirements". IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution 2, n.º 4 (2008): 516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd:20070370.

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39

Wilson, James F. "Scarcity, Market Power, and Price Caps in Wholesale Electric Power Markets". Electricity Journal 13, n.º 9 (novembro de 2000): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s1040-6190(00)00153-6.

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40

HELMAN, U. "Market power monitoring and mitigation in the US wholesale power markets". Energy 31, n.º 6-7 (maio de 2006): 877–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2005.05.011.

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41

Asgari, Mohammad Hossein, Hassan Monsef e Majid Oloomi Buygi. "A novel approach for evaluating market power in reactive power markets". European Transactions on Electrical Power 21, n.º 5 (7 de dezembro de 2010): 1731–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/etep.521.

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42

Montgomery, Cynthia A. "Product-Market Diversification and Market Power". Academy of Management Journal 28, n.º 4 (dezembro de 1985): 789–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/256237.

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43

Boulding, William, e Richard Staelin. "Environment, Market Share, and Market Power". Management Science 36, n.º 10 (outubro de 1990): 1160–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.36.10.1160.

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44

Montgomery, C. A. "PRODUCT-MARKET DIVERSIFICATION AND MARKET POWER." Academy of Management Journal 28, n.º 4 (1 de dezembro de 1985): 789–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/256237.

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45

Fiuza de Bragança, Gabriel Godofredo, e Toby Daglish. "Can market power in the electricity spot market translate into market power in the hedge market?" Energy Economics 58 (agosto de 2016): 11–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2016.05.010.

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46

Franck, Jens-Uwe, e Martin Peitz. "Market power of digital platforms". Oxford Review of Economic Policy 39, n.º 1 (1 de janeiro de 2023): 34–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grac045.

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Abstract Digital platforms have reshaped many product markets and play an increasingly important role in economies around the globe. Some of these platforms have become powerful players and may possess a lot of market power. Economists use a number of indicators to assess market power. In this article we discuss to which extent these indicators are helpful in the context of digital platforms. In particular, we focus on assessing entrenched market power and the role of potential competition to constrain this power. Finally, we discuss some cross-border issues of platform market power.

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47

Pavlova, Natalia, Alexandr Kurdin e Dmitriy Polyakov. "App Store: market boundaries and Apple’s market power". Moscow University Economics Bulletin, n.º 1 (28 de fevereiro de 2021): 103–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.38050/01300105202115.

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The article is based on the research in mobile applications markets. The distribution of market power in these markets depends on the ability of a digital ecosystem’s owner to control the handling of mobile applications inside the ecosystem. The degree of this control is determined by the substitutability of different application stores as necessary facilities for the access to mobile applications. The authors provide the survey-based empirical estimates of such substitutability for Apple’s mobile application store — App Store. The results of further tests for market boundaries delineation confirm the embeddedness of final users in Apple’s ecosystem in absence of feasible opportunities to change the operating system and, consequently, the application store. The findings explain the degree of Apple’s market power and provide grounds for antitrust intervention.

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Gounari, Panayota. "Neoliberalizing Higher Education in Greece: New Laws, Old Free-Market Tricks". Power and Education 4, n.º 3 (janeiro de 2012): 277–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2304/power.2012.4.3.277.

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Mozdawar, Seyed Alireza, Asghar Akbari Foroud e Meysam Amirahmadi. "Interdependent electricity markets design: Market power and gaming". International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems 136 (março de 2022): 107641. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2021.107641.

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Somaini, Paulo, e Liran Einav. "A Model of Market Power in Customer Markets". Journal of Industrial Economics 61, n.º 4 (dezembro de 2013): 938–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/joie.12039.

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Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Market power"

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