Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Harvard Council on Post-War Problems"

David K. Dunaway and Willa K. Baum, eds. Oral History: An Interdisciplinary Anthology. Nashville: American Assocation for State and Local History, 1984. Pp. xxiii, 436. Paper, $17.95 ($16.15 to AASLH members); cloth $29.50 ($26.95 to AASLH members). Review by Jacob L. Susskind of The Pennsylvania State University at Harrisburg. Salo W. Baron. The Contemporary Relevance of History: A Study in Approaches and Methods. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Pp. viii, 158. Cloth, $30.00; Stephen Vaughn, ed. The Vital Past: Writings on the Uses of History. Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1985. Pp. 406. Paper, $12.95. Review by Michael T. Isenberg of the United States Naval Academy. Howard Budin, Diana S. Kendall and James Lengel. Using Computers in the Social Studies. New York and London: Teachers College Press, 1986. Pp. vii, 118. Paper, $11.95. Review by Francis P. Lynch of Central Connecticut State University. David F. Noble. Forces of Production: A Social History of Industrial Automation. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Pp. xviii, 409. Paper, $8.95. Review by Donn C. Neal of the Society of American Archivists. Alan L. Lockwood and David E. Harris. Reasoning with Democratic Values: Ethical Problems in United States History. New York and London: Teachers College Press, 1985. Volume 1: Pp. vii, 206. Paper, $8.95. Volume 2: Pp. vii, 319. Paper, $11.95. Instructor's Manual: Pp. 167. Paper, $11.95. Review by Robert W. Sellen of Georgia State University. James Atkins Shackford. David Crocketts: The Man and the Legend. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986. Pp. xxv, 338. Paper, $10.95. Review by George W. Geib of Butler University. John R. Wunder, ed. At Home on the Range: Essays on the History of Western Social and Domestic Life. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985. Pp. xiii, 213. Cloth, $29.95. Review by Richard N. Ellis of Fort Lewis College. Sylvia R. Frey and Marian J. Morton, eds. New World, New Roles: A Documentary History of Women in Pre-Industrial America. New York, Westport, Connecticut, and London: Greenwood Press, 1986. Pp. ix, 246. Cloth, $35.00. Review by Barbara J. Steinson of DePauw University. Elizabeth Roberts. A Woman's Place: An Oral History of Working-Class Women, 1890-1940. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985. Pp. vii, 246. Paper, $12.95. Review by Thomas T. Lewis of Mount Senario College. Steven Ozment. When Fathers Ruled: Family Life in Reformation Europe. Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London: Harvard University Press, 1983. Pp. viii, 283. Cloth, $17.50; Paper, $7.50. Review by Sanford Gutman of State University of New York, College at Cortland. Geoffrey Best. War and Society in Revolutionary Europe, 1770-1870. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 336. Paper, $9.95; Brian Bond. War and Society in Europe, 1870-1970. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 256. Paper, $9.95. Review by Bullitt Lowry of North Texas State University. Edward Norman. Roman Catholicism in England: From the Elizabethan Settlement to the Second Vatican Council. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 138. Paper, $8.95; Karl F. Morrison, ed. The Church in the Roman Empire. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986. Pp. viii, 248. Cloth, $20.00; Paper, $7.95. Review by Raymond J. Jirran of Thomas Nelson Community College. Keith Robbins. The First World War. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Pp. 186. Paper, $6.95; J. M. Winter. The Great War and the British People. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. Pp. xiv, 360. Cloth, $25.00. Review by Roger D. Tate of Somerset Community College. Gerhardt Hoffmeister and Frederic C. Tubach. Germany: 2000 Years-- Volume III, From the Nazi Era to the Present. New York: The Ungar Publishing Co., 1986. Pp. ix, 279. Cloth, $24.50. Review by Abraham D. Kriegel of Memphis State University. Judith M. Brown. Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. Pp. xvi, 429. Cloth, $29.95; Paper, $12.95. Review by Steven A. Leibo of Russell Sage College.

AimsAdverse childhood experiences (ACEs), poverty, violence and harmful alcohol/substance are associated with poor mental health outcomes in the general population. These risks are likely to be exacerbated among Female Sex Workers (FSWs), however there are few studies examining risks factors for mental health problems among FSWs. We examine the prevalence and correlates of common mental health problems including suicidal behaviour among FSWs in Kenya.MethodMaisha Fiti is a longitudinal study among FSWs randomly selected from Sex Worker Outreach Programme (SWOP) clinics across Nairobi. Baseline data were collected from June-December 2019. Mental health problems were assessed using the Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) for depression, the Generalised Anxiety Disorder tool (GAD-7) for anxiety, and the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ-17) for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Recent suicidal behaviour was defined as reported suicide attempt or suicidal ideation in the past 30 days. Other measurement tools included the WHO Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) score, WHO Violence Against Women questionnaire, and the WHO ASSIST tool (to measure harmful alcohol/substance use in the past 3 months). Descriptive statistics and multivariable logistic regression were conducted in Stata 16.1.ResultOf 1039 eligible FSWs, 1003 FSWs took part in the study (response rate: 96%) with a mean age of 33.7 years. The prevalence of moderate/severe depression was 23.2% (95%CI: 20.7–25.9%), moderate/severe anxiety 11.0% (95%CI: 9.3–13.1%), PTSD 14.0% (95% CI: 12.2–16.5%) and recent suicidal behaviour 10.2% (95%CI: 8.5–12.2%) (2.6% suicide attempt; 10.0% suicidal ideation). Among women with any mental health problem 63.0% also had a harmful alcohol/substance use problem. One in four women (25%; 95%CI: 22.5–27.8%) had depression and/or anxiety and this was independently associated with higher ACE scores, hunger (skipped a meal in last week due to financial difficulties), death of a child, perceived sex work stigma and recent sexual/physical violence. PTSD was associated with higher ACE scores, hunger, increased STI prevalence (chlamydia trachomatis) and recent violence. Recent suicidal behaviour was associated with higher ACE scores, low literacy, hunger, and recent violence. Mental health problems and suicidal behaviour were less prevalent among women reporting social support.ConclusionThe high burden of mental problems among FSWs indicates a need for accessible services tailored for FSWs alongside broader structural interventions addressing poverty, harmful alcohol/substance use and violence. High rates of ACEs among this population indicates the need to consider early childhood and family interventions to prevent poor mental health outcomes.Funding: Medical Research Council and the UK Department of International Development

Cathedrals of the Catholic Church, as a rule, are gathering at the turning points of the development of the world and the life of the Church. II Vatican Council took place after the curves of the second drama of humanity in the Second World War, in the conditions of the post-war split of the world, first of all in Europe, in two opposing camps and the establishment of totalitarian regimes in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the collapse of the colonial system and the appearance on the political map of the world (first of all in Africa and Asia) of young independent countries. At the same time, the world was once again faced with the threat of a new, already thermonuclear war, which, like the Damocles sword, hangs over humanity. The problems of the post-war world development in the conditions of the growing scientific and technological revolution, the launch of the space era, as well as the uneven economic and social development of the world in the coordinates of the North-South, arose.

In the article based on regional archive materials, introduced campaign for election of deputies in the Supreme Council of USSR10th February 1946 in large soviet industrial center - Gorky city. Considered steps of their preparations: technical and organizational, agitators work among the citizens. Based on official documents of campaign marked some social problems of citizens in post-war city, and official relations for soviet authority and elections.

In recent years, the history of sex education policy in twentieth-century Britain, and the sexual discourses it both reflects and reinforces, has attracted increasing attention from a range of disciplines within the humanities and social sciences. Yet, research has primarily focused either on the early decades of the century or on the abrasive social politics of sex education since 1980. There is a dearth of material addressing the intervening years. Moreover, little research has been devoted to the Scottish experience, despite Scotland's distinctive traditions of education and law, as well as arguably a distinctive sexual culture. Drawing on a wide range of governmental archives, this article seeks to rectify these omissions by exploring the impulses and constraints that shaped Scottish school sex education policy in the period 1950-80. First, it examines the nature of the debate surrounding the issue prior to the Second World War. Secondly, it charts the reappraisal of policy in wartime and immediate post-war years in response to the perceived breakdown in moral and sexual standards among the young. Thereafter, the article examines the devolvement of responsibility for school sex education in the 1950s and 1960s to traditional purity and social hygiene organizations-the Alliance-Scottish Council and the Scottish Council for Health Education. The demise of such organizations, and the often conflicting and ineffectual efforts of the Scottish Education Department and Scottish Home and Health Department to address the sex educational needs of a more ‘permissive’ youth culture in the late 1960s and 1970s are then explored. Finally, the implications of the study for an understanding of the relationship of the State to sexual issues in later twentieth-century Scotland are reviewed.

The article examines under-researched aspect of the restoration of social services for re-evacuated Leningrad children in 1943–1946. Social services are interpreted as the work of local authorities, the Soviets, aimed at resuming the activities of children’s institutions in Leningrad, solving the problems of organizing the daily life of children outside their houses, primarily in nurseries, kindergartens, orphanages, schools, in medical institutions, and within health programs. Since February 1943, the re-evacuation of residents to Leningrad was initiated, and the city leadership was faced with the task of establishing social and consumer services for the population staying in the city. The policy related to the implementation of key restoration measures was directed by the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. The formidable challenge lay in the fact that during the war years, many city institutions were liquidated, and the buildings and premises, which had housed them, were destroyed or occupied by hospitals, headquarters of the Red Army, Red-Banner Baltic Fleet, and the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs. The staffing issue was acute. Topical were the issues of repair and provision of work with building materials, necessary inventory and equipment. The article is based on the clerical and regulatory documents of the Leningrad City Executive Committee from the funds of the Central State Archive of St. Petersburg; published materials of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR and the Council of People’s Commissars of the Russian SovietFederated Socialist Republic and the Leningrad City Executive Committee; and the data from periodicals for 1943–1946.

Background. The modern philosophy of social life, where equal rights and opportunities are guaranteed to all, is a trend of world development. Gender approaches are implemented in all areas of society. This is evidenced, in particular, by the Sustainable Development Goals (Goal 5), UN Security Council Resolution 1325 "Women. Peace. Security", the Gender Equality Strategy of the Council of Europe for 2018–2023, the European Charter for the Equality of Women and Men in the Life of Local Communities, the Biarritz Partnership etc. The implementation of gender approaches in various spheres of social life allows us to see existing problems for various social groups and individuals, to offer alternative ways of solving them, which allow us to meet the needs of specific women and specific men. The very understanding of "governance" is based on new views on the work of civil power, which reflect its turning towards citizens, democratization, and are especially important in the conditions of decentralization. The modern understanding of this term, as I. Degtyareva notes, was formed and began to be actively used in the 90s years of the 20th century to denote a modern way of managing a democratic state, when all interested parties are involved in decision-making, which significantly expands the boundaries of traditional management of government bodies. Therefore, we can talk about the transition to gender-oriented governance in modern democratic countries. The purpose of this article is to analyze the gender orientation of modern public administration of Ukraine in the conditions of post-war reconstruction. Object of study. Democratic governance in the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. Methods. To obtain scientific results, the method of comparative analysis was used to identify similarities/differences in Ukraine's development trends, readiness for joining the EU. A comparison of the study of the projects "Strengthening the role of women in politics and decision-making at the local level" of UNDP and "Gender aspects, development of agriculture and rural areas – Ukraine" of FAO gave grounds to conclude that the processes in the regions of Ukraine are similar to the global trend: the less authority and resources are in power, the more chances women have to come to power. The method of content analysis was also used as a quantitative-qualitative method of studying the speeches of the Head of the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service Issues, the Vice-Prime Minister of Ukraine on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of Ukraine, and people's deputies. Results. In Ukraine, government officials, together with citizens, developed, wrote and implemented the State program for ensuring equal rights and opportunities for women and men, the Government approved the National Action Plan for the Implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the National Action Plan for the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 "Women, peace, security". Departmental plans were developed and adopted for the implementation of this Plan. Amendments to normative legal acts that had discriminatory norms against women are planned and proposed for implementation. We can state that there is a real and rapid process of integration of gender approaches in all spheres of social life. The Government is also developing sectoral documents that will contribute to the development of gender-oriented public governance in the post-war period as well. At the same time, the problem remains the lack of experts on gender issues in public administration, as well as gender stereotypes that prevent effective change in society. Conclusions. Ukraine needs a systematic approach and consolidated actions of public authorities, civil society institutions, and business for a deeper understanding of gender approaches to the development of all spheres of our life. Post-war reconstruction will be a challenge for the implementation of a gender approach in all spheres of public life. At the same time, ensuring justice is the basic approach of public governance in European countries.

Introduction. On April 21, 2022, by Decree of the President of Ukraine No.266/2022, the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War was established as a consultative and advisory body under the President of Ukraine, and the Regulations on it and its staff were approved. The National Council prepared the Plan for the Reconstruction of Ukraine after the war and presented it at the international conference in Lugano on July 4–5, 2022 as a “road map” for the post-war reconstruction of Ukraine. And since in the conditions of the war unleashed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine, the right to participate in the management of state affairs is limited, there was no extensive discussion of this Plan. However, the issues that arose in the process of its preparation and adoption are quite relevant. Aim of the article – is to clarify the correspondence of the powers of the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War to its legal status as a consultative body under the President of Ukraine, the legal force of acts adopted by it and the problems of their implementation. Results. The issue of the legal status of consultative and advisory bodies, bodies that serve the President’s activities, has been the subject of scientific debate in legal science for a long time. There is also an attempt to define the concept of a consultative body in the current legislation of Ukraine. For example, in accordance with the Standard Regulation on the advisory, advisory and other auxiliary bodies established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (hereinafter – the Standard Regulation), approved by the resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “Issues of advisory, advisory andother auxiliary bodies established by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine” dated June 17 No. 599 of 2009, the consultative and advisory body is a permanent or temporary body of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as an auxiliary body), which is formed by it to ensure the exercise of its powers. As for consultative-advisory bodies under the President of Ukraine, efforts at the normative level to regulate their status were made in the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated May 3, 2006 No. 340/2006 “On some issues of regulating the activity of consultative-advisory bodies under the President of Ukraine”. However, on the basis of Presidential Decree No. 149/2008 of February 21, 2008, it became invalid. And the draft Law of Ukraine “On the office of the President, advisory, advisory and other auxiliary bodies and services that ensure the exercise of powers by the President of Ukraine” dated September 24, 2008 No. 3215 was not adopted. On the basis of the analysis of scientific and normative sources regarding the definition of the concept of “consultative and advisory body”, it can be stated that the features of the concept of “consultative and advisory body” proposed by legal scholars mostly coincide with the features established in the current regulatory and legal acts.The defining characteristics of the National Council as a consultative body under the President of Ukraine are as follows: it is an auxiliary body by nature of its activity; created on the basis of a separate Regulation approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated April 21, 2022 No. 266/2022; the main task is to develop a plan of measures for the post-war recovery and development of Ukraine; definition and development of proposals for priority reforms, the adoption and implementation of which are necessary in the war and post-war periods; preparation of strategic initiatives, projects of regulatory and legal acts, the adoption and implementation of which are necessary for the effective work and recovery of Ukraine in the war and post-warperiods; not endowed with state-authority powers; does not have the right to issue normative-legal acts on its own behalf, but is authorized to participate in the development of draft normative-legal acts regarding the recovery of Ukraine from the consequences of the war and to submit to the President of Ukraine the relevant recommendations and proposals developed based on the results of its work. It is worth paying attention to the binding nature of the provisions of the Plan for the Reconstruction of Ukraine after the war, adopted by the consultative and advisory body under the President of Ukraine. Clause 11 of the Regulations on the National Council states that “the Council shall make decisions on matters within its jurisdiction”. But such decisions of the advisory body are not binding for anyone. But such decisions of the advisory body are not binding for anyone. If necessary, the decisions of the Council can be implemented by issuing acts of the President ofUkraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in accordance with the established procedure, and introducing relevant draft laws for consideration by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. But the main purpose of the National Council under the President of Ukraine, as we have already noted, is to submit to the President of Ukraine appropriate recommendations and proposals regarding priority reforms developed based on the results of its work, the adoption and implementation of which are necessary in the war and post-war periods; including the preparation of strategic initiatives, projects of normative and legal acts. And the President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine can respectively issue Decrees and Resolutions only on matters defined forthem by the Constitution of Ukraine. Conclusions. In the conditions of the martial law regime and the deficit of budget funds, the creation of additional consultative and advisory bodies in general, not authorized to make universally binding decisions, and in particular the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War as aconsultative and advisory body under the President of Ukraine, seems quite problematic. After all, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine as the highest body of executive power in Ukraine and the system of executive power bodies in general, according to the Constitution of Ukraine and the Laws of Ukraine, has sufficient powers to ensure the adoption and implementation of the necessary regulatory and legal acts on post-war reconstruction and development of Ukraine. Key words: National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the Consequences of the War, consultative and advisory body under the President of Ukraine, Plan for the Recovery of Ukraine after the War, martial law regime, system of executive authorities.

Several mounts ago, during emergency meeting of UN Security Council, General Secretary Antonio Guterres, made a very trebling statement, that Cold war is back and it is even more dangerous than in the 60’s. This is not news for majority of scientific community. New international conflict started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimean peninsula. New international conflict will definitely change the balance in international relations. The most vulnerable in these new conditions are the young democracies and countries that formed several decades ago due collapse of USSR and the whole communist bloc, Ukraine, Moldova, south Caucasian and Baltic states. Imperial past left a lasting mark on economical, social and political life of newly form states. Soviet social experiments led to good number of problems for the former republics, ranging from political to territorial. Russian Federation uses these problems for her advantage. Surviving in this harsh conditions and reforming their society is the main challenge of young European countries. Key words: Ukraine, Moldova, Russia, Putin, hybrid war, post-soviet space, international security

We aimed to assess, in socio-cultural context, the level of hatred and revenge in war veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The sampling frame consisted of 215 Kosova War veterans, randomly selected. The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire was used to assess the prevalence of PTSD and Manchester Short Assessment of Life was used to assess social satisfactions. The participants were asked to declare the strength of feelings of hatred and revenge in the four preceding weeks by using four items scale: not at all, a little bit/sometimes, a lot and extremely. Willingness for action of veterans was assessed using three item scale: yes, no or maybe. A probability level of 0.05 was adopted to be considered as statistically significant for differences among groups. DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD (very similar to DSM-V) were met by 52.6% of veterans; the data have confirmed existence of thoughts and fantasies of revenge against opposing forces by 42.8% veterans; at the same level 42.8% manifested feelings of hatred. Fantasies of taking revenge a lot was recorded by 19.5% and extremely by 1.4% of veterans, while hateful thoughts at level a lot were likely expressed by 22.3% and extreme by 2.8% of veterans. It is important to note that 84.7% were confident to act based on their beliefs. Social-economic and cultural factors have played major role in the understanding of psychological problems of traumatized individuals with a direct impact on their ability to function socially. This study has confirmed the urgent need for the establishment of psychological rehabilitation programs as well as programs for the social and economic rehabilitation of War Veterans.

Objective: The purpose of this study was to evaluate a newly designed psychosocial treatment program for war traumatized child and adolescent refugees. The program was designed to reduce emotional distress and improve psychosocial functioning. Method: Ten young Kosovan refugees (mean age 13.3 years) residing in Germany participated in the manual based intervention program. This multimodal program consists of individual, family and group sessions using a psychoeducational approach beside trauma and grief focusing activities, creative techniques and relaxation. Kind and severity of traumatic experiences were gathered by interviewing the child and their caretakers using the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire (HTQ). Psychiatric diagnoses (Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia for School-Age Children, K-SADS) were assessed prior to the intervention. Post-traumatic symptomatology (HTQ), emotional problems (Diagnostic System for Psychological Disorders, DYSIPS) and the overall psychosocial functioning (Child Global Assessment Scale, CGAS) were assessed before and after the 12-week intervention. Results: Following the intervention the degree of overall psychosocial functioning increased substantially in 9 of 10 participants. Furthermore, post-traumatic, anxiety and depressive symptoms were reduced significantly. The rate of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnoses fell from 60% to 30%. The number of patients with PTSD and a high rate of comorbid symptoms (depression and anxiety) as well as a history of severe traumatization remained at 30%. Conclusions: This study suggests that the psychosocial treatment program specified for war traumatized adolescents may be useful for the relief of psychiatric sequelae and for an improvement in overall psychosocial functions, but not for the subgroup of severely traumatized patients with complex psychiatric disturbances.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, the tank industry, like other military branches of the Soviet economy, experienced a period of reorganization and technological restructuring. The central problem facing the military economy in the second half of the 1940s was a change in approaches to the production process and product quality assessment, and a more rational use of available resources. The solution of this problem, according to the author, depended on the results of bureaucratic interactions between the ministries of economy, the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and government structures – the operational bureaus of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. In addition, the personal qualities of Soviet leaders, such as V.A. Malyshev, N.A. Voznesensky, L.P. Beria, played an important role in solving the issues of planning and production of armored vehicles.

The Forced Loan of 1626–27 has traditionally been regarded as one of the milestones of early seventeenth-century politics. The great nineteenth-century Whig historian S. R. Gardiner saw it as the product of “new counsels” by which Charles I came increasingly to rely on the royal prerogative, and he depicted the opposition to this as a principled defense of Englishmen's liberties. Others writing in the same tradition have generally echoed these views. Thus the loan has been presented as the climax to a first stage of struggle between “Court” and “Country” or as a staging post on the “high road to Civil War.” Latterly, however, this verdict has come into question.With the work of “localist” and “revisionist” historians we have come to appreciate more clearly the extent of attachment to the local community and the continual striving toward consensus in relations between king and subject. This has led to a general revaluation of what have traditionally been regarded as clashes of principle. Local historians have stressed that opposition to taxes generally owed far more to backsliding and provincial inertia than to any concern for constitutional propriety. And a greater understanding of the problems of administration—particularly in wartime—has led to a recognition that government decision making was often a reflex action, prompted by the immediate need to make ends meet. These insights have been incorporated into the work of Conrad Russell, who has provided the most recent assessment of the loan.

The paper is devoted to the problem of the existence of Orthodox traditions in the life of Soviet collective farms during post-war decades. Its main goal is to find out how the traditional confessional culture of the village has adapted to the realities of “developed socialism”. Considering the Orthodox practices of Soviet peasants in the late Stalin and Khrushchev periods, the author departs from the traditionally rigid opposition of the concepts of “Soviet” and “religious”, starting from the thesis about the possibility of mutual influence of the corresponding cultures and their practical coordination at the level of everyday life. The research source base was made up of materials from the central and regional offices of the Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, as well as documents of party structures that actively discussed the problems of mass religiosity during the Khrushchev period. Based on them, the paper discusses the depth of penetration of Soviet ideology into village life, the manifestations of the post-war Orthodox revival, the attitude of local party cadres to it and specific ways of adapting “village Orthodoxy” to official Soviet discourses. The paper concludes that traditional Orthodox practices were filled with additional meanings corresponding to the values of patriotism, socialist construction, and the struggle for peace officially declared by the Soviet state. In addition, the appearance of a new type of “Soviet priest” in the village is demonstrated — a priest who shares communist values with the exception of atheism and broadcasts them to his parishioners. Finally, the paper shows examples of practical coordination by peasants of elements of Orthodox and new “socialist” culture both at the level of worldview and in everyday life.

Problem statement. Public discussions of post-war restoration of Ukraine, and, in particular, civil defense of people living under war conditions and prospects of further living next to Russia, have brought about setting up of NGO “City development platform Renaissance”. Using materials of the specialists that work for our NGO, we have drafted the program of measures aimed at broad availability of modern means of civil defense. Current laws and building norms are aimed at providing shelter for civil servants and workers of some strategic enterprises. In other words, they cover about 10 per cent of the total population and do not consider safety of the majority of Ukrainians. The goal of this article is to acquaint all possible stakeholders with the civil defense problems that Ukraine is facing at the moment and the ways of dealing with them. In this article we have determined the actual problems of the civil defense system in Ukraine, discrepancies in the major terminology, absence of the technical characteristics for the most simple shelters and their capacity to protect people from the modern weapons. This article has envisaged systematic measures to improve civil defense system, ways of its implementation and funding. This article contains proposals for creation of the State program of civil defense development for the period to 2030 within the framework of the National Council for restoration and reconstruction of Ukraine activities.

The author conducts a comparative analysis of international institutions that emerged as a result of two world wars in the twentieth century — the League of Nations and the United Nations, and shows their fundamental diff erence. The author rightly believes that the League of Nations was unable to prevent the Second World War due to the imperfection of its Charter and the lack of universal principles embodied in it. These shortcomings, according to the author, were due to the instability of the Versailles-Washington system, which failed to overcome the contradictions that later led to a new world war. Unlike the League of Nations, the United Nations, established after the Second World War, was able to take into account the systemic shortcomings that were originally embedded in the statutory principles of the former organization. The author focuses on the "veto" rule, which is the fundamental principle of the UN Charter, and shows its fundamental diff erence from the principle of "liberum veto" of the Statute of the League of Nations, which allowed any dissenting state to block a decision regarding the defi nition of a threat to peace and condone aggressor countries to freely exercise their expansionist plans. The author takes into account that the UN is an organization of the “nuclear age”, since the Yalta system determined the status of permanent members of the Security Council as victors in World War II and leading nuclear powers in the UN Charter. The author argues that complex international confl ict situations can only be resolved through the joint eff orts of the world community. With the help of various international mechanisms, regional confl icts must be resolved by political and diplomatic methods, and they must not be allowed to develop into a global confl ict, since a new world confl ict in the context of globalization can only be at the nuclear level. The UN Charter lays down the principles for resolving international regional problems and their settlement by political means. The author comes to the conclusion, that the United Nations is a stable international institution to prevent a new world war and maintain international security. Unlike the League of Nations, which failed to prevent the Second World War, the UN is an institution for actually preventing world crises and building a new post-war world order, which has been ensuring the sustainable development of mankind without global wars for more than 75 years.

The article features the practical methods of the "personnel retention" policy at the domestic industry enterprises in the first post-war years, their orientation and efficiency. The list of research sources includes statistical data, archival materials, normative documents of the period, including the previously unpublished Resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers. It has been revealed that the main cause of staff turnover was unfavorable living conditions of workers and supply problems. In the Soviet industry, the personnel retention problem was solved by strict administrative control, as well as by the expansion of benefits and social guarantees for employees. Personnel retention methods, as well as the amount of benefits and the severity of the punishment applied to employees for violation of labor discipline, were distributed in accordance with the key link principle: employees of state priority sectors (coal mining, metallurgy) experienced a higher concentration of benefits and sanctions. In the conditions of limited resources, this principle made it possible to achieve the desired social a nd economic tasks.

The authors of the article defined a set of problems in the labor sphere and the system of social dialogue under the conditions of the synergistic influence of the following factors: 1) digitalization (world trend), 2) full-scale armed aggression; 3) the impact of chronically unresolved internal problems, accumulated from 2014 to 2022; 4) the Euro-integrational vector of Ukrainian development with the intensification of this vector after Ukraine acquires the status of a candidate country for joining the European Union (2022). The authors have revealed a tendency towards the rapid activation of attention to the problems of social dialogue, readiness for changes in the current period on the part of the top management of the state, social partners and their joint representative bodies in connection with the processes of forced European integration. The article contains a thorough analysis of ILO documents regarding the assessment of the state and losses of the labor sphere as a result of full-scale armed aggression, as well as a recommendations on achieving the quality criteria of the system of social dialogue. The role of social dialogue in ensuring the stability of the labor sphere of Ukraine in the current conditions is revealed, which is defined by the need for a radical renewal of the system of interaction of social dialogue subjects, the restoration of the work of a joint representative body at the national level - the National Tripartite Socio-Economic Council, respectively, territorial tripartite socio-economic councils, active coordinated decisions and actions by social partners regarding the modernization of the current model of social dialogue in Ukraine. The updated model must meet the basic European requirements, be organically integrated into the system of post-war recovery of the social and labor sphere according to the ILO principle 'build back better'. The need to involve digital resources and possibilities for prospects of the development of the social dialogue system through its renewal on a modern technological network-digital basis is substantiated (author's idea). The practical implementation of the updated system of social dialogue becomes the basis for the creation of an information and communication platform for the interaction of partners at the inter-state and intra-state levels for the implementation of strategic decisions to ensure the stability and post-war recovery of the labor sphere, the economy and the country as a whole, in order to achieve the defined European integration benchmarks.

Over the past decade the perceived ‘threat’ of transnational organised crime (TOC) to the security of western political economies has become a principal issue on the agendas of key international forums such as the United Nations, G7/8 elite industrial countries and the Council of Europe. The intense policy activity around this threat is indicative of a key trend in post-Cold War international relations, that is, the reorientation of western security, intelligence and defence agencies toward crime control. Risk assessments and research evidence provided by international relations departments in higher education institutions, especially in the USA, have been particularly influential in providing the rationale for this reorientation. It is argued here, however, that there is a danger of intellectuals being drawn into the legitimisation of policies the terms of which are defined for them rather than by them. This jeopardises the critical contribution which academic research can make to policy change and learning, in particular it precludes a more reflexive approach to ‘evidence-based’ government. The paper draws upon discourse analysis and the study of ‘governmentality’ to develop a more reflexive interrogation of the assumptions underpinning this policy-shift in post-Cold War international relations. This is exemplified through an analysis of the two principal competing discourses on the threat of TOC and these are distinguished in terms of their focus on ‘criminologies of the other’ and ‘criminologies of the self’. The former narrates threats to security in terms of external, nationally and ethnically defined, pressures. The later perceive threats more in terms of the internal challenges now facing ‘sovereign’ governments struggling to command highly diverse, dynamic and complex social-political problems like organised crime. The ways in which these competing discourses constrain and enable alternative policy responses to TOC are examined.

This article analyzes the key problems of the financial constitution in the development of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1948-1949, based on materials from the Constitutional Convention at Herrenchiemsee and the Parliamentary Council of West Germany. It emphasizes that the relevance of this issue was influenced by Germany’s historical development, which had a long-standing experience in both regional and imperial financial administration. This led to high significance of financial constitution issues in post-war West German politics. It is concluded that the main approaches to this problem were developed at the Herrenchiemsee Convention in October 1948, and the main content of the financial section of the Basic Law was formulated in the financial committee at the beginning of October 1948. A key role in developing the financial constitution was played by parliamentarian H. HöpkerAschoff. However, until May 1949, the parties could not reach a consensus on matters of financial administration system and financial equalization. This was significantly influenced by constant objections from the occupying administrations, the position of the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CSU), uncertainty in assessing financial conditions, and the Social Democrats’ consistent defense of broad financial powers for the federal center.

This article is devoted to the analysis of the factors which influenced the effectiveness of the combat use of the Soviet aviation during the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. The object of the study is the armed forces of the Red Army, the subject of the study is the air force of the Red Army which participated in the war with Finland in 1939-1940. The sources for the work are archival materials - reports on the combat work of the Air Force of the combined arms armies during the conflict, on the use of certain types of aircraft, as well as military command work documents. In addition, the study contains published materials from compilations - documents of the Main Military Council, the Headquarters of the High Command, the command of the Leningrad Military District, as well as the conclusions and minutes of meetings of the Main Military Commission and the Air Force Commission. The aim of the work is to study various conditions and factors which inluenced the work of Soviet pilots during this conflict. The study examined the initial plans and tactics of the Soviet command for the use of aviation, their evolution in the course of hostilities. In addition, various problems and emergency situations which Soviet pilots faced with during the war were analyzed in this study. For the sake of completeness of the study at the end of the article attention is paid to the post-war analysis of the participation of the Soviet aviation in hostilities, and those problems which the Soviet command drew attention to are considered. The main factor underlying the entire combat work of the Soviet aviation at the initial stage of conflict was the fact that for the Soviet command the war with Finland was the first large-scale clash with another state, when a large number of aircraft were to participate in the hostilities. The Soviet leadership simply did not have experience in such operations, did not know how to use aviation correctly and what those operations required for. It were namely these facts which determined the initial not entirely successful tactics of using aviation, the poor preparedness of air reconnaissance. In addition, misunderstanding of the conditions of the future theater of operations played a significant role. Soviet air units were not equipped with the necessary uniforms and machinery. Weather conditions, in turn, also made their own adjustments to the work of aviation. At the same time, it is necessary to point out the insufficient training of pilots.

The work outlines the subject field of application of the project approach in the implementation of effective mechanisms for the protection of the rights of ethnic minorities (communities) of the temporarily occupied Melitopol and the formation of the cohesion of the multicultural community for the stability and restoration of the de-occupied post-war city and the Azov region. The point is that thanks to participation in the Council of Europe project «Supporting the reform of the national minority legal framework and the resilience of national minorities and Roma in Ukraine», Melitopol multicultural community has become one of the most consolidated among the representatives of those communities in the occupied territories of Ukraine, which were forced to temporarily leave their homes and the city. The main problems of preserving cultural diversity and observing the rights and freedom of ethnic communities, factors and mechanisms for improving the legislative and political framework for the protection of minority rights in Ukraine and promoting cooperation between local authorities and national minorities in war conditions are analyzed. Considered prospective approaches to the implementation of alternative methods of combating discrimination in martial law conditions and overcoming communication gaps between ethnic communities that remained in temporarily occupied Melitopol, live in the territory under the control of Ukraine or were forced to leave abroad. The mechanisms of implementation of successful cases and positive experience of the multicultural community of Melitopol in preventing and countering discrimination of persons belonging to national minorities (communities) and indigenous peoples of Melitopol are substantiated, based on modeling elements of social reality and intensive interpersonal interaction which madeit possible to become one of the most consolidated among the representatives of the communitieson the occupied Ukrainian territories.

Not long after the end of the First World War and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Minister of Education Pavle Marinković started an initiative to establish a Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje. In December 1919. he sent a letter to the, then rector of Belgrade University, Jovan Cvijić, in which he requested that the institution headed by Jovan express its opinion on the mentioned initiative. The very next day, the Council of the University of Belgrade met and supported the proposal of minister Marinković, pointing out that the establishment of the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje will be of great national and cultural importance. On February 2, 1920, the Decree was passed on the establishment of the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje, which officially “gave birth” to this institution. During the first decade of its existence, the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje built the image of an institution to be respected, despite objective difficulties and considerable problems it has faced since its inception. It was the only high school institution of the Yugoslav monarchy in the area between Belgrade and the border with Albania, Greece and Bulgaria. Faced with post-war poverty, the material, infrastructural and technological backwardness of the southern regions, as well as various socio-political crises and turmoil, it nevertheless became a lively center of educational, scientific and cultural life of the Yugoslav south part.On February 1, 1931, a solemn celebration of the tenth anniversary of the work of this institution was organized. As part of the aforementioned event, the day of Saint Sava was also celebrated. A formal session of the council of this faculty was held, greeting speeches by high dignitaries were heard, the consecration of the foundation of the student dormitory was performed, an exhibition of old printed and handwritten books, ancient frescoes, archaeological and ethnographic collections in the Museum of Southern Serbia was held. The celebration ended with a performance in the Skopje National Theater. The main organizer and host of the meeting was a prominent theologian and historian Radoslav Grujić, then dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Skopje. It was a dignified, well-organized manifestation with an appropriate program and with the participation of distinguished people not only from Skopje and the Vardar region, but also from the wider area of the Yugoslav state.

The article analyzes international legal sources: the UN Charter, the Declaration of Principles of International Law (1970), the NATO Charter, OSCE documents, etc. in the context of the reality of the implementation of the principle of maintaining international peace and security, in particular the mechanism for guaranteeing this principle. Like any other guarantee mechanism, it contains two groups of tools: documentary and activity, which should ensure its effectiveness. The purpose of this work is to identify the real possibilities of the mechanism of guaranteeing the principle of maintaining peace and security in modern conditions, in particular in Ukraine. The mechanism of guaranteeing the principle of international peace and security, which is enshrined in these documents, met the requirements of the 50’s of the twentieth century. and the beginning of the XXI century. and allowed to solve problems in this area. But a number of provisions are no longer relevant or do not meet the requirements of the time; quite often they are declarative in nature, do not contain specific means of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanism of peace and security. There is no constant monitoring of the implementation of this principle to anticipate the possibility of its violations and apply measures to prevent them. The conceptual vision of the role and significance of international organizations and international law in the light of the challenges of the time also needs to be changed. A number of provisions enshrining the means of guaranteeing the principle of maintaining international peace and security are not only ineffective in concrete realities, but can also create conditions for distortions (recorded during the Russian Federation’s war against Ukraine - when voting in the UN Security Council cessation of war and peace, substitution of concepts or interpretation of certain provisions in their favor to justify actions contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations). Updates require the provision of deprivation of the status of a member state that violates the goals and principles of the United Nations, in particular the principle of maintaining international peace and security (even in the post- war period). It is important to focus on means of preventing violations of the principle of maintaining international peace and security, as no single most effective jurisdictional mechanism will be able to restore lost lives. Particular attention should be paid to a holistic vision of the principle of maintaining international peace and security, rather than fragmentary (only within the territory of member states of the international organization), because today humanity is a single entity and losses in any part of it can lead to global problems in general. Therefore, the lack of reaction to war, which brings irreparable damage to humanity, is senseless and immoral. Key words: international law, international organization, principle of maintaining international peace and security

Extended abstract: Introduction: The process of decentralization of public power, transformation of territorial governance is connected with solving a complex of problems, in particular,its legislative and parliamentary support. The study of the parliamentary dimension of this process is relevant in view of the continuation of the reform of territorial governance in the modern conditions of military aggression, legislative support and ensuring the activities of executive power bodies, local governance. The aim of the article: The purpose and objectives of the study are the scientific analysis of modern organizational and legal forms of parliamentary and institutional support for the decentralization of public power, the reform of territorial governance in the conditions of martial law, and the prospects for the post-war restoration of local governance in Ukraine. Results: The parliamentary dimension of ensuring decentralization is manifested, first of all, in the law-making work of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The Verkhovna Rada adopted statutory and special legislative acts on decentralization, transformation, and reform of territorial governance. Statutory acts lay down the legal foundations of decentralization through the determination of the foundations of state regional policy, cooperation, and unification of territorial communities. In special ones, the structural aspects of decentralization in various spheres of its manifestation, the procedure for solving specific issues, for example, regarding the administrative-territorial system, are defined. The parliamentary dimension of decentralization and re-centralization, territorial governance is clearly expressed in relation to its legislative activities aimed at protecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine, and resistance to military aggression. In terms of the re-centralization of territorial governance, the parliamentary measure of regulation of the exercise of powers by state authorities and local self-government bodies in conditions of martial law, the powers of military administrations,which, by analogy with military-civilian administrations, exercise their own and granted by law («delegated») powers of bodies is indicative Local Government. Within the framework of this study, organizational and legal forms of parliamentary support for the development of territorial governance are of doctrinal interest. Based on the constitutional and legal status of the Parliament of Ukraine, its functional purpose and powers, the organizational and legal forms of ensuring the development of territorial governance can be attributed to: law-making, control,scientific and expert, advisory. The institutionally specified forms are manifested during sessional plenary meetings, in the activities of parliamentary committees, political factions, deputy groups, the Accounting Chamber, the Research Service of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and specialized structural subdivisions of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. The leading form of parliamentary support for the development of territorial governance is the legislative activity of theVerkhovna Rada. An important form of parliamentary support for the development of territorial governance is the implementation of the control powers of the Verkhovna Rada, primarily in the budgetary sphere, which is also manifested in law-making and in the activities of the relevant parliamentary structures. Scientific and advisory workin the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada is carried out by the Scientific and Advisory Council. Scientific-expert, advisory activities regarding parliamentary support, including the development of territorial governance, are also carried out by the Chief scientific-expert and legal departments of the Apparatus of the Verkhovna Rada. It is expedient to decide on the further ways of completing the renewal of the constitutional regulation of the entire governance system and, in particular, of territorial governance in the post-war period in view of the declarations on the fundamental transformation and restoration of Ukraine. Such an update should concern not only the decentralization of public power, but comprehensively cover the main constitutional institutions. Сonclusions: Practice has shown that the process of voluntary unification of territorial communities has shifted from «voluntary» to «legislative», and in the course of the reform of the territorial system – administrative influence to accelerate transformation. The very phenomenon of «re-centralization» deserves a separate study, includingin the parliamentary dimension of legislative consolidation of its legal status,determination of place and role in the system of governance, existence in space andtime, mutual relations in it of subjects of public authority, civil society , citizens,safeguards regarding its unlimited extension. It is appropriate to pay attention to the possibility of establishing additional legislative safeguards for re-centralization regarding the exercise of powers by bodies and officials of local self-government by bodies and officials of military and military civilian administrations. In particular, this concerns the terms of the beginning and end of the powers of the respective military and military-civilian administrations. It is desirable to determine the specified terms in the relevant provisions of the Law «On Local Self-Government in Ukraine» regarding its guarantees, in the fourth section ofthe Law. One of the directions for further improvement of the use of legislative, scientific expert, advisory forms of ensuring the development of territorial governance can be awider use of the potential of scientific institutions in interaction with the parliament. When transitioning from a military to a post-war state of governance, territorial organization of power, territorial governance when using organizational and legalforms of parliamentary support for the development of territorial governance, it is advisable to balance the modern rails of a combination of centralization and decentralization, gradually turn back and move to the path of broad decentralization of public power. Key words: Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, parliament, decentralization of publicpower, territorial governance, post-war restoration of local governance.

Abstract Women in post-conflict, low-income, post-conflict (LI-PC) countries are at risk of exposure to the traumatic events (TEs) of war and intimate partner violence (IPV), forms of stress that are known to lead to depression and other adverse mental health outcomes. We aimed to assess an index of exposure to these two forms of trauma to identify pregnant women attending antenatal clinics in conflict-affected Timor-Leste at high risk of depression and other forms of stress. A large, cross-sectional study of women in the second trimester of pregnancy was conducted in the four main government antenatal clinics in Dili district of Timor-Leste, between May 2014, and January 2015. The sample consisted of 1672 consecutive women, 3 to 6 months pregnant, with a response rate of 96%. We applied the Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale, the Kessler-10 psychological distress scale and the Harvard Trauma Questionnaire. IPV was assessed by the World Health Organisation measure. Composite categories of conflict-related TEs and severity of IPV showed a dose–response relationship with depressive symptoms: for exposure to four or more conflict-related TEs and severe psychological IPV, the adjusted odds ratio (AOR) was 3.95 (95% confidence interval (CI) 2.10–7.40); for four or more TEs and physical abuse, AOR 8.16 (95% CI 3.53–18.85); and for four or more TEs and severe psychological and physical abuse, AOR 9.78 (95% CI 5.31–18.02). For any mental distress, the AOR for four or more TEs and severe psychological abuse was 3.60 (95% CI 2.08–6.23); for four or more TEs and physical abuse 7.03 (95% CI 3.23–15.29); and for four or more TEs and severe psychological and physical abuse the AOR was 10.45 (95% CI 6.06–18.01). Of 184 women (11% of the sample) who reported ⩾4 TEs and either physical abuse alone or in combination with severe psychological abuse, 78 (42%) reached threshold for depressive symptoms and 93 (51%) for any mental distress, a 10-fold increase in depressive and other mental health symptoms. Priority should be directed to providing urgent mental health and social interventions for this group of women. Our findings offer a framework for a tiered approach to detection, guiding prevention and intervention strategies for IPV and associated mental health problems in low-income post-conflict countries.

People and families have been stricken by poverty from the dawn of time. As a result of the tragic events of World Wars I and II, the 20th century became the arena for the development of humanitarian law fundamentals. The most important international organizations, such as the United Nations, the International Labor Organization, and the Council of Europe, started operating in the post-war period. The first declarations and conventions referred to the issue of social protection on the ideological and axiological level and emphasized only a need to provide poor families and their members with social security. Over time, the normative dimension became specialized, both concerning the content and details of the proclaimed regulations. The article, which discusses the issue of social protection of the family from the perspective of basic international and EU laws, has a character of a review. The analysis of the selected legal acts is centered both on the territorial aspect, focusing on the universal, regional (European) and EU trends, and the temporal one – presenting the evolution of social protection programs over almost one hundred years. The study deals also with a question about the normative cohesion of the universal, regional (European) and EU systems, as well as their interrelations, that is to say: competition or mutual reception. The conclusions from the research give a positive answer and emphasize the development and specialization of social institutions, both on the universal and regional levels. Furthermore, the conclusions indicate that, during evolution, social proposals have moved from the ideological level towards detailed pragmatism, harmonizing the three legal protection systems. The dogmatic-legal method and theoretical-legal method have been applied to verify the problems and hypotheses formulated, owing to which it has been possible to carry out normative analyses and corroborate them with the doctrine of human rights and social law.

Despite the considerable influence he exerted on post-war church architecture in Poland, the designer Władysław Pieńkowski (1907–1991) is today an altogether forgotten figure. The current paper outlines his biography and his early oeuvre; this is because his experience in designing office blocks and industrial plants gained while working under the supervision of the most outstanding Polish architects of the mid-20th century, was to be of key importance to his later, independent designs for ecclesiastical buildings. The paper focuses on a particularly important work, one which in many ways constitutes a breakthrough in the architect’s career, namely the church of St. Michael the Archangel in the Mokotów district of Warsaw. This was the first entirely new church to be erected in the capital of Poland after the year 1945. Its construction depended on the dynamic changes in the balance of political forces. The church could be built owing to the support of the PAX Association circle, including the direct involvement of Bolesław Piasecki. In spite of their patronage, however, construction works were repeatedly halted and extended over several years, and the architectural design had to be reworked. The paper contains an analysis of three fundamental designs for the church, now held in the St. Michael the Archangel parish archive and in the architect’s records preserved by his heirs. The first design dates from the period of 1948/9–1951, the subsequent one from the year 1954, and the final one from 1956–1961. The evolution of the design moved from the initial continuation of forms typical of the pre-war Modernised Revivalism, through a peculiar reference to Socialist Realism, to rigorous Modernism. The church of St. Michael the Archangel became Pieńkowski’s testing ground; there, he tried out several solutions which he would consistently utilise in the subsequent years of his career, e.g. the large-scale application of prefabricated elements in both the construction and the decoration of the edifice. The construction of this church was concurrent with important events of a political (the Thaw) and religious nature (the Second Vatican Council). Tracing the history of the design for the Warsaw church and clarifying its connections with contemporaneous church architecture in Poland and in Western Europe made it possible to present the key problems faced by the Polish designers of ecclesiastical architecture in the first decades of the People’s Republic of Poland.

The article reveals the professional biography of Academician Alexander Dynkin, a prominent researcher of contemporary world economy and international relations, the seventh director of IMEMO. He has become the first representative of the post-war generation at the head of the Institute. His civic position is characterized by patriotism with adherence to democratic principles and liberal values. The son of a famous Soviet aircraft engine designer, A. Dynkin planned to continue his father’s career. After completing his studies at the prestigious Moscow Aviation Institute, Dynkin was included in the group of engineers engaged in the development of a project for manned flights to the Moon. When this project was unexpectedly closed at the beginning of 1972, Alexander Dynkin decided to change his profession. He passed the competition for the postgraduate study at IMEMO, where he prepared and in 1976 defended his first dissertation on the topic: “Economic Factors in the Creation and Operation of Civil Aviation Equipment in the United States”. Since that time, his life has become forever linked with IMEMO, where he has grown an outstanding researcher in the economic aspect of modern scientific and technological progress. In 1989, A. Dynkin successfully defended his doctoral dissertation on the topic: “A New Stage of the Scientific and Technological Revolution in the Capitalist Economy: Economic Content and Implementation Mechanism” at the Academic Council of IMEMO. The problematics, which Alexander Dynkin dealt with, were of particular relevance for the Soviet planned economy which was experiencing deep stagnation. Dynkin and his colleagues tried to find out means of overcoming this stagnation by accelerating scientific and technological progress; they looked for opportunities to adapt the Western experience in this area to Soviet economic realities. In the post-Soviet period, high professional qualities of Alexander Dynkin found a worthy application in economic practice. In 1998, he was invited as an economic advisor to Evgeny Primakov, the Prime Minister of Russia. Having returned to IMEMO a year later, Dynkin continued his scientific research and became an internationally recognized authority in world economy issues. Alexander Dynkin as a researcher has always combined fundamental and applied problems. The development of theoretical and practical aspects of the competitiveness of Russian economy, its integration into the world economy have been an important part of his activities. A. Dynkin proved himself to be not only a prominent researcher, but also an experienced organizer of the research process. Since 1989, he was Deputy Director of IMEMO, and in 2006 he was appointed as a Director of the Institute, which he successfully headed for ten years. Afterwards he became the President of IMEMO. Under his leadership, the Institute has confirmed its status as one of the world’s leading think tanks in the field of contemporary world economy and international relations studies.

The establishment of the International Trade Organisation was aimed at completing the process of institutionalisation of the international economic relations. The process began at Bretton Woods in 1944 with the establishment of The International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This integration entity was planned to become a foundation of the post-war order, and was going to have a broader influence and importance than the economic one. A third pillar of the International Trade Organization has never been established, but that is why the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into life. It is one of those agreements, whose nearly fifty-year duration had surpassed even the duration of some states. By carrying out trade negotiations, GATT adopted to new needs. However, the moment its integrity got questioned and such a special idea began to die out, the way was found to preserve the GATT achievements and to have the innovative approach join them. This was done with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation, as an international organisation that manages multilateral agreements in the area of trade (GATT), the trade of services (GATS) and the trade aspects of the intellectual property rights. The institution is of multinational and supranational character. It has its own structure that includes the Ministerial Conferences, the General Council and the Secretariat. The WTO continues a long tradition in GATT of seeking to make decisions not by voting but by consensus, although there are also "circles of decision making" that are gradually narrowing down with the degree of the achieved economic power. The WTO is today a primary concept whose main task is to work on bringing into practice the long-standing idea of free trade. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to abide by the basic principles which the WTO has four of. They are: non-discrimination, reciprocity, market approach and fair competition. If one draws a parallel between a product?s life cycle and GATT?s life, one can understand why GATT itself had reached its peak, but was also gradually surpassed. This is why the establishment of the World Trade Organization was a new opportunity to attain all that that GATT had not managed to attain, and to set new goals for the new century. With the establishment of the WTO, GATT was transformed into an organization, and its scopes were considerably broadened. According to the author, there are several challenges before the WTO. Primarily, the process of solving problems on a multilateral level should be continued. Also facing the still powerful forces fighting for the preservation of protectionism, more pronounced in industrial countries although present in developing ones, should be continued. Even if liberalized non-discriminatory trade and investment policy are achieved, the WTO will maintain its importance as a forum for talks on new areas and issues. Perhaps the biggest challenge in the WTO?s future is to work on further integration of developing countries into the world economic trends. The process of decision making itself is perhaps the best opportunity to show to the developing countries that something has changed, the author concludes.

This updated issue of the professional publication Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces is dedicated to the question of the Slovenian commitment to finding peaceful solutions to conflicts. As Commander­in­Chief of the Defence Forces of the Republic of Slovenia, I find this subject not only necessary but also entirely essential. There are many reasons for this. The historical experience of the Slovenian people has not always been pleasant regarding the preservation of national identity, manifested in the language as well as in the cultural and national tradition. Despite different repressive and denationalising measures taken by many foreign authorities, our ancestors managed to preserve the Slovenian nation through much wisdom, deep national awareness and political skill. The importance of consistent compliance with the provisions of international law in crisis situations, including wars, was seen in 1991. Slovenia won the war, not only in a military sense but also by complying with all legal norms, thus soon becoming recognised as a young European democratic country founded on high legal and moral principles. The lessons of war in 1991 increased the resolve of the Slovenian people for clear rejection of the use of force in finding solutions to any kind of conflict. For this reason, my pleasure at being invited to write about the topic of Slovenian people in the service of peace is that much greater, in part also due to the fact that I spent a large part of my professional life, from 1992 to 2005, working in the United Nations, first as the ambassador of the Republic of Slovenia, later as UN Assistant Secretary­General. In both functions I dealt with peacekeeping operations to a considerable extent. United Nations peacekeeping operations were in full swing at that time and underwent great development on the one hand, but also bitter disappointment and moments of deep doubt on the other. However, they continued to develop to the current extent. The topic of the Bulletin is presented in truly deep, scientific, theoretical and practical ways, from strategic and tactical levels, considering the evolutionary and transformational characteristics of peacekeeping operations, and deriving from historical experience. The most respected authors in the Slovenian professional field have thrown light upon important conceptual changes in the area of peacekeeping operations, which result from numerous factors, in particular from important geopolitical changes in the world. We must not disregard the increasing cooperation of regional organisations in the implementation of peacekeeping operations, which has indirectly brought about a different understanding of the term “peacekeeping operation” and opened technical discussions in the area of terminology as well as in the technical fulfilment of obligations, all the way to the question of the necessity of a preliminary UN mandate. These deficiencies can also be seen in Slovenia and point to the need for conducting a deep technical discussion as soon as possible and unifying the understanding of both the structure of the Slovenian Armed Forces and the broader defence and security system. The introductory and in particular the more theoretical parts of the Bulletin may be taken as important contributions in this regard. Some of the articles offer interesting historical insight into the cooperation of Slovenian men, and later women, in various endeavours for peace launched by individual great powers and international organisations. Although it is difficult to understand the military intervention of European forces on the island Crete in 1897 as a peacekeeping operation, the objective which is still in the forefront of contemporary efforts of the international community in this area was achieved for at least some time. This intervention ensured an armistice between the parties involved in the conflict and enabled a diplomatic solution on the island without unnecessary victims. The confidence that the highest political and military authorities in the Austro­Hungarian Empire had in the 2nd Battalion of the 87th Infantry Regiment from Celje was truly special. This was particularly the case because the military unit was mainly composed of Slovenes, and at the time of deployment in Crete its commander was a Slovene as well. However, we need to emphasise that such thinking is unconventional. By studying the literature on peacekeeping operations we see that such operations were first mentioned around 1919 in connection with peace conferences after the end of World War I and with managing various border issues in Europe, different plebiscites and other situations which, besides political and other diplomatic action, also required the protection of security and were followed by military operations intended for this particular purpose. History tells us much about peacekeeping operations intended to maintain truces. In these operations, coalition forces were deployed to an area in which a truce already existed and had to be maintained among well organised and disciplined armed forces. Today, the status of armed forces is quite different. We have to look at all of history and every aspect of international military engagement which is not armed combat by nature but a military presence with various aspects of employment of military force and the constant readiness and capability of peace forces to defend themselves effectively and be prepared to use weapons to fulfil their mandate. If today we see peacekeeping operations as valid in this respect, it is clear that we have to be familiar with history and evaluate what we can learn from past experience and how we are obliged to consider the present. Of course, we must consider the present. If we look at the status of peacekeeping operations today, we see how important this military activity is for the modern world. I will only dwell upon the United Nations, which from the standpoint of peacekeeping operations is the most important organisation operating today. Approximately 140,000 soldiers participate in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations. No other military force has that number of uniformed personnel operating abroad. These people are assigned to eighteen currently active peacekeeping operations, each costing the organisation about seven billion dollars. This is the largest component of the budget of the United Nations. However, this expenditure is small in comparison to other kinds of military deployment outside the UN, to operations which are not peacekeeping operations by nature. Peacekeeping operations have become very multidimensional. The latest such operations, established in Africa (Darfur, Chad, Central African Republic), have been among the most demanding from the very beginning. We can thus conclude that peacekeeping operations are becoming increasingly more complex, which also results in a higher degree of risk. In 2007, 67 members of UN peacekeeping operations lost their lives. Looking at individual operations we see that six people died in Lebanon alone that year. Ever since peacekeeping operations have been in existence, Lebanon has been one of the most dangerous areas. Today, however, it is somewhat outside the sphere of interest. This may be due to the fact that there is a peacekeeping operation active in the area, on account of which a state of relative peace can be better maintained. Peacekeeping operations are both dangerous and multidimensional, multidimensional because they are no longer focused merely on keeping belligerent parties apart. Modern peacekeeping operations include both standard and supplemental functions. Providing a secure environment for political normalisation, humanitarian activity and development is a comprehensive task, requiring the engagement of peacekeeping forces in operations that are far from being common types of military deployment. This raises different questions about the training and competence of peacekeeping forces. We also have to ask ourselves how we can fully consider the lessons learned from previous peacekeeping operations and organise a system of command, particularly in organisations such as the United Nations, while at the same time making sure that national contingents do not lose their identity. There are thus two lines of communication, one through channels established by international organisations and the other through those established by national systems of armed forces. How to balance this and achieve efficient functioning? How to ensure the operation of different cultures, members and levels of competence in a way that facilitates the success of peacekeeping operations? These are always important questions to consider. In recent years the question of interest has pointed to the complexity of modern peacekeeping operations. Peacekeeping operations are frequently required to facilitate an environment in which elections can be conducted and assist in the establishment of a legal order and institutions to maintain that order. Both tasks are extremely demanding. The establishment of a safe environment for conducting elections in a country with poor communications, with no tradition of elections and with violence linked to every political event, is an extremely difficult task. The establishment of a legal order in areas with no such tradition or adequate infrastructure is even harder. There is often a need to include the civilian police, whose tasks in peacekeeping operations are very demanding. Civilian police have a number of other particularities besides problems connected to the aforementioned multidimensionality. It is necessary to adapt to the local environment in order to facilitate effective police performance. How to facilitate this in an environment such as Haiti, for example, with its difficult past? How to facilitate this in linguistically demanding environments such as East Timor until recently and in other difficult circumstances? These are all extremely demanding tasks. However, there is not much understanding with regard to all the details and problems arising from their implementation. The international political community is often satisfied merely by defining the mandate of a peacekeeping operation. For many people this signifies the solution to the problem, considering that the mandate is defined and that the deployment of forces will occur. However, this is where real problem solving only begins. Only then does it become obvious what little meaning general resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and other acts by which mandates are defined have in the context of actual situations. Therefore, I am of the opinion that we have to take a detailed look at experience from the distant past as well as the present. When speaking of the civilian police we also have to consider the fully human aspects that characterise every peacekeeping operation. Once I spoke to a very experienced leader of civilian police operations about the need to send additional police officers to the mission in Kosovo in the spring, when winter is over and people become more active, which also results in a higher crime rate. He explained that this is not only a problem in the area of this mission but elsewhere in Europe. In spring, the crime rate rises everywhere. Therefore it is difficult to find police officers during this time who are willing to leave their homeland, where they are most needed, and go to a mission area which is just then facing increased needs. I mention this to broaden understanding of the fact that the deployment of peacekeeping forces, both military and civilian police, is not only a matter of mandates and military organisation, but sometimes of the purely elementary questions that accompany social development. I have already mentioned that memory of the past is a very important component of considering present peacekeeping operations. I would like to conclude with another thought. I believe the manner of organising the knowledge of peacekeeping operations is of great importance to all countries, especially those that are new to cooperating in peacekeeping operations. This knowledge cannot be gained from books written at universities, but only from monitoring and carefully analysing the previous experiences of others. It is very important that this knowledge be carefully organised, that these experiences be carefully gathered and analysed, and that a doctrine be developed gradually. This doctrine is required for a country like Slovenia, which is new at conducting peacekeeping operations, to be able to manage well and define its role in international peacekeeping operations properly. To achieve this objective, a new country must cooperate with those countries which have been conducting peacekeeping operations for a long time and therefore have a richer experience. The neighbouring Austria is known to have one of the longest and most interesting systems of experience in peacekeeping operations within the United Nations. Ever since it joined the UN, Austria has been active in numerous activities linked to peacekeeping operations. Its soldiers and the civilian police have participated in a number of peacekeeping operations. Experience gained in this way is of great value, and using this experience is necessary for successful planning of and operating in future peacekeeping operations. The future will be complicated! At one time, when the members of peacekeeping operations numbered approximately 80,000, the United Nations thought that nothing more could be done, and a larger number of members was unthinkable. Today the number of members is significantly larger, development will most likely still continue and conditions will become even more demanding. I do not wish to forecast events which have not yet taken place. However, I would like to strongly emphasise that the history of peacekeeping operations is not over yet and that the future will be full of risks and challenges. I would also again like to stress the importance of this issue of the Bulletin of the Slovenian Armed Forces, which is entering a new decade, and express my pleasure at being able to note down a few thoughts. Let me particularly emphasise that as Commander­in­Chief of the Slovenian Defence Forces I will continue to devote special attention to achievements in the area of cooperation in peacekeeping operations in the future, having a special interest in these experiences. I thank the authors of the articles of this important issue of the Bulletin for their scientific and professional contributions – and I greatly respect those who have already done important work in the name of the Republic of Slovenia with the Slovenian flag on their shoulders, with the hope that they continue to fulfil their obligations in accordance with the rules.

-Charles V. Carnegie, W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the age of sail. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997. xiv + 310 pp.-Stanley L. Engerman, Wim Klooster, Illicit Riches: Dutch trade in the Caribbean, 1648-1795. Leiden: KITLV Press, 1998. xiv + 283 pp.-Luis Martínez-Fernández, Emma Aurora Dávila Cox, Este inmenso comercio: Las relaciones mercantiles entre Puerto Rico y Gran Bretaña 1844-1898. San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1996. xxi + 364 pp.-Félix V. Matos Rodríguez, Arturo Morales Carrión, Puerto Rico y la lucha por la hegomonía en el Caribe: Colonialismo y contrabando, siglos XVI-XVIII. San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico y Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, 1995. ix + 244 pp.-Herbert S. Klein, Patrick Manning, Slave trades, 1500-1800: Globalization of forced labour. Hampshire, U.K.: Variorum, 1996. xxxiv + 361 pp.-Jay R. Mandle, Kari Levitt ,The critical tradition of Caribbean political economy: The legacy of George Beckford. Kingston: Ian Randle, 1996. xxvi + 288., Michael Witter (eds)-Kevin Birth, Belal Ahmed ,The political economy of food and agriculture in the Caribbean. Kingston: Ian Randle; London: James Currey, 1996. xxi + 276 pp., Sultana Afroz (eds)-Sarah J. Mahler, Alejandro Portes ,The urban Caribbean: Transition to the new global economy. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997. xvii + 260 pp., Carlos Dore-Cabral, Patricia Landolt (eds)-O. Nigel Bolland, Ray Kiely, The politics of labour and development in Trinidad. Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago: The Press University of the West Indies, 1996. iii + 218 pp.-Lynn M. Morgan, Aviva Chomsky, West Indian workers and the United Fruit Company in Costa Rica, 1870-1940. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996. xiii + 302 pp.-Eileen J. Findlay, Maria del Carmen Baerga, Genero y trabajo: La industria de la aguja en Puerto Rico y el Caribe hispánico. San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1993. xxvi + 321 pp.-Andrés Serbin, Jorge Rodríguez Beruff ,Security problems and policies in the post-cold war Caribbean. London: :Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's, 1996. 249 pp., Humberto García Muñiz (eds)-Alex Dupuy, Irwin P. Stotzky, Silencing the guns in Haiti: The promise of deliberative democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. xvi + 294 pp.-Carrol F. Coates, Myriam J.A. Chancy, Framing silence: Revolutionary novels by Haitian women. New Brunswick NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997. ix + 200 pp.-Havidán Rodríguez, Walter Díaz, Francisco L. Rivera-Batiz ,Island paradox: Puerto Rico in the 1990's. New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1996. xi + 198 pp., Carlos E. Santiago (eds)-Ramona Hernández, Alan Cambeira, Quisqueya la Bella: The Dominican Republic in historical and cultural perspective. Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996. xi + 272 pp.-Ramona Hernández, Emilio Betances ,The Dominican Republic today: Realities and perspectives. New York: Bildner Center for Western Hemisphere studies, CUNY, 1996. 205 pp., Hobart A. Spalding, Jr. (eds)-Bonham C. Richardson, Eberhard Bolay, The Dominican Republic: A country between rain forest and desert. Wekersheim, FRG: Margraf Verlag, 1997. 456 pp.-Virginia R. Dominguez, Patricia R. Pessar, A visa for a dream: Dominicans in the United States. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1995. xvi + 98 pp.-Diane Austin-Broos, Nicole Rodriguez Toulis, Believing identity: Pentecostalism and the mediation of Jamaican ethnicity and gender in England. Oxford NY: Berg, 1997. xv + 304 p.-Mary Chamberlain, Trevor A. Carmichael, Barbados: Thirty years of independence. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 1996. xxxv + 294 pp.-Paul van Gelder, Gert Oostindie, Het paradijs overzee: De 'Nederlandse' Caraïben en Nederland. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1997. 385 pp.-Roger D. Abrahams, Richard D.E. Burton, Afro-Creole: Power, Opposition, and Play in the Caribbean. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1997. x + 297 pp.-Roger D. Abrahams, Joseph Roach, Cities of the dead: Circum-Atlantic performance. New York NY: Columbia University Press, 1996. xiii + 328 pp.-George Mentore, Peter A. Roberts, From oral to literate culture: Colonial experience in the English West Indies. Kingston, Jamaica: The Press University of the West Indies, 1997. xii + 301 pp.-Emily A. Vogt, Howard Johnson ,The white minority in the Caribbean. Princeton NJ: Markus Wiener, 1998. xvi + 179 pp., Karl Watson (eds)-Virginia Heyer Young, Sheryl L. Lutjens, The state, bureaucracy, and the Cuban schools: Power and participation. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996. xiii + 239 pp.

The life path, scientific-pedagogical and public activity of Volodymyr Sokurenko – a prominent Ukrainian jurist, doctor of law, professor, talented teacher of the Lviv Law School of Franko University are analyzed. It is found out that after graduating from a seven-year school in Zaporizhia, V. Sokurenko entered the Zaporizhia Aviation Technical School, where he studied two courses until 1937. 1/10/1937 he was enrolled as a cadet of the 2nd school of aircraft technicians named after All-Union Lenin Komsomol. In 1938, this school was renamed the Volga Military Aviation School, which he graduated on September 4, 1939 with the military rank of military technician of the 2nd category. As a junior aircraft technician, V. Sokurenko was sent to the military unit no. 8690 in Baku, and later to Maradnyany for further military service in the USSR Air Force. From September 4, 1939 to March 16, 1940, he was a junior aircraft technician of the 50th Fighter Regiment, 60th Air Brigade of the ZAK VO in Baku. The certificate issued by the Railway District Commissariat of Lviv on January 4, 1954 no. 3132 states that V. Sokurenko actually served in the staff of the Soviet Army from October 1937 to May 1946. The same certificate states that from 10/12/1941 to 20/09/1942 and from 12/07/1943 to 08/03/1945, he took part in the Soviet-German war, in particular in the second fighter aviation corps of the Reserve of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Army. In 1943 he joined the CPSU. He was awarded the Order of the Patriotic War of the 1st degree and the Order of the Red Star (1943) as well as 9 medals «For Merit in Battle» during the Soviet-German war. With the start of the Soviet-German war, the Sokurenko family, like many other families, was evacuated to the town of Kamensk-Uralsky in the Sverdlovsk region, where their father worked at a metallurgical plant. After the war, the Sokurenko family moved to Lviv. In 1946, V. Sokurenko entered the Faculty of Law of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University, graduating with honors in 1950, and entered the graduate school of the Lviv State University at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law. V. Sokurenko successfully passed the candidate examinations and on December 25, 1953 in Moscow at the Institute of Law of the USSR he defended his thesis on the topic: «Socialist legal consciousness and its relationship with Soviet law». The supervisor of V. Sokurenko's candidate's thesis was N. Karieva. The Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Culture of the USSR, by its decision of March 31, 1954, awarded V. Sokurenko the degree of Candidate of Law. In addition, it is necessary to explain the place of defense of the candidate's thesis by V. Sokurenko. As it is known, the Institute of State and Law of the USSR has its history since 1925, when, in accordance with the resolution of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of March 25, 1925, the Institute of Soviet Construction was established at the Communist Academy. In 1936, the Institute became part of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and in 1938 it was reorganized into the Institute of Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In 1941–1943 it was evacuated to Tashkent. In 1960-1991 it was called the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In Ukraine, there is the Institute of State and Law named after V. Koretsky of the NAS of Ukraine – a leading research institution in Ukraine of legal profile, founded in 1949. It is noted that, as a graduate student, V. Sokurenko read a course on the history of political doctrines, conducted special seminars on the theory of state and law. After graduating from graduate school and defending his thesis, from October 1, 1953 he was enrolled as a senior lecturer and then associate professor at the Department of Theory and History of State and Law at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv State University named after Ivan Franko. By the decision of the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ministry of Higher Education of the USSR of December 18, 1957, V. Sokurenko was awarded the academic title of associate professor of the «Department of Theory and History of State and Law». V. Sokurenko took an active part in public life. During 1947-1951 he was a member of the party bureau of the party organization of LSU, worked as a chairman of the trade union committee of the university, from 1955 to 1957 he was a secretary of the party committee of the university. He delivered lectures for the population of Lviv region. Particularly, he lectured in Turka, Chervonohrad, and Yavoriv. He made reports to the party leaders, Soviet workers as well as business leaders. He led a philosophical seminar at the Faculty of Law. He was a deputy of the Lviv City Council of People's Deputies in 1955-1957 and 1975-1978. In December 1967, he defended his doctoral thesis on the topic: «Development of progressive political thought in Ukraine (until the early twentieth century)». The defense of the doctoral thesis was approved by the Higher Attestation Commission on June 14, 1968. During 1960-1990 he headed the Department of Theory and History of State and Law; in 1962-68 and 1972-77 he was the dean of the Law Faculty of the Ivan Franko Lviv State University. In connection with the criticism of the published literature, on September 10, 1977, V. Sokurenko wrote a statement requesting his dismissal from the post of Dean of the Faculty of Law due to deteriorating health. During 1955-1965 he was on research trips to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria, and Bulgaria. From August 1966 to March 1967, in particular, he spent seven months in the United States, England and Canada as a UN Fellow in the Department of Human Rights. From April to May 1968, he was a member of the government delegation to the International Conference on Human Rights in Iran for one month. He spoke, in addition to Ukrainian, English, Polish and Russian. V. Sokurenko played an important role in initiating the study of an important discipline at the Faculty of Law of the Lviv University – History of Political and Legal Studies, which has been studying the history of the emergence and development of theoretical knowledge about politics, state, law, ie the process of cognition by people of the phenomena of politics, state and law at different stages of history in different nations, from early statehood and modernity. Professor V. Sokurenko actively researched the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of Ukrainian legal and political thought. He was one of the first legal scholars in the USSR to begin research on the basics of legal deontology. V. Sokurenko conducted extensive research on the development of basic requirements for the professional and legal responsibilities of a lawyer, similar to the requirements for a doctor. In further research, the scholar analyzed the legal responsibilities, prospects for the development of the basics of professional deontology. In addition, he considered medical deontology from the standpoint of a lawyer, law and morality, focusing on internal (spiritual) processes, calling them «the spirit of law.» The main direction of V. Sokurenko's research was the problems of the theory of state and law, the history of legal and political studies. The main scientific works of professor V. Sokurenko include: «The main directions in the development of progressive state and legal thought in Ukraine: 16th – 19th centuries» (1958) (Russian), «Democratic doctrines about the state and law in Ukraine in the second half of the 19th century (M. Drahomanov, S. Podolynskyi, A. Terletskyi)» (1966), «Law. Freedom. Equality» (1981, co-authored) (in Russian), «State and legal views of Ivan Franko» (1966), «Socio-political views of Taras Shevchenko (to the 170th anniversary of his birth)» (1984); «Political and legal views of Ivan Franko (to the 130th anniversary of his birth)» (1986) (in Russian) and others. V. Sokurenko died on November 22, 1994 and was buried in Holoskivskyi Cemetery in Lviv. Volodymyr Sokurenko left a bright memory in the hearts of a wide range of scholars, colleagues and grateful students. The 100th anniversary of the Scholar is a splendid opportunity to once again draw attention to the rich scientific heritage of the lawyer, which is an integral part of the golden fund of Ukrainian legal science and education. It needs to be studied, taken into account and further developed.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

In her recent book published after the election of Donald Trump as the US President in 2016, Cynthia Enloe argues that the patriarchy, similar to our smart phones, has updated itself as a reaction against the achievements of the second and third wave feminisms. The updated patriarchy has this time renewed itself through the beliefs and values about the ways the world works (2017). The competing foreign policies representing the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity of the current world politics and its authoritarian leaders are the outputs of this new updated version of patriarchy. Enloe doubts that having gained sustainability with its updates, the patriarchy could be fought against simply with street demonstrations, as it was before. The patriarchy could be forced to retreat only by incessantly asking “curious” feminist questions that would expose all masculine patterns of life (2017). Continuously asking questions without giving up or giving in would make the patriarchy transparent and vulnerable. In the face of curious, non-stop questions from a gender perspective and the conscious use of the terms supporting gender equality, the patriarchy, albeit updated and sustained, does not stand a chance. Enloe explains the reason why incorporating gender in International Relations has been considered irrelevant by the power- and security dominated character of the discipline. Also, because the heavy majority of the academics associated with International Relations are male, it is them who choose what is important and worthy of ‘serious’ investigation (Enloe, 2004, 96). This masculine attitude, however, has been clearly excluding multiple human experiences and hindering their capacity to create new possibilities for peaceful co-existence in international relations (Youngs, 2004). As a matter of fact, when we look at the emergence of International Relations as a separate discipline, and the political theories that it takes as its first point of reference, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen) – the human rights document at the time of the French Revolution – Machiavelli’s The Prince; and Man, the State and War, written in 1959 by Kenneth Waltz, the founder of neo-realism, were the mainstream writings that brought liberal (libertarian) and realist perspectives to the discipline of International Relations, respectively. The fundamental aim of these texts was, in fact, to make an analysis based on history and ‘his’ problems. Although these texts put forward a desire for rights and freedoms, as well as the achievement of peace, these values are mostly targeted towards men. Thus, over time, the prominent concepts of International Relations, such as security and hegemony, were defined from a masculine and patriarchal perspective. For instance, from the theoretical view of realists, hegemony is attributed to the order established and led by the most powerful state of the international system– both militarily and economically– while sovereignty evokes the Hobbesian Leviathan (the Devil), with its masculine nature and might. Raewyn Connell responds to these masculine conceptualizations by pointing out that hegemony includes organized social domination in all spheres of life, from religious doctrines to mundane practice, from mass media to taxation (1998: 246). As Connell reminds us, “hegemonic masculinity” expresses the domination of men over women intellectually, culturally, socially, or even politically, thus establishing an unequivocal linkage between gender and power (Connell, 1998). Just as the Western approach to reading and identifying the East and its fiction found an answer in Edward Said’s critique of Orientalism, the theory of political realism put forth by Hans Morgenthau was criticized by Ann Tickner for conceptualizing international politics through the lens of an assumed masculine subject (Tür & Koyuncu, 2010: 9). Critical theory and postmodernism, as alternative approaches in International Relations, drew attention to the otherization of different geographies, civilizations and identities. Yet, on the issue of gender equality, the otherization of women has not been sufficiently recognized; the superiority of man and patriarchy is made possible through the othering of women. From this point of view, it would be beneficial to make a holistic reading of the International Relations literature, and to dismantle these masculine concepts by asking “curious” questions of the discipline. In Terrell Carver’s words, “Gendering IR” is...a project; “gendered” IR is an outcome” (Carver, 2003: 289). In order to achieve such outcome, it bears utmost importance for the gender-equality advocates to insist on, institutionally and practically, gender-based approaches and to not agree with the priority list of the masculine agenda. Security, order, control and retaliation increasingly dominate the discourse shaping the world politics. The gender perspective in International Relations develops to create alternative paradigms that would break this vicious circle of (in)security. Feminist theory in International Relations has demonstrated significant progress since the 1990s and opened pathways in an uncharted territory. Cynthia Enloe, Ann Tickner, Spike V. Peterson and Christine Sylvester, among others, are the most prominent forerunners of this field. Through their works, feminist theory has adopted a perspective critical of the masculinity and the masculine values of international politics by taking not only ‘women’ but a wider category of gender into its centre. These feminist scholars have deconstructed International Relations theories by posing gender-related questions and displayed the masculine prejudice embedded in the definitions of security, power and sovereignty. The feminist theories of International Relations have thus distinguished themselves from the other theories of the discipline by paying a ‘curious’ attention to the power hierarchies and relation structures through inclusiveness and self-reflexivity (True, 2017: 3). As Cynthia Enloe puts it, the gender perspective in International Relations must first be guided by a feminist consciousness (2004: 97). The feminist International Relations, however, although more than a quarter of century has passed since its emergence, are still struggling with the masculine theories to be considered as an equally legitimate way of understanding how the world works. Various epistemological, ontological and ethical debates may have enriched the field (True, 2017: 1), but at the same time, too many as they are, such debates may paradoxically be accusing the spreading-thin of the gender coalition. The capacity of the feminist International Relations’ ethical principles to participate in the global politics has been limited to the United Nations Security Council’s decision number 1325 and the Swedish feminist foreign policy. The feminist attempt to facilitate substantial change and interaction by creating a normative agenda has been called ‘normative feminism’ by Jacqui True (2013: 242). Normative feminism is a project of institutionalising gender in foreign policy by focusing on socio-economic and political changes. The special issue here is our attempt to partake in this project of change in international relations. We have aimed to enhance the visibility of the gender norms of behavior and decision-making with the presupposition that they would pose an alternative to the masculine norms in International Relations by better supporting the human priorities of peace and co-existence. Adopting Judith Butler’s notion of performativity, the feminist existence in international politics has an undeniable connection to engaging in continuous activities. As Rihannan Bury suggests, “what gives a community its substance is the consistent repetition of these ‘various acts’ by a majority of members.” “Being a member of community,” therefore, “is not something one is but something one does” (2005: 14). In Turkey, too, in order to challenge the recognition of the ‘hyper’ version of the hegemonic masculinity as the only viable world view, gender-charged normative discourses, interactions and agendas must be continuously created and multiplied. We hope that the Turkish literature-review and the articles published here will serve this purpose. As is the situation in all disciplines, the feminist International Relations has nurtured many onto-epistemologies, some in competition with one another. Such multitude, though definitely a richness, has been challenging the feminist stance’s capacity to stand united against the hypermasculine hegemonic masculinity. In her latest book, Enloe calls for a continuous struggle of a new and wider feminist coalition against the updated authoritarianism of the patriarchy –inspiring our title “Don’t Give Up! Don’t Give In!.” Such expanded coalition could rise on the common purpose of fighting male dominance and ignore the differences of discourse created by the debate on identity. The gender-guided change and transformation desired in international politics could be achieved more easily in this way (Hemmings, 2012: 148, 155). On this account, in parallel with Enloe’s proposal of establishing a wider consensus simply on peace and co-existence (2017), a new era, in which questions of identity will, for some time, not be asked, may be dawning. A grand coalition of consensus has better chance of resisting the authoritarian leaders of hyper hegemonic masculinity. Our special issue of Gender and International Relations opens with a Turkish literature review with the aim of introducing the topic to Turkish readers. Çiçek Coşkun, against a historical background, presents some of the prominent feminist scholars who have left their footprints in this very masculine area with their fresh gender perspectives. In doing that she offers us a comparative framework in which works by the Turkish and international scholars could be assessed simultaneously. Nezahat Doğan’s article seeks to establish the relation between global peace and gender by using the data obtained from the Global Peace Index, Gender Inequality Index and Social Institutions and Gender Index. In this way, adopting a currently trendy approach, Doğan investigates the interaction between gender and International Relations through a quantitative method. Zehra Yılmaz’s article discusses the temporary position of Syrian women asylum seekers in Turkey from the perspective of the post-colonial feminist concept of subaltern. The article aims to combine feminist migration studies and post-colonial feminist literature within the context of International Relations. Sinem Bal’s article questions whether the EU has designed its gender policies as an aspect of the human-right norms of the European integration or as a way to regulate market economy. Bal pursues such questioning through the reading of the official documents of the EU that prescribes what Europeanization is for Turkey. Thus, all articles constitute a well-rounded understanding of what gendered approaches can achieve in the current practice of international studies. The co-authored article written by Bezen Balamir-Coşkun and Selin Akyüz examined how the images of women leaders in international politics were presented in the international media. The selected images the three most powerful women political leaders list of Forbes in 2017 –Angela Merkel, Theresa May and Federica Mogherini were analysed in the light of the political masculinities literature from a social visual semiotics perspective. It is believed that such an analysis will contribute to the debates about gendered aspect of international relations as well as the current debates on political masculinities. Gizem Bilgin-Aytaç points out that the global policy that emerged after the Cold War and the emergence of the new way of approaching the IR from a feminist perspective have improved the scope of conceptual analysis in peace theories as well. Bilgin-Aytaç discusses global peace conditions with a gender perspective - in particular, referring to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, with a focus on exemplary contemporary issues. Fulden İbrahimhakkıoğlu, in her article, discusses the debate between Ukraine-based feminist group FEMEN staged several protests in support of Amina Tyler, a Tunisian FEMEN activist receiving death threats for posting nude photographs of herself online with social messages written on her body and the Muslim Women Against FEMEN who released an open letter criticizing the discourse FEMEN used in these protests, which they found to be white colonialist and Islamophobic. Thus, İbrahimhakkıoğlu aimes to examines the discursive strategies put forth by the two sides of the very debate, and unveiling the shortcomings of liberalism as drawn on by both positions, the author attempts to rethink what “freedom” might mean for international feminist alliances across differences.

At its first meeting, 23 Oct 1940, the Committee on Aviation Medicine (CAM) was tasked with making “…a survey of the present status of the medical and physiological problems pertaining to aviation…[and to] advise regarding the correlation and coordination of such research undertakings as are going forward in various government labs and flying fields, as well as in civilian labs and commercial aviation units. In addition the Committee should suggest the inauguration and development of new studies and investigative projects pertaining to the biological aspects of aviation and necessary to the national defense.” The CAM was comprised of Dr. E.F. DuBois, CAM Chairman (Cornell U) and members Drs. C.K. Drinker (Harvard U), J.F. Fulton (Yale U), W.R. Miles (Yale U) and E.M. Landis (U Va). The CAM and two USN liaison officers (Cdr. J.R. Poppen, Capt. L.E. Griffis) traveled by air from Washington D.C. to eight sites during 12 Nov – 1 Dec 1940: Langley Field; Norfolk Naval Air Base; Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and the Aircraft Carriers Wasp & Ranger; the Pensacola Naval Air Station and School of Aviation Medicine; San Diego Naval Air Base, and the Carrier Saratoga; Wright Field, Aero Medical Research Unit, Dayton; and the Banting Institute and Eglinton Labs, Toronto, Canada. The CAM's report to the National Research Council (NAS Archives: CAM Bulletin, pp. 52–96) made 20 recommendations to improve preparedness for a high‐altitude, high‐speed air war. They recognized that to date, aero medical research had lagged far behind development of aircraft. The limiting factor in flight operations was the pilot's physiology. Larger and better labs were needed at Wright Field, Randolph Field, Pensacola and Washington. Aero medical research should be expedited in civilian labs through immediate federal funding. Research projects the CAM deemed of urgent importance included: development of a suitable O2 breathing apparatus and pressurized aircraft cabins, with more studies in altitude chambers and planes at high‐altitude; mitigation strategies for relief from flyer's aeroembolism and black‐out from G‐forces during acceleration; effects of anoxemia on production of cerebral edema and increased cerebrospinal fluid pressure; effects of protracted breathing of 100% O2; psychological tests; fatigue; critical assessment of the Schneider test as a predictor of human efficiency; usefulness of the EEG in aviation medicine; studies of visual problems; problems of adequate clothing, particularly electrically‐heated clothing; and general studies of recreational and rest facilities at air stations. By 1942, the CAM had expanded into 7 subcommittees to oversee America's growing aero medical research program: Advisory Commission A (on the west coast near aircraft factories) to the CAM in Washington, Acceleration, Oxygen & Anoxia, Decompression Sickness, Visual Problems, Clothing, and Motion Sickness. Other general fields included adrenal physiology, the crash project, explosive decompression and pressure‐cabin aircraft, flying fatigue, injury to flying personnel by anti‐aircraft blasts, first aid aloft, rehabilitation program, and problem of securing information from operation squadrons.Support or Funding InformationUSF

Photograph by Gonzalo Echeverria (2010)Declaring War Soon after Al Qaeda’s terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration described its new grand strategy: the “Global War on Terror”. This underpinned the subsequent counter-insurgency in Afghanistan and the United States invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Media pundits quickly applied the Global War on Terror label to the Madrid, Bali and London bombings, to convey how Al Qaeda’s terrorism had gone transnational. Meanwhile, international relations scholars debated the extent to which September 11 had changed the international system (Brenner; Mann 303). American intellectuals adopted several variations of the Global War on Terror in what initially felt like a transitional period of US foreign policy (Burns). Walter Laqueur suggested Al Qaeda was engaged in a “cosmological” and perpetual war. Paul Berman likened Al Qaeda and militant Islam to the past ideological battles against communism and fascism (Heilbrunn 248). In a widely cited article, neoconservative thinker Norman Podhoretz suggested the United States faced “World War IV”, which had three interlocking drivers: Al Qaeda and trans-national terrorism; political Islam as the West’s existential enemy; and nuclear proliferation to ‘rogue’ countries and non-state actors (Friedman 3). Podhoretz’s tone reflected a revival of his earlier Cold War politics and critique of the New Left (Friedman 148-149; Halper and Clarke 56; Heilbrunn 210). These stances attracted widespread support. For instance, the United States Marine Corp recalibrated its mission to fight a long war against “World War IV-like” enemies. Yet these stances left the United States unprepared as the combat situations in Afghanistan and Iraq worsened (Ricks; Ferguson; Filkins). Neoconservative ideals for Iraq “regime change” to transform the Middle East failed to deal with other security problems such as Pakistan’s Musharraf regime (Dorrien 110; Halper and Clarke 210-211; Friedman 121, 223; Heilbrunn 252). The Manichean and open-ended framing became a self-fulfilling prophecy for insurgents, jihadists, and militias. The Bush Administration quietly abandoned the Global War on Terror in July 2005. Widespread support had given way to policymaker doubt. Why did so many intellectuals and strategists embrace the Global War on Terror as the best possible “grand strategy” perspective of a post-September 11 world? Why was there so little doubt of this worldview? This is a debate with roots as old as the Sceptics versus the Sophists. Explanations usually focus on the Bush Administration’s “Vulcans” war cabinet: Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfield, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, who later became Secretary of State (Mann xv-xvi). The “Vulcans” were named after the Roman god Vulcan because Rice’s hometown Birmingham, Alabama, had “a mammoth fifty-six foot statue . . . [in] homage to the city’s steel industry” (Mann x) and the name stuck. Alternatively, explanations focus on how neoconservative thinkers shaped the intellectual climate after September 11, in a receptive media climate. Biographers suggest that “neoconservatism had become an echo chamber” (Heilbrunn 242) with its own media outlets, pundits, and think-tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute and Project for a New America. Neoconservatism briefly flourished in Washington DC until Iraq’s sectarian violence discredited the “Vulcans” and neoconservative strategists like Paul Wolfowitz (Friedman; Ferguson). The neoconservatives' combination of September 11’s aftermath with strongly argued historical analogies was initially convincing. They conferred with scholars such as Bernard Lewis, Samuel P. Huntington and Victor Davis Hanson to construct classicist historical narratives and to explain cultural differences. However, the history of the decade after September 11 also contains mis-steps and mistakes which make it a series of contingent decisions (Ferguson; Bergen). One way to analyse these contingent decisions is to pose “what if?” counterfactuals, or feasible alternatives to historical events (Lebow). For instance, what if September 11 had been a chemical and biological weapons attack? (Mann 317). Appendix 1 includes a range of alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events which occurred. Collectively, these counterfactuals suggest the role of agency, chance, luck, and the juxtaposition of better and worse outcomes. They pose challenges to the classicist interpretation adopted soon after September 11 to justify “World War IV” (Podhoretz). A ‘Two-Track’ Process for ‘World War IV’ After the September 11 attacks, I think an overlapping two-track process occurred with the “Vulcans” cabinet, neoconservative advisers, and two “echo chambers”: neoconservative think-tanks and the post-September 11 media. Crucially, Bush’s “Vulcans” war cabinet succeeded in gaining civilian control of the United States war decision process. Although successful in initiating the 2003 Iraq War this civilian control created a deeper crisis in US civil-military relations (Stevenson; Morgan). The “Vulcans” relied on “politicised” intelligence such as a United Kingdom intelligence report on Iraq’s weapons development program. The report enabled “a climate of undifferentiated fear to arise” because its public version did not distinguish between chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons (Halper and Clarke, 210). The cautious 2003 National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) report on Iraq was only released in a strongly edited form. For instance, the US Department of Energy had expressed doubts about claims that Iraq had approached Niger for uranium, and was using aluminium tubes for biological and chemical weapons development. Meanwhile, the post-September 11 media had become a second “echo chamber” (Halper and Clarke 194-196) which amplified neoconservative arguments. Berman, Laqueur, Podhoretz and others who framed the intellectual climate were “risk entrepreneurs” (Mueller 41-43) that supported the “World War IV” vision. The media also engaged in aggressive “flak” campaigns (Herman and Chomsky 26-28; Mueller 39-42) designed to limit debate and to stress foreign policy stances and themes which supported the Bush Administration. When former Central Intelligence Agency director James Woolsey’s claimed that Al Qaeda had close connections to Iraqi intelligence, this was promoted in several books, including Michael Ledeen’s War Against The Terror Masters, Stephen Hayes’ The Connection, and Laurie Mylroie’s Bush v. The Beltway; and in partisan media such as Fox News, NewsMax, and The Weekly Standard who each attacked the US State Department and the CIA (Dorrien 183; Hayes; Ledeen; Mylroie; Heilbrunn 237, 243-244; Mann 310). This was the media “echo chamber” at work. The group Accuracy in Media also campaigned successfully to ensure that US cable providers did not give Al Jazeera English access to US audiences (Barker). Cosmopolitan ideals seemed incompatible with what the “flak” groups desired. The two-track process converged on two now infamous speeches. US President Bush’s State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002, and US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation to the United Nations on 5 February 2003. Bush’s speech included a line from neoconservative David Frumm about North Korea, Iraq and Iran as an “Axis of Evil” (Dorrien 158; Halper and Clarke 139-140; Mann 242, 317-321). Powell’s presentation to the United Nations included now-debunked threat assessments. In fact, Powell had altered the speech’s original draft by I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, who was Cheney’s chief of staff (Dorrien 183-184). Powell claimed that Iraq had mobile biological weapons facilities, linked to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Mohamed El-Baradei, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and the Institute for Science and International Security all strongly doubted this claim, as did international observers (Dorrien 184; Halper and Clarke 212-213; Mann 353-354). Yet this information was suppressed: attacked by “flak” or given little visible media coverage. Powell’s agenda included trying to rebuild an international coalition and to head off weather changes that would affect military operations in the Middle East (Mann 351). Both speeches used politicised variants of “weapons of mass destruction”, taken from the counterterrorism literature (Stern; Laqueur). Bush’s speech created an inflated geopolitical threat whilst Powell relied on flawed intelligence and scientific visuals to communicate a non-existent threat (Vogel). However, they had the intended effect on decision makers. US Under-Secretary of Defense, the neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz, later revealed to Vanity Fair that “weapons of mass destruction” was selected as an issue that all potential stakeholders could agree on (Wilkie 69). Perhaps the only remaining outlet was satire: Armando Iannucci’s 2009 film In The Loop parodied the diplomatic politics surrounding Powell’s speech and the civil-military tensions on the Iraq War’s eve. In the short term the two track process worked in heading off doubt. The “Vulcans” blocked important information on pre-war Iraq intelligence from reaching the media and the general public (Prados). Alternatively, they ignored area specialists and other experts, such as when Coalition Provisional Authority’s L. Paul Bremer ignored the US State Department’s fifteen volume ‘Future of Iraq’ project (Ferguson). Public “flak” and “risk entrepreneurs” mobilised a range of motivations from grief and revenge to historical memory and identity politics. This combination of private and public processes meant that although doubts were expressed, they could be contained through the dual echo chambers of neoconservative policymaking and the post-September 11 media. These factors enabled the “Vulcans” to proceed with their “regime change” plans despite strong public opposition from anti-war protestors. Expressing DoubtsMany experts and institutions expressed doubt about specific claims the Bush Administration made to support the 2003 Iraq War. This doubt came from three different and sometimes overlapping groups. Subject matter experts such as the IAEA’s Mohamed El-Baradei and weapons development scientists countered the UK intelligence report and Powell’s UN speech. However, they did not get the media coverage warranted due to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics. Others could challenge misleading historical analogies between insurgent Iraq and Nazi Germany, and yet not change the broader outcomes (Benjamin). Independent journalists one group who gained new information during the 1990-91 Gulf War: some entered Iraq from Kuwait and documented a more humanitarian side of the war to journalists embedded with US military units (Uyarra). Finally, there were dissenters from bureaucratic and institutional processes. In some cases, all three overlapped. In their separate analyses of the post-September 11 debate on intelligence “failure”, Zegart and Jervis point to a range of analytic misperceptions and institutional problems. However, the intelligence community is separated from policymakers such as the “Vulcans”. Compartmentalisation due to the “need to know” principle also means that doubting analysts can be blocked from releasing information. Andrew Wilkie discovered this when he resigned from Australia’s Office for National Assessments (ONA) as a transnational issues analyst. Wilkie questioned the pre-war assessments in Powell’s United Nations speech that were used to justify the 2003 Iraq War. Wilkie was then attacked publicly by Australian Prime Minister John Howard. This overshadowed a more important fact: both Howard and Wilkie knew that due to Australian legislation, Wilkie could not publicly comment on ONA intelligence, despite the invitation to do so. This barrier also prevented other intelligence analysts from responding to the “Vulcans”, and to “flak” and “echo chamber” dynamics in the media and neoconservative think-tanks. Many analysts knew that the excerpts released from the 2003 NIE on Iraq was highly edited (Prados). For example, Australian agencies such as the ONA, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the Department of Defence knew this (Wilkie 98). However, analysts are trained not to interfere with policymakers, even when there are significant civil-military irregularities. Military officials who spoke out about pre-war planning against the “Vulcans” and their neoconservative supporters were silenced (Ricks; Ferguson). Greenlight Capital’s hedge fund manager David Einhorn illustrates in a different context what might happen if analysts did comment. Einhorn gave a speech to the Ira Sohn Conference on 15 May 2002 debunking the management of Allied Capital. Einhorn’s “short-selling” led to retaliation from Allied Capital, a Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, and growing evidence of potential fraud. If analysts adopted Einhorn’s tactics—combining rigorous analysis with targeted, public denunciation that is widely reported—then this may have short-circuited the “flak” and “echo chamber” effects prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The intelligence community usually tries to pre-empt such outcomes via contestation exercises and similar processes. This was the goal of the 2003 NIE on Iraq, despite the fact that the US Department of Energy which had the expertise was overruled by other agencies who expressed opinions not necessarily based on rigorous scientific and technical analysis (Prados; Vogel). In counterterrorism circles, similar disinformation arose about Aum Shinrikyo’s biological weapons research after its sarin gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system on 20 March 1995 (Leitenberg). Disinformation also arose regarding nuclear weapons proliferation to non-state actors in the 1990s (Stern). Interestingly, several of the “Vulcans” and neoconservatives had been involved in an earlier controversial contestation exercise: Team B in 1976. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assembled three Team B groups in order to evaluate and forecast Soviet military capabilities. One group headed by historian Richard Pipes gave highly “alarmist” forecasts and then attacked a CIA NIE about the Soviets (Dorrien 50-56; Mueller 81). The neoconservatives adopted these same tactics to reframe the 2003 NIE from its position of caution, expressed by several intelligence agencies and experts, to belief that Iraq possessed a current, covert program to develop weapons of mass destruction (Prados). Alternatively, information may be leaked to the media to express doubt. “Non-attributable” background interviews to establishment journalists like Seymour Hersh and Bob Woodward achieved this. Wikileaks publisher Julian Assange has recently achieved notoriety due to US diplomatic cables from the SIPRNet network released from 28 November 2010 onwards. Supporters have favourably compared Assange to Daniel Ellsberg, the RAND researcher who leaked the Pentagon Papers (Ellsberg; Ehrlich and Goldsmith). Whilst Elsberg succeeded because a network of US national papers continued to print excerpts from the Pentagon Papers despite lawsuit threats, Assange relied in part on favourable coverage from the UK’s Guardian newspaper. However, suspected sources such as US Army soldier Bradley Manning are not protected whilst media outlets are relatively free to publish their scoops (Walt, ‘Woodward’). Assange’s publication of SIPRNet’s diplomatic cables will also likely mean greater restrictions on diplomatic and military intelligence (Walt, ‘Don’t Write’). Beyond ‘Doubt’ Iraq’s worsening security discredited many of the factors that had given the neoconservatives credibility. The post-September 11 media became increasingly more critical of the US military in Iraq (Ferguson) and cautious about the “echo chamber” of think-tanks and media outlets. Internet sites for Al Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya and other networks have enabled people to bypass “flak” and directly access these different viewpoints. Most damagingly, the non-discovery of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction discredited both the 2003 NIE on Iraq and Colin Powell’s United Nations presentation (Wilkie 104). Likewise, “risk entrepreneurs” who foresaw “World War IV” in 2002 and 2003 have now distanced themselves from these apocalyptic forecasts due to a series of mis-steps and mistakes by the Bush Administration and Al Qaeda’s over-calculation (Bergen). The emergence of sites such as Wikileaks, and networks like Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya, are a response to the politics of the past decade. They attempt to short-circuit past “echo chambers” through providing access to different sources and leaked data. The Global War on Terror framed the Bush Administration’s response to September 11 as a war (Kirk; Mueller 59). Whilst this prematurely closed off other possibilities, it has also unleashed a series of dynamics which have undermined the neoconservative agenda. The “classicist” history and historical analogies constructed to justify the “World War IV” scenario are just one of several potential frameworks. “Flak” organisations and media “echo chambers” are now challenged by well-financed and strategic alternatives such as Al Jazeera English and Al-Arabiya. Doubt is one defence against “risk entrepreneurs” who seek to promote a particular idea: doubt guards against uncritical adoption. Perhaps the enduring lesson of the post-September 11 debates, though, is that doubt alone is not enough. What is needed are individuals and institutions that understand the strategies which the neoconservatives and others have used, and who also have the soft power skills during crises to influence critical decision-makers to choose alternatives. Appendix 1: Counterfactuals Richard Ned Lebow uses “what if?” counterfactuals to examine alternative possibilities and “minimal rewrites” or slight variations on the historical events that occurred. The following counterfactuals suggest that the Bush Administration’s Global War on Terror could have evolved very differently . . . or not occurred at all. Fact: The 2003 Iraq War and 2001 Afghanistan counterinsurgency shaped the Bush Administration’s post-September 11 grand strategy. Counterfactual #1: Al Gore decisively wins the 2000 U.S. election. Bush v. Gore never occurs. After the September 11 attacks, Gore focuses on international alliance-building and gains widespread diplomatic support rather than a neoconservative agenda. He authorises Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan and works closely with the Musharraf regime in Pakistan to target Al Qaeda’s muhajideen. He ‘contains’ Saddam Hussein’s Iraq through measurement and signature, technical intelligence, and more stringent monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Minimal Rewrite: United 93 crashes in Washington DC, killing senior members of the Gore Administration. Fact: U.S. Special Operations Forces failed to kill Osama bin Laden in late November and early December 2001 at Tora Bora. Counterfactual #2: U.S. Special Operations Forces kill Osama bin Laden in early December 2001 during skirmishes at Tora Bora. Ayman al-Zawahiri is critically wounded, captured, and imprisoned. The rest of Al Qaeda is scattered. Minimal Rewrite: Osama bin Laden’s death turns him into a self-mythologised hero for decades. Fact: The UK Blair Government supplied a 50-page intelligence dossier on Iraq’s weapons development program which the Bush Administration used to support its pre-war planning. Counterfactual #3: Rogue intelligence analysts debunk the UK Blair Government’s claims through a series of ‘targeted’ leaks to establishment news sources. Minimal Rewrite: The 50-page intelligence dossier is later discovered to be correct about Iraq’s weapons development program. Fact: The Bush Administration used the 2003 National Intelligence Estimate to “build its case” for “regime change” in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Counterfactual #4: A joint investigation by The New York Times and The Washington Post rebuts U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell’s speech to the United National Security Council, delivered on 5 February 2003. Minimal Rewrite: The Central Intelligence Agency’s whitepaper “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs” (October 2002) more accurately reflects the 2003 NIE’s cautious assessments. Fact: The Bush Administration relied on Ahmed Chalabi for its postwar estimates about Iraq’s reconstruction. Counterfactual #5: The Bush Administration ignores Chalabi’s advice and relies instead on the U.S. State Department’s 15 volume report “The Future of Iraq”. Minimal Rewrite: The Coalition Provisional Authority appoints Ahmed Chalabi to head an interim Iraqi government. Fact: L. Paul Bremer signed orders to disband Iraq’s Army and to De-Ba’athify Iraq’s new government. Counterfactual #6: Bremer keeps Iraq’s Army intact and uses it to impose security in Baghdad to prevent looting and to thwart insurgents. Rather than a De-Ba’athification policy, Bremer uses former Baath Party members to gather situational intelligence. Minimal Rewrite: Iraq’s Army refuses to disband and the De-Ba’athification policy uncovers several conspiracies to undermine the Coalition Provisional Authority. AcknowledgmentsThanks to Stephen McGrail for advice on science and technology analysis.References Barker, Greg. “War of Ideas”. PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2007. ‹http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/newswar/video1.html› Benjamin, Daniel. “Condi’s Phony History.” Slate 29 Aug. 2003. ‹http://www.slate.com/id/2087768/pagenum/all/›. Bergen, Peter L. The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and Al Qaeda. New York: The Free Press, 2011. Berman, Paul. Terror and Liberalism. W.W. Norton & Company: New York, 2003. Brenner, William J. “In Search of Monsters: Realism and Progress in International Relations Theory after September 11.” Security Studies 15.3 (2006): 496-528. Burns, Alex. “The Worldflash of a Coming Future.” M/C Journal 6.2 (April 2003). ‹http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0304/08-worldflash.php›. Dorrien, Gary. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. New York: Routledge, 2004. Ehrlich, Judith, and Goldsmith, Rick. The Most Dangerous Man in America: Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers. Berkley CA: Kovno Communications, 2009. Einhorn, David. Fooling Some of the People All of the Time: A Long Short (and Now Complete) Story. Hoboken NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2010. Ellison, Sarah. “The Man Who Spilled The Secrets.” Vanity Fair (Feb. 2011). ‹http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/02/the-guardian-201102›. Ellsberg, Daniel. Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers. New York: Viking, 2002. Ferguson, Charles. No End in Sight, New York: Representational Pictures, 2007. Filkins, Dexter. The Forever War. New York: Vintage Books, 2008. Friedman, Murray. The Neoconservative Revolution: Jewish Intellectuals and the Shaping of Public Policy. New York: Cambridge UP, 2005. Halper, Stefan, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. New York: Cambridge UP, 2004. Hayes, Stephen F. The Connection: How Al Qaeda’s Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. Heilbrunn, Jacob. They Knew They Were Right: The Rise of the Neocons. New York: Doubleday, 2008. Herman, Edward S., and Noam Chomsky. Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Rev. ed. New York: Pantheon Books, 2002. Iannucci, Armando. In The Loop. London: BBC Films, 2009. Jervis, Robert. Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. Ithaca NY: Cornell UP, 2010. Kirk, Michael. “The War behind Closed Doors.” PBS Frontline. Boston, MA: 2003. ‹http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/›. Laqueur, Walter. No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Continuum, 2003. Lebow, Richard Ned. Forbidden Fruit: Counterfactuals and International Relations. Princeton NJ: Princeton UP, 2010. Ledeen, Michael. The War against The Terror Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2003. Leitenberg, Milton. “Aum Shinrikyo's Efforts to Produce Biological Weapons: A Case Study in the Serial Propagation of Misinformation.” Terrorism and Political Violence 11.4 (1999): 149-158. Mann, James. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. New York: Viking Penguin, 2004. Morgan, Matthew J. The American Military after 9/11: Society, State, and Empire. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. Mueller, John. Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them. New York: The Free Press, 2009. Mylroie, Laurie. Bush v The Beltway: The Inside Battle over War in Iraq. New York: Regan Books, 2003. Nutt, Paul C. Why Decisions Fail. San Francisco: Berrett-Koelher, 2002. Podhoretz, Norman. “How to Win World War IV”. Commentary 113.2 (2002): 19-29. Prados, John. Hoodwinked: The Documents That Reveal How Bush Sold Us a War. New York: The New Press, 2004. Ricks, Thomas. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: The Penguin Press, 2006. Stern, Jessica. The Ultimate Terrorists. Boston, MA: Harvard UP, 2001. Stevenson, Charles A. Warriors and Politicians: US Civil-Military Relations under Stress. New York: Routledge, 2006. Walt, Stephen M. “Should Bob Woodward Be Arrested?” Foreign Policy 10 Dec. 2010. ‹http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/10/more_wikileaks_double_standards›. 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This study aims to evaluate the success of the hegemonic stability theory within the framework of the Cold War era Security Council resolutions. In this direction, 725 resolutions of the Security Council between 1946 and 1991 have been examined and converted into numerical values in terms of content. It is seen that the decisions focused on a limited number of problems in the said period. The results show that the being of a single hegemonic power is not the main factor in providing stability. In addition, when looked at the post-Cold War period, it is possible to assert that the Security Council’s burden has increased. It is seen that the problems increase and diversify in the unipolar world, and international terrorism comes to the fore as the main actor. Hegemonic stability theory has not been successful in terms of international security. For international security, it is necessary to seek stability in a pluralistic structure, not in a single hegemonic power, because it does not seem possible to achieve success by ignoring national interests and the ethnicity and culture on which these national interests are built. Although the bipolar order offers a relatively stable security environment, the high threat perception prevents countries from revealing their potential for development.

We aimed to assess, in socio-cultural context, the level of hatred and revenge in war veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The sampling frame consisted of 215 Kosova War veterans, randomly selected. The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire was used to assess the prevalence of PTSD and Manchester Short Assessment of Life was used to assess social satisfactions. The participants were asked to declare the strength of feelings of hatred and revenge in the four preceding weeks by using four items scale: not at all, a little bit/sometimes, a lot and extremely. Willingness for action of veterans was assessed using three item scale: yes, no or maybe. A probability level of 0.05 was adopted to be considered as statistically significant for differences among groups. DSM-IV-TR criteria for PTSD (very similar to DSM-V) were met by 52.6% of veterans; the data have confirmed existence of thoughts and fantasies of revenge against opposing forces by 42.8% veterans; at the same level 42.8% manifested feelings of hatred. Fantasies of taking revenge<em> a lot</em> was recorded by 19.5% and <em>extremely</em> by 1.4% of veterans, while hateful thoughts at level a lot were likely expressed by 22.3% and <em>extreme</em> by 2.8% of veterans. It is important to note that 84.7% were confident to act based on their beliefs. Social-economic and cultural factors have played major role in the understanding of psychological problems of traumatized individuals with a direct impact on their ability to function socially. This study has confirmed the urgent need for the establishment of psychological rehabilitation programs as well as programs for the social and economic rehabilitation of War Veterans.

Post war problems of rising urban, industrial pollution and intractable waste disposal are usually considered as technical and economic problems only, solutions to which were led by experts at State level, and filtered into Australia from the ferments occurring in the United States and Britain in the 1960s and 70s. This paper investigates the change which arose from the localities in which the impact of those effects of modern city development were occurring. In particular, this study looks at a working class, industrial area, the Georges River near Bankstown Municipality, which was severely affected by Sydney’s post-war expansion. Here, action to address urgent environmental problems was initiated first at the local level, and only later were professional engineers and public health officials involved in seeking remedies. It was even later that these local experts turned from engineering strategies to environmental science, embracing the newly developed ecological analyses to craft changing approaches to local problems. This paper centres on the perspective of one local public health surveyor, employed by a local municipal council to oversee waste disposal, to identify the motives for his decisions to intervene dramatically in river health and waste disposal programs. Rather than being prompted to act by influences from higher political levels or overseas, this officer drew his motivation from careful local data collection, from local political agitation and from his own recreational knowledge of the river. It was his involvement with the living environments of the area – the ways in which he knew the river - through personal and recreational experiences, which prompted him to seek out the new science and investigate emerging waste disposal technologies.

The United Nations (UN) can impose sanctions by means of regional and other arrangements. History has demonstrated that during the Cold War era in Europe, the UN has imposed fewer sanctions than in the post-Cold War era. Although the UN Charter originally did not provide for the use of sanctions to protect democracy, it did protect international peace and security. However, the UN Security Council (UNSC) and other regional arrangements and communities like the EU and the AU are currently imposing sanctions even on undemocratic regime change, which should be an internal matter of a state. This development shows increased international commitment in favour of democracy. Further, the UNSC and the EU use different approaches than the AU, when removing sanctions. The AU’s approach in removing sanctions is more realistic and pragmatic. A case study of the Central African Republic shows that the UNSC and the EU approaches on sanctions towards African states could be counter-productive. It is advisable that the UNSC should consider African perspectives, by taking AU opinion into account, when imposing, modifying, or removing sanctions on the African continent. It would further increase local acceptance of sanctions, rendering them more effective. It is necessary to understand that problems in African states could have had local origins, but external factors such as international business interests could have aggravated these problems. Therefore, the targeted and smart sanctions will be more effective if international business interests, that help rebels, are also included in sanctions.

AbstractIn the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the prevalence of mental health issues could be greater than in other low-income and middle-income countries because of major risk factors related to armed conflicts and poverty. Given that mental health is an essential component of health, it is surprising that no systematic evaluation of mental health in the DRC has yet been undertaken. This study aims to undertake the first systematic review of mental health literacy and service provision in the DRC, to bridge this gap and inform those who need to develop an evidence base. This could support policymakers in tackling the issues related to limited mental health systems and service provision in DRC. Following Cochrane and PRISMA guidelines, a systematic (Web of Science, Medline, Public Health, PsycINFO, and Google Scholar) search was conducted (January 2000 and August 2023). Combinations of key blocks of terms were used in the search such as DRC, war zone, mental health, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, sexual violence, war trauma, resilience, mental health systems and service provision. We followed additional sources from reference lists of included studies. Screening was completed in two stages: title and abstract search, and full-text screening for relevance and quality. Overall, 50 studies were included in the review; the majority of studies (n = 31) were conducted in the Eastern region of the DRC, a region devastated by war and sexual violence. Different instruments were used to measure participants’ mental health such as the Hopkins Symptoms Checklist (HSCL-25), The Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9); General Anxiety Disorder (GAD-7), and Positive and Negative Symptoms Scale (PANSS). Our study found that wartime sexual violence and extreme poverty are highly traumatic, and cause multiple, long-term mental health difficulties. We found that depression, anxiety, and PTSD were the most common problems in the DRC. Psychosocial interventions such as group therapy, family support, and socio-economic support were effective in reducing anxiety, depression, and PTSD symptoms. This systematic review calls attention to the need to support sexual violence survivors and many other Congolese people affected by traumatic events. This review also highlights the need for validating culturally appropriate measures, and the need for well-designed controlled intervention studies in low-income settings such as the DRC. Better public mental health systems and service provision could help to improve community cohesion, human resilience, and mental wellbeing. There is also an urgent need to address wider social issues such as poverty, stigma, and gender inequality in the DRC.

История остарбайтеров – одна из трагических и малоизученных страниц Великой Отечественной войны. Цель статьи – исследовать трансформацию образов и представлений о «восточных рабочих» в СССР и современной России. Основными источниками стали оккупационные и советские газеты, плакаты, художественная литература, исторические исследования, интернет-архивы и другие проекты. Авторы опирались на системный подход, ситуационный и источниковедческий анализ. В годы войны оккупационные газеты и плакаты пропагандировали преимущества работы в Германии для советских граждан, в то время как советская печать, напротив, подчеркивала тяжелое положение «остовцев». После войны публикации о них практически прекратились. Интерес к теме возобновился с выходом романа Виталия Сёмина. Профессиональные исследования истории остарбайтеров начались в 1990-х гг. благодаря рассекречиванию архивов. В последнее время в связи с уходом из жизни бывших «восточных рабочих» интерес к их истории постепенно снижается. The history of “Eastern workers” (Ostarbeiters) is one of the most tragic problems of the Great Patriotic War. Ostarbeiters were citizens of the USSR forced to work in Germany during the Great Patriotic War. The aim of the article is to investigate the transformation of the scientific, popular, and artistic images of “Eastern workers” in the USSR and in modern Russia. The sources of the study were occupation and Soviet newspapers, posters, fiction, historical research, Internet archives, and other projects. The authors used a systematic approach, a situational analysis and a source study of historical sources. Occupation newspapers and German posters created ideas about the benefits of working in Germany for Soviet citizens. These propaganda images were little in line with reality. On the contrary, the Soviet press emphasized the cruelty of the German masters, the slave fate of the Ostarbeiters. These ideas were supposed to create a sense of hatred towards the enemy among Soviet soldiers. In August 1944, the Soviet government decided to return (repatriate) all Soviet citizens from abroad. The Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR created the Department of the Commissioner of the USSR Council of People’s Commissars for the Repatriation of Soviet citizens. The staff of the Department urged the “Eastern workers” to return home. Soviet authors accused the British and American military administration of disrupting the repatriation of Soviet citizens. In their homeland, however, many migrant workers experienced discrimination and concealed their work in Germany. Publications about “Eastern workers” in the USSR almost stopped in the post-war period. The history of the Ostarbeiters was forgotten for many years. It was only in 1976 when the memory-based novel by the Rostov writer Vitaly Semin The OST Chest Badgewas published. The novel was the first deep experience of comprehending the dramatic fates of “Eastern workers” in an artistic form. In the years of the Perestroika, other artistic works about the Ostarbeiters appeared. Professional historical research on the Ostarbeiters began in the 1990s after the declassification of archives. Contemporary historians study various aspects of the subject based on official documents, memories, and other sources. German compensation to the Ostarbeiters helped to increase public interest in the history of the “Eastern workers”. Former Ostarbeiters started to actively talk about their fate and publish memoirs. The first Internet archive of interviews with the Ostarbeiters appeared. However, with the demise of the “Eastern workers”, interest in their history gradually decreases.

The end of the First World War contributed to the fall of the Austrian-Hungarian dualist state and to the rising of new nations in the center of Europe. In this context, through the Paris’s Peace Treaty, new frontiers were shaped, concluding in the separation of Banat region between Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.In 1919 the Banat region was claimed both by the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and Romania, which generated a very complex issue, debated and solved by the greatest diplomats of the time. The Banat region had a diverse multiethnic population, being claimed both by the Romania and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, equally winners in the First World War, fact that made this issue more difficult.The representatives of the major political powers analyzed the Banat situation in February 1919 and came up with a series of proposals which produced the dissatisfaction of both Romanian and Serb diplomacy. Setting new borders between Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was solved in August 10, 1920, when the Sevres Treaty was signed, but its implementation has lasted several years and ended in 1924. Due to the new border lines, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes included more then 70 000 Romanians.The historical resolutions of Paris regarding the frontiers between Romania and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes made the Diocese of Arad to engage in a series of activities due to the fact that several orthodox parishes laid beyond the Romanian frontiers. Such an example are the eight villages of Comloș Deanery with 15203 of Romanians. In this context Diocese of Arad, represented by Bishop Ioan I. Papp, consistorial secretary Vasile Goldiș, and many other political and cultural personalities stood up and engage in Banat’s issue. Mihai Păcăţean, Dean of Comloș and Arad’s Diocese official, elaborated several reports describing the situation following the implementation of the decisions taken in Paris. He highlighted the fact that the orthodox’s parishes outside the Romanian frontiers were isolated having serious communication problems because even the Post stopped working. Following the Paris decisions of the Great Powers, the Bishop of Arad, Ioan I. Papp, and several Arad’s Diocese officials took actions both politically and religiously, by signing memoranda and reports to the Ruling Council and to Metropolitan of Sibiu aiming to allow the Romanians beyond the borders to form their own structures.In December 3/16, 1919, Bishop of Arad, Ioan I. Papp, wrote a letter to the “Most Venerable Metropolitan Consistory of Sibiu”, emphasizing the fact that the solving the Romanians issue in Serbia can only be done diplomatically “through the country’s government after hearing the opinion of the national-religious congress”. During the same period, Mihai Păcăţean asked the Ruling Council to financially intervene aiming to improve the life style of the Romanian priests from the Serbian Banat.

This article explores resilience as it is experienced by refugees in the context of a relational community, visiting the notions of trauma, a thicker description of resilience and the trajectory toward positive growth through community. It calls for going beyond a Western biomedical therapeutic approach of exploration and adopting more of an emic perspective incorporating the worldview of the refugees. The challenge is for service providers working with refugees (who have experienced trauma) to move forward from a ‘harm minimisation’ model of care to recognition of a facilitative, productive community of people who are in a transitional phase between homelands. Contextualising Trauma Prior to the 1980s, the term ‘trauma’ was not widely used in literature on refugees and refugee mental health, hardly existing as a topic of inquiry until the mid-1980’s (Summerfield 422). It first gained prominence in relation to soldiers who had returned from Vietnam and in need of medical attention after being traumatised by war. The term then expanded to include victims of wars and those who had witnessed traumatic events. Seahorn and Seahorn outline that severe trauma “paralyses you with numbness and uses denial, avoidance, isolation as coping mechanisms so you don’t have to deal with your memories”, impacting a person‘s ability to risk being connected to others, detaching and withdrawing; resulting in extreme loneliness, emptiness, sadness, anxiety and depression (6). During the Civil War in the USA the impact of trauma was referred to as Irritable Heart and then World War I and II referred to it as Shell Shock, Neurosis, Combat Fatigue, or Combat Exhaustion (Seahorn & Seahorn 66, 67). During the twenty-five years following the Vietnam War, the medicalisation of trauma intensified and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) became recognised as a medical-psychiatric disorder in 1980 in the American Psychiatric Association international diagnostic tool Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM–III). An expanded description and diagnosis of PTSD appears in the DSM-IV, influenced by the writings of Harvard psychologist and scholar, Judith Herman (Scheper-Hughes 38) The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) outlines that experiencing the threat of death, injury to oneself or another or finding out about an unexpected or violent death, serious harm, or threat of the same kind to a family member or close person are considered traumatic events (Chung 11); including domestic violence, incest and rape (Scheper-Hughes 38). Another significant development in the medicalisation of trauma occurred in 1998 when the Victorian Foundation for Survivors of Torture (VFST) released an influential report titled ‘Rebuilding Shattered Lives’. This then gave clinical practice a clearer direction in helping people who had experienced war, trauma and forced migration by providing a framework for therapeutic work. The emphasis became strongly linked to personal recovery of individuals suffering trauma, using case management as the preferred intervention strategy. A whole industry soon developed around medical intervention treating people suffering from trauma related problems (Eyber). Though there was increased recognition for the medicalised discourse of trauma and post-traumatic stress, there was critique of an over-reliance of psychiatric models of trauma (Bracken, et al. 15, Summerfield 421, 423). There was also expressed concern that an overemphasis on individual recovery overlooked the socio-political aspects that amplify trauma (Bracken et al. 8). The DSM-IV criteria for PTSD model began to be questioned regarding the category of symptoms being culturally defined from a Western perspective. Weiss et al. assert that large numbers of traumatized people also did not meet the DSM-III-R criteria for PTSD (366). To categorize refugees’ experiences into recognizable, generalisable psychological conditions overlooked a more localized culturally specific understanding of trauma. The meanings given to collective experience and the healing strategies vary across different socio-cultural groupings (Eyber). For example, some people interpret suffering as a normal part of life in bringing them closer to God and in helping gain a better understanding of the level of trauma in the lives of others. Scheper-Hughes raise concern that the PTSD model is “based on a conception of human nature and human life as fundamentally vulnerable, frail, and humans as endowed with few and faulty defence mechanisms”, and underestimates the human capacity to not only survive but to thrive during and following adversity (37, 42). As a helping modality, biomedical intervention may have limitations through its lack of focus regarding people’s agency, coping strategies and local cultural understandings of distress (Eyber). The benefits of a Western therapeutic model might be minimal when some may have their own culturally relevant coping strategies that may vary to Western models. Bracken et al. document case studies where the burial rituals in Mozambique, obligations to the dead in Cambodia, shared solidarity in prison and the mending of relationships after rape in Uganda all contributed to the healing process of distress (8). Orosa et al. (1) asserts that belief systems have contributed in helping refugees deal with trauma; Brune et al. (1) points to belief systems being a protective factor against post-traumatic disorders; and Peres et al. highlight that a religious worldview gives hope, purpose and meaning within suffering. Adopting a Thicker Description of Resilience Service providers working with refugees often talk of refugees as ‘vulnerable’ or ‘at risk’ populations and strive for ‘harm minimisation’ among the population within their care. This follows a critical psychological tradition, what (Ungar, Constructionist) refers to as a positivist mode of inquiry that emphasises the predictable relationship between risk and protective factors (risk and coping strategies) being based on a ‘deficient’ outlook rather than a ‘future potential’ viewpoint and lacking reference to notions of resilience or self-empowerment (342). At-risk discourses tend to focus upon antisocial behaviours and appropriate treatment for relieving suffering rather than cultural competencies that may be developing in the midst of challenging circumstances. Mares and Newman document how the lives of many refugee advocates have been changed through the relational contribution asylum seekers have made personally to them in an Australian context (159). Individuals may find meaning in communal obligations, contributing to the lives of others and a heightened solidarity (Wilson 42, 44) in contrast to an individual striving for happiness and self-fulfilment. Early naturalistic accounts of mental health, influenced by the traditions of Western psychology, presented thin descriptions of resilience as a quality innate to individuals that made them invulnerable or strong, despite exposure to substantial risk (Ungar, Thicker 91). The interest then moved towards a non-naturalistic contextually relevant understanding of resilience viewed in the social context of people’s lives. Authors such as Benson, Tricket and Birman (qtd. in Ungar, Thicker) started focusing upon community resilience, community capacity and asset-building communities; looking at areas such as - “spending time with friends, exercising control over aspects of their lives, seeking meaningful involvement in their community, attaching to others and avoiding threats to self-esteem” (91). In so doing far more emphasis was given in developing what Ungar (Thicker) refers to as ‘a thicker description of resilience’ as it relates to the lives of refugees that considers more than an ability to survive and thrive or an internal psychological state of wellbeing (89). Ungar (Thicker) describes a thicker description of resilience as revealing “a seamless set of negotiations between individuals who take initiative, and an environment with crisscrossing resources that impact one on the other in endless and unpredictable combinations” (95). A thicker description of resilience means adopting more of what Eyber proposes as an emic approach, taking on an ‘insider perspective’, incorporating the worldview of the people experiencing the distress; in contrast to an etic perspective using a Western biomedical understanding of distress, examined from a position outside the social or cultural system in which it takes place. Drawing on a more anthropological tradition, intervention is able to be built with local resources and strategies that people can utilize with attention being given to cultural traditions within a socio-cultural understanding. Developing an emic approach is to engage in intercultural dialogue, raise dilemmas, test assumptions, document hopes and beliefs and explore their implications. Under this approach, healing is more about developing intelligibility through one’s own cultural and social matrix (Bracken, qtd. in Westoby and Ingamells 1767). This then moves beyond using a Western therapeutic approach of exploration which may draw on the rhetoric of resilience, but the coping strategies of the vulnerable are often disempowered through adopting a ‘therapy culture’ (Furedi, qtd. in Westoby and Ingamells 1769). Westoby and Ingamells point out that the danger is by using a “therapeutic gaze that interprets emotions through the prism of disease and pathology”, it then “replaces a socio-political interpretation of situations” (1769). This is not to dismiss the importance of restoring individual well-being, but to broaden the approach adopted in contextualising it within a socio-cultural frame. The Relational Aspect of Resilience Previously, the concept of the ‘resilient individual’ has been of interest within the psychological and self-help literature (Garmezy, qtd. in Wilson) giving weight to the aspect of it being an innate trait that individuals possess or harness (258). Yet there is a need to explore the relational aspect of resilience as it is embedded in the network of relationships within social settings. A person’s identity and well-being is better understood in observing their capacity to manage their responses to adverse circumstances in an interpersonal community through the networks of relationships. Brison, highlights the collective strength of individuals in social networks and the importance of social support in the process of recovery from trauma, that the self is vulnerable to be affected by violence but resilient to be reconstructed through the help of others (qtd. in Wilson 125). This calls for what Wilson refers to as a more interdisciplinary perspective drawing on cultural studies and sociology (2). It also acknowledges that although individual traits influence the action of resilience, it can be learned and developed in adverse situations through social interactions. To date, within sociology and cultural studies, there is not a well-developed perspective on the topic of resilience. Resilience involves a complex ongoing interaction between individuals and their social worlds (Wilson 16) that helps them make sense of their world and adjust to the context of resettlement. It includes developing a perspective of people drawing upon negative experiences as productive cultural resources for growth, which involves seeing themselves as agents of their own future rather than suffering from a sense of victimhood (Wilson 46, 258). Wilson further outlines the display of a resilience-related capacity to positively interpret and derive meaning from what might have been otherwise negative migration experiences (Wilson 47). Wu refers to ‘imagineering’ alternative futures, for people to see beyond the current adverse circumstances and to imagine other possibilities. People respond to and navigate their experience of trauma in unique, unexpected and productive ways (Wilson 29). Trauma can cripple individual potential and yet individuals can also learn to turn such an experience into a positive, productive resource for personal growth. Grief, despair and powerlessness can be channelled into hope for improved life opportunities. Social networks can act as protection against adversity and trauma; meaningful interpersonal relationships and a sense of belonging assist individuals in recovering from emotional strain. Wilson asserts that social capabilities assist people in turning what would otherwise be negative experiences into productive cultural resources (13). Graybeal (238) and Saleeby (297) explore resilience as a strength-based practice, where individuals, families and communities are seen in relation to their capacities, talents, competencies, possibilities, visions, values and hopes; rather than through their deficiencies, pathologies or disorders. This does not present an idea of invulnerability to adversity but points to resources for navigating adversity. Resilience is not merely an individual trait or a set of intrinsic behaviours that can be displayed in ‘resilient individuals’. Resilience, rather than being an unchanging attribute, is a complex socio-cultural phenomenon, a relational concept of a dynamic nature that is situated in interpersonal relations (Wilson 258). Positive Growth through a Community Based Approach Through migrating to another country (in the context of refugees), Falicov, points out that people often experience a profound loss of their social network and cultural roots, resulting in a sense of homelessness between two worlds, belonging to neither (qtd. in Walsh 220). In the ideological narratives of refugee movements and diasporas, the exile present may be collectively portrayed as a liminality, outside normal time and place, a passage between past and future (Eastmond 255). The concept of the ‘liminal’ was popularised by Victor Turner, who proposed that different kinds of marginalised people and communities go through phases of separation, ‘liminali’ (state of limbo) and reincorporation (qtd. in Tofighian 101). Difficulties arise when there is no closure of the liminal period (fleeing their former country and yet not being able to integrate in the country of destination). If there is no reincorporation into mainstream society then people become unsettled and feel displaced. This has implications for their sense of identity as they suffer from possible cultural destabilisation, not being able to integrate into the host society. The loss of social supports may be especially severe and long-lasting in the context of displacement. In gaining an understanding of resilience in the context of displacement, it is important to consider social settings and person-environment transactions as displaced people seek to experience a sense of community in alternative ways. Mays proposed that alternative forms of community are central to community survival and resilience. Community is a source of wellbeing for building and strengthening positive relations and networks (Mays 590). Cottrell, uses the concept of ‘community competence’, where a community provides opportunities and conditions that enable groups to navigate their problems and develop capacity and resourcefulness to cope positively with adversity (qtd. in Sonn and Fisher 4, 5). Chaskin, sees community as a resilient entity, countering adversity and promoting the well-being of its members (qtd. in Canavan 6). As a point of departure from the concept of community in the conventional sense, I am interested in what Ahmed and Fortier state as moments or sites of connection between people who would normally not have such connection (254). The participants may come together without any presumptions of ‘being in common’ or ‘being uncommon’ (Ahmed and Fortier 254). This community shows little differentiation between those who are welcome and those who are not in the demarcation of the boundaries of community. The community I refer to presents the idea as ‘common ground’ rather than commonality. Ahmed and Fortier make reference to a ‘moral community’, a “community of care and responsibility, where members readily acknowledge the ‘social obligations’ and willingness to assist the other” (Home office, qtd. in Ahmed and Fortier 253). Ahmed and Fortier note that strong communities produce caring citizens who ensure the future of caring communities (253). Community can also be referred to as the ‘soul’, something that stems out of the struggle that creates a sense of solidarity and cohesion among group members (Keil, qtd. in Sonn and Fisher 17). Often shared experiences of despair can intensify connections between people. These settings modify the impact of oppression through people maintaining positive experiences of belonging and develop a positive sense of identity. This has enabled people to hold onto and reconstruct the sociocultural supplies that have come under threat (Sonn and Fisher 17). People are able to feel valued as human beings, form positive attachments, experience community, a sense of belonging, reconstruct group identities and develop skills to cope with the outside world (Sonn and Fisher, 20). Community networks are significant in contributing to personal transformation. Walsh states that “community networks can be essential resources in trauma recovery when their strengths and potential are mobilised” (208). Walsh also points out that the suffering and struggle to recover after a traumatic experience often results in remarkable transformation and positive growth (208). Studies in post-traumatic growth (Calhoun & Tedeschi) have found positive changes such as: the emergence of new opportunities, the formation of deeper relationships and compassion for others, feelings strengthened to meet future life challenges, reordered priorities, fuller appreciation of life and a deepening spirituality (in Walsh 208). As Walsh explains “The effects of trauma depend greatly on whether those wounded can seek comfort, reassurance and safety with others. Strong connections with trust that others will be there for them when needed, counteract feelings of insecurity, hopelessness, and meaninglessness” (208). Wilson (256) developed a new paradigm in shifting the focus from an individualised approach to trauma recovery, to a community-based approach in his research of young Sudanese refugees. Rutter and Walsh, stress that mental health professionals can best foster trauma recovery by shifting from a predominantly individual pathology focus to other treatment approaches, utilising communities as a capacity for healing and resilience (qtd. in Walsh 208). Walsh highlights that “coming to terms with traumatic loss involves making meaning of the trauma experience, putting it in perspective, and weaving the experience of loss and recovery into the fabric of individual and collective identity and life passage” (210). Landau and Saul, have found that community resilience involves building community and enhancing social connectedness by strengthening the system of social support, coalition building and information and resource sharing, collective storytelling, and re-establishing the rhythms and routines of life (qtd. in Walsh 219). Bracken et al. suggest that one of the fundamental principles in recovery over time is intrinsically linked to reconstruction of social networks (15). This is not expecting resolution in some complete ‘once and for all’ getting over it, getting closure of something, or simply recovering and moving on, but tapping into a collective recovery approach, being a gradual process over time. Conclusion A focus on biomedical intervention using a biomedical understanding of distress may be limiting as a helping modality for refugees. Such an approach can undermine peoples’ agency, coping strategies and local cultural understandings of distress. Drawing on sociology and cultural studies, utilising a more emic approach, brings new insights to understanding resilience and how people respond to trauma in unique, unexpected and productive ways for positive personal growth while navigating the experience. This includes considering social settings and person-environment transactions in gaining an understanding of resilience. Although individual traits influence the action of resilience, it can be learned and developed in adverse situations through social interactions. Social networks and capabilities can act as a protection against adversity and trauma, assisting people to turn what would otherwise be negative experiences into productive cultural resources (Wilson 13) for improved life opportunities. The promotion of social competence is viewed as a preventative intervention to promote resilient outcomes, as social skill facilitates social integration (Nettles and Mason 363). As Wilson (258) asserts that resilience is not merely an individual trait or a set of intrinsic behaviours that ‘resilient individuals’ display; it is a complex, socio-cultural phenomenon that is situated in interpersonal relations within a community setting. References Ahmed, Sara, and Anne-Marie Fortier. “Re-Imagining Communities.” International of Cultural Studies 6.3 (2003): 251-59. Bracken, Patrick. J., Joan E. Giller, and Derek Summerfield. Psychological Response to War and Atrocity: The Limitations of Current Concepts. Elsevier Science, 1995. 8 Aug, 2013 ‹http://www.freedomfromtorture.org/sites/default/files/documents/Summerfield-PsychologicalResponses.pdf>. Brune, Michael, Christian Haasen, Michael Krausz, Oktay Yagdiran, Enrique Bustos and David Eisenman. “Belief Systems as Coping Factors for Traumatized Refugees: A Pilot Study.” Eur Psychiatry 17 (2002): 451-58. Canavan, John. “Resilience: Cautiously Welcoming a Contested Concept.” Child Care in Practice 14.1 (2008): 1-7. Chung, Juna. Refugee and Immigrant Survivors of Trauma: A Curriculum for Social Workers. Master’s Thesis for California State University. Long Beach, 2010. 1-29. Eastmond, Maria. “Stories of Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research.” Journal of Refugee Studies 20.2 (2007): 248-64. Eyber, Carola “Cultural and Anthropological Studies.” In Forced Migration Online, 2002. 8 Aug, 2013. ‹http://www.forcedmigration.org/research-resources/expert-guides/psychosocial- issues/cultural-and-anthropological-studies>. Graybeal, Clay. “Strengths-Based Social Work Assessment: Transforming the Dominant Paradigm.” Families in Society 82.3 (2001): 233-42. Kleinman, Arthur. “Triumph or Pyrrhic Victory? The Inclusion of Culture in DSM-IV.” Harvard Rev Psychiatry 4 (1997): 343-44. Mares, Sarah, and Louise Newman, eds. Acting from the Heart- Australian Advocates for Asylum Seekers Tell Their Stories. Sydney: Finch Publishing, 2007. Mays, Vicki M. “Identity Development of Black Americans: The Role of History and the Importance of Ethnicity.” American Journal of Psychotherapy 40.4 (1986): 582-93. Nettles, Saundra Murray, and Michael J. Mason. “Zones of Narrative Safety: Promoting Psychosocial Resilience in Young People.” The Journal of Primary Prevention 25.3 (2004): 359-73. Orosa, Francisco J.E., Michael Brune, Katrin Julia Fischer-Ortman, and Christian Haasen. “Belief Systems as Coping Factors in Traumatized Refugees: A Prospective Study.” Traumatology 17.1 (2011); 1-7. Peres, Julio F.P., Alexander Moreira-Almeida, Antonia, G. Nasello, and Harold, G. Koenig. “Spirituality and Resilience in Trauma Victims.” J Relig Health (2006): 1-8. Saleebey, Dennis. “The Strengths Perspective in Social Work Practice: Extensions and Cautions.” Social Work 41.3 (1996): 296-305. Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. “A Talent for Life: Reflections on Human Vulnerability and Resilience.” Ethnos 73.1 (2008): 25-56. Seahorn, Janet, J. and Anthony E. Seahorn. Tears of a Warrior. Ft Collins, USA: Team Pursuits, 2008. Sonn, Christopher, and Adrian Fisher. “Sense of Community: Community Resilient Responses to Oppression and Change.” Unpublished article. Curtin University of Technology & Victoria University of Technology: undated. Summerfield, Derek. “Childhood, War, Refugeedom and ‘Trauma’: Three Core Questions for Medical Health Professionals.” Transcultural Psychiatry 37.3 (2000): 417-433. Tofighian, Omid. “Prolonged Liminality and Comparative Examples of Rioting Down Under”. Fear and Hope: The Art of Asylum Seekers in Australian Detention Centres Literature and Aesthetics (Special Edition) 21 (2011): 97-103. Ungar, Michael. “A Constructionist Discourse on Resilience: Multiple Contexts, Multiple Realities Among at-Risk Children and Youth.” Youth Society 35.3 (2004): 341-365. Ungar, Michael. “A Thicker Description of Resilience.” The International Journal of Narrative Therapy and Community Work 3 & 4 (2005): 85-96. Walsh, Froma. “Traumatic Loss and Major Disasters: Strengthening Family and Community Resilience.” Family Process 46.2 (2007): 207-227. Weiss, Daniel. S., Charles R. Marmar, William. E. Schlenger, John. A. Fairbank, Kathleen Jordon, Richard L. Hough, and Richard A. Kulka. “The Prevalence of Lifetime and Partial Post- Traumatic Stress Disorder in Vietnam Theater Veterans.” Journal of Traumatic Stress 5.3 (1992):365-76. Westoby, Peter, and Ann Ingamells. “A Critically Informed Perspective of Working with Resettling Refugee Groups in Australia.” British Journal of Social Work 40 (2010): 1759-76. Wilson, Michael. “Accumulating Resilience: An Investigation of the Migration and Resettlement Experiences of Young Sudanese People in the Western Sydney Area.” PHD Thesis. University of Western Sydney ( 2012): 1-297. Wu, K. M. “Hope and World Survival.” Philosophy Forum 12.1-2 (1972): 131-48.

Complex systems are an invention of the universe. It is not at all clear that science has an a priori primacy claim to the study of complex systems. (Galanter 5) Introduction In popular dialogues, describing a system as “complex” is often the point of resignation, inferring that the system cannot be sufficiently described, predicted nor managed. Transport networks, management infrastructure and supply chain logistics are all often described in this way. In socio-cultural terms “complex” is used to describe those humanistic systems that are “intricate, involved, complicated, dynamic, multi-dimensional, interconnected systems [such as] transnational citizenship, communities, identities, multiple belongings, overlapping geographies and competing histories” (Cahir & James). Academic dialogues have begun to explore the collective behaviors of complex systems to define a complex system specifically as an adaptive one; i.e. a system that demonstrates ‘self organising’ principles and ‘emergent’ properties. Based upon the key principles of interaction and emergence in relation to adaptive and self organising systems in cultural artifacts and processes, this paper will argue that complex systems are cultural systems. By introducing generic principles of complex systems, and looking at the exploration of such principles in art, design and media research, this paper argues that a science of cultural systems as part of complex systems theory is the post modern science for the digital age. Furthermore, that such a science was predicated by post structuralism and has been manifest in art, design and media practice since the late 1960s. Complex Systems Theory Complexity theory grew out of systems theory, an holistic approach to analysis that views whole systems based upon the links and interactions between the component parts and their relationship to each other and the environment within they exists. This stands in stark contrast to conventional science which is based upon Descartes’s reductionism, where the aim is to analyse systems by reducing something to its component parts (Wilson 3). As systems thinking is concerned with relationships more than elements, it proposes that in complex systems, small catalysts can cause large changes and that a change in one area of a system can adversely affect another area of the system. As is apparent, systems theory is a way of thinking rather than a specific set of rules, and similarly there is no single unified Theory of Complexity, but several different theories have arisen from the natural sciences, mathematics and computing. As such, the study of complex systems is very interdisciplinary and encompasses more than one theoretical framework. Whilst key ideas of complexity theory developed through artificial intelligence and robotics research, other important contributions came from thermodynamics, biology, sociology, physics, economics and law. In her volume for the Elsevier Advanced Management Series, “Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organisations”, Eve Mitleton-Kelly describes a comprehensive overview of this evolution as five main areas of research: complex adaptive systems dissipative structures autopoiesis (non-equilibrium) social systems chaos theory path dependence Here, Mitleton-Kelly points out that relatively little work has been done on developing a specific theory of complex social systems, despite much interest in complexity and its application to management (Mitleton-Kelly 4). To this end, she goes on to define the term “complex evolving system” as more appropriate to the field than ‘complex adaptive system’ and suggests that the term “complex behaviour” is thus more useful in social contexts (Mitleton-Kelly). For our purpose here, “complex systems” will be the general term used to describe those systems that are diverse and made up of multiple interdependent elements, that are often ‘adaptive’, in that they have the capacity to change and learn from events. This is in itself both ‘evolutionary’ and ‘behavioural’ and can be understood as emerging from the interaction of autonomous agents – especially people. Some generic principles of complex systems defined by Mitleton Kelly that are of concern here are: self-organisation emergence interdependence feedback space of possibilities co-evolving creation of new order Whilst the behaviours of complex systems clearly do not fall into our conventional top down perception of management and production, anticipating such behaviours is becoming more and more essential for products, processes and policies. For example, compare the traditional top down model of news generation, distribution and consumption to the “emerging media eco-system” (Bowman and Willis 14). Figure 1 (Bowman & Willis 10) Figure 2 (Bowman & Willis 12) To the traditional news organisations, such a “democratization of production” (McLuhan 230) has been a huge cause for concern. The agencies once solely responsible for the representation of reality are now lost in a global miasma of competing perspectives. Can we anticipate and account for complex behaviours? Eve Mitleton Kelly states that “if organisations are understood as complex evolving systems co-evolving as part of a social ‘ecosystem’, then that changed perspective changes ways of acting and relating which lead to a different way of working. Thus, management strategy changes, and our organizational design paradigms evolve as new types of relationships and ways of working provide the conditions for the emergence of new organisational forms” (Mitleton-Kelly 6). Complexity in Design It is thus through design practice and processes that discovering methods for anticipating complex systems behaviours seem most possible. The Embracing Complexity in Design (ECiD) research programme, is a contemporary interdisciplinary research cluster consisting of academics and designers from architectural engineering, robotics, geography, digital media, sustainable design, and computing aiming to explore the possibility of trans disciplinary principles of complexity in design. Over arching this work is the conviction that design can be seen as model for complex systems researchers motivated by applying complexity science in particular domains. Key areas in which design and complexity interact have been established by this research cluster. Most immediately, many designed products and systems are inherently complex to design in the ordinary sense. For example, when designing vehicles, architecture, microchips designers need to understand complex dynamic processes used to fabricate and manufacture products and systems. The social and economic context of design is also complex, from market economics and legal regulation to social trends and mass culture. The process of designing can also involve complex social dynamics, with many people processing and exchanging complex heterogeneous information over complex human and communication networks, in the context of many changing constraints. Current key research questions are: how can the methods of complex systems science inform designers? how can design inform research into complex systems? Whilst ECiD acknowledges that to answer such questions effectively the theoretical and methodological relations between complexity science and design need further exploration and enquiry, there are no reliable precedents for such an activity across the sciences and the arts in general. Indeed, even in areas where a convergence of humanities methodology with scientific practice might seem to be most pertinent, most examples are few and far between. In his paper “Post Structuralism, Hypertext & the World Wide Web”, Luke Tredennick states that “despite the concentration of post-structuralism on text and texts, the study of information has largely failed to exploit post-structuralist theory” (Tredennick 5). Yet it is surely in the convergence of art and design with computation and the media that a search for practical trans-metadisciplinary methodologies might be most fruitful. It is in design for interactive media, where algorithms meet graphics, where the user can interact, adapt and amend, that self-organisation, emergence, interdependence, feedback, the space of possibilities, co-evolution and the creation of new order are embraced on a day to day basis by designers. A digitally interactive environment such as the World Wide Web, clearly demonstrates all the key aspects of a complex system. Indeed, it has already been described as a ‘complexity machine’ (Qvortup 9). It is important to remember that this ‘complexity machine’ has been designed. It is an intentional facility. It may display all the characteristics of complexity but, whilst some of its attributes are most demonstrative of self organisation and emergence, the Internet itself has not emerged spontaneously. For example, Tredinnick details the evolution of the World Wide Web through the Memex machine of Vannevar Bush, through Ted Nelsons hypertext system Xanadu to Tim Berners-Lee’s Enquire (Tredennick 3). The Internet was engineered. So, whilst we may not be able to entirely predict complex behavior, we can, and do, quite clearly design for it. When designing digitally interactive artifacts we design parameters or co ordinates to define the space within which a conceptual process will take place. We can never begin to predict precisely what those processes might become through interaction, emergence and self organisation, but we can establish conceptual parameters that guide and delineate the space of possibilities. Indeed this fact is so transparently obvious that many commentators in the humanities have been pushed to remark that interaction is merely interpretation, and so called new media is not new at all; that one interacts with a book in much the same way as a digital artifact. After all, post-structuralist theory had established the “death of the author” in the 1970s – the a priori that all cultural artifacts are open to interpretation, where all meanings must be completed by the reader. The concept of the “open work” (Eco 6) has been an established post modern concept for over 30 years and is commonly recognised as a feature of surrealist montage, poetry, the writings of James Joyce, even advertising design, where a purposive space for engagement and interpretation of a message is designated, without which the communication does not “work”. However, this concept is also most successfully employed in relation to installation art and, more recently, interactive art as a reflection of the artist’s conscious decision to leave part of a work open to interpretation and/or interaction. Art & Complex Systems One of the key projects of Embracing Complexity in Design has been to look at the relationship between art and complex systems. There is a relatively well established history of exploring art objects as complex systems in themselves that finds its origins in the systems art movement of the 1970s. In his paper “Observing ‘Systems Art’ from a Systems-Theroretical Perspective”, Francis Halsall defines systems art as “emerging in the 1960s and 1970s as a new paradigm in artistic practice … displaying an interest in the aesthetics of networks, the exploitation of new technology and New Media, unstable or de-materialised physicality, the prioritising of non-visual aspects, and an engagement (often politicised) with the institutional systems of support (such as the gallery, discourse, or the market) within which it occurs” (Halsall 7). More contemporarily, “Open Systems: Rethinking Art c.1970”, at Tate Modern, London, focuses upon systems artists “rejection of art’s traditional focus on the object, to wide-ranging experiments al focus on the object, to wide-ranging experiments with media that included dance, performance and…film & video” (De Salvo 3). Artists include Andy Warhol, Richard Long, Gilbert & George, Sol Lewitt, Eva Hesse and Bruce Nauman. In 2002, the Samuel Dorsky Museum of Art, New York, held an international exhibition entitled “Complexity; Art & Complex Systems”, that was concerned with “art as a distinct discipline offer[ing] its own unique approache[s] and epistemic standards in the consideration of complexity” (Galanter and Levy 5), and the organisers go on to describe four ways in which artists engage the realm of complexity: presentations of natural complex phenomena that transcend conventional scientific visualisation descriptive systems which describe complex systems in an innovative and often idiosyncratic way commentary on complexity science itself technical applications of genetic algorithms, neural networks and a-life ECiD artist Julian Burton makes work that visualises how companies operate in specific relation to their approach to change and innovation. He is a strategic artist and facilitator who makes “pictures of problems to help people talk about them” (Burton). Clients include public and private sector organisations such as Barclays, Shell, Prudential, KPMG and the NHS. He is quoted as saying “Pictures are a powerful way to engage and focus a group’s attention on crucial issues and challenges, and enable them to grasp complex situations quickly. I try and create visual catalysts that capture the major themes of a workshop, meeting or strategy and re-present them in an engaging way to provoke lively conversations” (Burton). This is a simple and direct method of using art as a knowledge elicitation tool that falls into the first and second categories above. The third category is demonstrated by the ground breaking TechnoSphere, that was specifically inspired by complexity theory, landscape and artificial life. Launched in 1995 as an Arts Council funded online digital environment it was created by Jane Prophet and Gordon Selley. TechnoSphere is a virtual world, populated by artificial life forms created by users of the World Wide Web. The digital ecology of the 3D world, housed on a server, depends on the participation of an on-line public who accesses the world via the Internet. At the time of writing it has attracted over a 100,000 users who have created over a million creatures. The artistic exploration of technical applications is by default a key field for researching the convergence of trans-metadisciplinary methodologies. Troy Innocent’s lifeSigns evolves multiple digital media languages “expressed as a virtual world – through form, structure, colour, sound, motion, surface and behaviour” (Innocent). The work explores the idea of “emergent language through play – the idea that new meanings may be generated through interaction between human and digital agents”. Thus this artwork combines three areas of converging research – artificial life; computational semiotics and digital games. In his paper “What Is Generative Art? Complexity Theory as a Context for Art Theory”, Philip Galanter describes all art as generative on the basis that it is created from the application of rules. Yet, as demonstrated above, what is significantly different and important about digital interactivity, as opposed to its predecessor, interpretation, is its provision of a graphical user interface (GUI) to component parts of a text such as symbol, metaphor, narrative, etc for the multiple “authors” and the multiple “readers” in a digitally interactive space of possibility. This offers us tangible, instantaneous reproduction and dissemination of interpretations of an artwork. Conclusion: Digital Interactivity – A Complex Medium Digital interaction of any sort is thus a graphic model of the complex process of communication. Here, complexity does not need deconstructing, representing nor modelling, as the aesthetics (as in apprehended by the senses) of the graphical user interface conveniently come first. Design for digital interactive media is thus design for complex adaptive systems. The theoretical and methodological relations between complexity science and design can clearly be expounded especially well through post-structuralism. The work of Barthes, Derrida & Foucault offers us the notion of all cultural artefacts as texts or systems of signs, whose meanings are not fixed but rather sustained by networks of relationships. Implemented in a digital environment post-structuralist theory is tangible complexity. Strangely, whilst Philip Galanter states that science has no necessary over reaching claim to the study of complexity, he then argues conversely that “contemporary art theory rooted in skeptical continental philosophy [reduces] art to social construction [as] postmodernism, deconstruction and critical theory [are] notoriously elusive, slippery, and overlapping terms and ideas…that in fact [are] in the business of destabilising apparently clear and universal propositions” (4). This seems to imply that for Galanter, post modern rejections of grand narratives necessarily will exclude the “new scientific paradigm” of complexity, a paradigm that he himself is looking to be universal. Whilst he cites Lyotard (6) describing both political and linguistic reasons why postmodern art celebrates plurality, denying any progress towards singular totalising views, he fails to appreciate what happens if that singular totalising view incorporates interactivity? Surely complexity is pluralistic by its very nature? In the same vein, if language for Derrida is “an unfixed system of traces and differences … regardless of the intent of the authored texts … with multiple equally legitimate meanings” (Galanter 7) then I have heard no better description of the signifiers, signifieds, connotations and denotations of digital culture. Complexity in its entirety can also be conversely understood as the impact of digital interactivity upon culture per se which has a complex causal relation in itself; Qvortups notion of a “communications event” (9) such as the Danish publication of the Mohammed cartoons falls into this category. Yet a complex causality could be traced further into cultural processes enlightening media theory; from the relationship between advertising campaigns and brand development; to the exposure and trajectory of the celebrity; describing the evolution of visual language in media cultures and informing the relationship between exposure to representation and behaviour. In digital interaction the terms art, design and media converge into a process driven, performative event that demonstrates emergence through autopoietic processes within a designated space of possibility. By insisting that all artwork is generative Galanter, like many other writers, negates the medium entirely which allows him to insist that generative art is “ideologically neutral” (Galanter 10). Generative art, like all digitally interactive artifacts are not neutral but rather ideologically plural. Thus, if one integrates Qvortups (8) delineation of medium theory and complexity theory we may have what we need; a first theory of a complex medium. Through interactive media complexity theory is the first post modern science; the first science of culture. References Bowman, Shane, and Chris Willis. We Media. 21 Sep. 2003. 9 March 2007 http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/weblog.php>. Burton, Julian. “Hedron People.” 9 March 2007 http://www.hedron.com/network/assoc.php4?associate_id=14>. Cahir, Jayde, and Sarah James. “Complex: Call for Papers.” M/C Journal 9 Sep. 2006. 7 March 2007 http://journal.media-culture.org.au/journal/upcoming.php>. De Salvo, Donna, ed. Open Systems: Rethinking Art c. 1970. London: Tate Gallery Press, 2005. Eco, Umberto. The Open Work. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1989. Galanter, Phillip, and Ellen K. Levy. Complexity: Art & Complex Systems. SDMA Gallery Guide, 2002. Galanter, Phillip. “Against Reductionism: Science, Complexity, Art & Complexity Studies.” 2003. 9 March 2007 http://isce.edu/ISCE_Group_Site/web-content/ISCE_Events/ Norwood_2002/Norwood_2002_Papers/Galanter.pdf>. Halsall, Francis. “Observing ‘Systems-Art’ from a Systems-Theoretical Perspective”. CHArt 2005. 9 March 2007 http://www.chart.ac.uk/chart2005/abstracts/halsall.htm>. Innocent, Troy. “Life Signs.” 9 March 2007 http://www.iconica.org/main.htm>. Johnson, Jeffrey. “Embracing Complexity in Design (ECiD).” 2007. 9 March 2007 http://www.complexityanddesign.net/>. Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984. McLuhan, Marshall. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1962. Mitleton-Kelly, Eve, ed. Complex Systems and Evolutionary Perspectives on Organisations. Elsevier Advanced Management Series, 2003. Prophet, Jane. “Jane Prophet.” 9 March 2007 http://www.janeprophet.co.uk/>. Qvortup, Lars. “Understanding New Digital Media.” European Journal of Communication 21.3 (2006): 345-356. Tedinnick, Luke. “Post Structuralism, Hypertext & the World Wide Web.” Aslib 59.2 (2007): 169-186. Wilson, Edward Osborne. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New York: A.A. Knoff, 1998. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Cham, Karen, and Jeffrey Johnson. "Complexity Theory: A Science of Cultural Systems?." M/C Journal 10.3 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/08-cham-johnson.php>. APA Style Cham, K., and J. Johnson. (Jun. 2007) "Complexity Theory: A Science of Cultural Systems?," M/C Journal, 10(3). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0706/08-cham-johnson.php>.

On 23 August 2005, John Howard, then Prime Minister, called together Muslim ‘representatives’ from around the nation for a Muslim Summit in response to the London bombings in July of that year. One of the outcomes of the two hour summit was a Statement of Principles committing Muslim communities in Australia to resist radicalisation and pursue a ‘moderate’ Islam. Since then the ill-defined term ‘moderate Muslim’ has been used in both the political and media discourse to refer to a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of the nation state and that is coherent with the principles of secularism. Akbarzadeh and Smith conclude that the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘mainstream’ are used to describe Muslims whom Australians should not fear in contrast to ‘extremists’. Ironically, the policy direction towards regulating the practice of Islam in Australia in favour of a state defined ‘moderate’ Islam signals an attempt by the state to mediate the practice of religion, undermining the ethos of secularism as it is expressed in the Australian Constitution. It also – arguably – impacts upon the citizenship rights of Australian Muslims in so far as citizenship presents not just as a formal set of rights accorded to an individual but also to democratic participation: the ability of citizens to enjoy those rights at a substantive level. Based on the findings of research into how Australian Muslims and members of the broader community are responding to the political and media discourses on terrorism, this article examines the impact of these discourses on how Muslims are practicing citizenship and re-defining an Australian Muslim identity. Free Speech Free speech has been a hallmark of liberal democracies ever since its defence became part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Australian Constitution does not expressly contain a provision for free speech. The right to free speech in Australia is implied in Australia’s ratification of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 19 of which affirms: Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The ultimate recent endorsement of free speech rights, arguably associated with the radical free speech ‘open platform’ movement of the 1960s at the University of California Berkeley, constructs free speech as essential to human and civil liberties. Its approach has been expressed in terms such as: “I reject and detest XYZ views but will defend to the utmost a person’s right to express them”. An active defence of free speech is based on the observation that, unless held to account, “[Authorities] would grant free speech to those with whom they agree, but not to minorities whom they consider unorthodox or threatening” (“Online Archives of California”). Such minorities, differing from the majority view, do so as a right accorded to citizens. In very challenging circumstances – such as opposing the Cold War operations of the US Senate Anti-American Activities Committee – the free speech movement has been celebrated as holding fast (or embodying a ‘return’) to the true meaning of the American First Amendment. It was in public statements of unpopular and minority views, which opposed those of the majority, that the right to free speech could most non-controvertibly be demonstrated. Some have argued that such rights should be balanced by anti-vilification legislation, by prohibitions upon incitement to violence, and by considerations as to whether the organisation defended by the speaker was banned. In the latter case, there can be problems with excluding the defence of banned organisations from legitimate debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Sinn Fein was denounced in the UK as the ‘political wing of the IRA’ (the IRA being a banned organisation) and denied a speaking position in many forums, yet has proved to be an important party in the eventual reconciliation of the Northern Ireland divide. In effect, the banning of an organisation is a political act and such acts should best be interrogated through free speech and democratic debate. Arguably, such disputation is a responsibility of an involved citizenry. In general, liberal democracies such as Australia do not hesitate to claim that citizens have a right to free speech and that this is a right worth defending. There is a legitimate expectation by Australians of their rights as citizens to freedom of expression. For some Australian Muslims, however, the appeal to free speech seems a hollow one. Muslim citizens run the risk of being constructed as ‘un-Australian’ when they articulate their concerns or opinions. Calls by some Muslim leaders not to reprint the Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet Mohammed for example, met with a broader community backlash and drew responses that, typically, constructed Muslims as a threat to Australian cultural values of freedom and liberty. These kinds of responses to expressions by Australian Muslims of their deeply held convictions are rarely, if ever, interpreted as attempts to curtail Australian Muslims’ rights to free speech. There is a poor fit between what many Australian Muslims believe and what they feel the current climate in Australia allows them to say in the public domain. Positioned as the potential ‘enemy within’ in the evolving media and political discourse post September 11, they have been allocated restricted speaking positions on many subjects from the role and training of their Imams to the right to request Sharia courts (which could operate in parallel with Australian courts in the same way that Catholic divorce/annulment courts do). These social and political restrictions lead them to question whether Muslims enjoy citizenship rights on an equal footing with Australians from the broader community. The following comment from an Australian woman, an Iraqi refugee, made in a research interview demonstrates this: The media say that if you are Australian it means that you enjoy freedom, you enjoy the rights of citizenship. That is the idea of what it means to be Australian, that you do those things. But if you are a Muslim, you are not Australian. You are a people who are dangerous, a people who are suspicious, a people who do not want democracy—all the characteristics that make up terrorists. So yes, there is a difference, a big difference. And it is a feeling all Muslims have, not just me, whether you are at school, at work, and especially if you wear the hijab. (Translated from Arabic by Anne Aly) At the same time, Australian Muslims observe some members of the broader community making strong assertions about Muslims (often based on misunderstanding or misinformation) with very little in the way of censure or rebuke. For example, again in 2005, Liberal backbenchers Sophie Panopoulos and Bronwyn Bishop made an emotive plea for the banning of headscarves in public schools, drawing explicitly on the historically inherited image of Islam as a violent, backward and oppressive ideology that has no place in Western liberal democracy: I fear a frightening Islamic class emerging, supported by a perverse interpretation of the Koran where disenchantment breeds disengagement, where powerful and subversive orthodoxies are inculcated into passionate and impressionable young Muslims, where the Islamic mosque becomes the breeding ground for violence and rejection of Australian law and ideals, where extremists hijack the Islamic faith with their own prescriptive and unbending version of the Koran and where extremist views are given currency and validity … . Why should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance cloaked under a veil of some distorted form of religious freedom? (Panopoulos) Several studies attest to the fact that, since the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Islam, and by association Australian Muslims, have been positioned as other in the political and media discourse (see for example Aly). The construct of Muslims as ‘out of place’ (Saniotis) denies them entry and representation in the public sphere: a key requisite for democratic participation according to Habermas (cited in Haas). This notion of a lack of a context for Muslim citizenship in Australian public spheres arises out of the popular construction of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Australian’ as mutually exclusive modes of being. Denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as political citizens, Australian Muslims must pursue alternative communicative spaces. Some respond by limiting their expressions to closed spheres of communication – a kind of enforced silence. Others respond by pursuing alternative media discourses that challenge the dominant stereotypes of Muslims in Western media and reinforce majority-world cultural views. Enforced Silence In closed spheres of discussion, Australian Muslims can openly share their perceptions about terrorism, the government and media. Speaking openly in public however, is not common practice and results in forced silence for fear of reprisal or being branded a terrorist: “if we jump up and go ‘oh how dare you say this, rah, rah’, he’ll be like ‘oh he’s going to go off, he’ll blow something up’”. One research participant recalled that when his work colleagues were discussing the September 11 attacks he decided not to partake in the conversation because it “might be taken against me”. The participant made this decision despite the fact that his colleagues were expressing the opinion that United States foreign policy was the likely cause for the attacks—an opinion with which he agreed. This suggests some support for the theory that the fear of social isolation may make Australian Muslims especially anxious or fearful of expressing opinions about terrorism in public discussions (Noelle-Neumann). However, it also suggests that the fear of social isolation for Muslims is not solely related to the expression of minority opinion, as theorised in Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence . Given that many members of the wider community shared the theory that the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 2001 may have been a response to American foreign policy, this may well not be a minority view. Nonetheless, Australian Muslims hesitated to embrace it. Saniotis draws attention to the pressure on Australian Muslims to publicly distance themselves from the terrorist attacks of September 11 and to openly denounce the actions of terrorists. The extent to which Muslims were positioned as a threatening other was contingent on their ability to demonstrate that they too participated in the distal responses to the terrorist attacks—initial pity for the sufferer and eventual marginalisation and rejection of the perceived aggressor. Australian Muslims were obliged to declare their loyalty and commitment to Australia’s ally and, in this way, partake in the nationalistic responses to the threat of terrorism. At the same time however, Australian Muslims were positioned as an imagined enemy and a threat to national identity. Australian Muslims were therefore placed in a paradoxical bind- as Australians they were expected to respond as the victims of fear; as Muslims they were positioned as the objects of fear. Even in discussions where their opinions are congruent with the dominant opinion being expressed, Australian Muslims describe themselves as feeling apprehensive or anxious about expressing their opinions because of how these “might be taken”. Pursuing alternative discourses The overriding message from the research project’s Muslim participants was that the media, as a powerful purveyor of public opinion, had inculcated a perception of Muslims as a risk to Australia and Australians: an ‘enemy within’; the potential ‘home grown terrorist’. The daily experience of visibly-different Australian Muslims, however, is that they are more fearing than fear-inspiring. The Aly and Balnaves fear scale indicates that Australian Muslims have twice as many fear indicators as non-Muslims Australians. Disengagement from Western media and media that is seen to be influenced or controlled by the West is widespread among Australian Muslims who increasingly argue that the media institutions are motivated by an agenda that includes profit and the perpetuation of a negative stereotype of Muslims both in Australia and around the globe, particularly in relation to Middle Eastern affairs. The negative stereotypes of Muslims in the Australian media have inculcated a sense of victimhood which Muslims in Australia have used as the basis for a reconstruction of their identity and the creation of alternative narratives of belonging (Aly). Central to the notion of identity among Australian Muslims is a sense of having their citizenship rights curtailed by virtue of their faith: of being included in a general Western dismissal of Muslims’ rights and experiences. As one interviewee said: If you look at the Channel Al Jazeera for example, it’s a channel but they aren’t making up stories, they are taping videos in Iraqi, Palestine and other Muslim countries, and they just show it to people, that’s all they do. And then George Bush, you know, we hear on the news that George Bush was discussing with Tony Blair that he was thinking to bomb Al Jazeera so why would these people have their right to freedom and we don’t? So that’s why I think the people who are in power, they have the control over the media, and it’s a big political game. Because if it wasn’t then George Bush, he’s the symbol of politics, why would he want to bomb Al Jazeera for example? Amidst leaks and rumours (Timms) that the 2003 US bombing of Al Jazeera was a deliberate attack upon one of the few elements of the public sphere in which some Western-nationality Muslims have confidence, many elements of the mainstream Western media rose to Al Jazeera’s defence. For example, using an appeal to the right of citizens to engage in and consume free speech, the editors of influential US paper The Nation commented that: If the classified memo detailing President Bush’s alleged proposal to bomb the headquarters of Al Jazeera is provided to The Nation, we will publish the relevant sections. Why is it so vital that this information be made available to the American people? Because if a President who claims to be using the US military to liberate countries in order to spread freedom then conspires to destroy media that fail to echo his sentiments, he does not merely disgrace his office and soil the reputation of his country. He attacks a fundamental principle, freedom of the press—particularly a dissenting and disagreeable press—upon which that country was founded. (cited in Scahill) For other Australian Muslims, it is the fact that some media organisations have been listed as banned by the US that gives them their ultimate credibility. This is the case with Al Manar, for example. Feeling that they are denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as equal political citizens, Australian Muslims are pursuing alternative communicative spaces that support and reinforce their own cultural worldviews. The act of engaging with marginalised and alternative communicative spaces constitutes what Clifford terms ‘collective practices of displaced dwelling’. It is through these practices of displaced dwelling that Australian Muslims essentialise their diasporic identity and negotiate new identities based on common perceptions of injustice against Muslims. But you look at Al Jazeera they talk in the same tongue as the Western media in our language. And then you look again at something like Al Manar who talks of their own tongue. They do not use the other media’s ideas. They have been attacked by the Australians, been attacked by the Israelis and they have their own opinion. This statement came from an Australian Muslim of Jordanian background in her late forties. It reflects a growing trend towards engaging with media messages that coincide with and reinforce a sense of injustice. The Al Manar television station to which this participant refers is a Lebanese based station run by the militant Hezbollah movement and accessible to Australians via satellite. Much like Al Jazeera, Al Manar broadcasts images of Iraqi and Palestinian suffering and, in the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, graphic images of Lebanese casualties of Israeli air strikes. Unlike the Al Jazeera broadcasts, these images are formatted into video clips accompanied by music and lyrics such as “we do not fear America”. Despite political pressure including a decision by the US to list Al Manar as a terrorist organisation in December 2004, just one week after a French ban on the station because its programming had “a militant perspective with anti-Semitic connotations” (Jorisch), Al Manar continued to broadcast videos depicting the US as the “mother of terrorism”. In one particularly graphic sequence, the Statue of Liberty rises from the depths of the sea, wielding a knife in place of the torch and dripping in blood, her face altered to resemble a skull. As she rises out of the sea accompanied by music resembling a funeral march the following words in Arabic are emblazoned across the screen: On the dead bodies of millions of native Americans And through the enslavement of tens of millions Africans The US rose It pried into the affairs of most countries in the world After an extensive list of countries impacted by US foreign policy including China, Japan, Congo, Vietnam, Peru, Laos, Libya and Guatamala, the video comes to a gruelling halt with the words ‘America owes blood to all of humanity’. Another video juxtaposes images of Bush with Hitler with the caption ‘History repeats itself’. One website run by the Coalition against Media Terrorism refers to Al Manar as ‘the beacon of hatred’ and applauds the decisions by the French and US governments to ban the station. Al Manar defended itself against the bans stating on its website that they are attempts “to terrorise and silence thoughts that are not in line with the US and Israeli policies.” The station claims that it continues on its mission “to carry the message of defending our peoples’ rights, holy places and just causes…within internationally agreed professional laws and standards”. The particular brand of propaganda employed by Al Manar is gaining popularity among some Muslims in Australia largely because it affirms their own views and opinions and offers them opportunities to engage in an alternative public space in which Muslims are positioned as the victims and not the aggressors. Renegotiating an ‘Othered’ Identity The negative portrayal of Muslims as ‘other’ in the Australian media and in political discourse has resulted in Australian Muslims constructing alternative identities based on a common perception of injustice. Particularly since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror”, the ethnic divisions within the Muslim diaspora are becoming less significant as Australian Muslims reconstruct their identity based on a notion of supporting each other in the face of a global alliance against Islam. Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia. This causes problems, however, since religious identity has no place in the liberal democratic model, which espouses secularism. This is particularly the case where that religion is sometimes constructed as being at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy; namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. This problematic creates a context in which Muslim Australians are not only denied their heterogeneity in the media and political discourse but are dealt with through an understanding of Islam that is constructed on the basis of a cultural and ideological clash between Islam and the West. Religion has become the sole and only characteristic by which Muslims are recognised, denying them political citizenship and access to the public spaces of citizenship. Such ‘essentialising practices’ as eliding considerable diversity into a single descriptor serves to reinforce and consolidate diasporic identity among Muslims in Australia, but does little to promote and assist participatory citizenship or to equip Muslims with the tools necessary to access the public sphere as political citizens of the secular state. In such circumstances, the moderate Muslim may be not so much a ‘preferred’ citizen as one whose rights has been constrained. Acknowledgment This paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project, 2005-7, involving 10 focus groups and 60 in-depth interviews. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members. References Akbarzadeh, Shahram, and Bianca Smith. The Representation of Islam and Muslims in the Media (The Age and Herald Sun Newspapers). Melbourne: Monash University, 2005. Aly, Anne, and Mark Balnaves. ”‘They Want Us to Be Afraid’: Developing Metrics of the Fear of Terrorism.” International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities and Nations 6 (2007): 113-122. Aly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40. Clifford, James. Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century. London: Harvard UP, 1997. Haas, Tanni. “The Public Sphere as a Sphere of Publics: Rethinking Habermas’s Theory of the Public Sphere.” Journal of Communication 54.1 (2004): 178- 84. Jorisch, Avi. J. “Al-Manar and the War in Iraq.” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 5.2 (2003). Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth. “The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.” Journal of Communication 24.2 (1974): 43-52. “Online Archives of California”. California Digital Library. n.d. Feb. 2008 < http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt1199n498/?&query= %22open%20platform%22&brand=oac&hit.rank=1 >. Panopoulos, Sophie. Parliamentary debate, 5 Sep. 2005. Feb. 2008 < http://www.aph.gov.au.hansard >. Saniotis, Arthur. “Embodying Ambivalence: Muslim Australians as ‘Other’.” Journal of Australian Studies 82 (2004): 49-58. Scahill, Jeremy. “The War on Al-Jazeera (Comment)”. 2005. The Nation. Feb. 2008 < http://www.thenation.com/doc/20051219/scahill >. Timms, Dominic. “Al-Jazeera Seeks Answers over Bombing Memo”. 2005. Media Guardian. Feb. 2008 < http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/nov/23/iraq.iraqandthemedia >.

Introduction Over the past two decades the Cairns landscape has transformed from a remote tourist town beside the Great Barrier Reef to an international, tropical city with a new focus on culture and the arts. A number of important urban design projects have enabled this transformation, including key waterfront redevelopments, the addition of a large shopping mall and convention centre, a renovated museum, and now a new performing arts precinct and proposed ‘gallery precinct’ for the people of Cairns to access new art forms and events. Anderson and Law (556) depict recent developments as a kind of “mayor’s trophy collection” or set of “must have” attractions Cairns needs to stay ‘competitive’. More generally they might be interpreted as ‘entrepreneurial urbanism’ (Harvey) and the attractors for Richard Florida’s creative class, although there is now more scepticism about how these projects fuel property speculation and benefit the middle classes rather than the ‘bohemians’ Florida saw as key to urban growth and transformation (Wainwright). The renovation of Munro Martin Park discussed here is a culture infrastructure project helping transform Cairns into the ‘arts and culture capital of the north’. Here we interrogate the winners and losers of the renovation, with a specific focus on how its heritage values are preserved. The identity of Cairns as an arts and culture hub is not new or unfounded, but the debate changed in emphasis with a proposed Cairns Entertainment Precinct (CEP) in 2011/2012. The then Mayor Val Schier had secured federal and state funding for the development of a $155 million arts precinct on the waterfront near the Cairns Port, as the city had outgrown its existing facilities at the nearby Cairns Civic Theatre and the venue was unable to host large performances. The CEP was to be a key cultural infrastructure project marking a new era of arts and culture activities in Cairns. The subsequent election became a referendum on the precinct, with its location and need being questioned. Bob Manning became the new Mayor with a mandate to scrap the CEP and instead renovate the existing Civic Theatre as part of a scaled-down vision. In 2016, the Cairns Civic Theatre was demolished to make way for a new Cairns Performing Arts Centre. The original Civic Theatre was constructed in the 1970s and was one of a small handful of buildings in Cairns designed in late Brutalist architectural style: its exterior walls were made of fluted grey concrete blocks. Popular from the 1950s to the 1970s, brutalist architecture celebrated Modernism translated into raw, exposed concrete. Despite a renewed popular interest in Brutalist buildings in many western cities, many “are being demolished and new, … homogenous (often glass and composite-clad) towers [are being] erected in their place” (Mould 701). The Cairns Civic Theatre was no exception. Munro Martin Park, directly across from the Cairns Civic Theatre, was folded into the plans for the area and the two were imagined together to form a new Cairns Performing Arts Precinct (CPAC). Munro Martin Park History Munro Martin Park (originally Norman Park) was gazetted as a recreational reserve for Cairns in 1882. The park was set aside soon after European settlement and became a space for outdoor recreation. Community attachment to the park grew over time as the park became known as a meeting place for sporting events, community celebrations, parades, and political rallies. Circuses began annual visits to the park from 1891 as it was the closest large area of open ground to the inner city. These physical features also facilitated other community events, such as public holiday celebrations including May Day and ANZAC Day. Attempts to beautify the park and create shade were made in the early 1880s and again in 1892. Trees were planted with the aim of establishing a botanical reserve, although many did not survive. Those that did – mangoes, figs, and other tropical species – created shade, provided fruit for eating fresh or making chutneys and sauces, and became roosts for local flying foxes and bats. A major change of use occurred when the park was taken over by the military during WWII, and it became a space for accommodation huts and military training. An Air Raids Precautions control centre was erected (today one of the few remaining examples, and heritage listed), and a radio tower. After the war the local authority had no control over the park until it was returned from the military. The park’s war infrastructure was mostly removed, and after the war the parkland was in decline and underutilised (Grimwade 21). Most sporting clubs had moved to new grounds and community gatherings were no longer associated with sporting events (Cairns Regional Council 804). In 1954 the Cairns community saw substantial redevelopment of the park with a bequest from well-regarded local philanthropists: the Munro Martin sisters. The Cairns City Council redeveloped and beautified the park and on completion it was renamed Munro Martin Park in recognition of the sisters. It quickly renewed its status as a place for community gatherings and organised events, and as a rallying point for parades and political protests. Although the park continued to be used, it was no longer the focus of sports, with the development of purpose-built sporting fields on the southside of town. Much of the passive activity in the park began moving to the Cairns Esplanade in the early 1960s, with multi-purpose recreation areas and a large open saltwater swimming baths. This trend continued as the land along the Esplanade was reclaimed from mudflats and turned into areas for recreation and swimming (McKenzie et al. 113). By 2014 no major work had been undertaken in the park for some time, and it again became underutilised. A report by Grimwade evaluating the park’s condition found much of the infrastructure in disrepair. While it was still used by circuses, festivals, May Day celebrations and political rallies, the group most often found there were homeless Indigenous people. Plans to redevelop the park once again occurred in 2015, and these were folded into the CPAC vision. Fig. 1: Aerial image of Munro Martin Park, 1970. (Source: Cairns Historical Society image P291110.) Fig. 2: Aerial image of Munro Martin Park, 2018. (Source: Creative Life – Cairns Regional Council.) Winners and Losers After its renovation and re-opening in 2016, Munro Martin Park became a new public space with an art focus for the Cairns community. It is beautifully landscaped and entices new audiences to enjoy the arts, including families who find it a safe and secure environment for leisure. The barriers often associated with entering arts and culture venues are displaced by egalitarian outdoor seating on blankets, and programming and casting are demographically inclusive, which in turn entices a diverse audience. In this way the park is important to community life, offers health benefits and social interactions, and is a place that welcomes regardless of social standing (Slater and Koo 99). At the same time, the new space reflects neoliberal sensibilities in regard to safety and anti-social behaviour, as the park reflects a wider city branding exercise for Cairns (Mercer and Mayfield 508). The need for controlled ticketing, for example, means the park is now fenced with restricted access. Prior to its renovation the park was a safe haven and meeting and waiting place for those travelling from Indigenous communities in Cape York and the Torres Strait Islands to Cairns. It was frequented by Rosie’s, a local charity providing meals for the homeless, and many used it as a place to sleep (Dalton, Cairns Post). These communities are now locked out during performances and every night at sunset (CCTV ensures they do not remain). This is unfortunate as the park is underutilised on a day-to-day basis as performances are sporadic; this is partly because it is costly to rent and access for community events. In this way the public space of the park has become commodified as part of a new political economy of the city and displaced its use as a refuge for the alienated or excluded. In other words, the park’s renovation raises familiar questions about the ‘right to the city’ (Marcuse). The park had been a place where people could just ‘be’ or dwell, but this was inevitably associated with homelessness (Mitchell 123). It is not uncommon for different groups of people to claim the same site at different times of the day. The important thing is that the users feel a strong enough connection and that it reflects their cultural or social needs so that they are likely to use the place (Barnes et al.). In addition to the displacement of a homeless community, the park also lost significant heritage trees that had survived from the late 1800s. Local environmental activists protested by sitting in – and refusing to come down from – some of the trees as the renovation commenced (Power, Cairns Post). The trees expressed heritage value but were also home to endangered bat colonies (Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management). Although Munro Martin Park trees are not the only flying fox habitats, their loss has contributed to their demise. On the other hand, and through the park’s addition of new trees, tropical plants and elaborate vined arbours, the park is an award-winning showcase of tropical urban greenery evoking civic pride. This revitalisation and beautification creates opportunities for new community attachments to place through new sensory perceptions (Hashemnezhad et al. 7). Community attachment to Munro Martin Park and its related social value has thus changed over time. The park’s social value, as understood by the Burra Charter, is the social quality which makes it a focus for spiritual, political, national, or other cultural sentiment. Jones (21) defines social value as encompassing “the significance of the historic environment to contemporary communities, including people's sense of identity, belonging and place, as well as forms of memory and spiritual association” (see also Johnston, 1). Fond memories of sporting days, school excursions, and the circus are held by the older community, but after 1970 these positive associations diminish as the park became known for anti-social behaviour and was avoided. The heritage value and community associations are now remembered with interpretive panels that recall political rallies, circuses and celebrations, and the military takeover – making this history more accessible to younger audiences. While the park is no longer a rally point for the start of the annual May Day march, and the circus has shifted outside the city centre, portrait panels remember the stories of people who had a connection with the park. An obelisk created in the memory of the Munro and Martin sisters has been restored, which is also a reminder of Eddie Oribin’s and Sid Barnes’s joint work as influential Cairns-based architects (who built the former neighbouring brutalist Cairns Civic Theatre). The World War Two Air Raids Precautions control room, which coordinated all the air raid wardens in the city, remains and is listed on the Queensland Heritage Register. It was reused as a Scouts shop and has a large fibreglass scout hat put on top. The redevelopment thereby acknowledges the past and makes it more accessible than it was from the 1970s to the 2000s. Old places need new uses and new uses need old places, as urban activist Jane Jacobs famously said (Chang 524). These new uses become a part of a new city narrative and imaginary, creating new community attachments as a part of an evolving story. As it the case with other parts of the city’s history, however, some histories of Cairns are silenced in urban renewal (Law), reflecting the multiple and sometimes conflicting social values at play. Fig. 3: Munro Martin Park as a WWII Command Centre, n.d. (Source: Cairns Historical Society, image P08730.) Fig. 4: WWII Command Centre as Scout Hut with hat, 2016. (Source: Cairns Historical Society, image P20692.) Conclusion The revitalisation of places through arts-led gentrification is well documented and understood. This article builds on critiques of gentrification, asking slightly different questions about memory, history, and the contested meanings of heritage in urban renewal. The social value of Munro Martin Park is situated in time and space and by different users, and community attachment has evolved over time. For older generations the park evokes memories of sports, circuses, political rallies, and the closeness of the war. These histories have been remembered and curated through new park signage reflecting a conservative middle-class past: No Sports on Sundays; Circuses and Celebrations; Rallying at the Park; Military Takeover. For younger generations, for whom the park was a place to be avoided – a dangerous place on the edge of the city centre inhabited by the homeless – the park is now a new cultural space promoting accessibility to the arts. The mangoes that were once shelter for the flying fox population have given way to a new venue, tropical vines and foliage, and new signage and programming will produce new social value over time. Whether its redevelopment will “herald a renaissance in Cairns cultural life” by delivering “fresh performing arts and botanic experiences” (Cultural Services 8) remains to be seen in the shadow of COVID-19. What we do know is that the history and social significance of the park as a space for the homeless or a stopover and waiting place for Indigenous people from the Cape and the Torres Strait Islands has been erased, and that the now dispersed homeless population is difficult to reach except for food trucks and shelters. Their use of the park, whether as shelter or meeting place, is now highly constrained to a small, unfenced corner of the park at the corner of Sheridan and Minnie Street (which is rarely used). Although the redevelopment of Munro Martin Park is part of a vision for Cairns as a hub for arts and culture activities, it is important to ask at what cost. The controlled and surveilled nature of the park no longer permits the use of the space for rough sleeping or informal community events, although its redevelopment has increased visitation and created a safe and inclusive public space for middle class residents to enjoy the arts and contemplate the city’s history. With Marcuse and Mitchell we think it is important to ask larger questions about whose right to the city, and to see the remaking of urban sites as ongoing struggles over public space. In a city with one of the highest rates of homelessness per capita in Queensland, the renovation of this site of refuge reflects neoliberal tendencies in the creative economy to remake the city without due attention to the exclusion of undesirables and growing spatial inequality. References Anderson, Allison, and Lisa Law. "Putting Carmona’s Place-Shaping Continuum to Use in Research Practice." Journal of Urban Design 20.5 (2015): 545-562. DOI: 10.1080/13574809.2015.1071656. Barnes, Leanne, et al. Places Not Spaces: Placemaking in Australia. Envirobook, 1995. Cairns Regional Council. "Planning Scheme Policy – Places of Significance." Cairns Regional Council, 2016. 801-805. Chang, T.C. "‘New Uses Need Old Buildings’: Gentrification Aesthetics and the Arts in Singapore." Urban Studies 53.3 (2016): 524-539. DOI: 10.1177/0042098014527482. Cultural Services. "Cairns Regional Council Strategy for Culture and the Arts 2022." Cairns Regional Council, 2018. Dalton, Nick. 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On 23 August 2005, John Howard, then Prime Minister, called together Muslim ‘representatives’ from around the nation for a Muslim Summit in response to the London bombings in July of that year. One of the outcomes of the two hour summit was a Statement of Principles committing Muslim communities in Australia to resist radicalisation and pursue a ‘moderate’ Islam. Since then the ill-defined term ‘moderate Muslim’ has been used in both the political and media discourse to refer to a preferred form of Islamic practice that does not challenge the hegemony of the nation state and that is coherent with the principles of secularism. Akbarzadeh and Smith conclude that the terms ‘moderate’ and ‘mainstream’ are used to describe Muslims whom Australians should not fear in contrast to ‘extremists’. Ironically, the policy direction towards regulating the practice of Islam in Australia in favour of a state defined ‘moderate’ Islam signals an attempt by the state to mediate the practice of religion, undermining the ethos of secularism as it is expressed in the Australian Constitution. It also – arguably – impacts upon the citizenship rights of Australian Muslims in so far as citizenship presents not just as a formal set of rights accorded to an individual but also to democratic participation: the ability of citizens to enjoy those rights at a substantive level. Based on the findings of research into how Australian Muslims and members of the broader community are responding to the political and media discourses on terrorism, this article examines the impact of these discourses on how Muslims are practicing citizenship and re-defining an Australian Muslim identity. Free Speech Free speech has been a hallmark of liberal democracies ever since its defence became part of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Australian Constitution does not expressly contain a provision for free speech. The right to free speech in Australia is implied in Australia’s ratification of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), article 19 of which affirms: Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. The ultimate recent endorsement of free speech rights, arguably associated with the radical free speech ‘open platform’ movement of the 1960s at the University of California Berkeley, constructs free speech as essential to human and civil liberties. Its approach has been expressed in terms such as: “I reject and detest XYZ views but will defend to the utmost a person’s right to express them”. An active defence of free speech is based on the observation that, unless held to account, “[Authorities] would grant free speech to those with whom they agree, but not to minorities whom they consider unorthodox or threatening” (“Online Archives of California”). Such minorities, differing from the majority view, do so as a right accorded to citizens. In very challenging circumstances – such as opposing the Cold War operations of the US Senate Anti-American Activities Committee – the free speech movement has been celebrated as holding fast (or embodying a ‘return’) to the true meaning of the American First Amendment. It was in public statements of unpopular and minority views, which opposed those of the majority, that the right to free speech could most non-controvertibly be demonstrated. Some have argued that such rights should be balanced by anti-vilification legislation, by prohibitions upon incitement to violence, and by considerations as to whether the organisation defended by the speaker was banned. In the latter case, there can be problems with excluding the defence of banned organisations from legitimate debate. In the 1970s and 1980s, for example, Sinn Fein was denounced in the UK as the ‘political wing of the IRA’ (the IRA being a banned organisation) and denied a speaking position in many forums, yet has proved to be an important party in the eventual reconciliation of the Northern Ireland divide. In effect, the banning of an organisation is a political act and such acts should best be interrogated through free speech and democratic debate. Arguably, such disputation is a responsibility of an involved citizenry. In general, liberal democracies such as Australia do not hesitate to claim that citizens have a right to free speech and that this is a right worth defending. There is a legitimate expectation by Australians of their rights as citizens to freedom of expression. For some Australian Muslims, however, the appeal to free speech seems a hollow one. Muslim citizens run the risk of being constructed as ‘un-Australian’ when they articulate their concerns or opinions. Calls by some Muslim leaders not to reprint the Danish cartoons depicting images of the Prophet Mohammed for example, met with a broader community backlash and drew responses that, typically, constructed Muslims as a threat to Australian cultural values of freedom and liberty. These kinds of responses to expressions by Australian Muslims of their deeply held convictions are rarely, if ever, interpreted as attempts to curtail Australian Muslims’ rights to free speech. There is a poor fit between what many Australian Muslims believe and what they feel the current climate in Australia allows them to say in the public domain. Positioned as the potential ‘enemy within’ in the evolving media and political discourse post September 11, they have been allocated restricted speaking positions on many subjects from the role and training of their Imams to the right to request Sharia courts (which could operate in parallel with Australian courts in the same way that Catholic divorce/annulment courts do). These social and political restrictions lead them to question whether Muslims enjoy citizenship rights on an equal footing with Australians from the broader community. The following comment from an Australian woman, an Iraqi refugee, made in a research interview demonstrates this: The media say that if you are Australian it means that you enjoy freedom, you enjoy the rights of citizenship. That is the idea of what it means to be Australian, that you do those things. But if you are a Muslim, you are not Australian. You are a people who are dangerous, a people who are suspicious, a people who do not want democracy—all the characteristics that make up terrorists. So yes, there is a difference, a big difference. And it is a feeling all Muslims have, not just me, whether you are at school, at work, and especially if you wear the hijab. (Translated from Arabic by Anne Aly) At the same time, Australian Muslims observe some members of the broader community making strong assertions about Muslims (often based on misunderstanding or misinformation) with very little in the way of censure or rebuke. For example, again in 2005, Liberal backbenchers Sophie Panopoulos and Bronwyn Bishop made an emotive plea for the banning of headscarves in public schools, drawing explicitly on the historically inherited image of Islam as a violent, backward and oppressive ideology that has no place in Western liberal democracy: I fear a frightening Islamic class emerging, supported by a perverse interpretation of the Koran where disenchantment breeds disengagement, where powerful and subversive orthodoxies are inculcated into passionate and impressionable young Muslims, where the Islamic mosque becomes the breeding ground for violence and rejection of Australian law and ideals, where extremists hijack the Islamic faith with their own prescriptive and unbending version of the Koran and where extremist views are given currency and validity … . Why should one section of the community be stuck in the Dark Ages of compliance cloaked under a veil of some distorted form of religious freedom? (Panopoulos) Several studies attest to the fact that, since the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001, Islam, and by association Australian Muslims, have been positioned as other in the political and media discourse (see for example Aly). The construct of Muslims as ‘out of place’ (Saniotis) denies them entry and representation in the public sphere: a key requisite for democratic participation according to Habermas (cited in Haas). This notion of a lack of a context for Muslim citizenship in Australian public spheres arises out of the popular construction of ‘Muslim’ and ‘Australian’ as mutually exclusive modes of being. Denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as political citizens, Australian Muslims must pursue alternative communicative spaces. Some respond by limiting their expressions to closed spheres of communication – a kind of enforced silence. Others respond by pursuing alternative media discourses that challenge the dominant stereotypes of Muslims in Western media and reinforce majority-world cultural views. Enforced Silence In closed spheres of discussion, Australian Muslims can openly share their perceptions about terrorism, the government and media. Speaking openly in public however, is not common practice and results in forced silence for fear of reprisal or being branded a terrorist: “if we jump up and go ‘oh how dare you say this, rah, rah’, he’ll be like ‘oh he’s going to go off, he’ll blow something up’”. One research participant recalled that when his work colleagues were discussing the September 11 attacks he decided not to partake in the conversation because it “might be taken against me”. The participant made this decision despite the fact that his colleagues were expressing the opinion that United States foreign policy was the likely cause for the attacks—an opinion with which he agreed. This suggests some support for the theory that the fear of social isolation may make Australian Muslims especially anxious or fearful of expressing opinions about terrorism in public discussions (Noelle-Neumann). However, it also suggests that the fear of social isolation for Muslims is not solely related to the expression of minority opinion, as theorised in Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence . Given that many members of the wider community shared the theory that the attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 2001 may have been a response to American foreign policy, this may well not be a minority view. Nonetheless, Australian Muslims hesitated to embrace it. Saniotis draws attention to the pressure on Australian Muslims to publicly distance themselves from the terrorist attacks of September 11 and to openly denounce the actions of terrorists. The extent to which Muslims were positioned as a threatening other was contingent on their ability to demonstrate that they too participated in the distal responses to the terrorist attacks—initial pity for the sufferer and eventual marginalisation and rejection of the perceived aggressor. Australian Muslims were obliged to declare their loyalty and commitment to Australia’s ally and, in this way, partake in the nationalistic responses to the threat of terrorism. At the same time however, Australian Muslims were positioned as an imagined enemy and a threat to national identity. Australian Muslims were therefore placed in a paradoxical bind- as Australians they were expected to respond as the victims of fear; as Muslims they were positioned as the objects of fear. Even in discussions where their opinions are congruent with the dominant opinion being expressed, Australian Muslims describe themselves as feeling apprehensive or anxious about expressing their opinions because of how these “might be taken”. Pursuing alternative discourses The overriding message from the research project’s Muslim participants was that the media, as a powerful purveyor of public opinion, had inculcated a perception of Muslims as a risk to Australia and Australians: an ‘enemy within’; the potential ‘home grown terrorist’. The daily experience of visibly-different Australian Muslims, however, is that they are more fearing than fear-inspiring. The Aly and Balnaves fear scale indicates that Australian Muslims have twice as many fear indicators as non-Muslims Australians. Disengagement from Western media and media that is seen to be influenced or controlled by the West is widespread among Australian Muslims who increasingly argue that the media institutions are motivated by an agenda that includes profit and the perpetuation of a negative stereotype of Muslims both in Australia and around the globe, particularly in relation to Middle Eastern affairs. The negative stereotypes of Muslims in the Australian media have inculcated a sense of victimhood which Muslims in Australia have used as the basis for a reconstruction of their identity and the creation of alternative narratives of belonging (Aly). Central to the notion of identity among Australian Muslims is a sense of having their citizenship rights curtailed by virtue of their faith: of being included in a general Western dismissal of Muslims’ rights and experiences. As one interviewee said: If you look at the Channel Al Jazeera for example, it’s a channel but they aren’t making up stories, they are taping videos in Iraqi, Palestine and other Muslim countries, and they just show it to people, that’s all they do. And then George Bush, you know, we hear on the news that George Bush was discussing with Tony Blair that he was thinking to bomb Al Jazeera so why would these people have their right to freedom and we don’t? So that’s why I think the people who are in power, they have the control over the media, and it’s a big political game. Because if it wasn’t then George Bush, he’s the symbol of politics, why would he want to bomb Al Jazeera for example? Amidst leaks and rumours (Timms) that the 2003 US bombing of Al Jazeera was a deliberate attack upon one of the few elements of the public sphere in which some Western-nationality Muslims have confidence, many elements of the mainstream Western media rose to Al Jazeera’s defence. For example, using an appeal to the right of citizens to engage in and consume free speech, the editors of influential US paper The Nation commented that: If the classified memo detailing President Bush’s alleged proposal to bomb the headquarters of Al Jazeera is provided to The Nation, we will publish the relevant sections. Why is it so vital that this information be made available to the American people? Because if a President who claims to be using the US military to liberate countries in order to spread freedom then conspires to destroy media that fail to echo his sentiments, he does not merely disgrace his office and soil the reputation of his country. He attacks a fundamental principle, freedom of the press—particularly a dissenting and disagreeable press—upon which that country was founded. (cited in Scahill) For other Australian Muslims, it is the fact that some media organisations have been listed as banned by the US that gives them their ultimate credibility. This is the case with Al Manar, for example. Feeling that they are denied access to public spaces to partake in democratic dialogue as equal political citizens, Australian Muslims are pursuing alternative communicative spaces that support and reinforce their own cultural worldviews. The act of engaging with marginalised and alternative communicative spaces constitutes what Clifford terms ‘collective practices of displaced dwelling’. It is through these practices of displaced dwelling that Australian Muslims essentialise their diasporic identity and negotiate new identities based on common perceptions of injustice against Muslims. But you look at Al Jazeera they talk in the same tongue as the Western media in our language. And then you look again at something like Al Manar who talks of their own tongue. They do not use the other media’s ideas. They have been attacked by the Australians, been attacked by the Israelis and they have their own opinion. This statement came from an Australian Muslim of Jordanian background in her late forties. It reflects a growing trend towards engaging with media messages that coincide with and reinforce a sense of injustice. The Al Manar television station to which this participant refers is a Lebanese based station run by the militant Hezbollah movement and accessible to Australians via satellite. Much like Al Jazeera, Al Manar broadcasts images of Iraqi and Palestinian suffering and, in the recent war between Israel and Hezbollah, graphic images of Lebanese casualties of Israeli air strikes. Unlike the Al Jazeera broadcasts, these images are formatted into video clips accompanied by music and lyrics such as “we do not fear America”. Despite political pressure including a decision by the US to list Al Manar as a terrorist organisation in December 2004, just one week after a French ban on the station because its programming had “a militant perspective with anti-Semitic connotations” (Jorisch), Al Manar continued to broadcast videos depicting the US as the “mother of terrorism”. In one particularly graphic sequence, the Statue of Liberty rises from the depths of the sea, wielding a knife in place of the torch and dripping in blood, her face altered to resemble a skull. As she rises out of the sea accompanied by music resembling a funeral march the following words in Arabic are emblazoned across the screen: On the dead bodies of millions of native Americans And through the enslavement of tens of millions Africans The US rose It pried into the affairs of most countries in the world After an extensive list of countries impacted by US foreign policy including China, Japan, Congo, Vietnam, Peru, Laos, Libya and Guatamala, the video comes to a gruelling halt with the words ‘America owes blood to all of humanity’. Another video juxtaposes images of Bush with Hitler with the caption ‘History repeats itself’. One website run by the Coalition against Media Terrorism refers to Al Manar as ‘the beacon of hatred’ and applauds the decisions by the French and US governments to ban the station. Al Manar defended itself against the bans stating on its website that they are attempts “to terrorise and silence thoughts that are not in line with the US and Israeli policies.” The station claims that it continues on its mission “to carry the message of defending our peoples’ rights, holy places and just causes…within internationally agreed professional laws and standards”. The particular brand of propaganda employed by Al Manar is gaining popularity among some Muslims in Australia largely because it affirms their own views and opinions and offers them opportunities to engage in an alternative public space in which Muslims are positioned as the victims and not the aggressors. Renegotiating an ‘Othered’ Identity The negative portrayal of Muslims as ‘other’ in the Australian media and in political discourse has resulted in Australian Muslims constructing alternative identities based on a common perception of injustice. Particularly since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 2001 and the ensuing “war on terror”, the ethnic divisions within the Muslim diaspora are becoming less significant as Australian Muslims reconstruct their identity based on a notion of supporting each other in the face of a global alliance against Islam. Religious identity is increasingly becoming the identity of choice for Muslims in Australia. This causes problems, however, since religious identity has no place in the liberal democratic model, which espouses secularism. This is particularly the case where that religion is sometimes constructed as being at odds with the principles and values of liberal democracy; namely tolerance and adherence to the rule of law. This problematic creates a context in which Muslim Australians are not only denied their heterogeneity in the media and political discourse but are dealt with through an understanding of Islam that is constructed on the basis of a cultural and ideological clash between Islam and the West. Religion has become the sole and only characteristic by which Muslims are recognised, denying them political citizenship and access to the public spaces of citizenship. Such ‘essentialising practices’ as eliding considerable diversity into a single descriptor serves to reinforce and consolidate diasporic identity among Muslims in Australia, but does little to promote and assist participatory citizenship or to equip Muslims with the tools necessary to access the public sphere as political citizens of the secular state. In such circumstances, the moderate Muslim may be not so much a ‘preferred’ citizen as one whose rights has been constrained. 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Feb. 2008 http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/nov/23/iraq.iraqandthemedia>. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. "‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen." M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08-aly-green.php>. APA Style Aly, A., and L. Green. (Apr. 2008) "‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen," M/C Journal, 10(6)/11(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08-aly-green.php>.