Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Hardware isolation"
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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "Hardware isolation"
Shang, Ming. "A New Hardware Isolation Architecture". Applied Mechanics and Materials 530-531 (fevereiro de 2014): 631–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amm.530-531.631.
Texto completo da fonteHu, Nianhang, Mengmei Ye e Sheng Wei. "Surviving Information Leakage Hardware Trojan Attacks Using Hardware Isolation". IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing 7, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2019): 253–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tetc.2017.2648739.
Texto completo da fonteHooker, Sara. "The hardware lottery". Communications of the ACM 64, n.º 12 (dezembro de 2021): 58–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3467017.
Texto completo da fonteKaplan, David. "Hardware VM Isolation in the Cloud". Queue 21, n.º 4 (31 de agosto de 2023): 49–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3623392.
Texto completo da fonteKaplan, David. "Hardware VM Isolation in the Cloud". Communications of the ACM 67, n.º 1 (21 de dezembro de 2023): 54–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3624576.
Texto completo da fonteZeng, Qiang Hong, Shi Jian Zhu, Jing Jun Lou e Shui Qing Xie. "Hardware Design for Active Vibration Isolation Controller". Advanced Materials Research 211-212 (fevereiro de 2011): 1061–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.4028/www.scientific.net/amr.211-212.1061.
Texto completo da fonteChen, Sui, Lu Peng e Samuel Irving. "Accelerating GPU Hardware Transactional Memory with Snapshot Isolation". ACM SIGARCH Computer Architecture News 45, n.º 2 (14 de setembro de 2017): 282–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3140659.3080204.
Texto completo da fonteOmar, Hamza, e Omer Khan. "PRISM". ACM Transactions on Architecture and Code Optimization 18, n.º 3 (junho de 2021): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3450523.
Texto completo da fonteCho, Yeongpil. "Fine-Grained Isolation to Protect Data against In-Process Attacks on AArch64". Electronics 9, n.º 2 (1 de fevereiro de 2020): 236. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/electronics9020236.
Texto completo da fonteVerghese, Ben, Anoop Gupta e Mendel Rosenblum. "Performance isolation". ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 32, n.º 5 (dezembro de 1998): 181–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/384265.291044.
Texto completo da fonteTeses / dissertações sobre o assunto "Hardware isolation"
Vilanova, García Lluís. "Code-Centric Domain Isolation : a hardware/software co-design for efficient program isolation". Doctoral thesis, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/385746.
Texto completo da fonteEls sistemes software d'avui en dia contenen una multitud de components software: des de simples llibreries fins a plugins o serveis complexos. La seguretat i fiabilitat d'aquests sistemes depèn de ser capaç d'aïllar cadascun d'aquests components en un domini a part. L'aïllament en els sistemes convencionals imposa grans costos tant en el rendiment com en la programabilitat del sistema. És més, tots els sistemes solen donar prioritat al rendiment sobre qualsevol altre consideració, degradant la seguretat i fiabilitat del sistema. Aquests costos en rendiment i programabilitat són deguts a la co-evolució de les arquitectures i Sistemes Operatius (SOs) convencionals, que exposen l'aïllament en termes d'un model de "CPUs virtuals". Els SOs encarnen aquest model a través dels processos que proprcionen. El SO s'aïlla del codi d'usuari a través d'un nivell de privilegi separat. Al mateix temps, els processos d'usuari estan aïllats els uns dels altres al utilitzar taules de pàgines separades. El nucli del SO multiplexa aquests processos entre els diferents recursos físics del sistema, proporcionant-los la il·lusió d'estar executant-se en una màquina per al seu ús exclusiu. Donat aquest model, els processos interactuen a través d'interfícies que han estat dissenyades per a sistemes distribuïts, empitjorant-ne la programabilitat i rendiment. Els elements de l'arquitectura que s'utilitzen per a construïr processos imposen costos en el rendiment que superen el 10x i 1000x en comparació amb una simple crida a funció (en el cas de nivells de privilegi i canvis de taula de pàgina, respectivament). És més, part d'aquests costos no vénen donats per l'arquitectura, sinó pels costos inherents al disseny dels SOs actuals. El nucli del SO actua com a mitjancer en la comunicació entre processos a través de primitives conegudes com a IPC. El IPC no és només costós en termes de rendiment, sinó que a més a més es desvia de les semàntiques tradicionals de crida síncrona de funcions. Tot "thread" està lligat al procés que el crea, i la invocació de funcionalitat entre processos requereix de la costosa mediació del SO i de la participació del programador a l'hora de sincronitzar "threads" i intercanviar informacio a través dels canals d'IPC. Aquesta tesi proposa un co-disseny del programari i del maquinari que elimina els costos de l'aïllament basat en processos, alhora que proporciona un camí per a l'adopció gradual d'optimitzacions més agressives. És a dir, permet que qualsevol procés faci una simple crida a una funció que està en un altre domini d'aïllament (com ara un altre procés) sense trencar la la semàntica de les crides síncrones a funció. Aquesta tesi proposa l'arquitectura de protecció CODOMs, que proporciona protecció de memòria i privilegis entre components de programari d'una forma que és, alhora, eficient i flexible. Aquest substrat del maquinari és aleshores utilitzat per proposar DomOS, un conjunt de canvis al SO al nivell del "runtime" i del nucli que permeten a qualsevol "thread" fer crides a funció de forma eficient i segura a codi que resideix en d'altres processos. És a dir, que el "thread" d'un procés pot cridar una funció d'un altre procés sense haver de passar pel SO en el seu camí crític. Això s'aconsegueix a través de mapejar tots els processos en un espai d'adreces compartit i d'eliminar tots els costos d'IPC a través d'una combinació de noves primitives en el maquinari i d'optimitzacions en temps de compilació i en temps d'execució. El IPC a DomOS és fins a 24x més ràpid que les pipes a Linux, i fins a 14x més ràpid que el IPC al SO L4 Fiasco.OC. Si s'aplica el sistema a un servidor web multi-capa, DomOS és fins a 2.18x més ràpid que un sistema Linux no modificat, i 1.32x més ràpid de mitjana. En totes les configuracions, DomOS proporciona més del 85% de la eficiència d'un sistema ideal.
Goonasekera, Nuwan Abhayawardena. "Program-level support for protecting an application from untrustworthy components". Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2012. https://eprints.qut.edu.au/60851/1/Nuwan_Goonasekera_Thesis.pdf.
Texto completo da fonteMaisuradze, Giorgi [Verfasser], e Christian [Akademischer Betreuer] Rossow. "Assessing the security of hardware-assisted isolation techniques / Giorgi Maisuradze ; Betreuer: Christian Rossow". Saarbrücken : Saarländische Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek, 2019. http://d-nb.info/120658873X/34.
Texto completo da fonteBehrens, Diogo. "Error isolation in distributed systems". Doctoral thesis, Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2016. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-203428.
Texto completo da fonteBehrens, Diogo, Marco Serafini, Sergei Arnautov, Flavio Junqueira e Christof Fetzer. "Scalable error isolation for distributed systems: modeling, correctness proofs, and additional experiments". Saechsische Landesbibliothek- Staats- und Universitaetsbibliothek Dresden, 2016. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-203622.
Texto completo da fonteBehrens, Diogo, Marco Serafini, Sergei Arnautov, Flavio Junqueira e Christof Fetzer. "Scalable error isolation for distributed systems: modeling, correctness proofs, and additional experiments". Technische Universität Dresden, 2015. https://tud.qucosa.de/id/qucosa%3A29539.
Texto completo da fonteSensaoui, Abderrahmane. "Etude et implémentation de mécanismes de protection d'exécution d'applications embarquées". Thesis, Université Grenoble Alpes, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020GRALM002.
Texto completo da fonteLooking at the speed by which embedded systems technologies are advancing, there is no surprise the attacks' number is rising. Many applications are written quickly in a low-level language to keep up with industry pace, and they contain a variety of bugs. Bugs can be used to break into a device and to run malicious code. Reviewing code becomes more and more complex and costly due to its size. Another factor complicating code review is the use of on-the-shelf libraries. Even a detailed code review does not guarantee a bug-free application.This thesis presents an architecture to run securely untrusted applications on the same platform. We assume that the applications contain exploitable bugs, even the operating system can be exploited. We also assume that attackers can take control of In/Out hardware components (e.g., Direct Memory Access (DMA)). The device is trusted when the architecture guarantees that attackers cannot compromise the whole device and access sensitive code and data. Even when an application is compromised, our architecture guarantees a strong separation of multiple components: hardware and software. It ensures the authenticity and integrity of embedded applications and can verify their state before any sensitive operation. The architecture guarantees, for local and remote parties, that the device is running properly, and protect against software attacks.First, we study multiple attack vector and isolation and attestation architectures. We present multiple software attack vectors, and we define the security features and properties that these architectures need to ensure. We provide a detailed description of fifteen existing architectures in both academia and industry, and we compare their features. Then, we provide an in-depth study of five lightweight architectures where we give a comparison of performance, size, and how they behave against software-based attacks. From these studies, we draw our security objectives for lightweight devices: multi-layer isolation, attestation, upgradability, confidentiality, small size with a negligible run-time overhead and ease-of-use.Then, we design hybrid isolation and attestation architecture for lightweight devices. The so-called Toubkal offers multi-layered isolation; the system is composed of three layers of isolation. The first one is at the hardware level to separate In/Out components from each other. The second one is at the security monitor level; our study shows that there is a strong need to create a real separation between the security monitor and all the rest. Finally, the third layer is at the application level.However, isolation itself is not sufficient. Devices still need to ensure that the running application behaves as it was intended. For this reason, Toubkal provides attestation to be able to check the state of a device at any-time. It guarantees that a software component or data were not compromised.Finally, we prove the correctness of the security properties that Toubkal provides. We modeled Toubkal as a finite state machine and used computer-aided formal verification to prove the security properties. Then, we evaluated Toubkal's overhead. The results show that Toubkal overhead is small and fit for lightweight devices
Ducasse, Quentin. "Sécurisation matérielle de la compilation à la volée des machines virtuelles langage". Electronic Thesis or Diss., Brest, École nationale supérieure de techniques avancées Bretagne, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024ENTA0003.
Texto completo da fonteLanguage Virtual Machines (VMs) are the run-time environment of popular high level managed languages. They offer portability and memory handling for the developer and are deployed on most computing devices. Their widespread distribution, handling of untrusted user inputs, and low-level task execution make them interesting to attackers. Software-only solutions that isolate their different components often incur a high performance overhead incompatible with just-in-time (JIT) compilation. Hardware-accelerated run time protections are pushed in vendor processors as a solution to conciliate strong security guarantees with performance. To allow experimentation in the design and comparison of such solutions, this thesis is interested in the RISC-V instruction set and its extension capabilities. We present Gigue, a workload generator that outputs binaries similar to JIT code directly executable on RISC-V softcores. It provides an interface for custom instructions and guarantees their execution. We present an instruction-level domain isolation solution added to Gigue binaries and implemented in an application-class processor with processor modifications. The solution adds negligible performance overhead while enforcing strong properties on domains. As an effort to motivate deployment in real use cases, we extend the Pharo JIT compiler to the RISC-V instruction set along with its testing infrastructure
Wang, Shuo. "Control of a Uni-Axial Magnetorheological Vibration Isolator". University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2011. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1302200947.
Texto completo da fonteBenhani, El mehdi. "Sécurité des systèmes sur puce complexes hétérogènes". Thesis, Lyon, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020LYSES016.
Texto completo da fonteThe thesis studies the security of the ARM TrustZone technology in the context of complex heterogeneous SoCs. The thesis presents hardware attacks that affect elements of the SoCs architecture and it also presents countermeasure strategies
Livros sobre o assunto "Hardware isolation"
Patterson, Christopher B. Open World Empire. NYU Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9781479802043.001.0001.
Texto completo da fonteCapítulos de livros sobre o assunto "Hardware isolation"
Passaretti, Daniele, Felix Boehm, Martin Wilhelm e Thilo Pionteck. "Hardware Isolation Support for Low-Cost SoC-FPGAs". In Architecture of Computing Systems, 148–63. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21867-5_10.
Texto completo da fonteZhang, Kening, Ronald F. DeMara e Carthik A. Sharma. "Consensus-Based Evaluation for Fault Isolation and On-line Evolutionary Regeneration". In Evolvable Systems: From Biology to Hardware, 12–24. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11549703_2.
Texto completo da fonteYe, Mengmei, Myra B. Cohen, Witawas Srisa-an e Sheng Wei. "EvoIsolator: Evolving Program Slices for Hardware Isolation Based Security". In Search-Based Software Engineering, 377–82. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-99241-9_24.
Texto completo da fonteDowsley, Rafael, Jörn Müuller-Quade e Tobias Nilges. "Weakening the Isolation Assumption of Tamper-Proof Hardware Tokens". In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 197–213. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-17470-9_12.
Texto completo da fonteDing, Baozeng, Fufeng Yao, Yanjun Wu e Yeping He. "Improving Flask Implementation Using Hardware Assisted In-VM Isolation". In IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology, 115–25. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30436-1_10.
Texto completo da fonteTople, Shruti, Soyeon Park, Min Suk Kang e Prateek Saxena. "VeriCount: Verifiable Resource Accounting Using Hardware and Software Isolation". In Applied Cryptography and Network Security, 657–77. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93387-0_34.
Texto completo da fonteShi, Bin, Lei Cui, Bo Li, Xudong Liu, Zhiyu Hao e Haiying Shen. "ShadowMonitor: An Effective In-VM Monitoring Framework with Hardware-Enforced Isolation". In Research in Attacks, Intrusions, and Defenses, 670–90. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00470-5_31.
Texto completo da fonteWang, Zhuoyue, Zhiqiang Wang, Jinyang Zhao e Yaping Chi. "PCCP: A Private Container Cloud Platform Supporting Domestic Hardware and Software". In Proceeding of 2021 International Conference on Wireless Communications, Networking and Applications, 399–407. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-2456-9_41.
Texto completo da fonteYuan, Shenghao, Frédéric Besson, Jean-Pierre Talpin, Samuel Hym, Koen Zandberg e Emmanuel Baccelli. "End-to-End Mechanized Proof of an eBPF Virtual Machine for Micro-controllers". In Computer Aided Verification, 293–316. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13188-2_15.
Texto completo da fonteMalipatlolla, Sunil. "A Novel Approach for a Hardware-Based Secure Process Isolation in an Embedded System". In Communications in Computer and Information Science, 1–9. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40576-1_1.
Texto completo da fonteTrabalhos de conferências sobre o assunto "Hardware isolation"
Ekberg, Jan-Erik. "Hardware Isolation for Trusted Execution". In CCS'16: 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2994459.2994460.
Texto completo da fonteSong, Chengyu, Hyungon Moon, Monjur Alam, Insu Yun, Byoungyoung Lee, Taesoo Kim, Wenke Lee e Yunheung Paek. "HDFI: Hardware-Assisted Data-Flow Isolation". In 2016 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/sp.2016.9.
Texto completo da fonteYe, Mengmei, Nianhang Hu e Sheng Wei. "Lightweight secure sensing using hardware isolation". In 2016 IEEE SENSORS. IEEE, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icsens.2016.7808904.
Texto completo da fonteAthalye, Anish, Frans Kaashoek, Nickolai Zeldovich e Joseph Tassarotti. "The K2 Architecture for Trustworthy Hardware Security Modules". In KISV '23: 1st Workshop on Kernel Isolation, Safety and Verification. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3625275.3625402.
Texto completo da fonteKumar Saha, Sujan, e Christophe Bobda. "FPGA Accelerated Embedded System Security Through Hardware Isolation". In 2020 Asian Hardware Oriented Security and Trust Symposium (AsianHOST). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/asianhost51057.2020.9358258.
Texto completo da fonteJang, Jinsoo, e Brent Byunghoon Kang. "In-process Memory Isolation Using Hardware Watchpoint". In DAC '19: The 56th Annual Design Automation Conference 2019. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3316781.3317843.
Texto completo da fonteIbn Ziad, M. Tarek, Amr Alanwar, Yousra Alkabani, M. Watheq El-Kharashi e Hassan Bedour. "Homomorphic Data Isolation for Hardware Trojan Protection". In 2015 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI). IEEE, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/isvlsi.2015.66.
Texto completo da fonteChen, Sui, Lu Peng e Samuel Irving. "Accelerating GPU Hardware Transactional Memory with Snapshot Isolation". In ISCA '17: The 44th Annual International Symposium on Computer Architecture. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3079856.3080204.
Texto completo da fonteLeontie, Eugen, Gedare Bloom, Bhagirath Narahari, Rahul Simha e Joseph Zambreno. "Hardware-enforced fine-grained isolation of untrusted code". In the first ACM workshop. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1655077.1655082.
Texto completo da fonteGarcia R., Ferreiro, Perez Castelo J., Pinon Pazos A. e Calvo Rolle J.L. "On Fault Isolation by Functional and Hardware Redundancy". In World Automation Congress (WAC) 2006. IEEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/wac.2006.375955.
Texto completo da fonteRelatórios de organizações sobre o assunto "Hardware isolation"
Author, Not Given. Characteristics of spent fuel, high-level waste, and other radioactive wastes which may require long-term isolation: Appendix 2E, Physical descriptions of LWR nonfuel assembly hardware, Appendix 2F, User's guide to the LWR nonfuel assembly data base. Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI), dezembro de 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.2172/5294562.
Texto completo da fonteWu, Yingjie, Selim Gunay e Khalid Mosalam. Hybrid Simulations for the Seismic Evaluation of Resilient Highway Bridge Systems. Pacific Earthquake Engineering Research Center, University of California, Berkeley, CA, novembro de 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.55461/ytgv8834.
Texto completo da fonte