Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "General Convention of Universalists in the United States of America"

Children as one of the vulnerable groups who became victims of the war in the armed conflicts of the United States and Iraq in 2003 still have the right to education that should not be ignored. The international community has recognized the right to education as an international right where this arrangement has been stated in the convention on the rights of the child which has been agreed by various countries around the world. This writing aims to analyze the practice of protecting children's education rights based on the convention on children's rights using normative juridical methods so that it has a conclusion that the United States has a big responsibility to restore children's education rights that have been temporarily lost after the conflict is over with various infrastructures damaged in severe levels. Keywords: children's education rights: conventions on children's rights; United States of America.

Reports the findings of a survey of 491 United Church of Christ, Southern Baptist Convention, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, and Roman Catholic rural clergy from seven Northern Plains states. Offers implications for seminary and post-seminary training, placement of clergy in churches, pastoral counseling in rural congregations, and contextualized theory and ministry.

Radical changes in the international situation after the end of the Napoleonic Wars forced many states, and first of all England, to rethink the system of their foreign policy interests. In the new situation, the question of revenge against the United States has lost its relevance for England. If from 1783 and before the War of 1812, this problem was important for England, now the bet began to be placed on establishing stable trade and economic relations, which, coupled with control over Canada, allowed us to hope that North America would turn into a vast extremely profitable market for England’s economic expansion. The purpose of the study is an attempt to identify the peculiarities of the origin of the Canadian-American borders to find out what role the Treaty of 1818 played in the development of relations between London and Washington. The relevance of the study lies in the fact that there are practically no studies in Russian historiography that specifically consider the convention itself, despite the fact that this event laid the current border of the two states. It was concluded that in the general vector of development of Anglo-American relations, thanks to the Treaty of 1818, the trend towards stabilization was undoubtedly increasing.

National economies worldwide are in disarray, evidenced by escalating debts and growing deficits. As countries struggle with their faltering economies they are hard pressed to fulfill commitments of social programs made in more prosperous times, much less take on new government initiatives. The current experiences in health reform in the United States present an interesting example of the dilemmas governments now face when they embark on new ventures. While great political pressures have been launched and high expectations abound, the reality of American health reform quickly reveals that expanded access will come at a high price that won't be offset easily by conventional cost containment or market forces.In the search for an acceptable model for health reform, it was popular for policy makers and academics to turn their attentions to the health systems of other nations. Recommendations were made that the US should adopt a German or Canadian solution for our health problems.

Addressing the opening night rally of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) Convention on 31 August 1967, the executive director William F. Pepper informed the several thousand delegates that:Historians may well count your presence here as the most significant gathering of Americans since the founding of our nation. Never before have so many Americans, from so many different living conditions, come from so many diverse sections of the land to dedicate themselves to the rebuilding, indeed to the reclamation of their government and their destinies.Pepper concluded his remarks by declaring that “it may well be that what you begin here may ultimately result in a new social, economic and political system in the United States.” Outside the auditorium a bongo group was chanting “Kill Whitey.” The convention was one of the most ambitious attempts to forge a broad political alliance of antiwar organisations, New Left insurgents and the radical wing of the civil rights movement in 1960s America. It was planned by the NCNP, a co-ordinating organisation that hoped for a fundamental reconstitution of the American socio-economic and political order. Scholars have largely ignored the NCNP, and although the 1967 convention makes brief appearances in the literature it is generally portrayed as a farcical horror show. However, the motives behind, events of, and reaction to the convention reveals much about “the movement” in late sixties America.

PENDAHULUANThe Constitution of The United States of America yang ditandatangani39 delegasi di kala tanggal 17 September 1787 di Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, tempat terselenggaranya Constitutional Convention, mendorong lahirnya constitutional states (negara – negara konstitusi) di beberapa kawasan dunia, termasuk negara – negara monarki, yang dikenal dengan penamaan: constitutional monarch.Dalam perkembangannya beberapa constitutional state menyadari bahwa konstitusi negara – negara dimaksud kurang memuat pengaturan hal pembatasan penguasa dan pengakuan hak – hak sipil rakyat banyak di dalamnya.Muncul gagasan agar dalam konstitusi diatur semacam constitutional government, yang pada hakikatnya mewujudkan hal pembatasan pemerintahan atau limited government, yang bertujuan to keep government in order. Hal dimaksud menggagas diadopsinya paham konstitusionalisme atau constitutionalism dalam perubahan konstitusi (constitution amandement) beberapa negara di abad XX dan XXI.

The International Court of Justice is not a human rights court but it does hear human rights cases.1This is hardly remarkable. As Professor Ian Brownlie has pointed out ‘[h]uman rights problems occur in specific legal contexts. The issues may arise… within the framework of a standard-setting convention, or within general international law.’2Because human rights treaties normally have their own dispute settlement procedure, the situations in which the International Court of Justice is more likely to have to grapple with human rights issues lie within the realms of general international law or in non-human rights specific treaty provisions, which may, nevertheless, raise such issues. In addition, some human rights treaties, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948, contain provisions specifically referring disputes to the International Court of Justice.3Thus, it should come as no surprise that the Court has been involved in a number of cases involving human rights questions.

Amerika Serikat (AS) melibatkan Perusahaan Militer dan Keamanan Swasta atau “Private Military and Security Companies” (PMSC) dalam jumlah besar atas misi rekonstruksi Irak sejak tahun 2003. Keterlibatan dari PMSC telah menimbulkan banyak permasalahan khususnya kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan (Crime Against Humanity) yang dilakukan kepada warga sipil dalam misi rekonstruksi Irak ini. Adapun tulisan ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui status hukum dari PMSC dalam invasi Irak oleh Amerika Serikat (AS) berdasarkan hukum internasional yang berlaku serta untuk menganalisa pertanggungjawaban dari Amerika Serikat (AS) selaku pihak yang menggunakan PMSC dalam invasi ke Irak yang telah menyebabkan banyak permasalahan bagi Irak. Tulisan ini merupakan penelitian yuridis normatif yang menggunakan pendekatan peraturan perundang-undangan, dalam hal ini perjanjian, konvensi dan instrumen internasional yang relevan, pendekatan kasus serta pendekatan sejarah. Kesimpulan yang didapatkan adalah PMSC merupakan sebuah perusahaan yang bergerak pada pelayanan jasa berupa bantuan militer atau keamanan. Kontraktor PMSC yang melakukan Penembakan terhadap warga sipil di Irak telah mengubah statusnya dari civilian menjadi seseorang yang tidak berhak diberi status sebagai kombatan ataupun tawanan perang. Adapun hal ini telah sesuai dengan unsur-unsur daripada pasal 47 Protokol Tambahan 1 1977 United Nation Mercenary Convention dan The Montreux Document. Dapat pula disimpulkan mengenai pertanggungjawaban dibebankan kepada Amerika Serikat selaku pihak penyewa PMSC yang telah melakukan banyak permasalahan khususnya kejahatan terhadap kemanusiaan (Crime Against Humanity) kepada warga sipil wajib dikarenakan telah terjadi pelanggaran terhadap Konvensi Jenewa 1949, Pasal 51 Protokol Tambahan I 1977 dan Statuta Roma 1998. The United States of America (US) has engaged a large number of Private Military and Security Companies (PMSC) in Iraq reconstruction missions since 2003. The involvement of the PMSC has created many problems of crimes against humanity committed against civilians on this Iraq reconstruction mission. This paper aims to see the legal status of the PMSC in the invasion of Iraq by the United States of America (US) based on applicable international law and to analyze the accountability of the United States of America (US) as the party who used PMSC in the invasion of Iraq which has caused many problems. This paper is a normative legal research that uses statute approach, in terms of treaties, conventions and relevant international instruments, case approach and historical approach. The conclusion is that PMSC is a company engaged in services such as military or security assistance. PMSC contractors who carried out shootings on civilians in Iraq have changed their status from civilian to someone who is not entitled to the status of a combatant or prisoner of war. As for this, it is in accordance with the elements of Article 47 of Additional Protocol 1 of the 1977 United Nations Mercenary Convention and The Montreux Document. It can also be concluded that the responsibility imposed on the United of America States as the charterer of PMSC which has committed many problems, especially crimes against humanity (Crime Against Humanity), to civilians is obliged due to violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 51 Additional Protocol I 1977 and the Rome Statute 1998.

Information became more important than material or energy resources in the XXI century. Resources are generally defined as community-owned economic potential elements that can achieve specific goals in economic activity. For modern society, material, financial, labor, natural resources became commonplace. Estonia was the first state in Europe to carry out a massive cyber-attack in April and May 2007. That was why the states decided to get the first convention to defend their cyberspace as they defended their land, air, and sea spaces. In the XXI century in cyberspace, there are some main actors: The United States of America, Russia, Iran, China, North Korea, Israel. Russia is one of the most vital states in cybersecurity, which is constantly developing its abilities. The country has constant interests and goals for which he actively uses information space parallel with political and military opportunities.

The National Ocean Service (NOS) is responsible for charting the Nation's coastal waters and, therefore, is the lead Agency for the portrayal of maritime limits of the United States of America. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone states " ... the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low waterline along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state." In 1976, NOS was requested to show various maritime limits on its regular issue of nautical charts. The paper presents the history of maritime boundaries on National Ocean Service (NOS) charts, methods used in constructing the various maritime limits, the definition of the limits, the push for lateral seaward boundaries, and the technical aspects of maritime limits.

AbstractAdvances across the chemical and biological (life) sciences are increasingly enabled by ideas and tools from sectors outside these disciplines, with information and communication technologies playing a key role across 21st century scientific development. In the face of rapid technological change, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the implementing body of the Chemical Weapons Convention (“the Convention”), seeks technological opportunities to strengthen capabilities in the field of chemical disarmament. The OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in its review of developments in science and technology examined the potential uses of emerging technologies for the implementation of the Convention at a workshop entitled “Innovative Technologies for Chemical Security”, held from 3 to 5 July 2017, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The event, organized in cooperation with the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine of the United States of America, the Brazilian Academy of Sciences, and the Brazilian Chemical Society, was attended by 45 scientists and engineers from 22 countries. Their insights into the use of innovative technological tools and how they might benefit chemical disarmament and non-proliferation informed the SAB’s report on developments in science and technology for the Fourth Review Conference of the Convention (to be held in November 2018), and are described herein, as are recommendations that the SAB submitted to the OPCW Director-General and the States Parties of the Convention. It is concluded that technologies exist or are under development that could be used for investigations, contingency, assistance and protection, reducing risks to inspectors, and enhancing sampling and analysis.

The present scientific work offered primary attention to the unfolding of historical facts, which contributed decisively to the construction and applicability of public policies aimed at effectively combating the use and abuse of illicit drugs, starting with the Opium Wars, in the first half of the nineteenth century, between China and Great Britain, with its main development being the holding of the first international event, the International Opium Convention, held at the beginning of the twentieth century, which sought to find a universal solution to the problem that already bothered and caused concern to the authorities of the time. With the participation and signing of the Treaty by important international powers, such as the United States of America, China, France, the United Kingdom, among others, in a total of thirteen nations, the first effort was born towards effectively combating the spread of illicit drugs in the world. From the aforementioned Convention, a Legal Framework was constructed and, subsequently, fully adopted or adapted to the legislation of each signatory and member country of this conference, as in the case of Brazil. The developments arising from these international events contributed in a rich, positive and correct way to the construction of this brief and simple scientific research instrument.

According to Article 14 of the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine of the Council of Europe, the use of techniques of medically assisted procreation shall not be allowed for the purpose of choosing a future child’s sex, unless serious hereditary sex-related disease is to be avoided. In Israel and the United States of America, pre-conceptual sex selection for the purpose of family balancing is legal. The European health culture does not take reproductive justice for part of social justice. From this aspect, the situation is very similar in China and India. Reproductive liberty is opposed by the Catholic Church, too. According to the Catholic Church, medical grounds may not justify pre-conceptual sex selection, though being bioethically less harmful than family balancing for social reasons. In Hungary, according to Section 170 of the Criminal Code, pre-conceptual sex selection for the purpose of family balancing constitutes a crime. At present, the Hungarian legislation is in full harmony with the Oviedo Convention, enacted in Hungary in 2002 (Act No. 6 of 2002). Orv. Hetil., 2014, 155(46), 1815–1819.

Contrary to the conventional modern view, John Adams’s A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America (1787) was deeply influential on the Constitutional Convention. Adams’s constitutional system, though not original with him, provided a useful synthesis that emphasized balance as a working principle, checks as the operational corollary, and institutional structures reflecting the many, the few, and the one. Through the contemporaneous serialization in the Pennsylvania Mercury beginning May 11, 1787, this system and Adams’s conceptual terminology were read by key Framers and infusedthe Convention debates. The debate over the Virginia plan responded to Adams’s structural arguments and revealed the instability of the word “monarchy.” During the subsequent debate over the Senate, Adams’s ambivalence over “aristocracy” led to recognition of the new American aristocracy of white slaveowners. Finally, the Committee of Style and Arrangement draft, despite abandoning Adams’s vocabulary, closely paralleled his structural recommendations. The apparent irrelevancy of the Defence to modern scholars arose, ironically, from its crystallization of then-conventional wisdom, the very feature that resonated with so many delegates and generated its significant influence on the Convention. Adams’s Defense thus provides one more example that the Convention’s decisions cannot be understood without including the larger Framing generation.

Displaced persons are Refugees, cross borders under coercion by force, leave motherland and difficult to return safely to home of parents. Root word is ‘refuge’ from which ‘refugee’ is derived, it means hiding and shelter from danger. Pakistan is not signatory of Refugee Convention 1951 but member of the United Nations (UN). Afghan refugees are living in Pakistan for approximately four decades, the Government of Pakistan provides favorable treatment and atmosphere to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan. Resultantly, Pakistan has been suffering terrorism, political instability, and economic dropdown though after left of Unites States of America (USA) in 2021, many more Afghan Refugees are expected to migrate to Pakistan. International Community is required to work and ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan in order to ensure returning back of Afghan Refugees to their parent’s home safely and work for stability and peace of Afghanistan and the region so that they live there peacefully. According to Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (UDHR) article 14: everybody has freedom and right to enjoy, seek asylum from persecution in other countries. Asylum right not invoked if (i) genuinely arising prosecutions from non-political crimes, or (ii) acts repugnant to principles and purposes of United Nations, and Convention Relating to Status of Refugee signed in 1951 under United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). There are 145 signatories currently to Refugee Convention 1951 but Pakistan has not yet acceded to Refugee Convention 1951. According to Refugee Convention 1951 preamble: freedom under fundamental rights enjoyed by human beings under Charter of the UN and UDHR without discrimination. The UN has assured efforts to expand freedom under fundamental rights to refugees. Communitarian Critique research methodology is deployed to help understand issues of refugees. Qualitative methodology is used while conducting this research, an analytical and comparative methods to analyze and compare Government of Pakistan’s treatment of Afghan refugees in Pakistan approximately for 4 decades as compare to Syrian Refugees’ treatment by European Union (EU). The largest populated migrants refugee country of the world for 4 decades is Pakistan, approximately 5 million Afghan nationals migrated to Pakistan during Cold War and approximately around 1.3 million still living in Pakistan and they are not willing to go back to Afghanistan specially after withdrawal of USA in 2021. The International Community is required, requested, and suggested to wish, help, and endeavor to build up economies of Afghanistan and Pakistan and try to strengthen stability and peace so that remaining Afghan nationals who are living as refugees in Pakistan can go back to their motherland safely, happily, and live there peacefully.

Introduction. Relations between Russia and the United States have nearly three centuries of history, and for more than two hundred years the countries had diplomatic relations which were interrupted for sixteen years from 1917 to 1933. Perhaps the XIX century was the most peaceful and fruitful for our countries when the interests of the Russian Empire and the United States on the world stage did not contradict each other, often coincided, thus excluding confrontation between the two nation-states. The XIX century for Russia and the United States was marked by the singing of a number of bilateral treaties, including the treaty on the extradition of criminals, which consolidated their partnership.On the contrary, the XX century is marked by unstable and cyclical relations between the two countries. The rejection of Soviet power, the long period of non-recognition of the Soviet Union was followed in 1933 by mutual multifaceted cooperation between the USSR and the United States, which included the legal sphere, and by the allied relations during the Second World War. The second half of the twentieth century was the time of open confrontation between the two world giants, when the crisis of relations between the USSR and the United States put the world on the brink of world war III. In such conditions, there could be no talk of improving the legal framework of legal cooperation, and the agreement on the procedure for execution of court orders concluded in 1935 did not find its practical application.Modern Russia has assumed the entire burden of problems and contradictions in legal cooperation with the United States. Searching for ways out of them is possible only on the basis of historical analysis of their prerequisites, taking into account the peculiarities of modern international relations.Materials and methods. The methodological basis of the study is the dialectical method of cognition of phenomena in the relationship and mutual conditionality using a set of general and particular scientific methods of cognition of reality. The historical method contributed to the restoration of the chronological sequence of legal cooperation between Russia (USSR) and the United States. The method of actualization made it possible to identify the historical factors that determined the peculiarities of international cooperation in the legal sphere. The method of diachronization made it possible to identify certain successive stages in the development of international legal cooperation between Russia (USSR) and the United States, to compare them, to identify patterns of development.Results. In the framework of the study, the author found that inter-state legal cooperation is an integral part of the foreign policy of states. The international legal basis of cooperation between Russia and the United States in civil, family and criminal cases was created in a different historical era, does not meet modern international relations, and is poorly implemented by the justice authorities of the two States.There is no treaty on legal assistance in civil and family matters that is fundamental to the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens of both States, and there are no provisions on extradition in the Treaty on legal assistance in criminal matters.Discussion and Conclusions. The international legal framework of cooperation between the Russian Federation (and earlier - the Soviet Union) and the United States of America in the legal sphere; the problems of implementation of international legal assistance in civil, family and criminal cases are researched. The main provisions of the Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal cases of 2000; multilateral Conventions on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial cases of 1965 are analyzed. The 1958 Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, the 1935 Agreement “On the procedure for the execution of court orders between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America” were explored. The prospects for the development of legal cooperation between Russia and the United States are shown.

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to examine whether and to what extent the Article 3(g) of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression (Resolution 3314/1974 XXIX) can be interpreted using the case-law of the International Court of Justice. Three judgments delivered by the Court are analyzed: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) and Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro). Special attention is given to the connection between international norms on the use of force and the law of international responsibility, as well as to the meaning and status attributed by the Court to the expressions “sending” and “substantial involvement,” both present in Article 3(g).

The planet is facing numerous environmental concerns. Healthy soil, an appropriate quantity of clean and fresh water, and clean air are just a few of the basic essentials that allow humanity to survive, but are being stressed by rising populations and human demand for the earth's valuable resources. Tobacco-related processes are harmful to the environment, from cultivation to manufacture, distribution, product usage, and post-consumer trash. The tobacco industry's adverse influence on deforestation, climate change, and waste production is huge and expanding, and until now, these components of the tobacco control picture have received very little attention from researchers and policymakers. According to article 18 of the World Health Organization's (WHO) "framework convention on tobacco control (FCTC)," ratifying parties are required to give due consideration to environmental protection and the general well-being of people in relation to tobacco farming and production within their respective territories. Instead of focusing on controlling the tobacco epidemic, national and international discussions have centered on this idea to end it, which has sparked relatively longer-term strategy. Globally many countries including New Zealand, Scotland, United Kingdom, Ireland, United States of America, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Finland as well as India (third largest tobacco producer nation in the world) have already adopted various initiatives to adhere with end game strategy. This paper investigates the environmental impact of tobacco and its various other detrimental effects on health of living beings', as well as the "tobacco end game" approach to not only control the epidemic but also create a "tobacco-free world".

This article revisits and critically analyses the panel’s decision and reasoning in the dispute between the United States and Guatemala under the labour provisions of the Dominican Republic–Central America Free Trade Agreement vis-à-vis the treaty interpretation rules under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It further seeks to draw implications for the construction of labour provisions of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). The article sheds light on the normative and theoretical rationales that underlie tradelabour linkages in general, and the labour provisions under such free trade agreements in particular. Ultimately, the paper makes a case for the dual structure of conditionality-based labour provisions, a legal characteristic that demands that each of them pursue two different goals, first, protecting labour rights as human rights (social goal) and second, securing the condition of fair competition in trade/ investment and preventing a race to the bottom in labour regulation (economic goal). With this proposal, it attempts to put the long-overlooked, deontologically normative value that labour provisions pursue in its right place without prejudice to their role of levelling the playing field.

China has established a string of synthetic islands in the belt of the South China Sea. Then it militarized those islands and began claiming possession of the entire region. Under the body of Carl Schmitt’s theories at the Nomos of the earth and the relation of political enmity, this work aims to explain the consequences of this issue for the international legal order. To this purpose, we clarify the idea of Nomos of the earth and stress its relevance for the development of International Law. Then, we describe the international legal system on the Nations of the Sea, namely The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). We also exhibit the strategic value of the South China Sea and the current framing of those problems inside present day international law. However, we argue that the mere deployment of law enforcement cannot settle the situation. For the only country which could effectively challenge the new South China Sea Nation, given the volume of the Chinese financial and navy power, is the USA. Hence, this work explains how the relationship among the two powers, i.e., on the one hand, the democratic capitalist United States of America and, on the other hand, the dictatorial communist China, grew to what Carl Schmitt describes as a relation of enmity. An enmity stems from the ultimate existential conflict among groups, that could in the end lead to war. It is, then, from the conflict between the US and China that will emerge a new Nomos of the earth as well as a new law regulating the possession of the South China Sea.

AbstractIMO has, as an integral part of its mandate, the duty to make travel and transport by sea as safe as possible. In the wake of the tragic events of 11 September 2001 in the United States of America, the 22nd Session of the Assembly of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), which met at the Organization's London headquarters in November 2001, adopted Resolution A.924(22) on the "Review of Measures and Procedures to Prevent Acts of Terrorism which Threaten the Security of Passengers and Crews and the Safety of Ships". Since then a number of meetings of the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and its Working Group on maritime security were held and new maritime security regulations were developed. These mandatory provisions are detailed in the new Chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention and the new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code, which was subsequently adopted by a Diplomatic Conference on Maritime Security, held at the IMO headquarters in London from 9-13 December 2002, for formal entry into force on 1 July 2004 (if deemed accepted on 1 January 2004). In addition, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has been signed between the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the IMO in July 2001 to ensure closer co-operation. In addition to the work that the International Labour Organization (ILO) is undertaking regarding the development of a new seafarers' Identity Document, further co-operation is also anticipated in a Joint ILO/IMO Working Group to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for the security of all port areas.

The article analyzes the types of states in terms of the content and essence of state-religious relations, the constitutional and legal foundations of freedom of conscience in accordance with the constitutions of the United States of America, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Poland, the French Republic, the Republic of Turkey, Japan, the Republic of Estonia, Czech Republic and the Republic of Uzbekistan, their common features, similarities and differences, using secular scientific and comparative methods, appropriate conclusions are drawn, suggestions are made on the directions of research work that will be carried out in the future. Given the growing influence of the religious factor in the socio-political, spiritual and ideological spheres in the current period, and also taking the intensified preparation of constitutional reforms in our country into account, the author considers it relevant: a deep and comprehensive study of international and regional documents on the relationship between the state and religion with scientific analysis; conducting extensive scientific research on the genesis and evolution of the norms governing relations between the state and religion; a comparative study of the legislation of foreign, including secular countries, regulating relations between the state and religion in practice in the current period and making suggestions and recommendations on the critical use of achievements in this regard in improving national legislation. Also, considering the activation of socio-political forces that are trying to use religion for political purposes, and the fact that they pose a serious threat to countries, regions and international security that use religion as a disguise, especially Islam, the development of the draft “Convention against terrorism under the mask of religion” and its adoption by the UN General Assembly is a requirement of the time.

A globally applicable code of conduct specifically dedicated to biosecurity has been developed together with guidance for its procedural implementation. This is to address the regulations governing potential dual-use of biological materials, associated information and technologies, and reduce the potential for their malicious use. Scientists researching and exchanging micro-organisms have a responsibility to prevent misuse of the inherently dangerous ones, that is, those possessing characters such as pathogenicity or toxin production. The code of conduct presented here is based on best practice principles for scientists and their institutions working with biological resources with a specific focus on micro-organisms. It aims to raise awareness of regulatory needs and to protect researchers, their facilities and stakeholders. It reflects global activities in this area in response to legislation such as that in the USA, the PATRIOT Act of 2001, Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001; the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 and subsequent amendments in the UK; the EU Dual-Use Regulation; and the recommendations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), under their Biological Resource Centre (BRC) Initiative at the beginning of the millennium (OECD, 2001). Two project consortia with international partners came together with experts in the field to draw up a Code of Conduct on Biosecurity for BRCs to ensure that culture collections and microbiologists in general worked in a way that met the requirements of such legislation. A BRC is the modern day culture collection that adds value to its holdings and implements common best practice in the collection and supply of strains for research and development. This code of conduct specifically addresses the work of public service culture collections and describes the issues of importance and the controls or practices that should be in place. However, these best practices are equally applicable to all other microbiology laboratories holding, using and sharing microbial resources. The code was introduced to the Seventh Review Conference to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), United Nations, Geneva, 2011; the delegates to the States’ parties recommended that this code of conduct be broadly applied in the life sciences and disseminated amongst microbiologists, hence the publishing of it here along with practical implementation guidance. This paper considers the regulatory and working environment for microbiology, defines responsibilities and provides practical advice on the implementation of best practice in handling the organism itself, associated data and technical know-how.

295State immunity — United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 — Articles 30, 31 and 32 — Rules applicable to warships — Non-compliance by warships with laws and regulations of coastal State — United States vessel entering restricted area of Philippine waters — Responsibility of flag State for damage caused by warship — Immunities of warships — Philippines–United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement, 1998 — Whether any waiver of immunity — Role of executiveSea — Treaties — United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — Convention not ratified by United States — Customary international law — Coastal State rights — Marine environment — Whether relevant provisions of treaty codifying customary international law — Whether United States responsible for environmental damage — Whether United States immune from suitJurisdiction — United States vessel entering restricted area of Philippine waters — Whether act jure imperii — Environmental damage — Whether United States having immunity — Whether Philippines barred from exercising jurisdiction over United States respondents — Article XVI of Philippines Constitution, 1987Environment — Marine environment — Right to a healthful ecology — Intergenerational responsibility — Writ of Kalikasan — The law of the Philippines

Abstract Ninety years ago, the Federation of Polish Jews in America hosted their national convention and world congress in the New York City area. In this article, we will discuss some of what transpired at these events. Set at a tumultuous crossroads in world history, the Federation rallied Jewish groups throughout the United States and the world in humanitarian support for a war-torn Polish nation. The national convention and world congress were also set to have their own respective satellite sessions at the New York World’s Fair of 1939 and 1940. These satellite sessions are noteworthy in that they mark a Jewish presence at the Fair which extended beyond the Jewish Palestine Pavilion. They also mark a uniquely Polish presence, extending beyond Poland’s own Pavilion at the Fair.

Early activity of Polish communists in the United States. The case of Daniel Elbaum In the article the author discusses the American period in the activity of Daniel Elbaum, worker organiser and communist, participant in the 1905 revolution, activist of the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. After escaping from exile, in 1913 Elbaum went to the United States, where he became an activist in Polish socialist and then communist circles, campaigner for the separation of the Polish Section from the Socialist Party of America and its subsequent accession as a so-called language federation to the Communist Party USA, established in 1919. Elbaum was one of the founders of the Polish radical left in the USA. His activities in the context of the events taking place in America (explosion of political radicalism and repression against left-wing activists) first consisted in winning support for Polish communist circles, taking control of the Polish faction of the Socialist Party, then editing its periodical, Głos Robotniczy (Workers’ Voice), and participating, as a delegate from Michigan, in the founding convention of the Communist Party USA in Chicago in September 1919. Arrested in 1920 and threatened with deportation, Elbaum escaped from prison in March 1920, managing to get to Europe, where he continued his work as a communist activist. His career in the USA also illustrates the divisions among American socialists, growing role of immigrants among them and their gradual radicalisation, which eventually led to a split and the founding of the Communist Party USA.

Life sentence penalty covers a diverse range of practices, from the most severe form of life imprisonment without parole, in which a person is sentenced to die in prison so long as their sentence stands, to more indeterminate sentences in which at the time of sentencing it is not clear how long the sentenced person will spend in prison. Dealing with the question whether the extradition of a person to a foreign state where is accused of a crime for which a sentence of life imprisonment can be imposed can potentially violate article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.What all these sentences have in common, however, is that at the time the sentence is passed, a person is liable to be detained for the rest of his or her natural life. We all know “The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules” and relevant international instruments on the rehabilitation of imprisonment, but at the moment more than 73 States in the world retain life imprisonment as a penalty for offences committed while under the age of 18. General perspective of criminal justice reform in Latin America should take into a right account the meaning of life - imprisonment penalty under article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Why did the United States fail to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women? This overarching question forms the basis of this paper and will be answered using an array of primary and secondary sources. This paper gleans most of its evidence from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearings of 1994 and 2002, letters from both President Jimmy Carter and former Secretary of State Colin Powell, Congressional Research Service reports on CEDAW from 2013 and 2007, several Senators’ statements in the Congressional Record, Congressional testimony, and the text of the CEDAW treaty. This paper integrates these primary sources with secondary sources, citing legal analyses by former Attorney General Harold Hongju Koh, positions taken by lobby groups such as Amnesty International, the Heritage Foundation, and Concerned Women for America, the text, “Circle of Empowerment” by CEDAW Committee veteran Hannah-Beate Schopp-Schilling, and research on the legislative impact of CEDAW by Dutch legal analyst Rikki Holtmaat. This paper contends that CEDAW’s failure stemmed from: 1) the belief that U.S. women’s rights are already “covered,” 2) the convergence of federalism and inherent constitutional restrictions, 3) the belief that CEDAW will subvert American sovereignty, and, 4) distorted interpretations of the CEDAW Committee’s recommendations.

Introduction Daffodil Day, usually held in spring, raises funds for cancer awareness and research using this symbol of hope. On that day, people who donate money to this good cause are usually given a yellow daffodil pin to wear. When I lived in Auckland, New Zealand, on the last Friday in August most people walking around the city centre proudly wore a cheerful yellow flower. So many people generously participated in this initiative that one almost felt obliged to join the cause in order to wear the ‘uniform’ – the daffodil pin – as everyone else did on that day. To donate and to wear a daffodil is the social expectation, and operating in social environment people often endeavour to meet the expectation by doing the ‘appropriate things’ defined by societies or communities. After all, who does not like to receive a beam of acceptance and appreciation from a fellow daffodil bearer in Auckland’s Queen Street? States in international society are no different. In some ways, states wear ‘uniforms’ while executing domestic and foreign affairs just as human beings do within their social groups. States develop the understandings of desirable behaviour from the international community with which they interact and identify. They are ‘socialised’ to act in line with the expectations of international community. These expectations are expressed in the form of international norms, a prescriptive set of ideas about the ‘appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 891). Motivated by this logic of appropriateness, states that comply with certain international norms in world politics justify and undertake actions that are considered appropriate for their identities. This essay starts with examining how international norms can be spread to different countries through the process of ‘state socialisation’ (how the countries are ‘talked into’ wearing the ‘uniform’). Second, the essay investigates the idea of ‘cultural match’: how domestic actors comply with an international norm by interpreting and manipulating it according to their local political and legal practices (how the countries wear the ‘uniform’ differently). Lastly, the essay probes the current international normative community and the liberal values embedded in major international norms (whether states would continue wearing the ‘uniform’). International Norms and State Socialisation: Why Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’? Norm diffusion is related to the efforts of ‘norm entrepreneurs’ using various platforms to convince a critical mass of states to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 895-896). Early studies of norm diffusion tend to emphasise nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as norm entrepreneurs and advocates, such as Oxfam and its goal of reducing poverty and hunger worldwide (Capie 638). In other empirical research, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) were shown to serve as ‘norm teachers,’ such as UNESCO educating developing countries the value of science policy organisations (Finnemore 581-586). Additionally, states and other international actors can also play important roles in norm diffusion. Powerful states with more communication resources sometimes enjoy advantages in creating and promoting new norms (Florini 375). For example, the United States and Western European countries have often been considered as the major proponents of free trade. Norm emergence and state socialisation in a normative community often occurs during critical historical periods, such as wars and major economic downturns, when international changes and domestic crises often coincide with each other (Ikenberry and Kupchan 292). For instance, the norm entrepreneurs of ‘responsible power/state’ can be traced back to the great powers (mainly the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union) and their management of international order at the end of WWII (see Bull). With their negotiations and series of international agreements at the Cairo, Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam Conference in the 1940s, these great powers established a post-World War international society based on the key liberal values of international peace and security, free trade, human rights, and democracy. Human beings are not born to know what appropriate behaviour is; we learn social norms from parents, schools, peers, and other community members. International norms are collective expectations and understanding of how state governments should approach their domestic and foreign affairs. States ‘learn’ international norms while socialising with a normative community. From a sociological perspective, socialisation summarises ‘how and to what extent diverse individuals are meshed with the requirement of collective life’ at the societal level (Long and Hadden 39). It mainly consists of the process of training and shaping newcomers by the group members and the social adjustment of novices to the normative framework and the logic of appropriateness (Long and Hadden 39). Similarly, social psychology defines socialisation as the process in which ‘social organisations influence the action and experience of individuals’ (Gold and Douvan 145). Inspired by sociology and psychology, political scientists consider socialisation to be the mechanism through which norm entrepreneurs persuade other actors (usually a norm novice) to adhere to a particular prescriptive standard (Johnston, “Social State” 16). Norm entrepreneurs can change novices’ behaviour by the methods of persuasion and social influence (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 496-506). Socialisation sometimes demands that individual actors should comply with organisational norms by changing their interests or preferences (persuasion). Norm entrepreneurs often attempt to construct an appealing cognitive frame in order to persuade the novices (either individuals or states) to change their normative preferences or adopt new norms. They tend to use language that can ‘name, interpret and dramatise’ the issues related to the emerging norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 987). As a main persuasive device, ‘framing’ can provide a singular interpretation and appropriate behavioural response for a particular situation (Payne 39). Cognitive consistency theory found in psychology has suggested the mechanism of ‘analogy’, which indicates that actors are more likely to accept new ideas that share some similarities to the extant belief or ideas that they have already accepted (see Hybel, ch. 2). Based on this understanding, norm entrepreneurs usually frame issues in a way that can associate and resonate with the shared value of the targeted novices (Payne 43). For example, Finnemore’s research shows that when it promoted the creation of state science bureaucracies in the 1960s, UNESCO associated professional science policy-making with the appropriate role of a modern state, which was well received by the post-war developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia (Finnemore 565-597). Socialisation can also emanate actors’ pro-norm behaviour through a cost-benefit calculation made with social rewards and punishments (social influence). A normative community can use the mechanism of back-patting and opprobrium to distribute social reward and punishment. Back-patting – ‘recognition, praise and normative support’ – is offered for a novice’s or member’s cooperative and pro-norm behaviour (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503). In contrast, opprobrium associated with status denial and identity rejection can create social and psychological costs (Johnston 504). Both the reward and punishment grow in intensity with the number of co-operators (Johnston 504). A larger community can often create more criticism towards rule-breakers, and thus greatly increase the cost of disobedience. For instance, the lack of full commitment from major powers, such as China, the United States, and some other OECD countries, has arguably made global collective action towards mitigating climate change more difficult, as the cost of non-compliance is relatively low. While being in a normative environment, novice or emerging states that have not yet been socialised into the international community can respond to persuasion and social influence through the processes of identification and mimicking. Social psychology indicates that when one actor accepts persuasion or social influence based on its desire to build or maintain a ‘satisfying self-defining relationship’ to another actor, the mechanism of identification starts to work (Kelman 53). Identification among a social group can generate ‘obligatory’ behaviour, where individual states make decisions by attempting to match their perceptions of ‘who they are’ (national identity) with the expectation of the normative community (Glodgeier and Tetlock 82). After identifying with the normative community, a novice state would then mimic peer states’ pro-norm behaviour in order to be considered as a qualified member of the social group. For example, when the Chinese government was deliberating over its ratification of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety in 2003, a Ministry of Environmental Protection brief noted that China should ratify the Protocol as soon as possible because China had always been a country ‘keeping its word’ in international society, and non-ratification would largely ‘undermine China’s international image and reputation’ (Ministry of Environmental Protection of PRC). Despite the domestic industry’s disagreement with entering into the Protocol, the Chinese government’s self-identification as a ‘responsible state’ that performs its international promises and duties played an important role in China’s adoption of the international norm of biosafety. Domestic Salience of International Norms: How Do States Wear the ‘Uniforms’ Differently? Individual states do not accept international norms passively; instead, state governments often negotiate and interact with domestic actors, such as major industries and interest groups, whose actions and understandings in turn impact on how the norm is understood and implemented. This in turn feeds back to the larger normative community and creates variations of those norms. There are three main factors that can contribute to the domestic salience of an international norm. First, as the norm-takers, domestic actors can decide whether and to what extent an international norm can enter the domestic agenda and how it will be implemented in policy-making. These actors tend to favour an international norm that can justify their political and social programs and promote their interests in domestic policy debates (Cortell and Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter?” 453). By advocating the existence and adoption of an international norm, domestic actors attempt to enhance the legitimacy and authority of their current policy or institution (Acharya, “How Ideas Spread” 248). Political elites can strengthen state legitimacy by complying with an international norm in their policy-making, and consequently obtain international approval with reputation, trust, and credibility as social benefits in the international community (Finnemore and Sikkink 903). For example, when the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), only four states – Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States – voted against the Declaration. They argued that their constitutional and national policies were sufficiently responsive to the type of Indigenous self-determination envisioned by UNDRIP. Nevertheless, given the opprobrium directed against these states by the international community, and their well-organised Indigenous populations, the four state leaders recognised the value of supporting UNDRIP. Subsequently all four states adopted the Declaration, but in each instance state leaders observed UNDRIP’s ‘aspirational’ rather than legal status; UNDRIP was a statement of values that these states’ policies should seek to incorporate into their domestic Indigenous law. Second, the various cultural, political, and institutional strategies of domestic actors can influence the effectiveness of norm empowerment. Political rhetoric and political institutions are usually created and used to promote a norm domestically. Both state and societal leaders can make the performative speech act of an international norm work and raise its importance in a national context by repeated declarations on the legitimacy and obligations brought by the norm (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). Moreover, domestic actors can also develop or modify political institutions to incorporate an international norm into the domestic bureaucratic or legal system (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 76). These institutions provide rules for domestic actors and articulate their rights and obligations, which transforms the international norm’s legitimacy and authority into local practices. For example, the New Zealand Government adopted a non-nuclear policy in the 1980s. This policy arose from the non-nuclear movement that was leading the development of the Raratonga Treaty (South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone) and peace and Green party movements across Europe who sought to de-nuclearise the European continent. The Lange Labour Government’s 1984 adoption of an NZ anti-nuclear policy gained impetus because of these larger norm movements, and these movements in turn recognised the normative importance of a smaller power in international relations. Third, the characteristics of the international norm can also impact on the likelihood that the norm will be accepted by domestic actors. A ‘cultural match’ between international norm and local values can facilitate norm diffusion to domestic level. Sociologists suggest that norm diffusion is more likely to be successful if the norm is congruent with the prior values and practices of the norm-taker (Acharya, “Asian Regional Institutions” 14). Norm diffusion tends to be more efficient when there is a high degree of cultural match such that the global norm resonates with the target country’s domestic values, beliefs or understandings, which in turn can be reflected in national discourse, as well as the legal and bureaucratic system (Checkel 87; Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 73). With such cultural consistency, domestic actors are more likely to accept an international norm and treat it as a given or as ‘matter-of-fact’ (Cortell and Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact” 74). Cultural match in norm localisation explains why identical or similar international socialisation processes can lead to quite different local developments and variations of international norms. The debate between universal human rights and the ‘Asian values’ of human rights is an example where some Asian states, such as Singapore and China, prioritise citizen’s economic rights over social and political rights and embrace collective rights instead of individual rights. Cultural match can also explain why one country may easily accept a certain international norm, or some aspect of one particular norm, while rejecting others. For example, when Taiwanese and Japanese governments adapted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples into their local political and legal practice, various cultural aspects of Indigenous rights have been more thoroughly implemented compared to indigenous economic and political rights (Gao et al. 60-65). In some extreme cases, the norm entrepreneurs even attempt to change the local culture of norm recipients to create a better cultural match for norm localisation. For example, when it tried to socialise India into its colonial system in the early nineteenth century, Britain successfully shaped the evolution of Indian political culture by adding British values and practices into India’s social, political, and judicial system (Ikenberry and Kupchan 307-309). The International Normative Community: Would States Continue Wearing ‘Uniforms’? International norms evolve. Not every international norm can survive and sustain. For example, while imperialism and colonial expansion, where various European states explored, conquered, settled, and exploited other parts of the world, was a widely accepted idea and practice in the nineteenth century, state sovereignty, equality, and individual rights have replaced imperialism and become the prevailing norms in international society today. The meanings of the same international norm can evolve as well. The Great Powers first established the post-war international norms of ‘state responsibility’ based on the idea of sovereign equality and non-intervention of domestic affairs. However, the 1980s saw the emergence of many international organisations, which built new standards and offered new meanings for a responsible state in international society: a responsible state must actively participate in international organisations and comply with international regimes. In the post-Cold War era, international society has paid more attention to states’ responsibility to offer global common goods and to promote the values of human rights and democracy. This shift of focus has changed the international expectation of state responsibility again to embrace collective goods and global values (Foot, “Chinese Power” 3-11). In addition to the nature and evolution of international norms, the unity and strength of the normative community can also affect states’ compliance with the norms. The growing size of the community group or the number of other cooperatives can amplify the effect of socialisation (Johnston, “Treating International Institutions” 503-506). In other words, individual states are often more concerned about their national image, reputation and identity regarding norm compliance when a critical mass of states have already subscribed into the international norm. How much could this critical mass be? Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that international norms reach the threshold global acceptance when the norm entrepreneurs have persuaded at least one third of all states to adopt the new norm (901). The veto record of the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) shows this impact. China, for example, has cast a UNSC veto vote 17 times as of 2022, but it has rarely excised its veto power alone (Security Council Report). For instance, though being sceptical of the notion of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which prioritises human right over state sovereignty, China did not veto Resolution 1973 (2011) regarding the Libyan civil war. The Resolution allowed the international society to take ‘all necessary measure to protect civilians’ from a failed state government, and it received wide support among UNSC members (no negative votes from the other 14 members). Moreover, states are not entirely equal in terms of their ‘normative weight’. When Great Powers act as norm entrepreneurs, they can usually utilise their wealth and influence to better socialise other norm novice states. In the history of promoting biological diversity norms which are embedded in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), the OECD countries, especially France, UK, Germany, and Japan, have been regarded as normative leaders. French and Japanese political leaders employed normative language (such as ‘need’ and ‘must’) in various international forums to promote the norms and to highlight their normative commitment (see e.g. Chirac; Kan). Additionally, both governments provided financial assistance for developing countries to adopt the biodiversity norms. In the 2011 annual review of CBD, Japan reaffirmed its US$12 million contribution to assisting developing countries (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). France joined Japan’s commitment by announcing a financial contribution of €1 million along, with some additional funding from Norway and Switzerland (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity 9). Today, biological diversity has been one of the most widely accepted international environmental norms, which 196 states/nations have ratified (United Nations). While Great Powers can make more substantial contributions to norm diffusion compared to many smaller powers with limited state capacity, Great Powers’ non-compliance with the normative ‘uniform’ can also significantly undermine the international norms’ validity and the normative community’s unity and reputation. The current normative community of climate change is hardly a unified one, as it is characterised by a low degree of consensus. Major industrial countries, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia, have not yet reached an agreement concerning their individual responsibilities for reducing greenhouse emissions. This lack of agreement, which includes the amount of cuts, the feasibility and usefulness of such cuts, and the relative sharing of cuts across various states, is complicated by the fact that large developing countries, such as China, Brazil, and India, also hold different opinions towards climate change regimes (see Vidal et al.). Experts heavily criticised the major global powers, such as the European Union and the United States, for their lack of ambition in phasing out fossil fuels during the 2022 climate summit in Egypt (COP27; Ehsan et al.). In international trade, both China and the United States are among the leading powers because of their large trade volume, capacity, and transnational network; however, both countries have recently undermined the world trade system and norms. China took punitive measures against Australian export products after Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry request at the World Health Organisation. The United States, particularly under the Trump Administration, invoked the WTO national security exception in Article XXI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to justify its tariffs on steel and aluminium. Lastly, norm diffusion and socialisation can be a ‘two-way path,’ especially when the norm novice state is a powerful and influential state in the international system. In this case, the novices are not merely assimilated into the group, but can also successfully exert some influence on other group members and affect intra-group relations (Moreland 1174). As such, the novices can be both targets of socialisation and active agents who can shape the content and outcome of socialisation processes (Pu 344). The influence from the novices can create normative contestation and thus influence the norm evolution (Thies 547). In other words, novice states can influence international society and shape the international norm during the socialisation process. For example, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a set of norms that regulate member states’ relationships within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). It establishes a diplomatic and security culture characterised by informality, consultation, and dialogue, and consensus-building in decision-making processes (Caballero-Anthony). From its interaction with ASEAN, China has been socialised into the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Ba 157-159). Nevertheless, China’s relations with the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also suggest that there exists a ‘feedback’ process between China and ARF which resulted in institutional changes in ARF to accommodate China’s response (Johnston, “The Myth of the ASEAN Way?” 291). For another example, while the Western powers generally promote the norm of ‘shared responsibility’ in global environment regimes, the emerging economies, such as the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), have responded to the normative engagement and proposed a ‘Common but Differentiated Responsibilities’ regime where the developing countries shoulder less international obligations. Similarly, the Western-led norm of ‘Responsibility to Protect’, which justifies international humanitarian intervention, has received much resistance from the countries that only adhere to the conventional international rules regarding state sovereignty rights and non-intervention to domestic affairs. Conclusion International norms are shared expectations about what constitutes appropriate state behaviour. They are the ‘uniforms’ for individual states to wear when operating at the international level. States comply with international norms in order to affirm their preferred national identities as well as to gain social acceptance and reputation in the normative community. When the normative community is united and sizable, states tend to receive more social pressure to consistently wear these normative uniforms – be they the Geneva Conventions or nuclear non-proliferation. Nevertheless, in the post-pandemic world where liberal values, such as individual rights and rule of law, face significant challenges and democracies are in decline, the future success of the global normative community may be at risk. Great Powers are especially responsible for the survival and sustainability of international norms. The United States under President Trump adopted a nationalist ‘America First’ security agenda: alienating traditional allies, befriending authoritarian regimes previously shunned, and rejecting multilateralism as the foundation of the post-war global order. While the West has been criticised of failing to live up to its declared values, and has suffered its own loss of confidence in the liberal model, the rising powers have offered their alternative version of the world system. Instead of merely adapting to the Western-led global norms, China has created new institutions, such as the Belt and Road Initiatives, to promote its own preferred values, and has reshaped the global order where it deems the norms undesirable (Foot, “Chinese Power in a Changing World Order” 7). Great Power participation has reshaped the landscape of global normative community, and sadly not always in positive ways. Umberto Eco lamented the disappearance of the beauty of the past in his novel The Name of the Rose: ‘stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemus’ ('yesterday’s rose endures in its name, we hold empty names'; Eco 538). If the international community does not want to witness an era where global norms and universal values are reduced to nominalist symbols, it must renew and reinvigorate its commitment to global values, such as human rights and democracy. It must consider wearing these uniforms again, properly. 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Daily reports in the media about the extent of corruption in South Africa and the plight of whistle-blowers who dare to report it demonstrates the inadequacy of protective measures in South Africa. The murder of whistle-blower Babita Deokaran saw other whistle-blowers go into hiding, fearing for their own safety, and calls for urgent measures to be implemented to ensure the physical safety of whistle-blowers. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) contains measures that could be implemented to protect the physical safety of whistle-blowers. Currently, the only legislation specifically protecting whistle-blowers in South Africa is the Protected Disclosures Act (PDA), which only protects against detriment in the workplace. A number of other statutes provide a measure of protection, but they are fragmented and by no means adequate. A legal comparison with the United Kingdom (UK), Ireland and the United States of America (US) may provide guidelines for reform in South Africa. The UK is currently debating the Protection for Whistleblowing Bill (Bill 27) in the House of Lords to improve protection for whistle-blowers. This Bill proposes to sever the required link to employment so that any person reporting wrongdoing will be protected if certain requirements are met. Bill 27 also establishes the Office of the Whistleblower, which has wide-ranging powers to protect whistle-blowers. The Irish Protected Disclosures (Amendment) Act 2022 was amended to broaden the definition of “worker” to include persons not previously protected and to establish an Office of the Commissioner similar to the Office of the Whistleblower in Bill 27, although with limited power. Neither the UK nor Ireland requires whistle-blowers to report in good faith; the focus is on the message instead of the messenger. Financial rewards for whistle-blowers in the US have proved to be highly successful and could be implemented in South Africa. It is recommended that physical protection of whistleblowers be prioritised, that a Whistle-Blowers’ Office with wide-ranging powers be established, that protection be extended to persons outside the employment relationship, that whistle-blowers be rewarded for reporting on wrongdoing in prescribed circumstances, that the burden of proof be reversed and that the good faith requirement for protection be dropped.

Introduction Presidents “define who Americans are—often by declaring who they aren’t”, and “by their very utterances […] have shaped our sense of who we are as Americans” (Stuckey, front cover). This advocacy of some groups and policies to the exclusion of others has been facilitated in the United States’ political culture by the country music industry. Indeed, President Richard Nixon said of country music that it “radiates a love of this nation—a patriotism,” adding that it “makes America a better country” (Bufwack and Oermann 328). Country music’s ardent support of American military conflict, including Vietnam, has led to its long-term support of Republican candidates. There has been a general lack of scholarly interest, however, in how country music has promoted Republican definitions of what it means to be an American. Accordingly, we have two primary objectives. First, we will demonstrate that Republicans, aided by country music, have used the theme of defence of “country,” especially post-9/11, to attempt to intimidate detractors. Secondly, Republicans have questioned the love of “country,” or “patriotism,” of their electoral opponents just as country musicians have attempted to silence their own critics. This research is timely in that little has been done to merge Presidential advocacy and country music; furthermore, with the election of a new President mere days away, it is important to highlight the tendencies toward intolerance that both conservatism and country music have historically shared. Defence of ‘Country’ After the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush addressed the nation before a Joint Session of Congress on 20 September 2001. During this speech, the president threatened the international community and raised the spectre of fear in Americans both while drawing distinctions between the United States and its enemies. This message was reflected and reinforced by several patriotic anthems composed by country artists, thus enhancing its effect. In his remarks before Congress, Bush challenged the international community: “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists;” thus “advocating some groups to the exclusion of others” on the international stage (20 September 2001). With these words, the President expanded the definition of the United States’ enemies to include not only those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, but also anyone who refused to support him. Republican Senator John McCain’s hawkishness regarding the attacks mirrored the President’s. “There is a system out there or network, and that network is going to have to be attacked,” McCain said the next morning on ABC (American Broadcasting Company) News. Within a month he made clear his priority: “Very obviously Iraq is the first country,” he declared on CNN. Later he yelled to a crowd of sailors and airmen: “Next up, Baghdad!” (http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/08/17/america/mccain.php). Bush’s address also encouraged Americans at home to “be calm and resolute, even in the face of a continuing threat” (20 September 2001). The subtle “us vs. them” tension here is between citizens and those who would threaten them. Bush added that “freedom and fear” had always “been at war” and “God is not neutral between them” (20 September 2001) suggesting a dualism between God and Satan with God clearly supporting the cause of the United States. Craig Allen Smith’s research refers to this as Bush’s “angel/devil jeremiad.” The President’s emphasis on fear, specifically the fear that the American way of life was being assailed, translated into public policy including the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the Patriot Act. This strategic nomenclature strengthened the power of the federal government and has been used by Republicans to suggest that if a candidate or citizen is not a terrorist then what does he/she have to fear from the government? The impact of Bush’s rhetoric of fear has of late been evaluated by scholars who have termed it “melodrama” in international affairs (Anker; Sampert and Treiberg). To disseminate his message for Americans to support his defence of “country,” Bush needed look no further than country music. David Firestein, a State Department diplomat and published authority on country music, asserted that the Bush team “recognised the power of country music as a political communication device” (86). The administration’s appeal to country music is linked to what Firestein called the “honky-tonk gap” which delineates red states and blue states. In an analysis of census data, Radio-Locator’s comprehensive listing by state of country music radio stations, and the official 2004 election results, he concluded that If you were to overlay a map of the current country music fan base onto the iconic red-and-blue map of the United States, you would find that its contours coincide virtually identically with those of the red state region. (84) And country musicians were indeed powerful in communicating the Republican message after 9/11. Several country musicians tapped into Bush’s defence of country rhetoric with a spate of songs including Alan Jackson’s Where Were You? (When the World Stopped Turning), Toby Keith’s Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue (the Angry American), and Darryl Worley’s Have You Forgotten? to name a few. Note how well the music parallels Bush’s attempt to define Americans. For instance, one of the lines from Keith’s Courtesy of the Red, White, and Blue (the Angry American) speaks of those who have given their lives so that other Americans may rest peacefully. This sentiment is reiterated by the theme of Worley’s Have You Forgotten? in which he talks of spending time with soldiers who have no doubts about why they are at war. Both songs implicitly indict the listener for betraying United States soldiers if his/her support for the Iraqi war wanes or, put in Bush terms, the listener would become a supporter of “terrorism.” Country music’s appeal to middle-America’s red state conservatism has made the genre a natural vehicle for supporting the defence of country. Indeed, country songs have been written about every war in United States history; most expressing support for the conflict and the troops as opposed to protesting the United States’ action: “Since the Civil War and Reconstruction, ‘Dixie’ has always been the bellwether of patriotic fervour in time of war and even as the situation in Vietnam reached its lowest point and support for the war began to fade, the South and its distinctive music remained solidly supportive” (Andresen 105). Historically, country music has a long tradition of attempting to “define who Americans were by defining who they weren’t” (Stuckey). As Bufwack and Oermann note within country music “images of a reactionary South were not hard to find.” They add “Dixie fertilized ‘three r’s’ – the right, racism, and religion” (328). Country musicians supported the United States’ failed intervention in Vietnam with such songs as It’s for God and Country and You Mom (That’s Why I’m Fighting In Vietnam), and even justified the American massacre of noncombatants at My Lai in the Battle Hymn of Lt. Calley (328). Thus, a right-wing response to the current military involvement in Iraq was not unexpected from the industry and the honky-tonk state listeners. During the current election, Republican presidential nominee McCain has also received a boost from the country music genre as John Rich, of Big and Rich, wrote Raising McCain, a musical tribute to McCain’s military service used as his campaign theme song. The song, debuted at a campaign rally on 1 August 2008, in Florida, mentions McCain’s ‘Prisoner of War’ status to keep the focus on the war and challenge those who would question it. Scholars have researched the demographics of the country music listener as they have evaluated the massification theory: the notion that the availability of a widespread media culture would break down social and cultural barriers and result in a “homogenised” society as opposed to the results of government-controlled media in non-democratic countries (Peterson and DiMaggio). They have determined that the massification theory has only been partially demonstrated in that regional and class barriers have eroded to some extent but country music listeners are still predominately white and older (Peterson and DiMaggio 504). These individuals do tend to be more conservative within the United States’ political culture, and militarism has a long history within both country music and conservatism. If the bad news of the massification theory is that a mass media market may not perpetuate a homogenous society, there is good news. The more onerous fears that the government will work in tandem with the media to control the people in a democracy seem not to have been borne out over time. Although President Bush’s fear tactics were met with obsequious silence initially, resistance to the unquestioning support of the war has steadily grown. In 2003, a worldwide rally opposed the invasion of Iraq because it was a sovereign state and because the Bush doctrine lacked United Nations’ support. Further opposition in the United States included rallies and concerts as well as the powerful display in major cities across the nation of pairs of combat boots representing fallen soldiers (Olson). Bush’s popularity has dropped precipitously, with his disapproval ratings higher than any President in history at 71% (Steinhauser). While the current economic woes have certainly been a factor, the campaigns of Barack Obama and John McCain can also be viewed as a referendum on the Bush war. The American resistance to the Bush rhetoric and the Iraq war is all the more significant in light of research indicating that citizens incorrectly believe that the opposition to the Vietnam War was typified by protests against the troops rather than the war itself (Beamish). This false notion has empowered the Republicans and country musicians to challenge the patriotism of anyone who would subsequently oppose the military involvement of the United States, and it is to this topic of patriotism that we now turn. Patriotism Patriotism can be an effective way for presidential candidates to connect with voters (Sullivan et al). It has been a particularly salient issue since the 9/11 attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ironically, George W. Bush, a man whose limited military service had been the subject of debate in 2000, was able to employ the persistent patriotic themes of country music to his electoral advantage. In fact, Firestein argued that country music radio had a greater effect on the 2004 election than any ads run by issue groups because it “inculcated and reinforced conservative values in the red state electorate, helped frame the issues of the day on terms favourable to the conservative position on those issues, and primed red state voters to respond positively to President Bush’s basic campaign message of family, country, and God” (Firestein 83). Bush even employed Only in America, a patriotic anthem performed by Brooks and Dunn, as a campaign theme song, because the war and patriotism played such a prominent role in the election. That the Bush re-election campaign successfully cast doubt on the patriotism of three-time Purple Heart winner, Democratic Senator John Kerry, during the campaign is evidence of Firestein’s assertion. The criticism was based on a book: Unfit for Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry (O’Neill and Corsi). The book was followed by advertisements funded by Swift Boat Veterans for Truth which included unsubstantiated claims that Kerry lied or exaggerated his combat role in Vietnam in order to obtain two of his Purple Hearts and his Bronze Star; the testimony of Kerry’s crewmen and Navy records notwithstanding, these ads were effective in smearing Kerry’s service record and providing the President with an electoral advantage. As far as country music was concerned, the 2004 election played out against the backdrop of the battle between the patriotic Toby Keith and the anti-American Dixie Chicks. The Dixie Chicks were berated after lead singer Natalie Maines’s anti-Bush comments during a concert in London. The trio’s song about an American soldier killed in action, Travelin’ Soldier, quickly fell from the top spot of the country music charts. Moreover, while male singers such as Keith, Darryl Worley, and Alan Jackson received accolades for their post 9/11 artistic efforts, the Dixie Chicks endured a vitriolic reaction from country music fans as their CDs were burned, country radio refused to play their music, their names were added to an internet list of traitors, their concerts were protested by Bush supporters, and their lives were even threatened (http://www.poppolitics.com/archives/2003/04/Bandwagon). Speaking from experience at the 2008 Democratic National Convention, Kerry addressed the issue of patriotism stating: This election is a chance for America to tell the merchants of fear and division: you don’t decide who loves this country; you don’t decide who is a patriot; you don’t decide whose service counts and whose doesn’t. […] After all, patriotism is not love of power or some cheap trick to win votes; patriotism is love of country. (http://www.clipsandcomment.com/2008/08/27/full-text-john-kerry-speech-democratic-national-convention/) Kerry broached the issue because of the constant attacks on the patriotism of Democratic nominee, Senator Barack Obama. At the most basic level, many of the attacks questioned whether Obama was even an American. Internet rumours persisted that Obama was a Muslim who was not even an American citizen. The attacks intensified when the Obamas’ pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, came under fire for comments made during a sermon in which he stated “God damn America.” As a result, Obama was forced to distance himself from his pastor and his church. Obama was also criticised for not wearing a United States flag lapel pin. When Michelle Obama stated for the “first time [she was] proud of her country” for its willingness to embrace change in February of 2008, Cindy McCain responded that she “had always been proud of her country” with the implication being, of course, a lack of patriotism on the part of Michelle Obama. Even the 13 July 2008 cover of the liberal New Yorker portrayed the couple as flag-burning Muslim terrorists. During the 2008 election campaign, McCain has attempted to appeal to patriotism in a number of ways. First, McCain’s POW experience in Vietnam has been front and centre as he touts his experience in foreign policy. Second, the slogan of the campaign is “Country First” implying that the Obama campaign does not put the United States first. Third, McCain’s running mate, Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, insisted in a speech on 4 October 2008, that Barack Obama has been “palling around with terrorists who would target their own country.” Her reference was to Obama’s acquaintance, Bill Ayers, who was involved in a series of Vietnam era bombings; the implication, however, was that Obama has terrorist ties and is unpatriotic. Palin stood behind her comments even though several major news organisations had concluded that the relationship was not significant as Ayers’ terrorist activities occurred when Obama was eight-years-old. This recent example is illustrative of Republican attempts to question the patriotism of Democrats for their electoral advantage. Country music has again sided with the Republicans particularly with Raising McCain. However, the Democrats may have realised the potential of the genre as Obama chose Only in America as the song played after his acceptance speech at the Democratic Convention. He has also attempted to reach rural voters by starting his post-convention campaign in Bristol, Virginia, a small, conservative town. Conclusion Thus, in the wake of 9/11, Republicans seized the opportunity to control the culture through fear and patriotic fervour. They were facilitated in this endeavor by the country music industry with songs that that would questions the motives, defence of “country,” and patriotism, of anyone who would question the Bush administration. This alliance between country music and the right is an historically strong one, and we recommend more research on this vital topic. While this election may indeed be a referendum on the war, it has been influenced by an economic downturn as well. Ultimately, Democrats will have to convince rural voters that they share their values; they don’t have the same edge as Republicans without the reliance of country music. However, the dynamic of country music has changed to somewhat reflect the war fatigue since the 2004 campaign. The Angry American, Toby Keith, has admitted that he is actually a Democrat, and country music listeners have grown tired of the “barrage of pro-troop sentiment,” especially since the summer of 2005 (Willman 115). As Joe Galante, the chief of the RCA family of labels in Nashville, stated, “It’s the relatability. Kerry never really spent time listening to some of those people” (Willman 201). Bill Clinton, a Southern governor, certainly had relatability, carrying the normally red states and overcoming the honky-tonk gap, and Obama has seen the benefit of country music by playing it as the grand finale of the Democratic Convention. Nevertheless, we recommend more research on the “melodrama” theory of the Presidency as the dynamics of the relationship between the Presidency and the country music genre are currently evolving. References Andreson, Lee. Battle Notes: Music of the Vietnam War. 2nd ed. Superior, WI: Savage Press, 2003. Anker, Elisabeth. “Villains, Victims and Heroes: Melodrama, Media and September 11th.” Journal of Communication. 55.1 (2005): 22-37. Baker, Peter and David Brown. “Bush Tries to Tone Down High-Pitched Debate on Iraq.” Monday, 21November 2005, Page A04. washingtonpost.com Beamish, Thomas D., Harvey Molotch, and Richard Flacks. “Who Supports the Troops? Vietnam, the Gulf War, and the Making of Collective Memory.” Social Problems. 42.3 (1995): 344-60. Brooks and Dunn. Only in America. Arista Records, 2003. Bufwack, Mary A. and Robert K. Oermann. Finding Her Voice The Saga of Women in Country Music. New York: Crown Publishers, 1993. Dixie Chicks. “Travelin Soldier.” Home. Columbia. 27 August 2002. Firestein, David J. “The Honky-Tonk Gap.” Vital Speeches of the Day. 72.3 (2006): 83-88. Jackson, Alan. Where Were You? (When the World Stopped Turning) Very Best of Alan Jackson. Nashville: Arista, 2004. Keith, Toby. Courtesy of the Red, White and Blue (The Angry American). Nashville: Dreamworks. November 9, 2004. Olson, Scott. “Chicago remembers war dead with 500 pairs of empty boots.” 22 January 2004. http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-01-22-chicago-boots_x.htm O’Neill, John E. and Jerome L. Corsi. “Unfit for Command Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry.” Washington D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2004. Peterson, Richard A. and Peter Di Maggio. “From Region to Class, the Changing Locus of Country Music. A Test of the Massification Hypothesis.” Social Forces. 53.3 (1975): 497-506. Rich, John. Raising McCain. Production information unavailable. Sampert, Shannon, and Natasja Treiberg. “The Reification of the ?American Soldier?: Popular Culture, American Foreign Policy, and Country Music.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Chicago, Illinois, United States, 28 February 2007. Smith, Craig Allen. “President Bush’s Enthymeme of Evil: The Amalgamation of 9/11, Iraq, and Moral Values.” American Behavioral Scientist. 49 (2005): 32-47. Steinhauser, Paul. “Poll: More disapprove of Bush that any other president.” Politics Cnn.politics.com. 1 May 2008. Stuckey, Mary E. Defining Americans: The Presidency and National Identity. Lawrence: UP of Kansas, 2004. Sullivan, John L., Amy Fried, Mary G. Dietz. 1992. “Patriotism, Politics, and the Presidential Election of 1988.” American Journal of Political Science. 36.1 (1992): 200-234. Willman, Chris. Rednecks and Bluenecks: The Politics of Country Music. New York: The New Press, 2005. Worley, Darryl. Have You Forgotten? Nashville: Dreamworks, 2003.

In July 2005, while European heads of state attended memorials to mark the ten year anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide and court trials continued in The Hague at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Bosnian-American artist Aida Sehovic presented the aftermath of this genocide on a day-to-day level through her art installation in memory of the victims of Srebrenica. Drawing on the Bosnian tradition of coming together for coffee, this installation, ‘Što te Nema?’ (Why are you not here?), comprised a collection of tiny white porcelain cups (‘fildzans’ in Bosnian) arranged in the geographic shape of Srebrenica in the lobby of the United Nations building in New York. It was to represent Europe’s worst mass killing since the Second World War, which took place in July 1995 in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica. Up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) men and boys were killed when Bosnian Serb troops overran the internationally protected enclave (The Guardian). The cups were gathered from Bosnian families in the United States of America and Bosnia & Herzegovina, and in particular from members of ‘Zene Srebrenice’ (‘the women of Srebrenica’). Each of the 1,705 cups represented one exhumed, identified and re-buried victim of the Srebrenica genocide (1,705 at July 2005). The cups were filled either with coffee or, in the case of victims not yet 18 and therefore not old enough at the time of their death to have participated in the coffee tradition, with sugar cubes. The names and birth dates of the victims were recited on an audio loop. Genocide is the methodical destruction of the existence of a people. It is noted through the ‘UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ that genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity throughout history (UNHCHR). Tribunals, such as the ICTY, with their focus on justice, are formal and responsibility-based modes of responding to genocide. Society seeks justice, but raising awareness around genocide through the telling and hearing of the individual story is also required. Responding to genocide and communicating its existence through artistic expression has been a valuable way of bearing witness to such a horrendous and immense crime against humanity. Art can address the gaps in healing and understanding that cannot be addressed through tribunals. From Picasso’s ‘Guernica’, to the children’s pictures triggered by the Rwandan genocide, to the ‘War Rugs’ of Afghanistan and to vast installations such as Peter Eisenman’s recently opened Holocaust memorial in Berlin; art has proved a powerful medium for representing such atrocities and attempting to find healing after genocide. Artworks such as Sehovic’s ‘Što te Nema?’ give insight into the personal experience of genocide while challenging indifference and maintaining memory. For the affected communities, this addresses the impact on individuals; the human cost and the loss of everyday experiences. As Srebrenica survivor Emir Suljagic comments, “when you tell someone that 10,000 people died, they cannot understand or imagine that. What I want to say is that these people were peasants, car mechanics or masons. That they had daughters, mothers, that they leave someone behind; that a lot of people are hurt by this person’s death” (qtd. in Vulliamy). ‘Što te Nema?’ transmits this personal dimension of genocide by using an everyday situation of showing hospitality with family and friends, which is familiar and practised in most cultural experiences, juxtaposed with the loss of a family member who is missing as a result of genocide. This transmits the notion of genocide into the sphere of common experience, attachment and emotion. It acts as an invitation to explore the impact of genocide beyond the impersonal statistics and the aloof legalese of the courtroom drama. Beyond providing a representation of the facts or emotions around genocide, art provides a way of responding to a crime, which, by its nature, is generally difficult to comprehend. Art can offer a mode of giving testimony and providing catharsis about events which are not easily approached or discussed. As Sehovic says of ‘Što te Nema?’ (it) is a way of healing for Bosnians, coming to terms with this terrible thing that happened to us … it is building a bridge of understanding where Bosnian people are coming from, because it is very hard to talk about these things (qtd. in Vermont Quarterly Magazine). For its receiver, genocide art, with all its capacity to arouse our emotions and empathy, transmits something that we cannot see or engage with in the factual reporting of genocide or in a political analysis of the topic. Through art, it is possible to encounter genocide at an individual, personal level. As Mödersheim points out, we seem to need symbolic expressions to help us understand, and deal with the complex nature of events so horrific that reason and emotion fail to grasp their magnitude. To the intellect, many aspects of these experiences are unfathomable, and yet to keep our humanity we need to understand them … where words and explanations fail, we look for images (Mödersheim 18). An artist’s responses to genocide can vary from the need of survivors to create actual depictions of the atrocities, to more abstract portrayals of the emotional response to acts of genocide. Art that is created by survivors or witnesses to the genocide demonstrates a documentation and testament to what has occurred – a symbolic act of transmitting the personal experience of genocide. Artistic responses to genocide by those, such as Sehovic, who did not witness the event first hand, express how genocide “remains deeply felt to the point where we could not say it has ended” (Morris 329). Such art represents the continuation and global repercussions of genocide. The question of what ‘genocide art’ means to the neutral or removed viewer or society is also significant. Art is often associated with pleasure. Issues of mass killing and war are often not the types of topics one wishes to view on a trip to an art gallery. However, art has a more crucial function as a social reflector. It is often the reaction of non-acceptance of such artworks which indicates how society wishes to consider questions of genocide or of war in general. For example, Rayner Hoff’s 1932 war memorial ‘The Crucifixion of Civilisation 1914’ was rejected for display because it was considered too confronting and controversial in its depiction of a naked, tortured female victim of war in a Christ-like pose. As Picasso commented, “painting is not done to decorate apartments. It is an instrument of war for attack and defense against the enemy” (qtd. in Mödersheim 15). In discussing the art that emerged from the Sierra Leone Civil War, Ross notes, “as our stomachs and hearts turn over at such sights, we get a small taste of what the artists felt. Even as we look at the images and experience the horror, disgust and anger that comes with knowing that they really happened, we realise that if these images are to be understood as reports from the field, serving the same function as photojournalism, it means that we have been sheltered from this type of reporting from our own news sources” (Ross 39). Here, art can address the often cursory acknowledgment given to ‘events which happen in faraway places’ and lend an insight into the personal. As Adorno notes, “history in artworks is not something made, and history alone frees the work from being merely something posited or manufactured” (133). Here we see the indivisibility of the genocide (the ‘history’) from the artwork – that what is seen is not mere ‘depiction’ but art’s ability to turn the anonymous statistics or the unknown genocide into the realisation of a brutal annihilation of individual human beings – to bring history to life as it were. What the viewer does after viewing such art is perhaps immaterial; the important thing is that they now know. But why is it important to know and important to remember? It has been argued that genocides which occurred in places like Srebrenica and Rwanda happened because the international community did not know or refused to recognise the events to the point of initially declining to apply the term ‘genocide’ to Srebrenica and settling for the more sanitised term ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Bringa 196). It would be nave and even condescending to argue that ‘Što te Nema?’ or any of the myriad other artistic responses to genocide have the possibility of undoing a genocide such as that which took place in Srebrenica, or even the hope of preventing another genocide. However, it is in transporting genocide into the personal realm that the message is transmitted and ignorance to the event can no longer be claimed. The concept of genocide can be too horrendous and vast to take in; art, whilst making it no less horrific, transmits the message to and confronts the viewer at a more direct and personal level. Such art provokes and provides a starting point for comment and debate. Art also stands as a lasting memorial to those who have lost their lives as a result of genocide and as a reminder to humanity that to ignore, underestimate or forget genocide makes possible its recurrence. References Adorno, Theodor. Aesthetic Theory. Trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997. Bringa, Tone. “Averted Gaze: Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995.” Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of Genocide. Ed: Alexander Hinton Laban. London: University of California Press, 2002. 194-225. Kohn, Rachael. “War Memorials, Sublime & Scandalous.” Radio National 14 August 2005. 12 December 2005 http://www.abc.net.au/rn/relig/ark/stories/s1433477.htm>. Mödersheim, Sabine. “Art and War.” Representations of Violence: Art about the Sierra Leone Civil War. Ed. Chris Corcoran, Abu-Hassan Koroma, P.K. Muana. Chicago, 2004. 15-20. Morris, Daniel. “Jewish Artists in New York: The Holocaust Years.” American Jewish History 90.3 (September 2002): 329-331. Ross, Mariama. “Bearing Witness.” Representations of Violence: Art about the Sierra Leone Civil War. Ed. Chris Corcoran, Abu-Hassan Koroma, P.K. Muana. Chicago, 2004. 37-40. The Guardian. “Massacre at Srebrenica: Interactive Guide.” May 2005. 5 November 2005 http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,5860,474564,00.html>. United Nations. “International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.” 10 January 2006 http://www.un.org/icty/>. UNHCHR. “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.” 1951. 3 January 2006 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/p_genoci.htm>. Vermont Quarterly Magazine. “Cups of Memory.” Winter 2005. 1 December 2005 http://www.uvm.edu/~uvmpr/vq/vqwinter05/aidasehovic.html>. Vulliamy, Ed. “Srebrenica Ten Years On.” June 2005. 10 February 2006 http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-yugoslavia/srebrenica_2651.jsp>. Citation reference for this article MLA Style Hawkes, Martine. "Transmitting Genocide: Genocide and Art." M/C Journal 9.1 (2006). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0603/09-hawkes.php>. APA Style Hawkes, M. (Mar. 2006) "Transmitting Genocide: Genocide and Art," M/C Journal, 9(1). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0603/09-hawkes.php>.

Photo by Mika Baumeister on Unsplash INTRODUCTION When the COVID-19 pandemic swept the globe, governments and healthcare systems scrambled to control it. While most of the global public health community agreed that actions against the COVID-19 pandemic needed to be prompt and efficient, there were disagreements on what those actions should be. Some governments opted to adopt a containment strategy while others implemented mitigation measures; each had reasons to support their course of action, whether rooted in governmental structures, scientific findings, beliefs, or ethical and moral values. However, the dramatically different response strategies may have led to disparate results. This divide is furthered when ethical and moral values and cultural norms are added to this equation. In this paper, I will examine China and Korea, two countries that implemented a preventative containment strategy, and the United States of America and the United Kingdom, which adopted mitigation strategies. I will examine the differences in their outcomes and whether there is a “correct” response to pandemics like COVID-19. l. Response in China and Korea After its initial discovery in December 2019, COVID-19 rapidly spread beyond China to surrounding countries, including South Korea, Japan, and Singapore. China implemented swift measures drawing on its experience with the SARS outbreak. Measures included lockdowns, contact tracing, testing all individuals exposed to the virus, and consequently enforcing isolation and quarantine provisions.[1] During the early stages, the public health systems and the national government moved to a “health care to all” system to avoid nationwide spread. The government and all sectors of society were mobilized to track, contain, and adapt to the overall state of the epidemic.[2] COVID-19 continued and spread in China during Lunar New Year celebrations when population movement within the country was at its peak. Thus, Wuhan entered lockdown to control the number of infected people leaving the city to contain the virus;[3] even in areas where there were few to no cases, the general population of China voluntarily abided by measures like those implemented in Wuhan. The measures included wearing masks, social distancing, and following stay-at-home orders. Furthermore, healthcare workers from all over the country volunteered to travel to Hubei, where Wuhan is, and assembled several Fangcang shelter hospitals.[4] Fangcang hospitals were designed based on emergency medical care cabins that were used after two devastating earthquakes in China and served as temporary quarantine housing and hospital facilities.[5] They are mobile, have fast deployment, and can adapt quickly to different environments. At the start of the pandemic, Wuhan converted gymnasiums, convention centers, sports arenas and training centers, factories, and other venues into Fangcang hospitals. Although temporary, these quarantine hospital facilities were equipped with full medical equipment and personnel, allowing for complete medical functions for “treatment, disease monitoring, diagnosis and other clinical tasks.”[6] Teams of psychologists were also assigned to each hospital to provide counseling for patients.[7] Beyond separating those who were infected from the rest of the population and thus having more control over the community spread of the virus, Fangcang hospitals played a vital role in reducing patient density in traditional hospitals and medical centers by expanding treatment capacities.[8] South Korea reported its first COVID-19 case in January 2020, and, within days, the government activated the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters.[9] Similar to China, South Korea used existing epidemic protocols and implemented the 3Ts strategy, prioritizing testing, tracing, and treatment.[10] High-capacity screening facilities and working with the private sector to ensure an adequate supply of tests made South Korea’s efforts successful.[11] The South Korean government strictly regulated self-isolation and quarantine. Contact tracing efforts used various data sources, “including credit card transactions and closed-circuit television footage.”[12] The government also placed stringent restrictions on travel, beginning with designated entry lines and questionnaires, but expanding to include temperature checks, testing for all travelers at the border, and a mandatory fourteen-day monitored quarantine for anyone entering the country.[13] The majority of the population responded immediately with compliance, with national weekly movement decreasing by 38 percent between February 24, 2020, and March 1, 2020, compared to the corresponding week the previous month. Schools swiftly closed across the nation, and the entire country transitioned to remote learning until the gradual reopening in May and June 2020.[14] There was some discontentment within the population, especially with the South Korean government’s practice of publicly announcing the names of individuals who tested positive.[15] Critics of this practice say it is an infringement of patient privacy and can even be viewed as an invitation to public bullying.[16] However, even with some dissatisfaction with government regulations, a survey of 1,200 South Koreans in September 2020 asking people to agree if they were satisfied with the government’s response showed that the overwhelming majority either agreed or strongly agreed (44.08 percent and 19.75 percent, respectively), and less than 20 percent of the respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed (11.50 percent and 5.08 percent, respectively).[17] Regulations surrounding isolation and quarantine were strict and applied to those with confirmed cases of COVID-19, anyone who traveled internationally, or individuals suspected to be infected. Individuals were required to use the Self-Quarantine Safety Protection app that tracked location for fourteen days to ensure that quarantine protocols were followed.[18] Case officers monitored the app, and violators not only faced a substantial fine but were also required to wear electronic wristbands that would alert the officers if the individual left the location of their mobile device.[19] ll. The Western Response: The UK and US COVID-19 was reported in many Western nations around January 2020. However, unlike South Korea, many countries did not immediately respond to the outbreak with surveillance and containment strategies but had a wait-and-see approach. As the pandemic worsened, they gradually adopted mitigation strategies to combat the disease as it progressed. While the US adopted a combination of containment and mitigation strategies, a concrete response from state and federal governments did not occur until March 2020.[20] Even then, many states did little to address the pandemic. Although equipped with a robust healthcare system, a shortage of ventilators and hospital beds became evident in some localities early on. The US healthcare system failed to acknowledge the pandemic and prepare a coordinated response in time to stop the momentum of the disease.[21] The goal became “flattening the curve” (keeping the number of cases that needed hospital care low enough to avoid overwhelming the hospital system) as it was clear containment would be impossible. Once tests were developed, poor coordination of testing efforts and insufficient resources to test at the necessary scale to provide comprehensive national surveillance of the disease further hindered efforts to contain infected individuals and decelerate its spread.[22] Eventually, regulations and mitigation measures were implemented, including mask mandates, school closures, caps or bans on in-person gatherings, and the closure of non-essential businesses.[23] However, enforcement of these measures proved difficult, and people instigated protests against many of the recommended policies and requirements. The UK and the US both encountered a shortage of personal protective equipment for healthcare workers.[24] However, a more prominent problem arose from the UK’s initial response to the pandemic. The UK first said COVID-19 was like influenza and therefore did not call for emergency measures to deter its spread.[25] Furthermore, in the first few weeks of the pandemic, the UK government believed herd immunity was the best course of action, stating that most people would have mild symptoms,[26] and the population would become mostly immune to the virus once enough people were infected.[27] In theory, herd immunity was a potentially effective strategy. The public health authorities thought that if the threshold for herd immunity was reached, enough people would have developed protective antibodies against any future infection.[28] However, the risks of COVID-19 were high and the cases “would lead to high rates of hospitalization and need for critical care, straining health service capacity past the breaking point.”[29] Furthermore, while getting COVID-19 would offer some natural immunity against reinfection, reinfection remained a possibility, especially during the early stages of the pandemic when vaccines were unavailable.[30] Later, when vaccines were available, a study showed that an unvaccinated person who contracted the virus was more than twice as likely to become reinfected than a fully vaccinated person.[31] The UK government also expressed concern for “behavioral fatigue.”[32] It claimed that if restrictions were enforced pre-emptively and prematurely, people might become progressively “uncooperative and less vigilant.”[33] Regarding the concern for “behavioral fatigue,” numerous behavioral scientists stated that they were unconvinced that this reason was enough to hold off implementing restrictions. There was a lack of evidence of this phenomenon, and a group of 681 UK behavioral scientists said in an open letter that “[s]uch evidence is necessary if we are to base a high-risk public health strategy on it.”[34] Fortunately, this strategy only remained under consideration for a short period. After rapid increases in confirmed cases and deaths due to COVID-19, the UK government implemented more strict measures, like city lockdown, school closures, and the closure of non-essential businesses.[35] These restrictions took legal effect on March 26th, 2020 – around two weeks after the first proposal of the “herd immunity” strategy.[36] lll. Comparing the Two Approaches The Eastern and Western countries experienced significant outbreaks of COVID-19. However, looking at the mortality rate and new confirmed cases, the differences between the two categories of response to COVID-19 are significant. As of December 31, 2020, the mortality rate per 100,000 population for China and South Korea were 0.3 and 1.8, respectively, and new confirmed cases per day per 100,000 population were 87 and 1,029, respectively. However, the mortality rates per 100,000 in the US and the UK were 107 and 108, respectively, and they had up to 234,133 and 56,029 new confirmed cases every day, respectively.[37] As of July 2022, total deaths in China were 22, 994[38] (population 1.45 billion)[39] and in South Korea 24,794[40] (population 51.36 million)[41] compared to 1,015,093[42] in the US (population 335.03 million)[43] and 182,727[44] in the UK (population 68.62 million).[45] Further differences can be seen in the varying sectors of society, such as healthcare systems and authority models, political structures, and cultural customs among these countries, which in turn affect the response and control strategies.[46] In the US and the UK, rights-based political structures affected the response, making tracking and surveillance more problematic early on. But Western countries did have strict lockdowns and quarantines. China and South Korea maintained a proactive approach by “identifying and managing cases, tracking and isolating close contacts, and strictly restricting or controlling population movement when feasible and appropriate.”[47] In contrast, the UK implemented nationwide lockdowns early on, and the US restrictions varied among states. Both the UK and the US focused on treating the severe cases and those with underlying conditions rather than proactively preventing new cases from developing in the early pandemic.[48] They did shift gears to mass testing schemes and attempts to slow transmission. By the time they implemented cohesive strategies, COVID-19 was widespread. Due to their slow initial responses, they needed to manage an onslaught of cases while trying to prevent transmission. lV. Ethical Implications The “West vs. Rest” culture divide emerges when comparing the COVID-19 response strategies of East Asian countries to those of Western countries. The differences in their strategies further highlight the differences in the prevailing moral values influencing public policy. The preventative stance adopted by many East Asian countries shows a stronger collective identity among citizens. But it also may show more substantial governmental power and less appetite for protest. In contrast, the mostly non-interfering nature of Western governments’ actions shows a reliance on the “autonomous and unanimous responsibility of individuals.”[49] The moral values in the US also may reflect the prioritized position of personal rights and the suspicion of intrusive government policies. Culturally, the populations of South Korea and China are generally more tolerant of personal data-sharing and monitoring, suggesting there is less concern for autonomy or privacy. However, many people in the US and UK would consider the use of location tracking apps and electronic bracelets to be violations of individual autonomy and privacy.[50] Sectors of the Western world also argue that mandating masking or social distancing imposes on individual autonomy and free will. Mask-wearing was an existing practice in East Asian countries, even without mandates or pandemics. Individuals wear masks for common colds and influenza and do not consider a mask requirement an infringement of their autonomy. Furthermore, whether it is due to the authoritarian nature of the government or not, there is a general tendency toward public compliance and accepting government policies in many East Asian countries,[51] and the lack of public dissent played an important part in making combating COVID-19 easier for countries like China and South Korea. The lack of initiative from Western nations arguably violates the bioethical principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence.[52] For example, the promotion of the “herd immunity” strategy from the UK government and consequently the government’s inaction, risked the well-being of its citizens. The government failed to avoid the harm that COVID-19 brought. Similarly, by delaying its response until nearly two months after the initial case was reported, the US also violated the principle of non-maleficence. The success seen in South Korea and China during the early pandemic better exemplifies beneficence and nonmaleficence. The strategy of contact tracing and strict containment saved lives. The consequences of the restrictions varied across the countries as well. Not everyone can afford to self-isolate or quarantine and being required to do so can significantly impact many individuals’ well-being. Furthermore, not everyone’s occupation allows them to work from home and business closures disadvantaged portions of the population disparately. For those who are essential workers, school closures may also burden parents who do not have access to affordable childcare. The stringent restrictions regarding quarantine and self-isolation in East Asian countries also harmed people disparately, raising problems surrounding the principle of justice. However, the speed at which China had COVID-19 contained allowed people there to return to their normal lives quickly. Compared to some Western countries’ waves of lockdown and reinforcement of restrictions, the “zero-COVID” strategy in countries like China showed success, at least during the early stages of the pandemic. The contact tracing and containment was likely financially beneficial. While the pandemic resulted in substantial economic growth downgrades and global recessions, regions like East Asia were estimated to grow by around 0.5 percent. In comparison, the economy in regions like Europe contracted by around 4.7 percent.[53] CONCLUSION China arguably had an advantage in combating COVID-19 since the outbreak was relatively concentrated in one region. This allowed early detection of symptoms and quick containment of the virus. Other countries, like the US, had new cases on both coasts early in the pandemic; thus, containment was more challenging than it was in China. However, the delayed and reluctant response from countries like the US and the UK did not benefit the well-being of their populations and proved to put more stress on their healthcare systems. While mass tracking of people is politically contentious, the promptness of actions many East Asian countries employed at the beginning of COVID-19 seemed to be the more effective course of action that best protected the well-being of their citizens. - [1] Chen, Haiqian, et al. “Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Comparison of Strategies in Six Countries.” Frontiers in Public Health, vol. 9, September 30, 2021, pp. 1-11. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2021.708496. [2] Chen, et al. [3] Chen, et al. [4] Chen, et al. [5] Wang, Ke-Wei, et al. “Fangcang shelter hospitals are a One Health approach for responding to the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan, China.” One Health, vol. 10, August 29th, 2020, pp. 1-6. doi: 10.1016/j.onehlt.2020.100167. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352771420302688. [6] Wang. [7] Wang. [8] Wang. [9] Kim, June-Ho, et al. “Emerging COVID-19 Success Story: South Korea Learned the Lesson of MERS.” Our World Data, University of Oxford, March 5, 2021. https://ourworldindata.org/covid-exemplar-south-korea. [10] Chen, Haiqian, et al. [11] Kim, et al. [12] Kim. [13] Kim. [14] Scott, Dylan and Jun Michael Park. “South Korea’s Covid-19 success story started with failure.” Vox, April 19, 2021. https://www.vox.com/22380161/south-korea-covid-19-coronavirus-pandemic-contact-tracing-testing.. [15] Scott and Park. [16] Rich, Timothy S., et al. “What Do South Koreans Think of Their Government’s COVID-19 Response?” The Diplomat, October 7, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/what-do-south-koreans-think-of-their-governments-covid-19-response/. [17] Rich, et al. [18] Kim, et al. [19] Kim, et al. [20] Chen, et al. [21] Chen, et al. [22] Chen, et al. [23] Chen, et al. [24] Chen, et al. [25]Chen, et al. [26] Chen, et al. [27] O’Grady, Cathleen. “The U.K. backed off on herd immunity. To beat COVID-19, we’ll ultimately need it.” National Geographics, March 20, 2020. https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/uk-backed-off-on-herd-immunity-to-beat-coronavirus-we-need-it. [28] “Herd immunity and COVID-19: What you need to know.” Mayo Clinic, April 20, 2022. https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/coronavirus/in-depth/herd-immunity-and-coronavirus/art-20486808?p=1. [29] O’Grady. [30] O’Grady. [31] Mayo Clinic, April 20, 2022. [32] Yong, Ed. “The UK’s Coronavirus ‘Herd Immunity’ Debacle.” The Atlantic, March 16, 2020. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2020/03/coronavirus-pandemic-herd-immunity-uk-boris-johnson/608065/. [33] Yong. [34] Harvey, Nigel. “Behavioral Fatigue: Real Phenomenon, Naïve Construct or Policy Contrivance?” Frontiers in Psychology, vol. 11, November 6, 2020. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.589892, quoting a March 16, 2020 open letter to the UK government. [35] Chen, et al. [36]“Timeline of UK coronavirus lockdowns, March 2020 to March 2021.” Institute for Government Analysis. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/timeline-lockdown-web.pdf. [37] Chen, et al. [38] “China: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard.” World Health Organization, 2022, https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/cn. [39] “China Population.” Worldometer, 2022, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/. [40] “The Republic of South Korea: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard.” World Health Organization, 2022, https://covid19.who.int/region/wpro/country/kr. [41] “South Korea Population,” Worldometer, 2022, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/south-korea-population/. [42] “The United States of America: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard.” World Health Organization, 2022, https://covid19.who.int/region/amro/country/us. [43] “United States Population,” Worldometer, 2022, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/us-population/. [44] “The United Kingdom: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard.” World Health Organization, 2022, https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/gb. [45] “U.K. Population,” Worldometer, 2022, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/uk-population/. [46] Chen, et al. [47] Chen, et al., p 6. [48] Chen, et al. [49] Festing, Marion, Tobias Schumacher and Yong-Yueh Lee. “How Cultural Norms and Values Shape National Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic.” The London School of Economics and Political Science, April 15, 2021. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2021/04/15/how-cultural-norms-and-values-shaped-national-responses-to-the-covid-19-pandemic/. [50] Festing, et al. [51] Festing, et al. [52] Beauchamp, Tom L. and James F. Childress. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). [53] “The Global Economic Outlook During the COVID-19 Pandemic: A Changed World.” The World Bank, June 8, 2020. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2020/06/08/the-global-economic-outlook-during-the-covid-19-pandemic-a-changed-world.

Phillip Noyce is one of Australia’s most prominent film makers—a successful feature film director with both iconic Australian narratives and many a Hollywood blockbuster under his belt. Still, his beginnings were quite humble and far from his role today when he grew up in the midst of the counterculture of the late sixties. Millions of young people his age joined the various ‘movements’ of the day after experiences that changed their lives—mostly music but also drugs or fashion. The counterculture was a turbulent time in Sydney artistic circles as elsewhere. Everything looked possible, you simply had to “Do It!”—and Noyce did. He dived head-on into these times and with a voracious appetite for its many aspects—film, theatre, rallies, music, art and politics in general. In fact he often was the driving force behind such activities. Noyce described his personal epiphany occurring in 1968: A few months before I was due to graduate from high school, […] I saw a poster on a telegraph pole advertising American 'underground' movies. There was a mesmerising, beautiful blue-coloured drawing on the poster that I later discovered had been designed by an Australian filmmaker called David Perry. The word 'underground' conjured up all sorts of delights to an eighteen-year-old in the late Sixties: in an era of censorship it promised erotica, perhaps; in an era of drug-taking it promised some clandestine place where marijuana, or even something stronger, might be consumed; in an era of confrontation between conservative parents and their affluent post-war baby-boomer children, it promised a place where one could get together with other like-minded youth and plan to undermine the establishment, which at that time seemed to be the aim of just about everyone aged under 30. (Petzke 8) What the poster referred to was a new, highly different type of film. In the US these films were usually called “underground”. This term originates from film critic Manny Farber who used it in his 1957 essay Underground Films. Farber used the label for films whose directors today would be associated with independent and art house feature films. More directly, film historian Lewis Jacobs referred to experimental films when he used the words “film which for most of its life has led an underground existence” (8). The term is used interchangeably with New American Cinema. It was based on a New York group—the Film-Makers’ Co-operative—that started in 1960 with mostly low-budget filmmakers under the guidance of Jonas Mekas. When in 1962 the group was formally organised as a means for new, improved ways of distributing their works, experimental filmmakers were the dominant faction. They were filmmakers working in a more artistic vein, slightly influenced by the European Avant-garde of the 1920s and by attempts in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In film history, this era is also known as the Third Avant-garde. In their First Statement of the New American Cinema Group, the group drew connections to both the British Free Cinema and the French Nouvelle Vague. They also claimed that contemporary cinema was “morally corrupt, aesthetically obsolete, thematically superficial, temperamentally boring” (80). An all-encompassing definition of Underground Film never was available. Sheldon Renan lists some of the problems: There are underground films in which there is no movement and films in which there is nothing but movement. There are films about people and films about light. There are short, short underground films and long, long underground films. There are some that have been banned, and there is one that was nominated for an Academy Award. There are sexy films and sexless films, political films and poetical films, film epigrams and film epics … underground film is nothing less than an explosion of cinematic styles, forms and directions. (Renan 17) No wonder that propelled by frequent serious articles in the press—notably Jonas Mekas in the Village Voice—and regular screenings at other venues like the Film-makers’ Cinemathèque and the Gallery of Modern Art in New York, these films proved increasingly popular in the United States and almost immediately spread like bush fires around the world. So in early September 1968 Noyce joined a sold-out crowd at the Union Theatre in Sydney, watching 17 shorts assembled by Ubu Films, the premier experimental and underground film collective in 1960s Australia (Milesago). And on that night his whole attitude to art, his whole attitude to movies—in fact, his whole life—changed. He remembered: I left the cinema that night thinking, "I’m gonna make movies like that. I can do it." Here was a style of cinema that seemed to speak to me. It was immediate, it was direct, it was personal, and it wasn’t industrial. It was executed for personal expression, not for profit; it was individual as opposed to corporate, it was stylistically free; it seemed to require very little expenditure, innovation being the key note. It was a completely un-Hollywood-like aesthetic; it was operating on a visceral level that was often non-linear and was akin to the psychedelic images that were in vogue at the time—whether it was in music, in art or just in the patterns on your multi-coloured shirt. These movies spoke to me. (Petzke 9) Generally speaking, therefore, these films were the equivalent of counterculture in the area of film. Theodore Roszak railed against “technocracy” and underground films were just the opposite, often almost do-it-yourself in production and distribution. They were objecting to middle-class culture and values. And like counterculture they aimed at doing away with repression and to depict a utopian lifestyle feeling at ease with each imaginable form of liberality (Doggett 469). Underground films transgressed any Hollywood rule and convention in content, form and technique. Mobile hand-held cameras, narrow-gauge or outright home movies, shaky and wobbly, rapid cutting, out of focus, non-narrative, disparate continuity—you name it. This type of experimental film was used to express the individual consciousness of the “maker”—no longer calling themselves directors—a cinematic equivalent of the first person in literature. Just as in modern visual art, both the material and the process of making became part of these artworks. Music often was a dominant factor, particularly Eastern influences or the new Beat Music that was virtually non-existent in feature films. Drug experiences were reflected in imagery and structure. Some of the first comings-out of gay men can be found as well as films that were shown at the appropriately named “Wet Dreams Festival” in Amsterdam. Noyce commented: I worked out that the leading lights in this Ubu Films seemed to be three guys — Aggy Read, Albie Thoms and David Perry […They] all had beards and […] seemed to come from the basement of a terrace house in Redfern. Watching those movies that night, picking up all this information, I was immediately seized by three great ambitions. First of all, I wanted to grow a beard; secondly, I wanted to live in a terrace house in the inner city; and thirdly, I wanted to be a filmmaker. (Ubu Films) Noyce soon discovered there were a lot of people like him who wanted to make short films for personal expression, but also as a form of nationalism. They wanted to make Australian movies. Noyce remembered: “Aggy, Albie and David encouraged everyone to go and make a film for themselves” (Petzke 11). This was easy enough to do as these films—not only in Australia—were often made for next to nothing and did not require any prior education or training. And the target audience group existed in a subculture of people willing to pay money even for extreme entertainment as long as it was advertised in an appealing way—which meant: in the way of the rampaging Zeitgeist. Noyce—smitten by the virus—would from then on regularly attend the weekly meetings organised by the young filmmakers. And in line with Jerry Rubin’s contemporary adage “Do it!” he would immediately embark on a string of films with enthusiasm and determination—qualities soon to become his trademark. All his films were experimental in nature, shot on 16mm and were so well received that Albie Thoms was convinced that Noyce had a great career ahead of him as an experimental filmmaker. Truly alternative was Noyce’s way to finally finance Better to Reign in Hell, his first film, made at age 18 and with a total budget of $600. Noyce said on reflection: I had approached some friends and told them that if they invested in my film, they could have an acting role. Unfortunately, the guy whose dad had the most money — he was a doctor’s son — was also maybe the worst actor that was ever put in front of a camera. But he had invested four hundred dollars, so I had to give him the lead. (Petzke 13) The title was taken from Milton’s poem Paradise Lost (“better to reign in hell than serve in heaven”). It was a film very much inspired by the images, montage and narrative techniques of the underground movies watched at Ubu. Essentially the film is about a young man’s obsession with a woman he sees repeatedly in advertising and the hallucinogenic dreams he has about her. Despite its later reputation, the film was relatively mundane. Being shot in black and white, it lacks the typical psychedelic ingredients of the time and is more reminiscent of the surrealistic precursors to underground film. Some contempt for the prevailing consumer society is thrown in for good measure. In the film, “A youth is persecuted by the haunting reappearance of a girl’s image in various commercial outlets. He finds escape from this commercial brainwashing only in his own confused sexual hallucinations” (Sydney Filmmakers Co-operative). But despite this advertising, so convincingly capturing the “hint! hint!” mood of the time, Noyce’s first film isn’t really outstanding even in terms of experimental film. Noyce continued to make short experimental films. There was not even the pretence of a story in any of them. He was just experimenting with his gear and finding his own way to use the techniques of the underground cinema. Megan was made at Sydney University Law School to be projected as part of the law students’ revue. It was a three-minute silent film that featured a woman called Megan, who he had a crush on. Intersection was 2 minutes 44 seconds in length and shot in the middle of a five-way or four-way intersection in North Sydney. The camera was walked into the intersection and spun around in a continuous circle from the beginning of the roll of film to the end. It was an experiment with disorientation and possibly a comment about urban development. Memories was a seven-minute short in colour about childhood and the bush, accompanied by a smell-track created in the cinema by burning eucalyptus leaves. Sun lasted 90 seconds in colour and examined the pulsating winter sun by way of 100 single frame shots. And finally, Home was a one-and-a-half-minute single frame camera exploration of the filmmaker’s home, inside and out, including its inhabitants and pets. As a true experimental filmmaker, Noyce had a deep interest in technical aspects. It was recommended that Sun “be projected through a special five image lens”, Memories and Intersection with “an anamorphic lens” (Sydney Filmmakers Co-operative). The double projection for Better to Reign in Hell and the two screens required for Good Afternoon, as well as the addition of the smell of burning leaves in Memories, were inroads into the subgenre of so-called Expanded Cinema. As filmmaking in those days was not an isolated enterprise but an integral part of the all-encompassing Counterculture, Noyce followed suit and became more and more involved and politiced. He started becoming a driving force of the movement. Besides selling Ubu News, he organised film screenings. He also wrote film articles for both Honi Soit and National U, the Sydney University and Canberra University newspapers—articles more opinionated than sophisticated. He was also involved in Ubu’s Underground Festival held in August and in other activities of the time, particularly anti-war protests. When Ubu Films went out of business after the lack of audience interest in Thoms’s long Marinetti film in 1969, Aggy Read suggested that Ubu be reinvented as a co-operative for tax reasons and because they might benefit from their stock of 250 Australian and foreign films. On 28 May 1970 the reinvention began at the first general meeting of the Sydney Filmmakers Cooperative where Noyce volunteered and was elected their part-time manager. He transferred the 250 prints to his parents’ home in Wahroonga where he was still living he said he “used to sit there day after day just screening those movies for myself” (Petzke 18). The Sydney University Film Society screened feature films to students at lunchtime. Noyce soon discovered they had money nobody was spending and equipment no one was using, which seemed to be made especially for him. In the university cinema he would often screen his own and other shorts from the Co-op’s library. The entry fee was 50 cents. He remembered: “If I handed out the leaflets in the morning, particularly concentrating on the fact that these films were uncensored and a little risqué, then usually there would be 600 people in the cinema […] One or two screenings per semester would usually give me all the pocket money I needed to live” (Petzke 19). Libertine and risqué films were obviously popular as they were hard to come by. Noyce said: We suffered the worst censorship of almost any Western country in the world, even worse than South Africa. Books would be seized by customs officers at the airports and when ships docked. Customs would be looking for Lady Chatterley’s Lover. We were very censored in literature and films and plays, and my film [Better to Reign in Hell] was banned from export. I tried to send it to a film festival in Holland and it was denied an export permit, but because it had been shot in Australia, until someone in the audience complained it could still be screened locally. (Castaway's Choice) No wonder clashes with the law happened frequently and were worn like medals of honour in those days of fighting the system, proving that one was fighting in the front line against the conservative values of law and order. Noyce encountered three brushes with the law. The first occurred when selling Ubu Films’ alternative culture newspaper Ubu News, Australia’s first underground newspaper (Milesago). One of the issues contained an advertisement—a small drawing—for Levi’s jeans, showing a guy trying to put his Levis on his head, so that his penis was showing. That was judged by the police to be obscene. Noyce was found guilty and given a suspended sentence for publishing an indecent publication. There had been another incident including Phil’s Pill, his own publication of six or eight issues. After one day reprinting some erotic poems from The Penguin Collection of Erotic Poetry he was found guilty and released on a good behaviour bond without a conviction being recorded. For the sake of historical truth it should be remembered, though, that provocation was a genuine part of the game. How else could one seriously advertise Better to Reign in Hell as “a sex-fantasy film which includes a daring rape scene”—and be surprised when the police came in after screening this “pornographic film” (Stratton 202) at the Newcastle Law Students Ball? The Newcastle incident also throws light on the fact that Noyce organised screenings wherever possible, constantly driving prints and projectors around in his Mini Minor. Likewise, he is remembered as having been extremely helpful in trying to encourage other people with their own ideas—anyone could make films and could make them about anything they liked. He helped Jan Chapman, a fellow student who became his (first) wife in December 1971, to shoot and edit Just a Little Note, a documentary about a moratorium march and a guerrilla theatre group run by their friend George Shevtsov. Noyce also helped on I Happened to Be a Girl, a documentary about four women, friends of Chapman. There is no denying that being a filmmaker was a hobby, a full-time job and an obsessive religion for Noyce. He was on the organising committee of the First Australian Filmmakers’ Festival in August 1971. He performed in the agit-prop acting troupe run by George Shevtsov (later depicted in Renegades) that featured prominently at one of Sydney’s rock festival that year. In the latter part of 1971 and early 1972 he worked on Good Afternoon, a documentary about the Combined Universities’ Aquarius Arts Festival in Canberra, which arguably was the first major manifestation of counterculture in Australia. For this the Aquarius Foundation—the cultural arm of the Australian Union of Students—had contracted him. This became a two-screen movie à la Woodstock. Together with Thoms, Read and Ian Stocks, in 1972 he participated in cataloguing the complete set of films in distribution by the Co-op (see Sydney Filmmakers Cooperative). As can be seen, Noyce was at home in many manifestations of the Sydney counterculture. His own films had slowly become more politicised and bent towards documentary. He even started a newsreel that he used to screen at the Filmmakers’ Cooperative Cinema with a live commentary. One in 1971, Springboks Protest, was about the demonstrations at the Sydney Cricket Ground against the South African rugby tour. There were more but Noyce doesn’t remember them and no prints seem to have survived. Renegades was a diary film; a combination of poetic images and reportage on the street demonstrations. Noyce’s experimental films had been met with interest in the—limited—audience and among publications. His more political films and particularly Good Afternoon, however, reached out to a much wider audience, now including even the undogmatic left and hard-core documentarists of the times. In exchange, and for the first time, there were opposing reactions—but as always a great discussion at the Filmmakers’ Cinema, the main venue for independent productions. This cinema began with those initial screenings at Sydney University in the union room next to the Union Theatre. But once the Experimental Film Fund started operating in 1970, more and more films were submitted for the screenings and consequently a new venue was needed. Albie Thoms started a forum in the Yellow House in Kings Cross in May 1970. Next came—at least briefly—a restaurant in Glebe before the Co-op took over a space on the top floor of the socialist Third World Bookshop in Goulburn Street that was a firetrap. Bob Gould, the owner, was convinced that by first passing through his bookshop the audience would buy his books on the way upstairs. Sundays for him were otherwise dead from a commercial point of view. Noyce recollected that: The audience at this Filmmakers’ Cinema were mightily enthusiastic about seeing themselves up on the screen. And there was always a great discussion. So, generally the screenings were a huge success, with many full houses. The screenings grew from once a week, to three times on Sunday, to all weekend, and then seven days a week at several locations. One program could play in three different illegal cinemas around the city. (Petzke 26) A filmmakers’ cinema also started in Melbourne and the groups of filmmakers would visit each other and screen their respective films. But especially after the election of the Whitlam Labor government in December 1972 there was a shift in interest from risqué underground films to the concept of Australian Cinema. The audience started coming now for a dose of Australian culture. Funding of all kind was soon freely available and with such a fund the film co-op was able to set up a really good licensed cinema in St. Peters Lane in Darlinghurst, running seven days a week. But, Noyce said, “the move to St. Peters Lane was sort of the end of an era, because initially the cinema was self-funded, but once it became government sponsored everything changed” (Petzke 29). With money now readily available, egotism set in and the prevailing “we”-feeling rather quickly dissipated. But by the time of this move and the resulting developments, everything for Noyce had already changed again. He had been accepted into the first intake of the Interim Australian Film & TV School, another one of the nation-awareness-building projects of the Whitlam government. He was on his “long march through the institutions”—as this was frequently called throughout Europe—that would bring him to documentaries, TV and eventually even Hollywood (and return). Noyce didn’t linger once the alternative scene started fading away. Everything those few, wild years in the counterculture had taught him also put him right on track to become one of the major players in Hollywood. He never looked back—but he remembers fondly…References Castaway’s Choice. Radio broadcast by KCRW. 1990. Doggett, Peter. There’s a Riot Going On: Revolutionaries, Rock Stars and the Rise and Fall of ’60s Counter-Culture. Edinburgh: Canongate, 2007. Farber, Manny. “Underground Films.” Negative Space: Manny Farber on the Movies. Ed. Manny Farber. New York: Da Capo, 1998. 12–24. Jacobs, Lewis. “Morning for the Experimental Film”. Film Culture 19 (1959): 6–9. Milesago. “Ubu Films”. n.d. 26 Nov. 2014 ‹http://www.milesago.com/visual/ubu.htm›. New American Cinema Group. “First Statement of the New American Cinema Group.” Film Culture Reader. Ed. P. Adams Sitney. New York: Praeger, 1970. 73–75. Petzke, Ingo. Phillip Noyce: Backroads to Hollywood. Sydney: Pan McMillan, 2004. Renan, Sheldon. The Underground Film: An Introduction to Its Development in America. London: Studio Vista, 1968. Roszak, Theodore. The Making of Counter Culture. New York: Anchor, 1969. Stratton, David. The Last New Wave: The Australian Film Revival. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1980. Sydney Filmmakers Co-operative. Film Catalogue. Sydney: Sydney Filmmakers Co-operative, 1972. Ubu Films. Unreleased five-minute video for the promotion of Mudie, Peter. Ubu Films: Sydney Underground Movies 1965-1970. Sydney: UNSW Press, 1997.