Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Formation de coalition"
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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "Formation de coalition"
Rahwan, Talal, Tomasz Michalak, Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Jacek Sroka, Michael Wooldridge e Nicholas Jennings. "Constrained Coalition Formation". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 25, n.º 1 (4 de agosto de 2011): 719–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7888.
Texto completo da fonteDutta, Bhaskar, e Hannu Vartiainen. "Coalition formation and history dependence". Theoretical Economics 15, n.º 1 (2020): 159–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2947.
Texto completo da fonteGOLDER, SONA NADENICHEK. "Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation in Parliamentary Democracies". British Journal of Political Science 36, n.º 2 (9 de março de 2006): 193–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123406000123.
Texto completo da fonteCURRARINI, SERGIO, e MARCO A. MARINI. "COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES". International Game Theory Review 08, n.º 01 (março de 2006): 111–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000813.
Texto completo da fonteSinghal, Shiksha, e Veeraruna Kavitha. "Coalition Formation Resource Sharing Games in Networks". ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review 49, n.º 3 (22 de março de 2022): 57–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3529113.3529132.
Texto completo da fonteOWEN, GUILLERMO. "ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF COALITIONS". International Game Theory Review 10, n.º 04 (dezembro de 2008): 461–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198908002047.
Texto completo da fonteBEJAN, CAMELIA, e JUAN CAMILO GÓMEZ. "USING THE ASPIRATION CORE TO PREDICT COALITION FORMATION". International Game Theory Review 14, n.º 01 (março de 2012): 1250004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219198912500041.
Texto completo da fonteShi, Yuanyuan, Gang Zhu, Siyu Lin, Jianwen Ding e Shengfeng Xu. "Coalitional Game Theory for Cooperative Interference Management in Femtocell Networks". Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2015 (2015): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2015/767649.
Texto completo da fonteMARTIN, LANNY W., e RANDOLPH T. STEVENSON. "The Conditional Impact of Incumbency on Government Formation". American Political Science Review 104, n.º 3 (agosto de 2010): 503–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055410000213.
Texto completo da fonteKong, XiangLong, XiangRong Tong e YingJie Wang. "Min- k -Cut Coalition Structure Generation on Trust-Utility Relationship Graph". Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing 2021 (14 de abril de 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/8834879.
Texto completo da fonteTeses / dissertações sobre o assunto "Formation de coalition"
Winschel, Evguenia. "Essays on coalition formation". [S.l. : s.n.], 2007. http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-20457.
Texto completo da fonteHojnacki, Marie Elizabeth. "Coalition formation among organized interests /". The Ohio State University, 1994. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1487856906261803.
Texto completo da fonteBarton, Levi L. "Agent-Organized Network Coalition Formation". DigitalCommons@USU, 2008. https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/206.
Texto completo da fonteBäck, Hanna. "Explaining coalitions evidence and lessons from studying coalition formation in Swedish local government /". Uppsala : Uppsala Universitet, 2003. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/53332399.html.
Texto completo da fonteDeJong, Paul. "COALITION FORMATION IN MULTI-AGENT UAV SYSTEMS". Master's thesis, University of Central Florida, 2005. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2712.
Texto completo da fonteM.S.Cp.E.
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Engineering and Computer Science
Computer Engineering
Khan, Majid Ali. "Coalition formation and teamwork in embodied agents". Doctoral diss., University of Central Florida, 2007. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETD/id/2711.
Texto completo da fontePh.D.
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Engineering and Computer Science
Computer Engineering PhD
Pycia, Marek. "Essays on economic design and coalition formation". Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/34513.
Texto completo da fonteIncludes bibliographical references.
This thesis consists of three essays on economic design and coalition formation. The first chapter studies the stability of many-to-one matching, such as matching between students and colleges or interns and hospitals. Complementarities and peer effects are inherent in many such matching situations. The chapter provides the first sufficient condition for stability that may be used to study matching with complementarities and peer effects. The condition offered is shown to be also necessary for stability in some matching problems. The second chapter provides a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core in coalition formation such as the formation of clubs, partnerships, firms, business alliances, and jurisdictions voting on public goods. The condition is formulated for settings in which agents first form coalitions and then each coalition realizes a payoff profile from the set of available alternatives via a mechanism. In particular, there exists a core coalition structure if the payoffs are determined in the Tullock rent-seeking game or Nash bargaining. The core might be empty if the payoffs are determined by the Kalai-Smorodinsky or Shapley bargaining solutions.
(cont.) The chapter also determines the class of linear sharing rules and regular Pareto-optimal mechanisms for which there are core coalition structures. The third chapter studies the multidimensional screening problem of a profit-maximizing monopolistic seller of goods with multiple indivisible attributes. The buyer's utility is buyer's private information and is linear in the probabilities of obtaining the attributes. The chapter solves the seller's problem for an arbitrary number of attributes when there are two types of buyers, adding a new simple example to the few known examples of solved multidimensional screening problems. When there is a continuum of buyer types, the chapter shows that generically the seller wants to sell goods with some of the attributes partly damaged, stochastic, or leased on restrictive terms. The often-studied simple bundling strategies are shown to be generically suboptimal.
by Marek Pycia.
Ph.D.
Karos, Dominik [Verfasser]. "Power, Control, and Coalition Formation / Dominik Karos". Aachen : Shaker, 2013. http://d-nb.info/1050344871/34.
Texto completo da fonteDang, Viet Dung. "Coalition formation and operation in virtual organisations". Thesis, University of Southampton, 2004. https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/260239/.
Texto completo da fonteLee, Daesik. "Essays on coalition formation under asymmetric information". Diss., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1988. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/53567.
Texto completo da fontePh. D.
Livros sobre o assunto "Formation de coalition"
Bolduc, Nathalie. Les facteurs influençant la formation des coalitions. Québec: Université Laval, Laboratoire d'études politiques et administratives, 1992.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteMurnighan, John Keith. Organizational coalition formation: Process, consequences and dominant coalitions. [Urbana, Ill.]: College of Commerce and Business Administration, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1985.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteAd M.A. van Deemen. Coalition formation and social choice. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteGreenberg, Joseph. Coalition formation with eligibility. Toronto, Ont: Department of Economics, York University, 1989.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteHoller, Manfred J., e Guillermo Owen, eds. Power Indices and Coalition Formation. Boston, MA: Springer US, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-6221-1.
Texto completo da fontevan Deemen, M. A. Coalition Formation and Social Choice. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0.
Texto completo da fonteAcemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in political games. Cambridge, Mass: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2006.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteAcemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in political games. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2006.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteAcemoglu, Daron. Coalition formation in non-democracies. Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Economics, 2009.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteEvans, Robert A. Value, consistency and random coalition formation. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, Department of AppliedEconomics, 1992.
Encontre o texto completo da fonteCapítulos de livros sobre o assunto "Formation de coalition"
Bernhard, Laurent, e Hanspeter Kriesi. "Coalition Formation". In Political Communication in Direct Democratic Campaigns, 54–68. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230343214_4.
Texto completo da fonteBernhard, Laurent. "Coalition Formation". In Campaign Strategy in Direct Democracy, 102–23. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137011343_5.
Texto completo da fonteBimonte, Giovanna. "Restricted Coalition Formation". In New Economic Windows, 137–46. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-05185-7_8.
Texto completo da fonteChalkiadakis, Georgios, Edith Elkind, Evangelos Markakis e Nicholas R. Jennings. "Overlapping Coalition Formation". In Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 307–21. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-92185-1_37.
Texto completo da fontevan Deemen, M. A. "Coalition Preferences". In Coalition Formation and Social Choice, 149–86. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-2578-0_6.
Texto completo da fonteTakahashi, Shingo, Kyoichi Kijima e Ryo Sato. "Coalition Formation by Organizations". In Applied General Systems Research on Organizations, 115–30. Tokyo: Springer Japan, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-53949-0_6.
Texto completo da fonteRapoport, Anatol. "Theories of Coalition Formation". In Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 369–81. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7840-0_20.
Texto completo da fonteFiaschi, Davide, e Pier Mario Pacini. "Growth and Coalition Formation". In Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 171–88. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-27296-8_12.
Texto completo da fonteŞtefuriuc, Irina. "Coalition Formation — The Process". In Government Formation in Multi-Level Settings, 100–132. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137300744_7.
Texto completo da fonteRapoport, Anatol. "Theories of Coalition Formation". In Decision Theory and Decision Behaviour, 383–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230377769_20.
Texto completo da fonteTrabalhos de conferências sobre o assunto "Formation de coalition"
Mamakos, Michail, e Georgios Chalkiadakis. "Probability Bounds for Overlapping Coalition Formation". In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/47.
Texto completo da fonteKerkmann, Anna Maria, e Jörg Rothe. "Altruism in Coalition Formation Games". In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/49.
Texto completo da fonteTaguelmimt, Redha, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder e Tuomas Sandholm. "Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Solution Space Representation". In Thirty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-23}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2023. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/35.
Texto completo da fonteBistaffa, Filippo, e Alessandro Farinelli. "A COP Model for Graph-Constrained Coalition Formation (Extended Abstract)". In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. California: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/783.
Texto completo da fonteBoongasame, Laor. "Preference coalition formation algorithm for buyer coalition". In 2012 International Joint Conference on Computer Science and Software Engineering (JCSSE). IEEE, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/jcsse.2012.6261956.
Texto completo da fonteJi, Xi, Quan Liu, Wenjun Xu e Duzhong Zhang. "Complexity Optimization for Cooperative Sensing Using Coalition Games". In ASME 2014 International Manufacturing Science and Engineering Conference collocated with the JSME 2014 International Conference on Materials and Processing and the 42nd North American Manufacturing Research Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/msec2014-4078.
Texto completo da fonteChalkiadakis, Georgios, Evangelos Markakis e Craig Boutilier. "Coalition formation under uncertainty". In the 6th international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329203.
Texto completo da fonteSujit, P. B., J. M. George e R. W. Beard. "Multiple UAV coalition formation". In 2008 American Control Conference (ACC '08). IEEE, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/acc.2008.4586788.
Texto completo da fonteShuling Di. "Strategy of agent coalition formation based on outstanding coalition". In 2010 2nd International Conference on Computer Engineering and Technology. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iccet.2010.5485666.
Texto completo da fonteBlankenburg, Bastian, Rajdeep K. Dash, Sarvapali D. Ramchurn, Matthias Klusch e Nicholas R. Jennings. "Trusted kernel-based coalition formation". In the fourth international joint conference. New York, New York, USA: ACM Press, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1082473.1082623.
Texto completo da fonteRelatórios de organizações sobre o assunto "Formation de coalition"
Battaglini, Marco. Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, março de 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w25664.
Texto completo da fonteAcemoglu, Daron, Georgy Egorov e Konstantin Sonin. Coalition Formation in Political Games. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, dezembro de 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12749.
Texto completo da fonteBurger, Nicholas, e Charles Kolstad. Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, novembro de 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15543.
Texto completo da fonteOrtiz, Charles L., Regis Vincent, Eric Hsu, Bruno Dutertre e Barbara Grosz. Incremental Negotiation and Coalition Formation for Resource-Bounded Agents. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, janeiro de 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada421724.
Texto completo da fonteIrwin, Douglas. Antebellum Tariff Politics: Coalition Formation and Shifting Regional Interests. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, abril de 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w12161.
Texto completo da fonteSoh, Leen-Kiat. A Negotiation-Based Coalition Formation Model for Agents with Incomplete Information and Time Constraints. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, janeiro de 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada461997.
Texto completo da fonteSchuster, Christian. Strategies to Professionalize the Civil Service: Lessons from the Dominican Republic. Inter-American Development Bank, setembro de 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010594.
Texto completo da fonteDannenberg, Astrid, Andreas Lange e Bodo Sturm. On the Formation of Coalitions to Provide Public Goods - Experimental Evidence from the Lab. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, maio de 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w15967.
Texto completo da fonteBonvecchi, Alejandro. The Political Economy of Fiscal Reform in Latin America: The Case of Argentina. Inter-American Development Bank, maio de 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0010935.
Texto completo da fonte