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Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Fairness Preferences"

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Autor: Grafiati

Publicado: 31 de agosto de 2024

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1

Song, Lei, Qi Xin e Cheng-Min Wu. "Pricing Problem in the E-Commerce Low-Carbon Supply Chain under Asymmetric Fairness Preferences". Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2022 (3 de março de 2022): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/3268130.

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Given the different fairness preferences of online retailers and their investment in emission reduction and revenue sharing with manufacturers, an e-commerce low-carbon supply chain decision model was established using Stackelberg game theory under three circumstances: no fairness preference, symmetric fairness preferences, and asymmetric fairness preferences. Results reveal that the asymmetric fairness preference behaviors of online retailers weaken the manufacturers’ profits, where the online retailer’s utility is negatively correlated with its asymmetric fairness preference coefficient. The real fairness preference coefficient of the online retailer estimated by the manufacturer is negatively correlated with the manufacturer’s wholesale price and carbon emission reduction. The revenue sharing proportion of the manufacturer presents a positive correlation with its wholesale price but shows no correlation with the retail price, the green degree, or the supply chain profit. Within a feasible region, the proportion of the online retailer’s investment in emission reduction is positively correlated with the manufacturer’s profit, the online retailer’s utility, the total utility of the supply chain, the carbon emission reduction, the product’s retail price, and the product’s wholesale price.

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Zhang, Yinjunjie, Manuel Hoffmann, Raisa Sara e Catherine Eckel. "Fairness preferences revisited". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 223 (julho de 2024): 278–306. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.04.033.

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3

Cao, Zhaoyu, Xu Zhao, Yucheng Zou, Kairong Hong e Yanwei Zhang. "Multidimensional Fair Fuzzy Equilibrium Evaluation of Housing Expropriation Compensation from the Perspective of Behavioral Preference: A Case Study from China". Mathematics 9, n.º 6 (18 de março de 2021): 650. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math9060650.

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With the rapid development of urbanization, substantial land areas and houses are expropriated, which can cause huge numbers of disputes related to expropriation compensation. The root of the disputes is that the associated subjects are affected by various behavioral preferences and make different cognitive fairness judgments based on the same compensation price. However, the existing expropriation compensation strategies based on the market value under the assumption of “the economic man” hypothesis cannot meet the fairness preference demands of the expropriated. Therefore, finding a compensation price that satisfies subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences, including profit-seeking, loss aversion, and interactive fairness preferences, is necessary. Only in this way can the subjects reach an agreement regarding fair compensation and resolve their disputes. Because of the fuzziness of subjects’ expected revenues, this paper innovatively introduces trigonometric intuitional fuzzy numbers to construct one-dimensional and multidimensional fair fuzzy equilibrium evaluation models. The Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to an Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method is adopted to convert a multidimensional problem into a multiattribute group decision problem, which simplifies the problem of finding multidimensional equilibrium when considering the multidimensional fairness preferences of the two subjects. Real case data are introduced to verify the validity of this method. The research results show that upward revision of the multidimensional fairness preferences based on the market value assists in achieving a fair compensation agreement. Consideration of the influence of the subjects’ multidimensional fairness preferences on the fairness equilibrium is conducive to resolving the disputes, and provides a reference for the settlement of expropriation compensation disputes in developing countries.

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Miller, Fabienne, Christine A. Denison e Linda J. Matuszewski. "Modeling the Antecedents of Preferences for Incomplete Contracts in Bilateral Trade: An Experimental Investigation". Behavioral Research in Accounting 25, n.º 1 (1 de outubro de 2012): 135–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/bria-50346.

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ABSTRACT: Contracts constitute an important control mechanism. Their design is influenced by the preferences of the contracting parties, in addition to firm-level economic transaction costs. This study conducts an experiment to explore the antecedents of preferences for a less complete contract in a trade setting. Results from an experiment indicate that the preference for a more complete versus a less complete contract depends on the perceived riskiness of the incomplete contract, which is influenced by the perceived bargaining power and fairness preferences (namely, distributive and procedural fairness preferences) of the contracting parties. In other words, we find evidence that suggests that choosing the completeness of a contract is a form of risk-taking, and that the preference for a more incomplete contract is influenced by perceived power and fairness preferences.

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Wang, Yong, Tianze Tang, Weiyi Zhang, Zhen Sun e Qiaoqin Xiong. "The Achilles tendon of dynamic pricing –– the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on platform's dynamic pricing strategies". Journal of Internet and Digital Economics 1, n.º 1 (7 de outubro de 2021): 15–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jide-08-2021-0004.

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PurposeIn this paper, the authors study the effect of consumers' fairness preferences on dynamic pricing strategies adopted by platforms in a non-cooperative game.Design/methodology/approachThis study applies fair game and repeated game theory.FindingsThis study reveals that, in a one-shot game, if consumers have fairness preferences, dynamic prices will slightly decline. In a repeated game, dynamic prices will be reduced even when consumers do not have fairness preferences. When fairness preferences and repeated game are considered simultaneously, dynamic prices are most likely to be set at fair prices. The authors also discuss the effect of platforms' discounting factors, the consumers' income and alternative choices of consumption on the dynamic prices.Research limitations/implicationsThe study findings illustrate the importance of incorporating behavioral elements in understanding and designing the dynamic pricing strategies for platforms and the implications on social welfare in general.Originality/valueThe authors developed a theoretical model to incorporate consumers' fairness preference into the decision-making process of platforms when they design the dynamic pricing strategies.

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Kleinberg, Jon, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan e Ashesh Rambachan. "Algorithmic Fairness". AEA Papers and Proceedings 108 (1 de maio de 2018): 22–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20181018.

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Concerns that algorithms may discriminate against certain groups have led to numerous efforts to ‘blind’ the algorithm to race. We argue that this intuitive perspective is misleading and may do harm. Our primary result is exceedingly simple, yet often overlooked. A preference for fairness should not change the choice of estimator. Equity preferences can change how the estimated prediction function is used (e.g., different threshold for different groups) but the function itself should not change. We show in an empirical example for college admissions that the inclusion of variables such as race can increase both equity and efficiency.

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7

Ge, Genhasi, Daoping Wang e Mesumbe Bianca Epede. "Pricing Policies of Green Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns and Altruistic Preferences Based on Consumers’ Environmental Awareness and Channel Preference". International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 19, n.º 20 (19 de outubro de 2022): 13564. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijerph192013564.

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Taking into consideration fairness concerns and altruistic preferences of manufacturers, this paper aims to propose a green dual-channel supply chain that incorporates consumers’ environmental awareness (CEA) and channel preference. The purpose of this work is to explore and further compare the optimal outcomes in a green dual-channel supply chain in three scenarios, which are the fairness-neutrality scenario (Model N), the manufacturer is concerned with fairness scenario (Model F), and the manufacturer has altruistic preference (Model A), respectively. The game-theoretical models with different fairness preferences, comparative, and numerical analyses are used to put forward the impacts of consumers’ channel preference and CEA on pricing, profits, and utilities, and to identify the differences in decisional outcomes between the three models. The results indicate that CEA always contributes to developing the green market while adversely affecting common products. Moreover, consumers’ channel preferences might enable the manufacturer and retailer to enhance profitability under certain conditions. The findings also reveal that manufacturer’s fairness concerns can possibly increase the demand for green products but impair the overall performance of the supply chain in general. Moreover, while the manufacturer’s altruistic preference benefits the retailer’s profits, it has a detrimental effect on the performance of the green supply chain. The practical implications of this research come to promote green consumption and increasing consumer awareness of environmental protection are effective ways to develop a green supply chain. It is also important to note that in order to maintain the durability and stability of the sup-ply chain, the manufacturer must maintain a moderate level of fairness preference behaviors so that downstream retailers will remain enthusiastic about establishing long-term relationships.

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Li, Zhipeng, Shuzhen Zhu e Xinyu Cao. "Incentive Contract Design considering Fairness Preferences and Carbon Emission Reduction Multiobjective Tasks". Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2021 (17 de junho de 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2021/6541682.

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Considering the multitargets of corporate carbon emission reduction and the fairness preference psychology of the company, a government incentive model for corporate carbon emission reduction was constructed. The impact of corporate fairness preferences on government carbon emission reduction incentive strategies is studied. In addition, numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of changes in correlation coefficients, fairness preference coefficients, and discount rates on the optimal enterprise effort coefficient and the government optimal incentive coefficient. Research shows that the degree of fairness preference of a company has a direct impact on the degree of corporate effort, while the discount rate will only have an impact on the company’s long-term effort. In order to improve corporate carbon emission reduction efforts, the government must not only consider the impact of fairness preference on corporate efforts but also flexibly adjust the incentive coefficient of long-term and short-term tasks based on the discount rate.

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9

Zhang, Xuemei, Jian Cao, Yang Zhao e Jiansha Lu. "Fairness Concern in Remanufacturing Supply Chain—A Comparative Analysis of Channel Members’ Fairness Preferences". Sustainability 14, n.º 7 (24 de março de 2022): 3813. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su14073813.

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Remanufacturing is a sustainable product reutilization strategy to realize responsible consumption and production. However, it has remained a largely untapped opportunity for enhancing productivity due to some behavioral matters such as fairness concerns of remanufacturing related firms. Concerning the emerging and development of remanufacturing industry, this paper provides a game-theoretic analysis for a remanufacturing supply chain (RSC) consisting of one leading manufacturer and a following retailer, with the inclusion of fairness concern. We propose and compare several scenarios of channel members’ fairness preferences as, both members are fairness concerned, only one member is fairness concerned, and both members are fair neutral, to expound how fairness concern affects RSC strategies and resulting utilities. We also demonstrate dynamic evolution and stable state of channel members’ selections of whether being fairness concerned in the long term. Analytical results show that favorable scenarios for the RSC to achieve desired objective are relevant to its preference for improved supply chain performance or enhanced environmental benefit. Whatever the preference is, however, it is detrimental for both members to be fairness concerned in the short term. In the long term, evolutionary stable strategies of fairness concerns indicate that both members or only one member would choose to be fairness concerned. The eventual status relies on the initial state of fairness preference. The results are especially relevant as a reference for remanufacturing related strategies, thus enhancing production sustainability as well as environmental benefits.

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10

Thunström, Linda. "Preferences for fairness over losses". Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 83 (dezembro de 2019): 101469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.101469.

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Almås, Ingvild, Alexander W. Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen e Bertil Tungodden. "Attitudes to inequality: preferences and beliefs". Oxford Open Economics 3, Supplement_1 (2024): i64—i79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ooec/odae001.

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Abstract To understand attitudes to inequality, we need to study people’s fairness preferences and beliefs about the sources of inequality. This article reviews the existing experimental literature on fairness, including our new study ‘Fairness Across the World’ that collected novel data on attitudes to inequality in 60 countries. We establish that people in general are more willing to accept inequalities that reflect differences in performance than inequalities that reflect differences in luck—and that people care more about fairness than efficiency. We also document that people differ in their fairness preferences both within and between countries. Richer countries are more meritocratic, and, correspondingly, richer people are more meritocratic within countries. People also differ in their beliefs about the sources of inequality both between and within countries, and the evidence is consistent with people having a self-serving bias in beliefs.

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12

Sandbu, Martin Eiliv. "Axiomatic foundations for fairness-motivated preferences". Social Choice and Welfare 31, n.º 4 (9 de fevereiro de 2008): 589–619. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0296-x.

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Dickinson, David L. "Experiment timing and preferences for fairness". Journal of Socio-Economics 38, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2009): 89–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2008.05.010.

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14

Rerkjirattikal, Pavinee, Van-Nam Huynh, Sun Olapiriyakul e Thepchai Supnithi. "A Goal Programming Approach to Nurse Scheduling with Individual Preference Satisfaction". Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2020 (22 de novembro de 2020): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/2379091.

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The use of scheduling optimization tools is essential in creating an efficient nurse shift-rotation schedule. A well-designed nurse scheduling technique can improve nurses’ job satisfaction and their intention to stay. This study develops a goal programming approach to nurse scheduling that simultaneously considers workload fairness and individual preferences on working shift and day off assignments. A case study of an operating room at a hospital in Thailand is used to illustrate the model capabilities for solving an actual nurse scheduling problem. The job satisfaction factors defined based on an interview and questionnaire survey are integrated into the model. When compared against the manual scheduling result, the optimal schedules can be implemented to improve the nurse’s perception of fairness and preference satisfaction. The analysis of fairness and multiple individual preferences based on a case study investigation is the main contribution of this study.

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15

Chai, Caichun, Hailong Zhu e Zhangwei Feng. "Evolutionary Stable Strategies for Supply Chains: Selfishness, Fairness, and Altruism". Journal of Systems Science and Information 6, n.º 6 (10 de dezembro de 2018): 532–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.21078/jssi-2018-532-20.

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Abstract The management strategies of a firm are inevitable affected by individual behavior preferences. The effect of individual preference on the evolutionary dynamics for supply chains is studied by employing replicator dynamics. Each firm has three behavior preferences: selfishness, fairness, and altruism. Firstly, the case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers including two pure strategies is considered and the effect of preference parameter on the equilibrium outcome in the short-term interaction is discussed. Secondly, the equilibrium state in the short-term is always disturbed because the change of the environment, firm’s structure, and so forth. Using the replicator dynamics, the evolutionary stable strategies of manufacturers and retailers in the long-term interaction are analyzed. Finally, the extend case that the strategy set of manufacturers and retailers include three pure strategies is investigated. These results are found that the strategy profile in which both manufacturer and retailer choose fairness or altruism, or one player chooses fair or altruistic strategy and the other player chooses selfish strategy may be evolutionary stable, the stability of these equilibria depends on the the preference parameters.

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16

Zhang, Zi-yuan, Duan-xiang Fu e Qing Zhou. "Optimal Decisions of a Green Supply Chain under the Joint Action of Fairness Preference and Subsidy to the Manufacturer". Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2020 (5 de fevereiro de 2020): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/9610503.

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Government subsidy promotes the development of green supply chain, and the influence of decision-makers’ behavioral preferences becomes increasingly prominent in green supply chain management. In order to further enrich the research content of green supply chain, we first use Stackelberg game theory to construct game models by taking the product green degree, wholesale price and retail price as the decision variables, then we work out the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer and the retailer under four decision scenarios, and reveal the impact differences between the two parties’ fairness preference behaviors. Our research mainly has the following findings: Firstly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer can benefit these two parties and can have certain impact on the optimal decisions only by working with the green product market expansion efficiency. Secondly, these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors can cause serious damage to the other party’s profit and the overall profit of green supply chain, and increase the rate of their own profit in the overall profit of green supply chain, but the difference is that the retailer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater decline in product green degree and wholesale price, and when certain conditions are met, its own profit may rise compared to its fairness neutral, while the manufacturer’s fairness preference behavior can cause a greater damage to the overall profit of green supply chainand make its own profit always be lower than its fairness neutral. Thirdly, the government subsidy to the manufacturer and the fairness preference behaviors of both parties can cause a stack effect on the optimal solutions, which means that the subsidy government provides for the manufacturer can aggravate the negative influence caused by these two parties’ fairness preference behaviors.

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17

Ciccone, Alice, Ole Rogeberg e Ragnhild Braaten. "Fairness Preferences in a Bilateral Trade Experiment". Games 11, n.º 1 (31 de janeiro de 2020): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g11010008.

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Is the willingness to make trades influenced by how the total gains from trade are split between the trading partners? We present results from a bilateral trade game (n = 128) where all participants were price-takers and trading pairs faced one of three exogenously imposed trading prices. The fixed prices divided the gains either symmetrically in the reference treatment or asymmetrically in treatments favoring either the buyer or seller. Price treatments generating asymmetric gains from trade reduced desired transaction levels on both sides of the market, but more strongly by the disfavored party. The data weakly indicated a larger reduction when the disfavored party was a seller.

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Jütte, Silke, Daniel Müller e Ulrich W. Thonemann. "Optimizing railway crew schedules with fairness preferences". Journal of Scheduling 20, n.º 1 (23 de setembro de 2016): 43–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10951-016-0499-4.

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Fudenberg, Drew, e David K. Levine. "Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 81, n.º 2 (fevereiro de 2012): 606–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.09.004.

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Calo-Blanco, Aitor. "Health and fairness with other-regarding preferences". Review of Economic Design 24, n.º 3-4 (18 de junho de 2020): 123–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00235-2.

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Powers, Kathleen E., Joshua D. Kertzer, Deborah J. Brooks e Stephen G. Brooks. "What’s Fair in International Politics? Equity, Equality, and Foreign Policy Attitudes". Journal of Conflict Resolution 66, n.º 2 (29 de setembro de 2021): 217–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220027211041393.

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How do concerns about fairness shape foreign policy preferences? In this article, we show that fairness has two faces—one concerning equity, the other concerning equality—and that taking both into account can shed light on the structure of important foreign policy debates. Fielding an original survey on a national sample of Americans, we show that different types of Americans think about fairness in different ways, and that these fairness concerns shape foreign policy preferences: individuals who emphasize equity are far more sensitive to concerns about burden sharing, are far less likely to support US involvement abroad when other countries aren’t paying their fair share, and often support systematically different foreign policies than individuals who emphasize equality. As long as IR scholars focus only on the equality dimension of fairness, we miss much about how fairness concerns matter in world politics.

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Zhong, Meirui, Anqi Zeng, Jianbai Huang e Kairong Hong. "Project Capital Allocation Combination Equilibrium Decision Model Based on Behavioral Option Game". Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2014 (2014): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/803073.

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Aiming at option value of the project and fairness preference psychological utility features, this paper modified objective function between players by option game equilibrium and utility function of project managers by inequity aversion. Therefore, under the symmetric and asymmetric information conditions, a project capital allocation combination equilibrium decision model has been built. It draws a conclusion that the option value of projects has changed the utility function of shareholders and managers in capital allocation, whereas fairness preferences of the project managers have changed the way of allocation through psychological utility. These two effects have influenced the trigger point of capital allocation decision-making. One is the decrease of trigger point owing to capital allocation decision-making of a CEO affected by the option value; the other is the reaction due to the crowding-out and crowding-in effect of the project manager’s fairness preference, which restrains the severity of underinvestment. Therefore, a good incentive plan should be a balance among insurance, incentive, and fairness, not only a balance between insurance and incentive.

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Fleurbaey, Marc, e Martin Van der Linden. "Fair Social Ordering, Egalitarianism, and Animal Welfare". American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 13, n.º 4 (1 de novembro de 2021): 466–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20190091.

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We study fairness in economies where humans consume one private good and one public good representing the welfare of other species. We show that a social evaluator cannot be egalitarian with respect to humans while always respecting humans’ unanimous preferences. One solution is to respect unanimous preferences only when doing so does not lead to a decrease in the welfare of other species. Social preferences satisfying these properties reveal surprising connections between concerns for other species, egalitarianism among humans, and unanimity: the latter two imply a form of dictatorship from humans with the strongest preference for the welfare of other species. (JEL D11, D63, H41)

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Li, Cheng-Te, Cheng Hsu e Yang Zhang. "FairSR: Fairness-aware Sequential Recommendation through Multi-Task Learning with Preference Graph Embeddings". ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology 13, n.º 1 (28 de fevereiro de 2022): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3495163.

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Sequential recommendation (SR) learns from the temporal dynamics of user-item interactions to predict the next ones. Fairness-aware recommendation mitigates a variety of algorithmic biases in the learning of user preferences. This article aims at bringing a marriage between SR and algorithmic fairness. We propose a novel fairness-aware sequential recommendation task, in which a new metric, interaction fairness , is defined to estimate how recommended items are fairly interacted by users with different protected attribute groups. We propose a multi-task learning-based deep end-to-end model, FairSR, which consists of two parts. One is to learn and distill personalized sequential features from the given user and her item sequence for SR. The other is fairness-aware preference graph embedding (FPGE). The aim of FPGE is two-fold: incorporating the knowledge of users’ and items’ attributes and their correlation into entity representations, and alleviating the unfair distributions of user attributes on items. Extensive experiments conducted on three datasets show FairSR can outperform state-of-the-art SR models in recommendation performance. In addition, the recommended items by FairSR also exhibit promising interaction fairness.

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Luo, Qi, e Jicai Liu. "INCENTIVE MECHANISM OF GOVERNMENT OVERCOMMITMENT IN PPPS BASED ON INVESTORS’ FAIRNESS PREFERENCE". International Journal of Strategic Property Management 28, n.º 1 (12 de março de 2024): 29–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/ijspm.2024.21028.

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In public-private partnerships (PPPs), governments sometimes may not afford the guarantees in full as initially agreed upon due to limited fiscal budgets. Accordingly, government overcommitment can occur. The degree of government overcommitment fulfillment affects not only the incentives provided by governments but also investors’ willingness to cooperate and efforts. However, until now, this government overcommitment risk has been ignored during negotiations. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the impact of investors’ fairness preference. To this end, this paper constructs an incentive mechanism of government overcommitment based on investors’ fairness preference in the horizontal and vertical dimensions. The results show that the optimal strategies of both sides are usually affected by the degree of government overcommitment fulfillment, investors’ fairness preference and their willingness to cooperate. Contrary to intuition, the optimal incentive of governments and investors’ efforts do not always increase with the decreasing degree of government overcommitment fulfillment, and thus, fairness preferences should be considered. It is not always the case that a higher-level government overcommitment fulfillment is better for themselves. The findings contribute new insights to the incentive mechanism to innovatively work toward creating an effective contract to pay more attention to government overcommitment risk in advance in PPPs.

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Wang, Lunyan, Mengyu Tao, Xiaowei An e Guanghua Dong. "Research on Profit-Sharing Mechanism of IPD Projects Considering Multidimensional Fairness Preferences and BIM". Systems 11, n.º 9 (18 de setembro de 2023): 477. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/systems11090477.

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The integration of building information modeling (BIM) and the integrated project delivery (IPD) mode effectively promotes collaboration among project members and enhances project profitability. However, the issue of profit sharing significantly impacts the successful implementation of IPD projects. To enhance the profit-sharing mechanism of IPD projects and ensure their smooth implementation, a game analysis model of profit sharing in IPD projects was established based on the Stackelberg game theory, taking into account the multidimensional fair preferences of the participants and the application of BIM technology. Through simulation, the impact of various parameters of participants on output utility, total revenue, and sharing coefficient in IPD projects was analyzed. The results show that: (1) participants achieve their highest output utility and total revenue under vertical–horizontal fairness preferences; (2) under vertical fairness preferences, the profit sharing coefficient is the highest, while the output utility and total revenue are the lowest; (3) although the output utility and total revenue of participants under horizontal fairness preferences exceed those under neutral fairness preferences, the profit-sharing coefficient is lower; (4) the output utility, the total revenue, and the profit-sharing coefficient of the participants all increase with the increase in effort utility value and decrease with the increase in the effort cost coefficient and the risk avoidance coefficient. The research findings provide valuable theoretical support for the profit sharing of IPD projects, thereby further promoting the advancement and implementation of the IPD model.

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Duster, Troy. "Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the California Strategy". Representations 55, n.º 1 (julho de 1996): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/rep.1996.55.1.99p0440p.

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Duster, Troy. "Individual Fairness, Group Preferences, and the California Strategy". Representations 55 (1996): 41–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3043735.

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Clark, Jeremy. "Fairness preferences and optimization skills: are they substitutes?" Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 34, n.º 4 (março de 1998): 541–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0167-2681(97)00106-6.

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Hoffmann, Magnus, e Martin Kolmar. "Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests". Economics Letters 120, n.º 2 (agosto de 2013): 276–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.038.

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Hosseini, Hadi, Sujoy Sikdar, Rohit Vaish e Lirong Xia. "Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 35, n.º 6 (18 de maio de 2021): 5472–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16689.

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Envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) provides a strong and intuitive guarantee of fairness in the allocation of indivisible goods. But whether such allocations always exist or whether they can be efficiently computed remains an important open question. We study the existence and computation of EFX in conjunction with various other economic properties under lexicographic preferences--a well-studied preference restriction model in artificial intelligence and economics. In sharp contrast to the known results for additive valuations, we not only prove the existence of EFX and Pareto optimal allocations, but in fact provide an algorithmic characterization of these two properties. We also characterize the mechanisms that are, in addition, strategyproof, non-bossy, and neutral. When the efficiency notion is strengthened to rank-maximality, we obtain non-existence and computational hardness results, and show that tractability can be restored when EFX is relaxed to another well-studied fairness notion called maximin share guarantee (MMS).

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Bshary, Redouan, e Nichola Raihani. "“Fair” outcomes without morality in cleaner wrasse mutualism". Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36, n.º 1 (fevereiro de 2013): 83–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x12000738.

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AbstractBaumard et al. propose a functional explanation for the evolution of a sense of fairness in humans: Fairness preferences are advantageous in an environment where individuals are in strong competition to be chosen for social interactions. Such conditions also exist in nonhuman animals. Therefore, it remains unclear why fairness (equated with morality) appears to be properly present only in humans.

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Brock, J. Michelle, Andreas Lange e Erkut Y. Ozbay. "Dictating the Risk: Experimental Evidence on Giving in Risky Environments: Reply". American Economic Review 106, n.º 3 (1 de março de 2016): 840–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141017.

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In Brock, Lange, and Ozbay (2013), we experimentally investigate social preferences under risk. One of our conclusions is that a social preference model incorporating both ex ante and ex post fairness concerns may best describe behavior. Krawczyk and Le Lec (2016 ) argue that ex ante comparisons alone may account for our data. We address their points in this reply. (JEL C72, D63, D64, D81)

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Islam, Md Mouinul, Dong Wei, Baruch Schieber e Senjuti Basu Roy. "Satisfying complex top- k fairness constraints by preference substitutions". Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment 16, n.º 2 (outubro de 2022): 317–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.14778/3565816.3565832.

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Given m users (voters), where each user casts her preference for a single item (candidate) over n items (candidates) as a ballot, the preference aggregation problem returns k items (candidates) that have the k highest number of preferences (votes). Our work studies this problem considering complex fairness constraints that have to be satisfied via proportionate representations of different values of the group protected attribute(s) in the top- k results. Precisely, we study the margin finding problem under single ballot substitutions , where a single substitution amounts to removing a vote from candidate i and assigning it to candidate j and the goal is to minimize the number of single ballot substitutions needed to guarantee that the top-k results satisfy the fairness constraints. We study several variants of this problem considering how top- k fairness constraints are defined, (i) MFBinaryS and MFMultiS are defined when the fairness (proportionate representation) is defined over a single, binary or multivalued, protected attribute, respectively; (ii) MF-Multi2 is studied when top- k fairness is defined over two different protected attributes; (iii) MFMulti3+ investigates the margin finding problem, considering 3 or more protected attributes. We study these problems theoretically, and present a suite of algorithms with provable guarantees. We conduct rigorous large scale experiments involving multiple real world datasets by appropriately adapting multiple state-of-the-art solutions to demonstrate the effectiveness and scalability of our proposed methods.

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Andreoni, James, Marco Castillo e Ragan Petrie. "What Do Bargainers' Preferences Look Like? Experiments with a Convex Ultimatum Game". American Economic Review 93, n.º 3 (1 de maio de 2003): 672–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157034.

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The ultimatum game, by its all-or-nothing nature, makes it difficult to discern what kind of preferences may be generating choices. We explore a game that convexifies the decisions, allowing us a better look at the indifference curves of bargainers while maintaining the subgame-perfect equilibrium. We conclude that bargainers' preferences are convex and regular but not always monotonic. Money-maximization is the sole concern for about half of the subjects, while the other half reveal a preference for fairness. We also found, unexpectedly, the importance of risk aversion among money-maximizing proposers, which in turn generates significant bargaining power for fair-minded responders.

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Huo, Hong, Dan Luo, Zhanghua Yan e Hao He. "Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Supply Chain considering Different Fairness Preferences and Low-Carbon Advertising Level". Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society 2022 (20 de setembro de 2022): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2022/4589681.

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Countries around the world advocate low-carbon, green, and environmentally friendly lifestyles to combat climate change, which provides clear direction for enterprise decisions. This paper studies a low-carbon dual-channel supply chain based on behavioral economics, incentive theory, and optimization models to better formulate pricing decisions. This paper constructs a fair and neutral decentralized decision-making model (FNDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering Nash bargaining fairness concerns (NBFDD), a decentralized decision-making model considering absolute fairness concerns (AFDD), and a fair and neutral centralized decision-making model (FNCD) considering consumer preferences and the situations where supply chain members are fairness concerns or fairness neutrality. This paper analyzes the effect of low-carbon advertising level on pricing strategies of online retailers and offline stores and compares pricing strategies of online retailers and offline stores in four decisions. The results show that Nash bargaining fairness concerns of supply chain members could effectively reduce the retail price of low-carbon products and increase their sales volumes. Absolute fairness concerns intensify the dual marginal effect of decentralized decision-making.

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Malatesta, Deanna, Lisa Blomgren Amsler e Susanna Foxworthy Scott. "Disputant Experience and Preferences for Mediated or Adjudicated Processes in Administrative Agencies: The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission Settlement Part Program". ILR Review 73, n.º 2 (17 de outubro de 2019): 552–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0019793919882928.

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Research is limited regarding the type and amount of experience that matters for disputant preferences in dispute resolution processes. The authors focus on a unique federal appellate agency dispute resolution program at the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. Participants are professionals with repeat experience who are likely to have future interactions with the agency. Using survey data and regression analyses, the authors find that 1) greater personal experience with mediation or adjudication leads to a greater preference for mediation over adjudication; 2) higher levels of satisfaction with the fairness of process are associated with stronger preferences for mediation over adjudication; and 3) disputants who perceive a fair process in their most recent cases will express a greater preference for mediation over adjudication. Results have important implications for dispute system design.

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Duffy, John, e Félix Muñoz-García. "Patience or Fairness? Analyzing Social Preferences in Repeated Games". Games 3, n.º 1 (21 de março de 2012): 56–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/g3010056.

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Hetzer, Moritz, e Didier Sornette. "The Co-Evolution of Fairness Preferences and Costly Punishment". PLoS ONE 8, n.º 3 (20 de março de 2013): e54308. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0054308.

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Isaksson, Ann-Sofie, e Annika Lindskog. "Preferences for redistribution—A country comparison of fairness judgements". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 72, n.º 3 (dezembro de 2009): 884–902. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.08.006.

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Han, Jiaojie, e Amnon Rapoport. "Intention-based fairness preferences in multi-partner project teams". Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 81 (agosto de 2019): 84–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2019.06.003.

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Muklason, Ahmad, Andrew J. Parkes, Ender Özcan, Barry McCollum e Paul McMullan. "Fairness in examination timetabling: Student preferences and extended formulations". Applied Soft Computing 55 (junho de 2017): 302–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.asoc.2017.01.026.

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Briggeman, B. C., e J. L. Lusk. "Preferences for fairness and equity in the food system". European Review of Agricultural Economics 38, n.º 1 (3 de novembro de 2010): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbq033.

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Cohn, Alain, Lasse J. Jessen, Marko Klašnja e Paul Smeets. "Wealthy Americans and redistribution: The role of fairness preferences". Journal of Public Economics 225 (setembro de 2023): 104977. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104977.

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Vormittag, Isabella, Tuulia M. Ortner e Tobias Koch. "How Test Takers See Test Examiners". European Journal of Psychological Assessment 31, n.º 4 (outubro de 2015): 254–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759/a000232.

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Abstract. We addressed potential test takers’ preferences for women or men as examiners as well as how examiners were perceived depending on their gender. We employed an online design with 375 students who provided preferences for and ratings of examiners based on short video clips. The clips showed four out of 15 psychologists who differed in age (young vs. middle-aged) and gender giving an introduction to a fictional intelligence test session. Employing multivariate multilevel analyses we found female examiners to be perceived as more social competent and middle-aged examiners being perceived as more competent. Data analyses revealed a significant preference for choosing women as examiners. Results were discussed with reference to test performance and fairness.

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Hearn, Eddie. "Harm, fairness and trade policy preferences: An experimental examination of sincere fair-trade preferences". International Politics 51, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2014): 124–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.43.

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Lin, Chun-Cheng, Jia-Rong Kang, Wan-Yu Liu e Der-Jiunn Deng. "Modelling a Nurse Shift Schedule with Multiple Preference Ranks for Shifts and Days-Off". Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2014 (2014): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/937842.

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When it comes to nurse shift schedules, it is found that the nursing staff have diverse preferences about shift rotations and days-off. The previous studies only focused on the most preferred work shift and the number of satisfactory days-off of the schedule at the current schedule period but had few discussions on the previous schedule periods and other preference levels for shifts and days-off, which may affect fairness of shift schedules. As a result, this paper proposes a nurse scheduling model based upon integer programming that takes into account constraints of the schedule, different preference ranks towards each shift, and the historical data of previous schedule periods to maximize the satisfaction of all the nursing staff's preferences about the shift schedule. The main contribution of the proposed model is that we consider that the nursing staff’s satisfaction level is affected by multiple preference ranks and their priority ordering to be scheduled, so that the quality of the generated shift schedule is more reasonable. Numerical results show that the planned shifts and days-off are fair and successfully meet the preferences of all the nursing staff.

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Li, Min, Zhen Lian, Guangchuan Yang e Liaoning Li. "Profit-Sharing Contract of the Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chain under Community Group Purchase Mode Considering Freshness Preservation Efforts". Sustainability 15, n.º 9 (5 de maio de 2023): 7572. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su15097572.

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This article constructed a four-level fresh agricultural product (FAP) supply chain with a two-stage pricing strategy under a “community group purchase (CGP) platform + direct procurement from the FAP supplier” sales model. We investigate the influence of the CGP agency’s participation in the control strategy of FAP freshness preservation efforts on the profits of supply chain stakeholders. This article discusses the effects of the FAP supplier profit-sharing ratio, the CGP agency profit-sharing ratio, and consumers’ sensitivity to FAP freshness on the supply chain stakeholders’ freshness preservation efforts. Moreover, based on the fairness preference theory, this article designed a profit-sharing contract that involves the Nash bargaining game between the FAP supplier and the CGP agency as the supply chain coordination mechanism. Modeling results revealed that: (1) The CGP agency’s freshness preservation efforts increased total supply chain profits. (2) The FAP supplier profit-sharing ratio, CGP agency profit-sharing ratio, and consumers’ sensitivity to FAP freshness have a positive correlation to the profits of the FAP supply chain and promote the coordination of the supply chain. (3) Considering fairness preferences, with the increase in FAP suppliers’ business negotiating ability, their freshness preservation efforts and fairness utility both increased gradually, while the fairness utility of the CGP agency gradually decreased.

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Aziz, Haris, Isaiah Iliffe, Bo Li, Angus Ritossa, Ankang Sun e Mashbat Suzuki. "Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 38, n.º 9 (24 de março de 2024): 9477–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v38i9.28802.

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Envy-freeness is one of the most important fairness concerns when allocating items. We study envy-free house allocation when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the highest probability of being envy-free. We show that each model leads to a distinct set of algorithmic and complexity results, including detailed results on (in-)approximability. En route, we consider two related problems of checking whether there exists an allocation that is possibly or necessarily envy-free. We give a complete picture of the computational complexity of these two problems for all the uncertainty models we consider.

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Liu, Xinhua, Peng Guo, Ning Guo e Juan Du. "Linking organizational justice with positive behavior in temporary organization: The mediating role of cooperative willingness". Journal of General Management 48, n.º 2 (janeiro de 2023): 127–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/03063070211064587.

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This article associates cooperative willingness and positive behavior to fairness preference in temporary cooperation. Drawing on social exchange theory and project citizenship behaviors, the analysis indicates that cooperative positivity for temporary organizations is essentially built on organizational justice by constructing the structural equation and the multiple mediator models. The findings show that the comprehensive effect of organizational justice, especially distributive justice, has a driving effect on the willingness of inter-organizational cooperation and positive behaviors. Further, cooperative willingness, as a mediating factor, is helpful for facilitating voluntary behaviors, both in the willingness of additional investment and communication. Specifically, effective communication among cooperators is considered the perfect way for eliciting proactivity under temporary relationships, for improving cooperative perception and satisfaction. In sum, this study offers ideas on how organizational fairness preferences fare in cooperative behavior in temporary organizations to promote inter-organizational cooperation effectively.

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