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Puleri, Marco. "Russophonia as an Epistemic Challenge". Ab Imperio 2023, n.º 1 (2023): 76–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/imp.2023.0007.
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Lumbard, Joseph E. B. "Islam and the Challenge of Epistemic Sovereignty". Religions 15, n.º 4 (26 de março de 2024): 406. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/rel15040406.
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The search for knowledge has been central to the Islamic tradition from its inception in the Quran and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (aḥādīth). The injunctions to obtain knowledge and contemplate the signs of God in all things undergird a culture of ultimate questions in which there was an underlying epistemic unity among all fields of knowledge, from the religious sciences to the intellectual sciences to the natural sciences. Having lost sight of the underlying metaphysic that provides this epistemic unity, many thinkers in the modern period read the classical Islamic texts independently of the cognitive cartography and hierarchy of which they are a part. This approach leads to further misunderstandings and thus to a sense of hermeneutical gloom and epistemic subordination characteristic of coloniality. Postcolonial theory provides effective tools for diagnosing the process by which this epistemic erosion produces ideologically and epistemically conscripted subjects. But as it, too, arises from within a secular frame, it is only by understanding the cognitive cartography of the sciences within Islam that epistemic confidence and sovereignty can be reinstated.
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Velmurugan, Giajenthiran, e Jacob Gorm Davidsen. "Negotiating Epistemic Experience vs. Epistemic Expertise in PBL Supervision". Journal of Problem Based Learning in Higher Education 12, n.º 1 (28 de novembro de 2024): 92–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.54337/ojs.jpblhe.v12i1.8284.
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Supervision in higher education (HE) often balances the tension between fostering student autonomy and providing sufficient guidance, especially within undergraduate programs. This paper explores an under-researched area: the dynamics of group supervision in undergraduate education, specifically how students challenge their supervisor's expertise. Using video recordings of a group of engineering students at Aalborg University working within a Problem-Based Learning (PBL) framework, the study investigates moments of disagreement between students and their supervisor during project supervision. Employing conversation analysis (CA), the study examines the negotiation of epistemic claims — where students draw on their experience to challenge the supervisor’s expertise — and the subsequent impact on the learning trajectories. The findings highlight that students use their epistemic authority from experience to challenge their supervisor’s proposed academic direction, while the supervisor defends their stance based on disciplinary knowledge. The study emphasizes the importance of aligning cognitive congruence and situated learning to facilitate productive supervision interactions. Ultimately, the paper sheds light on the critical yet often overlooked role of student agency in supervision and offers insights into improving the supervisory process in HE, particularly in group settings.
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Marrone, Pierpaolo. "Epistemic Democracy and Technopolitics". International Journal of Technoethics 13, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2022): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijt.291551.
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In this article I examine the structure of four deliberative models: epistemic democracy, epistocracy, dystopic algocracy, and utopian algocracy. Epistocracy and algocracy (which in its two versions is an extremization of epistocracy) represent a challenge to the alleged epistemic superiority of democracy: epistocracy for its emphasis on the role of experts; algocracy for its emphasis on technique as a cognitively and ethically superior tool. In the concluding remarks I will advance the thesis that these challenges can only be answered by emphasizing the value of citizens’ political participation, which can also represent both an increase in their cognitive abilities and a value for public ethics.
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Murris, Karin. "The Epistemic Challenge of Hearing Child’s Voice". Studies in Philosophy and Education 32, n.º 3 (20 de janeiro de 2013): 245–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11217-012-9349-9.
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Schulz, Claudia, Christian M. Meyer e Iryna Gurevych. "Challenges in the Automatic Analysis of Students’ Diagnostic Reasoning". Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 33 (17 de julho de 2019): 6974–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33016974.
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Diagnostic reasoning is a key component of many professions. To improve students’ diagnostic reasoning skills, educational psychologists analyse and give feedback on epistemic activities used by these students while diagnosing, in particular, hypothesis generation, evidence generation, evidence evaluation, and drawing conclusions. However, this manual analysis is highly time-consuming. We aim to enable the large-scale adoption of diagnostic reasoning analysis and feedback by automating the epistemic activity identification. We create the first corpus for this task, comprising diagnostic reasoning selfexplanations of students from two domains annotated with epistemic activities. Based on insights from the corpus creation and the task’s characteristics, we discuss three challenges for the automatic identification of epistemic activities using AI methods: the correct identification of epistemic activity spans, the reliable distinction of similar epistemic activities, and the detection of overlapping epistemic activities. We propose a separate performance metric for each challenge and thus provide an evaluation framework for future research. Indeed, our evaluation of various state-of-the-art recurrent neural network architectures reveals that current techniques fail to address some of these challenges.
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Shaw, Elizabeth. "Expanding The Scope of The Epistemic Argument to Cover Nonpunitive Incapacitation". Diametros 21, n.º 79 (19 de abril de 2024): 132–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.33392/diam.1931.
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A growing number of theorists have launched an epistemic challenge against retributive punishment. This challenge involves the core claim that it is wrong (intentionally) to inflict serious harm on someone unless the moral argument for doing so has been established to a high standard of credibility. Proponents of this challenge typically argue that retributivism fails to meet the required epistemic standard, because retributivism relies on a contentious conception of free will, about whose existence we cannot be sufficiently certain. However, the scope of the epistemic challenge should not be limited to doubts about free will or retributivism. In this article, I argue that the epistemic challenge should be expanded beyond the original focus on justifications of punishment. By “expanding the epistemic challenge” I mean demanding that other purported justifications for serious (intentional) harm be held to a high standard of credibility. To provide a focus for the argument, I will concentrate on the “Public Health Quarantine Model” defended by Gregg Caruso, but my arguments have wider implications beyond this model. A growing number of “abolitionist” theorists believe that punishment is wrong in principle. If retributive punishment, or punishment in general, were abandoned, we would need to ask, “how else should we respond to crime?”. My arguments suggest that all such abolitionists will have to face the same epistemic standard as penal theorists if they wish to replace punishment with the intentional imposition of non-punitive severe coercive measures.
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De Preester, Helena, e John Dorsch. "Descartes on the Passions of the Soul and Internal Emotions: Two Challenges for Interoception Research in Emotions". Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 54, n.º 1 (5 de novembro de 2021): 65–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10021.
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Abstract On the basis of Descartes’s account of the passions of the soul, we argue that current interoception-based theories of emotions cannot account for the hallmark of a passion of the soul, i.e., that its effects are felt as being in the soul itself. We also pay attention to the epistemic functions of the passions and to Descartes’s category of emotions that are caused and occur in the soul alone. Certain passions of the soul and certain internal (or intellectual) emotions are similar to what are today called ‘epistemic (or noetic) feelings’ and ‘epistemic emotions.’ Descartes’s work reflects another challenge for contemporary embodied cognition: how might epistemic affect be embodied? Since the signature of embodiment is increasingly understood as interoceptive, the challenge to interoceptive research is demonstrating the degree to which (epistemic) affect results from interoception. This challenge also implies that the locus of emotional experience is taken into account.
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Kuzmanovic, Stefan. "Epistemic contextualism: Problems of disagreement and retraction". Theoria, Beograd 66, n.º 4 (2023): 15–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2304015k.
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Elke Brendel claims that, regarding several challenges, her nonindexical contextualism fares better than the so-called indexical versions of contextualism supported by prominent epistemic contextualists such as Keith DeRose, Stewart Cohen, etc. Of these challenges, we will consider the problems of disagreement and retraction. I will argue that the indexical nature of DeRose?s account doesn?t necessarily have to relate to personally indicated standards. Instead, I will offer an interpretation that generalizes the idea of conversational context and determines conversationally indicated epistemic standards as the main bearer of the content and the truth condition of knowledge attributions. In some cases, conversationally indicated epistemic standards are collapsing into personally indicated. In other cases, some form of the reconciliation of personally indicated standards produces the final conversationally indicated epistemic standards. This interpretation is motivated by Mion?s contextualist position, but in the first stage, it doesn?t require his notion of objective contexts. When dealing with typical face-to-face disputes, this interpretation of DeRose?s position will successfully account for the challenge of disagreement. Only when we are faced with so-called one-way disputes and the challenge of retraction, we will depart from DeRose, and instead, refer to Mion?s position. I will claim that by adopting his view, we are in a position to better respond to these two challenges, than Brendel with her nonindexical account.
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Lycett, Mark, e Chris Partridge. "The challenge of epistemic divergence in IS development". Communications of the ACM 52, n.º 6 (junho de 2009): 127–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/1516046.1516079.
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Heller, Vivien. "Embodying epistemic responsibility". Research on Children and Social Interaction 2, n.º 2 (3 de dezembro de 2018): 262–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/rcsi.37391.
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The study explores how children deploy gaze and embodied epistemic stance displays to establish a mutual epistemic responsibility when dealing with potentially controversial questions. Drawing on video recordings of 24 peer interactions involving children aged 9-12 years, the sequential and multimodal analysis describes the practices that construct intercorporeal participation frameworks for collaborative reasoning. Findings demonstrate that children coordinate gaze and multimodal displays of epistemic stance to mobilize co-participants' attention toward their position, while at the same time subjecting it to negotiation. Furthermore, children recruit the current speaker's gaze to issue a friendly challenge to his/her pre-determined stance. When the mutual epistemic responsibility was at stake, children occasioned a recalibration of stance displays at the earliest possible place. The children's embodied participation frameworks thus reflect their orientation to knowledge as being socially constructed.
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Zimmerling, Ruth. "Whom to believe? ‘Alternative’ epistemic authorities as a challenge for democracy". Rechtsphilosophie 8, n.º 4 (2022): 436–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/2364-1355-2022-4-436.
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The paper argues that democracy depends on an essential relationship between political authority and epistemic, or as Raz has called it, theoretical authority. The notable loss of trust in established epistemic authorities, such as science and professional journalism, currently observed among sizeable parts of the populations of many democracies, and the loss this implies of a shared understanding of factual realities, deeply affects political authority in a way that challenges the very foundations of democracy.
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Meehan, Daniella. "Is Epistemic Blame Distinct from Moral Blame?" Logos & Episteme 10, n.º 2 (2019): 183–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme201910216.
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In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the phenomenon to examples of moral or practical blame. The purpose of this paper is to defend the notion of epistemic blame against a reductionist objection to epistemic blame, offered by Trent Dougherty in “Reducing Responsibility.” This paper will object to Dougherty’s position by examining an account in favour of epistemic blame and demonstrate concerns over the reductionist methodology employed by Dougherty to argue for his sceptical position.
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Vance, Jona. "Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability". Philosophical Studies 169, n.º 2 (7 de agosto de 2013): 257–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-013-0181-z.
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Reed, Baron. "HAVING TO DO WITH KNOWLEDGE". Episteme 13, n.º 4 (dezembro de 2016): 549–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2016.30.
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ABSTRACTI articulate the value of the epistemic and the central importance of epistemology in response to a challenge from Allan Hazlett. I argue that epistemic evaluations should not be simply absorbed into a single, all-things-considered point of view.
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Bryant, Amanda. "A Thousand Flowers on the Road to Epistemic Anarchy: Comments on Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology". Dialogue 60, n.º 1 (abril de 2021): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000359.
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ABSTRACTI introduce the symposium on Anjan Chakravartty's Scientific Ontology by summarizing the book's main claims. In my commentary, I first challenge Chakravartty's claim that naturalized metaphysics cannot be indexed to science simpliciter. Second, I argue that there are objective truths regarding what conduces to particular epistemic aims, and that Chakravartty is therefore too permissive regarding epistemic stances and their resultant ontologies. Third, I argue that it is unclear what stops epistemic stances from having unlimited influence. Finally, I argue that Chakravartty's epistemic stance voluntarism is inadequately motivated and lacks empirical support for its psychological content.
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FRITZ, JAMES. "Akrasia and Epistemic Impurism". Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7, n.º 1 (2021): 98–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2020.16.
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AbstractThis essay provides a novel argument for impurism, the view that certain non-truth-relevant factors can make a difference to a belief's epistemic standing. I argue that purists, unlike impurists, are forced to claim that certain ‘high-stakes’ cases rationally require agents to be akratic. Akrasia is one of the paradigmatic forms of irrationality. So purists, in virtue of calling akrasia rationally mandatory in a range of cases with no obvious precedent, take on a serious theoretical cost. By focusing on akrasia, and on the nature of the normative judgments involved therein, impurists gain a powerful new way to frame a core challenge for purism. They also gain insight about the way in which impurism is true: my argument motivates the claim that there is moral encroachment in epistemology.
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Stewart, Heather. "We're Here, We're … Queer? On the Enduring Harms of Bisexual Erasure". Dialogue 60, n.º 3 (dezembro de 2021): 423–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217321000287.
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AbstractThis article highlights three epistemic practices, which, taken together, create conditions that worsen the problem of ‘bisexual erasure.’ Though bisexual people constitute a significant portion of the larger LGBTQ+ community, their identities and experiences and routinely erased — in queer communities and broader society alike. This article argues that we have both an epistemic and a moral obligation to attend to the epistemic conditions created for bisexual people, and to work to make those conditions more just. Specifically, I highlight the detrimental influence of testimonial injustice, testimonial smothering, and epistemic microaggressions on bisexual people's ability to challenge and resist their own erasure.
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Williams, Michael. "Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism". Episteme 4, n.º 1 (fevereiro de 2007): 93–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.93.
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ABSTRACTThis article distinguishes Wittgensteinian contextualism from epistemic relativism. The latter involves the view that a belief’s status as justified depends on the believer’s epistemic system, as well as the view that no system is superior to another. It emerges from the thought that we must rely, circularly, on our epistemic system to determine whether any belief is justified. Contextualism, by contrast, emerges from the thought that we need not answer a skeptical challenge to a belief unless there is good reason to doubt the belief; so we need not rely on our epistemic system to determine whether a belief is justified. Accordingly contextualism is not committed to the view that a belief’s status depends on the believer’s epistemic system, nor to the view that no system is superior to another. The contextualist is not committed to epistemic relativism.
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Dinges, Alexander. "EPISTEMIC INVARIANTISM AND CONTEXTUALIST INTUITIONS". Episteme 13, n.º 2 (27 de julho de 2015): 219–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/epi.2015.36.
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ABSTRACTEpistemic invariantism, or invariantism for short, is the position that the proposition expressed by knowledge sentences does not vary with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. At least one of the major challenges for invariantism is to explain our intuitions about scenarios such as the so-called bank cases. These cases elicit intuitions to the effect that the truth-value of knowledge sentences varies with the epistemic standard of the context in which these sentences can be used. In this paper, I will defend invariantism against this challenge by advocating the following, somewhat deflationary account of the bank case intuitions: Readers of the bank cases assign different truth-values to the knowledge claims in the bank cases because they interpret these scenarios such that the epistemic position of the subject in question differs between the high and the low standards case. To substantiate this account, I will argue, first, that the bank cases are underspecified even with respect to features that should uncontroversially be relevant for the epistemic position of the subject in question. Second, I will argue that readers of the bank cases will fill in these features differently in the low and the high standards case. In particular, I will argue that there is a variety of reasons to think that the fact that an error-possibility is mentioned in the high standards case will lead readers to assume that this error-possibility is supposed to be likely in the high standards case.
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Vandamme, Pierre-Étienne. "What’s wrong with an epistocratic council?" Politics 40, n.º 1 (26 de março de 2019): 90–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0263395719836348.
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Epistemic justifications of democracy affirm the comparative quality of democracies’ decisions. The challenge faced by those who endorse such views is to explain why we should prefer standard democratic institutions to some sort of epistocracy or rule of the wisest. This article takes up this challenge by assessing the epistemic potential of an epistocratic council, as imagined by Jason Brennan. Members of such council would be selected through competency exams, the required competencies being defined by the whole population. The argument defended in this article is that the potential gain in instrumental rationality that such an institution could offer under certain questionable conditions would be outweighed by the increased risks of misrule and involuntary biases if such council has decision-making or veto power. In comparison with the existing literature, this argument stresses the importance of moral rightness, here defined as impartiality, in the epistemic assessment of democracy and its alternatives. The article then ends with a qualified assessment of purely epistemic justifications of democratic inclusion, which could be insufficient to reject implausible but imaginable forms of epistemically justifiable disenfranchisement.
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Friedland, Joanna, e Merle Mahon. "Sister talk: Investigating an older sibling’s responses to verbal challenges". Discourse Studies 20, n.º 3 (29 de janeiro de 2018): 340–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1461445618754418.
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Children’s linguistic and social skills develop through play with siblings, but there is little research into sibling interaction using naturally occurring data. This conversation analytic case study presents an evidence-based account of how an older sibling responds to verbal challenges from her younger sibling during free play at home. The older sibling employs prosodic, rhetorical and linguistic devices to deflect challenges while avoiding conflict. She does this by acknowledging the grounds of the challenge, before invoking privileged information or epistemic differences to reject it. Structurally, the older sibling inserts extended digressions which obfuscate challenges by engaging the challenger and switching topic. These phenomena blur the traditional accept/reject response dichotomy. The findings provide insight into the complexity of a 5-/6-year-old’s challenge-defence strategies and highlight the importance of face preservation and mitigation of disagreement. We propose that the ability to respond to challenges while maintaining intersubjectivity is a component of communicative competence.
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KRAFT, JAMES. "Philip Quinn's contribution to the epistemic challenge of religious diversity". Religious Studies 42, n.º 4 (18 de outubro de 2006): 453–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412506008481.
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In this essay I describe seven central characteristics of Philip Quinn's approach to the epistemic challenge of religious diversity as they surface in his responses to other contemporary approaches. In the process an assessment is given of Quinn's contribution, and continued relevance, to the contemporary discussions about this topic. The first three sections describe Quinn's confrontations with Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and John Hick. The next section presents critical comments on Quinn's unique notion of thinning.
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Naghmana Siddique, H.M. Zahid Iqbal e Ambreen Bibi. "Contemporary Engagements with Decoloniality: Tracing Epistemic Disobedience and Decolonial Aesthesis in Pakistani Anglophone Literature". Panacea Journal of Linguistics & Literature 2, n.º 2 (31 de dezembro de 2023): 222–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.59075/pjll.v2i2.311.
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This paper seeks to discover epistemic reconstruction and reconstitution in Pakistani Anglophone literature to identify epistemic disobedience that confronts the rigidity of Western canons. In a so-called postcolonial age, the integration of indigenousness with decoloniality weaves an indigenous knowledge tapestry that may challenge hegemonic intellectual imperialism. In the last few decades, there has been a surge of interest in decolonizing epistemology. The native epistemological quest offers alternative knowledge claims that can replace hegemonic epistemology in the colonial matrix of power. It may be used to challenge the lionized image of various Western epistemologies ingrained in indigenous thinkers' minds over history. The central thesis of this paper is to examine the role of Pakistani indigeneity in providing a locus of enunciation, a context, or situatedness for Pakistani Anglophone literature to question Western canonization to decolonize indigenous epistemology. To accentuate epistemic disobedience that occurs in the wake of epistemic decolonization, this study explores Straggling through Fire by Gulam Murtaza Aatir by placing it in the theoretical framework of decoloniality by Walter Mignolo. Walter Mignolo's discernments on epistemic disobedience, locus of enunciation, and decolonial aesthesis provide a central theoretical framework for this paper to analyze Straggling through Fire by Gulam Murtaza Aatir. It paves the way for Pakistani researchers in the future to insert the versatility and novelty of our indigenous Anglophone writers in the mainstream of English literature to confront Western canonization.
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Hetherington, Stephen. "Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference As Such". Philosophy 76, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2001): 127–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819101000080.
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I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzle was effective against its stated logicist targets, it is not thereby an enduring difficulty regarding experience's ability to impart epistemic justification via inductive evidence.
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Bernáth, László, e János Tőzsér. "Epistemic self-esteem of philosophers in the face of philosophical disagreement". Human Affairs 30, n.º 3 (28 de julho de 2020): 328–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/humaff-2020-0029.
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AbstractOur paper consists of four parts. In the first part, we describe the challenge of the pervasive and permanent philosophical disagreement over philosophers’ epistemic self-esteem. In the second part, we investigate the attitude of philosophers who have high epistemic self-esteem even in the face of philosophical disagreement and who believe they have well-grounded philosophical knowledge. In the third section, we focus on the attitude of philosophers who maintain a moderate level of epistemic self-esteem because they do not attribute substantive philosophical knowledge to themselves but still believe that they have epistemic right to defend substantive philosophical beliefs. In the fourth section, we analyse the attitude of philosophers who have a low level of epistemic self-esteem in relation to substantive philosophical beliefs and make no attempt to defend those beliefs. We argue that when faced with philosophical disagreement philosophers either have to deny that the dissenting philosophers are their epistemic peers or have to admit that doing philosophy is less meaningful than it seemed before. In this second case, philosophical activity and performance should not contribute to the philosophers’ overall epistemic self-esteem to any significant extent.
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Lazovic, Zivan. "Externalism, skepticism and epistemic luck". Filozofija i drustvo 22, n.º 1 (2011): 89–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1101089l.
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This paper deals with the concept of epistemic luck and its place within wider philosophical debates on knowledge and skepticism. Philosophers involved in these debates share an intuition that knowledge excludes luck. Starting from Prichard?s modal definition of luck and his distinction between two varieties of epistemic luck, namely veridic and reflective, the paper explores the internalist and externalist prospects for avoiding epistemic luck and skepticism. Externalism seems to be capable of both coping with the Gettier-type cases and eliminating at least veridic epistemic luck by introducing the so-called safety condition for knowledge. As such, it also responds to some versions of skepticism as the safety condition explains how it is possible to acquire knowledge without proving that the well known skeptical alternatives (e.g. a brain-in-a-vat) are false. Thus, even though it does not eliminate the reflective epistemic luck or meta-epistemological skeptical challenge, the externalist approach to knowledge looks more plausible than the internalist, especially because it may allow an internalist justification to play its due role in acquiring knowledge.
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Min, John B. "Epistocracy and democratic epistemology". Politics in Central Europe 11, n.º 1 (1 de abril de 2015): 91–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pce-2015-0005.
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Abstract Epistocracy, the rule by the experts or educated, poses a significant challenge to authentic democratic rule. Epistocrats typically reason from the premise, “experts have knowledge of political truths” to the conclusion, “experts should have the authority to rule.” There may be powerful moral reasons for thinking that the inference is fallacious. Invoking a public reason standard of acceptability, David Estlund makes a powerful argument of this sort. I argue that Estlund’s argument against epistocracy overlooks democratic epistemology, which can and should be utilized to strengthen the epistemic merits of a democratic rule. I therefore examine whether democratic democracy’s epistemic value can rest on a formal epistemic model. The inadequacy of the formal epistemic model leads us to defend democratic epistemology differently. This will be defended in two ways. The first step will be to cast doubt into the epistemic merits of expert rule in two ways. First, experts sometimes do not have access to privileged information of citizens who bear the consequences of expert decisions. Second, experts themselves can be biased. I argue that democratic deliberation can offset those two disadvantages of expert rule. The second step will be to examine the epistemic values of inclusive democratic rule.
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Souza, Marcelo. "THE PANDEMIC AND THE ‘ENVIRONMENTALISATION’ OF GEOGRAPHY. AN EPISTEMIC-POLITICAL CHALLENGE". Revista Geografares 1, n.º 31 (8 de dezembro de 2020): 65–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.7147/geo.v1i31.31454.
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The purpose of this article is to extract from the COVID-19 pandemic a lesson for geographers: although without intending (or being possible) to simply go back to the past, it is necessary to re-value, nevertheless, the very quintessence of the identity of the geographical discourse, which has been characterised by a way of building epistemic objects that is committed to a dialogue between social research (represented by what we usually call‘human geography’) and natural research (represented by what we usually call ‘physical geography’). This project, presently called ‘environmentalisation,’ does not aim at anything overly ambitious: there is no case here for an exclusionary thesis in the style ‘geography should be this, and nothing else’; in fact, it just defends the idea that an approach such as that of environmental geography, resulting from an attempt at ‘environmentalisation,’ must have its place assured. Environmental geography, being committed to the construction of hybrid epistemic objects, allows us to mobilise the interfaces and knowledge necessary to deal with complex tasks such as the analysis of the short and long-term effects of the pandemic (among many other issues). However, the environmental geography project not only has to deal with intellectual challenges (integrating what knowledge, how and for what purpose?), but, in the end, it must also face political obstacles: the concrete power relations in the academic world and the zeal with which ‘borders’ and ‘territories’ are patrolled and defended, not to mention the resistance of many researchers to leave their thematic and theoretical-methodological comfort zones.
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MAWSON, T. J. "Mill's argument against religious knowledge". Religious Studies 45, n.º 4 (30 de julho de 2009): 417–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412509990047.
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AbstractIn On Liberty, Mill says that ‘the same causes which make … [a person] a Churchman in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Pekin’. Despite Mill's not having drawn it out, there is an argument implicit in his comments that is germane to both externalist and internalist understandings of the epistemic justification of religious beliefs, even though some of these understandings would not wish to use the term ‘epistemic justification’ to refer to whatever it is that they suggest must be added to true belief for it to count as knowledge. In this paper, we shall articulate this argument; examine how it challenges those religious believers who would wish to claim their religious beliefs as knowledge; and consider what they may do to meet this challenge.
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Anthony Raphael Etuk. "A critique of the traditional and the post-gettier theories of justification: an intervention with epistemological functionalism". World Journal of Advanced Research and Reviews 18, n.º 2 (30 de maio de 2023): 062–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.30574/wjarr.2023.18.2.0756.
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In their quest to refute the sceptics’ challenge to the possibility of knowledge, epistemologists have over the years strived to demonstrate how our beliefs can be appropriately justified. This paper critically examines two of these traditional or anti-sceptical theories of justification, namely: Foundationalism and Coherentism, as well as three famous post-Gettier theories of justification: Reliability, Defeasibility and Causal theories. Notwithstanding their relevant contributions in clarifying the conditions for the justification of knowledge, the paper argues that none of these theories attains the requirements of rational success without vulnerability to the sceptics’ challenge, since each is nettled with some identified epistemic defects, especially due to their emphasis on a single and fixed idea of rational justification – with preference for formal adequacy over functional efficacy of knowledge claim in human inquiry. As a way forward, the paper argues for epistemic justification in a functionalistic framework and concludes with the positive recommendation of this perspective as a more viable alternative approach to epistemic justification. The expository and critical methods of philosophical analysis are adopted in the work.
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List, Christian. "Group Knowledge and Group Rationality: A Judgment Aggregation Perspective". Episteme 2, n.º 1 (junho de 2005): 25–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/epi.2005.2.1.25.
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In this paper, I introduce the emerging theory of judgment aggregation as a framework for studying institutional design in social epistemology. When a group or collective organization is given an epistemic task, its performance may depend on its ‘aggregation procedure’, i.e. its mechanism for aggregating the group members' individual beliefs or judgments into corresponding collective beliefs or judgments endorsed by the group as a whole. I argue that a group's aggregation procedure plays an important role in determining whether the group can meet two challenges: the ‘rationality challenge’ and the ‘knowledge challenge’. The rationality challenge arises when a group is required to endorse consistent beliefs or judgments; the knowledge challenge arises when the group's beliefs or judgments are required to track certain truths. My discussion seeks to identify those properties of an aggregation procedure that affect a group's success at meeting each of the two challenges.
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Tuvel, Rebecca. "Sourcing Women's Ecological Knowledge: The Worry of Epistemic Objectification". Hypatia 30, n.º 2 (2015): 319–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hypa.12141.
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In this paper, I argue that although it is important to attend to injustices surrounding women's epistemic exclusions, it is equally important to attend to injustices surrounding women's epistemic inclusions. Partly in response to the historical exclusion of women's knowledge, there has been increasing effort among first‐world actors to seek out women's knowledge. This trend is apparent in efforts to mainstream gender in climate change negotiation. Here, one is told that women's superior knowledge about how to adapt to climate change makes them “poised to help solve and overcome this daunting challenge.” Pulling from the work of Miranda Fricker, I argue that such claims risk epistemically objectifying women. To illuminate the risk of women's epistemic objectification in climate change discourse, I offer a feminist analysis of current efforts to seek women's environmental knowledge, cautioning throughout that such efforts must reflect just epistemic relations.
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Terleckyj, Andrew. "The Old Modernist Challenge: Navigating the Hypermodern World of Don DeLillo’s White Noise". Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts 10, n.º 4 (13 de setembro de 2023): 329–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.30958/ajha.10-4-3.
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While many critics believe technology and media create a postmodern world of endless simulacrum, fractured identity, and vanishing boundaries in White Noise, this essay explores the possibility that DeLillo’s text in fact reveals the hypermodernist world of Paul Virilio, resisting these apocalyptic consequences of technology. Daniel Joseph Singal’s definition of Modernism helps to show how central aims of the Modernist project – that is, to achieve authenticity and reintegrate Victorian dichotomies – are not only possible but also imperative to achieve in White Noise, for the text implicitly suggests that rejecting Modernist principles may result in a national, epistemic crisis. More specifically, the novel points to one particular stream of Modernist culture as the antidote to epistemic failure. This stream, which Singal attributes to John Dewey, inspirits the novel’s central Modernist characters: Jack and Denise Gladney. Using Modernist ideologies, these two characters successfully find authenticity and meaning in a growingly complex technological world.
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Golomb, Sariel. "Slow Dramaturgies". TDR: The Drama Review 67, n.º 1 (março de 2023): 120–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1054204322000752.
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Whether scientist, politician, or theatre-maker, the challenge one faces in representing climate change is an accompanying epistemic crisis; it is contingent upon and resistant to legibility, and we cannot apprehend it in its totality. Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle poses a potential aesthetic and dramaturgical model for this challenge.
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KRAFT, JAMES. "Religious disagreement, externalism, and the epistemology of disagreement: listening to our grandmothers". Religious Studies 43, n.º 4 (7 de novembro de 2007): 417–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s003441250700916x.
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AbstractA new emphasis in epistemology is burgeoning, known by the phrase ‘the epistemology of disagreement’. The object of investigation is the situation where the two combatants of a disagreement are equally well situated epistemologically. Central questions include whether peer epistemic conflict reduces the support one has for one's belief, whether the reduction should be understood on internalist or externalist lines, and how often such peer conflict happens. The main objective in the first two sections will be to provide background by bringing key points of contention to the surface in the recent epistemologies of disagreement both in mainstream epistemology and in religious epistemology. A final section asserts that epistemic externalism in religious epistemology doesn't easily escape the challenge of epistemic, peer, religious disagreement.
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Verbeek, Lesley, Mark Koning e Alice Schippers. "Understanding Epistemic Justice through Inclusive Research about Intellectual Disability and Sexuality". Social Sciences 13, n.º 8 (6 de agosto de 2024): 408. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/socsci13080408.
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Formal language: This paper discusses inclusive research and epistemic justice by using an example of a published study the authors conducted on intellectual disability and sexuality in supported living environments. Our study addressed taboos and pushed boundaries in content and methodology through two ways of inclusive research: (1) the second author of this paper who has an intellectual disability was a main researcher in the study; and (2) we interviewed people with intellectual disabilities about their own experiences as well as their desired solutions to obstacles they face in their supported living environments. Their input was centralized in the final research report. This method challenged the epistemic injustice of who have historically not been ‘allowed’ to produce knowledge in research. This paper offers historical insight into epistemic injustice as well as relational approaches from critical disability studies and non-Western understandings of disability that ‘rethink’ disability and that can thus promote epistemic justice in academic theory. By addressing both practice and theory in this paper, we aim to contribute to the growing body of inclusive research and to the epistemic justice of people with intellectual disabilities. Plain language: (1) Epistemology = thinking about knowledge, producing knowledge, sharing knowledge. (2) In history, people with intellectual disabilities have often been excluded from participating in this. This is called epistemic injustice. It is caused by the discrimination of people with intellectual disabilities (ableism). (3) Performing inclusive research with people with intellectual disabilities challenges this. It contributes to epistemic justice. Researchers and interviewees with intellectual disabilities can bring knowledge from lived experience into research. (4) Knowledge from lived experience has not always been valued in traditional research. That means we also need to think differently about ‘knowledge’, and about ‘disability’ and its ‘value’. (5) Discrimination based on disability has a long history. For instance: during colonialism by European countries (starting in the 15th century), false ideas about ‘poor health’ and ‘low intelligence’ were already used to justify slavery. People with disabilities have often been locked away or even killed because they have been seen as ‘less valuable’. These ways of thinking still exist. They influence our understanding of ‘epistemology’ because they decide whose way of thinking and way of life is valuable or not valuable. We need to change this way of thinking. (6) Some academic fields that help are critical disability studies, indigenous studies, and feminist posthumanism. These fields challenge ableist ways of thinking. They can help us understand disability as something that is not negative or less valuable, but simply part of what makes us human.
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Harris, Keith Raymond. "Does Knowledge Intellectualism Have a Gettier Problem?" American Philosophical Quarterly 59, n.º 2 (1 de abril de 2022): 149–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/21521123.59.2.04.
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Abstract Knowledge intellectualism is the view that knowledge-how requires propositional knowledge. Knowledge intellectualism has a Gettier problem, or so many of its critics allege. The essence of this problem is that knowledge-how is compatible with epistemic luck in a way that ordinary propositional knowledge is not. Hence, knowledge-how can allegedly be had in the absence of knowledge-that, a fact inconsistent with knowledge intellectualism. This paper develops two responses to this challenge to knowledge intellectualism. First, it is not clear that propositional knowledge is incompatible with the forms of epistemic luck with which knowledge-how is allegedly compatible. Second, existing cases intended to serve as counterexamples to knowledge intellectualism are flawed, and revised versions of these cases no longer elicit the judgments necessary to challenge knowledge intellectualism.
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Vanney, Claudia E., e J. Ignacio Aguinalde Sáenz. "Interpersonal Intellectual Virtues". Scientia et Fides 10, n.º 2 (7 de dezembro de 2022): 167–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/setf.2022.025.
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Due to the hyperspecialization so prevalent nowadays, interdisciplinary research is a demanding kind of epistemic activity. The concept of intellectual virtue as presented by responsibilist approaches of virtue epistemology could offer an effective counterweight to this challenge but raises the question of what epistemic virtues are necessary for interdisciplinarity.
Based on a qualitative study, we identify and heuristically conceptualize a relevant subset of epistemic virtues required by interdisciplinarity that we call interpersonal intellectual virtues. These virtues are personal character traits that facilitate the reciprocal acquisition and distribution of knowledge with and through other people. By their very nature, they are only exercised in an interpersonal relationship that seeks an epistemic good, so in some sense, they are at the intersection of social virtues and intellectual virtues.
We use Jason Baehr’s four-dimensional proposal for the essential components of intellectual virtues (motivational, affective, skill, and judgment) to show that these interpersonal traits are indeed epistemic virtues. Some examples of interpersonal intellectual virtues are intellectual empathy, intellectual respect, and intellectual trust, among others. Intellectual empathy is a paradigmatic case that we analyze in more detail.
Finally, we suggest that interpersonal intellectual virtues are the key character traits of people involved in any successful collective epistemic endeavor, interdisciplinary research being a privileged context in which we can clearly see their manifestation.
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K. Esiaka, Darlingtina, e Glenn Adams. "Epistemic Violence in Research on Eldercare". Psychology and Developing Societies 32, n.º 2 (21 de agosto de 2020): 176–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0971333620936948.
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Decolonial perspectives challenge the notion that standard knowledge in hegemonic psychology is productive of progress and enlightenment. They instead emphasise its association with the colonial violence that constitutes the darker underside of modern development. Our contribution to the special issue applies a decolonial perspective to theory and research on obligation to an elderly parent. Thinking from the standpoint of West African epistemic locations not only illuminates the culture-bound character of standard models but also reveals their foundations in modern individualist selfways. Although modern individualist selfways can liberate well-endowed people to pursue fulfilling relationships and avoid unsatisfying connections with burdensome obligations, these ways of being pose risks of abandonment for people—like many elders—whose requirements for care might constitute a constraint on others’ satisfaction. In contrast, the cultural ecologies of embedded interdependence that inform everyday life in many West African settings afford selfways that emphasise careful maintenance of existing connections. Although these selfways may place constraints on the self-expansive pursuit of satisfying relationships, they provide elders and other vulnerable people with some assurance of support.
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Vega-Muñoz, Alejandro, Guido Salazar-Sepúlveda e Nicolás Contreras-Barraza. "Identifying the Blue Economy Global Epistemic Community". Water 13, n.º 22 (15 de novembro de 2021): 3234. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/w13223234.
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The following article aims to identify the characteristics of the epistemic community of Blue Economy researchers, through the description of its scientific production, its special organization and clustering. The information was examined using bibliometric techniques on 302 research works using the Web of Science databases (JCR) between 2013 and 2021. At the same time, VOSviewer software was used to represent the relationships metrically and visually between the data and metadata. A set of research works is reviewed which relates environmental conservation and its implication in the development of the territory, and the relationship between technology and the improvement of ocean management, to highlight those state interventions where benefits are generated for the population or where there is an important challenge for improvement.
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MacPherson, Brian. "A CHALLENGE TO THE KRIPKE/PUTNAM DISTINCTION BETWEEN EPISTEMIC AND METAPHYSICAL NECESSITY". Southwest Philosophy Review 13, n.º 2 (1997): 113–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview199713232.
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Mothoagae, Itumeleng Daniel. "RECONFIGURING THEOLOGY: NEED FOR ORGANIC INTELLECTUALS AND A CHALLENGE TO EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE". Scriptura 112 (5 de março de 2014): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.7833/112-0-99.
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Beneduce, Roberto, e Simona Taliani. "Witchcraft as a case of ethnographic murk: Impasse of knowledge, harshness of experience". Ethnography 25, n.º 4 (19 de novembro de 2024): 428–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/14661381241264029.
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Witchcraft has been described as knowledge that resists knowledge. Drawing on our field research on witchcraft, alienation, and violence in Mali and southern Cameroon as well as with migrants coming from sub-Saharan Africa, we consider two main issues. The first concerns the epistemic challenge of ‘witchcraft’ and its satellite notions (mystical weapons, animal metamorphosis, fetish and so forth). We analyse this ‘challenge’ beyond the problems of translation, both as a particular expression of African perspectivism and an unending struggle concerning epistemic sovereignty. The second issue directly originates from our field research. Prudently, we will try to give a new lease of life to an ethnographic material, studied 20 years ago. We would turn back to some drawings made by students at the primary school of Mbom (Sangmelina, southern Cameroon), and explore the power of what we provisionally define as ‘visual utterances’.
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Neta, Ram. "BOOK SYMPOSIUM ON ERNEST SOSA’S EPISTEMIC EXPLANATIONS". Philosophical Topics 49, n.º 2 (2021): 385–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics202149231.
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Ernest Sosa’s new monograph, Epistemic Explanations, develops an important new account of epistemic evaluation, epistemic normativity, and the explanatory role of these. The first two sections of the present paper develop an interpretation of Sosa’s metaphysics of the mental states of rational agents as a version of hylomorphism (a view according to which such states can be understood as composed of matter and form). The second half of the paper uses this hylomorphic view to argue that Sosa can account for differences among the various kinds of knowledge by appeal to nothing more than differences among the belief-like attitudes involved in those kinds of knowledge. My argument for this last claim will also challenge Sosa’s own argument for two of the book’s most heterodox epistemological claims, viz., that knowledge can be recognizably insecure, and that knowledge can be based on mere assumptions.
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Montminy, Martin. "Defending the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility". Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20, n.º 2 (17 de agosto de 2021). http://dx.doi.org/10.26556/jesp.v20i2.1405.
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I consider three challenges to the traditional view according to which moral responsibility involves an epistemic condition in addition to a freedom condition. The first challenge holds that if a person performs an action A freely, then she thereby knows that she is doing A. The epistemic condition is thus built into the freedom condition. The second challenge contends that no epistemic condition is required for moral responsibility, since a person may be blameworthy for an action that she did not know was wrong. The third challenge invokes the quality of will view. On this view, a person is blameworthy for a wrong action just in case the action manifests a bad quality of will. The blameworthy person need not satisfy an additional epistemic condition. I will argue that contrary to appearances, none of these challenges succeeds. Hence, moral responsibility does require a non-superfluous epistemic condition.
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Tarsney, Christian. "The epistemic challenge to longtermism". Synthese 201, n.º 6 (31 de maio de 2023). http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04153-y.
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"Epistemic justification and the skeptical challenge". Choice Reviews Online 43, n.º 08 (1 de abril de 2006): 43–4597. http://dx.doi.org/10.5860/choice.43-4597.
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Lutz, Matt. "Naturalism and the Projectability Challenge". Journal of Moral Philosophy, 4 de março de 2022, 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-20213546.
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Abstract In a recent paper in this journal, Bengson, Cuneo and Reiser (hereafter bcr) present a novel epistemic challenge to naturalist moral realism, which they call the Projectability Challenge. The Projectability Challenge aims to show that there is an important epistemic phenomenon, projectability, that naturalists are unable to explain, but which non-naturalists can explain. This flips a familiar dynamic on its head, since it is typically argued that the moral naturalist has epistemic advantages over the moral non-naturalist (see, e.g., Joyce 2006, Ch. 6; Bedke 2009). In this response, I argue that bcr dramatically underestimate the theoretical resources available to naturalists to explain the phenomenon of projectability. While bcr argue that no variety of moral naturalism can explain projectability, I contend that all varieties of moral naturalism can explain projectability. There is no projectability problem for any kind of naturalist realism.
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Müller, Julian F., e Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi. "An egalitarian challenge to increasing epistemic value in democracy". Synthese 202, n.º 3 (24 de agosto de 2023). http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04283-3.
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AbstractThe epistemic value of a political procedure—such as democracy or a civil trial system—depends on how well it performs in arriving at decisions that are correct by some independent standard. A core assumption in the literature on epistemic democracy is that boosting the epistemic value of such a procedure makes it better overall. Even though this assumption seems innocuous (and hence has not been discussed in much detail), we will argue that it is not beyond the pale of reasonable disagreement. For it is possible to increase the epistemic value of a political procedure in ways that give rise to egalitarian objections.