Artigos de revistas: "Endogenous rights"

1

Guerriero, Carmine. "Endogenous Property Rights". Journal of Law and Economics 59, n.º 2 (maio de 2016): 313–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/686985.

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Teng, Jimmy. "Endogenous authoritarian property rights". Journal of Public Economics 77, n.º 1 (julho de 2000): 81–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(99)00056-0.

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3

LEONARD, DANIEL, e NGO VAN LONG. "Endogenous Changes in Property Rights Regime*". Economic Record 88, n.º 280 (29 de novembro de 2011): 79–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.2011.00765.x.

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Marchese, Carla, Simone Marsiglio, Fabio Privileggi e Giovanni B. Ramello. "ENDOGENOUS RECOMBINANT GROWTH AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS". Macroeconomic Dynamics 23, n.º 5 (4 de setembro de 2017): 2035–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s136510051700058x.

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We show that, even in a framework in which monopolistic exploitation of patents does not occur, patents still give rise to serious drawbacks. We rely on a recombinant growth framework that provides a stylized but clear description of the formation of knowledge externalities. In our setting a benevolent government buys immediately new patents in a competitive market and releases their contents for free. We show that inefficiencies nevertheless arise and welfare can be improved by correcting the market price through a tax–subsidy scheme. We characterize the (asymptotic) steady-state equilibrium, and some properties of the transitional path. We show that if certain conditions are met, then the economy will converge to its (asymptotic) balanced growth path, and along such a pathgrowth will be independent of the policy parameter; conversely, transition dynamics are affected by the choice of the policy parameter. We then quantitatively analyze the effect of different policy interventions on welfare, and show that stricter tax (weaker appropriability) regimes lead to higher social welfare.

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5

Erlei, Mathias, e J. Philipp Siemer. "Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold-up Experiment". Metroeconomica 65, n.º 2 (23 de setembro de 2013): 237–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/meca.12037.

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Kwan, Yum K., e Edwin L. C. Lai. "Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous economic growth". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, n.º 5 (março de 2003): 853–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(02)00018-0.

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7

Hotte, Louis, Ngo Van Long e Huilan Tian. "International trade with endogenous enforcement of property rights". Journal of Development Economics 62, n.º 1 (junho de 2000): 25–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00074-2.

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Suphaphiphat, Nujin, Pietro F. Peretto e Simone Valente. "Endogenous growth and property rights over renewable resources". European Economic Review 76 (maio de 2015): 125–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.02.003.

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Dalton, Thomas R., R. Morris Coats e Badiollah R. Asrabadi. "Renewable resources, property-rights regimes and endogenous growth". Ecological Economics 52, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2005): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.03.033.

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10

Nugent, Jeffrey B., e Nicolas Sanchez. "Common Property Rights as an Endogenous Response to Risk". American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80, n.º 3 (agosto de 1998): 651–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1244575.

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11

Cysne, Rubens P., e David Turchick. "Intellectual property rights protection and endogenous economic growth revisited". Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 36, n.º 6 (junho de 2012): 851–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2011.12.005.

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Galinato, Gregmar I. "Endogenous property rights regimes, common-pool resources and trade". Ecological Economics 70, n.º 5 (março de 2011): 951–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2010.12.011.

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CH, RAFAEL, JACOB SHAPIRO, ABBEY STEELE e JUAN F. VARGAS. "Endogenous Taxation in Ongoing Internal Conflict: The Case of Colombia". American Political Science Review 112, n.º 4 (3 de agosto de 2018): 996–1015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055418000333.

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Recent empirical evidence suggests an ambiguous relationship between internal conflicts, state capacity, and tax performance. In theory, internal conflict should create strong incentives for governments to develop the fiscal capacity necessary to defeat rivals. We argue that one reason that this does not occur is because internal conflict enables groups with de facto power to capture local fiscal and property rights institutions. We test this mechanism in Colombia using data on tax performance and property rights institutions at the municipal level. Municipalities affected by internal conflict have tax institutions consistent with the preferences of the parties dominating local violence. Those suffering more right-wing violence feature more land formalization and higher property tax revenues. Municipalities with substantial left-wing guerrilla violence collect less tax revenue and witness less land formalization. Our findings provide systematic evidence that internal armed conflict helps interest groups capture municipal institutions for their own private benefit, impeding state-building.

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14

Nee, Victor, e Sonja Opper. "Endogenous Institutional Change and Dynamic Capitalism". SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO, n.º 118 (julho de 2010): 15–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.3280/sl2010-118002.

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State-centered theory asserts that political institutions and credible commitment by political elite to formal rules securing property rights provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for economic growth to take place. In this approach, the evolution of institutions favorable to economic performance is a top-down process led by politicians who control the state. Hence, in less developed and poor countries, the counterfactual is that if formal institutions secure property rights and check predatory action by the political elite, then sustained economic growth would follow. The limitation of state-centered theory stems from the problem that behavioral prescriptions - formal rules and regulations - that reflect what politicians prefer can be ignored. In contrast, we lay out the bottomup construction of economic institutions that gave rise to capitalist economic development in China. Entrepreneurship in the economically developed regions of the coastal provinces was not fueled by exogenous institutional changes. When the first entrepreneurs decided to decouple from the traditional socialist production system, the government had neither initiated financial reforms inviting a broader societal participation, nor had it provided property rights protection or transparent rules specifying company registration and liabilities. Instead, it was the development and use of innovative informal arrangements within close-knit groups of like-minded actors that provided the necessary funding and reliable business norms. This allowed the first wave of entrepreneurs to survive outside of the state-owned manufacturing system. This bottom-up process resembles earlier accounts of the rise of capitalism in the West.

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15

Buratto, Alessandra, Luca Grosset e Bruno Viscolani. "Endogenous royalty factor in a licensing contract". Yugoslav Journal of Operations Research 26, n.º 3 (2016): 263–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/yjor150120014b.

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The owner of a well known fashion brand grants a manufacturer the rights to produce and sell a second-line brand against a percentage of the sales called royalty. To this end, the brand owner and the manufacturer sign a licensing contract which assigns the owner, who has already determined his advertising campaign, the right of determining the royalty factor. The manufacturer will plan her advertising campaign for the licenced product in order to maximize her profit. The brand owner?s objective is twofold: on the one hand, he wants to maximize the profit coming from the contract, on the other hand, he wants to improve the value of the brand at the end of a given planning period. We model this interaction between the two agents using a Stackelberg game, where the brand owner is the leader and the manufacturer is the follower. We characterise the royalty percentage and the licensee?s advertising effort which constitute the unique Stackelberg equilibrium of the game.

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16

Jaworski, Taylor, e Bart J. Wilson. "Go West Young Man: Self-Selection and Endogenous Property Rights". Southern Economic Journal 79, n.º 4 (abril de 2013): 886–904. http://dx.doi.org/10.4284/0038-4038-2011.249.

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Schoonbroodt, Alice, e Michèle Tertilt. "Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility". Journal of Economic Theory 150 (março de 2014): 551–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.016.

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18

Costa, Lawrence W. "An endogenous growth model for the evolution of water rights systems". Agricultural Economics 46, n.º 5 (29 de abril de 2015): 677–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/agec.12163.

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19

Azevedo, Mónica L., Óscar Afonso e Sandra T. Silva. "Endogenous growth and intellectual property rights: A north–south modeling proposal". Economic Modelling 38 (fevereiro de 2014): 112–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2013.12.021.

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20

Pérez-Nievas, Mikel. "Efficiency with endogenous population growth. Do children have too many rights?" Theoretical Economics 18, n.º 4 (2023): 1375–406. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te4391.

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Fertility rates are declining in many countries. But are fertility rates inefficiently low? This paper addresses this question by exploring the efficiency properties of equilibria in an overlapping generations setting with endogenous fertility and dynastic parental altruism, using the notion of P ‐efficiency proposed by Golosov, Jones and Tertilt (2007). In contrast to Schoonbroodt and Tertilt (2014), who show that any equilibrium for which nonnegativity constraints on intergenerational transfers are binding is A ‐inefficient (and, under the assumption that new lives always increase social welfare, also P ‐inefficient), I characterize symmetric, P ‐efficient allocations as the equilibria arising from different distribution of rights among the agents, and show that many equilibria exhibiting binding constraints on transfers are P ‐efficient. To be more precise, except for dynamically inefficient equilibria, there is no need to alter children's rights so as to achieve efficiency.

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21

AZNAR-MÁRQUEZ, J., e J. R. RUIZ-TAMARIT. "RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENDOGENOUS GROWTH". Macroeconomic Dynamics 9, n.º 2 (abril de 2005): 170–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100505040149.

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We study the sustainability of long-run growth in a two-sector economy where a renewable natural resource is exploited under private property rights. We obtain short- and long-run growth trajectories in closed form, examine transitional dynamics, and characterize convergence properties. We find conditions for sustainable long-run growth, which depend on the harvesting rate, and show that the speed of convergence decreases during transition. We identify a stronger version of Hartwick's rule and analyze parameter dependences for endogenous variables. Economic growth relies less on abundance or scarcity of natural resources than on the way they are managed.

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22

Schäfer, Andreas, e Maik T. Schneider. "ENDOGENOUS ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, NORTH–SOUTH TRADE, AND GROWTH". Macroeconomic Dynamics 19, n.º 5 (17 de janeiro de 2014): 1074–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1365100513000709.

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Now that most countries have harmonized intellectual property right (IPR) legislation as a consequence of signing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the dispute about the optimal level of IPR protection has shifted toward IPR enforcement. This paper develops an endogenous growth framework with two open economies satisfying the classical North–South assumptions to study (a) the regions' incentives to enforce IPRs in a decentralized game, (b) the desired IPR enforcement of the two regions in negotiation rounds on global harmonization, and (c) the constrained efficient enforcement level. We show how the different solutions relate to each other and how the results depend on the research productivity in the North and the regions' relative market sizes. Although growth rates increase substantially when IPR enforcement is harmonized at the North's desired level, our numerical simulation suggests that the South may also benefit in terms of long-run welfare.

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23

Ho, Peter. "An endogenous theory of property rights: opening the black box of institutions". Journal of Peasant Studies 43, n.º 6 (novembro de 2016): 1121–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1253560.

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24

Bedasso, Biniam E. "Educated Bandits: Endogenous Property Rights and Intra-Elite Distribution of Human Capital". Economics & Politics 27, n.º 3 (14 de julho de 2015): 404–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12063.

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25

Ray, Christopher. "Towards a Meta-Framework of Endogenous Development: Repertoires, Paths, Democracy and Rights". Sociologia Ruralis 39, n.º 4 (outubro de 1999): 522–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9523.00122.

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26

Yang, Guifang, e Keith E. Maskus. "Intellectual property rights, licensing, and innovation in an endogenous product-cycle model". Journal of International Economics 53, n.º 1 (fevereiro de 2001): 169–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0022-1996(00)00062-3.

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27

Hu, Jin-Li, Hung-Yi Chen e Fang-Yun Tsai. "Exploring the Endogenous Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Economic Growth". Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences 35, n.º 3 (4 de maio de 2014): 255–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02522667.2014.914270.

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28

Eicher, Theo, e Cecilia García-Peñalosa. "Endogenous strength of intellectual property rights: Implications for economic development and growth". European Economic Review 52, n.º 2 (fevereiro de 2008): 237–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2007.10.003.

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29

Gerber, Elisabeth R., e John E. Jackson. "Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions". American Political Science Review 87, n.º 3 (setembro de 1993): 639–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938741.

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The assumption that individual preferences, or attitudes, are fixed and exogenously determined is central to many studies of political and economic institutions, such as markets and elections. We present a Bayesian model of adaptive preferences and empirical evidence consistent with that model to argue that preferences are not always exogenous and fixed. The changing relationships between partisanship and preferences on civil rights issues between 1956 and 1964 and on the Vietnam War issue between 1968 and 1972 coincide with significant changes in the major parties' positions on these issues, suggesting that preferences are endogenous to the electoral process. We conclude with a discussion of the positive and normative implications of endogenous preferences.

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Pang, Xianjun, e Liping Liu. "Venture capital, control rights, and family enterprise growth". PLOS ONE 16, n.º 8 (18 de agosto de 2021): e0256318. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0256318.

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This research explores and explains the path of family enterprise venture capital equity financing from the perspective of endogenous family control rights. We adopted unbalanced panel data on Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018. Empirical research shows that there are significant differences in the impact of venture capital on the growth performance of family enterprises and non-family enterprises. Venture capital negatively affects the growth performance of family enterprises, while the negative impact of venture capital on family enterprises is not significant. In addition, family control positively moderates the negative impact of venture capital on family enterprise growth performance.

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31

Zarkovic, Jelena. "Mechanisms for development of property rights institutions". Panoeconomicus 53, n.º 3 (2006): 283–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/pan0603283z.

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The institution of property rights is increasingly recognized as an essential building block of an economically prosperous society. The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property rights tends to be, in general, an optimistic one since there is a tendency to view the design of property rights institutions as maximizing decisions to economize on transaction costs and to facilitate new economic activities. On the other hand, since property rights define the distribution of wealth and political power in a society, changes in property rights structures are likely to be influenced by more than pure efficiency considerations. Therefore, in order to achieve a balanced analysis of the evolution of property rights institutions, the model of endogenous property rights creation should be modified. We did that by introducing the neoinstitutional theory of the state in the model.

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Pérez-Nievas, Mikel, José I. Conde-Ruiz e Eduardo L. Giménez. "Efficiency and endogenous fertility". Theoretical Economics 14, n.º 2 (2019): 475–512. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2138.

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This paper explores the properties of the notions of A ‐efficiency and P ‐efficiency, which were proposed by Golosov et al.. (2007), to evaluate allocations in a general overlapping generations setting in which fertility choices are endogenously selected from a continuum and any two agents of the same generation are identical. First, we show that the properties of A ‐efficient allocations vary depending on the criterion used to identify potential agents. If one identifies potential agents by their position in their siblings' birth order, as Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt do, then A ‐efficiency requires that a positive measure of agents use most of their endowment to maximize the utility of the dynasty head, which, in environments with finite‐horizon altruism, implies that some agents—the youngest in every family—obtain an arbitrary low income to finance their own consumption and fertility plans. If potential agents are identified by the dates in which they may be born, then A ‐efficiency reduces to dynastic maximization, which, in environments with finite‐horizon altruism, drives the economy to a collapse in finite time. To deal with situations like those arising in economies with finite‐horizon altruism, in which A ‐efficiency may be in conflict with individual rights, we propose to evaluate the efficiency of a given allocation with a particular class of specifications of P ‐efficiency for which the utility attributed to the unborn depends on the utility obtained by their living siblings. Under certain concavity assumptions on value functions, we also characterize every symmetric, P ‐efficient allocation as a Millian efficient allocation, that is, as a symmetric allocation that is not A ‐dominated—with the birth‐order criterion—by any other symmetric allocation.

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Litvin, Dmitry. "Modeling of the Institutional Framework of the Russian Forestry to Determine the Trajectory of the Transformation of Institutions". System Analysis & Mathematical Modeling 5, n.º 2 (14 de maio de 2023): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.17150/2713-1734.2023.5(2).115-130.

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Russia has the largest reserves and areas of forest resources in the world. Despite this, the Russian forestry does not have significant economic results and occupies less than 1 % of the country's GDP, accordingly, there is an undiscovered potential for effective, inexhaustible development. Taking into account intensive lawmaking, institutional changes are a recognized tool for adjusting forest policy to maximize the usefulness of the industry. However, as shown in the article, transformations do not lead to the desired result. A utility model is proposed that takes into account the shares of the distribution of ownership rights to forest resources between endogenous and exogenous agents. The model determines the macroeconomic situation of the industry on the basis of microfoundations in the form of a classical assessment of the preferences of agents on the distribution of property. On the basis of this approach, the utility maximization function is described, equal to the permissible limit of the rights of endogenous distribution agents, if preferences correspond to institutional changes. Graphically and empirically, the reduction of utility is justified if the maximization conditions are not met. The model integrates the influence of path dependence and self-reinforcement effects as important determinants of distorting in one direction or another the variable of time preferences of endogenous agents. For the practical application of the model, the approximate dynamics of the balance of cash flows from the policy pursued in the forest industry for the current periods of institutional changes is calculated. A number of functions are proposed, on the basis of which, according to statistical data, it is possible to conclude about the current position of the forest industry regarding the compliance of institutional transformations with the preferences of agents. From the data obtained, it follows that it is necessary to expand the ownership rights of agents of endogenous distribution.

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Rossi, Christopher R. "Water Rights and Hydro-Egoism: Endogenous Hegemony and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam". Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 32, n.º 2 (19 de setembro de 2022): 247–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.18060/26521.

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35

Ho, Peter. "In defense of endogenous, spontaneously ordered development: institutional functionalism and Chinese property rights". Journal of Peasant Studies 40, n.º 6 (novembro de 2013): 1087–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2013.866553.

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36

Boitani, Andrea, e Michele Grillo. "SOME REFLECTIONS ON EXTERNALITIES, COASE THEOREM AND THE ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS". Metroeconomica 43, n.º 3 (outubro de 1992): 309–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999x.1992.tb00714.x.

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Furukawa, Yuichi. "The protection of intellectual property rights and endogenous growth: Is stronger always better?" Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 31, n.º 11 (novembro de 2007): 3644–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.01.011.

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Dincer, Oguzhan C., e Christopher J. Ellis. "Predation, Protection, and Accumulation: Endogenous Property Rights in an Overlapping Generations Growth Model". International Tax and Public Finance 12, n.º 4 (agosto de 2005): 435–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-005-1266-1.

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Zhou, Tairan. "The Impact of Land Property Right on China’s Rural-urban Migration". BCP Business & Management 18 (13 de abril de 2022): 537–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.54691/bcpbm.v18i.595.

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China is undergoing a rural land system reform called Three Rights Division (TRD) which promotes the transformation of land management right and guarantees the security of land contract right. In this paper, we study the impacts of rural land system on migration under market (the ability to rent land) and government (land expropriation) mechanism. We employ the Probit model with robustness and endogenous checks to identify whether rent behavior and land insecurity have impacts on migration. Results show that the rent behavior has a positive impact on migration while land insecurity is negative, indicating that the reform of TRD promotes the probability to migrate both through market and government mechanism.

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Oparinde, Lawrence Olusola. "Land Rights and Improvement Investments Among Crop Farmers in Southwest, Nigeria". Nigerian Journal of Technological Research 16, n.º 1 (9 de março de 2021): 1–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/njtr.v16i1.1.

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This study examined the effects of land rights on investment decisions of farmers and determinants of land rights as well as the impact of land rights on farm productivity in Southwest Nigeria. Multistage sampling process was used in the selection of 320 respondents for the study. Two-stage conditional maximum likelihood (2SCML) approach of multivariate probit regression model and Endogenous switching regression (ESR) model were used for the analysis of the collected data. The results of Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) estimates from ESR revealed that land rights increase farm productivity. This study further confirmed the importance of land rights in facilitating investment in soil-improving measures which subsequently leads to higher productivity. One of the policy implications emanating from this study suggests that having use and transfer rights as against use only rights goes a long way in enhancing investment in soil-improving or conservation measures. Keywords: Crop, Investment, Land, Multivariate Probit Regression Model, Rights, Two-stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood.

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Shastri, Nilabh, e Keling Chen. "Equal Immune Rights For All Polypeptides (106.38)". Journal of Immunology 188, n.º 1_Supplement (1 de maio de 2012): 106.38. http://dx.doi.org/10.4049/jimmunol.188.supp.106.38.

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Abstract Effective immune surveillance requires that MHC class I molecules display a peptide repertoire on the surface representing all cellular proteins. How the peptide repertoire can be comprehensive despite large differences in abundance and stability of individual proteins is not known. We show here that peptide presentation by MHC I molecules is strongly influenced by the pioneer round of translation (PRT) associated with nonsense mediated decay (NMD) of mRNAs. The PRT allows cells to detect and eliminate aberrant mRNAs containing premature stop codons. Inhibition of PRT by knock-down of CBP80, a unique cap-binding protein reduced peptide presentation by MHC class I molecules on the cell surface without affecting global protein synthesis. On the other hand, introduction of premature stop codons changed mRNA stability without affecting peptide presentation by MHC I on the cell surface. Thus, the pioneer round of translation could be used to derive peptides presentation by MHC I molecules to generate a comprehensive display of virtually all endogenous proteins.

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Loury, Glenn C. "Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions". Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, n.º 2 (1 de maio de 1998): 117–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/jep.12.2.117.

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This comment argues that discrimination against blacks remains important, especially in labor markets, but that its extent is modest both by historical standards and in relation to supply-side racial disparities. It contends that the racial skills gap is endogenous, reflecting the effects of historical and ongoing discrimination; and that the moral obligation to reduce disparities in skills between the races is no less than the obligation to fight market discrimination. Finally, it suggests that imperfect information may be a more pervasive and intractable cause of racial discrimination today than is behavior based on agents' purported distaste for associating with blacks.

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Zhu, Yuan, Bingyue Wan e Lixin Tian. "Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Financial Development and Green Low-Carbon Endogenous Economic Growth". Sustainability 14, n.º 20 (12 de outubro de 2022): 13029. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su142013029.

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This paper considers the protection of intellectual property rights and financial development in the green low-carbon endogenous economic growth model, and also considers the total financing scale of the firms in the financial development sector, the transformation ability of the R&D sector to the advanced technology of developed countries, and the intensity of intellectual property protection, which gives the household utility function to a household. After maximizing the utility function, this paper analyzes the economic growth rate and mainly finds that the economic growth rate increases with the increase of technological transformation capacity parameters, two kinds of production efficiency parameters, and the total financing scale of the firms, and in addition it decreases with the increase of the technical level of developing countries relative to developed countries. Then, considering the improvement degree of intermediate goods, R&D efficiency and financial frictional coefficient, the relationship between it and the economic growth rate is obtained. This paper finds that the economic growth rate increases with the increase of the degree of improvement; R&D efficiency parameter; the probability that any R&D project can bring positive returns; technical level; the investment in reducing carbon emissions; the amount of energy invested in the final goods production sector; and it decreases with the increase of the financial frictional coefficient.

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Azevedo, Mónica L., Óscar Afonso e Sandra T. Silva. "Endogenous Growth and Intellectual Property Rights: A North-South Modelling Proposal with Population Ageing". Australian Economic Papers 56, n.º 1 (19 de setembro de 2016): 72–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12075.

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Casari, Marco. "Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps". Journal of Economic History 67, n.º 1 (março de 2007): 191–226. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022050707000071.

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This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 communities. Over time, private-order institutions in the form of charters replaced informal arrangements sustained by the long-run interaction among villagers. Although costly to run, the charters accomplished several tasks that increased resource use efficiency.

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Winfree, Jason A., e Jill J. McCluskey. "Takings of development rights with asymmetric information and an endogenous probability of an externality". Journal of Housing Economics 16, n.º 3-4 (novembro de 2007): 320–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jhe.2007.08.003.

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Lee, Yoo-Hwan, e Sang-Kee Kim. "The Endogenous Formation of Intellectual Property Protection Mechanism". Korea International Trade Research Institute 18, n.º 3 (30 de junho de 2022): 285–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.16980/jitc.18.3.202206.285.

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Purpose This study studies the conditions for the endogenous intellectual property protection(IPP). Design/Methodology/Approach Based on the research and development (R&D) spillover model by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the analytical framework of this study is set up. Findings For a given low IPP cost and large R&D spillover to make IPP highly efficient, instead of choosing “no use of the mechanism”, the firms optimally choose “use the mechanism”. In this situation, the profits is worse off, which is a clear case of prisoner’s dilemma. In contrast, for a given high IPP cost that makes IPP inefficient, each firm has an incentive to choose the strategy of “no use of the mechanism”. Research Implications Our finding does not support the public-generating a large volume of domestic IPP. In some countries, the government-supported policies to drive firms to create greater intellectual property rights have been widely established. If the polices reduce IPP costs, the distortion in producer surplus will be larger.

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Tatum, Robert C. "A hard row to hoe: farming on the economic frontier under incomplete property rights". Environment and Development Economics 18, n.º 5 (11 de abril de 2013): 576–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x13000181.

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AbstractFarmers on the economic frontier often do not have clear titles to their land. Therefore, using an infinite-horizon representative agent model calibrated with data for the Brazilian Amazon, this paper analyzes how improved property rights influence the frontier farmer's investment in the land, as well as the farmer's consumption and debt. Three channels through which property rights affect these variables are identified in the analysis. Two involve the expenditure the farmer incurs to defend the land claim, and the third involves the interest rate premium the farmer faces when borrowing without a clear title to the land. Variants of the model allow for labor to defend the land claim and for endogenous property rights. The findings suggest a need and direction for further, empirical research, particularly with regard to informal institutional arrangements, measures of property rights and the means by which they are defended.

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Schilirò, Daniele. "The Growth Conundrum: Paul Romer’s Endogenous Growth". International Business Research 12, n.º 10 (16 de setembro de 2019): 75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v12n10p75.

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The explanation and causes of economic growth, the problem of convergence of per capita income among different economies, the low productivity growth in many advanced economies, and the presence of disrupting technological innovations remain at the center of the debate among economists. The present contribution analyzes the endogenous growth theory of Paul Romer and discusses its features and content through Romer’s main works on the topic. This study on Romer’s work highlights the existence and importance of increasing returns in the process of growth, the key role of knowledge, the ideas as non-rival goods, the existence of externalities, the endogeneity of technological change, and the primary role of human capital, especially in research activity. Institutions, such as property rights are important as well. The state also has a decisive role in education and the research sector. Another relevant aspect is that economic growth and technological change are closely interconnected; they cannot be separated. Romer’s theory of endogenous technological change ties the development of new ideas and economic growth to the number of people working in the knowledge sector. New ideas, being non-rival and partially excludable, are fundamental for growth since they make everyone producing physical goods and services more productive. Finally, Romer’s endogenous growth highlights the factors that provide incentives for knowledge creation; thus, his theory can also be considered a significant contribution to the theory of the knowledge-based economy.

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Bamaze N’Gani, Essodina. "Les droits humains au prisme des particularismes culturels : quelle alternative ?" Studia Universitatis Babeș-Bolyai Philosophia 67, n.º 2 (12 de agosto de 2022): 159–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.24193/subbphil.2022.2.09.

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"Human Rights through the Lens of Cultural Particularities: What Alternative? While the proclaimed universality of human rights is a guarantee of security and protection for every human being, its implementation faces several cultural roadblocks. This paper clearly posits that the transcendent aspect of universality creates legal foreignness. We postulate that this foreignness is the source of particularistic hatred against the universality of human rights. In the light of this hypothesis, which is illustrated by excisions, this study recommends a translation of the universal language of human rights into local cultural contexts. Such a translation constitutes an effective antidote to any particularistic approach, because we believe that it creates space for shared responsibility towards universality. In this regard, this paper intends to rethink the very foundation of the universality of human rights as rooted in order to eventually demonstrates the relevance of its translation into local cultural contexts. The transcendent vision of human rights (and law in general) is therefore complemented by their taking root perception by the societies they seek to govern. Otherwise, these rights will always be perceived as extraneous values at the endogenous level of cultures. Hence their ineffectiveness. Keywords: Human rights, universality, cultural particularism, excisions, ineffectiveness, translation, rootedness."

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