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Deutscher, Max. "Simulacra, Enactment and Feeling". Philosophy 63, n.º 246 (outubro de 1988): 515–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100043837.
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The general context of this writing is that of finding exits both from dualism and from reductive physicalism. Dualism—the attitude of seeing and taking things according to a fixed absolute distinction, with mind as invisible, conscious ‘containing’ the thought, feeling and sensation ‘hidden’ by body. Reductive physicalism—the attempt to grasp and be satisfied with body as left over by dualism's rape of its mentality, dualism's refusal to recognize the distinctiveness of point of view, as requiring a bodily mentality. Physicalism finally supplants an ‘inner life’ within the bodily vacancy after all, as in traditional dualist image, but now understands that ‘inner’, ‘conscious’ life in the terms pertaining to processes in the brain, rather than as deeds, passions, thoughts, reasoning as within the general ‘imaginary’ of our several minds.
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Patterson, S. "Review: Descartes's Dualism". Mind 116, n.º 461 (1 de janeiro de 2007): 215–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzm215.
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Risteski, Aleksandar. "CARTESIAN DUALISM AND PLOTINUS’ PHILOSOPHY OF MIND". Concept: philosophy, religion, culture 2, n.º 10 (2019): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2541-8831-2019-2-10-27-39.
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Schweizer, Paul. "Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sankhya-Yoga Philosophy". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, n.º 4 (dezembro de 1993): 845. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2108256.
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RL, Tripathi. "The Mind: From Cartesian Dualism to Piccinini’s Computational Functionalism". Philosophy International Journal 7, n.º 3 (1 de julho de 2024): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000333.
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The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and modern philosophers like U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam are analyzed. The paper also discusses the implications of these theories on our understanding of mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience.
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Tripathi,, Rajeev Lochan. "What is Mind in Philosophy: An Introduction". INTERANTIONAL JOURNAL OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN ENGINEERING AND MANAGEMENT 08, n.º 06 (14 de junho de 2024): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.55041/ijsrem35849.
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The exploration of the mind is a fundamental pursuit spanning philosophy and psychology, with implications reaching into diverse practical realms. This paper delves into the intricacies of mental states, examining historical perspectives from ancient philosophers to modern theorists. Philosophical inquiries into intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of mental phenomena are scrutinized, alongside empirical investigations by psychologists. The discourse navigates through contrasting theories such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism, shedding light on the challenges of reconciling subjective experiences with objective obsNervations. The problem of other minds and the tension between internalism and externalism are dissected, revealing the complex interplay between individual cognition and external influences. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the intricate nature of philosophical inquiries into consciousness and the mind. KEY WORDS: Mind, consciousness, philosophy of mind, mental states, dualism, materialism, functionalism, internalism, externalism, intentionality, subjective experience, objectivity, psychology, other minds, Descartes, Hume, Kant, William James, behaviourism, computational theory of mind.
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ZAMFIR, LIA. "COGNITION AND CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE YOGA-SAMKHYA PHILOSOPHY – INTERSECTIONS WITH CURRENT DEBATES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND". Revista Română de Filosofie Analitică 15, n.º 2/2020 (20 de dezembro de 2024): 73–82. https://doi.org/10.62229/rrfaxv-2/1.
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This paper explores the intersection of Yoga-Samkhya philosophy with contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. While mainstream philosophy of mind has primarily embraced physicalism, asserting that everything has an underlying physical basis, it still fails to account satisfactorily for why or how exactly consciousness, and in particular its phenomenal aspect, would arise from neural structures and mechanisms. The paper argues for the relevance of ancient Eastern philosophies, specifically Samkhya-Yoga, in addressing persisting dilemmas regarding the relationship between the body, mind, and consciousness. The Samkhya philosophy, rooted in metaphysical dualism between material (prakrti) and spirit (purusa), introduces a perspective different from Western Cartesian dualism. The mind, in Samkhya, is considered part of nature or matter, distinct from consciousness or spirit. The article explores how Samkhya's ideas on the mind-body relationship, the role of intellect (buddhi), and the concepts of gunas (qualities of matter) and koshas (sheaths or aspects of human being) could enrich modern discussions. Samkhya proposes a form of panpsychism, suggesting that consciousness is inherent in everything, while differentiating between an immaterial, immutable and unchanging witnessing consciousness (purusa), free from the constraints of physicality, time and space, and unaffected by the continuous fluctuations of the material mind. The article concludes by asserting that considering Samkhya-Yoga's perspectives could reframe current debates, providing a constructive alternative to both Cartesian dualism and prevalent physicalism in understanding consciousness. The ancient philosophical insights from Samkhya-Yoga might offer valuable contributions to the ongoing discourse in the philosophy of mind.
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Hyde, Jason. "Kim and the Pairing Problem for Dualism". Forum Philosophicum 28, n.º 1 (22 de junho de 2023): 127–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.35765/forphil.2023.2801.07.
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The philosophical history of metaphysics of mind can be narrowed into two problems: Mind and body causation and issues of the self or persons. Due to the rise of the scientific revolution the nature of mental states and its possessors has been reduced to brain and cognitive functioning or eliminated instead of the ontological basic substance of a soul. The other criticism of soul identity or substance dualism is the problem of mental causation. In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism (2018), Jaegwon Kim argues against the intelligibility of Cartesian dualism and further extends that argument to any form of substance dualism by raising the question of mental causation or the traditional mind-body problem. His main attack comes from the essence of mind and the causal closure of the physical, together these provide an argument against the non-physical view of persons. The question, “can mental events cause physical events?” Is a problem for the dualist which he calls “the pairing problem.” Since causation requires a spatiotemporal relation between two bodies, and mind and body are distinct substances or properties, there’s no cause-and-effect pairing relation between minds and physical objects or bodies. Thus, according to Kim, the essence of an immaterial thinking substance, such as a soul, is unintelligible and should be rejected since it fails to answer the pairing problem. However, Kim has a misunderstanding of substance dualist views of the independent ontological status of a substantial self or soul. Further, Kim’s challenge does not take into account a causal powers ontology in which primitive is the free agentive causal subject. I’ll argue that a soul, though embodied, is a non-material primitive substance that has basic faculties to exemplify mental properties. One of the faculties of the soul is the instantiation of active agency. Further, the postulation of Gods existence, having a metaphysical internal structure and powers, is grounds for the existence of a soul with its own metaphysical, unified structure in which the dispositional properties of consciousness are located and exemplified. I conclude that mental causation is a coherent notion especially in light of the active powers of agent causation. Thus, Kim’s problem of mental causation becomes no problem at all.
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Mazarian, Alireza. "Modest Dualism and Individuation of Mind". Metaphysica 22, n.º 1 (19 de março de 2021): 63–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/mp-2020-0019.
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Abstract A persistent tradition in metaphysics of mind insists that there is a substantial difference between mind and body. Avicenna’s numerous arguments, for a millennium, have encouraged the view that minds are essentially immaterial substances. In the first part, I redesign and offer five versions of such arguments and then I criticize them. First argument (indivisibility) would be vulnerable in terms of two counterexamples. Second argument (universals) confuses existence with location. Third argument (bodily tools) is less problematic than the first two, though I will say a few words about why it may also not be convincing. Fourth argument (infinity) may not support substance dualism, because, I think, abundance is very different from infinity. Fifth argument (senescence) depends on empirically incorrect premises. Hence, it seems that no Avicennian argument can reasonably save substance dualism.
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Pech, Robin. "Mezi filosofií a medicínou. Ke Kantovu překonání karteziánského dualismu mysli a těla". Filosofický časopis 72, n.º 4 (dezembro de 2024): 649–61. https://doi.org/10.46854/fc.2024.4r.649.
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The aim of the study is to show that one of the essential motifs of Kant’s critical philosophy is the issue of human health. Its starting point is therefore Kant’s reflections in the Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and the Conflict of the Faculties (1798), where Kant presented his concept of so-called “universal medicine,” which focuses on the problem of a healthy regimen. Since its basic assumption is that the body and mind of a person, however different they might be, are mutually connected so that the diseases of the body can be cured by way of the mind, it is the author’s interpretation that this concept is a peculiar attempt to overcome the substantive dualism of mind and body seen in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy (1641). At the same time, however, Kant follows on from what Descartes himself attempted.
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Monnoyeur, Françoise. "The Substance-attributes Relationship in Cartesian Dualism". Journal of Philosophical Research 43 (2018): 177–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201882124.
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In their book on Descartes’s Changing Mind, Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire argue that Descartes discarded dualism to embrace a kind of monism. Descartes famously proposed that there are two separate substances, mind and body, with distinct attributes of thought and extension (Principles of Philosophy). According to Machamer and McGuire, because of the limitations of our intellect, we cannot have insight into the nature of either substance. After reviewing their argument in some detail, I will argue that Descartes did not relinquish his favorite doctrine but may have actually fooled himself about the nature of his dualism. It is my contention that the problem with Cartesian dualism stems from the definition of mind and body as substances and the role of their respective attributes—thought and extension—in the definition of substances.
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Vasiliev, Nikolay. "Richard Swinburne’s Cartesian Dualism and Eleonore Stump’s Hylomorphism: Comparative Analysis". History of Philosophy 29, n.º 2 (novembro de 2024): 88–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2074-5869-2024-29-2-88-99.
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The article makes a comparative analysis of R. Swinburne’s Cartesian dualism and E. Stump’s Thomistic hylomorphism. These authors are among the few contemporary philosophers who argue for strong dualist positions contrary to physicalism in the philosophy of mind. The main motivation for the comparative analysis lies in the fact that Swinburne’s and Stump’s projects compete both with strong physicalist tendencies and with each other. The author of the article analyses the content of Swinburne’s and Stump’s systems, and provides the main criticism of Cartesian dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism. The distinction between Cartesian dualism and Thomistic hylomorphism is examined. A number of similarities between the positions of Swinburne and Stump are highlighted, but philosophically significant differences are also observed. The author concludes that, despite having its own significant philosophical problems, Stump’s Thomistic hylomorphism is superior to Swinburne’s dualism in a number of aspects and has more prospects for defense.
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Baab, Florian. "Vater des Substanzdualismus? Eine kontextuelle Analyse von Descartes’ Thesen zum Geist-Materie-Verhältnis". Philosophisches Jahrbuch 123, n.º 2 (2016): 352–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2016-2-352.
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Abstract. The fact that Descartes describes mind and body as two fundamentally different entities has mostly led to the view that he has to be seen not only as the father of modern Philosophy, but also as the father of substance dualism. Against this commonsense view, I will argue that Descartes’ dualism does not primarily aim to prove an ontological, but a transcendental distinction between mind and body as a constitutional fact of human existence. As a consequence, Descartes’ dualism has to be seen as a kind of perspectivism: Depending on one’s point of view, the human mind can, according to Descartes, be seen as part of a union with the body, as self-consciousness (“ego cogito”) or, from a naturalistic point of view, as a natural function that has its correlate in the human brain.
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Tibbetts, Paul. "Residual Dualism in Computational Theories of Mind". Dialectica 50, n.º 1 (23 de maio de 2005): 37–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1746-8361.1996.tb00118.x.
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RASKIN (PUC/RS), Henrique. "NATURE AND SPIRIT IN TRIPLE-ASPECT MONISM". Kínesis - Revista de Estudos dos Pós-Graduandos em Filosofia 8, n.º 18 (14 de março de 2018): 137–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.36311/1984-8900.2016.v8.n18.11.p137.
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Despite having philosophy been modernly addressed to mind rather than to brain (or to metaphysics rather than to physics), the field of neurophilosophy could represent the reoccurrence of the pretension to embrace totality. By overcoming the traditional opposition between undifferentiated monism and mind-brain dualism, Pereira Jr.’s Triple-Aspect Monism (TAM) would be more than just a conciliation or an insertion of dualism into a physicalist regard of biology. In this essay, TAM is, then, correlated to the Hegelian philosophy, in order to identify its elements as a means of reaction to mind-brain dualism, as Hegel opposed to dualism in modern philosophy. There are, thus, mainly four topics discussed in this essay that summarize the correlation between Hegelian dialectics and TAM: (1) The triadic structure of being, nothing and becoming, – also in the form of the universal, the particular and the singular – connected to the three layers of physiological, unconscious/informational and conscious processes; (2) the idea of morality and ethical life as a result from physical interactions, which include intentionality, exchange of information waves and physical-chemical-biological exchanges; (3) the forms of Aristotle incorporated in Hegel’s idea of the Absolute’s movement, which overcomes the modern opposition between nature and spirit as different entities; and (4) Hegel’s considerations of the game of forces, compatible to TAM’s contemporary scientific approach.
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O'Leary-Hawthorne, John, e Jeffrey K. McDonough. "Numbers, Minds, and Bodies: A Fresh Look at Mind-Body Dualism". Nous 32, S12 (outubro de 1998): 349–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.32.s12.15.
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Prueitt, Catherine. "Human Being, Bodily Being: Phenomenology from Classical India, by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad". Mind 129, n.º 516 (8 de setembro de 2019): 1291–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzz052.
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Abstract In the matter of the body, even comparative language—the very use of English today—is soaked through and through with the Cartesian version of the intuition of dualism: the idea that we are fundamentally a mind and a body that must be either related ingeniously, or else reduced to one another. Instead, by deliberately looking at genres that pertain to other aspects of being human, I seek to go deeper into texts that simply start elsewhere than with intuitions of dualism, even while being engrossed in the category of the experiential ‘body’ (in all its translational variety in Sanskrit and Pali). (Ram-Prasad 2018, p. 11)
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Oderberg, David S. "HYLEMORPHIC DUALISM". Social Philosophy and Policy 22, n.º 2 (15 de junho de 2005): 70–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052505052040.
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To the extent that dualism is even taken to be a serious option in contemporary discussions of personal identity and the philosophy of mind, it is almost exclusively either Cartesian dualism or property dualism that is considered. The more traditional dualism defended by Aristotelians and Thomists, what I call hylemorphic dualism, has only received scattered attention. In this essay I set out the main lines of the hylemorphic dualist position, with particular reference to personal identity. First I argue that overemphasis of the problem of consciousness has had an unhealthy effect on recent debate, claiming instead that we should emphasize the concept of form. Then I bring in the concept of identity by means of the notion of substantial form. I continue by analyzing the relation between form and matter, defending the traditional theses of prime matter and of the unicity of substantial form. I then argue for the immateriality of the substantial form of the human person, viz. the soul, from an account of the human intellect. From this follows the soul's essential independence of matter. Finally, although the soul is the immaterial bearer of personal identity, that identity is still the identity of an essentially embodied being. I explain how these ideas are to be reconciled.
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Taliaferro, Charles. "Dualism and the Problem of Individuation". Religious Studies 22, n.º 2 (junho de 1986): 263–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018254.
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H. D. Lewis once remarked he did not think ‘any case for immortality can get off the ground if we fail to make a case for dualism’. Lewis vigorously defended both mind body dualism, the theory that minds (or persons) are nonphysical, spatially unextended things in causal interaction with physical, spatially extended things, as well as the conceivability of an after life. Lewis defended the intelligibility of supposing distinct, individual persons continue existing after bodily death, possibly even after all physical objects pass out of existence. Prominent philosophers such as Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Locke, Liebniz, and Reid have subscribed to both the truth of dualism and belief in continued personal existence after bodily death. Descartes' work might even be construed as reversing the order of Lewis' dictum. For Descartes, the case for dualism ‘gets off the ground’ because of the conceivability of an afterlife. Briefly put, Descartes sought to establish that a person (or mind) is distinct from physical objects on the basis of it being metaphysically possible for a person to exist without his or her body, indeed without there being any physical objects whatever. If A can exist without B, then A is not identical with B. Thus, if it is possible for God to bring it about that I exist and there be no physical objects, I am not a physical object. The purpose of this article is not to develop a case for dualism, nor to query whether the case for immortality can get off the ground assuming nondualist theories of the self. I hope instead to assess a popular objection to dualism, and consequently to a dualist conception of the afterlife, which could be termed the problem of individuation.
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Kąkol, Tomasz. "An Outline of Aquinas’s Philosophy of Mind: From Senses to Seeing God". Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 79, n.º 1-2 (31 de julho de 2023): 393–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.17990/rpf/2023_79_1_0393.
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In this article, I would like to present a brief overview of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. I try to express the cognitive processes that this model of the mind describes in more modern terminology (e.g., I interpret ‘an image’ [phantasm] as the binding effect of monomodal representations of a perceived object). Characteristic of this model is the postulation, in the case of the human mind, of intellectual abstraction leading to concepts, which requires assuming the existence of the intellect in its active and passive aspects. In this context, a metaphysical conclusion can be drawn about the immortal nature of this intellect, according to Thomas. On the other hand, this model of the mind is not, to all appearances, a variant of Platonic-Cartesian dualism – Aquinas makes several arguments against dualism understood in this way, at least one of which was still raised by (non-Thomistic) critics of Descartes. In addition, Thomas points to the developmental aspect of the human mind and also attempts to describe the possible functioning of the intellect after death.
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Gorham, Geoffrey. "Mind-Body Dualism and the Harvey-Descartes Controversy". Journal of the History of Ideas 55, n.º 2 (abril de 1994): 211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2709897.
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Htut Maung, Hane. "Panpsychism, Conceivability, and Dualism Redux". Synthesis philosophica 34, n.º 1 (2019): 157–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.21464/sp34111.
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In contemporary philosophy of mind, the conceivability argument against physicalism is often used to support a form of dualism, which takes consciousness to be ontologically fundamental and distinct from physical matter. Recently, some proponents of the conceivability argument have also shown interest in panpsychism, which is the view that mentality is ubiquitous in the natural world. This paper examines the extent to which panpsychism can be sustained if the conceivability argument is taken seriously. I argue that panpsychism’s ubiquity claim permits a strong reading or a weak reading. This presents a dilemma. On the one hand, the strong reading, which is typically characterised as a form of monism, is undermined by the conceivability argument. On the other hand, the weak reading, while compatible with the conceivability argument, turns out just to be a special case of dualism. I also show that the related position of panprotopsychism cannot provide a tenable monist position because it too cannot withstand the challenge of the conceivability argument. Therefore, if the conceivability argument is taken seriously, then we are committed to a dualist metaphysics, regardless of whether or not we accept the ubiquity claim.
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CHURCHLAND, PAUL M. "Philosophy of Mind Meets Logical Theory: Perry on Neo-Dualism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2004): 199–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00336.x.
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Stango, Marco. "Understanding Hylomorphic Dualism". Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 91 (2017): 145–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc2019102295.
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In this paper I will claim that the standard interpretation of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind is not satisfactory. A better reading is possible, which I will call strong hylomorphic dualism. Thus, I intend to do three things: first, I introduce strong hylomorphic dualism by highlighting the shortcomings of the standard reading, to which I will refer as weak hylomorphic dualism; second, I reconstruct two arguments provided by Aquinas to prove that his position is in fact best understood as strong hylomorphic dualism. Finally, I suggest that Aquinas thinks of the relationship between intellect and phantasms in terms of what could be called diagrammatic causality, as exemplified by his theory of abstraction and attention to the phantasms.
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Zavyalova, Galina I., Vadim G. Nedorezov e Leonid Yu Pisarchik. "The Problem of Intentionality in J. Searle’s Philosophy of Mind". Vestnik of Northern (Arctic) Federal University. Series Humanitarian and Social Sciences, n.º 3 (20 de junho de 2024): 100–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.37482/2687-1505-v352.
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This paper dwells on the understanding of intentionality by J. Searle, who developed the problem of intentionality as the core of the philosophy of mind. The research is relevant since the philosophy of mind occupies a prominent place in analytic philosophy, Searle’s concept of consciousness being central in this context. The purpose of the article is to describe Searle’s view on the problem of intentionality. He had to face the position that mental states (consciousness) do not exist, which was expressed by many representatives of analytic philosophy, including G. Ryle and D. Dennett. They relied on the ideas of behaviourism, with its stimulus-response formula, excluding consciousness as the mediator in this process. The paper demonstrates Searle’s arguments in defence of the existence of mental states. Moreover, Searle pointed out a criterion of the existence of consciousness, namely, intentionality. This criterion made it possible to draw a demarcation line between physical and mental states. Searle attempted to overcome the dualism of consciousness and physical processes, which was important since dualism was the subject of constant criticism from naturalists. The article uses the method of historical and philosophical analysis, comparative method and theoretical reconstruction. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that it demonstrates Searle’s significant contribution both to the problem of consciousness, by showing its specificity, and to the problem of intentionality.
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Barrett, Jeffrey A. "A Quantum-Mechanical Argument for Mind–Body Dualism". Erkenntnis 65, n.º 1 (17 de outubro de 2006): 97–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10670-006-9016-z.
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Bryson, Cynthia B. "Mary Astell: Defender of the “Disembodied Mind”". Hypatia 13, n.º 4 (1998): 40–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1998.tb01384.x.
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This paper demonstrates how Mary Astell's version of Cartesian dualism supports her disavowal of female subordination and traditional gender roles, her rejection of Locke's notion of “thinking matter” as a major premise for rejecting his political philosophy of “social contracts” between men and women, and, finally, her claim that there is no intrinsic difference between genders in terms of ratiocination, the primary assertion that grants her the title of the first female English feminist.
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Thakchoe, Sonam. "Buddhist Philosophy of Mind: Nāgārjuna's Critique of Mind-Body Dualism from His Rebirth Arguments". Philosophy East and West 69, n.º 3 (2019): 807–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/pew.2019.0064.
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D'Oro, Giuseppina. "Collingwood's “solution” to the problem of mind-body dualism". Philosophia 32, n.º 1-4 (maio de 2005): 349–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02641630.
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Hansen, Chad. "A New Look at the Classical Chinese Dào of the Relation between Word and World". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 95 (maio de 2024): 181–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246124000080.
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AbstractI argue that the absence of some of the ‘greatest hits’ of Western philosophy in Classical China can be explained by a Wittgensteinian take on the role of language in philosophy. One is the ‘Idea Theory’ of meaning which anchors Western Mind-Body dualism. Its attraction is removed when the writing reminds us that a picture does not by itself ‘give life to’ our language even while it plays a role of cross-linguistic communication. Another is the centrality of a law-command theory of normativity which combines with mind-body dualism to give a natural push toward monotheistic supernaturalism. Western attempts to make the ‘God’ impulse logical (e.g., the Ontological Argument) fail because of differences in Chinese syntax. The upshot is we need not deny Chinese thinkers the status of philosophers for their failure to share our philosophical presuppositions and resultant agenda.
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Shields, George W. "Whitehead and Analytic Philosophy of Mind". Process Studies 41, n.º 2 (1 de outubro de 2012): 287–336. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/44799191.
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Abstract My purpose in this essay is to provide a critical survey of arguments within recent analytic philosophy regarding the so-called "mind-body problem" with aparticular view toward the relationship between these arguments and the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead (and Charles Hartshorne’s closely related views). In course, I shall argue that Whitehead’s panexperientialist physicalism avoids paradoxes and difficulties of both materialist-physicalism and Cartesian dualism as advocated by a variety of analytic philosophers. However, and I believe that this point is not often sufficiently recognized, analytic philosophy of mind is no monolith, and there are those who have found some form of panexperientialism to be attractive enough to merit serious consideration or even full-fledged acceptance (David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, Ralph Pred, William Seager, and Galen Strawson among them). A critical discussion of such thinkers should be included in any adequate survey of the relation between process panexperientialism and the analytic tradition. Moreover, the revisionary strain of the analytical tradition which looks to natural science for its construction ofworldviews (Broad, Russell, Bunge, Carnap, Quine, etc.) would move us in the direction of examining arguments concerning Whitehead’s view and contemporary empirical scientific considerations. (For a discussion of the basic nature of analytic philosophy and the descriptive and revisionary approaches contained within it, see my Process and Analysis, 5-9, 12-13, 57; and McHenry.) Here I shall argue that Whiteheadian panexperientialism very naturally accommodates important aspects of quantum theory, including the top-down causation involved in neuroplastic phenomena under a quantum mechanical interpretation of brain processes and in so-called Quantum Zeno Effect. The overall picture which emerges is that Whitehead’s position is (at the very least) a strongly plausible alternative in philosophy of mind. While I must confess that this essay can only represent the merest sketch—indeed an adequate treatment of the richly complex interpretive, comparative, and substantive philosophical issues here requires at the very least a monograph—I nonetheless hope to present a coherent and useful précis of major arguments and comparative conceptual relationships, especially for the reader who may not be readily familiar with this terrain. I thus hope that this essay will serve as a short expository and critical introduction to the interface between process and analytic philosophy of mind, and a presentation of the several theoretical advantages gained by listening to Whitehead’s theory as it connects with concerns of analytic philosophers. I shall proceed by first working though the main outlines of John Searle’s important and widely reaching "The Recent History of Materialism," an essay which exposes critical flaws in a variety of materialist theories in ways which Whiteheadians should find especially fitting and congenial. I shall then examine defenses of dualism and the relation of Whitehead to such defenses, followed by a separate section on Chalmers, Nagel, and Pred. I will then consider a number of important objections to process panexperientialism, including objections arising from the work of Jaegwon Kim and John Searle. I close with a discussion of the mentioned empirical scientific arguments.
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R, Mishra. "The Explorations of Descartes and Ryle’s Idea of Mind: An Appraisal". Philosophy International Journal 6, n.º 3 (20 de setembro de 2023): 1–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.23880/phij-16000306.
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This paper attempts to explore the idea of mind on the basis of René Descartes and Gilbert Ryle’s vision. Descartes, a 17thcentury philosopher, developed a dualistic theory that posits the mind and body as distinct entities. According to him, the mind is an immaterial, non- extended entity with consciousness and rational thought, while the body is a material substance subject to physical laws. In contrast, 20th-century philosopher Ryle rejected the idea of a separate mental realm and argued for the unity of mind and body. He criticized Cartesian dualism, proposing that mental states and mental processes are not separate from bodily behavior but are intricately intertwined with it. This comparative analysis delves into Descartes’s arguments for dualism, including the interaction between mind and body through the pineal gland and his ideas on the mind’s independence from the body. On the other hand, Ryle’s critique of dualism is examined, with a focus on his concept of “category mistake” and his advocacy for behaviorism, which prioritizes observable behavior over unobservable mental states. By exploring these two contrasting perspectives, this paper aims to comprehensively understand the historical development and implications of the notion of mind. It highlights the influence of Descartes’s dualistic framework on philosophical discourse and Ryle’s efforts to challenge it, emphasizing the importance of considering the relationship between mind, body, and behavior in understanding human cognition and experience.
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Gaudemard, Lynda. "Descartes’s Conception of Mind Through the Prism of Imagination: Cartesian Substance Dualism Questioned". Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100, n.º 2 (5 de junho de 2018): 146–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/agph-2018-2002.
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Abstract: The aim of this article is to clarify an aspect of Descartes’s conception of mind that seriously impacts on the standard objections against Cartesian Dualism. By a close reading of Descartes’s writings on imagination, I argue that the capacity to imagine does not inhere as a mode in the mind itself, but only in the embodied mind, that is, a mind that is not united to the body does not possess the faculty to imagine. As a mode considered as a general property, and not as an instance of it, belongs to the essence of the substance, and as imagination (like sensation) arises from the mind-body union, then the problem arises of knowing to what extent a Cartesian embodied mind is separable from the body.
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Romanciuc, Zinaida. "The contrast in philosophy: a hermeneutic perspective". Studia Universitatis Moldaviae. Seria Ştiinţe Umanistice, n.º 10(200) (dezembro de 2024): 272–78. https://doi.org/10.59295/sum10(200)2024_35.
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This article analyzes the contrast as a method to explore opposing ideas, but through the lens of its historical evolution. In Greek philosophy, the Aristotle’s and Plato’s contrast is one of the most striking. Plato supported the existence of the world of Ideas, while Aristotle emphasized the experience of observable reality. This difference between Platonic idealism and Aristotelian realism has profoundly marked Western philosophy, from concepts of knowledge and reality to ethics and politics. Cartesian philosophy insists on mind-body dualism, emphasizing the existence of diametrically opposed and complementary categories. This dualism serves as basis for understanding antonymy, which are seen as linguistic expressions reflecting fundamental oppositions in the structure of reality. On the contrary, in modern philosophy, the contrast takes on new forms, being the center of essential debates. An example is the contrast between empiricism and rationalism, two schools of thought that developed different methods for knowing the world.
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Chomsky, Noam. "Naturalism and dualism in the study of language and mind". International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, n.º 2 (setembro de 1994): 181–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09672559408570790.
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Eichener, Elis. "Seele und Seelsorge. Eine emergenztheoretische Reformulierung des Seelenbegriffs". Evangelische Theologie 79, n.º 6 (1 de dezembro de 2019): 437–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.14315/evth-2019-790606.
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Abstract The term »soul« is widely criticized, particularly due to its legacy of substance dualism. Nonetheless, Pastoral Care (in German: Seelsorge = »care of souls«) cannot abandon the notion of soul. However, the resulting problems can be solved by recent approaches in the philosophy of mind. A concept of soul beyond dualism is possible. This article will apply emergentism to leave behind substance thinking and to define a holistic term of soul. Pastoral Care will be specified as a »care of souls« in both anthropological and theological respect.
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Leiter, Brian, e Alexander Miller. "Closet Dualism and Mental Causation". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28, n.º 2 (junho de 1998): 161–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.1998.10717488.
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Serious doubts about nonreductive materialism — the orthodoxy of the past two decades in philosophy of mind — have been long overdue. Jaegwon Kim has done perhaps the most to articulate the metaphysical problems that the new breed of materialists must confront in reconciling their physicalism with their commitment to the autonomy of the mental. Although the difficulties confronting supervenience, multiple-realizability, and mental causation have been recurring themes in his work, only mental causation — in particular, the specter of epiphenomenalism — has really captured the interest of philosophers in general in recent years.This growing attention has spawned a large body of literature, which it is not our aim here to explore or assess. Rather, we want to call attention to what we believe is a new and quite different argumentative strategy against epiphenomenalism voiced in some recent articles by Tyler Burge and Stephen Yablo. Each has challenged two central assumptions of the existing mental causation debate.
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Shah, Shriddha. "Body, Habit, Custom and Labour". Social Change 47, n.º 2 (junho de 2017): 189–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0049085717696391.
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Theories in the modern age in philosophy, as well as in the discourse of the social sciences, are pervaded with the presuppositions of the dualisms of mind and world, theory and practice, private and public. These theoretical dualisms make it impossible to have an account of the interconnected nature of the experience of individuals and societies. The philosophical theoretical vocabulary to take account of the relations between these dualisms has been effaced with the legacy of Cartesian dualism. I argue that through a conceptual analysis of the body, as has been posited by Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and the related concepts of habit, custom and labour, we can reclaim some concepts that allow a mediation of these dualisms. In this article, I make a conceptual analysis of the epistemic, metaphysical and social–political interrelations between these concepts and argue for the relational role they play in our philosophical theoretical discourse.
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Sober, Elliott. "The Principle of Conservatism in Cognitive Ethology". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 49 (março de 2001): 225–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100007189.
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Philosophy of mind is, and for a long while has been, 99% metaphysics and 1% epistemology. Attention is lavished on the question of the nature of mind, but questions concerning how we know about minds are discussed much less thoroughly. University courses in philosophy of mind routinely devote a lot of time to dualism, logical behaviourism, the mind/brain identity theory, and functionalism. But what gets said about the kinds of evidence that help one determine what mental states, if any, an individual occupies? Well, Skinner's puritanical disdain for postulating mental states gets raked over the coals, the problem of other minds gets solved by a perfunctory invocation of the principle of inference to the best explanation, and the Turing test gets discussed, mainly in order to emphasize that it can lead to mistaken answers.
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Teymoori, Ali. "The Mind and the Political". Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 6, n.º 1 (30 de setembro de 2024): 44–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.33497/2024.summer.6.
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In this commentary I present a brief overview of Maiese and Hanna’s work, The Mind-Body Politic, and highlight their valuable contribution in extending the insights from philosophy of mind to critically evaluate our contemporary social institutions and politics. Then I discuss some of the reservations and open questions about the way Maiese and Hanna lay out their version of a political philosophy of mind. In doing so, I focus on three main shortcomings in Maiese and Hanna’s work. First, I discuss how despite their critical view of Cartesian dualism, their own view of the way society is organized and works is dualistic. I argue that their dualistic view of society results in utopian thinking, and perhaps a more productive and constructive approach to our current predicaments would rather be an immanent critique. Second, I highlight the unclarity and confusion in some of their conceptual frameworks and their account of politics such as the way they use ideology and governmentality. Finally, I criticize their analysis of social institutions, especially the way they see new institutional structures can be formed. The project for a political philosophy of mind that Maiese and Hanna set up is worth pursuing and Maiese and Hanna already provide many hints and directions for its productive and constructive pursuit.
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Demertzi, Athena, Charlene Liew, Didier Ledoux, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Michael Sharpe, Steven Laureys e Adam Zeman. "Dualism Persists in the Science of Mind". Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1157, n.º 1 (março de 2009): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2008.04117.x.
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Cohen, Rona. "Jean-Luc Nancy and the Extension of the Mind". Philosophy Today 63, n.º 2 (2019): 347–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtoday201985272.
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This essay explores Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophical return to Cartesian philosophy, specifically to Descartes’s preoccupation with the relation of mind and body, as a fertile ground from which to develop an ontology of the body in (1992). It explores Nancy’s reasons for revisiting the Cartesian thinking framework, which on the face of it, is of little value to an ontology of the body. I argue that Descartes’s impasse in accounting for both mind/body dualism and their union constitutes Nancy’s point of departure in constructing an ontology of the body in , thereby transforming Descartes’s impasse into a productive aporia, in the Derridean sense of the term. To fully understand the significance of the notion of “relation” in Nancy’s’ philosophy, I turn to his reading of Lacan’s famous aphorism “there is no sexual relation” and explore its ontological implications.
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Tumanov, Vladimir. "Philosophy of Mind and Body in Andrei Tarkovsky's Solaris". Film-Philosophy 20, n.º 2-3 (outubro de 2016): 357–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/film.2016.0020.
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Andrei Tarkovsky's film Solaris (1972) is studied through the lens of philosophy of mind. The question of memory and personhood, as developed by John Locke and then expanded by Derek Parfit, is applied to the status of Hari – the copy of the protagonist's deceased wife. The key question addressed by this paper is on what basis Hari can (or should?) be considered human. Hari's personhood is further analyzed in the context of Cartesian dualism, the response to Descartes by reductionism and the rebuttal of reductionism by the functionalist theories of Hilary Putnam. Descartes' thoughts on animal suffering and the bête-machine are pitted against Hari's experience in Solaris. The key question is whether Hari can be reduced to her alien structure or should be considered in terms of her behavior. The moral implications of these questions are extended to human sociality, human emotional response and the role of the body in the human condition.
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Samitharathana, Rev Wadigala. "Is Reductive Materialism a Defensible Philosophy of Mind?" American Journal of Psychology 5, n.º 2 (13 de agosto de 2022): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.47672/ajp.1581.
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Over the past decades, reductive materialism has made a recipe for philosophy of mind to explore the subtle nature of the human mind. By and large, many identity theorists were likely to argue that mental states can be found in cognitive faculties of the brain so that the mind, if not most, associates with discoverable phenomena with no burden of proof. To put this bluntly, reductive materialism is typically defined by its very nature: all mental states are neurological states of the brain; ergo, it is implausible to make room for the substance dualism thereto. In response to this naturalist stance, aka reductive materialism, this article, thereby, contends that reductive materialism cannot be placed in a defensible position in philosophy of mind vis-à-vis the Kripkean modality; accordingly, this brief survey has identified several barnstorming findings in support of the thesis: the necessity and contingency, the core plank of possibility, rigid and non-rigid designators, and conceivability and possibility. In spite of its limitations, the study certainly adds to our understanding of the so-called reductive materialism in philosophy of mind. Nevertheless, a full discussion of naturalism lies beyond the scope of this study. Further work is, therefore, needed to fully digest the implications of reductive materialism and Kripke’s modal argument.
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Гусев, Александр Андреевич. "Репрезентационализм и природа ментальных состояний". Epistemology & Philosophy of Science 60, n.º 4 (2023): 69–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/eps202360459.
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The paper explores representationalist theories of mind in the context of the mind-body problem and the hard problem of consciousness. The mind-body problem is related to the substantial dualism, according to which there are two independent types of objects – physical and mental. For a materialistically oriented metaphysics, such a dualism was unacceptable. In the second half of the twentieth century. a new version of dualism appeared – the dualism of properties. Its essence lies in the fact that it is not the existence of mental substances that is affirmed, but the existence of phenomenal properties of experience that are irreducible to physical and functional properties. The dualism of properties is associated with the hard problem of consciousness – why are certain neurophysiological processes accompanied by a qualitative experience? The problem of a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenal characteristics of experience has become a new threat to naturalistic metaphysics. The first part of the work analyzes the philosophical context of the formation of cognitive science. It is shown how functionalism and representationalism became the two main philosophical positions that underlie this discipline. The second part deals with an attempt to solve the mind-body problem through the naturalization of intentionality. It is shown that teleosemantic representationalism, within the framework of which this naturalistic project was implemented, is not able to explain the phenomenon of misrepresentation, which plays a crucial role for the idea of representation as such. The final part of the study evaluates an attempt to answer the hard problem of consciousness by reducing the phenomenal character of experience to representational content. The author demonstrates that such a reduction leads to an ontology with non-instantiated properties and non-existent objects, which is an undesirable consequence for a physicalism.
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Toresano, Wa Ode Zainab Zilullah, e Kholid Al-Walid. "EXPLANATORY GAP AND HARD PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS ON PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: A CRITICAL STUDY ON SOUL-BODY RELATION POINT OF VIEW IN MULLÂ ŚADRÂ’S PHILOSOPHY". Jaqfi: Jurnal Aqidah dan Filsafat Islam 8, n.º 1 (2 de julho de 2023): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.15575/jaqfi.v8i1.25544.
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Abstract The goal pf this research to examine Śadrâ’s view on the “soul-body relation” in order to solve the “explanatory gap and the hard problem of consciousness” which are the basic core of the mind-body problem in the philosophy of mind. The explanatory gap explains how physical property can give influence non-physical things conversely. Meanwhile, the hard problem mentions how physical system (material) can produce subjectivity in the mind (non-physics/ immaterial), especially when we have experience. In this context, there is a gap that appears between the immaterial mind and the material body. According to the author’s view, Śadrâ’s philosophy of mind-body relation can solve the problem because it is based on principles of Hikmah Muta’âliyah philosophy, which is “monis of existential-dualism of essential” [in author’s term]. In this research, the author develops the research using Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic and philosophical approaches. This research would like to highlight Hikmah Muta’âliyah philosophy, which synthesizes philosophy, theology, and tasawuf (‘irfân), which can be the reference for Muslims (or anyone interested in Islamic Philosophy) to solve philosophical problems. In other explanations, Islamic tradition [in this paper it is represented by Śadrâ] can contribute to contemporary philosophical discourse without making tendentious claim that Western Philosophy cannot solve problems better than the philosophy of Śadrâ.
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Nicki, Andrea. "The Abused Mind: Feminist Theory, Psychiatric Disability, and Trauma". Hypatia 16, n.º 4 (2001): 80–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.2001.tb00754.x.
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I show how much psychiatric disability is informed by trauma, marginalization, sexist norms, social inequalities, concepts of irrationality and normalcy, oppositional mind-body dualism, and mainstream moral values. Drawing on feminist discussion of physical disability, I present a feminist theory of psychiatric disability that serves to liberate not only those who are psychiatrically disabled but also the mind and moral consciousness restricted in their ranges of rational possibilities.
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Filatov, V. "FROM THE MYSTERY OF LIFE TO THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS". Al-Farabi 78, n.º 2 (15 de junho de 2022): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.48010/2022.2/1999-5911.01.
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The article compares the history of solving the “mystery of life” and modern scientific and philosophical approaches to the “mystery of mind”. The main steps in solving the “mystery of life” are described. Such obstacles in the way of revealing the connections between the processes of mind and brain processes as “cognitive closeness”, “gap in explanation”, and “difficult problem” are considered. From the point of view of the philosophy of science, the advantages, and disadvantages of the main philosophical theories of mind are evaluated: the theory of the identity of mental and neural processes, functional theory, and the theory of property dualism.
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HIMMA, KENNETH EINAR. "Explaining why this body gives rise to me qua subject instead of someone else: an argument for classical substance dualism". Religious Studies 47, n.º 4 (13 de agosto de 2010): 431–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412510000405.
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AbstractSince something cannot be conscious without being a conscious subject, a complete physicalist explanation of consciousness must resolve an issue first raised by Thomas Nagel, namely to explain why a particular mass of atoms that comprises my body gives rise to me as conscious subject, rather than someone else. In this essay, I describe a thought-experiment that suggests that physicalism lacks the resources to address Nagel's question and seems to pose a counter-example to any form of non-reductive physicalism relying on the mind–body supervenience thesis, which would include William Hasker's emergent dualism. Since the particular thought-experiment does not pose any problems for classical substance dualism (CSD) and since the problem, as I call it, of explaining subjectivity is the central problem of mind, I conclude that CSD is better supported than any form of non-reductive physicalism.
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Smith, Roger. "Alfred North Whitehead – Against dualism". Philosophy Journal 13, n.º 4 (2020): 17–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2072-0726-2020-13-4-17-36.
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English-language philosophical debate about the relation of mind (or soul) and body, and in parallel, cultural debate about the relation of the humanities and the natural sciences in education, drew in the twentieth century, and draws again now, on the writings of Alfred North Whitehead (1861‒1947). The paper explains this. To do so, it describes Whitehead’s project in systematic metaphysics (or speculative cosmology), best known from Science and the Modern World (1926). Whitehead required metaphysics to be self-consistent, to be informed by and in turn to inform modern scientific knowledge (evolutionary theory, the theory of relativity), and to conform to the intuitions of everyday perception. Trained in mathematics, his style of precise expression requires special comment; the conclusion was a “philosophy of organism” or “process philosophy”. He was a philosophical realist. His understanding of what this entailed led to a radical critique of “scientific materialism”, with all its philosophical failings, which, in his judgment, had been dominant in Western culture since the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century. In four brief sections, the paper provides a background, describes the project in metaphysics, picks out the themes of causal efficacy in perception and of function for special discussion, and concludes with a summary of the importance of Whitehead to public debate about the direction of educated culture.