Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Criminal justice, Administration of – United States – Case studies"

The international influence of American criminal justice policy has been a central focus of research on policy transfer and comparative penology. With scholars divided between those emphasizing international convergence around United States policy, and others stressing ongoing American exceptionalism, it has become important to trace the extent of this influence not only across different countries but within particular national contexts. This article examines the impact of American criminal justice policy in New Zealand. I present three case studies exploring developments in different arms of the criminal justice system: the introduction of three strikes sentencing laws, the adoption of supermax principles of prison design and administration, and the use of zero tolerance and broken windows policing strategies. In tracing these changes, I find globalization opening new channels for the movement of policy that are often outside the control of the criminal justice establishment.

INTRODUCTION. The legal saga of the prosecution of Adolf Eichmann, one of the most wanted war criminals and chief “architect” of the Holocaust, raises many ethical, political and legal problems. The Eichmann trial is unprecedented in the long history of international criminal law for many reasons. Although many leaders of Nazi regime were put on trial at Nuremberg before International Military Tribunal, mass killings and other outrageous crimes against Jews was not the main object of the trial. Thereby prosecution and punishment one of the most important organizers of the genocide of Jewish people, creator of new type of evil and new type of crime, become the great task of the State of Israel.MATERIALS AND METHODS. The theoretical basis of the study consists of the works of leading international lawyers specializing in international criminal law, as well as the international extradition of criminals; the analytical base comprises of the decisions of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, as well as the national courts of the State of Israel, in particular the cult decision the Attorney General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, as well as the decisions of the national courts of the United States, cited in the article for the purpose of comparative analysis. The methodological basis of the research comprises historical method, methods of formal logic, including analysis, synthesis and analogy, as well as systemic, comparative legal methods and method of interpretation.RESEARCH RESULTS. Based on the study of international legal instruments and international judicial practice, as well as the national legislation of the State of Israel, the author made conclusions related to the abduction of accused from the territory of a foreign state, in particular its consequences in the form of violation of the sovereignty of the state. At the same time, the article contains a statement that the unlawfulness of the arrest does not prevent the court from exercising jurisdiction over the person. In the context of the administration of justice by the State of Israel, the author analyzes the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of December 14, 1951, paying special attention to the problem of the possible immunity of the accused based on the refugee status granted by the state.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS. In the course of the study, the author analyzed a significant amount of materials, summarized the doctrinal positions put forward by a number of prominent international scholars, and also formed the conclusion that the trial of Eichmann marked not only the administration of justice over the international criminal, but also provided another opportunity for a broad international publicity of the horrors of the Nazi regime and the need to unite collective efforts of states to save future generations from such international crimes.

Plea bargaining has become more popular as a way to resolve court issues around the world. The application, scope, and operation of plea bargains change significantly between the common law and civil law regimes. To analyze these differences with respect to different jurisdictions, a comparison between India and the United States has been conducted in this study. The relative advantages and disadvantages of plea bargaining are still debated. This is because some argue that plea bargains call into question the primary purpose "of a trial, i.e." to establish the truth and dispense justice. There is no denying that India needs a framework for speedy administration of justice. India's courts are being battered by rising criminal cases. Prisons are now overflowing with inmates being held without trial due to continuous delays in case disposal. This research uses normative law that examines document studies, namely using various secondary data such as laws and regulations, court decisions, legal theories, and can be in the form of scholars' opinions. This type of normative research uses qualitative analysis, namely by explaining existing data with words or statements not with numbers.The results show that India developed plea bargaining as a response to the deplorable status of the justice system. It is recognized as a credible strategy to resolve open cases and expedite the criminal justice system. However, despite being conceptualized for many years, the Indian criminal justice system has yet to adopt plea bargaining. The researcher attempts to ascertain whether plea bargaining in India in its current form and structure is adequate to achieve these goals by weighing its advantages and disadvantages in the context of the Indian justice system.

The 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was a momentous law that recast undocumented immigration as a crime and fused immigration enforcement with crime control (García Hernández 2016; Lind 2016). Among its most controversial provisions, the law expanded the crimes, broadly defined, for which immigrants could be deported and legal permanent residency status revoked. The law instituted fast-track deportations and mandatory detention for immigrants with convictions. It restricted access to relief from deportation. It constrained the review of immigration court decisions and imposed barriers for filing class action lawsuits against the former US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). It provided for the development of biometric technologies to track “criminal aliens” and authorized the former INS to deputize state and local police and sheriff's departments to enforce immigration law (Guttentag 1997a; Migration News 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Taylor 1997). In short, it put into law many of the punitive provisions associated with the criminalization of migration today. Legal scholars have documented the critical role that IIRIRA played in fundamentally transforming immigration enforcement, laying the groundwork for an emerging field of “crimmigration” (Morris 1997; Morawetz 1998, 2000; Kanstroom 2000; Miller 2003; Welch 2003; Stumpf 2006). These studies challenged the law's deportation and mandatory detention provisions, as well as its constraints on judicial review. And they exposed the law's widespread consequences, namely the deportations that ensued and the disproportionate impact of IIRIRA's enforcement measures on immigrants with longstanding ties to the United States (ABA 2004). Less is known about what drove IIRIRA's criminal provisions or how immigration came to be viewed through a lens of criminality in the first place. Scholars have mostly looked within the immigration policy arena for answers, focusing on immigration reform and the “new nativism” that peaked in the early nineties (Perea 1997; Jacobson 2008). Some studies have focused on interest group competition, particularly immigration restrictionists’ prohibitions on welfare benefits, while others have examined constructions of immigrants as a social threat (Chavez 2001; Nevins 2002, 2010; Newton 2008; Tichenor 2009; Bosworth and Kaufman 2011; Zatz and Rodriguez 2015). Surprisingly few studies have stepped outside the immigration policy arena to examine the role of crime politics and the policies of mass incarceration. Of these, scholars suggest that IIRIRA's most punitive provisions stem from a “new penology” in the criminal justice system, characterized by discourses and practices designed to predict dangerousness and to manage risk (Feeley and Simon 1992; Miller 2003; Stumpf 2006; Welch 2012). Yet historical connections between the punitive turn in the criminal justice and immigration systems have yet to be disentangled and laid bare. Certainly, nativist fears about unauthorized migration, national security, and demographic change were important factors shaping IIRIRA's criminal provisions, but this article argues that the crime politics advanced by the Republican Party (or the “Grand Old Party,” GOP) and the Democratic Party also played an undeniable and understudied role. The first part of the analysis examines policies of mass incarceration and the crime politics of the GOP under the Reagan administration. The second half focuses on the crime politics of the Democratic Party that recast undocumented migration as a crime and culminated in passage of IIRIRA under the Clinton administration. IIRIRA's criminal provisions continue to shape debates on the relationship between immigration and crime, the crimes that should provide grounds for expulsion from the United States, and the use of detention in deportation proceedings for those with criminal convictions. This essay considers the ways in which the War on Crime — specifically the failed mass incarceration policies — reshaped the immigration debate. It sheds light on the understudied role that crime politics of the GOP and the Democratic Party played in shaping IIRIRA — specifically its criminal provisions, which linked unauthorized migration with criminality, and fundamentally restructured immigration enforcement and infused it with the resources necessary to track, detain, and deport broad categories of immigrants, not just those with convictions.

More than 20 years have passed since the beginning of the judicial reform, which changed the judicial system that existed in the Soviet era, the position of the court and the role of representatives of the population in the process of considering and resolving a criminal case. At the same time, the comparative legal aspects of the implementation of the adversarial principle with the participation of jurors still remain insufficiently studied, since there are practically no works, with the exception of some articles by N. V. Radutnaya, such as «Trial by jury in the continental system of law», «Juror in Criminal Procedure», which raised issues related to the emergence of an adversarial model of criminal proceedings with the participation of representatives of the people. The aim of the work is to develop a theoretical understanding of the genesis of adversarial proceedings in common law countries with the participation of jurors. This goal predetermined the need to identify the historical path of the formation and development of forms of participation of representatives of the population in the administration of justice in Ancient Greece, England and the United States. Particular attention is paid to the comparison of historical features that took place in a specific period of development of the state, which later served as the basis for the reception of provisions on the adversarial form of criminal proceedings with the participation of jurors in other countries. As a methodological basis, the work used formal and logical methods (induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, hypothesis, analogy), the ascent from the abstract to the concrete, as well as some special scientific methods: historical, comparative legal, technical and legal. The theoretical significance of the work lies in the formulated conclusions, which can serve as a basis for the development of theoretical and practical provisions on the adversarial form of criminal proceedings with the participation of jurors in the Russian Federation in order to improve the current criminal procedural legislation.

The World Trade Center Attack or 9/11 tragedy has awakened the international community, particularly the United States (US) to sharpen its foreign policy in facing security threats coming from ‘weak states’. One of the most prominent weak states examples that pose a grave threat to other countries are the Northern Triangle Countries of Central America that referred to Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. Hence, this paper will discuss the rationale behind US initiatives in dealing with security threats in El Salvador as one of the Northern Triangle Countries. In analyzing the case, the writers will use the weak state concept and national interest concept. The result of this paper finds that El Salvador corresponds to the elements of a weak state and further poses security threats by giving rise to transnational criminal organizations, drug trafficking, and migrant problems in which overcoming those security threats has become US vital national interest. 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Accessed July 11,2021. Insight Crime. “Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI)." InSight Crime, October 18,2011, https://insightcrime.org/uncategorized/central-america-regional-security-initiative/. Accessed July 11, 2021 “Income Held by Top 20 Percent in El Salvador.” Statista, July 5, 2021.https://www.statista.com/statistics/1075313/el-salvador-income-inequality/. International Monetary Fund. “El Salvador: Selected Issues.” IMF Staff Country Reports 16, no. 206 (2016): 1. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781498342346.002. Interpol "El Salvador." El Salvador, n.d.,https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are/Member-countries/Americas/EL-SALVADOR. Accessed July 11, 2021. “Key Issues AFFECTING Youth in El Salvador - OCDE.” Key Issues affecting Youth in El Salvador - OCDE. Accessed August 8, 2021.https://www.oecd.org/fr/pays/elsalvador/youth-issues-in-el-salvador.htm. Lakhani, Nina. “Gang Violence in El Salvador Fuelling Country's Child Migration Crisis.” The Guardian. 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The development of information technologies and the global change in the economic situation in the world have necessitated adequate legal regulation of cryptocurrency turnover. Maintaining a balance of private and public interests in the process of confiscation of virtual assets as products of criminal activity or means of committing a crime is an essential element in maintaining the stability of criminal law mechanisms for combating crime. Considering the United States of America case, the author analyzes the models of cryptocurrencies and digital assets confiscation in the form of criminal, civil and administrative confiscation. The author also studies legislative initiatives that allow US law enforcement agencies both to provide the possibility of compensation for victims of criminal activity and to restore social and public justice in order to prevent the development of criminal activity. The author concludes that it is possible to use the positive experience of the United States in the framework of Russian legal regulation.

The subject of this research is the legislation and law enforcement in the area of criminal-legal protection of competition in the United States. The questions of counteracting encroachment upon competition alongside protection of rights of economic entities and consumers in case of unfair competition are one of the most relevant in the world. According to separate assessment, the U. S. antitrust legislation is recognized as most efficient. Its establishment, development, and application contributed to emergence of the generally accepted principles of protection of competition, such as per se and the rule of reason. Modern approaches towards restraint of violation of antitrust legislation determined the new trends in development of both, normative acts and judicial practice. Criminal legal protection of competition in the United States is characterized by strict prohibitions, high sanctions, presence of criminal-procedural authority of Antitrust Administration of the U. S. Ministry of Justice, as well as program of mitigation of responsibility for cartels. The goal of study lies in the analysis of legislation and law enforcement in the area of protection of competition in the United States for assessing the existing experience. The novelty consists in proposal of the author to take into account the U. S. experience with regards to countering encroachment upon competition, which can be valuable particularly in revision of the Article 178 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, improvement of the program of mitigation of responsibility for cartels, systematization of the compositions of crime related to unfair competition, cooperation of anti-monopoly agencies and law enforcement authorities. The research results can be used in the work of Federal Anti-Monopoly Service, as well as educational process and scientific activity.

Racial inequality is a major aspect of Americas history due to the major impacts that slavery had, with black people being the primary victims. Over the past decades, the shapes and forms of racism have changed from overt practices, such as slavery to covert forms. Reviewing the literature on racism in America showed that the changes led to the false illusion that racism ended in America, which is not true, considering the widespread discrimination of blacks and other groups. This paper mainly discusses human rights and racial inequality shifts in contemporary United States with cases studies, critically analyzes racism in contemporary America, including the case of police killing and abuse, show that racial minorities, for instance, African Americans endure high poverty rates, injustice, and victimization by the criminal justice system. The evidence of widespread racism in contemporary America demonstrates the need for change, focusing on addressing the underlying causes, including poor and unfair policies.

Crime is costly, yet we understand little about it. The United States justice system costs $280 billion per year, but compared to other areas, such as medicine and agriculture, we have few answers for the field's fundamental questions, like what causes crime and how we can best use our justice system to respond to it. In addition, the success or failure of the justice system impacts our safety, freedoms, and trust in government. Criminologists are working to bridge this gap in knowledge using methods that are fundamentally statistical, including randomized designs, case-control studies, instrumental variables, and natural experiments. This review discusses how criminologists explore the police, courts, sentencing, and communities and their effect on crime using daylight saving time, natural disasters, coding errors, quirks in funding formulas, and other phenomena to simulate randomization. I include analyses of racial bias, police shootings, public defense, parolees, graffiti, vacant lots, and abandoned buildings. This review should encourage statisticians to bring their methods and expertise to bear on criminological questions, as the field needs broader and deeper scientific examination.

Instances of racial disparities are well documented in the United States’ criminal justice system. This study reviewed the literature and conducted quantitative analyses on the role of race in forensic decision making among practitioners and other stakeholders in the criminal justice system. We hypothesized that Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) individuals will be significantly more likely to be associated with adverse outcomes than White individuals. A search strategy was developed and registered before the study commenced. Quantitative data were extracted from eligible studies to estimate the pooled effect size (odds ratio) for the effects of race. A final sample of 11 data sources (published study or dataset) was identified. Decision making by all stakeholders in the criminal justice system, including forensic practitioners, case investigators, and juries were evaluated in these studies. Two datasets evaluated the decision-making process involving forensic psychology or psychiatry, three focused on forensic evidence, four on forensic pathology, one involved forensic anthropology cases, and one involved clinical forensic medicine cases. The pooled odds ratio was estimated to be 1.10 (95% confidence interval: 0.67–1.81), indicating a trivial or negligible effect of race (i.e., BIPOC individuals were no more likely to be associated with adverse outcomes given the current evidence). Importantly, the results of this study do not indicate that bias or disparity related to race does not exist in forensic decision making in the criminal justice system. More research into systemic bias in forensic decision making, especially in relation to race, is needed. Forensic anthropologists are uniquely positioned to study and address racial disparities in the criminal justice system involving forensic science because of its interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary nature. This study highlights the need for further research and advocates for forensic anthropologists to be more involved in the study of the science and the impacts of forensic science rather than focusing on methodological advancement.

Objective: The article studies the application of AI in the field of criminal justice. Since then, the article evaluates the feasibility and offers solutions and recommendations to ensure the right to a fair trial when applying AI to criminal justice in Vietnam. Methods: To conduct research on the application of AI in criminal justice in Vietnam to ensure the right to a fair trial, the authors used traditional research methods of social science and legal science methods of analysis, synthesis, and case study to achieve the objective of the research. Results: Artificial intelligence (AI) and its application, in general, are a matter of concern in social life in general and law in particular. The application of artificial intelligence in criminal justice to digitize the judicial field is being applied in many parts of the world such as the United States and European countries. Based on the theory of the order of justice before the law, the authors analyzed and assessed the impacts and effects of AI and found that the application of AI in criminal justice can negatively affect the right to a fair trial. Conclusion: Through this study, we propose the following contents to effectively apply AI in Vietnamese criminal justice as follows: (i) The principle of the right to a fair trial must be respected when applying AI in decision-making; (ii) Enhancing the role of investigators, prosecutors, and judges in AI predictive decision-making; (iii) Building a database and AI system development agency in Vietnam; (iv) Upgrading technology infrastructure and databases at Criminal Justice Agencies; (v) Developing communication and training plan on technology and human rights content; (vi) Integrating the right to a fair trial systematically into every stage of the design, development, implementation, and ongoing monitoring of products, services, and systems using AI; (vi) Establishing the Department of AI Development and Use. In the future, the completion of the legal framework to ensure human rights under the influence of AI and legal issues on AI are issues that need to be further studied in Vietnam.

One of the most highly touted improvements in the criminal justice response to rape has been the wide-scale adoption of sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) programs that provide specialized medical care and forensic evidence collection to victims. Though previous studies have emphasized the benefits of SANE programs in improving criminal case outcomes, this study illustrates how the post-rape forensic examination can also discourage reporting, investigation, and prosecution. Interviews with local rape care advocates across the United States show how the increasing emphasis on forensic evidence collected through rape kits may provide an opportunity to reflect and enact persistent law enforcement stereotypes toward sexual assault complainants. Unless police resistance to taking rape seriously is confronted and addressed, even well-intentioned policy reforms such as SANE programs may end up undermining—rather than enhancing—fair and thorough investigation of sexual assault allegations.

On February 24, 2022, a significant international event transpired as Russian military forces crossed into Ukraine, initiating a full-scale conflict under the assertion of Anticipatory Self-defense. This development has sparked renewed discussions and inquiries into the legal and practical dimensions of Anticipatory Self-defense as a pretext for military actions. Notably, Anticipatory Self-defense has been invoked in the past, most notably by the Bush administration during the Iraq War and currently by the Israeli government in various contexts. In a similar vein, President Vladimir Putin employed the doctrine of Anticipatory Self-defense to legitimize and provide a legal basis for the Russian military's actions in Ukraine. This research paper seeks to undertake a thorough and systematic exploration of the essentials and legal aspects of Anticipatory Self-defense as a concept, examining its application and relevance in contemporary international relations. The primary objective is to shed light on the justifiability and legality of utilizing Anticipatory Self-defense as a rationale for military intervention, with a specific focus on the recent events in Ukraine. In addition to an overarching discussion on the principles and nuances of Anticipatory Self-defense, this paper will delve into select case studies from recent history, drawing upon experiences and actions taken by various countries, including the United States and Israel. Through a comprehensive analysis that combines legal, historical, and political perspectives, this research endeavor aims to provide a nuanced understanding of Anticipatory Self-defense, its utilization by different nations, and whether it can serve as a valid legal basis for military actions.Top of FormBottom of Form

Korea's criminal law stipulates the death penalty as a punishment. It also provides for the death penalty for heinous crimes such as murder. As of October 2023, 59 death row inmates are incarcerated in correctional institutions. Looking at court rulings over the past 10 years, no matter how serious the crime was, there was no case in which the death penalty was ultimately confirmed. However, there is a strong perception that life imprisonment, which is the second most severe punishment after the death penalty under the current law, is insufficient to replace the death penalty. Above all, the so-called ‘Sindang Station revenge murder’ incident raised the realistic issue that the parole period may be shorter than the prison sentence. Considering these problems, the Ministry of Justice is announcing the introduction of ‘absolute life imprisonment’, that is, life imprisonment without parole. In response to this, the Supreme Court (National Court Administration) expressed the opinion that judgment should be made cautiously, which is in fact the opposite position. In this paper, we looked at the concept and status of absolute life sentences, their effects, causes of increase, and further problems, focusing on the case of the United States, which implements absolute life sentences, and then considered the possibility of introducing them in Korea.

In November 1986, a Lebanese weekly published an article stating that high level officials within the administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan had sold weapons to an embargoed Iran and diverted the profits to counterrevolutionary forces fighting the government of Nicaragua. Both of these facts violated domestic and international law. What ensued was the Iran-Contra scandal that almost ended Reagan’s presidency and jeopardized the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. Drawing from periodicals from the U.S. and international presses, as well as U.S. Congressional records, this article demonstrates that studies on the origins of Iran-Contra have overlooked one critical cause of the scandal—a lawsuit that Nicaragua presented against the United States at the International Court of Justice in April 1984. While the case “Nicaragua v the United States of America” played an important causal role in the history of the Iran-Contra affair, its importance goes beyond mere causality. As this article demonstrates, the impact that this international lawsuit had on the origins of Iran-Contra elucidates the influence of public opinion on shaping domestic and foreign policy, on the extent to which foreign policy is driven by domestic political realities, and on the importance of international courts as the theaters where battles for legitimacy are waged.

Augmented intelligence—as the fusion of human and artificial intelligence—is effectively being employed in response to a spectrum of risks and crimes that stem from the online sexual exploitation marketplace. As part of a study that was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, the National Center on Sexual Exploitation has documented 15 tactics that have been used in more than 2650 US cities and counties to deter sex buyers from engaging with prostitution and sex trafficking systems. One of these tactics, technology-based enforcement and deterrence methods, has been used in more than 78 locations in the United States. This paper explores the issue of technology-facilitated trafficking in the online sexual exploitation marketplace and juxtaposes this with the use of augmented intelligence in collaborative responses to these crimes. Illustrative case studies are presented that describe how two organizations employ technology that utilizes the complementary strengths of humans and machines to deter sex buyers at the point of purchase. The human(e) touch of these organizations, combined with artificial intelligence, natural language processing, constructed websites, photos, and mobile technology, show significant potential for operational scaling, and provide a template for consideration by law enforcement agencies, criminal justice systems, and the larger multidisciplinary counter-trafficking community for collaborative replication in other settings.

Abstract:Research participants are entitled to many rights that may easily come into conflict. The most important ones are that researchers respect their autonomy as persons and act on the principles of beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. Since 2014, research subjects from numerous states in the United States of America also have a legal “right to try” that allows them, under certain circumstances, to receive experimental (i.e., preliminarily tested) interventions, including medical devices, before official approval from the United States Food and Drug Administration. In the context of experimental interventions, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) for Alzheimer’s disease, this article argues that research participants ought never to have a legal “right to try” without a corresponding “right to be sure.” The latter refers to external epistemic justification construed in terms of reliance on reliable evidence. This article demonstrates that the mere complexity of intervention ensembles, as in the case of DBS for Alzheimer’s disease which serves as a paradigm example, illustrate how unanswered and/or unasked open questions give rise to a “combinatorial explosion” of uncertainties that require epistemic responses that no single research team alone is likely able to provide. From this assessment, several epistemic asymmetrical relations between researchers and participants are developed. By elucidating these epistemic asymmetries, this article unravels the reasons why open science, transparent exhaustive data reporting, preregistration, and continued constant critical appraisal via pre- and postpublication peer review are not scientific virtues of moral excellence but rather ordinary obligations of the scientific work routine required to increase reliability and strength of evidence.

Forensic anthropology is shifting to reflect on the impact of its practices within the criminal justice context in important ways. Here, we contribute to this essential work by examining how decedent demographics as well as estimations of biological profile components are related to identification trends in forensic anthropology cases. The study uses data from more than 1,200 identified and unidentified forensic anthropology cases from three agencies (together representing a nation-wide sample). We found the following: i) multivariate analyses indicated that decedent sex, age, and race and/or ethnicity are not related to case identification rates in the pooled United States sample, ii) when identification rate differences do occur, they appear to be smaller effects, more agency-specific, and/or related to the context of a particular agency, iii) for the agency-specific sample with available data, there was no consistent evidence for a discrepancy in the duration of an identification investigation based on a decedent’s sex, age, or race and/or ethnicity, iv) forensic anthropological estimations of sex, age, and ancestry can improve the odds of identification for decedents, although these are small effects, and v) reporting an ancestry estimation does not appear to impact decedent race representation among resolved unidentified person cases. Although previous studies have identified demographic discrepancies in other areas of the criminal justice system, the results presented here suggest that decedent demographic estimation practices by forensic anthropologists in general do not appear to be related to discrepancies in identification trends, but more research is needed to examine whether these findings hold. Contextual factors and practices specific to each investigative agency likely contribute to identification trends.

Abstract The pivotal motive behind financial crime in the real socialist states was the chronic shortage of goods and services. In the case of Poland under the Gomułka administration (1956-1970), a factor which contributed to the prevalence of practices considered economically criminal was, ironically, the liberalization of the government in the period following Władysław Gomułka’s rise to power. The procedure of issuing new licenses to private and co-operative manufacturing businesses fostered illegal practices, because the new businesses needed supplies of deficit resources. Private trade businesses struggled with similar problems. The authorities tried to prevent financial crime by concentrating on publishing new laws which allowed heavy punishment for those behind the biggest economic scandals. In this field, the penal policy was shaped by the top authorities of the communist party, and their decisions were binding for the institutions of the justice system. Such decisions of the top authorities of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP) were behind the death sentence for Stanisław Wawrzecki, who was charged with fraudulence in meat trade in Warsaw. Poles’ attitude towards financial crime was not clear-cut. One the one hand, in their letters to authorities, many Poles expressed their support for severe punishment for those responsible for the biggest fraud, while others objected towards capital punishment for Wawrzecki. The information we have on the dynamics of confirmed financial crimes does not provide a clear answer whether it was actually related to the severity of the punishments.

This research analyzes human impartiality towards the single rationality of human ethics or cosmopolitanism in accepting racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious differences that have existed since the earth was created. The impartiality of the single value of human ethics takes Donald Trump's administration as the case study. After being elected as US President, Donald Trump followed the voice of his voters in determining the policies, especially regarding immigrants. Immigrants assessed undermine the country's economy and damage the social order of the local community. It resulted in a national political map that rejects the single rationality of ethical value of humanity, known as populism. Qualitative research methods are used by conducting in-depth research based on existing literature studies, including books used explicitly for theory development, journals to develop data, and media reports to analyze world leaders' responses towards Donald Trump's policies. Constructivism employs to analyze the case. The result was the rejection of the values of cosmopolitanism because of the community's disappointment with the government that offered jobs to strangers, especially immigrants without adequate skills, so the local community felt that their rights were being taken away and sacrificed under the pretext of justice. This assumption arose because people assumed their economic resources and welfare, such as job vacancies and social assistance provided by the state, absolutely belonged to them. This rejection then advocated to become an anti-immigrant issue, an act of rejection of differences in social identity that considers immigrants to be damaging to the economy, social stability and causing political turmoil that offends human identity. Trump used these community anxieties to win the 2017 US elections by using the political slogan Make America Great Again.

Keterangan saksi merupakan salah satu alat bukti yang sah dan sangat penting dalam setiap perkara pidana. Pentingnya hal tersebut dapat dilihat dari banyaknya kasus yang tidak dapat diselesaikan karena kurangnya alat bukti, terutama keterangan saksi. Ancaman kekerasan dan intimidasi yang sering diterima oleh saksi dan korban menjadi alasan utama mengapa banyak dari mereka yang tidak mau terlibat langsung dalam memberikan keterangan atas tindak pidana yang terjadi. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode yuridis empiris dengan teknik pengumpulan data melalui wawancara dan studi kepustakaan. Penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa implementasi kebijakan perlindungan saksi dan korban diawali dengan pemberlakuan Undang-Undang Nomor 31 Tahun 2014 tentang Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban. Dalam implementasinya, kebijakan perlindungan saksi dan korban di Indonesia didasarkan pada konsep perlindungan hukum terhadap saksi di Amerika Serikat sebagai model acuan. Meskipun telah ada regulasi yang mengatur tata cara pengajuan perlindungan saksi dan korban, namun masih terdapat beberapa kendala dalam perlindungan saksi dan korban. Beberapa kendala tersebut antara lain adalah posisi Lembaga Perlindungan Saksi dan Korban (LPSK) yang masih berpusat di ibu kota, sehingga akses dan pelayanan terhadap saksi dan korban di daerah terkadang kurang maksimal. Translated with DeepL.com (free version)Witness statement is one of the legal evidence and is very important in every criminal case. Its importance can be seen from the number of cases that cannot be resolved due to lack of evidence, especially witness statement. Threats of violence and intimidation that are often received by witnesses and victims are the main reasons why many of them do not want to be directly involved in providing testimony on criminal acts that occur. This research uses empirical juridicial method with data collection techniques through interviews and literature studies. The research concluded that the implementation of witness and victim protection policy begins with the implementation of Law No. 31/2014 on Witness and Victim Protection. In its implementation, witness and victim protection policy in Indonesia is based on the concept of legal protection of witnesses in the United States as a model of reference. Although there are regulations governing the procedures for applying for witness and victim protection, there are still several obstacles to witness and victim protection. Some of these obstacles include the position of the Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK) which is still centered in the capital city, so that access and services for witnesses and victims in the regions are sometimes less than optimal.

Concerns about the reliability of criminal justice systems in foreign countries have resulted in uneven treatment of foreign convictions in U.S. courts. Federal courts, however, have historically accepted tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under recidivist statutes. But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the uncounseled convictions obtained against Michael Bryant, Jr., a serial domestic abuser, in the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. The court dismissed a federal indictment that had been brought against Bryant under 18 U.S.C § 117, which makes it a felony to commit domestic violence against a spouse or partner in Indian country if the perpetrator has at least two prior domestic abuse convictions, because Bryant’s convictions did “not comport with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” The Ninth Circuit decision jeopardizes the health and safety of Native American women and stymies federal efforts to prosecute domestic violence in Indian country. Available studies suggest domestic abuse is a grave concern among indigenous communities. For instance, over half of indigenous women respondents to a Department of Justice survey reported being stalked, physically assaulted, or raped during their lifetimes. But the stakes of the case also extend to the legitimacy of tribal courts. Because federal courts often allow the use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses or factor them into sentencing decisions, even where those convictions would have violated the U.S. Constitution if obtained domestically, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the uncounseled conviction in United States v. Bryant implicitly suggested that tribal courts are less reliable fora than many foreign courts. This year the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s distrust of tribal court procedures and affirm its commitment to the integrity of tribal courts.

Concerns about the reliability of criminal justice systems in foreign countries have resulted in uneven treatment of foreign convictions in U.S. courts. Federal courts, however, have historically accepted tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under recidivist statutes. But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the uncounseled convictions obtained against Michael Bryant, Jr., a serial domestic abuser, in the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. The court dismissed a federal indictment that had been brought against Bryant under 18 U.S.C § 117, which makes it a felony to commit domestic violence against a spouse or partner in Indian country if the perpetrator has at least two prior domestic abuse convictions, because Bryant’s convictions did “not comport with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” The Ninth Circuit decision jeopardizes the health and safety of Native American women and stymies federal efforts to prosecute domestic violence in Indian country. Available studies suggest domestic abuse is a grave concern among indigenous communities. For instance, over half of indigenous women respondents to a Department of Justice survey reported being stalked, physically assaulted, or raped during their lifetimes. But the stakes of the case also extend to the legitimacy of tribal courts. Because federal courts often allow the use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses or factor them into sentencing decisions, even where those convictions would have violated the U.S. Constitution if obtained domestically, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the uncounseled conviction in United States v. Bryant implicitly suggested that tribal courts are less reliable fora than many foreign courts. This year the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s distrust of tribal court procedures and affirm its commitment to the integrity of tribal courts.

Concerns about the reliability of criminal justice systems in foreign countries have resulted in uneven treatment of foreign convictions in U.S. courts. Federal courts, however, have historically accepted tribal court convictions as predicate offenses under recidivist statutes. But the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rejected the uncounseled convictions obtained against Michael Bryant, Jr., a serial domestic abuser, in the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. The court dismissed a federal indictment that had been brought against Bryant under 18 U.S.C § 117, which makes it a felony to commit domestic violence against a spouse or partner in Indian country if the perpetrator has at least two prior domestic abuse convictions, because Bryant’s convictions did “not comport with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” The Ninth Circuit decision jeopardizes the health and safety of Native American women and stymies federal efforts to prosecute domestic violence in Indian country. Available studies suggest domestic abuse is a grave concern among indigenous communities. For instance, over half of indigenous women respondents to a Department of Justice survey reported being stalked, physically assaulted, or raped during their lifetimes. But the stakes of the case also extend to the legitimacy of tribal courts. Because federal courts often allow the use of foreign convictions as predicate offenses or factor them into sentencing decisions, even where those convictions would have violated the U.S. Constitution if obtained domestically, the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the uncounseled conviction in United States v. Bryant implicitly suggested that tribal courts are less reliable fora than many foreign courts. This year the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to repudiate the Ninth Circuit’s distrust of tribal court procedures and affirm its commitment to the integrity of tribal courts.

Among the handful of high-profile terrorism cases in which the U.S. government has failed to win convictions in jury trials, that of Muhammad Salah stands out. Like the cases against Sami Al-Arian, Abdelhaleem Ashqar, and the Holy Land Foundation, the case against Salah was built on the criminalization of political support for the Palestinian resistance. But while the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is at the core of all four cases, Salah's, unlike the others, was primarily about Israel: the case was manufactured in Israel, the evidence on which it was based was generated in Israel, and its prosecution depended on close U.S.-Israeli cooperation at every turn. Salah, a Palestinian-American Chicago resident and former grocer, was arrested in Israel in January 1993 while on a mission to distribute money to poverty-stricken Palestinians in the occupied territories. Accused of being a U.S.-based Hamas terrorist commander, he was interrogated by Shin Bet, tried before a military tribunal, and spent almost five years in prison in Israel. While the U.S. initially supported Salah and rejected Israel's accusations against him, in January 1995 he became (while still in prison) the first and (to date) only U.S. citizen to be branded a ““specially designated terrorist”” by his government. Upon his return home in November 1997, he was one of the main targets of an intensive terrorism funding investigation, dropped in 2000 for lack of evidence but reactivated in 2002 in the wake of 9/11. In this two-part exclusive report, Salah's lawyers recount for the first time the details of their client's labyrinthine case. Part I focused on the Israeli phase of the story, including the political context of Salah's arrest, and the investigations and legal proceedings launched against him in the United States when he returned. In essence, part I laid the foundation for the trial to come, emphasizing in particular its complex legal underpinnings and implications as well as its importance as a ““test case.”” Part II focuses on the post-9/11 period that unfolded under the George W. Bush Justice Department, starting with Salah's indictment in November 2004, continuing with the two years of contentious pretrial preparations and hearings, and ending with the trial itself. As in part I, the legal dimensions of the case are emphasized, as are the government's maneuvers to advance new standards governing the admissibility of coerced confessions and secret evidence at trial and to manipulate other established principles of the U.S. criminal justice system. This article deals solely with Muhammad Salah, but Abdelhaleem Ashqar, a former professor of business administration in Virginia, was his codefendant at trial. Both were indicted, along with twenty other coconspirators, for participation in a fifteen-year ““racketeering conspiracy”” to ““illegally finance terrorist activities”” in Israel and the occupied territories, as well as for several lesser charges. The two men had never met before the trial opened in October 2006. Despite the common charge, their cases were very different and went forward in parallel fashion, with different lawyers, witnesses, arguments, and entirely separate pretrial proceedings. When the jury trial ended in February 2007, both men were acquitted of all terrorism-related charges.

Historically, Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter “Bosnia”) has been a region where diverse ethnic groups, cultures, and religions coexisted. However, in the process of the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, armed conflicts broke out between ethnic groups in Bosnia, and mass atrocities were experienced. Although the Dayton Peace Agreement—led by the United States—was signed by the parties involved in the conflict in November 1995, thus ending the war in Bosnia, large and small conflicts continued. Accordingly, extensive efforts are still needed to heal the wounds from war and settle peace through reconciliation. Since the end of the war, Bosnia has focused on the punishment of war criminals through the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and many studies have been conducted in this regard. However, research on reparation for victims of these war crimes has been relatively limited. Thus, this paper examines and evaluates the efforts that have been made at the international and domestic levels to compensate the victims of the Bosnian War. At the international level, such compensation was first attempted by the ICTY but was ineffective, as it was entrusted to the domestic courts. Afterward, in the Genocide Convention Case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Bosnia sought reparation from Serbia by invoking state responsibility. However, in its 2007 judgment, although the ICJ confirmed Serbia’s violation of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide, it refused to give an order for compensation because a sufficient and direct causal link could not be found between the violation and damages. Thus, the declaration on Serbia’s failure to prevent and punish the genocide was to be considered appropriate satisfaction. At the Bosnian national level, the victims sought compensation through the domestic court and Human Rights Court, but this too had several limitations. The victims also argued for compensation in the Netherlands, but the Dutch Supreme Court only recognized a 10% liability of the Dutch government for the deportation of refugees from the UN military compound, which was carried out by the Dutch UN forces. In conclusion, many Bosnian War victims have not yet received adequate reparation, almost 30 years after the end of the war. Therefore, it is critical to establish a comprehensive reparation program for all the victims as soon as possible.

One of the most significant consequences of the use of post-conviction DNA testing in the criminal justice system has been the growing recognition that eyewitness identification testimony is simply not as reliable as it was previously considered to be. In approximately 75% of DNA exonerations in the United States, mistaken eyewitness identifications were the principal cause of wrongful convictions. Notwithstanding scientific advances regarding human memory and other factors that could influence identifications by eyewitnesses, courts have not shown eagerness in utilising such scientific knowledge in reaching legal decisions. Two cases have been chosen for discussion in this article. In S v Henderson 27 A 3d 872 (NJ 2011) the New Jersey Supreme Court was the first in State and Federal jurisdictions in the US that adopted a science-based approach to the evaluation of eyewitness evidence. The other case under discussion is S v Mdlongwa 2010 2 SACR 419 (SCA),a South African Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, where the identification of the perpetrator was based on an eyewitness account and the evidence of an expert on CCTV images. In part one of this article the research findings with regard to estimator variables that were acknowledged in S v Henderson are discussed. Part two specifically scrutinizes S v Mdlongwa to determine the extent to which psychological eyewitness research findings are recognised in South Africa as having an influence on the reliability of eyewitness evidence. In Henderson the court recognised that the legal standards governing the admissibility and use of identification evidence lagged far behind the findings of numerous studies in the social sciences. The new wave introduced by S v Henderson has not gone unnoticed in other State courts in the USA. In Massachusetts, for example, the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court convened a study group on Eyewitness Evidence and the resulting report inter alia recommended judicial notice of modern psychological principles, revised jury eyewitness identification instructions and continuous education of both judges and lawyers. Recognition and education pertaining to these factors can and should be incorporated in South Africa.

Aim: Keeping up with the international law enforcement literature sometimes runs the risk of bringing together disparate topics in a single publication, as the theme of this issue of the Observer demonstrates. We can be convinced that, while our war-torn planet is giving priority to the centralised state police model, municipal police forces and community policing, which continue to be models at the forefront of strengthening local public security, must not lose their importance. Civil associations, which are an essential part of local security, are not far removed from the principle of decentralisation, and in our country they are embodied in the civil police. At the same time, migration flows, which have become a global phenomenon since 2015, continue to preoccupy the practice of law enforcement administration as well as theory. Only while the former sees illegal migration as a security and cultural threat, the latter cannot forget the humanity-driven protection of refugees. Nor can the fight against terrorism be left off the agenda, especially where these dramatic conflicts are accompanied by the rearrangement of different civilisational cultures. Lastly, the future role of artificial intelligence, for example in areas such as justice, cannot be ignored. Methodology: The authors of the studies primarily rely on empiricism to present the regularities of their research subject, but they also draw on methods tried and tested in the social sciences, especially in sociology, such as interviews and various questionnaires. There is also a lesson to be learned from the fact that the literature, mainly in English, also tries to develop a clear conceptual apparatus, as we have seen in the case of police research in Hungary. Findings: In his review of community policing, Kálmán Etter writes: ‘The publication reveals a specific form of organisation, in which community policing is a group of a few professional police officers and civil servants, operating in individual towns or in the urban areas of larger cities.’ Zsolt Lippai sums up the efforts of citizens to ensure public safety and the tasks of police science: ‘The increasing involvement of non-state actors in the creation of security and the use of methods other than those traditionally used in what might be called “traditional” policing have given rise to a number of theoretical and practical questions which police researchers are called upon to answer.’ Bernadett Bacsó draws attention to a little-studied consequence of migration: ‘In recent years, migration, especially migration driven by young men, has changed the gender balance in destination countries, as this trend leads to a lack of potential female partners.’ The main aim of the study was to build a picture of what Americans think about current issues such as national security, terrorism, counter-terrorism policies, immigration and religion. Tamás Pressburger cites the perceptions of US citizens about terrorism, but also what motivates these views: ‘Based on the experiment, the author concludes that when white subjects are informed that whites are projected to become a demographic minority in the United States by 2060, they are more likely to endorse the use of torture against suspected terrorists.’ Katalin Erdélyi's review highlights the controversial role of artificial intelligence (AI) in the administration of justice: ‘The author's conclusion in this excellent article is that the coexistence of AI and human judges risks a covert transfer of decision-making power.’ It could also be argued that the computer cannot take over the formation of internal judicial convictions because only humans can do that. Value: The modern rule of law makes humanity a core value. The studies to which issue XIII of the Observer draws attention, not infrequently accompanied by concern, represent this value system.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

The DebateQuestion 1: Various commentators have frequently invoked the importance of moderate Muslims and the role that they can play in fighting extremism in the Muslim world. But it is not clear who is a moderate Muslim. The recent cancellation of Tariq Ramadan’s visa to the United States, the raids on several American Muslim organizations, and the near marginalization of mainstream American Muslims in North America pose the following question: If moderate Muslims are critical to an American victory in the war on terror, then why does the American government frequently take steps that undermine moderate Muslims? Perhaps there is a lack of clarity about who the moderate Muslims are. In your view, who are these moderate Muslims and what are their beliefs and politics? AC: I would like to say from the outset that I am neither a Muslim nor a sociologist. Therefore, my remarks should be taken as those of an interested and sympathetic outsider. I do not believe at all that the American government “undermines” moderate Muslims. The problem is more complicated. Many American officials abhor engagement in religion or the politics of religion. They believe that the American Constitution separates religion and state and does not allow them to make distinctions when it comes to different interpretations of Islam. For some of them, Salafiya Islam is as good as Sufi Islam. Others do not have a sufficient knowledge base to sort out the moderates from the radicals, identify the retrograde fundamentalists, or recognize modernizers who want political Islam to dominate. This is wrong. Radical ideologies have to do more with politics and warfare than religion, and, in some extreme cases, should not enjoy the constitutional protections of freedom of religion or free speech. There is a difference between propagating a faith and disseminating hatred, violence, or murder. The latter is an abuse and exploitation of faith for political ends, and should be treated as such. For example, the racist Aryan Nation churches were prosecuted and bankrupted by American NGOs and the American government. One of the problems is that the American government allows radical Muslims who support terrorism to operate with impunity in the United States and around the world, and does very little to support moderate Muslims, especially in the conflict zones. To me, moderate Muslims are those who do not view the “greater jihad” either as a pillar of faith or as a predominant dimension thereof. A moderate is one who is searching for a dialogue and a compromise with people who adhere to other interpretations of the Qur’an, and with those who are not Muslim. Amoderate Sunni, for example, will not support terror attacks on Shi`ahs or Sufis, or on Christians, Jews, or Hindus. Moderate Muslims respect the right of individuals to disagree, to worship Allah the way they chose, or not to worship – and even not to believe. Amoderate Muslim is one who is willing to bring his or her brother or sister to faith by love and logic, not by mortal threats or force of arms. Amoderate Muslim decries suicide bombings and terrorist “operations,” and abhors those clerics who indoctrinate toward, bless, and support such atrocities. The list of moderate Muslims is too long to give all or even a part of it here. Shaykh Muhammad Hisham Kabbani (chairman of the Islamic Supreme Council of America) and Sheikh Abdul Hadi Palazzi (secretarygeneral of the Rome-based Italian Muslim Association) come to mind. Ayatollah Ali Sistani may be a moderate, but I need to read more of his teachings. As the Wahhabi attacks against the Shi`ah escalate, Shi`i clerics and leaders are beginning to speak up. Examples include Sheikh Agha Jafri, a Westchester-based Pakistani Shi`ah who heads an organization called the Society for Humanity and Islam in America, and Tashbih Sayyed, a California-based Pakistani who serves as president of the Council for Democracy and Tolerance. I admire the bravery of Amina Wadud, a female professor of Islamic studies at Virginia Commonwealth University who led a mixed-gender Friday Islamic prayer service, according to Mona Eltahawy’s op-ed piece in The Washington Post on Friday, March 18, 2005 (“A Prayer Toward Equality”). Another brave woman is the co-founder of the Progressive Muslim Union of America, Sarah Eltantawi. And the whole world is proud of the achievements of Judge Shirin Ebadi, the Iranian human rights lawyer who was awarded the Nobel peace prize in 2003. There is a problem with the first question, however. It contains several assumptions that are debatable, to say the least, if not outright false. First, it assumes that Tariq Ramadan is a “moderate.” Nevertheless, there is a near-consensus that Ramadan, while calling for ijtihad, is a supporter of the Egyptian Ikhwan al-Muslimin [the Muslim Brotherhood] and comes from that tradition [he is the grandson of its founder, Hasan al-Banna]. He also expressed support for Yusuf al-Qaradawi (and all he stands for) on a BBC TVprogram, and is viewed as an anti-Semite. He also rationalizes the murder of children, though apparently that does not preclude the European Social Forum from inviting him to be a member. He and Hasan al-Turabi, the founder of the Islamic state in Sudan, have exchanged compliments. There are numerous reports in the media, quoting intelligence sources and ex-terrorists, that Ramadan associates with the most radical circles, including terrorists. In its decision to ban Ramadan, the United States Department of Homeland Security was guided by a number of issues, some of them reported in the media and others classified. This is sufficient for me to believe that Ramadan may be a security risk who, in the post-9/11 environment, could reasonably be banned from entering the United States.1 Second, the raids on “American Muslim organizations” are, in fact, a part of law enforcement operations. Some of these steps have had to do with investigations of terrorist activities, such as the alleged Libyan conspiracy to assassinate Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia. Others focused on American Islamist organizations that were funding the terrorist activities of groups on the State Department’s terrorism watch list, such as Hamas. To say that these criminal investigations are targeting moderate Islam is like saying that investigating pedophile priests undermines freedom of religion in the United States. Finally, American Muslims are hardly marginalized. They enjoy unencumbered religious life and support numerous non-governmental organizations that often take positions highly critical of domestic and foreign policy – something that is often not the case in their countries of origin. There is no job discrimination – some senior Bush Administration officials, such as Elias A. Zerhouni, head of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), are Muslims. American presidents have congratulated Muslims on religious holidays and often invite Muslim clergymen to important state functions, such as the funeral of former president Ronald Reagan.

The Covid-19 pandemic had a dangerous impact on early-childhood education, lost learning in almost all aspects of child development. The house-to-house learning, with the name Moving Home Learning Program (MHLP), is an attractive offer as an emergency remote teaching solution. This study aims to describe the application of MHLP designed by early-childhood education institutions during the learning process at home. This study used a qualitative approach with data collection using interviews, observation, and documentation. The respondents involved in the interview were a kindergarten principal and four teachers. The research data were analyzed using the data content analysis. The Findings show that the MHLP has proven to be sufficiently in line with the learning needs of early childhood during the Covid-19 pandemic. Although, the application of the MHLP learning model has limitations such as the distance from the house that is far away, the number of meetings that are only once a week, the number of food and toy sellers passing by, disturbing children's concentration, and the risk of damage to goods at home. The implication of this research can be the basis for evaluating MHLP as an adaptive strategy that requires the attention of related parties, including policy makers, school principals, and teachers for the development of new, more effective online learning models. Keywords: Moving Home Learning Program (MHLP), Children Remote Teaching References:Abdollahi, E., Haworth-Brockman, M., Keynan, Y., Langley, M. J., & Oghadas, S. M. (2020). Simulating the effect of school closure during COVID-19 outbreaks in Ontario , Canada. BMC Medicine, 1–8. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1186/s12916-020-01705-8 Arends, R. I., & Kilcher, A. (2010). 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Abstract Although scholarship analyzing U.S. incarceration policy generally focuses on the federal government and federal criminal justice laws, state and local governments are principally responsible for the criminal justice strategy and tactics utilized within their jurisdictions, and that determines the size of state correctional populations. The overwhelming majority of the total U.S. prison population is under the jurisdiction of state correctional authorities. Since 2010, forty-six states have reduced their prison populations, but the efficacy of these reforms and interventions has varied considerably. Utilizing a series of case studies, I analyze a range of state approaches to reducing the prison population and consider the effectiveness of these policies. The most effective approaches have focused on reducing prison admissions, creating or expanding early release opportunities, and decreasing readmission of conditional release violators.

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The purpose of the study was to determine the impact of leadership and managerial decision making within the Drug Enforcement Administration since September 11, 2001.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>A web based survey questionnaire was used to collect the data.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Participants in the study were criminal justice professors from randomly selected colleges and universities located in the southeast and southwest region of the United States.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. Each participant was asked to complete a post survey that addressed areas of leadership and decision-making based on opinions and knowledge related to criminal justice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Paired samples t test was used to describe the data. In spite of the survey findings of change in knowledge, skills, and cultural behavior, these changes did not appear to lead to significant differences in determining leadership skills.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It is recommended that future studies use a survey sample instrument designed to measure attitudinal dimensions of decision-making among leaders and managers within the Drug Enforcement Administration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One possible recommendation is to utilize a different type of comparison method or instrument that would measure certain dimensions of managerial levels between upper and lower management.</span></span></p>

This review synthesizes the historical literature on the criminalization and incarceration of black Americans for an interdisciplinary audience. Drawing on key insights from new histories in the field of American carceral studies, we trace the multifaceted ways in which policymakers and officials at all levels of government have used criminal law, policing, and imprisonment as proxies for exerting social control in predominantly black communities from the colonial era to the present. By underscoring this antiblack punitive tradition in America as central to the development of crime-control strategies and mass incarceration, our review lends vital historical context to ongoing discussions, research, and experimentation within criminology and other fields concerned about the long-standing implications of institutional racism, violence, and inequity entrenched in the administration of criminal justice in the United States from the top down and the ground up. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Criminology, Volume 4 is January 13, 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Cities across the political spectrum in the United States are shifting toward co-responder models that involve social workers with police departments in some capacity, but research is lagging about the proper role of police social workers (PSWs). This case study explores how the micro and macro roles of the embedded PSW model can improve resource delivery and divert people in crisis away from the criminal justice system. Few research studies to date have explored the role and potential effectiveness of creating such a position within police departments. An analysis of 7 months of data found that the PSW was much more efficient than officers in making referrals for high-needs clients. Furthermore, high-needs clients were more likely to have unmet basic needs such as shelter, food, and health care, indicating that police departments may frequently interact with people who have high levels of such needs. Qualitative case notes also revealed that PSWs can divert individuals from the criminal justice system by using crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques on-scene with clients. This research has important implications for improving community safety and well-being, and this case study reveals that PSWs with micro and macro skills are a promising model for improving public safety and justice in the right context.

From the mid-twentieth century, state and public conceptions of deviance and crime control have turned increasingly punitive (Hallett 115; Hutchinson 138). In a Western context, criminal justice has long been retributive, prioritising punishment over rehabilitation (Wenzel et al. 26). Within that context, there has been an increase in punitiveness—understood here as a measure of a punishment’s severity—the intention of which has been to help restore the moral imbalance created by offending while also deterring future crime (Wenzel et al. 26). Entangled with the global spread of neoliberal capitalism, punitiveness has become internationally pervasive to a near-hegemonic degree (Sparks qtd. in Jennings et al. 463; Unnever and Cullen 100).The punitive turn has troubling characteristics. Punitive policies can be expensive, and increased incarceration stresses the criminal justice system and leads to prison overcrowding (Hutchinson 135). Further, punitiveness is not only applied unequally across categories such as class, race, and age (Unnever and Cullen 105-06; Wacquant 212) but the effectiveness of punitive policy relative to its costs is contested (Bouffard et al. 466, 477; Hutchinson 139). Despite this, evidence suggests public demand is driving punitive policymaking, but that demand is only weakly related to crime rates (Jennings et al. 463).While discussion of punitiveness in the public sphere often focuses on measures such as boot camps for young offenders, increased incarceration, and longer prison sentences, punitiveness also has a darker side. Our research analysing discussion taking place on a large, regional, crime-focused online forum reveals a startling degree and intensity of violence directed at offenders and related groups. Members of the discussion forum do propose unsurprising measures such as incarceration and boot camps, but also an array of violent alternatives, including beating, shooting, dismemberment, and conversion into animal food. This article draws on our research to explore why discussion of punitiveness can be so intensely violent.Our research applies thematic analysis to seven discussion threads posted to a large regional online forum focused on crime, made between September and November 2017. One discussion thread per week of the study period was purposively sampled based on relevance to the topic of punitiveness, ultimately yielding 1200 individual comments. Those comments were coded, and the data and codes were reiteratively analysed to produce categories, then basic, organising, and global themes. We intended to uncover themes in group discussion most salient to punitiveness to gain insight into how punitive social interactions unfold and how those who demand punitiveness understand their interactions and experiences of crime. We argue that, in this online forum, the global theme—the most salient concept related to punitiveness—is a “subaltern citizenship”. Here, a clear division emerges from the data, where the group members perceive themselves as “us”—legitimate citizens with all attendant rights—in opposition to an external “them”, a besieging group of diverse, marginalised Others who have illegitimately usurped certain rights and who victimise citizens. Group members often deride the state as too weak and untrustworthy to stop this victimisation. Ironically, the external Others perceived by the group to hold power are themselves genuinely marginalised, though the group does not recognise or see that form of marginalisation as legitimate. In this essay, to preserve the anonymity of the forum and its members, we refer to them only as “the Forum”, located in “the City”, and refrain from direct quotes except for commonly used words or phrases that do not identify individuals.It is also important to note that the research described here deliberately focused on a specific group in a specific space who were concerned about specific groups of offenders. Findings and discussion, and the views on punitiveness described, cannot be generalised to the broader community. Nor do we suggest these views can be considered representative of all Forum members as we present here only a limited analysis of some violent discourse emerging from our research. Likewise, while our discussion often centres on youth and other marginalised groups in the context of offending, we do not intend to imply that offending is a characteristic of these groups.Legitimate CitizenshipCommonly, citizenship is seen as a conferred status denoting full and equal community membership and the rights and responsibilities dictated by community values and norms (Lister 28-29). Western citizenship norms are informed by neoliberal capitalist values: individual responsibility, an obligation to be in paid employment, participation in economic consumption, the sanctity of ownership, and that the principal role of government is to defend the conditions under which these norms can freely thrive (Walsh 861-62). While norms are shaped by laws and policy frameworks, they are not imposed coercively or always deployed consciously. These norms exist as shared behavioural expectations reproduced through social interaction and embodied as “common sense” (Kotzian 59). As much as Western democracies tend to a universalist representation of one, undifferentiated citizenship, it is clear that gender, race, sexual orientation, religion, ethnicity, and migrant status all exist in different relationships to citizenship as an identity category. Glass ceilings, stolen generations, same-sex marriage debates, and Australian Government proposals to strip citizenship from certain types of criminal offender all demonstrate that the lived experience of norms surrounding citizenship is profoundly unequal for some (Staeheli et al. 629-30). An individual’s citizenship status, therefore, more accurately exists on a spectrum between legitimacy—full community membership, possessing all rights and living up to all associated responsibilities—and illegitimacy—diminished membership, with contested rights and questionable fulfilment of associated responsibilities—depending on the extent of their deviation from societal norms.Discussing punitiveness, Forum members position themselves as “us”, that is, legitimate citizens. Words such as “we” and “us” are used as synonyms for society and for those whose behaviours are “normal” or “acceptable”. Groups associated with offending are described as “they”, “them”, and their behaviours are “not normal”, “disgusting”, “feral”, and merit the removal of “them” from civilisation, usually to “the middle of nowhere” or “the Outback”. Possession of legitimate citizenship is implicit in assuming authority over what is normal and who should be exiled for failing the standard.Another implicit assumption discernible in the data is that Forum members perceive the “normal we” as good neoliberal citizens. “We” work hard, own homes and cars, and take individual responsibility. There is a strong imputation of welfare dependency among offenders, the poor, and other suspect groups. Offending is presented as something curable by stripping offenders or their parents of welfare payments. Members earn their status as legitimate citizens by adhering to the norms of neoliberal citizenship in opposition to potential offenders to whom the benefits of citizenship are simply doled out.Forum members also frame their citizenship as legitimate by asserting ownership over community spaces and resources. This can be seen in their talking as if they, their sympathetic audience, and “the City” are the same (for example, declaring that “the City” demands harsher punishments for juvenile offenders). There are also calls to “take back” the streets, the City, and Australia from groups associated with offending. That a space can and should be “taken back” implies a pre-existing state of control interrupted by those who have no right to ownership. At its most extreme, the assertion of ownership extends to a conviction that members have the right to position offenders as enemies of the state and request that the army, the ultimate tool of legitimate state violence, be turned against them if governments and the criminal justice system are too “weak” or “soft” to constrain them.The Illegitimate OtherThroughout the data, perceived offenders are spoken of with scorn and hatred. “Perceived offenders” may include offenders and their family, youths, Indigenous people, and people of low socioeconomic status, and these marginalised groups are referenced so interchangeably it can be difficult to determine which is being discussed.Commenting on four “atsi [sic] kids” who assaulted an elderly man, group members asserted “they” should be shot like dogs. The original text gives no antecedents to indicate whether “they” is meant to indicate youths, Indigenous youths, or offenders in general. However, Australia has a colonial history of conflating crime and indigeneity and shooting Indigenous people to preserve white social order (Hill and Dawes 310, 312), a consequence of the tendency of white people to imagine criminals as black (Unnever and Cullen 106). It must be noted that the racial identity of individual Forum members is unknown. This does constitute a limitation in the original study, as identity categories such as race and class intersect and manifest in social interactions in complex ways. However, that does not prevent analysis of the text itself.In the Forum’s discursive space, “they” is used to denote offenders, Indigenous youths, youths, or the poor interchangeably, as if they were all a homogeneous, mutually synonymous “Other”. Collectively, these groups are represented as so generally hopeless that they are imagined as choosing to offend so they will be sentenced to the comforts of “holiday camp” prisons where they can access luxuries otherwise beyond their reach: freedom from addicted parents, medical care, food, television, and computers. A common argument, that crime is an individual choice, is often based on the idea that prison is a better option for the poor than going home. As a result, offending by marginalised offenders is reconstructed as a rational choice or a failure of individual responsibility rather than a consequence of structural inequality.Further, parents of those in suspect populations are blamed for intergenerational maintenance of criminality. They are described as too drunk or drugged to care, too unskilled in parenting due to their presumed dreadful upbringing, or too busy enjoying their welfare payments to meet their responsibility to control their children or teach them the values and skills of citizenship. Comments imply parents probably participated in their children’s crimes even when no evidence suggests that possibility and that some groups simply cannot be trusted to raise disciplined children owing to their inherent moral and economic dissipation. That is, not just offenders but entire groups are deemed illegitimate, willing to enjoy benefits of citizenship such as welfare payments but unwilling or unable to earn them by engaging with the associated responsibilities. This is a frequent argument for why they deserve severely punitive punishment for deviance.However, the construction of the Other as illegitimate in Forum discussions reaches far beyond imagining them as lacking normative skills and values. The violence present on the Forum is startling in its intensity. Prevalent within the data is the reduction of people to insulting nicknames. Terms used to describe people range from the sarcastic— “little darlings”—through standard abusive language such as “bastards”, “shits”, “dickheads”, “lowlifes”, to dehumanising epithets such as “maggots”, “scum”, and “subhuman arsewipes”. Individually and collectively, “they” are relentlessly framed as less than human and even less than animals. They are “mongrels” and “vermin”. In groups, they are “packs”, and they deserve to be “hunted” or just shot from helicopters. They are unworthy of life. “Oxygen thieves” is a repeated epithet, as is the idea that they should be dropped out at sea to drown. Other suggestions for punishment include firing squads, lethal injections, and feeding them to animals.It is difficult to imagine a more definitive denial of legitimacy than discursively stripping individuals and groups of their humanity (their most fundamental status) and their right to existence (their most fundamental right as living beings). The Forum comes perilously close to casting the Other as Agamben’s homo sacer, humans who live in a “state of exception”, subject to the state’s power but excluded from the law’s protection and able to be killed without consequence (Lechte and Newman 524). While it would be hyperbole to push this comparison too far—given Agamben had concentration camps in mind—the state of exception as a means of both excluding a group from society and exercising control over its life does resonate here.Themes Underlying PunitivenessOur findings indicate the theme most salient to punitive discussion is citizenship, rooted in persistent concerns over who is perceived to have it, who is not, and what should be done about those Others whose deviance renders their citizenship less legitimate. Citizenship norms—real or aspirational—of society’s dominant groups constitute the standards by which Forum members judge their experiences of and with crime, perceived offenders, the criminal justice system, and the state. However, Forum members do not claim a straightforward belonging to and sharing in the maintenance of the polity. Analysis of the data suggests Forum members consider their legitimate citizenship tainted by external forces such as politics, untrustworthy authorities and institutions, and the unconstrained excess of the illegitimate Other. That is, they perceive their citizenship to be simultaneously legitimate and undeservedly subaltern.According to Gramsci, subaltern populations are subordinate to dominant groups in political and civil society, lulled by hegemonic norms to cooperate in their own oppression (Green 2). Civil society supports the authority of political society and, in return, political society uses the law and criminal justice system to safeguard civil society’s interests against unruly subalterns (Green 7). Rights and responsibilities of citizenship reside within the mutual relationship between political and civil society. Subalternity, by definition, exists outside this relationship, or with limited access to it.Forum members position themselves as citizens within civil society. They lay emphatic claim to fulfilling their responsibilities as neoliberal citizens. However, they perceive themselves to be denied the commensurate rights: they cannot rely on the criminal justice system to protect them from the illegitimate Other. The courts are “soft”, and prisons are “camps” with “revolving doors”. Authorities pamper offenders while doing nothing to stop them from hurting their victims. Human rights are viewed as an imposition by the UN or as policy flowing from a political sphere lacking integrity and dominated by “do gooders”. Rights are reserved only for offenders. Legitimate citizens no longer even have the right to defend themselves. The perceived result is a transfer of rights from legitimate to illegitimate, from deserving to undeserving. This process elides from view the actual subalterns of Australian society—here, most particularly Indigenous people and the socioeconomically vulnerable—and reconstructs them as oppressors of the dominant group, who are reframed as legitimate citizens unjustly made subaltern.The Violence in PunitivenessOn the Forum, as in the broader world, a sense of “white victimisation”—the view, unsupported by history or evidence, that whites are an oppressed people within a structure systematically doling out advantage to minorities (King 89)—is a recurrent legitimising argument for punitiveness and vigilantism. Amid the shrinking social safety nets and employment precarity of neoliberal capitalism, competitiveness increases, and white identity forms around perceived threats to power and status incurred by “losing out” to minorities (Sacks and Lindholm 131). One 2011 study finds a majority of white US citizens believe themselves subject to more racism than black people (King 89). However, these assumptions of whiteness tend to be spared critical examination because, in white-dominated societies, whiteness is the common-sense norm in opposition to which other racial categories are defined (Petray and Collin 2). When whiteness is made the focus of critical questioning, white identities gain salience and imaginings of the “dark other” and besieged white virtues intensify (Bonilla-Silva et al. 232).With respect to feelings of punitiveness, Unnever and Cullen (118-19) find that the social cause for punitiveness in the United States is hostility towards other races, that harsh punishments, including the death penalty, are demanded and accepted by the dominant group because they are perceived to mostly injure “people they do not like” (Unnever and Cullen 119). Moreover, perception that a racial group is inherently criminal amplifies more generalised prejudices against them and diminishes the capacity of the dominant group to feel empathy for suffering inflicted upon them by the criminal justice system (Unnever and Cullen 120).While our analysis of the Forum supports these findings where they touch on crimes committed by Indigenous people, they invite a question. Why, where race is not a factor, do youths and the socioeconomically disadvantaged also inspire intensely violent punitiveness as described above? We argue that the answer relates to status. From this perspective, race becomes one of several categories of differentiation from legitimate citizenship through an ascription of low status.Wenzel, Okimoto, and Cameron (29) contend punitiveness, with respect to specific offences, varies according to the symbolic meaning the offence holds for the observer. Crimes understood as a transgression against status or power inspire a need for “revenge, punishment, and stigmatisation” (Wenzel et al. 41) and justify an increase in the punitiveness required (Wenzel et al. 29, 34). This is particularly true where an offence is deemed to make someone unfit for community membership, such that severe punishment serves as a symbolic marker of exile and a reaffirmation for the community of the violated values and norms (Wenzel et al. 41). Indeed, as noted, Forum posts regularly call for offenders to be removed from society, exiled to the outback, or shipped beyond Australia’s territorial waters.Further, Forum members’ perception of subaltern citizenship, with its assumption of legitimate citizenship as being threatened by undeserving Others, makes them view crime as implicitly a matter of status transgression. This is intensified by perception that the political sphere and criminal justice system are failing legitimate citizens, refusing even to let them defend themselves. Virulent name-calling and comparisons to animals can be understood as attempts by the group to symbolically curtail the undeservedly higher status granted to offenders by weak governments and courts. More violent demands for punishment symbolically remove offenders from citizenship, reaffirm citizen values, and vent anger at a political and criminal justice system deemed complicit, through weakness, in reducing legitimate citizens to subaltern citizens.ConclusionsIn this essay, we highlight the extreme violence we found in our analysis of an extensive online crime forum in a regional Australian city. We explore some explanations for violent public punitiveness, highlighting how members identify themselves as subaltern citizens in a battle against undeserving Others, with no support from a weak state. This analysis centres community norms and a problematic conception of citizenship as drivers of both public punitiveness and dissatisfaction with crime control policy and the criminal justice system. We highlight a real dissonance between community needs and public policy that may undermine effective policymaking. That is, evidence-based crime control policies, successful crime prevention initiatives, and falling crime rates may not increase public satisfaction with how crime is dealt with if policymakers pursue those measures without regard for how citizens experience the process.While studies such as that by Wenzel, Okimoto, and Cameron identify differences in status between legitimate citizens and offenders as amplifiers of punitiveness, we suggest the amplification may be mediated by the status relationship between legitimate citizens and authority figures within legitimate society. The offender and their crime may not contribute as much to the public’s outrage as commonly assumed. Instead, public punitiveness may predominantly arise from the perception that the political sphere, media, and criminal justice system respond to citizens’ experience of crime in ways that devalue the status of legitimate citizens. At least in the context of this regional city, this points to something other than successful crime control being integral to building more effective and satisfactory crime control policy: in this case, the need to rebuild trust between citizens and authority groups.ReferencesBonilla-Silva, Eduardo, Carla Goar, and David G. 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Ed. Cynthia Levine-Rasky. Albany, NY: State U of New York P, 2002. 129-151.Staeheli, Lynn A., Patricia Ehrkamp, Helga Leitner, and Caroline R. Nagel. “Dreaming the Ordinary: Daily Life and the Complex Geographies of Citizenship.” Progress in Human Geography 36.5 (2012): 628–644.Unnever, James D., and Francis T. Cullen. “The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A Test of Three Competing Models.” Criminology 48.1 (2010): 99–129.Wacquant, Loïc. “Crafting the Neoliberal State: Workfare, Prisonfare, and Social Insecurity.” Sociological Forum 25.2 (2010): 197–220.Walsh, James P. “Quantifying Citizens: Neoliberal Restructuring and Immigrant Selection in Canada and Australia.” Citizenship Studies 15.6-7 (2011): 861–879.Wenzel, Michael, Tyler Okimoto, and Kate Cameron. “Do Retributive and Restorative Justice Processes Address Different Symbolic Concerns?” Critical Criminology 20.1 (2012): 25–44.

This paper discusses the vulnerability of diabetic individuals when they are subjected to arrest procedures in criminal law. It analyzes the wrongful arrest theory as a device for individuals with disabilities to bring claims against law enforcement when their rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are violated. Individuals with diabetes constitute more than 10% of the United States population, meaning that many individuals are at risk for police misconduct because of their disability. The symptoms that come about with having diabetes, such as fruity-smelling breath and loss of coordination, can be mistaken for illegal activity leading to a wrongful arrest. No case involving ADA Title II violation claims against law enforcement relying on the wrongful arrest theory has been brought by an individual with diabetes. This paper explores the possibility of its potential success. To accomplish this, this paper first defines disability under the law, including diabetes. It then conducts a thorough analysis of the wrongful arrest theory in various case studies consisting of non-diabetic and diabetic plaintiffs. In a final case study, I apply the wrongful arrest theory to a case hypothetically to illustrate the plaintiff's potential success if he claims a wrongful arrest. Lastly, I explore some of the theory&rsquo;s limitations and propose a potential solution. I hope that my findings will emphasize the lack of discourse surrounding individuals with diabetes in disability law and encourage further research and education on the wrongful arrest theory as a successful claim against Title II violations committed by law enforcement.

Since the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the United Kingdom, a significant expansion in the use of drug detection dogs, the most common tool of olfactory surveillance, has taken place with relatively little debate, without specific legislative authority and in the absence of a code of practice. In contrast, the use of the dogs in New South Wales, Australia and in the United States has been the subject of Supreme Court decisions, and in New South Wales, of parliamentary legislation and an independent review by the New South Wales Ombudsman. This paper will argue that the difficult legal issues raised by olfactory surveillance are similar to those raised by other forms of 'new surveillance' in the criminal justice system and that the failure of the legal system to deal with these issues in the case of olfactory surveillance could amount to a dangerous precedent for the regulation of other surveillance technologies.

Two revolutionary developments impacted the United States criminal justice system over the past 30 years that are now primed for an institutional reckoning—the legalization of medical marijuana at the state level and the exponential rise of adult drug treatment courts across the country. The states that have legalized medical marijuana also provide criminal immunity protections for qualifying medical marijuana patients, including those serving probationary sentences. Drug treatment courts are a form of intensive probation offering treatment services for participants plagued by substance use disorders. Most drug treatment courts operate on an abstinence‐based model and do not permit the use of medical marijuana. Consequently, challenges by drug court participants to the continued prohibition of medical marijuana are on the horizon. The purpose of this article is to highlight the contours of these knotty issues from a sociolegal perspective. The material for this article stems from a review of existing judicial decisions in addition to qualitative data collected during my case studies of three different adult drug treatment courts.

<p class="MsoNormal" style="text-align: justify; margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt; mso-layout-grid-align: none;"><span style="font-size: 10pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">The purpose of the study was to determine the impact of leadership and managerial decision making within the Drug Enforcement Administration since September 11, 2001.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>A web based survey questionnaire was used to collect the data.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Participants in the study were criminal justice professors from randomly selected colleges and universities located in the southeast and southwest region of the United States.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. Each participant was asked to complete a post survey that addressed areas of leadership and decision-making based on opinions and knowledge related to criminal justice.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Paired samples t test was used to describe the data. In spite of the survey findings of change in knowledge, skills, and cultural behavior, these changes did not appear to lead to significant differences in determining leadership skills.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>It is recommended that future studies use a survey sample instrument designed to measure attitudinal dimensions of decision-making among leaders and managers within the Drug Enforcement Administration.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>One possible recommendation is to utilize a different type of comparison method or instrument that would measure certain dimensions of managerial levels between upper and lower management.</span></span></p>

Abstract Despite decades of crime decline, police surveillance has continued to expand through a range of tactics oriented towards policing social disadvantage. Yet, despite attention to the linkages between residential inequality and policing, few studies have accounted for two intertwined structural developments since the turn of the 21st century: (1) the shift away from spatially concentrated patterns of racial segregation within urban centers towards sprawling patterns of economic segregation and (2) the turn from reactive policing towards proactive surveillance. Using the case of big data policing, we create a new measure of big data surveillance in metropolitan areas to examine how changes in segregation have affected the expansion of proactive police surveillance. In contrast to theoretical accounts emphasizing the role of police surveillance in governing economic inequality and perpetuating racial segregation, we do not find evidence that racial segregation or income inequality increase big data surveillance. Instead, much of the recent rise in big data policing is explained by increases in sprawling patterns of income segregation. These results provide new insight into the linkages between policing and residential inequality and reveal how changes in metropolitan segregation influence criminal justice surveillance in the era of big data.

Abstract This article extends Michael L. Radelet’s 1989 study of rare cases in which Whites have been executed for committing capital crimes against Blacks to include an assessment of White executions involving Latinx and Asian victims. The threefold aim is to (1) establish the frequency of such rare cases, and (2) explore the extent to which status characteristics (beyond race, ethnicity or gender) are present for these rare events; and (3) offer social dominance theory as a viable explanation for the patterns found in the data. An analysis of unique data from the Texas Department of Criminal Justice shows that out of 570 executions imposed between April 1982 and July 2020, only six cases led to the execution of Whites for crimes against Blacks (1.1%), sixteen cases for crimes against Hispanics (2.8%), and one case for crimes against an Asian American (0.18%). Beyond the minority status of the victim, two or more status markers were present when Whites were executed for crimes against people of color. The results, which are consistent with expectations drawn from social dominance theory, highlight the differential value placed on minority lives and call into question the legitimacy of the death penalty in the United States.

In India Courts are overburdened with litigations. There are so many reasons for over burdening but one of the good reason is that proportionately to the case number of courts are less, and applications of procedural law consumes lot of time and it result into delay. “Justice Delayed is Justice Denied” that is the reason people usually frustrate by litigations in India. Recently there is a good realization amounts all stockholders of law that there should be quick disposal of cases and prompt justice delivered system. Considering this aspect, to lessen the burden of court alternate dispute resolution system is encouraged and having good result in the form of mediation and arbitration. Even civil courts under section 18 resort to settle the matter through mediation. In criminal arbitration of justice now fast track courts are doing very good role and delay in criminal trials to some extent is minimize may not be fully controlled. But for that we have to give credit to Supreme Court of India by giving directions in number of Public interest Litigation started from Hussainara Khatun & Others Vs Home Secretary, State of Bihar ( 1979 AIR 1369,1979 SCR(3)532). There is also a one thought to introduce plea bargaining in India. Plea bargain usually occurs any time before verdict is passed. Good thing about Plea Bargain is that it concludes a criminal case without a trial. PLEA BARGAINING IN INDIA Prior to the Criminal law (Amendment) Act, 2005 the concept of Plea Bargain was totally unknown. In state of UP vs Chandrika( AIR 2000SC 164) and Kripalsingh Vs State of Haryana 2000(1) Crimes 53 (SC). Supreme Court of India observed that the concept of Plea Bargaining is against the Public Policy and further said that neither that trial Courts nor High Court has Jurisdiction to bypass the minimum sentence prescribed by the law. Before proceeding to plea bargaining the concept now started introducing in India, it would be good known what is pleas bargaining. There is no perfect or simple definition of Plea Bargaining. Simply we can put it and say that a plea bargaining is a contractual bargaining between the prosecution and in defendant accused concerning disposition of a criminal charge. However, unlike other contractual obligations it is not enforceable until a Judge approved it. From the point of view accused means who trends conviction and demand lesser sentence where he likely to be convicted. As researcher written about that the Plea bargaining, introduced in India from the year 2005 and not earlier. But there are certain provisions n earlier Acts also i.e. provision in chapter XXI of Crpc. The same has taken place through amendment I criminal law (Amendment) Act, 2005 and came into the effect from July 2005. Recognizing that there are significant differences in criminal procedures as well as in the role and status of various agencies in different countries, the Act does not give recognition to any existing practice akin to plea-bargaining. Instead, it lays down procedures with a distinct feature of enabling an accused to an application for plea bargaining in the court where the trial is pending. The Act further requires the court after receiving the application, must examine the accused in camera to ascertain whether the application has been filed voluntarily. Once the court is convinced that the accused is participating, in the plea-bargain voluntarily, the court must then issue notice to the Public prosecutor or the complainant to work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case. The negotiation of such a mutually acceptable settlement is left to the free will of the prosecution (including the victim) and the accused. If a settlement is reached, the court can award compensation based on it to the victim and then hear the parties on the issue of punishment. The Court may release the accused on probation if the law allows for it; if a minimum sentence is provided for the offence committed’ the accused may be sentenced to half of such minimum punishment; above, then the accused may be sentences to one fourth of the punishment provided or extendable for such offences. The accused may also avail of the benefit under section 428 of the code of criminal Procedure, 1973 which allows setting of the period of detention undergone by the accused against the sentence of imprisonment in plea bargained settlement. The court must deliver the Judgement in open Court according to the terms of the mutually agreed disposition and formula prescribed for sentencing including victim Compensation. IT may be noted that this Judgement is final and no appeal lies apart from a writ petition to the State high Court under article 226 and 226 of the Constitution or a special leave petition to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. IN addition to above the Act also provides: • If the accused is a first time offender, the court will have the option of releasing him/her on probation. Alternatively, the court may grant half the minimum punishment for the particular offence. • The plea-bargaining is applicable only in respect of those offences for which punishment of imprisonment is up to a period of 7 years; it does not apply where such offence affect the socio-economic condition of the country or has been committed against a woman or a child below the age of 14 years; • The application for plea – bargaining should be filed by the accused voluntarily; • The statement or facts stated by an accused in an application for plea-bargaining shall not be used for any other purpose other than for plea bargaining; This was the concept of plea bargaining, in a nutshell, as included in Indian Criminal Justice Process. It would be pertinent here to understand how different the above process is from the plea bargaining as practiced in United States. In India rate of conviction is not high, on the contrary acquittal rate is more i.e. why accused do not resort to plea-bargaining. Because in plea bargaining once you accept guilt, conviction is must. When most of the accused are told that the will be acquitted by court they usually do not come forward for plea bargaining. Therefore unless and until conviction rate is not become higher, there will not be good result of plea bargaining what actually was happened in USA same cannot be happened in India immediately. The need of the time is to revamp criminal administration of the justice.

Abstract Background Although Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) is internationally considered a harmful practice, it is increasingly being medicalized allegedly to reduce its negative health effects, and is thus suggested as a harm reduction strategy in response to these perceived health risks. In many countries where FGM/C is traditionally practiced, the prevalence rates of medicalization are increasing, and in countries of migration, such as the United Kingdom, the United States of America or Sweden, court cases or the repeated issuing of statements in favor of presumed minimal forms of FGM/C to replace more invasive forms, has raised the debate between the medical harm reduction arguments and the human rights approach. Main body The purpose of this paper is to discuss the arguments associated with the medicalization of FGM/C, a trend that could undermine the achievement of Sustainable Development Goal 5.3. The paper uses four country case studies, Egypt, Indonesia, Kenya and UK, to discuss the reasons for engaging in medicalized forms of FGM/C, or not, and explores the ongoing public discourse in those countries concerning harm reduction versus human rights, and the contradiction between medical ethics, national criminal justice systems and international conventions. The discussion is structured around four key hotly contested ethical dilemmas. Firstly, that the WHO definition of medicalized FGM/C is too narrow allowing medicalized FGM to be justified by many healthcare professionals as a form of harm reduction which contradicts the medical oath of do no harm. Secondly, that medicalized FGM/C is a human rights abuse with lifelong consequences, no matter who performs it. Thirdly, that health care professionals who perform medicalized FGM/C are sustaining cultural norms that they themselves support and are also gaining financially. Fourthly, the contradiction between protecting traditional cultural rights in legal constitutions versus human rights legislation, which criminalizes FGM/C. Conclusion More research needs to be done in order to understand the complexities that are facilitating the medicalization of FGM/C as well as how policy strategies can be strengthened to have a greater de-medicalization impact. Tackling medicalization of FGM/C will accelerate the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goal of ending FGM by 2030.

Photo by 14825144 © Alita Xander | Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT The US government's approach to the War on Drugs has created laws to deter people from using illicit drugs through negative punishment. These laws have not controlled illicit drug use, nor has it stopped the opioid pandemic from growing. Instead, these laws have created a negative bias surrounding addiction and have negatively affected particularly vulnerable patient populations, including pregnant women with substance use disorder and newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome. This article highlights some misconceptions and underscores the challenges they face as they navigate the justice and healthcare systems while also providing possible solutions to address their underlying addiction. INTRODUCTION Pregnant women with substance use disorder require treatment that is arguably for the benefit of both the mother and the fetus. Some suggest that addiction is a choice; therefore, those who misuse substances should not receive treatment. Proponents of this argument emphasize social and environmental factors that lead to addiction but fail to appreciate how chronic substance use alters the brain’s chemistry and changes how it responds to stress, reward, self-control, and pain. The medical community has long recognized that substance use disorder is not simply a character flaw or social deviance, but a complex condition that requires adequate medical attention. Unfortunately, the lasting consequences of the War on Drugs have created a stigma around addiction medicine, leading to significant treatment barriers. There is still a pervasive societal bias toward punitive rather than rehabilitative approaches to addiction. For example, many women with substance use disorder lose custody of their baby or face criminal penalties, including fines and jail time.[1] These punitive measures may cause patients to lose trust in their physicians, ultimately leading to high-risk pregnancies without prenatal care, untreated substance misuse, and potential lifelong disabilities for their newborns.[2] As a medical student, I have observed the importance of a rehabilitative approach to addiction medicine. Incentivizing pregnant women with substance use disorder to safely address their chronic health issues is essential for minimizing negative short-term and long-term outcomes for women and their newborns. This approach requires an open mind and supportive perspective, recognizing that substance use disorder is truly a medical condition that requires just as much attention as any other medical diagnosis.[3] BACKGROUND The War on Drugs was a government-led initiative launched in 1970 by President Richard M. Nixon with the aim of curtailing illegal drug use, distribution, and trade by imposing harsher prison sentences and punishments.[4] However, it is worth noting that one can trace the roots of this initiative back further. In 1914, Congress enacted the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act to target the recreational use of drugs such as morphine and opium.[5] Despite being in effect for over four decades, the War on Drugs failed to achieve its intended goals. In 2011, the Global Commission on Drug Policy released a report that concluded that the initiative had been futile, as “arresting and incarcerating tens of millions of these people in recent decades has filled prisons and destroyed lives and families without reducing the availability of illicit drugs or the power of criminal organizations.”[6] One study published in the International Journal of Drug Policy in the same year found that funding drug law enforcement paradoxically contributed to increasing gun violence and homicide rates.[7] The Commission recommended that drug policies focus on reducing harm caused by drug use rather than solely on reducing drug markets. Recognizing that many drug policies were of political opinion, it called for drug policies that were grounded in scientific evidence, health, security, and human rights.[8] Unfortunately, policy makers did not heed these recommendations. In 2014, Tennessee’s legislature passed a “Fetal Assault Law,” which made it possible to prosecute pregnant women for drug use during pregnancy. If found guilty, pregnant women could face up to 15 years in prison and lose custody of their child. Instead of deterring drug use, the law discouraged pregnant women with substance use disorder from seeking prenatal care. This law required medical professionals to report drug use to authorities, thereby compromising the confidentiality of the patient-physician relationship. Some avoided arrest by delivering their babies in other states or at home, while others opted for abortions or attempted to go through an unsafe withdrawal prior to receiving medical care, sacrificing the mother's and fetus's wellbeing. The law had a sunset provision and expired in 2016. During the two years this law was in effect, officials arrested 124 women.[9] The fear that this law instilled in pregnant women with substance use disorder can still be seen across the US today. Many pregnant women with substance use disorders stated that they feared testing positive for drugs. Due to mandatory reporting, they were not confident that physicians would protect them from the law.[10] And if a woman tried to stop using drugs before seeking care to avoid detection, she often ended up delaying or avoiding care.[11] The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recognizes the fear those with substance use disorders face when seeking appropriate medical care and emphasizes that “obstetric–gynecologic care should not expose a woman to criminal or civil penalties, such as incarceration, involuntary commitment, loss of custody of her children, or loss of housing.”[12] Mandatory reporting strains the patient-physician relationship, driving a wedge between the doctor and patient. Thus, laws intended to deter people from using substances through various punishments and incarceration may be doing more harm than good. County hospitals that mainly serve lower socioeconomic patients encounter more patients without consistent health care access and those with substance use disorders.[13] These hospitals are facing the consequences of the worsening opioid pandemic. At one county hospital where I recently worked, there has been a dramatic increase in newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome born to mothers with untreated substance use disorders during pregnancy. Infants exposed to drugs prenatally have an increased risk of complications, stillbirth, and life-altering developmental disabilities. At the hospital, I witnessed Child Protective Services removing two newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome from their mother’s custody. Four similar cases had occurred in the preceding month. In the days leading up to their placement with a foster family, I saw both newborns go through an uncomfortable drug withdrawal. No baby should be welcomed into this world by suffering like that. Yet I felt for the new mothers and realized that heart-wrenching custody loss is not the best approach. During this period, I saw a teenager brought to the pediatric floor due to worsening psychiatric symptoms. He was born with neonatal abstinence syndrome that neither the residential program nor his foster family could manage. His past psychiatric disorders included attention deficit disorder, conduct disorder, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, intellectual developmental disorder, and more. During his hospitalization, he was so violent towards healthcare providers that security had to intervene. And his attitude toward his foster parents was so volatile that we were never sure if having them visit was comforting or agitating. Throughout his hospital course, it was difficult for me to converse with him, and I left every interview with him feeling lost in terms of providing an adequate short- and long-term assessment of his psychological and medical requirements. What was clear, however, was that his intellectual and emotional levels did not match his age and that he was born into a society that was ill-equipped to accommodate his needs. Just a few feet away from his room, behind the nurses’ station, were the two newborns feeling the same withdrawal symptoms that this teenager likely experienced in the first few hours of his life. I wondered how similar their paths would be and if they would exhibit similar developmental delays in a few years or if their circumstance may follow the cases hyped about in the media of the 1980s and 1990s regarding “crack babies.” Many of these infants who experienced withdrawal symptoms eventually led normal lives.[14] Nonetheless, many studies have demonstrated that drug use during pregnancy can adversely impact fetal development. Excessive alcohol consumption can result in fetal alcohol syndrome, characterized by growth deficiency, facial structure abnormalities, and a wide range of neurological deficiencies.[15] Smoking can impede the development of the lungs and brain and lead to preterm deliveries or sudden infant death syndrome.[16] Stimulants like methamphetamine can also cause preterm delivery, delayed motor development, attention impairments, and a wide range of cognitive and behavioral issues.[17] Opioid use, such as oxycodone, morphine, fentanyl, and heroin, may result in neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome, in which a newborn may exhibit tremors, irritability, sleeping problems, poor feeding, loose stools, and increased sweating within 72 hours of life.[18] In 2014, the American Association of Pediatrics (AAP) reported that one newborn was diagnosed with neonatal abstinence syndrome every 15 minutes, equating to approximately 32,000 newborns annually, a five-fold increase from 2004.[19] The AAP found that the cost of neonatal abstinence syndrome covered by Medicaid increased from $65.4 million to $462 million from 2004 to 2014.[20] In 2020, the CDC published a paper that showed an increase in hospital costs from $316 million in 2012 to $572.7 million in 2016.[21] Currently, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the prevalence of newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome is unknown. I predict that the increase in opioid and polysubstance use during the pandemic will increase the number of newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome, thereby significantly increasing the public burden and cost.[22] In the 1990s, concerns arose about the potentially irreparable damage caused by intrauterine exposure to cocaine on the development of infants, which led to the popularization of the term “crack babies.”[23] Although no strong longitudinal studies supported this claim at the time, it was not without merit. The Maternal Lifestyle Study (NCT00059540) was a prospective longitudinal observational study that compared the outcomes of newborns exposed to cocaine in-utero to those without.[24] One of its studies revealed one month old newborns with cocaine exposure had “lower arousal, poorer quality of movements and self-regulation, higher excitability, more hypertonia, and more nonoptimal reflexes.”[25] Another study showed that at one month old, heavy cocaine exposure affected neural transmission from the ear to the brain.[26] Long-term follow up from the study showed that at seven years old, children with high intrauterine cocaine exposure were more likely to have externalizing behavior problems such as aggressive behavior, temper tantrums, and destructive acts.[27] While I have witnessed this behavior in the teenage patient during my pediatrics rotation, not all newborns with intrauterine drug exposure are inevitably bound to have psychiatric and behavioral issues later in life. NPR recorded a podcast in 2010 highlighting a mother who used substances during pregnancy and, with early intervention, had positive outcomes. After being arrested 50 times within five years, she went through STEP: Self-Taught Empowerment and Pride, a public program that allowed her to complete her GED and provided guidance and encouragement for a more meaningful life during her time in jail. Her daughter, who was exposed to cocaine before birth, had a normal childhood and ended up going to college.[28] From a public health standpoint, more needs to be done to prevent the complications of substance misuse during pregnancy. Some states consider substance misuse (and even prescribed use) during pregnancy child abuse. Officials have prosecuted countless women across 45 states for exposing their unborn children to drugs.[29] With opioid and polysubstance use on the rise, the efficacy of laws that result in punitive measures seems questionable.[30] So far, laws are not associated with a decrease in the misuse of drugs during pregnancy. Millions of dollars are being poured into managing neonatal abstinence syndrome, including prosecuting women and taking their children away. Rather than policing and criminalizing substance use, pregnant women should get the appropriate care they need and deserve. I. Misconception One: Mothers with Substance Use Disorder Can Get an Abortion If an unplanned pregnancy occurs, one course of action could be to terminate the pregnancy. On the surface, this solution seems like a quick fix. However, the reality is that obtaining an abortion can be challenging due to two significant barriers: accessibility and mandated reporting. Abortion laws vary by state, and in Tennessee, for instance, abortions are banned after six weeks of gestation, typically when fetal heart rhythms are detected. An exception to this is in cases where the mother's life is at risk.[31] Unfortunately, many women with substance use disorders are from lower socioeconomic backgrounds and cannot access pregnancy tests, which could indicate they are pregnant before the six-week cutoff. If a Tennessee woman with substance use disorder decides to seek an abortion after six weeks, she may need to travel to a neighboring state. However, this is not always a feasible option, as the surrounding states (WV, MO, AR, MI, AL, and GA) also have restrictive laws that either prohibit abortions entirely or ban them after six weeks. Moreover, she may be hesitant to visit an obstetrician for an abortion, as some states require physicians by law to report their patients' substance use during pregnancy. For example, Virginia considers substance use during pregnancy child abuse and mandates that healthcare providers report it. This would ultimately limit her to North Carolina if she wants to remain in a nearby state, but she must go before 20 weeks gestation.[32] For someone who may or may not have access to reliable transportation, traveling to another state might be impossible. Without resources or means, these restrictive laws have made it incredibly difficult to obtain the medical care they need. II. Misconception Two: Mothers with SUD are Not Fit to Care for Children If a woman cannot take care of herself, one might wonder how she can take care of another human being. Mothers with substance use disorders often face many adversities, including lack of economic opportunity, trauma from abuse, history of poverty, and mental illness.[33] Fortunately, studies suggest keeping mother and baby together has many benefits. Breastfeeding, for example, helps the baby develop a strong immune system while reducing the mother’s risk of cancer and high blood pressure.[34] Additionally, newborns with neonatal abstinence syndrome who are breastfed by mothers receiving methadone or buprenorphine require less pharmacological treatment, have lower withdrawal scores, and experience shorter hospital stays.[35] Opioid concentration in breastmilk is minimal and does not pose a risk to newborns.[36] Moreover, oxytocin, the hormone responsible for mother-baby bonding, is increased in breastfeeding mothers, reducing withdrawal symptoms and stress-induced reactivity and cravings while also increasing protective maternal instincts.[37] Removing an infant from their mother’s care immediately after birth would result in the loss of all these positive benefits for both the mother and her newborn. The newborns I observed during my pediatrics rotation probably could have benefited from breastfeeding rather than bottle feeding and being passed around from one nurse to the next. They probably would have cried less and suffered fewer withdrawal symptoms had they been given the opportunity to breastfeed. And even if the mothers were lethargic and unresponsive while going through withdrawal, it would still have been possible to breastfeed with proper support. Unfortunately, many believe mothers with substance use disorder cannot adequately care for their children. This pervasive societal bias sets them up for failure from the beginning and greatly inhibits their willingness to change and mend their relationship with their providers. It is a healthcare provider’s duty to provide non-judgmental care that prioritizes the patient’s well-being. They must treat these mothers with the same empathy and respect as any other patient, even if they are experiencing withdrawal. III. Safe Harbor and Medication-Assisted Treatment Addiction is like any other disease and society should regard treatment without stigma. There is no simple fix to this problem, given that it involves the political, legal, and healthcare systems. Punitive policies push pregnant women away from receiving healthcare and prevent them from receiving beneficial interventions. States need to enact laws that protect these women from being reported to authorities. Montana, for example, passed a law in 2019 that provides women with substance use disorders safe harbor from prosecution if they seek treatment for their condition.[38] Medication-assisted treatment with methadone or buprenorphine is the first line treatment option and should be available to all pregnant women regardless of their ability to pay for medical care.[39] To promote continuity of care, health officials could include financial incentives to motivate new mothers to go to follow-up appointments. For example, vouchers for groceries or enrollment in the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) may offset financial burdens and allow a mother to focus on taking care of her child and her recovery. IV. Mandated Substance Abuse Programs Although the number of people sentenced to state prisons for drug related crimes has been declining, it is still alarming that there were 171,300 sentencings in 2019.[40] Only 11 percent of the 65 percent of our nation’s inmates with substance use disorder receive treatment, implying that the other 89 percent were left without much-needed support to overcome their addiction.[41] It is erroneous to assume that their substance use disorder would disappear after a period without substance use while behind bars. After withdrawal, those struggling with substance use disorder may still have cravings and the likelihood of relapsing remains high without proper medical intervention. Even if they are abstinent for some time during incarceration, the underlying problem persists, and the cycle inevitably continues upon release from custody. In line with the recommendations by Global Commission on Drug Policy and the lessons learned from the failed War on Drugs, one proposed change in our criminal justice system would be to require enrollment and participation in assisted alcohol cessation programs before legal punishment. Policy makers must place emphasis on the safety of the patient and baby rather than the cessation of substance use. This would incentivize people to actively seek medical care, restore the patient-physician relationship, and ensure that they take rehabilitation programs seriously. If the patient or baby is unsafe, a caregiver could intervene while the patient re-enrolls in the program. Those currently serving sentences in prisons and jails can treat their substance use disorder through medication assisted treatment, cognitive behavioral therapy, and programs like Self Taught Empowerment and Pride (STEP). Medication assisted treatment under the supervision of medical professionals can help inmates achieve and maintain sobriety in a healthy and safe way. Furthermore, cognitive behavioral therapy can help to identify triggers and teach healthier coping mechanisms to prepare for stressors outside of jail. Finally, multimodal empowerment programs can connect people to jobs, education, and support upon release. People often leave prisons and jail without a sense of purpose, which can lead to relapse and reincarceration. Structured programs have been shown to decrease drug use and criminal behavior by helping reintegrate productive individuals into society.[42] V. Medical Education: Narcotic Treatment Programs and Suboxone Clinics Another proactive approach could be to have medical residency programs register with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as Narcotic Treatment Programs and incorporate suboxone clinics into their education and rotations. Rather than family medicine, OB/GYN, or emergency medicine healthcare workers having to refer their patients to an addiction specialist, they could treat patients with methadone for maintenance or detoxification where they would deliver their baby. Not only would this educate and prepare the future generation of physicians to handle the opioid crisis, but it would allow pregnant women to develop strong patient-physician relationships. CONCLUSION Society needs to change from the mindset of tackling a problem after it occurs to taking a proactive approach by addressing upstream factors, thereby preventing those problems from occurring in the first place. Emphasizing public health measures and adequate medical care can prevent complications and developmental issues in newborns and pregnant women with substance use disorders. Decriminalizing drug use and encouraging good health habits during pregnancy is essential, as is access to prenatal care, especially for lower socioeconomic patients. Many of the current laws and regulations that policy makers initially created due to naïve political opinion and unfounded bias to serve the War on Drugs need to be changed to provide these opportunities. To progress as a society, physicians and interprofessional teams must work together to truly understand the needs of patients with substance use disorders and provide support from prenatal to postnatal care. There should be advocation for legislative change, not by providing an opinion but by highlighting the facts and conclusions of scientific studies grounded in scientific evidence, health, security, and human rights. There can be no significant change if society continues to view those with substance use disorders as underserving of care. Only when the perspective shifts to compassion can these mothers and children receive adequate care that rehabilitates and supports their future and empowers them to raise their children. - [1] NIDA. 2023, February 15. Pregnant People with Substance Use Disorders Need Treatment, Not Criminalization. https://nida.nih.gov/about-nida/noras-blog/2023/02/pregnant-people-substance-use-disorders-need-treatment-not-criminalization [2] Substance Use Disorder Hurts Moms and Babies. National Partnership for Women and Families. June 2021 [3] All stories have been fictionalized and anonymized. [4] A History of the Drug War. Drug Policy Alliance. https://drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war [5] The Harrison Narcotic Act (1914) https://www.druglibrary.org/Schaffer/library/studies/cu/cu8.html [6] The War on Drugs. The Global Commission on Drug Policy. Published June 2011. https://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/reports/the-war-on-drugs [7] Werb D, Rowell G, Guyatt G, Kerr T, Montaner J, Wood E. Effect of drug law enforcement on drug market violence: A systematic review. Int J Drug Policy. 2011;22(2):87-94. doi:10.1016/j.drugpo.2011.02.002 [8] Global Commission on Drug Policy, 2011 [9] Women NA for P. Tennessee’s Fetal Assault Law: Understanding its impact on marginalized women - New York. Pregnancy Justice. Published December 14, 2020. https://www.pregnancyjusticeus.org/tennessees-fetal-assault-law-understanding-its-impact-on-marginalized-women/ [10] Roberts SCM, Nuru-Jeter A. Women’s perspectives on screening for alcohol and drug use in prenatal care. Womens Health Issues Off Publ Jacobs Inst Womens Health. 2010;20(3):193-200. doi:10.1016/j.whi.2010.02.003 [11] Klaman SL, Isaacs K, Leopold A, et al. Treating Women Who Are Pregnant and Parenting for Opioid Use Disorder and the Concurrent Care of Their Infants and Children: Literature Review to Support National Guidance. J Addict Med. 2017;11(3):178-190. doi:10.1097/ADM.0000000000000308 [12] Substance Abuse Reporting and Pregnancy: The Role of the Obstetrician–Gynecologist. https://www.acog.org/en/clinical/clinical-guidance/committee-opinion/articles/2011/01/substance-abuse-reporting-and-pregnancy-the-role-of-the-obstetrician-gynecologist [13] R. Ghertner, G Lincoln The Opioid Crisis and Economic Opportunity: Geographic and Economic Trends. ASPE. Office of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation. DHHS Revised September 11, 2018 https://aspe.hhs.gov/reports/economic-opportunity-opioid-crisis-geographic-economic-trends [14] Midon, M. Z., Gerzon, L. R., & de Almeida, C. S. (2021). Crack and motor development of babies living in an assistance shelter. ABCS Health Sciences, 46, e021215-e021215. And for example, see Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later : NPR https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643 [15] Williams JF, Smith VC, the Committee on Substance Abuse. Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders. Pediatrics. 2015;136(5):e20153113. doi:10.1542/peds.2015-3113 [16] CDC Tobacco Free. Smoking During Pregnancy. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Published April 11, 2022. https://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/health_effects/pregnancy/index.htm [17] Abuse NI on D. What are the risks of methamphetamine misuse during pregnancy? National Institute on Drug Abuse. https://nida.nih.gov/publications/research-reports/methamphetamine/what-are-risks-methamphetamine-misuse-during-pregnancy [18] CDC. Basics About Opioid Use During Pregnancy | CDC. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Published July 21, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/pregnancy/opioids/basics.html [19] Honein MA, Boyle C, Redfield RR. Public Health Surveillance of Prenatal Opioid Exposure in Mothers and Infants. Pediatrics. 2019;143(3):e20183801. doi:10.1542/peds.2018-3801 [20] Winkelman TNA, Villapiano N, Kozhimannil KB, Davis MM, Patrick SW. Incidence and Costs of Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Among Infants with Medicaid: 2004–2014. Pediatrics. 2018;141(4):e20173520. doi:10.1542/peds.2017-3520 [21] Strahan AE, Guy GP Jr, Bohm M, Frey M, Ko JY. Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome Incidence and Health Care Costs in the United States, 2016. JAMA Pediatr. 2020;174(2):200-202. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2019.4791 [22] Ghose R, Forati AM, Mantsch JR. Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Opioid Overdose Deaths: a Spatiotemporal Analysis. J Urban Health Bull N Y Acad Med. 2022;99(2):316-327. doi:10.1007/s11524-022-00610-0 [23] Mayes LC, Granger RH, Bornstein MH, Zuckerman B. The Problem of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment. JAMA. 1992;267(3):406-408. doi:10.1001/jama.1992.03480030084043 [24] NICHD Neonatal Research Network. The Maternal Lifestyle Study. clinicaltrials.gov; 2016. https://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/study/NCT00059540 [25] Lester BM, Tronick EZ, LaGasse L, et al. The maternal lifestyle study: effects of substance exposure during pregnancy on neurodevelopmental outcome in 1-month-old infants. Pediatrics. 2002;110(6):1182-1192. doi:10.1542/peds.110.6.1182 [26] Lester BM, Lagasse L, Seifer R, et al. The Maternal Lifestyle Study (MLS): effects of prenatal cocaine and/or opiate exposure on auditory brain response at one month. J Pediatr. 2003;142(3):279-285. doi:10.1067/mpd.2003.112 [27] Bada HS, Bann CM, Bauer CR, et al. Preadolescent behavior problems after prenatal cocaine exposure: Relationship between teacher and caretaker ratings (Maternal Lifestyle Study). Neurotoxicol Teratol. 2011;33(1):78-87. doi:10.1016/j.ntt.2010.06.005 [28] N, P, R. Crack Babies: Twenty Years Later. NPR. Published May 3, 2010. https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126478643 [29] Miranda L, Dixon V, September CRP on, 30, 2015. How States Handle Drug Use During Pregnancy http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/maternity-drug-policies-by-state [30] NCDAS: Substance Abuse and Addiction Statistics [2023]. NCDAS. https://drugabusestatistics.org/ [31] (Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-216). [32] Institute G. Interactive Map: US Abortion Policies and Access After Roe. https://states.guttmacher.org/policies/ [33] Whitesell M, Bachand A, Peel J, Brown M. Familial, Social, and Individual Factors Contributing to Risk for Adolescent Substance Use. J Addict. 2013;2013:579310. doi:10.1155/2013/579310 [34] CDC. Five Great Benefits of Breastfeeding. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Published July 27, 2021. https://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/dnpao/features/breastfeeding-benefits/index.html [35] Welle-Strand GK, Skurtveit S, Jansson LM, Bakstad B, Bjarkø L, Ravndal E. Breastfeeding reduces the need for withdrawal treatment in opioid-exposed infants. Acta Paediatr. 2013;102(11):1060-1066. doi:10.1111/apa.12378 [36] Ilett KF, Hackett LP, Gower S, Doherty DA, Hamilton D, Bartu AE. Estimated dose exposure of the neonate to buprenorphine and its metabolite norbuprenorphine via breastmilk during maternal buprenorphine substitution treatment. Breastfeed Med Off J Acad Breastfeed Med. 2012;7:269-274. doi:10.1089/bfm.2011.0096 [37] Pedersen CA, Smedley KL, Leserman J, et al. Intranasal Oxytocin Blocks Alcohol Withdrawal in Human Subjects. Alcohol Clin Exp Res. 2013;37(3):484-489. doi:10.1111/j.1530-0277.2012.01958.x [38] Montana SB0289. https://leg.mt.gov/bills/2019/billhtml/SB0289.htm [39] Mullins N, Galvin SL, Ramage M, Gannon M, Lorenz K, Sager B, Coulson CC. Buprenorphine and Naloxone Versus Buprenorphine for Opioid Use Disorder in Pregnancy: A Cohort Study. J Addict Med. 2020 May/Jun;14(3):185-192. doi: 10.1097/ADM.0000000000000562. PMID: 31567599. [40] Drug Related Crime Statistics [2023]: Offenses Involving Drug Use. NCDAS. https://drugabusestatistics.org/drug-related-crime-statistics/ [41] Association APH. Online only: Report finds most U.S. inmates suffer from substance abuse or addiction. Nations Health. 2010;40(3):E11-E11. [42] Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment: A Research-Based Guide (Third Edition) | NIDA Archives. Published January 17, 2018. http://archives.nida.nih.gov/publications/principles-drug-addiction-treatment-research-based-guide-third-edition

One of the biggest cases of prisoners (WBP) in correctional institutions throughout Indonesia is Narcotics Cases. The number of prisoners in Indonesia ranks 7th in the World after the United States, China, Brazil, India, Russia, and Turkey which is around 275,518 WBP. As the prison capacity can only accommodate 140,424 WBP so that the overcapacity experienced is around 96%, while other data shows more than 158,000 WBP as narcotics cases (60%). The same thing is also experienced by the Regional Office of the Ministry of Law and Human Rights of South Sumatra with a total of 20 Technical Implementation Units (UPT) of Correctional Institutions (Lapas) and State Detention Centers (Rutan). At the South Sumatra Ministry of Law and Human Rights regional office, there are two special narcotics prisons, namely the Banyuasin narcotics prison and the Muara Beliti narcotics prison. The Banyuasin narcotics prison is the closest to the capital of South Sumatra province, which has a capacity of 484 WBP and is filled with 851 WBP narcotics cases. With such large numbers, it is important to encourage and maximize the Revitalization of Correctional Administration program to optimize the guidance of prisoners based on their level of risk keeping in mind the principle of legal protection and respect for human rights based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The Directorate General of Corrections made a breakthrough to optimize the guidance of prisoners by implementing the Correctional Implementation Revitalization policy stipulated in the Ministry of Law and Human Rights Regulation Number 35 of 2018, concerning the correctional implementation revitalization policy which discusses the Determination of Super Maximum Security, Maximum Security, Medium Security, and Minimum Security Pilot Project Correctional Institutions. The application of the latest rules of Corrections, namely Law Number 22 of 2022 concerning corrections, where the correctional concept has an inseparable goal from an integrated criminal justice system organized by the government as part of the law enforcement process in the context of services as well as coaching and mentoring for social reintegration. It does not yet have a real model and concept and is felt by the community related to the Empowerment of Narcotics Case Prisoners in the context of realizing social reintegration. It can also be seen from the data in the South Sumatra Regional Office that there are more dealers than users, which is very funny and unreasonable if you think about it in a healthy and rational root of narcotics crime that has long survived and experienced an increasing trend; however, consumers or users are less than the market, namely sellers in terms of cases. Narcotics crimes that have high economic value, makes it difficult for people to find jobs or earn money further leading them to commit drug abuse crimes. For this reason, it cannot be underestimated related to the condition of community powerlessness, which is one of the factors for entering the realm of narcotics abuse. This then becomes a fundamental question in a society where the role of the Government lies in paying attention to and empowering prisoners to be independent. They should also be responsible for restoring the unity of life, living, and livelihood of prisoners where they are a generation of nations that must be saved by the state because their freedom of movement has been taken away by the State. It is important and urgent to gain the attention of the government regarding the empowerment of prisoners in the context to systematics, processes, models, harmonious and accountable concepts, synergy, and collaboration to achieve WBP goals so as not to repeat the crime of narcotics abuse; and can independently play an active role in the community environment and support the National development process. Keywords: revitalization, corrections, narcotics, WBP

Firearms Use Comes With A Number Of Potential Health & Environmental Hazards Due To The High Noise Levels Generated. Noise Reduction Is Clearly A Desirable Goal. Firearm Silencers Are Often More Correctly Referred To As Sound Suppressors, Sound Moderators, Or Mufflers In The Interests Of Consistency With Federal Legislation, The Term Ilencershall Be Used Throughout This Paper. Firearm Silencers Are Legal For Civilian Ownership And Use In The Majority Of Us States, Though They Are Heavily Regulated. In States Where Silencers Are Legal Their Regulation Is Typically Accomplished At The Federal Level, Though Many States Do Have Their Own Laws. This Paper Focuses On Federal Legislation And Its Administration, Enforcement, And Litigation. Until 1934 There Were No Restrictions On Silencer Ownership And Use By Private Individuals. In 1934 Congress Passed The National Firearms Act (Nfa) Which Had The Net Effect Of Making Silencer Manufacture, And Possession By Private Citizens, A Prohibitively Costly And Administratively Burdensome Endeavor. The Nfa Legislation Is Articulated In Title 26 Of The United States Code, And The Federal Law Is Administered And Enforced By The Us Department Of Justice (Doj) Via The Bureau Of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, And Explosives (Batfe). Commercially Available Silencers Reduce The Muzzle Report Of A Firearm By Reducing Peak Sound Pressure By 30 To 40 Decibels (Db). A 223 Remington (5.56mm Nato) Caliber Rifle Will Typically Generate Around 160 Db Without A Silencer, And Just 120 To 130 Db With A Typical Commercially Available Silencer Installed. Some Individuals Construct Homemade Silencers, With Varying Degrees Of Success. Federal Prosecutors, Possibly Prompted By An Overzealous Batfe, And Following The Letter Of The Law, Feel Justified In Prosecuting Cases Where The Alleged Silencer Reduces The Noise Generated By Just A Few Db. The Law Defines, In Part, A Silencer, Or Muffler, As Ny Device For Silencing, Muffling, Or Diminishing The Report Of A Portable Firearm This Is A Very Vague Definition, And In Strict Technical Terms It Could Include Legitimate Technologies, Such As A Lengthened Barrel, A Muzzle Brake, Or A Flash Hider, All Of Which Will Diminish, Or Redirect, The Noise Of A Gunshot. Understanding Sound, And Sound Measurement, Is Not Easy, And This Fact Coupled With The Loose Legal Definition Of What Constitutes A Silencer Leads To The Prosecution Of Many Individuals Who, Either Deliberately Or Inadvertently, Have Procured Or Created A Device For Their Firearm That Reduces The Measured Report By Only A Small Amount. A Study Published By The American Medical Association1 Revealed That Recreational Shooters Suffered Hearing Damage Following Very Limited Exposure To Firearms Noise, And That Damage Occurred Even When Shooters Wore Hearing Protection. Paradoxically, In An Age When Both Legislators, And The Population At Large, Are Obsessed With Environmental And Health & Safety Issues, We Have Outdated Legislation In Place That Actually Works To Make An Everyday Item Less Safe For The User, And Less Environmentally Friendly From The Perspective Of Those In The Vicinity Of The User. We Have Legislation That Seeks To Limit The Noise Produced By Motorcycles And Other Motor Vehicles While, Concurrently, We Have Legislation That Makes It Illegal (Or Prohibitively Burdensome & Expensive) To Attempt To Reduce The Dangerous Noise Produced By Firearms. The Injustices And Difficulties Resulting From Poorly Drafted Legislation Have Been Compounded By The Use Of Outdated Batfe Testing Protocols. To Their Credit, Batfe Appear To Have Been Receptive To The Use Of New Technology And Things Have Improved Somewhat In Recent Years. Sound Measuring Equipment With A Data Sample Time Interval Short Enough To Accurately Capture A Gunshot Is Expensive, And Interpretation Of Results Is Difficult For Those Not Well Versed In The Technical Intricacies Of Acoustics. This Paper Includes Two Case Studies. The First Case Study Demonstrates How Outdated Test Protocols And Inappropriate Equipment Lead To Potentially Misleading Results. The Second Case Study Demonstrates How An Overzealous Prosecution Expert Can Paint A Misleading Picture Of An Alleged Homemade Silencer. It Is Concluded That Current Legislation Relating To Silencers Provides Vague Technical Definitions, Leads To Unnecessary And Expensive Prosecutions, Has A Significant Adverse Affect On The Health Of The Nation, And Raises Significant Legal, Administrative, And Financial Barriers To Those Firearms Owners Who Wish To Maximize Safety And Minimize Environmental Impact.

In one of the earliest films about a whistleblower, On the Waterfront (1954), the dock worker Terry Malloy (Marlon Brando), who also works for the union boss and mobster Johnny Friendly (Lee J. Cobb), decides to testify in court against him and uncover corruption and murder. By doing so he will not only suffer retribution from Friendly but also be seen as a “stool pigeon” by his co-workers, friends, and neighbours who will shun him, and he will be “marked” forever by his deed. Nonetheless, he decides to do the right thing. Already it is clear that in most cases the whistleblowers are not simply the ones who reveal things, but they themselves are also revealed.My aim in this article is to explore the depiction of Edward Snowden and Julian Assange in fiction film and its connection to what I would like to call, with Slavoj Žižek, “Hollywood ideology”; the heroisation of the “ordinary guy” against a big institution or a corrupt individual, as it is the case in Snowden (2016) on the one hand, and at the same time the impossibility of true systemic critique when the one who is criticising is “outside of the system”, as Assange in The Fifth Estate (2013). Both films also rely on the notion of individualism and convey conflicting messages in regard to understanding the perception of whistleblowers today. Snowden and AssangeAlthough there are many so called “whistleblower films” since On the Waterfront, like Serpico (1973), All the President’s Men (1976), or Silkwood (1983), to name but a few (for a comprehensive list see https://ew.com/movies/20-whistleblower-movies-to-watch/?), in this article I will focus on the most recent films that deal with Edward Snowden and Julian Assange. These are the most prominent cases of whistleblowing in the last decade put to film. They are relevant today also regarding their subject matter—privacy. Revealing secrets that concern privacy in this day and age is of importance and is pertinent even to the current Coronavirus crisis, where the question of privacy again arises in form of possible tracking apps, in the age of ever expanding “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff).Even if Assange is not strictly speaking a whistleblower, an engagement with his work in this context is indispensable since his outsider status, up to a point, resembles those of Snowden or Manning. They are not only important because they can be considered as “authentic heroe[s] of our time” (Žižek, Pandemic, 7), but also because of their depiction which differs in a very crucial way: while Snowden is depicted as a “classic” whistleblower (an American patriot who did his duty, someone from the “inside”), Assange’s action are coming from the outside of the established system and are interpreted as a selfish act, as it is stated in the film: “It was always about him.”Whistleblowers In his Whistleblower’s Handbook, Kohn writes: “who are these whistleblowers? Sometimes they are people you read about with admiration in the newspaper. Other times they are your co-workers or neighbours. However, most whistleblowers are regular workers performing their jobs” (Kohn, xi). A whistleblower, as the employee or a “regular worker”, can be regarded as someone who is a “nobody” at first, an invisible “cog in the wheel” of a certain institution, a supposedly devoted and loyal worker, who, through an act of “betrayal”, becomes a “somebody”. They do something truly significant, and by doing so becomes a hero to some and a traitor to others. Their persona suddenly becomes important.The wrongdoings that are uncovered by the whistleblower are for the most part not simply isolated missteps, but of a systemic nature, like the mass surveillance by the National Security Agency (NSA) uncovered by Snowden. The problem with narratives that deal with whistleblowing is that the focus inevitably shifts from the systemic problem (surveillance, war crimes, etc.) to the whistleblower as an individual. Moretti states that the interest of the media regarding whistleblowing, if one compares the reactions to the leaking of the “Pentagon Papers” regarding the Vietnam War in the 1970s by Daniel Ellsberg and to Snowden’s discoveries, shifted from the deed itself to the individual. In the case of Ellsberg, Moretti writes:the legitimate questions were not about him and what motivated him, but rather inquiry on (among other items) the relationship between government and media; whether the U.S. would be damaged militarily or diplomatically because of the release of the papers; the extent to which the media were acting as watchdogs; and why Americans needed to know about these items. (8)This shift of public interest goes along, according to Moretti, with the corporate ownership of media (7), where profit is the primary goal and therefore sensationalism is the order of the day, which is inextricably linked to the focus on the “scandalous” individual. The selfless and almost self-effacing act of whistleblowing becomes a narrative that constructs the opposite: yet another determined individual that through their sheer willpower achieves their goal, a notion that conforms to neoliberal ideology.Hollywood IdeologyThe endings of All the President’s Men and The Harder They Fall (1956), another early whistleblower film, twenty years apart, are very similar: they show the journalist eagerly typing away on his typewriter a story that will, in the case of the former, bring down the president of the United States and in the latter, bring an end to arranged fights in the boxing sport. This depiction of the free press vanquishing the evil doers, as Žižek states it, is exactly the point where “Hollywood ideology” becomes visible, which is:the ideology of such Hollywood blockbusters as All the President’s Men and The Pelican Brief, in which a couple of ordinary guys discover a scandal which reaches up to the president, forcing him to step down. Corruption is shown to reach the very top, yet the ideology of such works resides in their upbeat final message: what a great country ours must be, when a couple of ordinary guys like you and me can bring down the president, the mightiest man on Earth! (“Good Manners”)This message is of course part of Hollywood’s happy-ending convention that can be found even in films that deal with “serious” subject matters. The point of the happy end in this case is that before it is finally reached, the film can show corruption (Serpico), wrongdoings of big companies (The Insider, 1999), or sexual harassment (North Country, 2005). It is important that in the end all is—more or less—good. The happy ending need not necessarily be even truly “happy”—this depends on the general notion the film wants to convey (see for instance the ending of Silkwood, where the whistleblower is presumed to have been killed in the end). What is important in the whistleblower film is that the truth is out, justice has been served in one way or the other, the status quo has been re-established, and most importantly, there is someone out there who cares.These films, even when they appear to be critical of “the system”, are there to actually reassure their audiences in the workings of said system, which is (liberal) democracy supported by neoliberal capitalism (Frazer). Capitalism, on the other hand, is supported by the ideology of individualism which functions as a connecting tissue between the notions of democracy, capitalism, and film industry, since we are admiring exceptional individuals in performing acts of great importance. This, in turn, is encapsulated by the neoliberal mantra—“anyone can make it, only if they try heard enough”. As Bauman puts it more concretely, the risks and contradictions in a society are produced socially but are supposed to be solved individually (46).Individualism, as a part of the neoliberal capitalist ideology, is described already by Milton Friedman, who sees the individual as the “ultimate entity in the society” and the freedom of the individual as the “ultimate goal” within this society (12). What makes this an ideology is the fact that, in reality, the individual, or in the context of the market, the entrepreneur, is always-already tethered to and supported by the state, as Varoufakis has successfully proven (“Varoufakis/Chomsky discussion”). Therefore individualism is touted as an ideal to strive for, while for neoliberalism in order to function, the state is indispensable, which is often summed up in the formula “socialism for the rich, capitalism for the poor” (Polychroniou). The heroic Hollywood individual, as shown in the whistleblower film, regardless of real-life events, is the perfect embodiment of individualist ideology of neoliberal capitalism—we are not seeing a stylised version of it, a cowboy or a masked vigilante, but a “real” person. It is paradoxically precisely the realism that we see in such films that makes them ideological: the “based on a true story” preamble and all the historical details that are there in order to create a fulfilling cinematic experience. All of this supports its ideology because, as Žižek writes, “the function of ideology is not to offer us a point of escape from our reality but to offer us the social reality itself as an escape from some traumatic, real kernel” (Sublime Object 45). All the while Snowden mostly adheres to Hollywood ideology, The Fifth Estate also focuses on individualism, but goes in a different direction, and is more problematic – in the former we see the “ordinary guy” as the American hero, in the latter a disgruntled individual who reveals secrets of others for strictly personal reasons.SnowdenThere is an aspect of the whistleblower film that rings true and that is connected to Michel Foucault’s notion of power (“Truth and Power”). Snowden, through his employment at the NSA, is within a power relations network of an immensely powerful organisation. He uses “his” power, to expose the mass surveillance by the NSA. It is only through his involvement with this power network that he could get insight into and finally reveal what NSA is doing. Foucault writes that these resistances to power from the inside are “effective because they are formed right at the point where relations of power are exercised; resistance to power does not have to come from elsewhere to be real … It exists all the more by being in the same place as power” (Oushakine 206). In the case of whistleblowing, the resistance to power must come exactly from the inside in order to be effective since whistleblowers occupy the “same place as power” that they are up against and that is what in turn makes them “powerful”.Fig. 1: The Heroic Individual: Edward Snowden in SnowdenBut there is an underside to this. His “relationship” to the power structure he is confronting greatly affects his depiction as a whistleblower within the film—precisely because Snowden, unlike Assange, is someone from inside the system. He can still be seen as a patriot and a “disillusioned idealist” (Scott). In the film this is shown right at the beginning as Snowden, in his hotel room in Hong Kong, tells the documentary filmmaker Laura Poitras (Melissa Leo) and journalist Glenn Greenwald (Zachary Quinto) his name and who he is. The music swells and the film cuts to Snowden in uniform alongside other soldiers during a drill, when he was enlisted in the army before work for the NSA.Snowden resembles many of Stone’s typical characters, the all-American patriot being disillusioned by certain historical events, as in Born on the 4th of July (1989) and JFK (1991), which makes him question the government and its actions. It is generally of importance for a mainstream Hollywood film that the protagonist is relatable in order for the audiences to sympathise with them (Bordwell and Thompson 82). This is important not only regarding personal traits but, I would argue, also political views of the character. There needs to be no doubt in the mind of American audiences when it comes to films that deal with politics, that the protagonists are patriots.Stone’s film profits from this ambivalence in Snowden’s own political stance: at first he is more of a right winger who is a declared fan of Ayn Rand’s conservative-individualist manifesto Atlas Shrugged, then, after meeting his future partner Lindsey Mills, he turns slightly to the left, as he at one point states his support for President Obama. This also underlines the films ambiguity, as Oliver Stone openly stated about his Vietnam War film Platoon (1986) that “it could be embraced by … the right and the left. Essentially, most movies make their money in the middle” (Banff Centre). As Snowden takes the lie detector test as a part of the process of becoming a CIA agent, he confirms, quite sincerely it seems, that he thinks that the United States is the “greatest country in the world” and that the most important day in his life was 9/11. This again confirms his patriotic stance.Snowden is depicted as the exceptional individual, and at the same time the “ordinary guy”, who, through his act of courage, defied the all-powerful USA. During the aforementioned job interview scene, Snowden’s superior, Corbin O’Brian (Rhys Ifans), quotes Ayn Rand to him: “one man can stop the motor of the world”. Snowden states that he also believes that. The quote could serve as the film’s tagline, as a “universal truth” that seems to be at the core of American values and that also coincides with and reaffirms neoliberal ideology. Although it is undeniable that individuals can accomplish extraordinary feats, but when there is no systemic change, those can remain only solitary achievements that are only there to support the neoliberal “cult of the individual”.Snowden stands in total contrast to Assange in regard to his character and private life. There is nothing truly “problematic” about him, he seems to be an almost impeccable person, a “straight arrow”. This should make him a poster boy for American democracy and freedom of speech, and Stone tries to depict him in this way.Still, we are dealing with someone who cannot simply be redeemed as a patriot who did his duty. He cannot be unequivocally hailed as an all-American hero since betraying state secrets (and betrayal in general) is seen as a villainous act. For many Americans, and for the government, he will forever be remembered as a traitor. Greenwald writes that most of the people in the US, according to some surveys, still want to see Snowden in prison, even if they find that the surveillance by the NSA was wrong (365).Snowden remains an outcast and although the ending is not quite happy, since he must live in Russian exile, there is still a sense of an “upbeat final message” that ideologically colours the film’s ending.The Fifth EstateThe Fifth Estate is another example of the ideological view of the individual, but in this case with a twist. The film tries to be “objective” at first, showing the importance and impact of the newly established online platform WikiLeaks. However, towards the end of the film, it proceeds to dismantle Julian Assange (Benedict Cumberbatch) with the “everyone has secrets” platitude, which effectively means that none of us should ever try to reveal any secrets of those in power, since all of us must have our own secrets we do not want revealed. The film is shown from the perspective of Assange’s former disgruntled associate Daniel Domscheit-Berg (Daniel Brühl), who wrote a book about his time at WikiLeaks on which the film is partly based on (Inside WikiLeaks). We see Assange through his eyes and delve into personal moments that are supposed to reveal the “truth” about the individual behind the project. In a cynical twist, it is Daniel who is the actual whistleblower, who reveals the secrets of WikiLeaks and its founder.Assange, as it is said in the film, is denounced as a “messiah” or a “prophet”, almost a cult leader who only wants to satisfy his perverse need for other people’s secrets, except that he is literally alone and has no followers and, unlike real cult leaders, needs no followers. The point of whistleblowing is exactly in the fact that it is a radical move, it is a big step forward in ending a wrongdoing. To denounce the radical stance of WikiLeaks is to misunderstand and undermine the whole notion of whistleblowing as a part of true changes in a society.The cult aspects are often referred to in the film when Assange’s childhood is mentioned. His mother was supposed to be in a cult, called “The Family”, and we should regard this as an important (and bad) influence on his character. This notion of the “childhood trauma” seems to be a crutch that is supposed to serve as a characterisation, something the scriptwriting-guru Robert McKee criticises as a screenwriting cliché: “do not reduce characters to case studies (an episode of child abuse is the cliché in vogue at the moment), for in truth there are no definitive explanations for anyone’s behaviour” (376).Although the film does not exaggerate the childhood aspect, it is still a motive that is supposed to shed some light into the “mystery” that is Assange. And it also ties into the question of the colour of his hair as a way of dismantling his lies. In a flashback that resembles a twist ending of an M. Night Shyamalan thriller, it turns out that Assange actually dyes his hair white, witnessed in secret by Daniel, instead of it turning naturally white, as Assange explains on few occasions but stating different reasons for it. Here he seems like a true movie villain and resembles the character of the Joker from The Dark Knight (2008), who also tells different stories about the origin of his facial scars. This mystery surrounding his origin makes the villain even more dangerous and, what is most important, unpredictable.Žižek also draws a parallel between Assange and Joker of the same film, whom he sees as the “figure of truth”, as Batman and the police are using lies in order to “protect” the citizens: “the film’s take-home message is that lying is necessary to sustain public morale: only a lie can redeem us” (“Good Manners”). Rather than interpreting Assange’s role in a positive way, as Žižek does, the film truly establishes him as a villain.Fig. 2: The Problematic Individual: Julian Assange in The Fifth EstateThe Fifth Estate ends with another cheap psychologisation of Assange on Daniel’s part as he describes the “true purpose” of WikiLeaks: “only someone so obsessed with his own secrets could’ve come up with a way to reveal everyone else’s”. This faux-psychological argument paints the whole WikiLeaks endeavour as Assange’s ego-trip and makes of him an egomaniac whose secret perverted pleasure is to reveal the secrets of others.Why is this so? Why are Woodward and Bernstein in All the President’s Men depicted as heroes and Assange is not? The true underlying conflict here is between classic journalism; where journalists can publish their pieces and get the acclaim for publishing the “new Pentagon Papers”, once again ensuring the freedom of the press and “inter-systemic” critique. This way of working of the press, as the films show, always pays off. All the while, in reality, very little changes since, as Žižek writes, the “formal functioning of power” stays in place. He further states about WikiLeaks:The true targets here weren’t the dirty details and the individuals responsible for them; not those in power, in other words, so much as power itself, its structure. We shouldn’t forget that power comprises not only institutions and their rules, but also legitimate (‘normal’) ways of challenging it (an independent press, NGOs, etc.). (“Good Manners”)In the very end, the “real” journalism is being reinforced as the sole vehicle of criticism, while everything else is “extremism” and, again, can only stem from a frustrated, even “evil”, individual. If neoliberal individualism is the order of the day, then the thinking must also revolve around that notion and cannot transcend that horizon.ConclusionŽižek expresses the problem of revealing the truth in our day and age by referring to the famous fable “The Emperor’s New Clothes”, where a child is the only one who is naive and brave enough to state that the emperor is in fact naked. But for Žižek today,in our cynical era, such strategy no longer works, it has lost its disturbing power, since everyone now proclaims that the emperor is naked (that Western democracies are torturing terrorist suspects, that wars are fought for profit, etc., etc.), and yet nothing happens, nobody seems to mind, the system just goes on functioning as if the emperor were fully dressed. (Less than Nothing 92)The problem with the “Collateral Murder”, a video of the killing of Iraqi civilians by the US Army, leaked by Wikileaks and Chelsea Manning, that was presented to the public, for instance, was according to accounts in Inside Wikileaks and Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy, that it did not have the desired impact. The public seems, in the end, to be indifferent to such reveals since it effectively cannot do anything about it. The return to the status quo after these reveals supports this stance, as Greenwald writes that after Snowden’s leaks there was no substantial change within the system; during the Obama administration, there was even an increase of criminal investigations of whistleblowers with an emergence of a “climate of fear” (Greenwald 368). Many whistleblower films assure us that in the end the system works; the good guys always win, the antagonists are punished, and laws have been passed. This is not to be accepted simply as a Hollywood convention, something that we also “already know”, but as an ideological stance, since these films are taken more seriously than films with similar messages but within other mainstream genres. Snowden shows that only individualism has the power to challenge the system, while The Fifth Estate draws the line that should not be crossed when it comes to privacy as a “universal” good because, again, “everyone has secrets”. Such representations of whistleblowing and disruption only further cement the notion that in our societies no real change is possible because it seems unnecessary. Whistleblowing as an act of revelation needs therefore to be understood as only one small step made by the individual that in the end depends on how society and the government decide to act upon it.References All the President’s Men. Dir. Alan J. Pakula. 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Photo 190773207 / Transplant Medicine © Victor Moussa | Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT Xenotransplant research offers hope to individuals waiting for vital organ transplants. Nascent first-in-human xenotransplantation research trials present unique ethical challenges which may translate into obligations for researchers and special considerations for institutional review boards (IRBs). Contextual vulnerability is an important consideration in reviewing proposed subject selection methods. Some recipients are uniquely prone to receiving an unfair offer to enroll in an experimental clinical trial when excluded from allograft waitlists due to psychosocial or compliance evaluations. These exclusions represent an allocational injustice. Enrolling research subjects subjectively excluded from allotransplantation into xenotransplant research is not a mechanism of fair access but rather an exploitation of an unjustly option-constrained vulnerable group by the clinical transplant system. Carefully considering contextual vulnerability can help researchers and IRBs clarify eligibility criteria for xenograft clinical trials. A requirement for simultaneous allograft co-listing can safeguard the interests of vulnerable potential subjects. INTRODUCTION In the United States, the supply of allogeneic, or human-derived, organs and tissues from living donors and cadavers available for transplant into critically ill individuals is inadequate.[i] Physicians refer only half of potentially eligible patients for transplant evaluation, and the clinical transplant team ultimately waitlists less than 30 percent.[ii] Waitlists are lengthy for those who make it through the evaluation process, and many individuals die while waiting for a transplant.[iii] In contrast to allogeneic transplants, xenotransplantation, from the prefix, xeno- meaning foreign, is the process of taking live organs or tissues from an animal for surgical placement into a human recipient. Xenografts are typically sourced from porcine animals (domestic pigs) or non-human primates (baboons) and range from simple tissues like corneas to complex vital organs like hearts, lungs, or kidneys. Scientists have explored xenotransplantation methods for decades, but research with vital organ xenotransplants has been in largely haphazard and non-controlled studies, which demonstrated only short-duration survival for recipients.[iv] Recent advances using gene modification and improved immunosuppression in single-patient attempts to transplant porcine organs into brain-dead human recipients have presented more realistic human-environment models; however, these modified xenografts have still functioned only for very short durations.[v] The limited bioethics discourse on xenotransplantation centers primarily on the ethical use of high-order animals and the risks of zoonotic infectious disease spread.[vi] Bioethics pays insufficient attention to the potential for exploitation of vulnerable individuals in need of a transplant amid growing interest in phase I clinical trials in living human subjects. Clinician-investigators in contemporary literature repeatedly recommend that these trials enroll subjects who are medically eligible for, but effectively excluded or outright denied access to, an allograft.[vii] The Food & Drug Administration (FDA) recommends xenotransplants be limited to subjects with serious or life-threatening diseases for whom adequately safe and effective alternative therapies are not available.[viii] The ethically salient difference between the investigator and the regulatory recommendations is why alternatives are not available to potential subjects: because transplant centers have subjectively denied access or because there is a clinical contraindication that proves prohibitively risky. In a notable single-patient emergency use authorization, physician-investigators offered a genetically modified porcine heart to a living male recipient after denying him access to the waitlist for a human-donor heart, citing a history of non-compliance.[ix] This case suggests that a person denied access to a transplant waitlist due to subjective compliance criteria is an appropriate research subject. The physician-investigators failed to acknowledge how offering a xenotransplant to a contextually vulnerable subject is potentially unfair. Contextual vulnerability is a specific feature of a research environment that increases a subject’s risk of harm. Bioethics discourse must address this vulnerability within the transplant research environment. This paper describes the current transplant system’s use of subjective evaluation criteria, particularly psychosocial support and compliance. Subjective evaluation criteria perpetuate discriminatory medical biases rather than advance the transplant system’s goal of additional life-years gained. Researchers designing controlled human subject trials and institutional review boards (IRBs) reviewing and approving proposed protocols must consider how disparate waitlisting practices unjustly preclude some patients from a fair opportunity to access an allograft and impacts their participation in research. It is unethical for physician-investigators to intentionally take advantage of this vulnerability, creating an exploitative and unethical transaction.[x] Protocol inclusion criteria requiring proof of simultaneous allograft listing is a feasible procedural safeguard to protect research subjects’ interests. I. Injustices in Organ Allocation Solid organ allocation systems are varied but aim for equity and efficiency in granting individuals with similar claims a fair opportunity to access the scarce resource. Allocation decisions attempt to maximize the common good of additional life-years gained.[xi] The federal oversight of allograft allocation in the US uses objective clinical metrics like blood type, immune compatibility, body size, and geographic distance to match organs to recipients to increase both graft and patient survival.[xii] Transplant centers additionally use their own evaluations to waitlist patients. Although variation exists between transplant center criteria across more objective measurements, such as lab values and concurrent diseases, significant inconsistencies arise in how they incorporate subjective factors like compliance with medical recommendations, psychosocial support, and intellectual disability into the review process.[xiii] Only 7 percent of renal transplant programs use formal criteria for subjective psychosocial assessments, while no pediatric solid organ transplant programs use formal, explicit, or uniform review to assess developmental delays and psychosocial support.[xiv] Failing to establish uniform definitions and inconsistently applying evaluation criteria in the review of potential transplant candidates introduce bias into listing practices.[xv] The center they present to and the variable evaluative criteria the center uses may discount an individual’s claim to a fair opportunity to access a scarce resource. Labeling a patient non-compliant can preclude both a referral to and placement on a waitlist for potentially suitable recipients. Compliance considerations presuppose that graft longevity will be jeopardized by an individual’s failure to adhere to pre- and post-transplant regimens. It is necessary to distinguish individuals who are intentionally non-adherent to treatment regimens and demonstrate willful disregard for medical recommendations from those who are involuntarily non-adherent due to barriers that limit full participation in care plans. The former would not be offered a spot on the waitlist for an allograft, nor would investigators offer them a spot in a xenotransplantation research study. Significant and repeated refusals to participate in treatment plans would confound the ability of researchers to collect necessary data and perform the safety monitoring required by early-phase clinical trials. Enrolling subjects who are medically eligible for a traditional transplant but denied access requires a population that is suitably compliant to participate in a clinical trial reliably and safely yet judged not worthy of receipt of a standard allograft during the evaluation process. The latter population is most disadvantaged by compliance judgments and unsubstantiated outcome predictions. Multi-center research studies have found that moderate non-adherence to immunosuppression regimens is not directly associated with poor kidney transplant outcomes.[xvi] Nor are intellectual and developmental disabilities, conditions for which transplant centers may categorically refuse evaluation, clear indicators of an individual’s ability to comply with treatment regimens.[xvii] Large cohort studies of both pediatric kidney and liver transplant recipients found no correlation between intellectual disability and graft or patient survival.[xviii] Rather, it is the perpetuation of medical biases and quality-of-life judgments that presumptively label specific populations poor transplant candidates or label their support systems insufficient, notwithstanding data demonstrating their ability to achieve successful transplant outcomes.[xix] Variability in compliance assessments and psychosocial support criteria allows medical biases to persist and disproportionately impedes waitlist access to patients from underserved populations.[xx] Low-income Medicaid patients are 2.6 times more likely to be labelled non-compliant as privately insured patients.[xxi] Additionally, the medical records of Black patients are 2.5 times more likely to contain negative descriptors like non-compliant, non-adherent, aggressive, unpleasant, and hysterical than those of white patients.[xxii] The higher prevalence of stigmatizing, compliance-based language in the medical records of minority, economically disadvantaged, and disabled persons decreases the likelihood that they will be recommended for a transplant, referred for an evaluation, placed on a waiting list, or ultimately receive a transplant.[xxiii] These populations are at heightened risk of being used in ethically inappropriate ways by xenograft research that capitalizes on this precluded access. II. Defining Vulnerability Subjective evaluation criteria in allograft waitlisting disproportionately impact some populations. This precluded access to waitlists increases their vulnerability to experience harm in experimental xenotransplant research. Fair subject selection requires the development of specific and appropriate inclusion and exclusion criteria designed to address and minimize known subject vulnerabilities.[xxiv] This process begins with physician-investigators designing research trials and IRB review of proposed trials in which some or all potential subjects are vulnerable.[xxv] The literature has no consensus on defining vulnerability in the clinical or research setting.[xxvi] Prominent guidelines such as the Common Rule and the Declaration of Helsinki focus on a categorical, consent-based approach to assessing vulnerability. The capacity to provide freely given consent is a necessary prerequisite for ethical human subject research. Still, consent alone is insufficient to establish ethical permissibility or assure that a research transaction is fair.[xxvii] Harm can occur even with informed consent if it results from coercion, undue influence, or exploitation.[xxviii] Subjects have limited ability to avoid exploitation and act as an autonomous moral agents under such circumstances. Categorical assessments label groups whose members share salient features, such as prisoners or children, as vulnerable. This shared characteristic may compromise their capacity for free consent and autonomous ability to protect their interests. Although widely used, broad categorizations create monolithic views of populations but lack clarity as to why a particular feature makes one vulnerable or what a given characteristic decidedly renders one vulnerable to.[xxix] Individuals broadly vulnerable in society, such as the severely economically disadvantaged or incarcerated, are not necessarily vulnerable as research subjects in a given proposed trial.[xxx] Categorical vulnerability is insufficient to recognize that research-related harm is specific to a particular subject potentially participating in a given protocol at a definite time and place. III. Assessing for Contextual Vulnerability Ensuring ethical consent, therefore, requires more than an accounting of capacity, competency, and freedom from coercion. This requires looking beyond voluntariness to ask whether the research offer is fair. Contextual vulnerability recognizes and addresses how some subjects are at a heightened risk of being used in ethically inappropriate ways due to research-specific situations and environments.[xxxi] Contextual vulnerability derives from a specific feature of the research environment that increases a subject’s risk of harm rather than an intrinsic categorical condition of that subject. Accounting for contextual vulnerabilities is necessary because it is ethically unsound for a competent subject to give voluntary consent to an offer that is nonetheless unfair or exploitative.[xxxii] Potential subjects excluded from accessing an allograft are contextually vulnerable in a research environment that may view their diminished range of choice as an opportunity for experimental research enrollment. Proposals to exploit or take advantage of this vulnerability places these individuals at a heightened risk of research-related harm. IV. Exploitative Transactions in Xenotransplant Research In the landmark single-patient case in Maryland, a genetically modified porcine heart was offered to the subject only because he was denied access to the allograft waitlist due to a history of noncompliance with a recommended medical regimen.[xxxiii] Physician-investigators did not define how they evaluated compliance, nor did they elaborate on how this claim demonstrated the subject’s clear and convincing contraindication to receive a conventional cardiac allograft. The subject was presented with a so-called Hobson’s choice, in which there is the illusion of free choice but ultimately there is no real choice as only one outcome, the acceptance of the experimental xenograft, is permitted; access to other choices, such as pursuing standard of care waitlisting, have been removed.[xxxiv] This case set a precedent for researchers and IRBs to view individuals denied access to conventional allografts as an appropriate subject population without acknowledgment of how this transaction is consensually exploitative. Consensual exploitation occurs when researchers intentionally and wrongfully take advantage of a subject’s vulnerability.[xxxv] In the cardiac xenotransplant case, the application of subjective evaluation criteria created a unique contextual vulnerability specific to transplant waitlist practices. Investigators took advantage of the subject’s diminished ability to access the heart transplant waitlist to obtain consent for the xenotransplant procedure. Researchers have no obligation to repair unjust conditions that they bear no responsibility for causing.[xxxvi] The wrongfulness in this case is how subjective compliance-based waitlisting criteria precluded the subject from accessing the heart transplant waitlist and denied him fair consideration in accessing the standard clinical option. Then, the transplantation team exploited this disadvantage they were morally responsible for creating. The subject agreed to the terms for an experimental and high-risk xenograft from a place of vulnerability due to the diminished range of choice specifically constructed by the policy and actions of the transplant center. The options offered by the physician-investigators to the patient were manipulated to promote the research system’s interests through the production of new scientific knowledge, not necessarily the subject’s conception of his own good.[xxxvii] V. Recommendation for Simultaneous Allograft Listing Ethical research design calls for assessments of which vulnerabilities and in which contexts researchers and IRBs ought to offer additional safeguards. Subjects should be clinically suitable to produce robust, reliable, and generalizable scientific knowledge and be presented with a fair research offer. Researchers and IRBs can achieve this through an inclusion criterion requiring that a subject has previously been placed on and maintains a spot on a waitlist for a conventional allograft. Investigators and IRBs must ensure that subjects are selected based on scientific rationale, not because they are easy to recruit due to a compromised or vulnerable position.[xxxviii] Evidence of simultaneous allograft listing would provide verification that a researcher expects a potential subject to survive the burdens of an experimental xenotransplant procedure. Individuals of advanced age or with severe life-limiting comorbidities separate from their end-stage organ failure are less likely to survive after receiving an allograft or a research xenograft. These subjects would not produce valuable data in service to the study’s endpoints or knowledge generalizable to broader patient populations. Requiring evidence of simultaneous allograft listing fulfills the ethical requirement that subjects who withdraw consent are not worse off than if they had not pursued research enrollment.[xxxix] If a subject withdraws consent before receiving a xenograft, their continued place on a waitlist ensures that their fair opportunity claim to an allograft has been maintained. Simultaneous allograft waitlisting excludes contextually vulnerable subjects clinically suitable to receive a graft but denied access to a waitlist. This inclusion criteria provides an additional safeguard against unfairly capitalizing on a subject’s marginalized status. Requiring simultaneous allograft listing will narrow the potential subject population to those clinically suitable and well situated to receive a fair opportunity to enroll in research: individuals listed for an allograft but significantly unlikely to receive or to benefit from that allograft. This potential subject population includes individuals with broadly reactive antibodies who are unlikely to match to a donor organ and individuals with anatomical contraindications who face prohibitive risks with standard allografts or bridging therapies.[xl] This subject population aligns with the FDA recommendation to enroll subjects for whom safe and effective alternatives are not available.[xli] These individuals have not had their claim to a fair opportunity transgressed by a subjective evaluation process, nor has their interest in accessing a scarce resource been unjustly discounted.[xlii] Neither the individual nor the transplant clinicians are responsible for creating a clinical or statistical disadvantage to receiving a standard allograft. An offer of research enrollment extended to this population has not been manipulated to favor one party over the other, but rather appropriately considers the interests of both parties.[xliii] Researchers have an interest in identifying subjects capable of producing scientifically valuable knowledge. Potential subjects have an interest in exploring alternatives to the high morbidity of a traditional allograft. This subject population retains the autonomous choice to pursue a standard-of-care allograft or to enroll in xenograft research. Having few treatment options available does not inexorably undermine the voluntariness of research consent or increase vulnerability.[xliv] The consent transaction is not exploitative or unfair because the transplant system is not responsible for creating this diminished range of choice. Simultaneous allograft listing represents an eligibility criterion that responds to and limits the products of subjective decisions from unjustly impacting trial enrollment. VI. Counterargument: Is Something Better Than Nothing? Some may argue that for medically exigent individuals in need of a transplant, any option to participate in research is better than no option. Autonomy and dignity, however, are not advanced when an inability to access the standard of care compels a subject’s decision to pursue experimental research. An offer of research enrollment that is unfair or exploitative remains unethical regardless of whether the subject stands to benefit. Nor should benefit be expected in early-phase research. The goals of phase I research are primarily to collect short-term safety, toxicity, dosing, and pharmacologic data, not to provide efficacious treatment.[xlv] Expanding access to experimental research trials cannot be conflated with fair access to equitable health care.[xlvi] Broadened access alone does not produce a more ethical research environment. Excluding contextually vulnerable subjects from research should not be the end goal, but rather a necessary interim to call attention to the need to redress biases and existing injustices in transplant access. Research that targets a population’s vulnerability serves to enable the continuation of unjust systems. CONCLUSION In summary, the urgent and significant clinical need for transplantable organs cannot undermine the requirements of ethical research design and conduct. Fair subject selection is a requirement of ethical clinical research.[xlvii] Potential subjects enrolled in upcoming xenograft research must be selected for their ability to answer the scientific objectives of a proposed study and must have the capacity to provide freely given informed consent within a fair research environment. Denying access to allotransplants for subjective psychosocial or compliance-based claims creates contextual vulnerability specific to transplant research that perpetuates the unfairness of the organ allocation system. Ethical research that produces valuable scientific knowledge cannot exploit the rights or interests of subjects in the process. A look beyond categorical vulnerability to contextual vulnerability highlights this currently overlooked area of exploitation. - [i] “Organ Donation Statistics,” Health Resources and Services Administration, accessed April 18, 2022, https://www.organdonor.gov/learn/organ-donation-statistics. [ii] Schold, J.D. et al., “Barriers to Evaluation and Wait Listing for Kidney Transplantation,” Clinical Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 6, no. 7 (2011): 1760-67. [iii] Abouna, G.M. “Ethical Issues in Organ Transplantation,” Medical Principles and Practice 12, no. 1 (2003): 54-69. [iv] Anderson, M. “Xenotransplantation: A Bioethical Evaluation,” Journal of Medical Ethics 32, no. 4 (2006): 205-8. [v] Lambert, J. “What Does the First Successful Test of a Pig-to-Human Kidney Transplant Mean?,” ScienceNews, October 22, 2021, https://www.sciencenews.org/article/xenotransplantation-pig-human-kidney-transplant.; Koplon, S. “Xenotransplantation: What It Is, Why It Matters and Where It Is Going,” UAB News, February 17, 2022, https://www.uabmedicine.org/-/xenotransplantation-what-it-is-why-it-matters-and-where-it-is-going. [vi] Anderson, supra; Daar, A.S. “Ethics of Xenotransplantation: Animal Issues, Consent, and Likely Transformation of Transplant Ethics,” World Journal of Surgery 21, no. 9 (1997): 975-82.; Kim, M.K., et al., “The International Xenotransplantation Association Consensus Statement on Conditions for Undertaking Clinical Trials of Xenocorneal Transplantation,” Xenotransplantation 21, no. 5 (2014): 420-30. [vii] Abouna, supra; Pierson, R.N., et al., “Pig-to-Human Heart Transplantation: Who Goes First?,” American Journal of Transplantation 20, no. 10 (2020): 2669-74. [viii] Food and Drug Administration, Source Animal, Product, Preclinical, and Clinical Issues Concerning the Use of Xenotransplantation Products in Humans (Silver Spring, MD, 2016), 43, https://www.fda.gov/media/102126/download. [ix] Wang, W., et al., “First Pig-to-Human Heart Transplantation,” Innovation (Camb) 3, no. 2 (2022): 100223. [x] Carse, A.L. and Little, M.O. “Exploitation and the Enterprise of Medical Research,” in Exploitation and Developing Countries, ed. J. S. Hawkins and E. J. Emanuel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 206-45. [xi] Halpern, S.D. and Goldberg, D.“Allocating Organs to Cognitively Impaired Patients,” New England Journal of Medicine 376, no. 4 (2017): 299-301. [xii] “How We Match Organs,” United Network for Organ Sharing, accessed April 18, 2022, https://unos.org/transplant/how-we-match-organs/. [xiii] UW Medicine Harborview Medical Center – UW Medical Center University of Washington Physicians, Selection Criteria: Kidney Transplant Recipient (Seattle, WA, 2019), 1-3, https://www.uwmedicine.org/sites/stevie/files/2020-11/UW-Medicine-Kidney-Selection-Criteria-UH2701.pdf; Penn Medicine, Kidney Transplant Selection Criteria (Philadelphia, PA: Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania), 1-2. https://www.pennmedicine.org/media/documents/instructions/transplant/kidney_transplant_selection_criteria.ashx. [xiv] Dudzinski, D.M. “Shifting to Other Justice Issues: Examining Listing Practices,” American Journal of Bioethics 4, no. 4 (2004): 35-37.; Richards, C.T., et al., “Use of Neurodevelopmental Delay in Pediatric Solid Organ Transplant Listing Decisions: Inconsistencies in Standards Across Major Pediatric Transplant Centers,” Pediatric Transplant 13, no. 7 (2009): 843-50. [xv] Dudzinski, supra. [xvi] Israni, A.K., et al., “Electronically Measured Adherence to Immunosuppressive Medications and Kidney Function after Deceased Donor Kidney Transplantation,” Clinical Transplantation 25, no. 2 (2011): 124-31. [xvii] National Council on Disability, Organ Transplant Discrimination against People with Disabilities (Washington, DC, 2019), 25-35, https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_Organ_Transplant_508.pdf.; Halpern and Goldberg, supra. [xviii] Wightman, A., et al., “Prevalence and Outcomes of Renal Transplantation in Children with Intellectual Disability,” Pediatric Transplantation 18, no. 7 (2014): 714-19.; Wightman, A., et al., “Prevalence and Outcomes of Liver Transplantation in Children with Intellectual Disability,” Journal of Pediatric Gastroenterology and Nutrition 62, no. 6 (2016): 808-12. [xix] Richards et al., supra; Godown, J., et al., “Heart Transplantation in Children with Down Syndrome,” Journal of the American Heart Association 11, no. 10 (2022): e024883. [xx] Silverman, H. and Odonkor, P.N. “Reevaluating the Ethical Issues in Porcine-to-Human Heart Xenotransplantation,” Hastings Center Report 52, no. 5 (2022): 32-42. [xxi] Sun, M., et al., “Negative Patient Descriptors: Documenting Racial Bias in the Electronic Health Record,” Health Affairs 41, no. 2 (2022): 203-11. [xxii] Ibid. [xxiii] Dudzinski, supra; Garg, P.P., et al., “Reducing Racial Disparities in Transplant Activation: Whom Should We Target?,” American Journal of Kidney Diseases 37, no. 5 (2001): 921-31. [xxiv] Emanuel, E.J., et al., “What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?,” JAMA 283, no. 20 (2000): 2701-11. [xxv] 45 C.F.R. 46.111(b). [xxvi] Hurst, S.A. “Vulnerability in Research and Health Care; Describing the Elephant in the Room?,” Bioethics 22, no. 4 (2008): 191-202. [xxvii] The Nuremberg Code, Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law 2, no. 10: 181-2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949); Kipnis, K. “Vulnerability in Research Subjects: A Bioethical Taxonomy. Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants.,” in Ethical and Policy Issues in Research Involving Human Participants, (Bethesda, MD: National Bioethics Advisory Commission, August 2001), G1-G13. [xxviii] Dickert, N. and Grady, C. “Incentives for Research Participants,” in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, ed. E. J. Emanuel et al. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 386-96. [xxix] Gordon, B.G. “Vulnerability in Research: Basic Ethical Concepts and General Approach to Review,” Ochsner Journal 20, no. 1 (2020): 34-38. [xxx] Kipnis, supra. [xxxi] Hurst, supra. [xxxii] Lamkin, M. and Elliott, C. “Avoiding Exploitation in Phase I Clinical Trials: More Than (Un)Just Compensation,” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 46, no. 1 (2018): 52-63.; Jansen, L.A. “A Closer Look at the Bad Deal Trial: Beyond Clinical Equipoise,” Hastings Center Report 35, no. 5 (2005): 29-36. [xxxiii] Wang et al., supra; Silverman and Odonkor, supra. [xxxiv] Silverman and Odonkor, supra. [xxxv] Carse and Little, supra. [xxxvi] Wertheimer, A. “Exploitation in Clinical Research,” in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, ed. E. J. Emanuel et al. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 201-210. [xxxvii] Brock, D.W. “Philosophical Justifications of Informed Consent in Research,” in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, ed. E. J. Emanuel et al. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 606-612. [xxxviii] Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, International Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving Humans (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2016), https://cioms.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf. [xxxix] Ibid. [xl] Pierson et al., supra. [xli] Food and Drug Administration, supra. [xlii] Hurst, supra. [xliii] Kipnis, supra. [xliv] Hawkins, J.S. and Emanuel, E.J. “Introduction: Why Exploitation?,” in Exploitation and Developing Countries, ed. J. S. Hawkins and E. J. Emanuel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Universiy Pres, 2008), 1-20. [xlv] Muglia, J.J. and DiGiovanna, J.J. “Phase 1 Clinical Trials,” Journal of Cutaneous Medicine and Surgery 2, no. 4 (1998): 236-41. [xlvi] Dresser, R. “The Role of Patient Advocates and Public Representatives in Research,” in The Oxford Textbook of Clinical Research Ethics, ed. E. J. Emanuel et al. (Oxford University Press, 2008), 231-41. [xlvii] MacKay, D. and Saylor, K.W. “Four Faces of Fair Subject Selection,” The American Journal of Bioethics 20, no. 2 (2020): 5-19.