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Iremiren, Benjamin Akhigbe. "Governance, corruption and economic development : reflections on corruption and anti-corruption initiatives in Nigeria". Thesis, Loughborough University, 2011. https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/2134/9098.
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This thesis is about the complex relationship between governance, corruption and economic development. It seeks to extend the literature via exploring the complex web of connections between corruption, development and the quality of political institutions in the specific case of Nigeria. In so doing the thesis explores some of the limitations of mainstream approaches to corruption and postulates that, rather than being a simple issue of rent-seeking that requires a prescription of orthodox economic policy reforms, corruption is an issue that requires contextualizing within the evolution of particular political cultures in specific places and a sensitivity to the impacts of culture on the definitions, causes and impacts of corruption. The thesis also reflects upon the impacts of market reforms on the opportunities for corrupt activity and the potential role of civil society in rendering anti-corruption interventions more effective. Accordingly, the thesis places the current high-profile debates over corruption and poor governance in Nigeria within an historical analysis of the patterns of governance in Nigeria over the years since independence in order to understand the intricate issues surrounding the historical, cultural and socio-political context of the problems of governance and corruption and their influence on anti-corruption reforms in the Nigerian context. Data were collected and analyzed using both qualitative and quantitative methods; the methods used in data collection included questionnaires and in particular a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews with key political stakeholders. The analysis culminates in an extensive exploration of the anti-corruption measures and strategies adopted by Nigerian administrations and the efforts of the international organisations which have supported them in tackling corruption.
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Gofur, A. "Rethinking corruption". Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2013. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1389943/.
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It is generally agreed by policymakers and scholars alike that corruption is a form of misconduct which merits criminalisation. But definitions of corruption vary widely and there is no consensus on what constitutes corruption. Theorising about corruption is therefore a valuable exercise because it promotes greater understanding of this important concept. For example, it enables us to clarify the issues for debates about criminalisation, it assists with fair labelling of wrongdoing, and it helps in establishing coherent penalty regimes through accurate identification of the harms involved in corruption. But in order to theorise about corruption, we must have a complete picture of the harm which results from such conduct, and this in turn requires us to identify the interests being set back and their relationship to the wrongdoing involved. The scholarship on corruption is defective in this respect because it fails to provide a complete account of the harm which results from corruption. The dominant bodies of non-legal literature tend to argue that corruption results in remote harms to public interests. They assume but fail to provide a detailed account of the primary and indirect harms suffered by those innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption. By contrast, the legal literature has tended to focus almost exclusively on the wrongdoing in corruption. But this approach is incomplete because it not only fails to acknowledge that corruption harms innocent actors by setting back their interests, it also fails to emphasise the connection between such harming and the wrongdoing which also results from corruption. This thesis addresses these omissions by articulating a coherent theory of the harm in corruption. Using a three-part analytical framework, it analyses a number of core cases of corruption, and uncovers the harm and wrongdoing caused by such conduct (particularly to those innocent actors who are not engaged in corruption).
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Turer, Ahmet. "Combating Corruption: A Comparison of National Anti-Corruption Efforts". Thesis, University of North Texas, 2003. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4247/.
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The primary goal of this thesis is to provide a comparative analysis of the institutional and organizational mechanisms designed to monitor and control political corruption at the national level. The paper will provide comparisons of these arraignments and control systems across three nations. The thesis will identify differences across countries in terms of organizational and institutional political corruption control mechanisms, and use the CPI index to suggest and identify those control mechanisms that appear to be present in nations with low CPI measurements. Finally, the thesis will conclude with the discussion concerning the future prospects for controlling political corruption in Turkey based on the comparative analysis described above.
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Wong, Kam-bill. "Corruption in Japan". Click to view the E-thesis via HKUTO, 1998. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record/B3197871X.
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Holmgren, Veronika. "Women and Corruption". Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Sociologiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-117659.
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In this paper, two assumptions about corruption levels are examined, theoretically explained and empirically tested for. The first assumption is that a higher percentage of women in the lower house in countries would decrease the level of corruption in a country. The meaning of “lower house” are in example the parliament and ministries, depending on how the country’s government looks like. If the country is governed with a parliamentary system, the lower house represent the parliament in itself and the ministry’s that comes with it and if the country is governed with a presidential system the lower house is seen as the second chamber and the institutions that goes with the chamber. The second assumption is that a country who is governed democratically would also have lower corruption levels. These assumptions are explained by studies and theories from de Beauvoir (1973), Harris and Jenkins (2006), Rudebeck (2013) and Rothstein (2014) amongst others. To examine the outcome, a cross-sectional dataset from the Quality of Government Institute is used and the results are shown in three models. The results show that if tested for nothing else than the percentage of women in the lower house and democracy levels, they both have a positive impact on corruption levels in countries, in other words reduce predicted corruption levels, but with a low variance explained in the dependent variable. When checked for other factors, such as an anti-corruption laws, the effects of women in lower houses becomes insignificant and democracy goes from giving a positive impact to giving a negative impact. This is probably because the anti-corruption laws becomes an intermediate variable and thus take most of the effect from the other two variables.
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黃錦標 e Kam-bill Wong. "Corruption in Japan". Thesis, The University of Hong Kong (Pokfulam, Hong Kong), 1998. http://hub.hku.hk/bib/B3197871X.
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Yousefi, Hana. "Corruption and inflation". Thesis, University of Exeter, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/10871/18006.
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Public sector corruption is endemic in many economies and is frequently cited as a cause of poor economic performance. Corruption hinders the completion of beneficial transactions and distorts the outcomes of economic policies. It can also affect the policy choices of governments as they attempt to counteract the consequences of corruption. Excessive inflation may be a negative side effect of corruption if the government compensates for lost revenue by increasing the rate of monetary expansion to exploit seigniorage. There is convincing empirical evidence from cross-section studies that inflation and corruption are positively correlated. It has been suggested that this is a consequence of governments in corrupt economies turning to the use of seigniorage as a method of raising revenue (Al-Marhubi, 2000). This seems a likely route through which the correlation can arise, but the mechanism at work has not received any theoretical attention. In particular, there has been no demonstration that an optimizing government will rationally exploit seigniorage as a response to corruption. The contribution of this study is an analysis of this issue in theoretical models in which the growth rate of money supply is chosen by an optimizing government. Although an empirical analysis is undertaken to explore the relationship between corruption and inflation in chapter one, the main focus of the study is on chapters three, four, and five where theoretical analysis plays the principal role in the research.
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Dahlström, Tobias. "Causes of corruption". Doctoral thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Nationalekonomi, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-31974.
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This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four essays. Although possible to read individually they all analyse the causes of corruption and hence complement each other. The four essays collectively illustrate the complex nature of corruption. Often many interrelated factors work together in causing corruption. Hence, discovering how these factors, individually and together, cause corruption is vital in combating corruption. The first essay helps to explain the path dependency of corruption. It shows that even if the legal system and enforcement level in a corrupt country or organisation is altered to become identical to that in a non corrupt, the level of corruption may not converge. The second essay analyses how the decision making structure influences corruption. It is found that even though the profits of corruption may be monotonically related to changes in the organisational structure the incidence of corruption is not necessarily so. The third essay looks on how corruption may spread between different organisations or countries as they interact with each other, with corrupt/non corrupt behaviour being more likely to be transmitted from successful to nonsuccessful entities than vice versa. The fourth and final essay investigates how the freedom of information can impact on corruption. Looking on both regulatory and technical constraints on information flows, the conclusion is that relaxation of both constraints simultaneously is needed to combat corruption.
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Ghazi, Faezeh. "Corruption and Growth". Bowling Green State University / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=bgsu1410522823.
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Kajsiu, Blendi. "A discourse analysis of corruption : sustaining neoliberalism against corruption in Albania". Thesis, University of Essex, 2012. https://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.549298.
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Johnsøn, Jesper Stenberg. "Corruption and stabilisation : aid agencies' anti-corruption strategies in fragile states". Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.708377.
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Pirlea, Ana Florina. "Economic growth and corruption". Diss., Connect to the thesis, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/10066/1020.
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Cordis, Adriana S. "Judicial checks on corruption". Connect to this title online, 2008. http://etd.lib.clemson.edu/documents/1211388402/.
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Gantsou, Ossebi Sophonie Lemec. "Corruption et trafic d'influence /". Villeneuve d' Ascq : Presses Univ. du Septentrion, 2001. http://www.gbv.de/dms/sbb-berlin/341267864.pdf.
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Arsenis, Panagiotis. "Three essays on corruption". Thesis, University of Leicester, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2381/28595.
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This thesis is a study on corruption from an economics perspective. Corruption is defined as the misuse of power in public office for private gain. Unfortunately, its obscure nature makes it difficult to identify and fight it. The thesis’ aim is to increase our understanding of its mechanics and help toward this direction. In particular, it consists of three different studies, which focus on the causes of corruption, its consequences and measurement. The first section investigates whether political leaders are empirically associated with governance, one of its constituent elements being corruption. The results show that leaders do matter for bureaucratic quality and the rule of law, especially in autocratic regimes. Corruption does not seem to be affected by leaders though, which is an outcome probably driven by the data inadequacies and the inherent features of malfeasance. The second part elaborates on corruption as a driving force behind a salient feature of demographic transition. This is the dilemma that parents face whether to improve their children’s education or increase the size of their families. Corruption can affect their decision since it impedes the provision of public services important for the development of human capital. The model shows that higher levels of corruption increase fertility, diminish human capital and lower growth. Additionally, the model offers an explanation for the empirical observation of volatile fertility rates. Finally, the last study explores the measurement of malfeasance. Initially, a new dataset is built including measures of perceived corruption along with survey questions. A sample of 10 measures is chosen taking into consideration their nature and reliability. An advanced statistical model is applied to this sample in order to construct a new index of corruption, whose scores are accompanied by their measurement errors as well. The strength of the new index is its ability to combine the knowledge of numerous scholars and analysts who examine corruption. In addition, the model is equipped with tools that make feasible the comparison of the constituent measures’ different levels and reliability on the same underlying scale.
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Cartier-Bresson, Jean. "L'économie de la corruption". Paris 13, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996PA131017.
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La corruption est un cas particulier de modeles d'agence. Pour la majorite des economistes, a partir des travaux de l'economie du crime, et sur la "rent-seeking society" nous avons un marche de la corruption ou l'offre et la demande sont soumis a une contrainte de sanction. Ces auteurs ne traitent que d'echanges ponctuels et inorganises d'agents impersonnels (corruption troc), alors que le phenomene commence a poser un probleme economique et politique quand il s'institutionnalise, se personalise (corruption relationnelle ou echange-social) et s'organise a partir des reseaux sociaux legaux du clientelisme, permettant des echanges non specifies et compensables dans le temps de facon indetermine. Notre these - a la suite d'une presentation des grandes controverses et d'une presentation critique de la litterature economique existante - offre une theorie des reseaux de corruption qui se developpent a partir de modalites de coordination hybridesCorruption is a particular case of agency models. To the majority of economists, and according to works on the economics of crime and rent-seeking society, we have a market for corruption where supply and demand are subjected to constraints of sanction. These authors treat only occasional and unorganised exchanges between impersonal agents (market corruption), whereas the phenomenon begins to pose an economic and a political problem when it becomes institutionalized, when it is personalized (pariochal corruption or social exchange corruption) and when it organizes itself through the legal social network of clientelism, thus allowing for non-specific and compensable exchanges over time in an undetermined manner. Our thesis, after a presentation of great controversies and a critical approach of existing economic literature, offers a theory of corruption networks that spread from the modalities of hybrid coordination
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Orjales, Andres Penovi. "Fútbol, Politics, and Corruption". Thesis, Virginia Tech, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/99049.
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This thesis explores how football (soccer) is used as a tool to promote corruption within political and economic institutions in Latin America and Europe. By drawing on international political and economic policies and analyzing work that theorizes how neoliberalism is not only an outside force that highly influences the state, but also shapes power relationships in society that are procreated by every day economic actions of the working class, this research aims to provide a more theoretically informed perspective on global politics. This thesis also examines how entrepreneurial endeavors can lead to relations of exploitation, extraction and economic dispossession in broader political society. More specifically, it analyses neoliberalism in Argentina and Germany through the perspective of state power, informal economies, and international migration. Lastly, this research portrays the mindset of Argentine and German politicians over the last century by analyzing the actions of the elites within the football clubs and organizations under the guise of entrepreneurship.Master of Arts
This thesis aims to understand the corrupt ways in which football (soccer) is used within Latin America and Europe to illicitly gain political and economic power. More specifically, it aims at analyzing neoliberalism in Argentina and Germany through the perspective of state power, informal economies, and international migration. The aim of this research is to understand how the footballing industry can lead to relations of manipulation, extraction, and economic impoverishment within broader society seen through the connections between politicians, club officials, and third party illicit actors.
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Barber, Cary Michael. "A Case for Corruption". The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1276796676.
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Ernst, Evan David. "How Corruption Affects Growth". Ohio Dominican University Honors Theses / OhioLINK, 2020. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=oduhonors1608241150479265.
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Gantsou, Ossebi Sophonie Lemec. "Corruption et trafic d'influence". La Rochelle, 1999. http://www.theses.fr/1999LAROD005.
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La législation pénale française punit le fait par une personne chargée d'une fonction publique ou privée de solliciter, d'agréer ou de recevoir une rémunération dans le but soit d'accomplir ou de s'abstenir d'accomplir un acte de sa fonction ou facilité par elle (corruption passive), soit d'accomplir un acte de son influence réelle ou supposée (trafic d'influence passif). La corruption active consiste à offrir ou à remettre une telle rémunération, et à céder à l'invitation du corrompu. Le trafic d'influence actif est constitué par des faits identiques néanmoins, il est spécifique ; son but est l'achat d'un acte d'influence. La présente thèse étudie et met en rapport la corruption passive et active et le trafic d'influence passif et actif. La proximité réciproque unique de ces deux délits commande une présentation regroupée. L’approche juridique, seule satisfaisante, a été retenue à l'exclusion des approches économique, politique, sociologique, etc. Car, elle privilégie l'analyse des caractéristiques des faits délictueux et le rôle des personnes impliquées dans les poursuites judiciaires (civiles, pénales, administratives. . . ). La thèse fait de ces deux délits une analyse plus large qu'un simple regard pénal. La réflexion a consisté à faire le point sur les instruments ou stratégies d'analyse de la responsabilité et de l'indemnisation, afin de répondre aux problèmes de fond soulevés par ces deux notions. La première partie est consacrée à la responsabilité. La deuxième partie traite du problème de l'existence ou non de victimes personnalisées dans ces deux infractions.
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Badinger, Harald, e Elisabeth Nindl. "Globalization and Corruption, revisited". Wiley, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/twec.12156.
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This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing on the role of globalisation and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995-2005 point to three main results: (i) Detection technologies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital and political rights reduce corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption; (ii) Globalisation (in terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more pronounced in developing countries; (iii) Inequality increases corruption, and once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalisation on corruption is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalisation - besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition - affects corruption also by reducing inequality.
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Faller, Julie Kathleen. "Essays on Political Corruption". Thesis, Harvard University, 2015. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17467300.
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This dissertation presents three essays offering explanations for the persistence of corruption despite electoral competition.
The first essay, co-authored with Adam Glynn and Nahomi Ichino, asks what the effect of electoral systems is on corruption. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003) proposed that plurality electoral systems should lead to lower corruption compared to proportional representation (PR) systems because the former creates a direct link between voters and politicians whom voters can hold accountable for corruption. The empirical question re- mains unresolved, however, in part due to the endogeneity of the electoral institutions and difficulties in measuring corruption. Using nonparametric methods and new data to reduce sensitivity to these problems, we find no evidence for this hypothesis. Instead, we find some evidence in the opposite direction, that PR leads to less corruption.
The second essay makes a theoretical distinction between voters’ perceptions of the corruption of the political system and of individual politicians. Evidence from original interviews and focus group discussions, as well as public opinion data shows that many Ugandan citizens perceive their political system to be highly corrupt. In particular, they perceive corrupt acts to be widespread, do not expect perpetrators to be punished, and have difficulty distinguishing “honest” candidates. These characteristics cause voters who perceive the system to be highly corrupt to be less likely to punish overtly corrupt individuals by withdrawing electoral support. In some cases, they even prefer clearly corrupt candidates.
The third essay argues that to understand when voters hold politicians accountable for corruption, it is necessary to understand who they perceive to be corrupt. It presents evidence from a survey experiment showing that American voters perceive copartisan politicians to be less corrupt than those from the other political party or without a party label. This pattern is consistent with motivated reasoning in which voters expend extra cognitive resources to process information that contradicts their partisan leanings rather than from the use of party labels as heuristics to avoid cognitive burdens. Furthermore, I show that the ideological orientation of the media source reporting allegations of corruption affects whether they are viewed as credible. Counterstereotypical allegations – i.e., those that come from a media source that is ideologically similar to the politician – are taken more seriously by respondents. In fact, when partisans view counterstereotypical allegations, they exhibit less bias toward copartisans. In sum, this research demonstrates that in-group favoritism poses a challenge to democratic accountability, but that motivated reasoning is bounded by the evidence voters view, and thus that media sources with well-known ideological ori- entations may serve a particularly important role in encouraging democratic accountability among their bases.Government
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Badinger, Harald, e Elisabeth Nindl. "Globalization, Inequality, and Corruption". WU Vienna University of Economics and Business, 2012. http://epub.wu.ac.at/3521/1/wp139.pdf.
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This paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing
on the role of globalization and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102
countries over the period 1995-2005 point to three main results: i) Detection technologies,
reflected in a high level of development, human capital, and political rights reduce
corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption. ii) Globalization (in
terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which
is more pronounced in developing countries. iii) Inequality increases corruption, and
once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalization on corruption
is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalization - besides reducing
corruption through enhanced competition - affects corruption also by reducing
inequality.Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series
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Shalabi, Yasser. "Corruption and Economic Growth". Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-44065.
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In the last two or three decades, corruption has become a noticeable issue in many countries, especially in developing countries where it has serious effects on the economy. In this paper, the effect of corruption on economic growth will be examined through literature and researches that involve the effect of corruption in economic growth followed by cross-sectional regression analysis to the issue. The focus will be on how much corruption and how much corruption control are present for each country. other different variables that could be expected to affect the economic growth for this period will also, be examined. To answer this question, corruption control as an independent variable while economic growth is the dependent variable will be examined. The second question would be to study corruption control as a dependent variable while using a set of variables as independent variables and see how much they would affect corruption control. Finally, a case study that draws a comparison between the economy in Germany and South Korea where the results from the empirical part will be applied to the two countries and the difference between the true reported numbers and the numbers from the OLS equations will be checked and explained. From all the directions been taken to study the subject “literatures, empirical and case study “ the results showed that corruption activities have negative effects on economic growth and although it might be in some cases shown to be insignificant, however, it is very important to minimize the corruption activities by boosting variables such as corruption control, rule of law, stability and also education as it is shown that the more years of education will decrease the levels of corruption in some cases. The conclusion here will be, although corruption may have more effects in some economies more than others, to combat corruption that will take a global effort. The countries that may not suffer greatly from it may be caught in the cost of cleaning it by having to support failed economies. Or worse, corruption may be increased to levels that it could not be ignored.
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Maciel, Gustavo Gouvêa. "Legal corruption: a way to explain citizens' perceptions about the relevance of corruption". Master's thesis, Universidade de Aveiro, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10773/17109.
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Mestrado em Ciência PolíticaCorruption, a word with an illicit identity that represents a major public problem for citizens. In fact, this apparent unquestionable common sense statement does permeate recent political discourses or even cutting-edge academic research. But, indeed, what may be wrong with this well-accepted assertion? And why is it characterized as a possible mistaken assumption? Both questions can be summed up in one direct answer: corruption is much more than illegalities, it is also a ‘beyond the law’ concern with social implications. Little attention has been given to evaluate corruption as an exclusive combination of pure licit behaviors. This alternative approach has always assumed a marginal or even complementary status in the comprehension of the phenomenon. This thesis affirms that illegalities offer a relevant, but incomplete contribution. For this reason, they must be set aside in order to unveil how legalities affect citizens’ perceptions about corruption as a whole. Undoubtedly, it is easier to establish objective parameters to limit the measurement of corruption to a mere evaluation of prosecutions, condemnations, or even perceptions about the commitment of illegal actions. However, corrupt behaviors proved to be resilient essentially because of their capacity to resemble both socially and normatively accepted as necessary for the ordinary democratic political operation. A renewed methodological approach is here proposed to demonstrate why legality in corruption matters. Thus, legal corruption must be put in evidence in order to verify how corruption appears as a pervasive, adaptable, dangerous for politics, and widely accepted major problem, especially in the public sector. Such methodology does not aim to incorporate ‘beyond the law’ elements in a broader corruption measurement, as usually attempted. On the contrary, it will isolate what is considered purely lawful, although corrupt, to deeply explore its specific effects on citizens’ perceptions. In essence, this thesis aims to show that legalities are more important to define the relevance of corruption than illicitness. It also wants to identify what should count as sufficient to determine such legal corruption. In this context, socioeconomic factors proved to be fundamental, especially ‘Internet Usage’ and ‘Wastefulness of Government Spending’. Finally, it is possible to conclude that legality in corruption can be unveiled by simply asking citizens if they consider corruption a relevant problem in the public sector of advanced democracies or quasi-democracies, instead of asking directly about specific dimensions of corruption. It is also possible to perceive if corruption is a relevant public problem without directly asking citizens about corruption, but about general socially accepted misconducts with regards to legal corruption, such as the necessity of establishing personal contacts to get things done; the capacity of distorting rules, norms, and statutes in order to make private interests resemble licit and politically acceptable; and the governments’ ability to do what tradespeople want without hindering citizens’ wills.
Corrupção, uma palavra com identidade ilícita que representa um grande problema para os cidadãos. De facto, esta afirmação – aparentemente inquestionável e baseada no senso comum – permeia discursos políticos recentes ou até mesmo pesquisas académicas de ponta. Mas, em verdade, o que pode estar errado com esta afirmação tradicionalmente aceite? E por que caracterizá-la como equivocada? Ambas as questões podem ser resumidas em uma única e objetiva resposta: corrupção não se refere tão somente a ilegalidades, mas também a interesses ‘para além da lei’ que possuem implicações sociais. Pouca atenção tem sido dada à avaliação da corrupção sob uma perspetiva meramente lícita. Esta abordagem alternativa sempre foi marginal ou mesmo complementar. Esta tese afirma que a caracterização da corrupção como algo ilegal oferece uma contribuição relevante, mas incompleta para o entendimento do fenómeno. Por esta razão, deve ser posta de lado, a fim de se desvendar como apenas as legalidades afetam as perceções dos cidadãos sobre a corrupção como um todo. Sem dúvida, é mais fácil estabelecer parâmetros objetivos para limitar a medição da corrupção a uma mera avaliação de processos, de execuções penais ou mesmo de perceções sobre o cometimento de atos ilegais. Entretanto, o comportamento corrupto se mostra resiliente essencialmente devido à sua capacidade de parecer socialmente e normativamente aceite como necessário ao normal funcionamento político democrático. Uma renovada abordagem metodológica é aqui proposta para demonstrar a importância do papel da legalidade perante a corrupção. Logo, a corrupção legal deve ser colocada em evidência para que seja possível verificar como a corrupção (em sentido mais amplo) aparece como um invasivo, adaptável, politicamente perigoso e amplamente aceite problema, especialmente no setor público. Tal metodologia não pretende incorporar elementos ‘para além da lei’ em uma mensuração mais alargada da corrupção, como é usualmente feito. Pelo contrário, ela isolará o que é considerado puramente legal, embora corrupto, para explorar mais detalhadamente seus efeitos específicos sobre as perceções dos cidadãos. Em essência, esta tese pretende mostrar que as legalidades são mais importantes para definir a relevância da corrupção do que as ilegalidades. Também busca identificar o que deve contar como suficiente para determinar essa tal corrupção legal. Neste contexto, fatores socioeconómicos provaram ser fundamentais, especialmente aqueles relacionados ao ‘Uso da Internet’ e ao ‘Desperdício dos Gastos do Governo".
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Xu, Gang. "Essays on the Political Economy of Corruption and Anti-corruption : Evidence from China". Kyoto University, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/244507.
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Henri, Brigitte. "La corruption : un mal endémique /". Lyon : l'Hermès, 2002. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb388558171.
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Yiu, Yee-ling. "Corruption in the public sector in Hong Kong and the Philippines". [Hong Kong : University of Hong Kong], 1993. http://sunzi.lib.hku.hk/hkuto/record.jsp?B13641360.
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Farouz-Chopin, Frédérique. "La lutte contre la corruption /". Perpignan : Presses universitaires de Perpignan, 2003. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb39098350s.
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Schmid, Carola. "Korruption, Gewalt und die Welt der Polizisten Deutschland, Chile, Bolivien und Venezuela im Vergleich /". Frankfurt am Main : Vervuert, 2007. http://catalog.hathitrust.org/api/volumes/oclc/123126185.html.
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Sun, Yunbo. "A chronic political illness, an analysis of corruption and anti-corruption in contemporary China". Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp04/mq23520.pdf.
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Kearns, Sean. "Communicating Anti-Corruption - An Analysis of Transparency International's Role in the Anti-Corruption Industry". Thesis, Malmö högskola, Fakulteten för kultur och samhälle (KS), 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mau:diva-23637.
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Corruption is an increasingly important factor in development. Despite a range of initiatives to address the issue, few anti-corruption initiatives to date have had a positive impact. Popular definitions of corruption are reductive, normative, and economics-based, and common ways of addressing corruption are also deficient. In addition, local contextual factors are often not taken into consideration in anti- corruption initiatives. The present study focuses on the most influential non- governmental organization in the anti-corruption industry, Transparency International (TI). The study is based on a social constructivist approach to knowledge and employs a combination of Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis and Philipp Mayring’s qualitative content analysis to a single TI initiative to answer the question Do Transparency International’s youth anti-corruption initiatives neglect local contextual factors? The study’s findings are inconclusive: Social actors’ agency is encouraged, but cultural norms are neglected.
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Brügger, Esther. "On corruption and illegal strategies". [S.l.] : [s.n.], 2004. http://www.zb.unibe.ch/download/eldiss/04bruegger_e.pdf.
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Bayar, Guzin. "Corruption-a Game Theoretical Analysis". Phd thesis, METU, 2003. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/678664/index.pdf.
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Corruption is an important social and ethical problemfight with it requires changes in values, norms and behavioral patterns of the society. This is usually a long and difficult process. Decades should pass to change deep values of a society. In the mean time, it is possible to combat corruption by changing incentive structures in the economy. If deep causes of the problem are analyzed carefully, a new system of governance can be established, such that, even most opportunist individuals do not find getting involved in corrupt practices profitable. Aim of this thesis is to examine characteristics of the system providing a fertile environment for corruption and to figure out factors stimulating corrupt transactions using game theoretical models. The first two models examine corruption as a kind of transaction between the briber and the bribee. In the models, it is shown that intermediaries sector occur from the profit maximization behavior of agents. This sector, by establishing long term, trust based relationships with bureaucrats, decreases risks occurring from the fact that the two parties involved in a corrupt transaction do not know each other perfectly. This sector, by reducing the likelihood of detection, serves corrupt transactions, and in return for the service it provided, takes commission, so gets benefit. Third model examines a strange type of corruption, a case of (spurious) middlemen obtaining bribe from the public service bureaucrats give, by pretending that he has influence on the acceptance or speed of it. The model tries to detect the characteristics of the environment making such a deception process persistent.
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Feng, Ye. "Combating corruption : a Chinese perspective". Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.595814.
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Noone, Gregory P. "An analysis of transnational corruption". Morgantown, W. Va. : [West Virginia University Libraries], 2007. https://eidr.wvu.edu/etd/documentdata.eTD?documentid=5524.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2007.Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 245 p. Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 200-224).
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Noh, Hyung Gyoo. "Economic analysis of bureaucratic corruption". Connect to resource, 1991. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view.cgi?acc%5Fnum=osu1261420867.
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Viceisza, Angelino Casio. "Essays on Corruption and Preferences". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2008. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/econ_diss/49.
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This dissertation comprises three essays. The theme that unifies them is "experiments on corruption and preferences." The first essay (chapter 2) reports theory-testing experiments on the effect of yardstick competition (a form of government competition) on corruption. The second essay (chapter 3) reports theory-testing experiments on the effect of efficiency and transparency on corruption. Furthermore, this essay revisits the yardstick competition question by implementing an alternative experimental design and protocol. Finally, the third essay (chapter 4) reports a theory-testing randomized field experiment that identifies the causes and consequences of corruption. The first essay finds the following. Theoretically, the paper derives a main proposition which suggests that institutions with more noise give rise to an increase in corrupt behavior and a decrease in voter welfare. Empirically, the paper finds a few key results. First, there are an initial nontrivial proportion of good incumbents in the population. This proportion goes down as the experiment session progresses. Secondly, a large proportion of bad incumbents make theoretically inconsistent choices given the assumptions of the model. Third, overall evidence of yardstick competition is mild. Yardstick competition has little effect as a corruption-taming mechanism when the proportion of good incumbents is low. Namely, an institution that is characterized by a small number of good incumbents has little room for yardstick competition, since bad incumbents are likely to be replaced by equally bad incumbents. Thus, incumbents have less of an incentive to build a reputation. This is also the case in which (1) yardstick competition leads to non-increasing voter welfare and (2) voters are more likely to re-elect bad domestic incumbents. Finally, a partitioning of the data by gender suggests that males and females exhibit different degrees of learning depending on the payoffs they face. Furthermore, male voter behavior exhibits mild evidence of yardstick competition when voters face the pooling equilibrium payoff. The second essay finds the following. First, efficiency is an important determinant of corruption. A decrease in efficiency makes it more costly for incumbents to "do the right thing." This drives them to divert maximum rents. While voters retaliate slightly, voters tend to be worse off. Secondly, increased lack of a particular form of transparency (as defined in terms of an increase in risk in the distribution of the unit cost) leaves corrupt incumbent behavior unchanged. In particular, if the draw of the unit cost is unfavorable, incumbents tend to be less corrupt. Third, there is strong evidence of yardstick competition. On the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism if the incumbent is female. On the voter's side, voters are less likely to re-elect the incumbent in the presence of yardstick competition. Specifically, voters pay attention to the difference between the tax signal in their own jurisdiction and that in another. As this difference increases, voters re-elect less. This gives true meaning to the concept of "benchmarking." Finally, the analysis sheds light on the role of history and beliefs on behavior. Beliefs are an important determinant of incumbents' choices. If an incumbent perceives a tax signal to be associated with a higher likelihood of re-election, he is more likely to choose it. On the voter's side, history tends to be important. In particular, voters are more likely to vote out incumbents as time progresses. This suggests that incumbents care about tax signals because they provide access to re-elections while voters use the history of taxes and re-elections in addition to current taxes to formulate their re-election decisions. Finally, the third essay finds the following. First, 19.08% of mail is lost. Secondly, money mail is more likely to be lost at a rate of 20.90% and this finding is significant at the 10% level. This finding suggests that loss of mail is systematic (non-random), which implies that this type of corruption is due to strategic behavior as opposed to plain shirking on the part of mail handlers. Third, we find that loss of mail is non-random across other observables. In particular, middle-income neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost (money) mail. Also, female heads of household in low-income neighborhoods are more likely to experience lost mail while female heads of household in high-income neighborhoods are much less likely to experience lost (money) mail. Finally, this form of corruption is costly to different stakeholders. The sender of mail bears a direct and an indirect cost. The direct cost is the value of the mail. The indirect cost is the cost of having to switch carriers once mail has been lost. Corruption is also costly to the intended mail recipient as discussed above. Finally, corruption is costly the mail company (SERPOST) in terms of lost revenue and to society in terms of loss of trust. Overall, the findings suggest that public-private partnerships need not increase efficiency by reducing corruption; particularly, when the institution remains a monopoly. Increased efficiency in mail delivery is likely to require (1) privatization and (2) competition; otherwise, the monopolist has no incentive to provide better service and loss of mail is likely to persist.
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D'Agostino, G. "Government expenditure, corruption and growth". Thesis, University of the West of England, Bristol, 2013. http://eprints.uwe.ac.uk/22804/.
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This thesis has undertaken a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between public spending and economic growth in a neoclassical framework. The focus of the analysis has been to underline two different rules that determine the allocation of public resources across different categories of expenditure. The first rule considers the effective needs of each category and their productivity, relative to the other categories and to private capital. This allows the effect of each category of expenditure on the growth rate of the economy, when productive, to be determined. Following this line of argument, the standard model (a model which only includes this rule) pre- dicts a non-linear relationship between the components of public spending and economic growth, justifying both positive and negative impacts of these components on the economy’s growth rate. When applied to the defence sector, this model can show that the contradictory results found in the literature for the relationship between military burden and economic growth may be explained by an excessive amount of resources attributed to this sector, when its productivity level is lower than that of the other parts of the public sector. A second rule that drives public allocation decisions is not linked to any economic considerations, but to the possibility for the politician can collect bribes by misallocating public resources. As pointed out by many researchers, it is easier to collect bribes from infrastructure projects or highly sophisticated defence equipment than textbooks or teachers’ salaries. In other areas, such as health, this picture is less clear-cut, as opportunities to collect bribes may be abundant in the procurement of hospital buildings, but more limited in the payment of doctors’ and nurses’ salaries. This differential impact of corruption can be used to explain the non-linearities that emerge in the standard model. The underlying conjecture is that, since corruption has a nega- tive impact on growth and given that politicians may favour less productive public sectors, the complementarities between these two mechanisms may explain the low growth rates in those countries in which corruption is more endemic. A related contribution in the thesis is to consider the way corruption is introduced into estimated of growth equations. While several recent papers have considered the underlying causes and consequences of corruption, little (and only recent) attention has been given to the methodological question of how ”corruption” is measured by international organisations and whether there construction of indices may bias empirical results and suggestions for policy. The final part of the thesis considers these issues.
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Baymul, Cinar. "Perceived income inequality and corruption". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:aafe740b-e166-491c-ab2d-95645f034436.
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The theories linking income inequality to corruption are numerous, yet economists mostly fail to support them with empirical evidence. In this thesis, we argue that the primary reason why empirical studies find no significant link between income inequality and corruption is the conceptual difference between income inequality and its perception. Corruption in the public sector is the result of an interaction between two agents: a public official and a private individual. A public official considers several different factors when he decides to engage in corruption. If income inequality is theorized to be one of those factors, it is essential to consider that agents are subject to a veil of ignorance, especially in matters relating to the distribution of income. Public officials do not have perfect information on the distribution of income; but rather rely on their own perceptions drawn from a sub-sample of the population. These perceptions are formed by experiences over time with the limited information that the economic agents possess. Recent studies on the subject demonstrate that systematic biases exist in individuals' perceptions of inequality. Failures to address these biases, might be contributing to a lack in substantive evidence that would otherwise be able to link income inequality to corruption. This thesis develops a new conceptual and economic framework to shed light on to the relationship between perceptions of inequality and corruption. We explore the answers of our research questions using three main methods: Regression analyses, a laboratory experiment and a country-case study in Turkey including interviews with public officials. While the results of the regression analysis do not provide evidence to suggest that a rise in actual income inequality corresponds with higher levels of corruption, our results do however support the hypothesis that there is a strong link between perceived nationwide inequality and forms of corruption. Our experimental design allows us to investigate the ways in which subjects' behaviours change when initial endowment inequality differs between treatments in a bribery game. We observe the impact of inequality to subjects' decisions through its effect on perceptions. The economic model is built upon several assumptions, such as the public officials' lack of comprehensive information on incomes of others, and their inequity aversion. We administer a country-case study in Turkey to examine whether these assumptions are realistic and valid. Data we gather from the interviews, as well as existing surveys, enable us to shed more light into the differences between measured and perceived inequality.
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Novoa, Curich Yvana Lucía. "Corruption as a discrimination mechanism". Derecho & Sociedad, 2017. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/117028.
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This research paper deals with the phenomenon of corruption as a crime not only from the perspective of criminal law, but as the cause of violations of fundamental rights. The article explains the concept of corruption and places this phenomenon in the international legal framework. Likewise, the content of the right to equality and the prohibition of discrimination is developed in this article. It exposed, with the help of examples, how that corruption violates Human Rights, affecting vulnerable groups in a particular and special way, and how well it ends up being a mechanism of structural discrimination in Peru.El presente artículo de investigación versa sobre el fenómeno de la corrupción no solo como delito, desde la perspectiva del derecho penal, sino como la causa de vulneraciones de derechos fundamentales. El artículo explica el concepto de corrupción y sitúa este fenómeno en el marco jurídico internacional. De igual manera, se desarrolla el contenido del derecho a la igualdad y la prohibición de discriminación. Se expone, con la ayuda de ejemplos, cómo es que la corrupción vulnera derechos humanos, afectando en mayor medida y de manera particular a grupos en situación de vulnerabilidad, y cómo así termina siendo un mecanismo de discriminación estructural en Perú.
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Chopin, Frédérique. "La lutte contre la corruption". Aix-Marseille 3, 1998. http://www.theses.fr/1998AIX32004.
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L'objectif de cette recherche sur la lutte contre la corruption est de demontrer que le delit de corruption presente un caractere mutant qui lui permet de changer radicalement de forme au gre des domaines auxquels il s'attaque. Ainsi, il ne revet pas la meme forme quand il se developpe dans les domaines des marches publics, des delegations de service public, de l'urbanisme commercial, de l'immobilier, du commerce international, du sport, de la publicite ou du financement de la vie politique. Ce constat du caractere mutant du delit permet de mieux comprendre les difficultes qu'a pu rencontrer le legislateur dans la lutte contre la corruption et l'echec des reponses etatiques qui ont ete donnees jusque la. Des lors, une adaptation de la lutte contre la corruption au caractere mutant du delit s'avere necessaire, elle implique une double mutation d'une part, une mutation au niveau spatio-temporel, et d'autre part une mutation au niveau des interventions. Les mutations spatio-temporel imposent de tenir compte non seulement des insuffisances et de l'inadaptation dans le temps des mesures prises jusque la mais egalement de la politique menees par les autres etats ainsi que les perspectives d'harmonisation et leurs obstacles. Les mutations au niveau des interventions conduisent elles, a prendre en compte d'une part, l'emergence, a cote des intervenants traditionnels, de nouveaux intervenants dans la lutte (citoyens, ong, associations, presse) et d'autre part, la nature de ces mutations et notamment leurs enjeux et limites juridiques, criminologiques, sociologiques et ethiques. Enfin, pour conclure, une serie de propositions sont formulees dans le cadre d'une approche multidisciplinaire du delit dans le but d'ameliorer la lutte conte la corruption en tenant compte de cet aspect nouveau du delit : son caractere mutantThis work wants to explain that corruption is an infraction whose main characteristic is its mutation capacity. Depending on what it affects, public markets, sport, publicity, international trades, urban mercantile or political life, it isn't the same infraction. This main characteristic justifies the difficulties that the ruler has met in the fight against corruption. Therefore, an adaptation in the fight against corruption is necessary. It implies a double change : on one hand, a change in space and time and on the other hand, a change in the work of fighting. A change in space and time must take into account all the inappropriate and inefficient measures taken before now, the politics which are driven all over the world and the chance of their harmonisation besides the obstacles. A change in the work of the fight can be illustrated by the appearance of new actors (citizens, associations, press and non-governmental organisations) and by the new nature of the enterprise, on law, criminal, sociological and ethical bases. At last, in a multidisciplinary approach, we suggest some changes in order to improve the fight against corruption's main characteristic : its mutation capacity
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Sachet-Milliat, Anne. "La corruption dans les organisations". Paris 9, 2002. https://portail.bu.dauphine.fr/fileviewer/index.php?doc=2002PA090038.
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Henri, Brigitte. "La corruption : un mal endémique". Nice, 2001. http://www.theses.fr/2001NICE0018.
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Mal endémique enraciné dans les sociétés, quel que soit leur degré d'évolution, la corruption instaure ses propres règles, en marge des lois. Elle s'infiltre dans tous les secteurs d'activité de la société, au sein des partis politiques, des administrations ; elle met en danger les règles démocratiques et fragilise les Etats en permettant au crime organisé de gangrener tous les rouages de la vie économique et politique à l'échelon international. Or, face à cette menace, les gouvernements, la police et la justice ne sont pas à la hauteur de leur adversaire. Cette thèse a pour but de faire un état des lieux de la corruption en développant tous ces aspects, en évoquant le rôle de la corruption dans l'histoire, son étendue dans différents pays et en approfondissant les mécanismes sur lesquels elle repose. Cette thèse comporte trois parties : les contours de la corruption (Partie I), ses mécanismes (Partie II) et les moyens engagés ainsi que les solutions envisagées pour lutter contre elle (Partie III).
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Rudenok, M. G. "Corruption: lessons to be learnt". Thesis, Sumy State University, 2016. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/49042.
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The target of my paper is to analyze the experience of European countries in their attempt to solve the problem of corruption and find ways which can help our country to be less corrupt. Cоrruption is a problem for all countries.
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Bohomol. "HOW CORRUPTION AFFECTS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT". Thesis, Київ 2018, 2018. http://er.nau.edu.ua/handle/NAU/33670.
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Safavian, Mehnaz S. "Corruption and microenterprises in Russia /". The Ohio State University, 2001. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1486398528558962.
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Martyanova, Natalya. "Foreign direct investment and corruption". Thesis, Aston University, 2010. http://publications.aston.ac.uk/11940/.
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In the last few decades, the world has witnessed an enormous growth in the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). The global stock of FDI reached US$ 7.5 trillion in 2003 and accounted for 11% of world Gross Domestic Product, up from 7% in 1990. The sales of multinational enterprises at around US$ 19 trillion were more than double the level of world exports. Substantial FDI inflows went into transition countries. Inflows into one of the region's largest recipient, the Russian Federation, almost doubled, enabling Russia to become one of the five top FDI destinations in 2005-2006. FDI inflows in Russia have increased almost threefold from 13.6% in 2003 to 35% in 2007. In 2003, these flows were twice greater than those into China; whilst in 2007 they were six times larger. Russia's FDI inflows were also about 2.5 times greater than those of Brazil. Efficient government institutions are argued by many economists to foster FDI and growth as a result. However, the magnitude of this effect has yet to be measured. This thesis takes a Political Economy approach to explore, empirically, the potential impact of malfunctioning governmental institutions, proxied by three indices of perceived corruption, on FDI stocks accumulation/distribution within Russia over the period of 2002-2004. Using a regional data-set it concentrates on three areas relating to FDI. Firstly, it considers the significance, the size and the sign of the impact of perceived corruption on accumulation of FDI stocks within Russia. Secondly, it quantifies the impact of perceived corruption on the volume of FDI stocks simultaneously estimating the impact of the investment in public capital such as telecommunications and transportation networks on FDI in the presence of corruption. In particular, it addresses the question whether more corrupt regions in Russia are also those that could have accumulated more of FDI stocks, and investigates whether those 'more corrupt' regions would have had lower level of public capital investment. Finally, it examines whether decentralisation increases or decreases corruption and whether a larger extent of decentralisation has a positive or negative impact on FDI (stocks). The results of three studies are as follows. Firstly, along with market potential, corruption is found to be one of the key factors in explaining FDI distribution within Russia between 2002 and 2004. Secondly, corruption on average is found to be related to FDI positively suggesting that it may act as speed money: to save their time foreign direct investors might be willing to bribe the regional authorities so to move in front of the bureaucratic lines. Thirdly, although when corruption is controlled for, the impact of the latter on unobservable FDI is found to be on average positive, no association between FDI and public investment is observed with the only exception of transportation infrastructure (i.e., railway). The results might suggest therefore that it is possible that not only regions with high levels of perceived corruption attract more FDI but also that expansions in public capital investments are not accompanied by an increase of the volume of FDI (stocks) in regions with high levels of corruption. This casts some doubt on the productivity of the investment in public capital in these regions as it might be that bureaucrats may prefer to use these infrastructural projects for rent extraction. Finally, we find decentralisation to have a significant and positive impact on both FDI stock accumulation and corruption, suggesting that local governments may spend more on public goods to make the area more attractive to foreign investors but at the same time they may be interested into extracting rents from foreign investors. These results support the idea that the regulation of FDI is associated with and facilitated by a larger public sector, which distorts competition and introduces opportunities for rent-seeking by particular economic and political factors.
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Waisman, Gisela. "Essays on Discrimination and Corruption". Doctoral thesis, Stockholm : Institute for International Economics Studies, Stockholm University, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-7260.
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Sakib, Nurul Huda. "Anti-Corruption Efforts in Bangladesh". Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/2123/18409.
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Corruption has been a severe problem in Bangladesh since the country’s independence. The response in recent years has been massive anti-corruption efforts involving both the Bangladesh government and non-governmental stakeholders. These efforts have focused on the transplantation of institutions in accordance with the prescriptions and models of donor agencies. Organizations in Bangladesh have attempted to gain legitimacy by copying the successful structures and operational models of similar organizations in other countries. This phenomenon can be characterized as institutional isomorphism. Institutionalists argue that this type of isomorphism has been successful in combating corruption in various countries. Examples of the implementation of this isomorphic strategy in Bangladesh include introducing the National Integrity Strategy (NI-Strategy), strengthening the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) and involving citizens in anti-corruption efforts through community-based organizations (CBOs). The research, reported in this thesis, has examined the effectiveness of this isomorphic approach to combating corruption in Bangladesh, drawing on an original nation-wide mass survey, interviews with members of the elite, and analysis of official documents and processes. The study found that the isomorphic approach to combating corruption in Bangladesh has had very limited success against the backdrop of massive expenditure and efforts. These efforts have mainly created an ‘isomorphic mimicry’ of successful anti-corruption strategies but, in Bangladesh, these have mostly remained ceremonial. In other words, they look good on paper but lack proper implementation. The study suggests that the reasons for this failure can be divided into two groups. The first group of four reasons is more general and focuses on pervasive issues of structure as well as agency, namely: (1) patronage-based politics; (2) the existence of ‘iron triangles’ of political, bureaucratic and business elites; (3) a lack of strong political will among government leaders; and (4) the ability of policy makers to deploy a range of strategies to blunt anti-corruption initiatives. The second group comprises micro-level problems, such as the lack of resourcing for institutions, within each element of the dominant anti-corruption strategies. In response to the failure of isomorphism in Bangladesh’s efforts towards integrity, this study suggests an alternative potential avenue for anti-corruption efforts through CBOs that can mobilize or harness spontaneous public participation. This approach differs from donor-assisted government and non-governmental community engagement activities. Drawing on several examples, the study shows that spontaneous participation through CBOs and other forms of activity involving various stakeholders is creating a ‘silent movement’ against corruption in Bangladesh, based on a problem-driven approach in the local context. With spontaneous participation, CBOs could play a potential role through awareness and advocacy to break the societal acceptance of corruption in Bangladesh. Finally, the study argues that, while obstacles to such a spontaneous participation approach are apparent, they might be addressed by coordination between CBOs to form a new foundation for the national integrity system of Bangladesh.