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1
Lih, Lars. "The Ironic Triumph of Old Bolshevism: The Debates of April 1917 in Context". Russian History 38, n.º 2 (2011): 199–242. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187633111x566048.
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AbstractDuring the debates in Bolshevik party circles after Lenin's return to Russia in early April 1917, one central issue was the status of "Old Bolshevism." According to Lenin, Old Bolshevism was outmoded, whereas other Bolsheviks such as Lev Kamenev and Mikhail Kalinin defended its relevance. The central tenet of prewar Old Bolshevism was "democratic revolution to the end," a slogan that implied a vast social transformation of Russia under the aegis of a revolutionary government based directly on the narod. Far from being rendered irrelevant by the overthrow of the tsar, Old Bolshevism mandated a political course aimed at overthrow of the "bourgeois" Provisional Government. Lenin's innovative vision of "steps toward socialism" in Russia, prior to and independent of European socialist revolution was not a radical break with Old Bolshevism and it was not the central issue during the debates of April 1917. The actual Bolshevik message of 1917 (as documented by pamphlets issued by the Moscow Bolsheviks) was closer in most respects to the outlook of Lenin's opponents, as he came close to explicitly admitting. The usual characterization of the April debates as Lenin's successful attempt to imbue the Bolsheviks with a radically new vision of socialist revolution must therefore be rejected.
2
Riga, Liliana. "Ethnonationalism, Assimilation, and the Social Worlds of the Jewish Bolsheviks in Fin de Siècle Tsarist Russia". Comparative Studies in Society and History 48, n.º 4 (9 de agosto de 2006): 762–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0010417506000296.
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This article offers biographical sketches of the Jewish members of the Bolshevik revolutionary élite. It explores how their commitments to socialist universalism and eventual identification with Bolshevism were influenced by experiences and identities as Jews in fin de siècle Tsarist Russia. Situating them within a comparative historical sociology of ethnicity and identity across the Empire, I consider the ways in which ambiguities of assimilation, ethnic exclusion, and ethnocultural marginality influenced their attraction to Bolshevik socialism. In doing so, I revise the traditional argument that that the Bolsheviks of Jewish origin were highly assimilated “non-Jewish Jews” whose Jewishness played no role in their political radicalism. Instead, the claim is made that for the Jewish Bolshevik élite ascriptive Jewishness was a social fact mediated by ethnopolitical context, and therefore a dimension of varying significance to their radicalism, even for those for whom Jewishness was not a claimed identity.
3
Kononenko, Valerii. "National Policy of Ukrainian Soviet State Formations at the Stage of Formation of the Bolshevik Regime (1917–1920)". Scientific Papers of the Vinnytsia Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi State Pedagogical University. Series: History, n.º 36 (junho de 2021): 42–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.31652/2411-2143-2021-36-42-49.
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The aim of the article is to analyze the state policy towards the national minorities of Ukraine of the Ukrainian Soviet state formations of the period of formation of the Soviet goverment in Ukraine. The author explores the peculiarities of the formation and change of the national policy of the Bolsheviks on the eve of the October coup of 1917 and during the functioning of the Ukrainian People’s Republic of Soviets (UPR Soviets) and the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR). The research methodology is based on a combination of general scientific and special-historical methods of scientific research. Using the method of content analysis, the main Bolshevik legal acts of the period of establishment of the Bolshevik regime are analyzed, which reflect the basic principles and provisions of the national policy of the first Ukrainian Soviet state formations on the territory of Ukraine. The scientific novelty of the work is that the author focused on the evolution and functioning of the national policy of the Bolsheviks in Ukraine depending on internal and external factors that were associated with the establishment of the Bolshevik regime of 1917 – 1920’s. Conclusions. We believe that the policy of the Ukrainian Soviet state formations during the period of establishment of the Bolshevik regime towards the national minorities of Ukraine was an indispensable component of the national policy of the Bolsheviks of the RSFSR. The flirtation with the national liberation movements of the former peoples of the Russian Empire through the «right to self-determination» and the «right to national and cultural life» weakened with the stages of Bolshevism in Ukraine, and disappeared altogether with the establishment of the Bolshevik regime. Belief in the rapid and «triumphant» future victory of communism at the initial stage of Soviet rule in Ukraine deprived the Ukrainian Bolsheviks of the opportunity to determine the basic principles and provisions of national and cultural policy toward Ukraine’s ethnic minorities. Preserving the «independent» status of Soviet Ukraine during the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian SSR was nothing more than a tactical step in the process of «convergence» of national Soviet formations in the natural process of victory of communism.
4
Konkin, A. A., e I. A. Tropov. "Press in System of Bolshevik Propaganda during the Civil War in the North-West of Russia in 1919". Nauchnyy Dialog, n.º 4 (30 de abril de 2020): 353–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.24224/2227-1295-2020-4-353-366.
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The issues related to determining the place of the regional Bolshevik press in the system of propaganda activities of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War in the North-West of Russia in 1919 are discussed in the article. The relevance of the study is due to the significant role of the media in the regulation of socio-political processes both in modern Russia and in its historical past. The novelty of the study is in the consideration of the Bolshevik periodicals as a purposefully used by the "red" tool in achieving victory in the military-political confrontation with the White Guards. A comparative analysis of the materials of Bolshevik publications published in 1919 in the North-West of Russia was carried out. It is concluded that the press occupied an important place in the Bolshevik propaganda system in the northwestern region. It was established that its keynote was the formation of a negative image of the enemy in contrast with the Bolsheviks and the Red Army. It is proved that in the local Bolshevik press the image of "Soviet power" as the only fair and the Red Army as a powerful and invincible force was consistently created. It is shown that the positions and slogans put forward in the Bolshevik press were called upon to provide massive support for the revolutionary forces in the region and the mobilization of forces to repulse the enemy.
5
Brovkin, Vladimir. "Workers‘ Unrest and the Bolsheviks‘ Response in 1919". Slavic Review 49, n.º 3 (1990): 350–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2499983.
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At the end of 1917, the Bolsheviks appeared to enjoy considerable social support. They were perceived as the proponents of soviet power; support for the Bolshevik party meant support for soviet power. The majority of workers (especially those in large industrial centers) identified with the Bolsheviks because they promoted greater workers’ control at the workplace. The Bolsheviks were perceived as uncompromising defenders of workers’ interests. For the peasants, the Bolsheviks represented a party of black repartition, that is a party that encouraged peasant land seizures. For the soldiers, the Bolsheviks were a party that promised to stop the war. For the Kronstadt sailors, the Bolsheviks exemplified direct rule from below, the rule of Soviets. All of these diverse constituencies converged in their support for the Bolshevik party at the end of 1917, each for a different reason.
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Gregory, Paul R. "The Ultimate Bolshevik". Russian History 47, n.º 4 (8 de setembro de 2021): 399–407. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/18763316-12340013.
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Abstract Ron Suny’s Stalin: Passage to Revolution traces Stalin from a young revolutionary in the Caucasus to his ascent to the top of the Bolshevik hierarchy. Discovered and promoted by Lenin, the young Stalin agitated among the workers of the giant factories in Baku, Tiflis, and Batumi as Russian socialists split between Menshevism’s social democracy and Bolshevism’s Marxist revolution. Between 1902 and 1917, Stalin was arrested or exiled six times, escaping five times. Rushing to Petrograd in the wake of the abdication and formation of the coalition government, Stalin managed the Bolshevik press and served as the main Bolshevik figure in Lenin’s absence. Although not among the most popular political parties, the Bolshevik’s “ground game” among workers and soldiers proved decisive once Lenin concluded to begin the Bolshevik coup.
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Наталія Василівна Рудницька. "PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION INFLUENCE ON THE SOVIETIZING PROCESS OF THE LIFE OF POLES AND JEWS IN THE VOLYN PROVINCE IN THE 20'S OF THE XXTH CENTURY". Intermarum history policy culture, n.º 5 (1 de janeiro de 2018): 273–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.35433/history.111820.
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The article examines the role of the Bolshevik propaganda and agitation in the period of the Soviet power formation, methods and forms of work with the population of polyethnic Ukraine and technologies of mass consciousness manipulation. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-1921 activated the national and socio-political life of the Poles and Jews in Ukraine, in particular in the Volyn province. But the civil war and the Bolshevik aggression led to the destruction of Ukraine's independence, the Sovietization of all spheres of life, in particular Polish and Jewish communities, began. Communist ideology equated national movements with nationalism, fought against them with all possible means. It is noted that the confrontation between the communist party leadership and the Polish and Jewish population was inevitable because the Bolsheviks tried to monopolize and control the ideological, political, spiritual and economic life of national communities. Some Poles and Jews supported the Bolshevik slogans and the policy of the Soviet power, but many of them were not able to compromise and adapt to the needs of a rigid communist ideology.It is highlighted that propaganda was supposed to interpret the Bolshevik ideological slogans and ideas, and campaigning to adjust the masses to decisive action. The complexity of the Bolshevik propaganda and agitation among the Poles and Jews was in the diversity of the social structure. The Soviet atheistic ideology as one of the Bolshevik activities among the Polish and Jewish population of Volhynia considered anti-religious propaganda and agitation, since Judaism and the Catholic Church had authority and great influence on everyday and social life.In an effort to favor the Polish and Jewish masses, the Bolsheviks supported national cultures, created a new system of education, stopped Jewish pogroms, made Poles and Jews legally equal to all Ukrainian citizens. But gradually Bolshevik propaganda and agitation, using various forms and methods of influence on Poles and Jews, reached the goal set by the authorities, turned citizens of the polyethnic region into the Soviet people.
8
Kotyukova, Tatiana. "The Russian Revolution in Turkestan Through the Eyes of an Eyewitness: “Red”-“White” Memoirs of Alexander Gzovsky". Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, n.º 1 (2022): 69. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640018259-2.
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The memoirs of the publicist and writer Alexander Gzovsky, a participant in the revolutionary events in Turkestan, are centred around several dramatic events that took place in Central Asia in late 1917 and early 1918: the fall of tsarism and the coming to power of the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government, the defeat of the Turkestan Committee of the Provisional Government and the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, the proclamation of Turkestan (Kokand) autonomy and its liquidation by the Bolsheviks and, finally, the Bolshevik, the so-called Kolesov campaign in Bukhara in March 1918. The “Social Revolution in Turkestan (memoirs)”, written from Bolshevik positions and published on the territory of Soviet Belarus in 1919 and “Crescent and Red Star (Turkestan memoirs)”, written by A. Gzovsky from anti-Bolshevik positions after emigrating to Poland in 1922 in Polish. The source-research value of Gzovsky's writings lies in the fact that they contain diametrically opposite assessments of events, which provides a comprehensive view of the political situation in Turkestan and broadens the existing understanding in historical science of what happened there in 1917–1918, in particular: what were the political discourses of the Muslim organizations of Turkestan; what place Turkestan occupied in the discourses of all-Russian political parties; what was the “Turkestan agenda” in the All-Russian Muslim movement; can the “circuits of Kokand autonomy” be discovered before the creation of the Bolshevik government in Tashkent; what guided the Bolsheviks in Turkestan: class or national consciousness?
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Kovalova, Natalіja. "Seljanske pitannja v polіticі RKP(b) – KP(b)U 1918 – 1923 rr.: vitoki totalіtarizmu". Pomiędzy. Polonistyczno-Ukrainoznawcze Studia Naukowe 2, n.º 1 (2016): 44–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/pomi201603.
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The Peasant Question in Policy of RCP(b) – CP(b)U in 1918 – 1923: Sources of Totalitarianism. The article analyses attitude of Bolshevik congresses of RCP(b) and CP(b)U to agricultural question in 1918 – 1923. It marks out the main features of Bolshevik policy as for peasantry that caused forming of totalitarian regime: ignoring of the entire social class interests, absence of scientific explanation and party discussion of the ways as for solving agricultural question, declarative character of Bolshevik policy especially in Ukraine. RCP(b) did not develop their own program of solving peasant question when rising to power in 1917. RCP(b) could determine its position only at the beginning of 1919 and in 1923. Ukrainian Bolsheviks stayed between the necessity to implement principles of proletarian internationalism and the reaction of merely Ukrainian environment to it. The peculiarity of CP(b)U activity was in earlier appeal to peasant question in 1918, but Ukrainian Bolsheviks underestimated the potential of peasants movement. Alexander Shumskyi, Yakov Yakovlev, Volodymir Zatonskyi and Andrey Bubnov supported Ukrainian peculiarities in agricultural question.
10
Krylova, Anna. "Beyond the Spontaneity-Consciousness Paradigm: “Class Instinct” as a Promising Category of Historical Analysis". Slavic Review 62, n.º 1 (2003): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3090463.
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Anna Krylova questions whether the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm, the standard interpretive approach toward Bolshevik thought in the field of Soviet studies, offers an exhaustive account of Bolshevik discourse. To do that she examines the centrality of V I. Lenin's What Is to Be Done? (1902) in Bolshevik thought and points to the 1905 revolution as the formative event in the Bolshevik conception of the worker. Krylova introduces an overlooked Bolshevik notion of “class instinct” (klassovyiinstinkt, klassovoe chut'ie) and argues that the notion of “class instinct” centrally informed the Bolshevik vision of the worker, structuring her article as a dialogue between scholars of Soviet history and their historical subjects. In the conclusion, she suggests the consequences that such a broadened notion of the Bolshevik conception of proletarian identity—beyond the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm—has for interpretations of Bolshevik and Stalinist culture. In “A Paradigm Lost?” his response to Krylova's essay, Reginald E. Zelnik welcomes Krylova's “class instinct” thesis as a fresh enrichment of and supplement to the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm, but, he argues, if we place this language in its early historical context, we cannot avoid the conclusion that with or without the introduction of “instinct,” Lenin and the Bolsheviks still had to face the same kind of contradictions in their conceptualization of the role of workers in the revolutionary movement. The revolutionary value of particular consciousness or particular instinct still had to be judged in accordance with an external point of reference, the nature of which remained and remains elusive. Igal Halfin, in his response, “Between Instinct and Mind: The Bolshevik View of the Proletarian Self,” argues that the Bolshevik notion of the self indeed deserves careful scrutiny. Focusing on how the official Soviet language characterized the interaction between workers’ bodies and workers’ souls, Halfin argues that the synthesis of the affective and the cerebral was key to this construction of the New Man in the 1920s and 1930s.
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Zelnik, Reginald E. "A Paradigm Lost? Response to Anna Krylova". Slavic Review 62, n.º 1 (2003): 24–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3090464.
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Anna Krylova questions whether the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm, the standard interpretive approach toward Bolshevik thought in the field of Soviet studies, offers an exhaustive account of Bolshevik discourse. To do that she examines the centrality of V I. Lenin's What Is to BeDone? (1902) in Bolshevik thought and points to the 1905 revolution as the formative event in the Bolshevik conception of the worker. Krylova introduces an overlooked Bolshevik notion of “class instinct” (klassovyiinstinkt, klassovoe chut'ie) and argues that the notion of “class instinct” centrally informed the Bolshevik vision of the worker, structuring her article as a dialogue between scholars of Soviet history and their historical subjects. In the conclusion, she suggests the consequences that such a broadened notion of the Bolshevik conception of proletarian identity—beyond the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm—has for interpretations of Bolshevik and Stalinist culture. In “A Paradigm Lost?” his response to Krylova's essay, Reginald E. Zelnik welcomes Krylova's “class instinct” thesis as a fresh enrichment of and supplement to the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm, but, he argues, if we place this language in its early historical context, we cannot avoid the conclusion that with or without the introduction of “instinct,” Lenin and the Bolsheviks still had to face the same kind of contradictions in their conceptualization of the role of workers in the revolutionary movement. The revolutionary value of particular consciousness or particular instinct still had to be judged in accordance with an external point of reference, the nature of which remained and remains elusive. Igal Halfin, in his response, “Between Instinct and Mind: The Bolshevik View of the Proletarian Self,” argues that the Bolshevik notion of the self indeed deserves careful scrutiny. Focusing on how the official Soviet language characterized the interaction between workers’ bodies and workers’ souls, Halfin argues that the synthesis of the affective and the cerebral was key to this construction of the New Man in the 1920s and 1930s.
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Halfin, Igal. "Between Instinct and Mind: The Bolshevik View of the Proletarian Self". Slavic Review 62, n.º 1 (2003): 34–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3090465.
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Anna Krylova questions whether the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm, the standard interpretive approach toward Bolshevik thought in the field of Soviet studies, offers an exhaustive account of Bolshevik discourse. To do that she examines the centrality of V I. Lenin's What Is to BeDone? (1902) in Bolshevik thought and points to the 1905 revolution as the formative event in the Bolshevik conception of the worker. Krylova introduces an overlooked Bolshevik notion of “class instinct” (klassovyiinstinkt, klassovoe chut'ie) and argues that the notion of “class instinct” centrally informed the Bolshevik vision of the worker, structuring her article as a dialogue between scholars of Soviet history and their historical subjects. In the conclusion, she suggests the consequences that such a broadened notion of the Bolshevik conception of proletarian identity—beyond the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm—has for interpretations of Bolshevik and Stalinist culture. In “A Paradigm Lost?” his response to Krylova's essay, Reginald E. Zelnik welcomes Krylova's “class instinct” thesis as a fresh enrichment of and supplement to the spontaneity-consciousness paradigm, but, he argues, if we place this language in its early historical context, we cannot avoid the conclusion that with or without the introduction of “instinct,” Lenin and the Bolsheviks still had to face the same kind of contradictions in their conceptualization of the role of workers in the revolutionary movement. The revolutionary value of particular consciousness or particular instinct still had to be judged in accordance with an external point of reference, the nature of which remained and remains elusive. Igal Halfin, in his response, “Between Instinct and Mind: The Bolshevik View of the Proletarian Self,” argues that the Bolshevik notion of the self indeed deserves careful scrutiny. Focusing on how the official Soviet language characterized the interaction between workers’ bodies and workers’ souls, Halfin argues that the synthesis of the affective and the cerebral was key to this construction of the New Man in the 1920s and 1930s.
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Eremeeva, Anna. "Practice of Memorialization of the Anti-Soviet Movement in the South of Russia During the Civil War". Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Serija 4. Istorija. Regionovedenie. Mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija, n.º 2 (maio de 2021): 171–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.15688/jvolsu4.2021.2.13.
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Introduction. The article is devoted to the memorialization of the anti-Soviet movement in the South of Russia, which took place during the Civil War. The author considers the approaches of Denikin and Cossack (Don and Kuban) governments to the glorification of the struggle against the Bolsheviks, the canonization of the leaders of this struggle, the creation of so-called places of memory. Methods and materials. The research is based on legislative acts and documentation records of anti-Soviet governments in the South of Russia. The unpublished documents are stored in central and regional archives of the Russian Federation and Hoover Institution Archives (USA). The other significant sources are periodicals, propaganda products, artistic texts of 1918–1920, and private correspondence. Analysis and results. The politics of memory of the “white” and Cossack governments was an important part of the official propaganda. It was aimed to legitimize and consolidate the anti-Bolshevik movement. During the Civil War, documents and other artifacts were actively collected for future archives and museums of the “liberation war”. The Military-Historical Commission under Denikin Propaganda Department played an important role in this activity. Museums of the struggle against Bolshevism in the Kuban and Don were being formed at the initiative of Cossack governments. There were monumental, toponymical and other projects to perpetuate the memory of the anti-Bolshevik movement heroes. The presence of the opposing memorial narratives in the South of Russia was the result of serious contradictions between the main actors inside the anti-Bolshevik camp.
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Wołkonowski, Jarosław. "„Neutralność” Litwy podczas Bitwy Warszawskiej". Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 12, n.º 2 (31 de dezembro de 2021): 63–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.6862.
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After the First World War, three concepts clashed in Eastern Europe: the model of the nation state, the expansion of the Bolshevik revolution implemented by Russia and the union of nation-states (Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine, Belarus and Latvia) according to Piłsudski resulting from the threat. Russia in the years 1920-1921 signed five peace treaties, but only the treaty with Lithuania contained secret arrangements regarding the neutrality of Lithuania in the Bolshevik-Polish war. The analysis of the source material shows that Russia used the secret provisions of the peace treaty in its plans for the expansion of bolshevism, and after the defeat of the Polish army, it was to carry out a Bolshevik coup in Lithuania. Despite the proclaimed neutrality, Lithuania turned out to be on the side of Russia in this conflict, causing additional difficulties for Polish troops in the Battle of Warsaw. The Polish victory over the Vistula impeded the expansion of Bolshevism to Europe.
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MIRZAKHANYAN, Ruben, e Hayk GRIGORYAN. "Armenian Apostolic Church Under Bolshevik Ideological and Political Pressure Between 1920 and 1922". WISDOM 18, n.º 2 (25 de junho de 2021): 67–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.24234/wisdom.v18i2.539.
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This article presents the ideological controversies that arose between the Armenian Apostolic church and the bolshevik regime following the invasion of soviet troops into Armenia. From its first days in power bolshevik authorities implemented radical steps against its ideological rival – the armenian church. Following the harsh anti-church political line of Russian bolsheviks, the soviet authorities in Armenia started a massive appropriation of Armenian church properties. The article mentions also the first attempts of the soviet administration to organize state institutions for the preservation and study of national cultural heritage.
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Trythall, Marisa Patulli. "“Russia’s Misfortune Offers Humanitarians a Splendid Opportunity”: Jesuits, Communism, and the Russian Famine". Journal of Jesuit Studies 5, n.º 1 (21 de dezembro de 2018): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22141332-00501005.
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Using archival documentation, this article discusses the beginning of the first grand international aid mission of the Catholic Church (1922–23), undertaken to assist the starving children of Bolshevik Russia. Under the auspices of the American Relief Administration (ara), the Papal Relief Mission to Russia fed approximately 158,000 persons a day. The pivotal figure between American Catholics and the Roman Curia, and subsequently between the Vatican and the Bolsheviks, was Edmund Aloysius Walsh, S.J., founder of the first us school of diplomacy, at Georgetown University. Walsh served as papal emissary in charge of this mission, which, among other duties, entailed liaising with the ara, keeping the Vatican informed, and negotiating with the Bolsheviks regarding the church’s position within a communist society. Walsh’s experience provides a firsthand view of the “Bolshevik world” and insight into the manner in which the Bolshevik Revolution was understood by the Vatican. The actions of the protagonists (Włodzimierz Ledóchowski, Jesuit superior general; Pietro Cardinal Gasparri, Vatican secretary of state; Mgr. Giuseppe Pizzardo, Vatican substitute secretary of state; Col. William Haskell, director of the ara’s Russian Relief Program; Mgr. Lorenzo Lauri, apostolic nuncio to Poland; and Walsh), are revealed through their own words, which show the difficulties encountered within both the Christian and Bolshevik spheres and clarify that common objectives were often shared only in appearance. Notwithstanding the good will that the mission’s success earned for the Vatican, the attempt to establish diplomatic relations was destined to fail, due in large part to the events narrated herein.
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Timofey A., Balyko. "The Path from the Idea Of Social Truth to Compromise with the Bolsheviks in the Publications of the Ideologist of the Renovationist Split, Prof. B.V. Titlinov". Almanac “Essays on Conservatism” 4 (30 de outubro de 2022): 159–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.24030/24092517-2022-0-4-159-165.
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The article discusses the development of the idea of the “social truth of the Gospel” in the works of Professor of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy B.V. Titlinov, who, after the February Revolution of 1917, became one of the active supporters of the new liberal government, and in 1922 veered into the Renovationist schism in the Russian Orthodox Church, became a key figure in Renovationism, one of the ideologists of the Renovationist schism. The author of the study, based on the texts of Titlinov from different years, proposes to identify the point that made it possible to establish a certain compromise between the renovation movement and the Bolshevik authorities of socialist Russia. A feature of this historical moment was the situation in which what for B.V. Titlinov and other Renovationists was an attempt to reconcile Christianity and revolutionary socialism, for the Bolsheviks themselves it was exclusively a tool for the defeat of Christianity in Russia. The antagonism of these two views — Christianity and Bolshevism — was manifested even at the time of the First Russian Revolution of 1905-1907, although the desire for social truth was also expressed by church liberal democrats of these years, to which Titlinov can be attributed, and the leader of the Bolshevik socialists V.I. Lenin.
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Kislitsyn, Sergey A. "ARON FRENKEL. THE FATE OF THE ROSTOV REVOLUTIONARY: FROM THE REVOLUTION AND THE CIVIL WAR ON THE DON TO THE CHINESE REVOLUTION AND STALIN'S TERROR". IZVESTIYA VUZOV SEVERO-KAVKAZSKII REGION SOCIAL SCIENCE, n.º 3 (211) (30 de setembro de 2021): 48–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.18522/2687-0770-2021-3-48-58.
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The article highlights the political biography of the Don Bolshevik, the Bolshevik figure of the second plan A.A. Frenkel, who played a significant role during the civil war on the Don. Special attention is paid to Fren-kel's activities as part of the tragic expedition of F.G. Podtelkov, his work as a secretary of the Donburo of the RCP(b) - a special Bolshevik body for organizing underground work in the rear of Denikin's troops. Attention is drawn to the mediating influence of the extraordinary nature of the struggle of the Donburo of the RCP(b) with the Denikin regime on the implementation of an extremist policy of terrorist storytelling in fundamentally new conditions after the liberation of the region from the white troops. An attempt to explain his rejection of the cruel anti-Cossack policy and the subsequent conflict with the majority of the Donburo is made. His party work after the Civil War is covered. Contributing to the strengthening of the Stalinist-Bolshevik regime, Fren-kel became its zealot and immanent victim during the period of personnel repression of the 1930s. Frenkel, as a typical Bolshevik leader at the regional level, reflected in his biography the characteristic features of Bolshevism as a unique phenomenon.
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Bublik, Olga. "Religious component of Soviet ideology as a factor influencing society". Bulletin of Luhansk Taras Shevchenko National University, n.º 6 (337) (2020): 109–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.12958/2227-2844-2020-6(337)-109-116.
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The article comprehensively considers the religious component inherent in the development of the Soviet ideological model, the implementation of which began in the 20s of the twentieth century. The aim of the article is a detailed consideration of the religious component of Soviet ideology as a factor in strengthening the Bolshevik influence on the masses, especially during the formation of the Soviet state – 20's – early 30's. According to the author, establishing their own regime, the Bolsheviks tried to establish it as an alternative to the ruling before their coming to power in the USSR Christian Orthodox Church. This was the reason for the way of presenting to society the canons of Soviet ideology, which was based on the involvement of old methods of spreading the Christian religion. As a result of the study, the author concludes that Bolshevism is not just and not so much with the ideological and political movement as with religion. There is a clear substitution in Soviet ideology: just as the Church of Christ was founded on faith in Jesus Christ, so the Bolshevik Party-Church and the new people created had to be based on Lenin, even on his „immortal” body. The author notes that it is no coincidence that the tribunes of the highest ranks of the party and government were created on the mausoleum, above Lenin's body – a direct parallel to the Throne of the Orthodox Church, near which only the clergy can be chosen and which necessarily contains the relics of the saint. The main postulates of Bolshevik atheism were: belief in a bright future „kingdom of God”, belief in the evolutionary origin of man; worship of founders, teachers; the presence of a universal ideology; the idea of world revolution (missionary activity); irreconcilable hostility to other ideologies; the presence of its „clergy” - the party apparatus and the „Inquisition” – the punitive authorities.
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Lema A., Turpalov, e Alkhastova Zarina М. "The press as a source for the study of the national-state policy of the Bolshevik party in the North Caucasus during the socialist modernization of the region". Kavkazologiya 2022, n.º 3 (30 de setembro de 2022): 331–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.31143/2542-212x-2022-3-331-350.
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The leading instrument of ideological support of the proletariat dictatorship in the Russian nation-al regions after the October revolution in 1917 served the local press, which was formed and func-tioned under the control of the Bolshevik party. Especially difficult was strengthening Soviet power in the North Caucasus because socialist ideas were unknown and poorly understood by the highlanders. Bolsheviks propagated, first through the local press, the slogan of the right of nations to self-determination to attract the mountain peoples to their side. Large-scale propaganda of the national policy of the Bolshevik Party was carried out in the pages of newspapers and magazines. Meanwhile, publications devoted to these issues in periodicals during the first decades of the So-viet power have been insufficiently studied in the Caucasus studies. At the present stage of histor-ical-journalistic science, the need to rethink the provisions and conclusions of scholarly works of the recent Soviet past has increased. The article attempts to reveal the peculiarities of coverage in the North Caucasus regional press of the Bolshevik party policy in the sphere of national-state building during the Bolshevik totalitarian regime, based on the critical understanding of the pub-lished scientific literature, the study of archival materials, content analysis of regional newspapers and magazines.
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Leonid, Obukhov. "“White” Press of the Perm on the Bol’shevik Regime and the Bol’shevik Leaders". TECHNOLOGOS, n.º 2 (2022): 93–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.15593/perm.kipf/2022.2.07.
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The periodicals are the important sources on the history of the Civil war seriously supplementing the information from the archives. The article analyses the descriptions of the Bolshevik regime and the Bolshevik leaders in the “White” press. The newspapers published in Perm were typical for the Anti-Bolshevik Russia and practically did not differ from the other Ural and Siberian ones. The articles and notes were often republished. The newspapers were the most widespread and popular sources of information in the Civil war and the effective instrument of the Information warfare between the “Reds” and “Whites” (All the Anti-Bolshevik governments are designated as White here, though using such a term in relation to the Komuch, Provisionsl Government of Siberia,and Provisional Government of the Ural Region, which existed during the period of the “Democratic Counterrevolution” does not seem absolutely correct). The press of the “Whites” described the inner life of the “Sovdepia” in negative terms and overestimated the scale of hunger and terror. The attention of the newspaper was concentrated on the situation in Moscow and Petrograd. In order to be more convincing in their descriptions of the horrors of the Bolshevism, the newspapers made references to the news agencies, including the foreign ones, and personal evidences. The “White” press tried to form the most negative attitude to the Bolshevik regime, to win the wide masses, because it might determine the outcome of the fratricidal civil war. The characteristics of the Bolshevik leaders, especially of Lenin and Trotsky, served the same goal. The newspapers stressed permanently the contradictions and conflicts between them. In their characteristics of the Bolshevik leaders the authors of the publications sometimes draw impartial and correct pictures, which might be seen as a valuable addition to the portraits of the prominent Bolshevik leaders. First of all it refers to the image of Trotsky. In spite of the active propaganda campaign in the press, the “Whites” lost the information war. In the country with the illiterate majority, the Bolshevik propaganda apparatus and methods of the information warfare turned to be more effective, than those of their opponents.
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Borymskyi, Vitalii. "The Polish-Ukrainian Alliance of 1920 and “White” Russia". Polish Review 67, n.º 2 (1 de julho de 2022): 64–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/23300841.67.2.04.
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Abstract Relations in the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian triangle have never been simple. The history of the Polish-Soviet war of 1920 is one of the illustrative moments. Although the Polish offensive against the Bolsheviks in April 1920 was tactically beneficial to Petr Vrangel's Russian Army, the Russian white emigration was largely hostile to Józef Piłsudski's Ukrainian policy. The main reason for this hostility was the project of Poland's support for the independence of the Ukrainian People's Republic. Russian public opinion could not support either the Bolsheviks or the Poles with the Ukrainians in this war. The article examines a wide range of Russian non-Bolshevik political thought. Through the prism of Russian national identity, the article explains how a wide range of Russian anti-Bolshevik politicians and public figures, from monarchists to Mensheviks, perceived Polish policy toward Ukraine in 1920. This research is not a study of Vrangel's Ukrainian policy, although this is an important background, but rather a study of political thought and history of ideas.
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DenBeste-Barnett, Michelle, e Barbara Evans Clements. "Bolshevik Women". Slavic and East European Journal 42, n.º 4 (1998): 783. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/309816.
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Wieczynski, Joseph L. "Bolshevik Women". History: Reviews of New Books 26, n.º 4 (julho de 1998): 191–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.1998.10528231.
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Makhmudov, Oybek. "“The Roof of the World” at the Crossroads of Anglo-Soviet Geopolitical Interests (1917–1922)". Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, n.º 1 (2022): 98. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s013038640018261-5.
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The Anglo-Bolshevik confrontation in the Pamirs, as well as the problem of establishing Soviet authority in the region, is poorly studied problem. The revolutionary events and the events of the Civil War in the Pamirs are still not well considered and not completely clear. This is primarily attributable to a lack of examination of archival material. The documents, which are being analysed in academic literature for the first time, provide a better understanding of the events that took place in the region. The article focuses on the intelligence and anti-Bolshevik efforts in the Pamirs and neighbouring regions of the British Consul General in Kashgar, Percy Etherton. From the reports and messages of Etherton himself, it becomes clear that he actively attracted both the local population and anti-Bolshevik-minded Russians for intelligence purposes. Separately, we can emphasise the widespread engagements of the Ismailis of the Pamirs and Ismaili peers, some of whom sought to prevent the establishment of Soviet power in the region and were ready to rely even on the Afghan Sunnis and Bukharans, as well as enlist the support of the British. The article reviews the struggle of the Bolsheviks to establish their power in the Pamirs and their counterintelligence measures against the actions of the British in the region. The subject of the study is the methods used by the opposing sides, the matter of maintaining support and why the anti-Bolshevik efforts of the British were generally unsuccessful. Drawing on archival documents and a number of studies, the course of the struggle against ant-Soviet forces and insurgents is reconstructed. The Bolsheviks were interested in the Pamirs themselves as a route by which to “export” the revolution to British India, as part of their policy of spreading their ideology in Asia. These are all little-known pieces of the region's history New archival materials have given a different perspective on the events that took place in the Pamirs between 1917 and 1922.
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Shabalin, Vladislav Valer'evich. "Professional activity of former members of the united opposition in the 1930s (on the example of biographies of the Bolsheviks who signed the “Declaration of 83”". Genesis: исторические исследования, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2021): 1–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.25136/2409-868x.2021.1.34797.
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The object of this research is the collective fate of former members of the united opposition (Bolshevik-Leninist faction) in the 1930s. This topic is rarely covered by the researchers and remains poorly studied. The subject of this article is the peculiarities of professional career of the oppositionists reestablished in the ranks of the Communist Party. The group under review is the members of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), who in May 1927 signed the “Declaration of 83”. Comparative analysis of the available biographical records on the signers of the “Declaration of 83” allow determining the spheres of professional activity of the former Bolshevik-Leninists. The author enlists the spheres of their activity, indicating the number of employed capitulated factionists therein, as well as positions held by them, enterprises and institutions they worked at during this period. The conducted research demonstrates that the highest concentration of capitulated oppositionists was in the industrial sector, while professional spheres, such as science, trade, etc., are noticeably behind. At the same time, former Bolshevik-Leninists often mastered new types of activities. Most of them were appointed as chief executives, which the author explains with shortage of personnel committed to the Communist ideas who possessed organizational experience. The novelty of this research consists in the statement that the returned to the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) supporters of Trotskyism and Zinovievism), despite their demotion, were actively engaged in Stalin's modernization. They were appointed with executive positions and included into the ruling elite (although holding a special “niche” therein).
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Shishkin, V. I. "Ex-Socialists as Human Resources for the Communist Party between February and October Revolutions (March — October 1917)". Modern History of Russia 11, n.º 4 (2021): 857–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu24.2021.402.
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At the end of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century, political parties became the main actors for Russia’s social and economic processes and events. During the last three decades, they have been the focus of scholars’ efforts since classified sources of the Soviet period were opened for public access at the end of the 20th century. Intense scholarship shaped two main approaches to the topic. One focuses on each political party individually, and the other focuses on interactions between all of them. The second approach, even considering its merits, remains limited because relationships are explained mainly through competition between political parties, whereas in reality, connections were more diverse. This article makes a first attempt to show at personal and group levels the transition of former socialists to the Bolshevik party between the February and October revolutions. It identifies specific party leaders and groups that changed their political views and positions; establishes the time and motives for their break with their former parties to join the Bolsheviks; and clarifies the impact of their joining the Bolshevik party. Based on an analysis of questionnaires of delegates who participated in the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (Bolsheviks), the article concludes that by the end of the summer of 1917, the Bolshevik political elite consisted of almost 43 % of former socialists, among whom there was a large proportion of professional revolutionaries. Such human resources, mostly consisting of “left-socialists,” contributed to the radicalization of the RSDLP(b), reorienting the political struggle from democratic and political methods to violence and militarism.
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Венков, А. В. "Don Soviet Republic in 1918". Istoricheskii vestnik, n.º 36(2021) (17 de março de 2021): 92–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.35549/hr.2021.2021.36.003.
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Статья посвящена попыткам большевистского руководства решить одновременно две задачи — удержать на позициях нейтралитета донских казаков, дав им автономию, и поставить заслон перед наступающими германскими войсками. Германские войска после заключения в Бресте мира с Украиной и Россией пользовались отсутствием в начале 1918 г. четкой границы между Украиной и Россией и двигались все дальше на восток. Большевики пытались создать на их пути республики, которые не являлись бы частью Украины. Такая республика была создана на Дону в марте 1918 г. Ее возглавили революционные казаки, выдвинутые партиями большевиков и левых социалистов-революционеров. Однако Донская советская республика не оправдала надежд большевистского руководства. Большинство казаков на Дону выступило против большевиков, а германские войска заняли г. Ростов-на-Дону. Правительство республики заявило о самороспуске. The article is dedicated to the attempt of the Bolshevik government to simultaneously solve two problems — first, to maintain the neutrality of the Don Cossacks, by giving them autonomy, and second, to create a barrier in the path of an offensive German army. After signing the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the German army took advantage of the absence of a well-defined boundary between Russia and Ukraine and gradually moved further East. To create a barrier in their way, the Bolsheviks sought to establish republics that were not part of Ukraine. Such a republic was established on Don in 1918, led by prorevolution Cossacks, who have been put forward by the Bolshevik and leftwing Socialist Parties. However, the Don Soviet Republic didn’t justify the hopes of Bolshevik leaders. The majority of Don Cossacks stood against the Bolsheviks and the German arms occupied Rostov-on-Don. The republic’s government declared self-dissolution.
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Voytikov, Sergey S. "Materials of the Serpukhov Uezd Committee of the RCP(B) as a Source on the History of the Soviet Military Construction in 1918–19, on the “Stavka” Case on the “Conspiracy in the Field Staff” of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, and on the Reaction of the Bolshevik Leadership to the Explosion in Leontievsky Lane". Herald of an archivist, n.º 4 (2020): 1168–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2020-4-1168-1183.
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The Central State Archive of the City of Moscow (TsGA of Moscow) holds documents that expand existing notions on the Soviet military construction of 1918-19, the formation of military intelligence and counterintelligence in Soviet Russia, and the “third wave” of mass Red terror in 1919. These documents are mostly found in the seemingly insignificant fond of the Serpukhov uezd committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Since in the autumn 1918 – summer 1919, the Field Staff of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was located in Serpukhov and its military commissar, head of the registration department, and founder of the Soviet military intelligence, S. I. Aralov actively worked in the Serpukhov uezd committee, the committee protocols are of great importance for studying the formation of the Red Army and its special services. The documents on admission to the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and party registration of the Field Staff senior officials, brothers Alexei and Pavel Vasiliev contain new information on the personnel continuity in the Operational Department of the People's Commissariat for Military Affairs of the RSFSR and the Field Staff. Protocols of the reports of the old Bolshevik A.A. Antonov at sessions of the Serpukhov uezd bodies of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) clarify the existing notions on the calamity of June 1919, which took place on the eve of the events associated with the arrest of the first Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Republic J. J. V?cietis and some of his employees in July 1919, the cleaning of the Field Staff initiated by the old Bolshevik, longtime associate of Lenin S.I. Gusev who replaced S.I. Aralov at his posts. There are also documents containing information on the Bolshevik leadership reaction to the events related to the explosion in the building of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on September 25, 1919, when 12 Bolsheviks were killed and 55 received wounds of varying severity. These materials complement and correct data from the documents stored in the federal archives, in particular, in the Russian State Military Archive, which keeps documents on the history of the Red Army in 1918-41. For instance, it turns out that it was decided to arrest the bourgeoisie and other “counter-revolutionaries” with their subsequent imprisonment in a concentration camp created specifically for this purpose in Serpukhov district.
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Kucher, Volodymyr, Nataliia Shchebetiuk e Olha Hloba. "Food Dictatorship of the Bolshevik Regime – a Means of Organization of Famine in Ukraine (1921–1923)". Ethnic History of European Nations, n.º 65 (2021): 72–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2518-1270.2021.65.08.
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The article examines the process of establishing a food dictatorship by the Bolshevik authorities against the Ukrainian rural population, which led to the starvation of millions of Ukrainians in 1921–1923. But the most vulnerable were the Bolsheviks’ procurement and export of peasant bread and food to Russia. Using coercive harsh methods, the procurement campaign was carried out in the drought-stricken southern regions of Ukraine. This criminal action was led by O. Shlichter and M. Vladimirov sent by the Russian government in accordance with numerous government orders and directives involving the poorest sections of the peasantry and specially trained military units. In the spring of 1921, wealthy peasants had almost no grain left, and the need for a solution to the food problem by the Bolshevik government only grew. In order to eliminate the resistance of the peasants, which the Bolsheviks regarded as political banditry, the idea of the so-called stratification of the village into separate classes (poor semi-proletarians, middle peasants, kulaks) was introduced by mobilizing tens of thousands of workers in industrial centers. The People’s Commissar for Land Affairs of the USSR D. Manuilskii consciously pursued a predatory policy of destroying productive farms. Attempts by the Ukrainian leadership to stop harvesting bread in Ukraine have failed several times at a time when about 4 million people are on hunger strike in the country. The actions of the Bolshevik government contradicted the realities of peasant life at the time, as did the entire population, which suffered from famine and crop failure, backed by numerous taxes, the forcible confiscation of the last peasant food supplies, and military aggression. After the official recognition of the critical state of agriculture and famine in Ukraine, no assistance was provided by the government other than permission to appeal to the international community.
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Delokarov, K. Kh. "Scientization Bolshevik Style". Russian Studies in Philosophy 39, n.º 2 (outubro de 2000): 92–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2753/rsp1061-1967390292.
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White, Stephen. "The Bolshevik Poster". Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 47, n.º 2 (1989): 203. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/431856.
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Kennedy, Janet, e Stephen White. "The Bolshevik Poster." American Historical Review 95, n.º 4 (outubro de 1990): 1252. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2163635.
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Fayzullin, A. R. "Situation and Activity of Tatar Muslim Community in Kazan Province after the 1917 February Revolution (February — October 1917)". Islam in the modern world 15, n.º 3 (29 de outubro de 2019): 137–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.22311/2074-1529-2019-15-3-137-150.
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The article deals with events related to the situation and activities of the Muslim Tatars of Russia after the February 1917 revolution. The revolution divided the Muslim Tatars of Russia of all strata and views into the opposing groups and movements that actively pursued their policies. Socio-political organizations and institutions were created, some of which supported the Provisional Government, while the others supported the Bolshevik Party. Initially, the Muslim clergy, headed by Mufti of Orenburg Spiritual assembly Muhammad-Safa Bayazitov, did not support the February revolution, that is why the assembly was dissolved by leaders of the Tatar bourgeoisie and nobility of Ufa. In May 1917, the First all-Russian Muslim Congress took place in Moscow, at which a number of important decisions were made, including the recognizing of equality of women and the land commodification. In contrast to the Kazan Muslim Committee supporting the Provisional Government, the Kazan Bolshevik Party in early April 1917 organized the Muslim Socialist Committee, headed by the revolutionary Bolshevik Mullanur Vakhitov, led his work among the working Muslims of the Tatars. The Kazan Muslim Committee relied on the intellectuals, the wealthy peasants, the clergy, the Tatar-Muslim bourgeoisie, and the Muslim Socialist Committee did more stakes on the Tatar workers. The October Revolution led to the victory of the Bolsheviks, who were supported by Muslim left socialists.
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Kasakow, Ewgeniy. "Bewegung versus Avantgarde?" PROKLA. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft 47, n.º 187 (1 de junho de 2017): 325–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.32387/prokla.v47i187.148.
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In the leftist debates, one of the most widespread notions is that in 1917 workers and peasants were about to build their own model of socialism, and only the Bolshevik bureaucracy hindered them. In the struggle between the councils and the party, the former are regarded as representatives of a left alternative to the authoritarian Bolsheviks. Only rarely are such assumptions examined by means of archival documents and new studies based on them.
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Blackburn, Christopher. "When Typhus Rode a Red Horse: Weaponizing Disease During the Polish-Bolshevik War". Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy 22, n.º 2 (2021): 87–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.32089/wbh.phw.2021.2(276).0003.
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This work explores the role of the Red Army in the spread of typhus on Polish lands during the Polish-Bolshevik War, 1919–1920. As a result of the Bolshevik style of war, one of the results of the Soviet advance into Poland was the anti-typhus effort along the border and throughout the country. Polish efforts, supported by American humanitarian groups, had made great strides in eradicating typhus however, much of this was undone with the Bolshevik offensive of 1920. Through both active and passive means the Bolshevik advance drove typhus victims and refugees across the Polish lines, while at the same time Bolshevik forces destroyed or removed sanitation equipment and supplies across the frontier.
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Malmenvall, Simon. "Ideational Preconditions to the Success of the October Revolution". Monitor ISH 20, n.º 1 (13 de junho de 2018): 51–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.33700/1580-7118.20.1.51-68(2018).
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This article aims to analyse some ideational preconditions, traced back to the preceding periods of Russian history, which enabled the success of the October Revolution in 1917. Firstly, the article deals with the views of Georges Florovsky (1893–1979), Russian theologian, philosopher and historian. Florovsky argues that Russian thought had been ‘in captivity’ ever since the 16th century, a captivity imposed by Western influences. Among the foreign influences, it is the German idealist philosophy that is perceived by Florovsky as the most detrimental, for it paved the way for various utopian projects, including the Bolshevik revolution. Secondly, the article examines the notions of the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev (1874–1948). From Berdyaev’s point of view, the victory of Bolshevism resulted from Russia’s lack of a free secular intellectual- philosophical tradition, which was thwarted by the authoritarian state. As a consequence, Bolshevik ideology interpreted the original Marxism in conceptually closed terms. The present paper argues that the views of Florovsky and Berdyaev are acceptable yet partial. This is because they are concerned with generally interpreting the formation of the intellectual environment which favoured the victory of Bolshevism on Russian soil, without considering the complexity of Russian politics and society at the turn of the 19th century.
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Marot, John. "Lenin, Bolshevism, and Social-Democratic Political Theory". Historical Materialism 22, n.º 3-4 (2 de dezembro de 2014): 129–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1569206x-12341370.
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Lars Lih has contributed to our knowledge of Russian Social Democracy lately. However, serious methodological flaws bedevil this advance in knowledge. Lih’s overall approach displays a very static understanding of political ideas in relation to political movements. In the first section, ‘Lenin, the St Petersburg Bolshevik Leadership, and the 1905 Soviet’, I challenge Lih’s position that Lenin never changed his mind about bringing socialist consciousness into the working class ‘from without’. In the second section, ‘Lenin, “Old Bolshevism” and Permanent Revolution: The Soviets in 1917’, I challenge Lih’s revisionist view that Old Bolshevism’s pre-1917 goal of ‘democratic revolution to the end’ drove Lenin’s partisans to make a working-class, socialist revolution in 1917. On this singular account, Lenin’s April Theses, which called for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the transfer of all power to the soviets, was merely a further expression of Old Bolshevik politics, not a break with it, as has almost universally been held.
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Матвієнко Т. О. "ПОВІТОВІ ТА ВОЛОСНІ ЗЕМСТВА УКРАЇНСЬКОЇ НАРОДНОЇ РЕСПУБЛІКИ ПІД ОКУПАЦІЄЮ БІЛЬШОВИЦЬКОЇ РОСІЇ". World Science 2, n.º 10(38) (31 de outubro de 2018): 41–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.31435/rsglobal_ws/31102018/6186.
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The consequences of Bolshevik Russia aggression into Ukraine in late 1917 - early 1918 for the volosne and district zemstvos of the Ukrainian People Republic (UPR) zemstvos are analysed. The UPR was proclaimed by the Central Council on 7 November 1917 in response to the violent takeover by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. At its territories where Bolsheviks seized power they transferred power to the councils they controlled. Local governments – zemstvos – existing here – were regarded by them as incompatible with the objectives of the socialist revolution and establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat. Typically, the Bolsheviks eliminated zemstvos leaders from their positions, and dissolved rural assemblies. For some time they used the economic apparatus of zemstvos management. However, the "revolutionary expediency" very soon prevailed over common sense and zemstvos as local population authorities were eliminated.
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Brooks, Jeffrey, e James Von Geldern. "Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920." American Historical Review 99, n.º 4 (outubro de 1994): 1365. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2168894.
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Gerstein, Linda, e James von Geldern. "Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920". Slavic and East European Journal 38, n.º 3 (1994): 523. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/308868.
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Swift, E. Anthony, e James von Geldern. "Bolshevik Festivals, 1917-1920". Russian Review 55, n.º 1 (janeiro de 1996): 131. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/131936.
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FER, B. "The Bolshevik Political Poster". Journal of Design History 2, n.º 4 (1 de janeiro de 1989): 310–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jdh/2.4.310.
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Bergman, Jay. "The Image of Jesus in the Russian Revolutionary Movement". International Review of Social History 35, n.º 2 (agosto de 1990): 220–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020859000009883.
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SummaryThis article explores how Russian revolutionaries, in particular the Russian Marxists, used the image of Jesus to explain their political choices and commitments. These revolutionaries were almost uniformly hostile to institutional Christianity. Yet a number of Russian Marxists, such as Anatolii Lunacharskii, considered Jesus a genuine precursor of socialism. In 1917 many Bolsheviks and Bolshevik sympathizers interpreted the October Revolution in Christian terms, principally as a spiritual resurrection and rebirth. And in 1924, following Lenin's death, some Bolsheviks analogized Lenin to Jesus, and claimed that both were revolutionary martyrs. Finally, the article argues that Russian revolutionaries invested the Russian lower classes with a Christlike virtue, making it easier for the revolutionaries, once in power, to justify everything they did as advancing the interests of these classes.
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Mark, Rudolf A. "National Self-Determination, as Understood by Lenin and the Bolsheviks". Lithuanian Historical Studies 13, n.º 1 (28 de dezembro de 2008): 21–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-01301004.
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The article gives an abridged introduction to the genesis of the term ‘right to self-determination’ from the mid-nineteenth century. It also illustrates the term’s usage before and after the Bolshevik Revolution. The right to self-determination played a crucial role in the political discourse of socialist parties in Central and Eastern Europe on the eve of World War One. The Bolsheviks made use of the term as a slogan to fight imperialism and to make non-Russian nationalities side with the Soviet project of establishing the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
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Abekhtikov, Yevgeniy Ye. "The role of the proletariat as a class in 1917 and at first after the October Revolution". Vestnik of Kostroma State University, n.º 4 (2019): 41–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.34216/1998-0817-2019-25-4-41-43.
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The article examines the role of the proletariat in the preparation and implementation of the October Revolution of 1917. The author shows that after the revolution, the Bolsheviks had every reason to be disappointed in the proletariat as a class as they started decreasing in number rapidly due to the return of peasants to villages and difficulties in working in enterprises in cities. Much attention is paid in the article to the concept of "dictatorship of the proletariat", which has become the centre of the Bolshevik ideological programme. Due to the fact that the Marxist class analysis turned out to be inappropriate for Russian social reality, the Bolsheviks had to transform their initial ideas, develop a system of measures to educate the people and influence them. To maintain power after its seize, the Bolsheviks created the myth of an enemy class threatening the proletariat and of building a bright future.
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Gorodnia, Nataliya. "The Ukrainian Directorate and Entente Nations Representatives’ Negotiations in January March of 1919". European Historical Studies, n.º 6 (2017): 84–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/2524-048x.2017.06.84-106.
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The paper studies the content and the matter of negotiations between the Directorate of the Ukrainian People’s Republic’s (the UNR) representatives and the allied (French) military command in Odessa, as well as the Entente nations’ leaders and diplomats in Paris in January-March of 1919. The author argues that a victory of the Entente nations in the Great War did not create a favorable environment for the foundation of an independent Ukrainian national state, for the victorious nations did not tolerate Russia’s disintegration. They did not recognize independence of Ukraine and had a negative attitude towards the Directorate. However, the latter’s control over the Ukrainian territory and its large and battle worthy army shaped a background for its engagement into the united front against bolshevism. During the negotiations in Odessa, the French military command offered a military support to the Directorate in exchange for protectorate of France over Ukraine for the period of war against Bolsheviks. The UNR representatives could hardly accept the terms, and the talks lasted for about two months. Meanwhile, the strategic situation in Ukraine had fundamentally changed. As soon as the Directorate has lost the territories it controlled and its army has been mostly dismissed, the Entente nations lost their interest in dealing with it. Instead, they focused on strengthening Poland and Romania to contain the Bolshevik expansion to the West. It is concluded that in January-March of 1919, the window of opportunities for Ukrainians existed to avoid Bolsheviks’ rule and to become a partner of victorious nations in containment of bolshevism. The cooperation could create other opportunities, especially if Soviet Russia survived. All along of the ineffectiveness and weakness of the regime of the Directorate, the historic chance has been lost.
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Vyacheslav V, Shevtsov, e Vyachisty Dmitry D. "Relations Between the Soviet Government and the Technical Intelligentsia in 1917–1919". Humanitarian Vector 15, n.º 6 (dezembro de 2020): 23–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.21209/1996-7853-2020-15-6-23-33.
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The article presents an overview of the political measures of the Soviet government to marginalize the socio-professional group of technical intelligentsia in 1917–1919. The article describes the process of forming the attitude of the Soviet government to the social group of technical specialists in the conditions of the accomplished October revolution and the Civil war in the country. The political writings of V. I. Lenin as the leader of the Bolshevik party and the head of the country regarding the place of technical specialists in the social space of the new state were characterized. The motives of the authorities in implementing a change in the social status of technical specialists were identified. Through the use of the historical-genetic method, the study analyzes the consecutive statements of V. I. Lenin regarding this socio-professional group was carried out. As a result of this, the periodization of the development of their relationships was constructed. The construction of such a chronology is relevant, because it makes possible to assess the motives of the actions of the Bolshevik government from the point of view of a specific goal setting, not from the standpoint of the class struggle, but in the search for the most effective way to overcome it. At the beginning, the authorities tried to create pragmatic relations with engineers, but seeing their refusal to cooperate, they took a course to stigmatize and marginalize them as a social group. As a result of this discrediting, the only buyer of their services became the Soviet government, using them centrally in the most important fields of production and economy. The authorities were forced to abandon further marginalization in the face of the difficult situation on Civil war, the small number of remaining specialists and the low efficiency of their work. In this regard, the process of rehabilitation of engineers was initiated, authorized by V. I. Lenin at the VIII Congress of the Bolshevik party. The head of state in a short period managed to organize a campaign to discredit the specialists, after which they were forced to abandon the anti-Soviet rhetoric and begin to integrate into society on the terms proposed by the Bolsheviks. Keywords: engineers, technical specialists, intellectuals, V. I. Lenin, Bolsheviks, class struggle
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Hai-Nyzhnyk, Pavlo. "Diplomacy of Deception and Tactics of Terror: Hybrid Politics in the Strategy and Practice of the Secret War of Soviet Russia against the Hetmanate (April – December 1918)". Diplomatic Ukraine, n.º XXI (2020): 7–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-1.
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The article highlights the behind-the-scenes policies of hybrid war of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) against the Ukrainian State headed by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi (April – December 1918). The author examines anti-Ukrainian activities of the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR, the ruling Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and the allied Russian parties of left and right socialist-revolution-aries and anarchists. These include Soviet Russia’s efforts to undermine social and political stability in Ukraine; organisational, armed, and financial assistance to anti-government insurgent units; guidance of the rebel movement; organisation of large-scale strikes and sabotage via secret agents as well as setting up arms caches and underground networks of revolutionary committees, etc. The article exposes secret aspects of subversive anti-Ukrainian activities of Bolshevik diplomacy in Ukraine, particularly of the Soviet consulate in Odesa, and its assistance to the anti-hetman movement with the acquiescence of German diplomats accredited to the Ukrainian State. Special attention is attached to the Soviet-Bolshevik policy of establishing secret military units of the underground socialist terrorist army in Ukraine and such steps of the Russian Soviet government as supporting and sponsoring mass rebel and terrorist movements and the direct organisation of acts of individual terror against Ukrainian public figures, including several attempts to assassinate Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi. The author notes that Ukrainian security services were aware of the structure, network, subversive activities, and organisation of attempted assassinations of the Ukrainian hetman. The article describes the preparation of the Soviet armed invasion of Ukraine and records the beginning of the military aggression in the autumn of 1918. Keywords: Bolshevik terror, RSFSR, Skoropadskyi, Ukrainian State, hybrid war.
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Kaleta, Petr. "A Russian Officer with Polish Roots in Czechoslovakia. On the Seventieth Anniversary of Vladimír Hejmovský’s Victory in the Grand Pardubice Steeplechase". Czech-polish historical and pedagogical journal 13, n.º 1 (3 de junho de 2022): 13–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/cphpj-2021-002.
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Vladimír Hejmovský (Russian: Vladimir Geymovsky) was a tsarist officer in Russia who fought on the side of the Whites against the Bolsheviks. After arriving in Czechoslovakia in 1923, he became an officer in the Czechoslovak army. He was also a passionate equestrian who managed to win the Grand Pardubice Steeplechase in 1951 – when he was nearly sixty years old. But he would never again achieve a similar sporting achievement. Czechoslovakia’s State Security (StB) sought to get rid of him for his earlier anti-Bolshevik activities (and his activities in the Russian émigré organization Victor), which they succeeded in doing in September 1952