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Cowan, Steven B. "Or Abstractum". Philosophia Christi 23, n.º 1 (2021): 175–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/pc202123114.
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George Berkeley is famous for the metaphysical principle esse is percipi or percipere (“to be is to be perceived or to be a perceiver”). Many Berkeleyan idealists take this principle to be incompatible with Platonic realism about abstract objects, and thus opt either for nominalism or divine conceptualism on which they are construed as divine ideas. In this paper, I argue that Berkeleyan idealism is consistent with a Platonic realism in which abstracta exist outside the divine mind. This allows the Berkeleyan to expand Berkeley’s principle to read: esse is percipi or percipere or abstractum.
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López, Alberto Luis. "Ontología y mundo externo en Berkeley [Berkeley’s Ontology and External World]". LOGOS Revista de Filosofía 135, n.º 135 (21 de julho de 2020): 11–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.26457/lrf.v135i135.2713.
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Es habitual que algunos lectores confundan la postura de Berkeley al creer que niega la existencia del mundo externo y que su filosofía lleva inevitablemente al solipsismo. Frente a estas lecturas, analizo en este artículo el tema de la relación entre ontología y mundo externo en Berkeley, con el propósito de aclarar algunos desaciertos interpretativos sobre el asunto y mostrar con ello tres cosas: 1) que se trata de un error creer que su filosofía elimina el mundo externo y lleva al solipsismo, 2) que en la propia ontología está la clave para entender la constitución del mundo externo, y 3) que Dios le da el sentido último a ese mundo.
Palabras clave
Berkeley, mundo externo, ontología, Dios, solipsismo
Referencias
Berkeley, G., Philosophical Commentaries, en: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Luce, A. A. (ed.). London: Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1948-57, 9 vols. Vol. I, 1948.
___________, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge; Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous, en: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Jessop, T. E. (ed.). London: Nelson & Sons Ltd., 1948-57, 9 vols. Vol. II, 1949.
___________, Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher, en: The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Jessop, T. E. (ed.). London: Nelson & Sons Ltd. 9 vols. 1948-57, 9 vols. Vol. III, 1950.
___________, Comentarios filosóficos. Introducción Manuscrita a los Principios del conocimiento humano. Correspondencia con Johnson. J. A. Robles (trad.). México: IIF’s-UNAM, 1989.
Bettcher, Talia Mae. Berkeley. A Guide for the Perplexed. Londres: Continuum, 2008.
Cassirer, Ernst. La Filosofía de las formas simbólicas. 3 vols. México: FCE, 1976.
Hight, M.A. (ed.). The Correspondence of George Berkeley. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Liébana Martínez, Ismael, “Conocimiento y mundo externo en Berkeley”. Diálogo Filosófico nº 46 (enero/abril, 2000): 69-76.
Luis López, Alberto, “Berkeley: sobre el conocimiento nocional de la mente”, Contrastes. Revista Internacional de Filosofía 22, núm. 1, mayo (2017): 137-154.
___________, “Sobre la ontología inmaterialista: el concepto de idea en Berkeley”, Areté. Revista de Filosofía 31, núm. 2 (2019): 427-449.
Muehlmann, Robert G. “The Substance of Berkeley’s Philosophy”. En Berkeley´s Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretive, and Critical Essays, edit. Muehlmann, Robert, 89-105. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004.
Nols, Carmen. Zeichenhafte Wirklichkeit. Realität als Ausdruck der kommunikativen Präsenz Gottes in der Theologie George Berkeleys. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011.
Roberts, John Russell. A Metaphysics for the Mob. The Philosophy of George Berkeley. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Robles, José Antonio. “Inteligibilidad y cualidades sensibles: de Descartes a Berkeley o de la resurrección de las cualidades secundarias”. Diánoia XLIV, núm 44 (1998): 33-62.
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Hill, James. "The Synthesis of Empiricism and Innatism in Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions". Berkeley Studies 21 (2010): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2010211.
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This essay argues that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions is an account of concept-formation that offers a middle-way between empiricism and innatism, something which Berkeley himself asserts at Siris 308. First, the widespread assumption that Berkeley accepts Locke’s conceptual empiricism is questioned, with particular attention given to Berkeley’s views on innatism and ideas of reflection. Then, it is shown that Berkeley’s doctrine of notions comes very close to the refined form of innatism to be found in Descartes’ later writings and in Leibniz. Finally, it is argued that Berkeley denies a principle common to both empiricism and innatism, namely, that all conceptual knowledge amounts to the perception of ideas. By denying this―at least in the case of the concepts of self, causation, substance, and virtue―Berkeley is able to provide a synthesis of conceptual empiricism and innatism.
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Roberts, John Russel. "Berkeley’s Mental Realism". Berkeley Studies 24 (2013): 22–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2013242.
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This essay summarizes the argument of my A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, and it provides replies to objections raised against it, particularly about my focus on Berkeley's view of the nature of spirits. Specifically, I address worries about identifying mind as will, how we can think of God, the relation of mind and ideas, and how thinking of Berkeley’s efforts as metaphysical is compatible with his commitment to common sense.
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Migely, Genevieve. "Berkeley’s Cartesian Account of Volitional Causation". MANUSYA 12, n.º 1 (2009): 11–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/26659077-01201002.
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Although the heart of Berkeley’s philosophy is active substance, some argue that Berkeley’s notion of causation precludes human agency, an undesirable result for Berkeley. In the hope of securing the ontological status of finite substance in Berkeley’s metaphysics, this paper seeks to offer a rather different take on the Cartesian influence supporting Berkeley’s views on the causal efficacy of human spirits. After demonstrating the possibility of a Malebranchian occasionalism in light of Berkeley’s views on necessary connection, a close examination of Berkeley’s works reveals his real stance on what type of connection counts as causal. Employing Descartes’s divinely-established natural connection between a finite will and its effects, Berkeley is able to offer a coherent account of finite causation in the natural world that can accommodate free will. This naturalistic interpretation is able to situate Berkeley as one who is influenced by a Cartesian version of causation (though not the one scholars often attribute to him), but is able to legitimately resist the fall into Hume’s metaphysically empty position on causation as nothing but constant conjunction.
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Matthiessen, Hannes Ole. "A Reiding of Berkeley's Theory of Vision". Journal of Scottish Philosophy 20, n.º 1 (março de 2022): 19–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2022.0318.
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George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary signs for tangible bodies. But is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently.
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Falkenstein, Lorne. "Reid's Critique of Berkely's Position on the Inverted Image". Journal of Scottish Philosophy 16, n.º 2 (junho de 2018): 175–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2018.0196.
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Reid and Berkeley disagreed over whether we directly perceive objects located outside of us in a surrounding space, commonly revealed by both vision and touch. Berkeley considered a successful account of erect vision to be crucial for deciding this dispute, at one point calling it ‘the principal point in the whole optic theory.’ Reid's critique of Berkeley's position on this topic is very brief, and appears to miss Berkeley's point. I argue that there is more to Reid's response to Berkeley than at first meets the eye. Reid's rival account of erect vision draws on evidence that makes a compelling case for the position that we see the same space that we touch.
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Jankowiak, Tim. "Kantian Phenomenalism Without Berkeleyan Idealism". Kantian Review 22, n.º 2 (5 de maio de 2017): 205–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415417000024.
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AbstractPhenomenalist interpretations of Kant are out of fashion. The most common complaint from anti-phenomenalist critics is that a phenomenalist reading of Kant would collapse Kantian idealism into Berkeleyan idealism. This would be unacceptable because Berkeleyan idealism is incompatible with core elements of Kant’s empirical realism. In this paper, I argue that not all phenomenalist readings threaten empirical realism. First, I distinguish several variants of phenomenalism, and then show that Berkeley’s idealism is characterized by his commitment to most of them. I then make the case that two forms of phenomenalism are consistent with Kant’s empirical realism. The comparison between Kant and Berkeley runs throughout the paper, with special emphasis on the significance of their theories of intentionality.
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Hight, Marc, e Walter Ott. "The New Berkeley". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34, n.º 1 (março de 2004): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2004.10716557.
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Throughout his mature writings, Berkeley speaks of minds as substances that underlie or support ideas. After initially flirting with a Humean account, according to which minds are nothing but ‘congeries of Perceptions’ (PC 580), Berkeley went on to claim that a mind is a ‘perceiving, active being … entirely distinct’ from its ideas (P 2). Despite his immaterialism, Berkeley retains the traditional category of substance and gives it pride of place in his ontology. Ideas, by contrast, are ‘fleeting and dependent beings’ (P 89) that must be supported by a mental substance. There is no doubt that Berkeley's conception of the relationship between minds and ideas is non-traditional, but that fact does not undercut his commitment to the traditional conception of substance.
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Kroiz, Lauren. "Relocating Romare Bearden’s Berkeley". Boom 6, n.º 3 (2016): 50–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/boom.2016.6.3.50.
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In 1972, the black artist and writer Romare Bearden traveled from his home in New York to spend ten days in the capital of counterculture in Berkeley, California. He visited on an official commission from the city of Berkeley to create a new artwork for its City Council Chambers. The result was the monumental work Berkeley—The City and its People, which hung for decades until extensive seismic trouble plaguing City Hall forced its removal and relocation to a storage facility. Berkeley has changed dramatically since Bearden’s visit. The percentage of Berkeley’s black population has dropped from almost 25 percent in 1970 to less than 10 percent in 2010. Perhaps this demographic shift, coupled with the full mural’s removal from public view, has made it difficult to remember that Bearden’s Berkeley originated in a moment of racially charged civic conflict. Bearden’s Berkeley envisions how the California city is built from and on shifting histories of encounter and settlement by many groups with different backgrounds, interests, and beliefs, all needed to work together to build a better future.
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Huggler, Jørgen. "The Response to George Berkeley’s Philosophy in Twentieth-Century Danish Experimental Psychology: Edgar Rubin and Edgar Tranekjær Rasmussen". Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 51, n.º 1 (12 de dezembro de 2018): 47–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300-05101001.
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The purpose of this paper is to explore the reception of George Berkeley in a particular corner of 20th-century Danish psychology and philosophy. In contrast to philosophers, such as Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt, Danish experimental psychologists, including Edgar Rubin and Edgar Tranekjær Rasmussen, made highly appreciative reference to the methodology and experimental observations of Berkeley and David Hume. This paper focuses on these psychologists’ interest in Berkeley’s ideas. I will first present Rubin’s path from a mosaic-like understanding of psychological phenomena (elemental psychology) to a holistic view, detailing what he termed adspective psychology and its method. I then turn to Rubin’s embrace of certain experimental observations made by Berkeley and, in particular, by Hume concerning the minima visibilia. The second part of the paper deals with Tranekjær Rasmussen’s interpretation of Berkeley’s work, and in particular of his immaterialism, his notion of God, and his critique of abstract ideas.
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Hošman, Mirek Tobiáš. "George Berkeley’s Tar-water Medicine". Early Science and Medicine 25, n.º 2 (29 de julho de 2020): 173–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15733823-00252p04.
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Abstract In his last major book, Siris (1744), the philosopher George Berkeley proposed tar-water as a universal medicine, suggesting that he had found a panacea. Shortly after its publication, Siris became immensely popular and tar-water spread all around Europe and even reached America. The aim of this article is to present Berkeley’s ideas about tar-water as a medicine with a particular focus on the origins of tar-water in Berkeley’s thinking and its alleged medical effects. Berkeley conceived of tar-water as at one end of a chain, with God at the other end. I reconstruct this chain, excluding from the examination the last parts, related to metaphysics and theology. Furthermore, relying on eighteenth-century letters, books and pamphlets, I briefly introduce the conditions leading Berkeley to start experimenting with tar-water as well as the context and the so called “pamphlet war” following the publication of Siris.
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Townsend, Chris. "Nature and the Language of the Sense: Berkeley's Thought in Coleridge and Wordsworth". Romanticism 25, n.º 2 (julho de 2019): 129–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/rom.2019.0414.
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Though George Berkeley's name appears in a number of studies of British Romantic poetry, sustained readings of his influence on poets of the period are scarce. This is in large part because our modern understanding of Berkeley as an idealist philosopher often precludes us from seeing the role that his theory of nature as a divine language played in poetic conceptions of the relations between mind, world, and God. In this essay I explore the writings of Coleridge and Wordsworth from the 1790s, sketching as complete a picture as possible of their knowledge of Berkeley, and offering readings of Berkeleian moments in their poetry. These moments, which draw Berkeley's ideas into a complex dialogue with philosophical materialism, centre around a rhetoric of semblance – in which the world can ‘seem’ less gross than bodily. I offer this reading as a step towards a fuller understanding of the Romantic understanding of Berkeley.
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Adar, Einat. "‘The Young Fellow of Trinity College’: Beckett, Berkeley, and the Genesis of Murphy". Journal of Beckett Studies 32, n.º 2 (setembro de 2023): 145–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jobs.2023.0401.
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The article revisits the reference to the 18th century Irish philosopher George Berkeley in Samuel Beckett's first published novel, Murphy. Previous scholarship assumed that references to Berkeley's theory of immaterialism were inherent to the novel's exploration of the relations between the mind and the world. However a comparison of the novel's manuscript, typescript and the final printed version reveals that they were a relatively late addition. As Beckett was typing up the manuscript in June 1936 he expanded on a previous cryptic allusion to Berkeley, and added two more. Beckett's reluctance to engage with Berkeley in the earlier version may be due in part to his scepticism towards the Irish Revival which adopted the famous philosopher as a national model for Irish thinking. It was Beckett's reading of Arnold Geulincx in 1936, it is argued, that made him revisit Berkeley's views and contrast them with Geulingian ethics which he viewed more favourably. The first reference to Berkeley in the published novel echoes a comparison he made between him and Arnold Geulincx in a letter to McGreevy, highlighting the relevance of this reference point for Beckett's treatment of Berkeley. The denial that Murphy's mind was ‘involved in the idealist tar’ is shown to be subsequent to Beckett's reading of Geulincx. Finally, the reference to ‘percipi’ and ‘percipere’ in the description of Murphy's state following his game of chess with Mr. Endon is correlated with Geulincx's ethics to suggest that, however briefly, Murphy becomes aware of his own impotence.
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Fields, Keota. "Berkeley on the Meaning of General Terms". Berkeley Studies 29 (2021): 3–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2021291.
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I argue that for Berkeley the meaning of a general term is constituted by the multiple particular ideas indifferently signified by that term. This reading faces two challenges. First, Berkeley argues that the meaning of sentences containing general terms is constituted by the one idea signified by the name in that sentence rather than by multiple ideas, implying that general terms are meaningful although they do not signify multiple ideas. Second, Berkeley writes that finite minds know the meaning of the biblical phrase ‘good thing’ even though that phrase fails to signify any ideas at all. Both challenges are met by deploying Berkeley’s account of mediate perception.
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C. Rickless, Samuel. "The Nature, Grounds, and Limits of Berkeley’s Argument for Passive Obedience". Berkeley Studies 26 (2016): 3–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2016261.
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Scholars disagree about the nature of the doctrinal apparatus that supports Berkeley’s case for passive obedience to the sovereign. Is he a rule-utilitarian, or natural law theorist, or ethical egoist, or some combination of some or all these elements? Here I argue that Berkeley is an act-utilitarian who thinks that one is more likely to act rightly by following certain sorts of rules. I also argue that Berkeley mischaracterizes and misevaluates Locke’s version of the social contract theory. Finally, I consider the potentially practically self-defeating nature of Berkeley’s claim that there is no obligation to submit to the rule of “madmen” or “usurpers.”
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Reddy, Vegitha, Aman Tripathi e Parameshwar Rama Bhat. "Berkeley’s God and solipsism". Brazilian Journal of Development 10, n.º 5 (2 de maio de 2024): e69387. http://dx.doi.org/10.34117/bjdv10n5-007.
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In this paper I provide a meta-analysis of Berkeley’s argument of ‘esse est percipi.’ – to be is to be perceived. I also propose an alternative way Berkeley, could have solved the problem of solipsism without invoking God. I borrow from Wittgenstein’s use of language - to overcome the solipsism of the beetle thought experiment. Similarly, one could also think of escaping solipsist framework of Berkeley by invoking the notion of web of concepts.
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BROOK, RICHARD J. "Berkeley and Proof in Geometry". Dialogue 51, n.º 3 (setembro de 2012): 419–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217312000686.
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Berkeley in his Introduction to the Principles of Human knowledge uses geometrical examples to illustrate a way of generating “universal ideas,” which allegedly account for the existence of general terms. In doing proofs we might, for example, selectively attend to the triangular shape of a diagram. Presumably what we prove using just that property applies to all triangles.I contend, rather, that given Berkeley’s view of extension, no Euclidean triangles exist to attend to. Rather proof, as Berkeley would normally assume, requires idealizing diagrams; treating them as if they obeyed Euclidean constraints. This convention solves the problem of representative generalization.
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West, Peter. "Getting Beyond “The Curtain of the Fancy:” Anti-Representationalism in Berkeley and Sergeant". Berkeley Studies 30 (2023): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2023301.
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This paper argues for a re-evaluation of the relationship between Berkeley and his predecessor, the neo-Aristotelian thinker John Sergeant. In the literature to date, the relationship between these two thinkers has received attention for two reasons. First, some commentators have attempted to establish a causal connection between them by focusing on the fact that both thinkers develop a theory of “notions.” Second, some have argued that both Berkeley and Sergeant develop “anti-representationalist” arguments against Locke’s epistemology. The first issue has received much greater attention, particularly from commentators seeking an explanation for Berkeley’s use of the term “notion.” Only one scholar (G. A. Johnston in 1923) has considered Berkeley and Sergeant’s anti-representationalism in any depth. In this paper, I argue that the weight given to the causal connection between Berkeley and Sergeant’s “notions” is misplaced since the evidence in favor of this connection is weaker than is usually acknowledged. Instead, I build on Johnston’s analysis of the conceptual connection between Berkeley and Sergeant’s anti-representationalism. I first corroborate Johnston’s claim that there are striking similarities between their criticisms of Locke before going beyond that analysis to identify two important similarities between their anti-representationalist arguments.
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Nichols, Roger. "Berkeley Conducts Berkeley". Musical Times 134, n.º 1805 (julho de 1993): 412. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1003114.
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Smith, Frederik N. "BECKETT AND BERKELEY: A Reconsideration". Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui 7, n.º 1 (8 de dezembro de 1998): 331–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757405-90000104.
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No one doubts that Beckett was influenced by the skepticism of the eighteenth-century Irish philosopher George Berkeley; what is not appreciated, however, is the influence of the form of Berkeley's less well-known writings. Of particular importance are his youthful Philosophical Commentaries (kept in 1707-08), and his late, apparently incomplete Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water (published in 1744). Beckett knew both of these works and in them seems to have discovered formal models for the personal, tentative, philosophical fiction of the 'trilogy' and How It Is. In Beckett as in Berkeley, language and writing become not only the means but also the greatest impediment to understanding.
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West, Peter. "Reid and Berkeley on Scepticism, Representationalism, and Ideas". Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17, n.º 3 (setembro de 2019): 191–210. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/jsp.2019.0242.
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Both Reid and Berkeley reject ‘representationalism’, an epistemological position whereby we (mediately) perceive things in the world indirectly via ideas in our mind, on the grounds of anti-scepticism and common sense. My aim in this paper is to draw out the similarities between Reid and Berkeley's ‘anti-representationalist’ arguments, whilst also identifying the root of their disagreements on certain fundamental metaphysical issues. Reid famously rejects Berkeley's idealism, in which all that exists are ideas and minds, because it undermines the dictates of common sense. Reid also charges Berkeley with not only accepting but furthering the progress of ‘the Way of Ideas’, a longstanding tradition which has drawn philosophy away from true science and common sense. From Berkeley's perspective, Reid is a ‘materialist’; that is, he dogmatically accepts that mind-independent things exist. I argue that these important differences can be explained by both thinkers’ construal of certain ‘philosophical prejudices’. Finally, I conclude that despite these differences, both ought to be characterised as ‘anti-representationalists’ in light of their shared epistemological concerns.
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Kendrick, Nancy. "The ‘Empty Amusement’ of Willing: Berkeley on Agent Causation". Berkeley Studies 25 (2014): 3–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2014251.
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Some aspects of Berkeley’s view of volitional causation would be unobjectionable to his contemporaries. That minds are efficient causes and that their causal power consists in volition would be troubling to neither Descartes nor Locke, since both recognized that through the power of will, minds could create ideas. But Berkeley’s view is not that agent causation is one kind of causal power, it is that it is the only kind, and few of his contemporaries would have found that claim acceptable. Malebranche is an exception: he also thought agent causation the only genuine causation. Many commentators link Berkeley with Malebranche in supposing that both treated necessary connection as the defining feature of causation. I argue that this is mistaken: a “true cause” for Berkeley, is not, as it is for Malebranche, such that the mind perceives a necessary connection between it and its effects. A true cause is a volitional cause. This is a claim about what causation is, not a claim about where necessary connections are located (in the will rather than in the world). Berkeley’s view of agent causation offers an alternative to causation understood as necessary connection; it does not provide an alternative place for necessary connections to occur. This reading of Berkeley permits him to hold that both an infinite spirit and finite spirits are genuine causes.
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Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. "Anthropologist as Court Jester". Boom 6, n.º 4 (2016): 80–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/boom.2016.6.4.80.
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This autobiopic piece chronicles Scheper-Hughes’s early voluntary service with the Peace Corp in Brazil, followed by her early academic career and coming to Berkeley, and then her ongoing engagement and activism in standing up for, and standing with, others. This welled up into community activism and advocacy for the homeless together with Berkeley Catholic Workers, eventually resulting in a café inside of Berkeley’s People’s Park in 1989, providing rationale for Scheper-Hughes’s own well-known applied anthropology and activism, which has made her famous as one of today’s leading anthropologists.
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Alves, Pedro MS. "A Percepção Da Extensão. Exame das teses de Berkeley". Phainomenon 18-19, n.º 1 (1 de outubro de 2009): 71–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2009-0005.
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Abstract In this paper I discuss Berkeley’s theories about vision, perception of distance, and the foundations of Geometry. I start with Locke’s answer to Molineaux’s problem and the criticisms Berkeley addressed to it. I explain the fundamentais of Berkeley’s theory about our cognitive shaping of the visual field and the type of connections that visual data establishes with data from the haptic field. I show how interesting are Berkeley’s conceptions for a phenomenology of perception, and, eventually, I carried some phenomenological evidence against Berkeley’s too much strict location of the idea of distance in the haptic field alone.
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DERİNÖZ, Berk. "İmmateryalizm ve Algı Perdesi Sorunu Bağlamında Tanrı, Ruh ve Eşyanın Tabiatı Üzerine Bir İnceleme". Eskiyeni, n.º 48 (28 de março de 2023): 79–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.37697/eskiyeni.1221323.
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Eşyanın tabiatı, nesnelerin tabiatı yahut genel olarak dünyanın tabiatı anlamına gelir. Bu dünyada bulunan herkes, kendisini eşyanın, yani şeylerin/nesnelerin ortasında bulur; hatta vücudu itibariyle o şeylerden/nesnelerden bir tanesidir. İnsanlık varolalı beri eşyanın tabiatı konusu zihinleri kurcalamıştır. İlk filozofların düşüncelerini incelediğimizde, hepsinin eşyanın tabiatı konusunu töz kavramı üzerinden ele aldıklarını, tözü de maddi bir şey olarak tasavvur ettiklerini görürüz. Sonraki dönemlerde eşyanın tabiatının maddi olmadığını imleyen filozoflar olmuşsa da bunu imlemli olarak değil açık açık dile getiren ilk filozof Berkeley olmuştur. Berkeley madde diye bir şeyin aslında olmadığını, bunun yersiz bir inançtan ibaret olduğunu savlar. Bunu gerçekleştirmesine olanak tanıyan ise felsefede algı perdesi sorunu olarak bilinen sorun olmuştur. Söz konusu sorunun temelinde ise Descartes’ın ortaya attığı birtakım argümanlar bulunmaktadır. Berkeley bu argümanları (Locke felsefesi dolayımında) kendisi için bir sıçrama tahtası olarak kullanarak kendi sistemini kurmuştur. Berkeley zihni, tıpkı Descartes'ın düşündüğü gibi, yani uzamı olmayan fakat düşünen, algılayan, bilen bir şey olarak kabul eder. Descartes zihnin varlığını maddenin varlığı ile açıklamaya kalkmanın yanlış olacağını iddia ediyordu, Berkeley de onunla hemfikirdir. Ancak Berkeley daha da ileri giderek maddenin varlığının bütünüyle zihnin varlığına indirgenebileceğini serdeder. Böylelikle eşyanın tabiatı konusunda yepyeni bir tutum ortaya koyar. Biz bu makalenin ilk bölümünde Berkeley'in eşyanın tabiatını 'gayrı-maddi' ile özdeşleştiren felsefesini ve algı perdesi sorununu ele alıp inceleyeceğiz. Makalenin ikinci bölümünde ise, bu minvalde, eşyanın tabiatı ile Tanrı ve ruh arasındaki ilişkiyi ele alıp inceleyeceğiz ve bu amaçla Descartes'ın res cogitans kavramı üzerinde de duracağız. Böylelikle "eşyanın tabiatı nedir?" sorusuna Berkeleyci perspektiften cevap vermeyi ve eşyanın tabiatı ile tanrı ve ruh arasındaki ilişkiye ışık tutmayı deneyeceğiz.
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Gordon-Roth, Jessica. "Tracing Reid’s ‘Brave Officer’ Objection Back to Berkeley—And Beyond". Berkeley Studies 28 (2019): 3–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2019281.
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Berkeley’s two most obvious targets in Alciphron are Shaftesbury and Mandeville. However, as numerous commentators have pointed out, there is good reason to think Berkeley additionally targets Anthony Collins in this dialogue. In this paper, I bolster David Berman’s claim that “Collins looms large in the background” of Dialogue VII, and put some meat on the bones of Raymond Martin and John Barresi’s passing suggestion that there is a connection between the Clarke–Collins correspondence, Alciphron, and the objection that Berkeley raises regarding persons and their persistence conditions therein. Specifically, I argue that we have evidence that Berkeley’s objection to consciousness–based views of personal identity, as found in VII.8, is a response to a challenge that Collins raises to Clarke in “An Answer to Mr. Clarke’s Third Defense of his Letter to Mr. Dodwell.” This is significant not just because this objection is usually—and consistently—taken to be an objection to Locke, but also because Berkeley’s objection works against Collins’s theory of personal identity in a way that it doesn’t against Locke’s.
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Fasko, Manuel, e Peter West. "The Irish Context of Berkeley's ‘Resemblance Thesis’". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 88 (outubro de 2020): 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246120000089.
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AbstractIn this paper, we focus on Berkeley's reasons for accepting the ‘resemblance thesis’ which entails that for one thing to represent another those two things must resemble one another. The resemblance thesis is a crucial premise in Berkeley's argument from the ‘likeness principle’ in §8 of the Principles. Yet, like the ‘likeness principle’, the resemblance thesis remains unargued for and is never explicitly defended. This has led several commentators to provide explanations as to why Berkeley accepts the resemblance thesis and why he also takes his opponents to do so too. We provide a contextual answer to this question, focusing on epistemological discussions concerning resemblance and representation in Early Modern Irish Philosophy. We argue that the resemblance thesis is implicit in early responses to William Molyneux's famous example of the ‘man born blind made to see’ and trace the ‘Molyneux man’ thought experiment as it is employed by Irish thinkers such as William King and Berkeley himself. Ultimately, we conclude that Berkeley's acceptance of the resemblance thesis can be explained by the Irish intellectual climate in which he was writing.
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Freitas, Vinícius França. "O Ceticismo de George Berkeley na Leitura de Thomas Reid". Philosophica: International Journal for the History of Philosophy 29, n.º 57 (2021): 5–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philosophica202128571.
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The paper advances two hypotheses concerning Thomas Reid’s reading of George Berkeley’s immaterialist system. First, it is argued that, on Reid’s view, Berkeley is skeptic about the existence of the objects of the material world, not in virtue of a doubt about the senses but for his adoption of the principle that ideas are the immediate objects of the operations of mind. On Reid’s view, that principle is a skeptical principle by its own nature. Secondly, it is argued that Berkeley really accepts in his system the notion of ‘idea’ such as Reid understands it, namely, as an entity distinct from mind and its operations.
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Lowe, E. J. "Identity, Individuality, and Unity". Philosophy 78, n.º 3 (julho de 2003): 321–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819103000329.
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Locke notoriously included number amongst the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized for doing so by Berkeley. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that ‘Number is a property of external things’, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objections of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized. More precisely, it is argued that numbers are assignable to pluralities of individuals. However, it is also argued that Locke went too far in asserting that ‘Number applies itself to ... everything that either doth exist, or can be imagined’.
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Flage, Daniel E. "Rickless and Passive Obedience". Berkeley Studies 28 (2019): 24–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2019282.
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Samuel Rickless has recently defended an act utilitarian interpretation of Berkeley’s Passive Obedience. Part of his argument is a criticism of my natural law reading of Berkeley, particularly my contention that natural lawyers are committed to a distributive notion of universality, while utilitarians are committed to a collective sense of universality. This essay is, in part, a reply to Rickless’s criticisms. I argue that if we assume that Berkeley was either a natural lawyer or a utilitarian, and if we can find grounds for distinguishing natural law theories from utilitarian theories, then a natural law theory provides a more philosophically defensible fit with the texts than does a utilitarian theory.
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Grzeliński, Adam. "Siris and Berkeley’s Late Social Philosophy". Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych 30, n.º 1 (2018): 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.15290/idea.2018.30.1.15.
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In the present article, I aim at showing a shift in Berkeley’s understanding of society in the late Siris (1744). Although the work is primarily devoted to the curative qualities of tar-water and on the speculative level develops a new neoplatonic metaphysic of light, it should also be seen as a work in which Berkeley’s mature philosophy is expressed as a whole. Together with the fact that since the thirties Berkeley thought was more inclined towards practical, i.e. economic and social, issues, this might be a premise for interpreting the Siris as a work in which a vision of society is presented. The parallelism of nature and society, of macrocosm and microcosm, and the claim that nature is not perfect, but is a dynamic, developing whole, makes it possible to treat society as an imperfect whole developed and perfected by human activity. If such a reading is correct it evidences the fact that in his Siris Berkeley abandoned the religious radicalism typical for his early works.
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Jakapi, Roomet. "Loomislugu filosoofias: hr Berkeley vastus Lady Percivalile". Mäetagused 81 (dezembro de 2021): 151–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.7592/mt2021.81.jakapi.
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The paper discusses George Berkeley’s metaphysical account of the Creation in his work Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (1713). As we know from Berkeley’s correspondence, his detailed attempt to show that his immaterialist philosophy is compatible with the Mosaic description of the Creation was occasioned by an objection from the wife of his friend Sir John Percival. According to Berkeley’s philosophy, only minds and ideas exist. Physical things such as books and trees are mere collections of ideas in human minds. No thing can exist unless there is a mind to perceive it. Yet the Mosaic story states that many things were created and existed before humans came into being. Lady Percival pointed out that Berkeley’s view makes it hard to understand how things could be created if there were no human beings around to perceive them. In response, Berkeley offered a sophisticated metaphysical construct in which the creation of the physical world is interpreted as God’s decree to produce certain kinds of ideas in potential perceivers. The paper aims to show how Berkeley’s response to Lady Percival’s objection reflects the complicated relationship between philosophy and revealed religion in the early 18th century. Berkeley’s commitment to biblical truth sets significant limits to his philosophical speculation.
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Belfrage, Bertil. "Berkeley". International Studies in Philosophy 20, n.º 1 (1988): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198820157.
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Kline, A. David, e R. J. Van Iten. "Berkeley". International Studies in Philosophy 21, n.º 3 (1989): 116–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil198921324.
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Bracken, Harry M. "Berkeley". Idealistic Studies 15, n.º 2 (1985): 176–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies198515237.
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Winkler, Kenneth P. "Berkeley". Idealistic Studies 22, n.º 3 (1992): 300–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/idstudies199222378.
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Ackoff, Russel L. "Berkeley". Systems Practice 5, n.º 6 (dezembro de 1992): 583–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01083612.
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Faaborg, Robert. "Berkeley". Teaching Philosophy 12, n.º 1 (1989): 87–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil198912129.
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Welker, David. "Berkeley". Teaching Philosophy 13, n.º 3 (1990): 284–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil199013339.
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Holtzman, Matthew. "Berkeley’s Theory of Common Sense". Berkeley Studies 24 (2013): 3–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2013241.
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This essay situates Berkeley’s views on common sense within the context of eighteenth-century debates about the nature of common sense. It argues that in his Notebooks, Berkeley develops a theory according to which to possess common sense is to use the faculties of the mind properly, and that Berkeley’s approach to common sense can be understood as a response to John Toland’s epistemology of religion. It concludes with a discussion of consequences of this analysis for our understanding of Berkeley’s later works, his methods, and his overarching philosophical aims.
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Dicker, Georges. "Berkeley’s Idealism". Berkeley Studies 24 (2013): 75–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2013247.
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This essay replies to criticisms of my Berkeley’s Idealism: A Critical Examination made by Margaret Atherton and Samuel Rickless. These critics both focus primarily on my treatment of Berkeley’s arguments in the opening sections of Principles Part I and the first of his Three Dialogues. They mainly agree that the arguments I attribute to Berkeley are unsound for the reasons that I give, but also argue that I misrepresent his arguments and that his real arguments are better. Here I defend both my interpretations and my assessments of Berkeley’s arguments.
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Fields, Keota. "Berkeley’s Metaphysics of Perception". Berkeley Studies 24 (2013): 51–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/berkeleystudies2013245.
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In this reply, I use an act theory to explain divine ideas and Berkeley’s archetype–ectype distinction. I argue that divine ideas are acts of divine self-consciousness in reply to the objection that if divine ideas are acts, then for Berkeley they are acts without objects. The result is a much more plausible account of Berkeley’s archetype–ectype distinction than is available on representationalist interpretations. Lastly, while arguments from illusion are indispensable to representationalist theories, Berkeley’s rejection of arguments from illusion is evidence that he endorsed an act theory of ideas.
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Laguna García, Rogelio. "Berkeley vs. Berkeley y la cuestión de Dios en los Principios Berkeley versus Berkeley. On God in the Treatise". LOGOS Revista de Filosofía 135, n.º 135 (21 de julho de 2020): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.26457/lrf.v135i135.2716.
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En este artículo nos interesa hacer una revisión de la cuestión de Dios en el Tratado de Berkeley sobre los principios del conocimiento humano. Para ello realizamos una exposición de las ideas centrales de esta obra, después ofrecemos una revisión crítica de los postulados, de acuerdo a las críticas establecidas por el propio Berkeley en el Tratado. Finalmente ponemos a discusión si el propio concepto de Dios tiene que reconsiderarse y si esto tendría implicaciones en la doctrina de la inmaterialidad del mundo.
Palabras clave
Modernidad, materia, filosofía natural, racionalismo
Referencias
Berkeley, George. Principios del conocimiento humano. Barcelona:Folio, 1999.
Consiglio, Francesco. “Introducción al concepto de idea en la filosofía de George Berkeley”. Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 5:6 (2016): 283–296.
Sobrevilla, David, “El idealismo de Berkeley”. Areté. Revista de filosofía VII: 2, (1995): 331-352.
Defez, Antoni, “Inmaterialismo y realismo en Berkeley”. Pensamiento 71:68 (2015), pp. 897-908.
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Rickless, Samuel C. "Berkeley's Criticisms of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson". Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 88 (outubro de 2020): 97–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246120000119.
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AbstractIn this paper, I attempt to clarify the nature and purpose of Berkeley's criticisms of Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's ethical systems in the third chapter of Alciphron, explaining the extent to which those criticisms rely on the truth of idealism and considering whether Berkeley or his philosophical opponents have the better of the arguments. In the end, I conclude that some of Berkeley's criticisms are based on confusion and misunderstanding, others are likely contradicted by the empirical evidence, and yet others are unconvincing. At the same time, the criticisms reveal that Berkeley's metaphysical and ethical views are, perhaps surprisingly, significantly intertwined.
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Mordka, Cezary. "Realistyczna interpretacja domniemanego idealizmu G. Berkeleya". Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, sectio I – Philosophia-Sociologia 43, n.º 2 (10 de junho de 2019): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.17951/i.2018.43.2.93-105.
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<p align="justify">W artykule przedstawiam próbę wskazania na to, iż dokonania Berkeleya, mimo rzekomego konsensusu, nie dają się umiejscowić w obszarze idealizmu subiektywnego. Niezależnie od sformułowań samego Berkeleya, który nie pozostawał klarowny semantycznie, daje się utrzymać tezę, iż świat nie utracił dla niego pozycji bytu realnego, tyle że realność tego świata całkowicie była uzależniona od aktywności bytu boskiego. Filozof słusznie zwrócił uwagę na nieodzowność podmiotowych ujęć w kwestii dostępu do świata. Nie mając odpowiedniej ontologii dla idei, Berkeley nie był w stanie „oderwać” idei od umysłu, lecz znaczyło to u niego „bycie dla umysłu”.</p><p align="justify"> </p><p align="justify"> </p>
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Ortolani, S., E. Bica, B. Barbuy e M. Zoccali. "The old open clusters Berkeley 36, Berkeley 73 and Biurakan 13 (Berkeley 34)". Astronomy & Astrophysics 429, n.º 2 (17 de dezembro de 2004): 607–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361:20041458.
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Ortolani, S., E. Bica, B. Barbuy e M. Zoccali. "The old open clusters Berkeley 36, Berkeley 73 and Biurakan 13 (Berkeley 34)". Astronomy & Astrophysics 439, n.º 3 (12 de agosto de 2005): 1135. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/0004-6361:20041458e.
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Dierig, Simon. "Berkeleys Idealismus". Philosophisches Jahrbuch 121, n.º 1 (2014): 76–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2014-1-76.
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Abstract. According to a widespread interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy, advocated, for example, by Kant and Reid, Berkeley’s main claim in the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge is that there are no material, but only mental entities. In the following essay, it is argued that this reading of Berkeley’s idealism is mistaken. Berkeley does not hold ontological idealism, that is, the view that there is not a material world, to be true, but only counterfactual idealism, that is, the claim that material entities counterfactually depend upon mental substances for their existence. While defending this interpretation of Berkeley’s philosophy, I examine in some detail his theory of ideas and his account of corporeal substances. I conclude by discussing several objections to the reading of Berkeley’s idealism advanced in this essay.
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MATSUSHIMA, Toshiyasu. "Berkeley Report". IEICE ESS FUNDAMENTALS REVIEW 5, n.º 3 (2012): 281–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1587/essfr.5.281.
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