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Artigos de revistas sobre o tema "Bargaining process"

Autor: Grafiati

Publicado: 4 de junho de 2021

Última modificação: 12 de fevereiro de 2022

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1

Craig, Alton W. J. "The Collective Bargaining Process". Relations industrielles 25, n.º 1 (12 de abril de 2005): 34–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/028098ar.

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This paper attempts to highlight the parts of the Woods 1 Report dealing with the collective bargaining process. The author discusses how the goals (inputs) of labour and management are converted to outputs via the mechanisms of collective bargaining, and gives his personal opinions on the positions advanced in the Task Force Report. 1. Canadian Industrial Relations, The Report of the Task Force on Labour Relations, Ottawa, the Queen's Printer, 1969. This document will be referred to throughout this paper as the Task Force Report.

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Haruvy, Ernan, Elena Katok e Valery Pavlov. "Bargaining Process and Channel Efficiency". Management Science 66, n.º 7 (julho de 2020): 2845–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3360.

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The behavioral literature has demonstrated that the format of supply chain contracts matters even when theoretically it should not and that contracts that in theory coordinate channels fail to do so in laboratory experiments. The existing body of experimental evidence uses an ultimatum bargaining protocol to test analytical models, but there is no reason to think that bargaining in supply chains is in the form of ultimatum offers. We investigate the effect of bargaining on contract performance by extending the bargaining protocol to allow the manufacturer to make concessions. We test coordinating contract with bargaining in the laboratory by comparing wholesale price and the two-part tariff contracts using two different bargaining protocols. We then develop and estimate a statistical model of behavior with bargaining and find that this model organizes our data well. Our main finding is that the contracts that we study are more efficient when participants are allowed to make concessions. The additional channel efficiency is owing to more efficient offers made by manufacturers. The higher channel efficiency primarily benefits the retailer—the weaker party. Our main contribution is the observation that, when testing analytical models of contracts in the laboratory, the way that the bargaining process is implemented, such as the ability to make concessions, has a critical effect on conclusions. This paper was accepted by Vishal Gaur, operations management.

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3

Ryu, Seung-Jin, e SiDi Wu. "NEGOTIATION PROCESS DESIGN FOR BARGAINING CONTRACT TO ACHIEVE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION". International Journal of Strategic Management 17, n.º 3 (1 de dezembro de 2017): 69–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.18374/ijsm-17-3.6.

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4

Lim, Stephen Ghee-Soon, e J. Keith Murnighan. "Phases, Deadlines, and the Bargaining Process". Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 58, n.º 2 (maio de 1994): 153–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/obhd.1994.1032.

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5

PÕLAJEVA, Tatjana. "BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS: COMMUNICATION IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS". Journal of Business Economics and Management 18, n.º 3 (16 de junho de 2017): 554–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/16111699.2017.1333525.

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6

Fogel, Walter A., Jean A. Baderschneider, Richard N. Block e John A. Fossum. "The Collective Bargaining Process: Readings and Analysis." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 38, n.º 3 (abril de 1985): 452. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2523771.

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7

Golder, Sona N. "Bargaining Delays in the Government Formation Process". Comparative Political Studies 43, n.º 1 (30 de julho de 2009): 3–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414009341714.

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Ilsøe, Anna, Andreas Pekarek e Ray Fells. "Partnership under pressure: A process perspective on decentralized bargaining in Danish and Australian manufacturing". European Journal of Industrial Relations 24, n.º 1 (2 de junho de 2017): 55–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959680117708375.

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Decentralization of collective bargaining has become widespread in developed economies, and EU policies have pushed this trend further. We use process-tracing methodology to explore the consequences of decentralization for the reproduction of partnership bargaining relations at company level. We compare two cases of decentralized bargaining in manufacturing, one in Denmark and one in Australia. Agreement-based decentralization seems to offer better process conditions for reproduction of local partnership compared to decentralization regulated by law. This implies that future decentralization measures should be negotiated rather than imposed.

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9

Rafferty, Felicity. "Equal Pay: The Evolutionary Process 1984-1994". Journal of Industrial Relations 36, n.º 4 (dezembro de 1994): 451–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002218569403600401.

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Equal pay in Australia has been implemented with varying degrees of success since the first historic equal pay decision was handed down in 1969. The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of the equal pay process in the federal industrial relations sphere, with major emphasis on the period from the mid-1980s to the recent legislation that provides for equal remuneration for work of equal value as a legislative right. The mechanisms for processing equal pay are exam ined, drawing on the experience gained from various cases in which implementa tion of equal pay was the goal. Emphasis is given to recent experience in the Family Court Counsellors Case to illustrate the impact of enterprise bargaining on the equal pay process. The paper concludes that the equal pay process has developed greater objectivity over time, thereby enhancing the flexibility of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission's work value principle for the pur poses of evaluating work in feminized occupations. The conclusion is also reached that enterprise bargaining, which is known to disadvantage women, has also been the catalystfor equal pay as a legislative right—although the value of that right in an enterprise bargaining environment is questioned.

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10

Sloan, Judith. "The Economic Implications of Enterprise Bargaining". Economic and Labour Relations Review 4, n.º 1 (junho de 1993): 27–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/103530469300400102.

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The economic implications of enterprise bargaining depend critically on the precise version of enterprise bargaining being contemplated. One version sees enterprise bargaining as an add-on process, with the existing bank of awards retained, and trade unions playing a central and protected role. Another version sees enterprise bargaining as an holistic process, wherein all terms and conditions of employment can be negotiated subject to some minimum conditions. Trade unions may play some role, but not to the exclusion of other bargaining agents. Add-on enterprise bargaining may have only a small impact on productivity; there is a danger that wage (and price) inflation could increase; and the impact on employment is uncertain. Holistic enterprise bargaining is likely to have a more substantial impact on productivity; is unlikely to lead to inflation; and employment growth should be boosted. However, power-reducing policies and the abolition of awards are necessary correlates of holistic enterprise bargaining.

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Lindenberg, Karen E. "The Grievance Process in a Collective Bargaining Setting". Academe 72, n.º 3 (1986): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/40249612.

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12

Keyhani, Mohammad, e Moren Levesque. "Returns to Bargaining Ability in the Market Process". Academy of Management Proceedings 2016, n.º 1 (janeiro de 2016): 15248. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2016.15248abstract.

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13

Beaumont, P. B., e L. C. Hunter. "Continuous process technology, annualised hours and national bargaining". New Technology, Work and Employment 11, n.º 2 (setembro de 1996): 118–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-005x.1996.tb00070.x.

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14

Sisson, Keith, e Paul Marginson. "Co-ordinated Bargaining: A Process for Our Times?" British Journal of Industrial Relations 40, n.º 2 (junho de 2002): 197–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8543.00229.

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15

Feng, Qi, e J. George Shanthikumar. "Posted Pricing vs. Bargaining in Sequential Selling Process". Operations Research 66, n.º 1 (fevereiro de 2018): 92–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2017.1651.

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Sánchez‐Pagés, Santiago. "Conflict as a Part of the Bargaining Process". Economic Journal 119, n.º 539 (11 de junho de 2009): 1189–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02259.x.

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17

Gauthier, David. "Bargaining and Justice". Social Philosophy and Policy 2, n.º 2 (1985): 29–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003204.

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My concern in this paper is with the illumination that the theory of rational bargaining sheds on the formulation of principles of justice. I shall first set out the bargaining problem, as treated in the theory of games, and the Nash solution, or solution F. I shall then argue against the axiom, labeled “independence of irrelevant alternatives,” which distinguished solution F, and also against the Zeuthen model of the bargaining process which F formalizes.

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Hamin, Zaiton, e Ahmad Ridhwan Abd Rani. "Negotiating for Justice: Judge's Perception of the Plea-Bargaining Process in Malaysia". GATR Global Journal of Business Social Sciences Review 7, n.º 1 (20 de fevereiro de 2019): 27–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gjbssr.2019.7.1(4).

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Objective - This paper aims to examine the role of judges and the reality of the plea-bargaining process from the perspective of the judiciary, focusing primarily on their perceptions on the new law and their role and the problems facing them in implementing the law. Methodology/Technique - This paper adopts a qualitative methodology, in which the primary data is obtained from semi-structured interviews with 20 respondents comprising of the stakeholders in the criminal justice system. The secondary data is obtained from analysing the CPC and other library-based sources. Findings - The research reveals that judges are facing some problems derived from the law itself which makes the new plea-bargaining process unappealing to them. Consequently, judges have invented their solutions either by reverting to the old practice or imposing on the parties their terms in disposing of the case through judge-prompted plea-bargain. Novelty - This paper is significant in providing some evidence of the procedural difficulties faced by judges in hearing plea-bargaining application at the pre-trial stage. Type of Paper - Review Keywords: Criminal Procedure; Judiciary; Pre-trial Stage; Plea-Bargaining Process; Plea of Guilty. JEL Classification: K40, K49

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19

Perlman, Bruce J., e T. Zane Reeves. "The Emergence of Collective Bargaining in the Guatemalan Public Sector: A Case of “Union Boulwarism”?" Public Personnel Management 27, n.º 2 (junho de 1998): 231–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009102609802700209.

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This paper analyzes the collective bargaining process in the Guatemalan public sector through data collected in governmental documents and interviews with key participants in that process. The results reveal a model of “Union Boulwarism” in which public employee unions dominate collective bargaining through tactics of whipsawing, wildcat strikes and the emplazamiento. The paper concludes with recommendations for developing a model to encourage bargaining in good faith.

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20

Ready, Kathryn J. "Is Pattern Bargaining Dead?" ILR Review 43, n.º 2 (janeiro de 1990): 272–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979399004300207.

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This paper challenges the common belief that pattern bargaining largely ended in the 1980s. Applying a measure of pattern bargaining—the dispersion of log wages—to wage data drawn from the same data set that Audrey Freedman used in her widely quoted studies of this subject, the author shows that the extent of pattern bargaining was actually greater in 1983 than in 1977. The evidence suggests that managers' perceptions of changes in the bargaining process, which are the basis for Freedman's claim that pattern bargaining has eroded, are inconsistent with actual changes in wage patterns.

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Schneider, Andrea Kupfer, e Cynthia Alkon. "Bargaining in the Dark". New Criminal Law Review 22, n.º 4 (2019): 434–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2019.22.4.434.

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Plea bargaining is the primary, and unavoidable, method for resolving the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States. As more attention is paid to reform and changes in the criminal legal system, plea bargaining has also come into the spotlight. Yet we actually know very little about what happens during that process—a potentially complex negotiation with multiple parties that can, at different times, include prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, defendants, and victims. Using negotiation theory as a framework, we analyze why more information about the process itself can improve this crucial component of the system. More information—more data—would permit informed judicial oversight of pleas, improve lawyers’ capacities to negotiate on behalf of clients and the state, and increase the legitimacy of the bargaining between parties where one side tends to have far more resources and power. Without increased transparency, many of the players in the criminal legal system are just bargaining in the dark.

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22

Saunders, George. "Collective Bargaining and Inflation". Relations industrielles 23, n.º 4 (12 de abril de 2005): 553–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/027946ar.

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Pending the results of such further research it can only be concluded at this juncture that, given the nature of the Canadian economy and the system of wage determination, there is no reason to believe that the contribution of collective bargaining to recent price developments was any greater than that of other factors in the inflationary process.

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23

Beil, Martin, e Jon E. Litscher. "Consensus Bargaining in Wisconsin State Government: A New Approach to Labor Negotiation". Public Personnel Management 27, n.º 1 (março de 1998): 39–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/009102609802700104.

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Wisconsin, always one of the pioneers in public sector bargaining, has contributed here a move from traditional to cooperative bargaining. As in many jurisdictions, bargaining had developed in a way that produced a great deal of conflict, characterized by frequent and lengthy impasses, a grievance backlog that reached 1,400 arbitration cases and a public and political leadership that was losing patience. This jointly written article illustrates how change can begin, the role of statewide leadership, the resulting work behind the scenes and the possibilities. Since 1992, the Wisconsin Department of Employment Relations and the state's largest labor union, the 27,000-member Wisconsin State Employees Union (WSEU), have successfully used “consensus bargaining.” This cooperative, problem-solving approach contrasts sharply with the traditional adversarial and confrontational approach to bargaining. Consensus bargaining focuses on identifying and meeting bargainers' interests and creating a positive and constructive basis for discussions. This problem-solving approach has created more cooperative labor-management relations in Wisconsin State Government, reduced bargaining time, stimulated creative new contract provisions and helped develop a more positive and closer labor-management relationship. There are several keys to successful consensus negotiation: management and union leaders must be committed to the process; leaders must model cooperative behavior; bargainers should receive formal training in the process; negotiators must be candid throughout bargaining; and management and labor have to realize that reaching agreement on a contract is the beginning, not the end of creating a cooperative relationship. Wisconsin State Government, the WSEU, and other state employee unions have successfully used the consensus process and are committed to this cooperative approach.

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Chan, Chris King-Chi, e Elaine Sio-Ieng Hui. "The Development of Collective Bargaining in China: From “Collective Bargaining by Riot” to “Party State-led Wage Bargaining”". China Quarterly 217 (5 de dezembro de 2013): 221–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0305741013001409.

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Abstract2010 was a turbulent year for labour relations in China. The wave of strikes sparked by the Honda workers has highlighted the urgent need for trade union reform and workplace collective bargaining. In response to this turbulence, the Chinese government has stepped up efforts to promote the practice of collective bargaining, which had been neglected under the existing “individual rights-based” labour regulatory framework. In the midst of rapid social and policy changes, this article aims to examine the effect of labour strikes on the development of collective bargaining in China. The authors argue that, driven by growing labour protests, the collective negotiation process in China is undergoing a transition, from “collective consultation as a formality,” through a stage of “collective bargaining by riot,” and towards “party state-led collective bargaining.” This transition, however, is unlikely to reach the stage of “worker-led collective bargaining” in the near future.

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25

Feng, Meng. "The policy implementation costs and occurring mechanisms of bargaining among different levels of the Chinese governmental hierarchy: A case analysis of the prohibition of grazing in Sidong County". Chinese Journal of Sociology 5, n.º 3 (julho de 2019): 340–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2057150x19856280.

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Bargaining is a significant form of interaction between different levels of the Chinese government. Therefore, the mechanism of bargaining is suggested as a representative operational model for understanding the behaviors of local governments in the hierarchical system of government. This paper describes in detail several rounds of bargaining between superior and subordinate government officials in the process of implementing a policy prohibiting grazing in Sidong County. The policy was made at the county level. Township-level governments chose to bargain with their superior due to the difficulty of implementation in the early stages but failed. Strict implementation then led to frequent conflicts between local government and farmers. The township level of government instantly turned to bargaining with the county level and used a confrontational strategy to successfully obtain more freedom for implementation. This paper uses the theoretical framework of implementation costs analysis to illustrate the functioning mechanism of bargaining behavior. The different combinations of implementation costs cause township-level governments to choose or adjust to different methods. The high cost of implementation processes allows the township-level government to use bargaining as the only reasonable method of implementation. The process of bargaining indicates that township-level governments improve bargaining ability relative to strict requirements for implementation of policy and intensifying social conflicts. The essential features of bargaining in policy implementation among different levels of the Chinese governmental hierarchy are: no deadlock implementation; agreement point swings from side to side; and alternating occurrences between short-run equilibrium and bargaining.

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I. DESCARPENTRIE AND CHARLES A. SLO, LLOYD. "FACTORS AFFECTING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PROCESS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS". Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public Sector 20, n.º 3 (1 de setembro de 1991): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2190/q3rt-q573-0b5r-7aw0.

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Coleman, Rick, e C. R. P. Fraser. "Integrative Versus Distributive Bargaining: Choosing a Problem Resolution Process". Relations industrielles 34, n.º 3 (12 de abril de 2005): 546–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/028990ar.

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This paper examines the antithetical nature of two methods of resolving conflict through negotiation, and suggests there is an appropriate process depending upon how a party views the problem, and how he perceives it being viewed by his opponent.

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Putnam, Linda L., e Patricia Geist. "Argument in bargaining: An analysis of the reasoning process". Southern Speech Communication Journal 50, n.º 3 (setembro de 1985): 225–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10417948509372633.

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29

Nelson, Lindsay, e Andrew Frith. "The Process of Enterprise Bargaining in a Manufacturing Organisation". Journal of Industrial Relations 43, n.º 4 (dezembro de 2001): 462–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1472-9296.t01-1-00029.

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Bennett, Victor Manuel. "Organization and Bargaining: Sales Process Choice at Auto Dealerships". Management Science 59, n.º 9 (setembro de 2013): 2003–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1691.

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Abd Razak, Siti Suraya, e Nik Ahmad Kamal Nik Mahmod. "AN ANALYSIS OF THE GOOD FAITH BARGAINING PRACTICE IN THE TRADE UNION RECOGNITION PROCESS: REFORM OF THE MALAYSIAN TRADE UNION LEGAL FRAMEWORK". IIUM Law Journal 27, n.º 2 (18 de dezembro de 2019): 501–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.31436/iiumlj.v27i2.455.

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The trade union recognition process is a pre-requisite to the collective bargaining action of a trade union. The recognition is important to ascertain the competency of a trade union and the acceptance by the workers to represent them in the collective bargaining action with the employer. However, the ambiguities in the existing legislations on the trade union recognition process in Malaysia and the anti-union practices of the employer are currently depriving the workers of their rights to negotiate for better working conditions. The primary focus of the present work is to identify the weaknesses of the recognition legal framework and the anti-union practices of employers in the recognition process of trade unions. Secondly, is to critically analyse the good faith bargaining practice in other countries and its significance to the recognition process in Malaysia. To explore the anti-union tactics perpetrated by employers, semi-structured interviews have been conducted to analyse the trade unions’ experience in their recognition claims. This research employed a qualitative approach as the instrument to study the good faith bargaining practices in the Australian and New Zealand labour law framework. The findings reveal that the good faith bargaining practices in Australia and New Zealand have improved the odds for trade unions to represent the workers in negotiating collective agreements. The study finally concludes that in order to reform the recognition process of trade unions in Malaysia, the good faith bargaining practice should be implemented in the nation’s industrial relations law framework.

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Watson, Duncan. "The Attorney General's Guidelines on Plea Bargaining in Serious Fraud: Obtaining Guilty Pleas Fairly?" Journal of Criminal Law 74, n.º 1 (fevereiro de 2010): 77–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/jcla.2010.74.1.617.

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Fraud reform has recently culminated in the introduction of guidelines on plea bargaining issued by the Attorney General. In addition, it is likely that these guidelines will be complimented by new sentencing provisions from the Sentencing Guidelines Council to give a formal plea-bargaining model, which is hoped will increase conviction rates, process cases more expeditiously and reduce public expenditure for fraud prosecution. In addition, these guidelines have been complemented by new sentencing provisions from the Sentencing Guidelines Council to give a formal plea-bargaining model. This article will examine whether the new plea-bargaining model will deliver the transparent, efficient and effective system desired, whilst ensuring that those defendants who enter into plea bargains are free from improper pressure to plead guilty. Having been studied as part of the fraud reform process, the US Federal plea-bargaining model will be used as a barometer in this examination.

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Buccella, Domenico. "Wage versus efficient bargaining in a Cournot duopoly: A Preliminary Note on Welfare". Ekonomia 25, n.º 1 (13 de maio de 2019): 23–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2084-4093.25.1.2.

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Wage versus efficient bargaining in a Cournot duopoly: A preliminary note on welfare In a unionized Cournot duopoly with decentralized, firm-level bargaining, this note re-examines the endogenous equilibrium agendas wage vs. efficient bargaining that can arise under three different specifications of the timing of negotiations and the impact of the outcome of the bargaining process on social welfare. Given that explicit conflict of interest among the bargaining parties can arise in every timing specification, this note proposes, analyzes, and discusses some guiding principles for governments and public authorities interested in pursuing social welfare improvements.

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Feeley, Malcolm M. "Legal Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process: The Origins of Plea Bargaining". Israel Law Review 31, n.º 1-3 (1997): 183–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700015284.

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The standard form of disposition for most English and American criminal cases is the guilty plea, by means of a plea bargain. Jury trials are the rare exception rather than the rule. Although plea bargaining is the subject of a huge scholarly literature analyzing its nature and functioning, there is a much smaller literature on its origins and development. Most of the literature is highly critical, and much of it rests upon a belief that bureaucratic justice has come to replace the vigorous adversarial jury trial. Some critics lament “our vanishing jury”. Others decry the rise of “technocratic justice”. And still others warn that we are witnessing the “twilight of the adversary process”, or the decline of the adversary system. Even those who defend plea bargaining, such as justices on the United States Supreme Court, tend to regard it as a “necessary evil” required as an expedient to cope with the rising tide of caseloads rather than an ideal process.Despite important differences of emphasis among these and still other commentators, most share an important commonalty; they adopt a form of functional analysis that understands plea bargaining as an adaptation to caseload pressures. Hence the power of the metaphor “the twilight” of the adversary process. This assessment seems plausible in light of pervasive plea bargaining and the crush of caseloads in American and English courts.

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Ma, Xiaogang, Chunyu Bao e Lin Su. "Analysis of Complex Dynamics in Different Bargaining Systems". Complexity 2020 (1 de julho de 2020): 1–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2020/8406749.

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This paper focuses on the bargaining behavior of supply chain members and studies the stability of the bargaining system. There are two forms of bargaining in the process of negotiation. One is separate bargaining, and the other is that the automobile manufacturers form an alliance and bargain with the supplier collectively. We explore the influence of bargaining power and adjustment speed on the stability of the dynamic system and find that both of the factors need to be small to maintain the stability of the supply chain. After comparing the two forms of bargaining in terms of profits and stable regions, we find that the collective bargaining is a pattern with the existence of risk and benefit simultaneously. In order to control chaos in collective bargaining to lower the risk, we adopt the delay feedback control method. With the introduction of the control factor, the system tends to be stable finally.

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Prasad, Sanjay, Ravi Shankar e Sreejit Roy. "Impact of bargaining power on supply chain profit allocation: a game-theoretic study". Journal of Advances in Management Research 16, n.º 3 (15 de julho de 2019): 398–416. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jamr-10-2018-0096.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain. Design/methodology/approach This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game. Findings A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits. Research limitations/implications This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model – this assumption can be relaxed in future research. Practical implications Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split. Originality/value This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.

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De Villiers, David. "Interest based bargaining: The role of the trust relationship between employer and employee". South African Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 2, n.º 3 (30 de setembro de 1999): 442–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajems.v2i3.2590.

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This paper highlights the inherent adversarialism of traditional collective bargaining, and the various attempts that have been made by academics and practitioners to find ways to minimize the adversarial nature of the process. The paper then examines a number of cases where Interest Based Bargaining was used to create a positive, co-operative collective bargaining climate, and derives a number of guiding principles. Finally, the paper shows that building and maintaining a relationship of trust is a prerequisite for constructive collective bargaining.

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Bolle, Friedel, e Philipp E. Otto. "Matching as a Stochastic Process". Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 236, n.º 3 (1 de maio de 2016): 323–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/jbnst-2015-1017.

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Abstract Results of multi-party bargaining are usually described by concepts from cooperative game theory, in particular by the core. In one-on-one matching, core allocations are stable in the sense that no pair of unmatched or otherwise matched players can improve their incomes by forming a match. Because of incomplete information and bounded rationality, it is difficult to adopt a core allocation immediately. Theoretical investigations cope with the problem of whether core allocations can be adopted in a stochastic process with repeated re-matching. In this paper, we investigate sequences of matching with data from an experimental 2×2 labor market with wage negotiations. This market has seven possible matching structures (states) and is additionally characterized by the negotiated wages and profits. First, we describe the stochastic process of transitions from one state to another including the average transition times. Second, we identify different influences on the process parameters as, for example, the difference of incomes in a match. Third, allocations in the core should be completely durable or at least more durable than comparable out-of-core allocations, but they are not. Final bargaining results (induced by a time limit) appear as snapshots of a stochastic process without absorbing states and with only weak systematic influences.

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Hebdon, Robert, e Maurice Mazerolle. "Regulating Conflict in Public Sector Labour Relations". Articles 58, n.º 4 (23 de março de 2004): 667–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/007821ar.

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Abstract Using a comprehensive collective bargaining data set, we examine dispute resolution patterns of all bargaining units in the province of Ontario over a 10-year period. A central finding is that bargaining units covered by legislation requiring compulsory interest arbitration arrive at impasse 8.7 percent to 21.7 percent more often than bargaining units in the right to strike sectors. Even after controlling for legislative jurisdiction, union, bargaining unit size, occupation, agreement length, time trend, and part-time status, strong evidence was found that compulsory arbitration has both chilling and dependence effects on the bargaining process. The problem of failure to reach negotiated settlements is particularly acute in the health care sector, especially among hospitals. Our results also call into question the use of interest arbitration in a central bargaining context. The centralized structure appears to exacerbate the negative effects of interest arbitration.

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Hsieh, Chang-Tseh, e Michael L. Menefee. "An Application of Group Decision Support Technology in Collective Bargaining". Journal of Information Technology 6, n.º 3-4 (setembro de 1991): 176–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0268396291006003-407.

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An enhanced distributive bargaining model is developed to be used as the foundation model of a group-decision support system for facilitating collective bargaining. The proposed system takes into account the multiple objectives decision process and is able to handle qualitative decision variables. The implementation of the proposed system can expedite bargaining and minimize the possibility of a work stoppage.

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Urbanavičienė, Vita, Artūras Kaklauskas, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Jūratė Šliogerienė, Jurga Naimavičienė e Nikolay Ivanovich Vatin. "FACILITATING THE HOUSING BARGAINING WITH THE HELP OF THE BARGAINING DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM". International Journal of Strategic Property Management 18, n.º 3 (18 de setembro de 2014): 213–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3846/1648715x.2014.933137.

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More than 90 percent home buyers today rely on the Internet as one of their primary research sources and real estate related searches continually grows. Internet helps buyers to find and select bigger number of right homes for sale in a shorter time, so provides more alternatives for bargaining. The bargaining is an inseparable part of the home buying and selling process. However, housing bargaining mostly is conducted face-to face, so there is a growing need for facilitating the housing bargaining and conducting such bargaining on the Web with the help of the systems. The article describes the developed Real-Time Housing Multiple Criteria Bargaining Decision Support System, based on multiple-criteria mathematical methods, which helps to improve the efficiency of bargaining through the following functions: search for housing alternatives; formulation of the initial comparative table of alternatives; multiple criteria analysis of housing alternatives and negotiation tactics; determination of the most useful home option for buying; presentation of recommendations and real-time determination of a home's market value; e-bargaining using templates of bargaining e-mails generated by the system.

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Giannetti, Daniela, Andrea Pedrazzani e Luca Pinto. "Bicameralism and government formation: does bicameral incongruence affect bargaining delays?" European Political Science Review 12, n.º 4 (8 de julho de 2020): 469–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773920000235.

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AbstractThe effects of bicameral legislatures on government formation have attracted scholarly attention since Lijphart’s (1984) seminal contribution. Previous research found support for the ‘veto control hypothesis,’ showing that bicameralism affects coalition governments’ composition and duration. However, the effects of bicameralism on the duration of the bargaining process over government formation have yet to be explored. Our work contributes to this area of research by focusing on the impact of bicameralism on bargaining delays. We show that the duration of the bargaining process over government formation decreases at increasing levels of partisan incongruence of the two chambers, especially in those legislative assemblies in which the upper chamber plays a relevant role in the policy-making process. Such empirical evidence is in contrast with the conventional expectation according to which bicameralism should delay the government formation process, as it introduces an additional element of complexity in the bargaining environment. We test our hypothesis by using a novel data set about the partisan composition of upper and lower chambers in 12 Western and Eastern European democracies over the postwar period.

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Claes, Dag Harald. "The Process of Europeanization: Norway and the Internal Energy Market". Journal of Public Policy 22, n.º 3 (setembro de 2002): 299–323. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x02002027.

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This paper approaches the study of national adaptation to the European Union as a process involving institutional constraints and actors' interactions across levels of decision-making. The argument is that domestic adaptation to the EU is a matter of the ability and willingness to conduct integrative political bargaining rather than a matter of matching institutional structures. The paper provides an empirical case study of the Norwegian adaptation to EU energy sector legislation, the Internal Energy Market (IEM). The various outcomes of different directives in this sector indicate that the structural feature of a particular state or policy sector is inadequate to explain fully variations in national and domestic adaptation to EU legislation. The paper focuses on characteristics of the process of adaptation itself, such as affectedness, policy similarities, bargaining opportunities, and legal proceedings.

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ENGEL, STEFANIE, e RAMÓN LÓPEZ. "Exploiting common resources with capital-intensive technologies: the role of external forces". Environment and Development Economics 13, n.º 5 (outubro de 2008): 565–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1355770x08004725.

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ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on the interactions between local communities having at least some degree of informal claims over natural resources and firms interested in commercially exploiting such resources, explicitly allowing for interventions by third parties interested in community welfare and environmental outcomes. Integrating conflict and bargaining theories, we develop a bargaining model with endogenous inside and outside options, in which the feasibility and outcomes of a potential bargaining game depend on the unraveling of a conflict stage and vice versa. The model implies that, contrary to the conventional bargaining model, distribution and efficiency cease to be separable. We show that certain third-party interventions in the bargaining process may have unexpected and counterproductive effects.

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Cloutier, Julie, Pascale L. Denis e Henriette Bilodeau. "Collective Bargaining and Perceived Fairness: Validating the Conceptual Structure". Articles 67, n.º 3 (28 de setembro de 2012): 398–425. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1012537ar.

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The aim of this study is to conceptualize the “perceived fairness in the context of collective bargaining” and empirically validate its internal structure. This concept refers to employees’ justice perceptions formed during the collective bargaining process (the process of determining the employees’ working conditions when they are unionized). Drawing on the organizational justice literature, we derive a conceptualization and formulate hypotheses regarding the convergent, discriminant and predictive validity of the concept’s dimensionality. The study was conducted among faculty at a Canadian university, where the collective bargaining process took nearly two years to complete. Using confirmatory factor analyses and hierarchical regressions, we find support for discriminant, convergent, and predictive validity. The results show that the new conceptualization includes eight distinct dimensions, combining the two sources of (in)justice (employer and union) and the four types of justice perceptions: procedural, distributive, relational (interpersonal) and informational justice. Indeed, employees clearly distinguish eight justice dimensions, which have a differential effect on their attitudes: trust in the employer and satisfaction with the union. Moreover, collective bargaining is an allocation process which encourages employees to participate actively. Because such participation might entails costs (energy, time, loss of money), employees are likely to form their justice perceptions based on not only elements from the structural model (Leventhal, 1980) and the process control model (Thibaut and Walker, 1975), but also two new justice elements: the usefulness of actions (the probability that actions force the employer to improve their offer to the expected level) and the profitability of actions (cost-benefits ratio). Opening the black box of collective bargaining through the concept of fairness is the first step in order to understanding the attitudinal and behavioural consequences of collective bargaining after employees have returned to work.

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Ecker, Alejandro, e Thomas M. Meyer. "Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies". British Journal of Political Science 50, n.º 1 (22 de dezembro de 2017): 261–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123417000539.

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Why do some government formation periods end after a few days, while others last for several weeks or even months? Despite the rich literature on government formation, surprisingly little is known about the underlying bargaining processes. This article introduces a new dataset on 303 bargaining attempts in nineteen European democracies to analyse the duration of individual bargaining rounds. The study hypothesizes that (1) preference tangentiality, (2) ideological proximity, (3) incumbency and (4) party leadership tenure decrease the duration of coalition bargaining. Employing a copula approach to account for the non-random selection process of the observations, it shows that these actor-specific factors matter in addition to systemic context factors such as post-election bargaining and party system complexity. These findings highlight the need to consider both actor-specific and systemic factors of the bargaining context to explain government formation.

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Carlos, Ann M., e Elizabeth Hoffman. "The North American Fur Trade: Bargaining to a Joint Profit Maximum under Incomplete Information, 1804–1821". Journal of Economic History 46, n.º 4 (dezembro de 1986): 967–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002205070005066x.

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We examine bargaining between the Northwest Company and the Hudson's Bay Company using recent models of bargaining under incomplete information. Two previously undisturbed bodies of correspondence are analyzed: letters between the two companies and letters between the Hudson's Bay Company and its London committee. Through merger the companies achieved a joint maximum, but the lengthy and costly bargaining process dissipated much of the potential gain through depletion of animal stocks. Achievement of a joint maximum was hindered by incomplete information, commitment to a strategy which led to bargaining breakdowns, delineation of each party's rights under law, and environmental changes.

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Mershon, Carol, e Olga Shvetsova. "Traditional authority and bargaining for legitimacy in dual legitimacy systems". Journal of Modern African Studies 57, n.º 2 (junho de 2019): 273–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x19000065.

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ABSTRACTThis paper investigates the quest for legitimacy conducted by hereditary, traditional leaders in dual legitimacy systems. We theorise that traditional leaders engage in meta-constitutional bargaining, i.e. bargaining among constitutionally and traditionally defined actors within the meta-constitutional space. This process resembles constitutional bargaining in federations over the institutional balance between the members and centre, and among members. We thus propose a parallel between the theory of federal bargaining, on the one hand, and, on the other, the process of institutional balancing between agents in constitutional and traditional authority structures in dual legitimacy systems. Evidence from narratives of institutional balancing between constitutional and traditional authorities in Southern Africa suggests that actors’ strategies in dual legitimacy systems accord with the framework here. The narratives also disclose that both constitutional and traditional authorities rely on the state's courts for adjudication. The paper enriches social science scholarship on traditional authority, political economy and federalism.

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Hamin, Zaiton, Mohd Bahrin Othman e Ahmad Ridhwan Abd Rani. "Sticking to the Old Ways in the Plea-Bargaining Process: Some evidence from Malaysia". Environment-Behaviour Proceedings Journal 5, SI1 (1 de junho de 2020): 225–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.21834/ebpj.v5isi1.2324.

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In Malaysia, the plea-bargaining process was formalized in 2010 with the amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code 1976, which was intended to reduce the number of criminal cases that could be resolved at the pre-trial stage. However, the law in action does not appear to be in line with the law in the statute book. Hence, this paper aims at examining the reality of the plea-bargaining process and the extent of the applications in Malaysia. This paper adopts a qualitative methodology, of which the primary data is obtained from semi-structured while the secondary data obtained from library-based sources. Keywords: Plea-Bargaining Process; Criminal Procedure; Prosecutor; Defence Counsel. eISSN: 2398-4287 © 2020. The Authors. Published for AMER ABRA cE-Bs by e-International Publishing House, Ltd., UK. This is an open access article under the CC BYNC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). Peer–review under responsibility of AMER (Association of Malaysian Environment-Behaviour Researchers), ABRA (Association of Behavioural Researchers on Asians) and cE-Bs (Centre for Environment-Behaviour Studies), Faculty of Architecture, Planning & Surveying, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Malaysia. DOI: https://doi.org/10.21834/ebpj.v5iSI1.2324

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Iyer, Ganesh, e J. Miguel Villas-Boas. "A Bargaining Theory of Distribution Channels". Journal of Marketing Research 40, n.º 1 (fevereiro de 2003): 80–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jmkr.40.1.80.19134.

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A critical factor in channel relationships between manufacturers and retailers is the relative bargaining power of both parties. In this article, the authors develop a framework to examine bargaining between channel members and demonstrate that the bargaining process actually affects the degree of coordination and that two-part tariffs will not be part of the market contract even in a simple one manufacturer-one retailer channel. To establish the institutional and theoretical bases for these results, the authors relax the conventional assumption that the product being exchanged is completely specifiable in a contract. They show that the institution of bargaining has force, and it affects channel coordination when the complexity of nonspecifiability of the product exchange is present. The authors find that greater retailer power promotes channel coordination. Thus, there are conditions in which the presence of a powerful retailer might actually be beneficial to all channel members. The authors recover the standard double-marginalization take-it-or-leave-it offer outcome as a particular case of the bargaining process. They also examine the implications of relative bargaining powers for whether the product is delivered “early” (i.e., before demand is realized) or “late” (i.e., delivered to the retailer only if there is demand). The authors present the implications for returns policies as well as of renegotiation costs and retail competition.

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